Datasets:

AYI-NEDJIMI
/

ad-tiering-model-en

id stringlengths 7 9	category stringlengths 3 36	subcategory stringlengths 6 55	question stringlengths 35 116	answer stringlengths 461 2.14k	source_url stringclasses 1 value	metadata stringlengths 32 124
TIER-000	tier_architecture	Tier 0	Describe Tier 0 of the Active Directory tiering model, its assets, access rules, and monitoring requirements.	Tier 0 represents the highest control level of the Active Directory infrastructure. It contains assets that directly control identity and access across the entire AD forest. A Tier 0 compromise equals a total environment compromise. Tier 0 administrators hold absolute power over the entire information system. Protecting this level is the absolute priority in any AD security strategy. Assets: Domain Controllers (DC) - all DCs in the forest, Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) - root and subordinate CAs, Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) - federation servers, Azure AD Connect - hybrid synchronization servers, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) - certificate authority servers, System Center Operations Manager (SCOM) - agents on DCs, AD-integrated DNS servers, Critical DHCP servers, NPS/RADIUS servers for authentication, Tier 0 service accounts (krbtgt, replication accounts) Admin accounts: Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins accounts, KRBTGT accounts, AD DS service accounts, DC management accounts. These accounts must be members of the Protected Users group and never be used on lower-tier machines. Access rules: Exclusive access from Tier 0 PAWs only. No interactive logon allowed from standard workstations. Multi-factor authentication mandatory. No direct Internet access. Time-limited sessions with full logging. Strict prohibition of using Tier 0 accounts on Tier 1 or Tier 2 systems. Network segmentation: Dedicated VLAN isolated by firewall. Strict flow rules: only ports necessary for AD replication (TCP/UDP 389, 636, 3268, 3269, 88, 464, 53, 135, 49152-65535). No inbound flows from lower tiers except authentication requests. Microsegmentation recommended between each DC. IPsec between domain controllers. Monitoring: Centralized logging of all security events (Event ID 4624, 4625, 4672, 4768, 4769, 4776). DCSync, Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket attack detection. Real-time alerts on privileged group modifications. AD replication monitoring. Schema modification auditing. Compromised service account detection. Behavioral baseline of Tier 0 administrators.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"tier_level": 0, "type": "tier_definition"}
TIER-001	tier_architecture	Tier 1	Describe Tier 1 of the Active Directory tiering model, its assets, access rules, and monitoring requirements.	Tier 1 encompasses member servers and enterprise applications that do not directly control identity but host critical data and services for the organization's operations. A Tier 1 compromise can lead to a Tier 0 compromise if segmentation controls are not properly implemented. Securing Tier 1 is essential to prevent lateral movement toward Tier 0. Assets: Domain member servers, Line-of-business application servers (ERP, CRM), SQL Server and database servers, Microsoft Exchange servers, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM/MECM), Windows Server Update Services (WSUS), Print servers, Internal web servers (IIS), Virtualization servers (Hyper-V, VMware vCenter), Backup servers (Veeam, DPM) Admin accounts: Server Admins accounts, application administration accounts, application service accounts, SQL SA accounts, Exchange administration accounts. These accounts must be distinct from Tier 0 and Tier 2 accounts. gMSA usage recommended for service accounts. Access rules: Access from Tier 1 PAWs or dedicated jump servers. Tier 0 administrators can access Tier 1 but Tier 1 administrators can never access Tier 0. Restricted and logged RDP access. Dedicated administration accounts per application. No use of Tier 1 accounts on Tier 2 workstations. Network segmentation: Dedicated server VLAN separated from Tier 0 VLAN and workstation VLAN. Firewall rules allowing only necessary application flows. Restriction of administration protocols (RDP, WinRM, SSH) to authorized sources only. Additional segmentation by application or criticality. Monitoring: Administrative connection monitoring. Lateral movement detection. Sensitive database access auditing. Service account monitoring. Alerts on unauthorized software installations. Privilege escalation attempt detection. Server configuration change tracking.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"tier_level": 1, "type": "tier_definition"}
TIER-002	tier_architecture	Tier 2	Describe Tier 2 of the Active Directory tiering model, its assets, access rules, and monitoring requirements.	Tier 2 represents the workstation and user endpoint layer. It is the most threat-exposed level as it is in direct contact with users and the Internet. The majority of attacks begin at Tier 2 (phishing, malware, social engineering). The objective is to prevent a Tier 2 compromise from spreading to upper tiers through credential theft or lateral movement. Assets: Windows workstations, Corporate laptops, Mobile devices (smartphones, tablets), VDI workstations (Virtual Desktop Infrastructure), Conference room terminals, Kiosks and interactive terminals, Printers and network peripherals, Enterprise IoT devices, Contractor workstations, Managed BYOD equipment Admin accounts: Helpdesk accounts, local workstation administration accounts, SCCM deployment accounts for workstations. These accounts must never have privileges on Tier 1 servers or Tier 0 domain controllers. LAPS mandatory for local administrator accounts. Access rules: Standard users connect only to Tier 2. Tier 2 administrators (Helpdesk) use dedicated accounts separate from their user accounts. No Tier 0 or Tier 1 privileged account should ever log on to a Tier 2 workstation. Least privilege principle enforcement. Local administration rights restriction. Network segmentation: Dedicated workstation VLAN. Sensitive workstation isolation (management, finance, HR). Mandatory web filtering and proxy. Outbound flow restriction. No direct access to server VLANs except through authorized application flows. NAC (Network Access Control) for network admission control. Monitoring: EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) on all workstations. Credential theft attempt monitoring. Attack tool detection (Mimikatz, BloodHound, etc.). PowerShell logging. Abnormal network connection tracking. Lateral movement detection between workstations. Local privilege escalation alerts.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"tier_level": 2, "type": "tier_definition"}
TIER-003	tier_architecture	Control Plane	Describe Control Plane of the Active Directory tiering model, its assets, access rules, and monitoring requirements.	The Control Plane groups tools and systems used to administer the different tiers securely. It includes Privileged Access Workstations (PAW), jump servers, and bastion hosts. The Control Plane applies the Clean Source Principle by ensuring administration always occurs from a trusted environment. It is the central element that maintains separation between tiers. Assets: Tier 0 Privileged Access Workstations (PAW), Tier 1 Privileged Access Workstations (PAW), Dedicated jump servers per tier, Secure access bastions, PAM solution (Privileged Access Management) - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Enterprise password vault, MFA infrastructure for administrators, Centralized logging servers (SIEM), Certificate management consoles, AD audit and compliance tools Admin accounts: Control Plane administration accounts themselves. These accounts manage the PAW infrastructure, jump servers, and PAM solutions. They are considered Tier 0 assets because a Control Plane compromise undermines the entire tiering strategy. Access rules: Restricted physical access to PAWs. Multi-factor authentication mandatory on all components. Video recording of administration sessions. Second administrator approval for critical operations (four-eyes principle). Automatic password rotation via PAM solution. Limited session duration. Network segmentation: Completely isolated dedicated administration network. No Internet access from the administration network. Strictly controlled flows between the Control Plane and each tier. Dedicated administration VPN for remote access. Continuous monitoring of all Control Plane network flows. Monitoring: Maximum monitoring of all Control Plane access. Immediate alerts on any unauthorized access attempt. Complete and tamper-proof logging of all administration sessions. PAW integrity verification. Unauthorized configuration change detection. Regular access and permission auditing.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"tier_level": -1, "type": "tier_definition"}
TIER-004	tier_architecture	Data Plane	Describe Data Plane of the Active Directory tiering model, its assets, access rules, and monitoring requirements.	The Data Plane groups enterprise storage systems and data repositories. While these systems are generally classified as Tier 1 from an infrastructure perspective, they deserve special attention as they contain the most sensitive business data. Data classification and granular access control are essential to protect this plane. The Data Plane is often the attacker's final target after an AD compromise. Assets: Enterprise file servers, SharePoint Server and SharePoint Online, Document management systems (DMS), Critical business databases, Backup and archiving systems, Enterprise SAN/NAS storage, Email servers (mailboxes), Source code repositories (Git, TFS), ERP and CRM systems (data), Data warehouses and data lakes Admin accounts: File server administration accounts, DBA (Database Administrator) accounts, SharePoint administration accounts, backup service accounts. Data access rights must follow the least privilege principle and be reviewed regularly. Access rules: Role-based data access (RBAC). Mandatory data classification (public, internal, confidential, secret). Sensitive data encryption at rest and in transit. Granular access control based on AD groups. Logging of all sensitive data access. DLP (Data Loss Prevention) to prevent data leaks. Network segmentation: Network segmentation by data classification level. Critical database isolation. Flow encryption between data servers and consumers. Identity-based network access control. Monitoring of large or unusual data transfers. Monitoring: Complete auditing of sensitive file access. Abnormal database query monitoring. Data exfiltration detection. Alerts on massive permission changes. After-hours access tracking. Regular verification of permission consistency with business needs.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"tier_level": -2, "type": "tier_definition"}
IAM-001	Identity & Access Management	Protected Users group membership	How to implement the 'Protected Users group membership' control in the AD tiering model?	Add all Tier 0 privileged accounts to the Protected Users group to disable NTLM, unconstrained Kerberos delegation, and credential caching. This group forces Kerberos with AES usage and drastically reduces the credential theft attack surface. Implementation steps: Identify all Tier 0 accounts -> Verify application compatibility with Protected Users -> Add accounts to the Protected Users group -> Test access after addition -> Document exceptions Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Audit Event ID 4735 for group modifications. Regular verification of Protected Users group membership. PowerShell Command: `Add-ADGroupMember -Identity 'Protected Users' -Members (Get-ADGroupMember 'Domain Admins')`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-002	Identity & Access Management	AdminSDHolder hardening	How to implement the 'AdminSDHolder hardening' control in the AD tiering model?	Secure the AdminSDHolder container that automatically protects privileged objects every 60 minutes via the SDProp process. Verify and harden AdminSDHolder container ACLs to prevent unauthorized modifications of privileged group permissions. Implementation steps: Audit current AdminSDHolder ACLs -> Remove unnecessary ACEs -> Document authorized permissions -> Set up modification monitoring -> Test the SDProp process Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Monitor Event ID 5136 on the AdminSDHolder container. Alert on any ACL modification. PowerShell Command: `Get-ACL 'AD:\CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=com' \| Format-List`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-003	Identity & Access Management	Service account management (gMSA)	How to implement the 'Service account management (gMSA)' control in the AD tiering model?	Migrate traditional service accounts to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) which offer automatic password rotation (every 30 days) and simplified management. gMSAs eliminate the risk of static passwords and Kerberoasting on service accounts. Implementation steps: Inventory all service accounts -> Identify gMSA-compatible ones -> Create KDS root key if needed -> Create gMSAs and configure services -> Disable old service accounts Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Regular inventory of non-gMSA service accounts. Detection of SPNs on standard user accounts. PowerShell Command: `New-ADServiceAccount -Name 'svc_SQLEngine' -DNSHostName 'svc_SQLEngine.domain.com' -PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword 'SQLServers$'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-004	Identity & Access Management	Kerberos delegation restrictions	How to implement the 'Kerberos delegation restrictions' control in the AD tiering model?	Restrict unconstrained Kerberos delegation and configure only Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) when necessary. Unconstrained delegation allows an attacker to impersonate any user, including administrators. Implementation steps: Identify all accounts with unconstrained delegation -> Evaluate delegation necessity -> Migrate to constrained delegation or RBCD -> Remove unconstrained delegation -> Monitor new delegation configurations Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Regular search for accounts with unconstrained delegation. Event ID 4768 with delegation options. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $true} -Properties TrustedForDelegation \| Select-Object Name`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-005	Identity & Access Management	LAPS deployment	How to implement the 'LAPS deployment' control in the AD tiering model?	Deploy Microsoft LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) on all workstations and servers to automatically generate and store unique local administrator passwords. LAPS eliminates the lateral movement risk via identical local admin passwords. Implementation steps: Extend AD schema for LAPS -> Deploy LAPS client via GPO or SCCM -> Configure LAPS read permissions -> Define complexity and rotation policy -> Verify deployment across all assets Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Verification that all computer objects have a non-empty ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute. Audit of LAPS attribute reads. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime \| Where-Object {$_.'ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime' -eq $null} \| Select-Object Name`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-006	Identity & Access Management	Fine-grained password policies	How to implement the 'Fine-grained password policies' control in the AD tiering model?	Implement Fine-Grained Password Policies (FGPP) with enhanced requirements for privileged accounts: minimum 20 character length, lockout after 3 attempts, 24 password history, and 60-day maximum lifetime for Tier 0. Implementation steps: Create a PSO for each tier -> Define complexity parameters per tier -> Link PSOs to security groups -> Communicate new requirements -> Verify PSO application Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: medium Detection method: Regular verification of PSO application on target accounts. Password change auditing. PowerShell Command: `New-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy -Name 'PSO_Tier0' -Precedence 10 -MinPasswordLength 20 -MaxPasswordAge '60.00:00:00' -LockoutThreshold 3 -LockoutDuration '00:30:00'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-007	Identity & Access Management	Privileged group cleanup	How to implement the 'Privileged group cleanup' control in the AD tiering model?	Clean up Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and Schema Admins groups by removing all non-strictly necessary members. Domain Admins should contain only 3 to 5 accounts maximum. Enterprise Admins and Schema Admins should be empty during normal operations. Implementation steps: List all privileged group members -> Evaluate necessity of each membership -> Create dedicated administration accounts -> Remove unnecessary members -> Set up modification alerts Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Monitor Event ID 4728, 4732, 4756 for additions to privileged groups. Automated daily inventory. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADGroupMember 'Domain Admins' -Recursive \| Select-Object Name, SamAccountName, objectClass \| Format-Table`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-008	Identity & Access Management	SIDHistory cleanup	How to implement the 'SIDHistory cleanup' control in the AD tiering model?	Remove residual SIDHistory attributes after domain migrations. SIDHistory can be exploited to perform privilege escalation attacks by injecting privileged group SIDs (SID History Injection). Implementation steps: Identify all accounts with SIDHistory -> Evaluate if SIDHistory is still needed -> Migrate ACLs using old SIDs -> Remove SIDHistory from accounts -> Enable SID filtering on trusts Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Regular search for accounts with SIDHistory. Monitoring of authentications using SIDHistory. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADUser -Filter {SIDHistory -like '*'} -Properties SIDHistory \| Select-Object Name, SIDHistory`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-009	Identity & Access Management	AdminCount attribute reset	How to implement the 'AdminCount attribute reset' control in the AD tiering model?	Clean up the AdminCount attribute on accounts that are no longer members of privileged groups. Accounts with AdminCount=1 retain restrictive ACLs defined by AdminSDHolder even after removal from privileged groups, which can cause operational issues. Implementation steps: Identify non-privileged accounts with AdminCount=1 -> Reset AdminCount to 0 -> Restore permission inheritance -> Verify ACLs after reset -> Automate regular verification Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P2 \| Effort: low \| Impact: medium Detection method: Regular script checking consistency between AdminCount and privileged group membership. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADUser -Filter {AdminCount -eq 1} -Properties AdminCount, MemberOf \| Where-Object {($_.MemberOf -notmatch 'Domain Admins\|Enterprise Admins\|Schema Admins')}`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "low", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-010	Identity & Access Management	Authentication policies and silos	How to implement the 'Authentication policies and silos' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure Authentication Policies and Authentication Policy Silos (Windows Server 2012 R2+) to restrict privileged accounts to specific machines. Authentication silos allow confining Tier 0 accounts to authorized domain controllers and PAWs only. Implementation steps: Create an authentication policy per tier -> Define access conditions (authorized machines) -> Create an authentication silo -> Assign accounts to the silo -> Test in audit mode then enforce Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P2 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Monitor Event ID 106 (AuthenticationPolicyFailures). Audit of authentication attempts rejected by silos. PowerShell Command: `New-ADAuthenticationPolicy -Name 'Tier0_Policy' -UserAllowedToAuthenticateFrom 'O:SYD:(XA;OICI;CR;;;WD;(@USER.ad://ext/AuthenticationSilo == "Tier0_Silo"))'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-011	Identity & Access Management	Inactive account disabling	How to implement the 'Inactive account disabling' control in the AD tiering model?	Identify and disable user and computer accounts inactive for more than 90 days. Inactive accounts represent an unmonitored attack surface and can be exploited for lateral movement or privilege escalation. Implementation steps: Identify inactive accounts (lastLogonTimestamp) -> Notify owners -> Disable accounts after confirmation -> Move to dedicated OU -> Delete after 180 days Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P2 \| Effort: low \| Impact: medium Detection method: Automated weekly inactive account report. Alert on reactivation of disabled accounts. PowerShell Command: `Search-ADAccount -AccountInactive -TimeSpan 90.00:00:00 \| Where-Object {$_.Enabled -eq $true} \| Select-Object Name, LastLogonDate`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "low", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-012	Identity & Access Management	KRBTGT account restriction	How to implement the 'KRBTGT account restriction' control in the AD tiering model?	Perform regular KRBTGT account password rotation (twice consecutively to invalidate all existing tickets). The KRBTGT account is the target of Golden Ticket attacks. Regular rotation limits the lifetime of a compromised Golden Ticket. Implementation steps: Schedule rotation during off-peak hours -> Perform first rotation -> Wait at least 12 hours (TGT lifetime) -> Perform second rotation -> Verify authentication functionality Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Verification of KRBTGT password last modification date. Alert if older than 180 days. PowerShell Command: `Reset-KrbtgtKeyInteractive.ps1 # Script Microsoft officiel recommande`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-013	Identity & Access Management	Administration account separation	How to implement the 'Administration account separation' control in the AD tiering model?	Implement dedicated administration accounts per tier (T0-admin, T1-admin, T2-admin) separate from standard user accounts. An administrator must never use their privileged account for daily tasks (email, web browsing). Implementation steps: Define naming convention (prefix T0-, T1-, T2-) -> Create dedicated administration accounts -> Apply logon restrictions via GPO -> Train administrators on correct usage -> Regularly audit account usage Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Detection of Tier 0 accounts used on non-Tier 0 machines. Alerts on cross-tier logons. PowerShell Command: `New-ADUser -Name 'T0-admin-jdupont' -Path 'OU=Tier0_Admins,OU=Admin,DC=domain,DC=com' -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString 'P@ssw0rd' -AsPlainText -Force) -Enabled $true`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-014	Identity & Access Management	Service account restrictions	How to implement the 'Service account restrictions' control in the AD tiering model?	Restrict service accounts to the minimum necessary privileges. Apply 'Deny logon locally' and 'Deny logon through RDP' on service accounts. Configure SPNs correctly to prevent Kerberoasting. Implementation steps: Audit each service account's privileges -> Apply least privilege principle -> Configure interactive logon restrictions -> Verify SPN configuration -> Document dependencies Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Kerberoasting detection via Event ID 4769 with RC4 encryption. Monitoring of interactive logons by service accounts. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -like '*'} -Properties ServicePrincipalName, PasswordLastSet \| Select-Object Name, ServicePrincipalName, PasswordLastSet`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
IAM-015	Identity & Access Management	AD replication permission control	How to implement the 'AD replication permission control' control in the AD tiering model?	Restrict 'Replicating Directory Changes' and 'Replicating Directory Changes All' permissions to only legitimately necessary accounts. These permissions are exploited in DCSync attacks to extract hashes of all domain accounts. Implementation steps: List all accounts with replication rights -> Verify legitimacy of each access -> Remove unnecessary rights -> Configure modification alerts -> Audit regularly Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: DCSync detection via Event ID 4662 with replication GUIDs. Immediate alert on any unauthorized replication. PowerShell Command: `(Get-ACL 'AD:\DC=domain,DC=com').Access \| Where-Object {$_.ObjectType -eq '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' -or $_.ObjectType -eq '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'} \| Select-Object IdentityReference`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
NET-001	Network Segmentation	Tier 0 network isolation (VLAN/firewall)	How to implement the 'Tier 0 network isolation (VLAN/firewall)' control in the AD tiering model?	Isolate domain controllers and Tier 0 assets in a dedicated VLAN protected by strict firewall rules. Only flows necessary for authentication and AD replication should be allowed. Implementation steps: Design Tier 0 VLAN architecture -> Configure VLAN on network equipment -> Migrate DCs to new VLAN -> Configure firewall rules -> Test all application flows Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Monitoring of unauthorized flows to Tier 0 VLAN. IDS/IPS alerts on access attempts. PowerShell Command: `Test-NetConnection -ComputerName DC01 -Port 389 -InformationLevel Detailed`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
NET-002	Network Segmentation	RDP restrictions between tiers	How to implement the 'RDP restrictions between tiers' control in the AD tiering model?	Block RDP connections between tiers except from authorized PAWs. A Tier 2 administrator must never be able to RDP to a Tier 1 server or Tier 0 domain controller. Implementation steps: Identify all existing RDP flows -> Configure Windows and network firewall rules -> Apply restrictions via GPO (User Rights Assignment) -> Test restrictions -> Monitor blocked attempts Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4625 with logon type 10 (RDP) on Tier 0 and 1 machines. Alert on any unauthorized RDP connection. PowerShell Command: `# GPO: Deny logon through Remote Desktop Services - ajouter les groupes Tier 2 sur les serveurs Tier 0/1`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
NET-003	Network Segmentation	SMB signing enforcement	How to implement the 'SMB signing enforcement' control in the AD tiering model?	Enable and enforce SMB signing on all servers and workstations. SMB signing prevents NTLM relay and man-in-the-middle attacks on the SMB protocol. Implementation steps: Enable SMB signing via GPO -> Test application compatibility -> Progressively enforce by OU -> Verify on third-party equipment (NAS, printers) -> Document exceptions Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Regular verification of SMB signing configuration on all servers. Detection of unsigned SMB connections. PowerShell Command: `Set-SmbServerConfiguration -RequireSecuritySignature $true -Force; Set-SmbClientConfiguration -RequireSecuritySignature $true -Force`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
NET-004	Network Segmentation	LDAP signing and channel binding	How to implement the 'LDAP signing and channel binding' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure and enforce LDAP signing and LDAP channel binding on all domain controllers. These measures prevent LDAP relay attacks and unauthenticated or unencrypted LDAP queries. Implementation steps: Audit unsigned LDAP clients (Event ID 2889) -> Fix applications using LDAP simple bind -> Configure required LDAP signing via GPO -> Enable LDAP channel binding -> Verify compliance Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 2889 for unsigned LDAP connections. Monitoring of LDAP relay attempts. PowerShell Command: `# Registry: Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters' -Name 'LDAPServerIntegrity' -Value 2`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
NET-005	Network Segmentation	IPsec between domain controllers	How to implement the 'IPsec between domain controllers' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure IPsec tunnels between domain controllers to encrypt and authenticate AD replication traffic. IPsec protects against interception and manipulation of replication traffic. Implementation steps: Define IPsec policy for DCs -> Configure connection security rules -> Deploy via GPO on DCs -> Test replication with IPsec -> Monitor negotiation failures Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P2 \| Effort: high \| Impact: medium Detection method: Monitoring of IPsec negotiation failures. Verification of IPsec coverage between all DCs. PowerShell Command: `New-NetIPsecRule -DisplayName 'DC-to-DC Replication' -InboundSecurity Require -OutboundSecurity Require -Protocol TCP -LocalPort 389,636,3268,3269`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "high", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
NET-006	Network Segmentation	DNS security	How to implement the 'DNS security' control in the AD tiering model?	Secure the Active Directory-integrated DNS infrastructure. Enable DNSSEC, restrict dynamic updates, configure DNS logging, and protect against DNS poisoning and unauthorized zone transfers. Implementation steps: Configure AD-integrated DNS zones in secure mode -> Restrict zone transfers -> Enable DNS logging -> Configure DNSSEC if possible -> Monitor suspicious DNS changes Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: medium Detection method: Monitoring of unauthorized DNS changes. Detection of abnormal DNS queries to DCs. PowerShell Command: `Set-DnsServerPrimaryZone -Name 'domain.com' -DynamicUpdate Secure; Set-DnsServerDiagnostics -All $true`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
NET-007	Network Segmentation	NTLMv1 elimination	How to implement the 'NTLMv1 elimination' control in the AD tiering model?	Completely eliminate NTLMv1 from the environment and restrict NTLMv2 to strict necessity. NTLMv1 is cryptographically weak and can be cracked in seconds. Migration to Kerberos should be the long-term goal. Implementation steps: Audit NTLM usage (Event ID 4624 NTLM type) -> Identify dependent applications -> Configure GPO to refuse NTLMv1 -> Migrate applications to Kerberos -> Progressively restrict NTLMv2 Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4624 with NTLM authentication package. Audit of residual NTLMv1 authentications. PowerShell Command: `Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa' -Name 'LmCompatibilityLevel' -Value 5`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
NET-008	Network Segmentation	Network monitoring at tier boundaries	How to implement the 'Network monitoring at tier boundaries' control in the AD tiering model?	Deploy network monitoring probes (IDS/IPS) at boundaries between tiers to detect lateral movement attempts, unauthorized flows, and network attacks. Implementation steps: Identify inter-tier crossing points -> Deploy IDS/IPS probes -> Configure detection rules -> Integrate alerts into SIEM -> Test with attack scenarios Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P2 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Real-time IDS/IPS alerts. Analysis of abnormal inter-tier network flows.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
NET-009	Network Segmentation	Administration port restriction	How to implement the 'Administration port restriction' control in the AD tiering model?	Restrict access to administration ports (RDP 3389, WinRM 5985/5986, SSH 22, SMB 445) to only authorized PAW and jump server IP addresses via Windows Firewall and network firewalls. Implementation steps: List administration ports per tier -> Configure Windows Firewall rules -> Configure network ACLs -> Test access from PAWs -> Verify blocking from standard workstations Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Monitoring of connection attempts to administration ports from unauthorized sources. PowerShell Command: `New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'Allow RDP from PAW only' -Direction Inbound -Protocol TCP -LocalPort 3389 -RemoteAddress '10.0.0.0/24' -Action Allow`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
NET-010	Network Segmentation	WMI protocol restriction	How to implement the 'WMI protocol restriction' control in the AD tiering model?	Restrict WMI access to authorized administration machines only. WMI is frequently used for lateral movement and remote command execution by attackers. Implementation steps: Configure WMI permissions via GPO -> Restrict DCOM access -> Configure firewall for WMI -> Test management tools -> Monitor WMI usage Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: medium Detection method: Event ID 5857, 5858, 5859, 5860, 5861 for WMI activity. Detection of WMI connections from unauthorized sources. PowerShell Command: `# Set-WmiNamespaceSecurity -Namespace 'root' -Operation 'Remove' -Account 'Everyone' -Permissions 'RemoteAccess'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
NET-011	Network Segmentation	LLMNR and NetBIOS disabling	How to implement the 'LLMNR and NetBIOS disabling' control in the AD tiering model?	Disable LLMNR (Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution) and NetBIOS on all network segments. These protocols are exploited by Responder-type attacks to capture NTLM hashes. Implementation steps: Disable LLMNR via GPO -> Disable NetBIOS on network adapters -> Verify DNS resolution works correctly -> Test dependent applications -> Monitor residual LLMNR/NetBIOS queries Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Detection of residual LLMNR and NetBIOS queries on the network. Deployment of a Responder honeypot. PowerShell Command: `# GPO: Computer Configuration > Admin Templates > Network > DNS Client > Turn Off Multicast Name Resolution = Enabled`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
NET-012	Network Segmentation	Inter-domain trust hardening	How to implement the 'Inter-domain trust hardening' control in the AD tiering model?	Secure trust relationships between domains. Enable SID filtering, restrict selective authentication, and regularly audit existing trusts. Misconfigured trusts are a cross-forest attack vector. Implementation steps: Inventory all existing trusts -> Enable SID filtering on external trusts -> Configure selective authentication -> Audit cross-trust permissions -> Remove obsolete trusts Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Monitoring of abnormal cross-trust authentications. Regular audit of trust configuration. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADTrust -Filter * \| Select-Object Name, Direction, TrustType, SIDFilteringForestAware, SelectiveAuthentication`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-001	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	Dedicated hardware for Tier 0 admin	How to implement the 'Dedicated hardware for Tier 0 admin' control in the AD tiering model?	Deploy dedicated physical hardware exclusively for Tier 0 administration. Tier 0 PAWs must never be virtual machines on a shared hypervisor and should only be used for domain controller and Tier 0 asset administration. Implementation steps: Acquire dedicated hardware with TPM 2.0 -> Install clean OS from verified media -> Harden configuration per CIS recommendations -> Join to domain in dedicated PAW OU -> Apply PAW hardening GPOs Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Regular PAW inventory and compliance verification. Detection of any non-administrative usage. PowerShell Command: `Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Tpm -Namespace root\cimv2\security\microsofttpm \| Select-Object IsActivated_InitialValue, IsEnabled_InitialValue, SpecVersion`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-002	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	Device Guard / Credential Guard	How to implement the 'Device Guard / Credential Guard' control in the AD tiering model?	Enable Windows Defender Credential Guard on all PAWs to protect authentication secrets (NTLM hashes, Kerberos TGT tickets) in an isolated virtualized environment (VSM). Credential Guard renders Mimikatz attacks ineffective. Implementation steps: Verify hardware prerequisites (VBS, UEFI, TPM) -> Enable Credential Guard via GPO -> Enable Device Guard for code integrity control -> Verify activation via msinfo32 -> Test resistance to credential extraction tools Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Regular verification of Credential Guard status. Alert if disabled on a PAW. PowerShell Command: `Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard -Namespace root\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard \| Select-Object SecurityServicesRunning, VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-003	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	AppLocker / WDAC policies	How to implement the 'AppLocker / WDAC policies' control in the AD tiering model?	Deploy AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies on PAWs to only allow approved administration applications. Block execution of unsigned scripts, unauthorized binaries, and unapproved DLLs. Implementation steps: Inventory required applications on PAWs -> Create a baseline policy in audit mode -> Analyze AppLocker events in audit mode -> Switch to enforcement mode -> Maintain the allowed application list Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 8003, 8004 (AppLocker blocked). Monitoring of unauthorized application execution attempts. PowerShell Command: `Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective \| Test-AppLockerPolicy -Path 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe' -User 'domain\T0-admin'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-004	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	Clean source principle	How to implement the 'Clean source principle' control in the AD tiering model?	Apply the clean source principle: a security asset can only be administered from a trust environment at least equal to its security level. A Tier 0 DC can only be administered from a Tier 0 PAW, never from a standard workstation. Implementation steps: Document the principle and associated rules -> Configure logon restrictions via GPO -> Train administrators on the principle -> Implement technical controls -> Audit compliance regularly Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Detection of administrative connections non-compliant with the clean source principle. PowerShell Command: `# GPO: Deny logon locally pour les comptes Tier 0 sur les machines non-Tier 0`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-005	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	USB device restrictions	How to implement the 'USB device restrictions' control in the AD tiering model?	Block unauthorized USB device usage on PAWs to prevent malicious USB key attacks (BadUSB, Rubber Ducky) and data exfiltration. Only input devices (keyboard, mouse) should be allowed. Implementation steps: Configure USB restrictions via GPO -> Allow only necessary device classes -> Block USB storage devices -> Deploy a device control solution -> Test restrictions Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P2 \| Effort: low \| Impact: medium Detection method: Event ID 400, 410 for blocked device installation attempts. Alert on unauthorized USB device insertion. PowerShell Command: `# GPO: Computer Config > Admin Templates > System > Device Installation > Device Installation Restrictions`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "low", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-006	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	Internet access restrictions	How to implement the 'Internet access restrictions' control in the AD tiering model?	Completely block Internet access on Tier 0 PAWs and severely restrict on Tier 1 PAWs. Internet access is the primary initial compromise vector (phishing, drive-by download, watering hole). Implementation steps: Configure proxy to block Internet on PAWs -> Configure outbound firewall rules -> Allow only Windows updates via internal WSUS -> Block all web browsers -> Test isolation Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Monitoring of Internet connection attempts from PAWs. Alert on any unauthorized outbound flow. PowerShell Command: `New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'Block Internet Outbound' -Direction Outbound -Action Block -RemoteAddress 'Internet' -Profile Any`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-007	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	Multi-factor authentication (MFA)	How to implement the 'Multi-factor authentication (MFA)' control in the AD tiering model?	Implement multi-factor authentication for PAW access and all administrative connections. Use hardware tokens (smartcard, FIDO2) rather than software solutions for Tier 0 accounts. Implementation steps: Deploy PKI infrastructure for smartcards -> Issue certificates for Tier 0 administrators -> Configure smartcard logon policy -> Deploy FIDO2 tokens as alternative -> Train administrators Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Monitoring of logons without MFA on privileged accounts. Event ID 4624 without certificate authentication. PowerShell Command: `# GPO: Interactive logon: Require Smart Card = Enabled (pour les comptes Tier 0)`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-008	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	Secure boot chain	How to implement the 'Secure boot chain' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure Secure Boot, BitLocker with TPM, and boot integrity verification on all PAWs. The secure boot chain ensures the operating system has not been altered by a bootkit or rootkit. Implementation steps: Enable Secure Boot in BIOS/UEFI -> Configure BitLocker with TPM + PIN -> Enable boot integrity measurement -> Configure boot integrity verification -> Test recovery process Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: medium Detection method: Regular verification of Secure Boot and BitLocker status. Alert if disabled on a PAW. PowerShell Command: `Confirm-SecureBootUEFI; Get-BitLockerVolume -MountPoint 'C:' \| Select-Object MountPoint, VolumeStatus, ProtectionStatus, EncryptionMethod`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-009	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	PAW patching and hardening	How to implement the 'PAW patching and hardening' control in the AD tiering model?	Keep PAWs updated with the latest security patches and apply hardening compliant with CIS benchmarks. PAWs must be the best-protected machines in the environment as they serve as the administration vector for all critical assets. Implementation steps: Configure dedicated WSUS for PAWs -> Apply patches within 48h (critical) / 7 days (important) -> Apply CIS Level 2 benchmarks -> Automate compliance verification -> Schedule regular vulnerability scans Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: PAW update compliance report. Alert if a critical patch is not installed within 48h. PowerShell Command: `Get-WindowsUpdate -MicrosoftUpdate -Severity Critical \| Where-Object {$_.IsInstalled -eq $false}`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
PAW-010	Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)	PAW logging and monitoring	How to implement the 'PAW logging and monitoring' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure comprehensive logging on PAWs with centralized log forwarding. Record all administrative actions, logons, program executions, and configuration changes. PAWs are highly monitored assets. Implementation steps: Configure advanced audit policy -> Enable Sysmon with custom configuration -> Configure log forwarding to SIEM -> Enable RDP session recording -> Set up PAW-specific alerts Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: PAW event correlation in SIEM. Alert on any abnormal activity on PAWs. PowerShell Command: `auditpol /set /subcategory:'Logon' /success:enable /failure:enable; auditpol /set /subcategory:'Process Creation' /success:enable`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-001	Group Policy Hardening	Dedicated GPO per tier	How to implement the 'Dedicated GPO per tier' control in the AD tiering model?	Create dedicated GPOs for each tier with a corresponding OU structure. Each tier must have its own hardening, access restriction, and audit GPOs. Never mix security settings between tiers in the same GPO. Implementation steps: Design OU structure per tier -> Create baseline GPOs per tier -> Link GPOs to corresponding OUs -> Test GPO application (gpresult) -> Document GPO strategy Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Regular GPO application audit (gpresult /H). OU/GPO consistency verification. PowerShell Command: `New-GPO -Name 'SEC-Tier0-Hardening' -Comment 'GPO de durcissement Tier 0' \| New-GPLink -Target 'OU=Tier0,DC=domain,DC=com'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-002	Group Policy Hardening	Logon restrictions (Deny logon)	How to implement the 'Logon restrictions (Deny logon)' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure 'Deny logon locally', 'Deny logon through Remote Desktop Services', and 'Deny access to this computer from the network' restrictions to prevent privileged accounts from logging on to wrong tiers. This is the fundamental technical mechanism of tiering. Implementation steps: Define access matrices per tier -> Configure Deny logon locally on Tier 2 machines for Tier 0/1 accounts -> Configure Deny RDP on Tier 2 machines for Tier 0/1 accounts -> Test all access combinations -> Monitor violations Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4625 with sub-status indicating policy denial. Alert on cross-tier logon attempts. PowerShell Command: `# GPO: Computer Config > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment > Deny logon locally`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-003	Group Policy Hardening	User Rights Assignment	How to implement the 'User Rights Assignment' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure User Rights Assignment restrictively to limit privileges on each tier. Restrict 'Act as part of the operating system', 'Debug programs', 'Take ownership', 'Load drivers' to strictly necessary accounts only. Implementation steps: Audit current rights on each tier -> Define minimum rights per tier -> Configure User Rights Assignment via GPO -> Test application compatibility -> Document exceptions Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Regular audit of effective user rights. Event ID 4674 for sensitive privilege usage. PowerShell Command: `secedit /export /cfg C:\temp\secpol.cfg; Select-String -Path C:\temp\secpol.cfg -Pattern 'SeDebugPrivilege\|SeTcbPrivilege\|SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-004	Group Policy Hardening	Security Options hardening	How to implement the 'Security Options hardening' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure GPO Security Options to harden system behavior: disable anonymous enumeration, force logoff on session expiration, disable LM hash storage, configure SMB signing level. Implementation steps: Apply CIS recommendations for Security Options -> Disable LM hash storage -> Configure UAC elevation behavior -> Restrict anonymous SAM and share enumeration -> Test compatibility Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: medium Detection method: Regular compliance scans against CIS benchmarks. Configuration deviation detection. PowerShell Command: `Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa' -Name 'NoLMHash','RestrictAnonymous','RestrictAnonymousSAM'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-005	Group Policy Hardening	Audit policy configuration	How to implement the 'Audit policy configuration' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure Advanced Audit Policy on all tiers to capture critical security events: logons, object access, policy changes, account management, and privilege use. Implementation steps: Define audit policy per tier -> Configure Advanced Audit Policy via GPO -> Ensure log sizes are sufficient -> Configure centralized collection -> Verify all critical events are captured Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Regular verification of effective audit policy. Alert if critical audit categories are disabled. PowerShell Command: `auditpol /get /category:* \| findstr /i 'success failure'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-006	Group Policy Hardening	PowerShell logging (ScriptBlock, Module, Transcription)	How to implement the 'PowerShell logging (ScriptBlock, Module, Transcription)' control in the AD tiering model?	Enable all three levels of PowerShell logging: ScriptBlock Logging (records executed code), Module Logging (records used modules), and Transcription (records complete sessions). PowerShell is the primary attacker tool for post-exploitation. Implementation steps: Enable ScriptBlock Logging via GPO -> Enable Module Logging for all modules -> Configure transcription to a secure share -> Configure PowerShell log sizes -> Integrate PowerShell logs into SIEM Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4104 (ScriptBlock) for malicious script detection. Search for PowerShell obfuscation patterns. PowerShell Command: `# GPO: Computer Config > Admin Templates > Windows Components > Windows PowerShell > Turn on Script Block Logging = Enabled`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-007	Group Policy Hardening	WMI/WinRM restrictions	How to implement the 'WMI/WinRM restrictions' control in the AD tiering model?	Restrict WMI and WinRM usage to authorized administration accounts and machines only. These remote administration protocols are widely used by attackers for lateral movement and remote command execution. Implementation steps: Configure WMI permissions per namespace -> Restrict WinRM to authorized machines (TrustedHosts) -> Configure firewall rules for WinRM (5985/5986) -> Enable WMI and WinRM logging -> Test existing management tools Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 6 (WSMan) for WinRM connections. Monitoring of remote commands executed via WMI. PowerShell Command: `Set-Item WSMan:\localhost\Client\TrustedHosts -Value 'PAW01.domain.com,PAW02.domain.com' -Force`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-008	Group Policy Hardening	LSASS protection (RunAsPPL)	How to implement the 'LSASS protection (RunAsPPL)' control in the AD tiering model?	Enable PPL (Protected Process Light) protection on the LSASS process to prevent in-memory credential extraction by tools like Mimikatz. RunAsPPL prevents non-Microsoft signed processes from interacting with LSASS. Implementation steps: Test in audit mode with LSA protection audit mode -> Verify security provider compatibility -> Enable RunAsPPL via registry and GPO -> Restart machines -> Verify activation Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Verification that LSASS runs in PPL mode. Event ID 3065, 3066 for PPL violations. PowerShell Command: `Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa' -Name 'RunAsPPL' -Value 1 -Type DWord`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-009	Group Policy Hardening	Script execution restriction	How to implement the 'Script execution restriction' control in the AD tiering model?	Restrict script execution (VBScript, JScript, HTA, WSH) via GPO and AppLocker/WDAC. Scripts are widely used in phishing attacks and for persistence. Disable Windows Script Host (WSH) on machines that do not need it. Implementation steps: Audit script usage in the environment -> Disable WSH via registry -> Configure AppLocker to block unapproved scripts -> Block HTA execution via GPO -> Test compatibility Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: medium Detection method: Event ID 8004 (AppLocker blocks a script). Monitoring of wscript.exe and cscript.exe execution. PowerShell Command: `Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings' -Name 'Enabled' -Value 0 -Type DWord`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-010	Group Policy Hardening	Debug mode restriction	How to implement the 'Debug mode restriction' control in the AD tiering model?	Restrict the SeDebugPrivilege to only accounts that strictly need it. This privilege allows access to any process memory and is used by credential extraction tools like Mimikatz. Implementation steps: Remove SeDebugPrivilege from all groups except local Administrators on DCs -> Configure via GPO User Rights Assignment -> Monitor privilege usage -> Document exceptions -> Test diagnostic tool compatibility Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4674 with SeDebugPrivilege. Alert on usage of this privilege by unauthorized accounts. PowerShell Command: `# GPO: Computer Config > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment > Debug programs = Administrators only`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-011	Group Policy Hardening	Command line process creation auditing	How to implement the 'Command line process creation auditing' control in the AD tiering model?	Enable process creation auditing with complete command line (Process Command Line). This feature records arguments passed to each created process, essential for post-exploitation attack detection. Implementation steps: Enable process creation auditing via GPO -> Enable command line inclusion -> Configure security log size -> Integrate events into SIEM -> Create detection rules for suspicious commands Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4688 with command line. Detection of attack patterns in commands. PowerShell Command: `# GPO: Computer Config > Admin Templates > System > Audit Process Creation > Include command line in process creation events = Enabled`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
GPO-012	Group Policy Hardening	Software installation restriction	How to implement the 'Software installation restriction' control in the AD tiering model?	Restrict software installation to authorized accounts only and from approved sources only. Use AppLocker/WDAC to block execution of unsigned or unapproved binaries, especially on Tier 0 and Tier 1 servers. Implementation steps: Define approved software list per tier -> Configure AppLocker in allowlist mode -> Block installer access for standard users -> Configure alerts on unauthorized installations -> Maintain approved software list Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P2 \| Effort: high \| Impact: medium Detection method: Event ID 11707 (successful installation), 1033 (MSI). AppLocker Event ID 8003, 8004 for blocks. PowerShell Command: `Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective -Xml \| Out-File C:\temp\AppLockerPolicy.xml`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "high", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
MON-001	Monitoring & Detection	Centralized event log forwarding	How to implement the 'Centralized event log forwarding' control in the AD tiering model?	Deploy centralized Windows log collection via WEF (Windows Event Forwarding) or SIEM agents to a centralized security platform. All critical security events must be centralized for correlation and detection. Implementation steps: Deploy WEF/WEC infrastructure or SIEM agents -> Configure subscriptions to critical events -> Verify event reception from all tiers -> Configure retention and archiving -> Test collection completeness Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Daily verification that all systems send their logs. Alert if a system stops sending events. PowerShell Command: `wecutil gr 'AD-Security-Events' \| Select-String 'RunTimeStatus\|LastError'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
MON-002	Monitoring & Detection	Honey tokens and honey accounts	How to implement the 'Honey tokens and honey accounts' control in the AD tiering model?	Deploy honey tokens (fake privileged accounts, fake SPNs, fake DNS entries) in Active Directory to detect reconnaissance and attacks. Any interaction with a honey token indicates malicious activity. Implementation steps: Create realistic honey token accounts (fake DA, fake service accounts) -> Configure fake SPNs to detect Kerberoasting -> Deploy fictitious DNS entries -> Configure alerts on any interaction -> Document honey tokens (security team only) Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Immediate alert on any Event ID 4624, 4625, 4769, 4768 involving a honey token. Zero false positives. PowerShell Command: `New-ADUser -Name 'svc_backup_admin' -SamAccountName 'svc_backup_admin' -Description 'Backup Service - DO NOT DELETE' -ServicePrincipalNames @('MSSQLSvc/backup01:1433') -Enabled $true`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
MON-003	Monitoring & Detection	DCSync attack detection	How to implement the 'DCSync attack detection' control in the AD tiering model?	Implement DCSync attack detection which exploits AD replication rights to extract hashes of all domain accounts. Monitor Event ID 4662 with replication GUIDs from non-DC machines. Implementation steps: Configure directory service access auditing -> Create SIEM rule for Event ID 4662 with replication GUIDs -> Filter legitimate DCs -> Alert on any replication from a non-DC -> Test with a simulation tool Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4662 with GUID 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 and 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 from a non-DC. PowerShell Command: `# SIEM Rule: Event ID 4662 AND ObjectType contains '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' AND SubjectUserName NOT IN (DC_accounts)`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
MON-004	Monitoring & Detection	Golden Ticket attack detection	How to implement the 'Golden Ticket attack detection' control in the AD tiering model?	Implement Golden Ticket attack detection which uses the KRBTGT account hash to forge arbitrary TGTs. Monitor anomalies in Kerberos tickets: abnormal lifetime, non-existent SIDs, name/SID mismatch. Implementation steps: Configure detailed Kerberos auditing -> Create detection rules for Event ID 4769 with anomalies -> Monitor TGTs with lifetime exceeding policy -> Detect non-existent SIDs in PACs -> Test with a test Golden Ticket Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4769 with RC4 encryption. Discrepancies in Kerberos ticket metadata. Regular KRBTGT rotation. PowerShell Command: `# SIEM: Event ID 4769 where TicketEncryptionType = 0x17 (RC4) AND ServiceName = krbtgt`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
MON-005	Monitoring & Detection	Kerberoasting detection	How to implement the 'Kerberoasting detection' control in the AD tiering model?	Detect Kerberoasting attacks that request service tickets (TGS) for accounts with SPNs to attempt offline password cracking. Monitor massive TGS requests with RC4 encryption for service accounts. Implementation steps: Configure detailed service ticket auditing (Event ID 4769) -> Create rules for massive TGS requests -> Filter by RC4 encryption type -> Alert on abnormal requests -> Deploy honey tokens with SPNs Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4769 with RC4 encryption (0x17). Correlation of multiple requests from the same source. PowerShell Command: `# SIEM: Multiple Event ID 4769 from same source within 5 minutes where TicketEncryptionType = 0x17`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
MON-006	Monitoring & Detection	Lateral movement detection	How to implement the 'Lateral movement detection' control in the AD tiering model?	Implement lateral movement detection between machines. Monitor unauthorized inter-tier connections, pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, and overpass-the-hash techniques. Correlate logon events with normal patterns. Implementation steps: Establish a baseline of normal connections -> Configure abnormal connection detection -> Monitor type 3 (network) logons between workstations -> Detect lateral movement tools (PsExec, WMI) -> Alert on cross-tier connections Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4624 type 3 between machines of different tiers. Detection of PsExec, remote WMI, PowerShell remoting tools. PowerShell Command: `# SIEM: Event ID 4624 LogonType 3 where SourceWorkstation is in Tier2 AND TargetServer is in Tier0`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
MON-007	Monitoring & Detection	Privileged group change alerts	How to implement the 'Privileged group change alerts' control in the AD tiering model?	Configure real-time alerts on any modification of privileged groups (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Administrators, Backup Operators, etc.). Any member addition or removal must trigger an immediate notification. Implementation steps: Identify all privileged groups to monitor -> Configure SIEM rules for Event ID 4728, 4732, 4756 -> Configure email/SMS notifications -> Define change validation process -> Test alerts Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 4728 (global add), 4732 (local add), 4756 (universal add) on privileged groups. PowerShell Command: `# SIEM: Event ID 4728 OR 4732 OR 4756 where TargetGroup IN ('Domain Admins','Enterprise Admins','Schema Admins','Administrators')`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
MON-008	Monitoring & Detection	AD replication monitoring	How to implement the 'AD replication monitoring' control in the AD tiering model?	Monitor Active Directory replication health and detect anomalies. Replication failures can indicate a compromise or critical malfunction. Also monitor unauthorized DC additions (DCShadow). Implementation steps: Configure repadmin /replsummary monitoring -> Alert on persistent replication failures -> Detect unplanned new DCs -> Monitor replication schema changes -> Integrate replication metrics into monitoring Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Continuous replication monitoring via repadmin. Unauthorized DC detection via Event ID 4742. PowerShell Command: `repadmin /replsummary; Get-ADDomainController -Filter * \| ForEach-Object { repadmin /showrepl $_.HostName }`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
MON-009	Monitoring & Detection	AS-REP Roasting detection	How to implement the 'AS-REP Roasting detection' control in the AD tiering model?	Detect AS-REP Roasting attacks targeting accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled. Monitor AS-REQ requests without pre-authentication and identify vulnerable accounts. Implementation steps: Identify accounts without Kerberos pre-authentication -> Enable pre-authentication on all possible accounts -> Configure detection in SIEM (Event ID 4768) -> Alert on massive AS-REP requests -> Deploy vulnerable honey tokens Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P2 \| Effort: low \| Impact: medium Detection method: Event ID 4768 with ResultCode 0 and without pre-authentication. Inventory of accounts without Kerberos pre-auth. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $true} -Properties DoesNotRequirePreAuth \| Select-Object Name, SamAccountName`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "low", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
MON-010	Monitoring & Detection	AD persistence detection	How to implement the 'AD persistence detection' control in the AD tiering model?	Detect persistence mechanisms in Active Directory: schema modifications, ACL backdoor additions, default security descriptor modification, SPN additions on privileged accounts, unauthorized trust creation. Implementation steps: Configure schema modification auditing -> Monitor ACL changes on critical objects -> Detect unplanned SPN additions -> Monitor trust creation -> Regularly compare AD state with a baseline Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Event ID 5136 (AD object modification). Regular comparison of AD state with a known baseline. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADObject -SearchBase (Get-ADRootDSE).schemaNamingContext -Filter * -Properties whenChanged \| Sort-Object whenChanged -Descending \| Select-Object -First 20 Name, whenChanged`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-001	Operational Procedures	Break-glass procedures	How to implement the 'Break-glass procedures' control in the AD tiering model?	Define and test break-glass procedures for emergency access to Tier 0 systems when normal authentication mechanisms are unavailable. Break-glass accounts must be stored securely (physical safe) and their use must trigger an immediate alert. Implementation steps: Create dedicated break-glass accounts -> Store credentials in a physical safe -> Configure alerts on any usage -> Document the usage procedure -> Test the procedure every 6 months Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Immediate alert on any break-glass account logon. Mandatory post-use review.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-002	Operational Procedures	AD change management	How to implement the 'AD change management' control in the AD tiering model?	Implement a formal change management process for all Active Directory infrastructure modifications. Any modification to GPOs, privileged groups, schema, DNS configuration, or trusts must follow a formal approval process. Implementation steps: Define the AD change management process -> Create change request forms -> Establish the Change Advisory Board (CAB) -> Implement a change tracking tool -> Train teams on the process Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: medium Detection method: Correlation of AD changes with approved change requests. Detection of untracked modifications.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-003	Operational Procedures	AD backup and recovery (DSRM, snapshots)	How to implement the 'AD backup and recovery (DSRM, snapshots)' control in the AD tiering model?	Implement robust Active Directory backup and recovery procedures. Regularly back up DC System State, test restorations, keep DSRM passwords up to date, and document complete forest recovery procedures. Implementation steps: Configure daily System State backups -> Store backups offline and offsite -> Test restoration quarterly -> Update DSRM password regularly -> Document forest recovery procedure Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Daily verification of backup success. Alert if a backup fails or is missing. PowerShell Command: `wbadmin start systemstatebackup -backupTarget:E: -quiet`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-004	Operational Procedures	Tier 0 admin onboarding	How to implement the 'Tier 0 admin onboarding' control in the AD tiering model?	Define a structured onboarding process for new Tier 0 administrators including background checks, mandatory tiering model training, PAW provisioning, dedicated account creation, and acceptable use policy signing. Implementation steps: Define prerequisites to become a Tier 0 admin -> Create the mandatory training program -> Prepare the onboarding kit (PAW, accounts, documentation) -> Define the privileged access usage policy -> Plan mentoring with an existing admin Applicable tiers: Tier 0 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: medium Detection method: Training completion tracking. Policy signature verification. Account usage auditing after onboarding.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-005	Operational Procedures	Regular access reviews	How to implement the 'Regular access reviews' control in the AD tiering model?	Perform quarterly access reviews on all privileged accounts and sensitive group memberships. Each membership must be justified by an active business need. Unjustified access must be revoked immediately. Implementation steps: Define access review scope -> Automate membership extraction -> Send reviews to managers for validation -> Revoke non-validated access -> Document results and exceptions Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: high Detection method: Quarterly access review report. Revocation rate tracking. Alert if a review is not completed on time. PowerShell Command: `Get-ADGroupMember 'Domain Admins' -Recursive \| Select-Object Name, SamAccountName, @{N='Manager';E={(Get-ADUser $_.SamAccountName -Properties Manager).Manager}}`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "medium", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-006	Operational Procedures	Penetration testing schedule	How to implement the 'Penetration testing schedule' control in the AD tiering model?	Schedule regular penetration tests (at least annual) specifically targeting the Active Directory infrastructure. Tests must validate tiering model effectiveness, resistance to known attacks, and detection capability. Implementation steps: Define AD pentest scope and objectives -> Select an AD-specialized provider -> Schedule annual tests (at minimum) -> Remediate identified vulnerabilities -> Retest after remediation Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P2 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Pentest report with risk score. Vulnerability remediation tracking. Score evolution between tests.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-007	Operational Procedures	AD compromise incident response	How to implement the 'AD compromise incident response' control in the AD tiering model?	Develop an incident response plan specific to Active Directory compromises. Define procedures for each attack type (DCSync, Golden Ticket, Kerberoasting, DC compromise), responsible teams, containment and remediation steps. Implementation steps: Develop playbooks per AD attack type -> Define roles and responsibilities (RACI) -> Prepare incident response tools -> Train the incident response team -> Conduct regular simulation exercises Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P1 \| Effort: high \| Impact: high Detection method: Mean AD incident response time. Number of simulation exercises conducted. Incident containment success rate.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "high", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-008	Operational Procedures	Documentation requirements	How to implement the 'Documentation requirements' control in the AD tiering model?	Maintain complete and up-to-date documentation of the Active Directory infrastructure, tiering model, operational procedures, access matrices, network mapping, and emergency contacts. Documentation is essential for operational continuity. Implementation steps: Define documentation scope -> Create documentation templates -> Assign documentation owners -> Schedule quarterly reviews -> Store documentation securely Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P3 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: medium Detection method: Quarterly documentation review. Verification of each document's last update date.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P3", "effort": "medium", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-009	Operational Procedures	Continuous administrator training	How to implement the 'Continuous administrator training' control in the AD tiering model?	Implement a continuous training program for AD administrators on new threats, emerging attack techniques, security best practices, and tiering model evolutions. Administrators are the first line of defense. Implementation steps: Define the annual training program -> Include technical and awareness training -> Organize hands-on workshops (labs) -> Evaluate skills regularly -> Maintain a knowledge repository Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 Priority: P2 \| Effort: medium \| Impact: medium Detection method: Training completion tracking. Post-training skill assessment. Training participation rate.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P2", "effort": "medium", "impact": "medium", "tier_applicable": [0, 1, 2], "type": "control_point"}
OPS-010	Operational Procedures	Privileged administrator offboarding	How to implement the 'Privileged administrator offboarding' control in the AD tiering model?	Define a structured offboarding process for privileged administrators leaving the organization or changing roles. Immediately revoke all access, rotate shared secrets, audit recent actions, and recover equipment (PAW, MFA tokens). Implementation steps: Define the admin offboarding checklist -> Revoke all access within 24h -> Rotate shared passwords -> Audit last 90 days of actions -> Recover equipment and tokens Applicable tiers: Tier 0, Tier 1 Priority: P1 \| Effort: low \| Impact: high Detection method: Alert if an offboarded account is reactivated or used. Verification of offboarding checklist completeness. PowerShell Command: `Disable-ADAccount -Identity 'T0-admin-departing'; Set-ADUser -Identity 'T0-admin-departing' -Description 'OFFBOARDED - $(Get-Date -Format yyyy-MM-dd)'`	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"priority": "P1", "effort": "low", "impact": "high", "tier_applicable": [0, 1], "type": "control_point"}
PHASE-000	implementation_roadmap	Phase 0: Assessment and inventory	Describe Phase 0: Assessment and inventory of the AD tiering model implementation.	Perform a complete audit of the existing Active Directory environment. Map all assets, privileged accounts, network flows, and application dependencies. Identify gaps against Microsoft best practices and ANSSI recommendations. Assess the current maturity level and define the target. This phase is fundamental as it conditions the success of the entire tiering project. An incomplete inventory will lead to security blind spots. Deliverables: - Complete inventory of domain controllers and member servers - Privileged account mapping (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, etc.) - Existing GPO audit and application assessment - Network flow mapping between tiers - Service account inventory and privilege assessment - AD maturity assessment report - Risk analysis and prioritized remediation plan - Asset classification document by tier Estimated duration: 4-6 semaines / 4-6 weeks Risks: - Discovery of unknown or orphaned privileged accounts - Undocumented application dependencies on service accounts - Resistance to change from administration teams - Underestimation of environment complexity - Lack of existing documentation Success criteria: 95% complete inventory of AD assets. All privileged accounts identified and documented. Network mapping validated by infrastructure teams. Audit report presented to management and approved. Remediation plan validated with stakeholders.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "4-6 semaines / 4-6 weeks", "dependencies": [], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
PHASE-001	implementation_roadmap	Phase 1: Quick wins - Rapid hardening	Describe Phase 1: Quick wins - Rapid hardening of the AD tiering model implementation.	Implement quick-win security measures that immediately reduce the attack surface. Add privileged accounts to the Protected Users group, deploy LAPS for local administrator passwords, clean up privileged groups, disable obsolete protocols. These actions offer an optimal effort/benefit ratio and form the foundation of the tiering approach. Deliverables: - Tier 0 accounts added to Protected Users group - LAPS deployed on all workstations and servers - Privileged groups cleaned up (unnecessary members removed) - Inactive accounts disabled or deleted - NTLMv1 disabled in the environment - Enhanced password policy (Fine-Grained Password Policy) - SIDHistory cleaned on affected accounts - Service accounts migrated to gMSA where possible Estimated duration: 2-4 semaines / 2-4 weeks Risks: - Service disruption due to removal of still-used accounts - Applications incompatible with Protected Users (no NTLM, no delegation) - Access loss if LAPS is not properly documented - Impact on applications using NTLMv1 - Service accounts not supporting gMSA Success criteria: 100% of Tier 0 accounts in Protected Users. LAPS deployed on 100% of assets. Fewer than 5 members in Domain Admins. Zero inactive accounts with elevated privileges. NTLMv1 completely eliminated.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "2-4 semaines / 2-4 weeks", "dependencies": ["PHASE-000"], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
PHASE-002	implementation_roadmap	Phase 2: Network segmentation	Describe Phase 2: Network segmentation of the AD tiering model implementation.	Implement network segmentation between the different tiers. Create dedicated VLANs for Tier 0, Tier 1, and Tier 2. Configure firewall rules to control flows between tiers. Implement microsegmentation for the most critical assets. This phase is often the most complex as it impacts existing network infrastructure and requires close coordination with network teams. Deliverables: - Tier 0 VLAN created and isolated for domain controllers - Tier 1 VLAN configured for member servers - Tier 2 VLAN defined for workstations - Inter-tier firewall rules documented and implemented - SMB signing enabled on all servers - LDAP signing and channel binding configured - IPsec configured between domain controllers - Flow matrix validated and implemented Estimated duration: 6-10 semaines / 6-10 weeks Risks: - Network service disruption during VLAN migration - Undocumented application flows blocked by new rules - Network performance impact due to additional filtering - Implementation complexity in multi-site environments - Incompatibility of some legacy network equipment Success criteria: Complete Tier 0 VLAN isolation. No unauthorized flows between tiers. SMB signing active on 100% of servers. LDAP signing enforced. Penetration tests validating segmentation. Network documentation up to date.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "6-10 semaines / 6-10 weeks", "dependencies": ["PHASE-000", "PHASE-001"], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
PHASE-003	implementation_roadmap	Phase 3: PAW deployment	Describe Phase 3: PAW deployment of the AD tiering model implementation.	Deploy Privileged Access Workstations (PAW) for administrators of each tier. Tier 0 PAWs are the most critical and must be deployed first. Apply the Clean Source Principle to ensure administration occurs from a trusted environment. Configure Device Guard, Credential Guard, AppLocker, and network access restrictions. Deliverables: - Tier 0 PAWs deployed for all AD administrators - Tier 1 PAWs deployed for server administrators - Device Guard and Credential Guard enabled on all PAWs - AppLocker/WDAC policies configured and tested - USB and device restrictions applied - Internet access blocked on PAWs - MFA configured for PAW access - PAW usage procedures documented and communicated Estimated duration: 4-8 semaines / 4-8 weeks Risks: - Administrator resistance to using dedicated machines - Dedicated hardware acquisition cost - Complexity of managing multiple workstations per administrator - Administration applications incompatible with restrictions - Risk of rule circumvention by administrators Success criteria: 100% of Tier 0 administrators exclusively use PAWs. Zero administrative connections from standard workstations. Credential Guard active on all PAWs. No unauthorized applications executable on PAWs.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "4-8 semaines / 4-8 weeks", "dependencies": ["PHASE-001", "PHASE-002"], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
PHASE-004	implementation_roadmap	Phase 4: GPO hardening	Describe Phase 4: GPO hardening of the AD tiering model implementation.	Configure and deploy hardening Group Policy Objects (GPO) for each tier. Implement logon restrictions to prevent privileged accounts from logging on to the wrong tiers. Configure audit policies, PowerShell restrictions, LSASS protection, and advanced security settings. GPOs are the central mechanism for enforcing tiering rules in Active Directory. Deliverables: - Logon restriction GPO per tier (Deny logon locally, Deny RDP) - Advanced audit GPO (PowerShell ScriptBlock, Module, Transcription logging) - LSASS protection GPO (RunAsPPL enabled) - WMI/WinRM restriction GPO per tier - User Rights Assignment configuration GPO - Security Options hardening GPO - Obsolete protocol restriction GPO - Complete GPO documentation and regression testing Estimated duration: 4-6 semaines / 4-6 weeks Risks: - Misconfigured GPOs blocking production services - Conflicts between new GPOs and existing GPOs - Impact on applications requiring restricted protocols - Exception management complexity - GPO propagation time in extended environments Success criteria: Zero Tier 0 account logons on Tier 1 or Tier 2 machines. PowerShell auditing active on 100% of machines. LSASS protected (RunAsPPL) on all servers and workstations. Regression tests validated without production impact.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "4-6 semaines / 4-6 weeks", "dependencies": ["PHASE-001", "PHASE-003"], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
PHASE-005	implementation_roadmap	Phase 5: Monitoring deployment	Describe Phase 5: Monitoring deployment of the AD tiering model implementation.	Set up the monitoring and detection infrastructure for the entire AD environment. Deploy centralized event log collection, configure real-time alerts, implement honey tokens and known attack detection mechanisms (DCSync, Golden Ticket, Kerberoasting). Monitoring is essential to detect tiering model violations and compromise attempts. Deliverables: - Centralized Windows log collection (WEF/WEC or SIEM agent) - DCSync, Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket detection rules - Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting detection - Honey tokens and honey accounts deployed - Privileged group modification alerts - Real-time AD monitoring dashboard - Lateral movement detection - AD replication and DC health monitoring Estimated duration: 6-8 semaines / 6-8 weeks Risks: - Large log volume requiring adapted infrastructure - False positives generating alert fatigue - Complexity of multi-source event correlation - SIEM solution and license costs - Specific skills required for alert analysis Success criteria: 100% of DCs sending logs to SIEM. DCSync detection functional and tested. Honey tokens in place across all tiers. Mean detection time under 15 minutes for critical attacks. Zero critical alerts unaddressed within 1 hour.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "6-8 semaines / 6-8 weeks", "dependencies": ["PHASE-004"], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
PHASE-006	implementation_roadmap	Phase 6: Tier 1 segmentation	Describe Phase 6: Tier 1 segmentation of the AD tiering model implementation.	Refine Tier 1 segmentation by creating subcategories by application type and criticality level. Separate database servers, application servers, Exchange servers, SCCM, and WSUS into distinct segments. Implement dedicated administration accounts per segment. This additional granularity significantly reduces the impact of a member server compromise. Deliverables: - Tier 1 sub-segmentation by application type - Dedicated administration accounts per Tier 1 segment - Intra-Tier 1 firewall rules implemented - Exchange servers isolated in dedicated segment - SCCM/MECM isolation with enhanced access controls - WSUS isolation to prevent supply chain attacks - Specific GPOs per Tier 1 segment - Intra-Tier 1 penetration tests Estimated duration: 6-10 semaines / 6-10 weeks Risks: - Increased complexity of administration account management - Inter-application flows blocked by sub-segmentation - Application team resistance to additional restrictions - Difficulty maintaining up-to-date documentation - Increased operational workload Success criteria: Effective isolation of each Tier 1 segment validated by tests. Unique administration accounts per segment. No unauthorized lateral movement possible between Tier 1 segments. Up-to-date documentation of all segments and rules.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "6-10 semaines / 6-10 weeks", "dependencies": ["PHASE-002", "PHASE-004", "PHASE-005"], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
PHASE-007	implementation_roadmap	Phase 7: Tier 2 hardening	Describe Phase 7: Tier 2 hardening of the AD tiering model implementation.	Strengthen security of workstations and user endpoints (Tier 2). Deploy EDR solutions, harden Windows configurations, restrict user privileges, implement application control policies. Tier 2 being the most likely entry point for attackers, its hardening is essential to protect the entire tier chain. Deliverables: - EDR deployed on 100% of workstations - Local administration rights removed from standard users - AppLocker/WDAC deployed on workstations - Automatic update policy (WSUS/SCCM) enforced - BitLocker encryption enabled on all workstations - Hardened Windows configuration (CIS Benchmarks) - NAC network access restrictions - Security awareness training for users Estimated duration: 8-12 semaines / 8-12 weeks Risks: - User productivity impact - Business applications incompatible with AppLocker/WDAC - User resistance to restrictions - Increased support incident volume during transition - Numerous exceptions needed for special cases Success criteria: EDR active on 100% of workstations. Zero standard users with local admin rights (excluding validated exceptions). BitLocker active on 100% of laptops. CIS Benchmarks compliance rate above 90%.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "8-12 semaines / 8-12 weeks", "dependencies": ["PHASE-004", "PHASE-005"], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
PHASE-008	implementation_roadmap	Phase 8: Operational maturity	Describe Phase 8: Operational maturity of the AD tiering model implementation.	Establish mature operational processes to maintain and evolve the tiering model. Formalize AD change management procedures, privileged administrator onboarding/offboarding processes, break-glass procedures, regular access reviews, and incident response exercises. Operational maturity is what ensures the tiering model's sustainability over time. Deliverables: - Break-glass procedures documented and tested - AD change management process formalized - AD backup and recovery procedures (DSRM, snapshots) - Tier 0 administrator onboarding process - Automated quarterly access reviews - Regular penetration testing schedule - AD-specific incident response plan - Continuous training program for administrators Estimated duration: 6-8 semaines / 6-8 weeks Risks: - Procedures not followed due to lack of training - Progressive control erosion without regular auditing - Team turnover leading to knowledge loss - Insufficient budget to maintain security level - Environment evolution not accounted for Success criteria: All procedures documented and tested at least once. Break-glass successfully tested. First access review completed. At least one penetration test performed. All administrators trained on the tiering model.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "6-8 semaines / 6-8 weeks", "dependencies": ["PHASE-005", "PHASE-006", "PHASE-007"], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
PHASE-009	implementation_roadmap	Phase 9: Continuous improvement	Describe Phase 9: Continuous improvement of the AD tiering model implementation.	Establish a continuous improvement cycle for the tiering model. Perform regular audits, adapt the model to new threats and technologies, integrate incident feedback, and evolve controls based on organizational maturity. Continuous improvement is an endless process that ensures the tiering model remains effective against evolving threats and infrastructure changes. Deliverables: - Automated quarterly compliance audits - Monitoring of new AD threats (CERT, ANSSI, Microsoft) - Integration of incident lessons learned - Model evolution toward Zero Trust / Enterprise Access Model - Benchmarking with industry standards - AD security metrics and maturity dashboards - Regular Red Team / Purple Team program - Participation in AD security communities Estimated duration: Continu / Ongoing Risks: - Loss of vigilance after initial implementation - New threats undetected by existing controls - Progressive configuration drift - Tool and procedure obsolescence - Lack of budget for continuous improvement Success criteria: Compliance score continuously improving quarter over quarter. Zero undetected regressions. Detection and response time continuously decreasing. Tiering model up to date with latest Microsoft and ANSSI recommendations. Competent and regularly trained team.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"duration": "Continu / Ongoing", "dependencies": ["PHASE-008"], "type": "roadmap_phase"}
QA-EN-001	Core concepts	questions_answers	What is the Active Directory Tiering Model and why is it essential for security?	The Active Directory Tiering Model is a security architecture that segments the AD environment into hierarchical levels (Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2) to prevent attack propagation between layers. Tier 0 contains domain controllers and identity control assets, Tier 1 contains member servers and applications, and Tier 2 contains workstations. The fundamental principle is that a higher-tier asset must never be administered from a lower tier, thus preventing privileged credential theft and lateral movement. This model is recommended by Microsoft, ANSSI, and major cybersecurity authorities.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-002	Tier 0	questions_answers	What does Tier 0 contain and why is it the most critical level?	Tier 0 contains Domain Controllers (DCs), AD CS (Certificate Services), AD FS (Federation Services), Azure AD Connect, PKI infrastructure, and KRBTGT accounts. It is the most critical because a Tier 0 compromise equals a total compromise of the entire AD forest. An attacker controlling Tier 0 can create accounts, modify permissions, forge Kerberos tickets (Golden Ticket), and access any domain resource. Protecting Tier 0 is therefore the absolute priority of any AD security strategy.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-003	Protected Users	questions_answers	How does the Protected Users group protect privileged accounts in the tiering model?	The Protected Users group (available since Windows Server 2012 R2) automatically applies enhanced protections to member accounts: NTLM authentication disabled (Kerberos with AES only), credential caching prohibited, unconstrained Kerberos delegation disabled, and TGT lifetime reduced to 4 hours. In the tiering context, all Tier 0 accounts (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins) must be members of this group to prevent credential theft via Mimikatz, pass-the-hash, and other extraction techniques.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-004	PAW	questions_answers	What is a PAW (Privileged Access Workstation) and how to implement it?	A PAW is a physical workstation dedicated exclusively to administering a specific tier. For Tier 0, the PAW must be dedicated hardware with TPM 2.0, Secure Boot, BitLocker, Credential Guard, and Device Guard enabled. Internet access is completely blocked, only AD administration tools are allowed via AppLocker/WDAC, and MFA authentication via smartcard or FIDO2 token is mandatory. The PAW must never be a VM on a shared hypervisor. It enforces the Clean Source Principle: always administer from an environment at least as secure as the target.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-005	gMSA	questions_answers	How do gMSA (Group Managed Service Accounts) improve tiering security?	gMSAs replace traditional service accounts by offering automatic password rotation every 30 days, with complex 240-character passwords automatically generated by AD. They eliminate the risk of static passwords targeted by Kerberoasting attacks. In the tiering model, each service should use a gMSA with minimum necessary privileges. The New-ADServiceAccount command creates a gMSA, and PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword defines which machines can use it.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-006	LAPS	questions_answers	How to deploy LAPS within the tiering model framework?	LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) automatically generates and stores unique local administrator passwords for each machine in a protected AD attribute. Deployment includes: AD schema extension, LAPS client deployment via GPO or SCCM, read permission configuration per tier (only Tier 0 admins read DC passwords, Tier 1 for servers, Tier 2 for workstations). LAPS is essential because it prevents lateral movement via identical local admin passwords, a very common attack technique.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-007	Kerberos	questions_answers	Why is unconstrained Kerberos delegation dangerous for tiering?	Unconstrained Kerberos delegation allows a server to store TGTs of users who authenticate to it and reuse them to access any service on their behalf. If a Tier 1 server with unconstrained delegation is compromised, the attacker can capture TGTs of Tier 0 administrators who connect to it and replay them to take domain control. In tiering, all unconstrained delegation must be eliminated and only Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) should be used when necessary.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-008	AdminSDHolder	questions_answers	What is the role of AdminSDHolder in tiering security?	AdminSDHolder is an automatic Active Directory protection mechanism that reapplies protective ACLs every 60 minutes (via the SDProp process) on objects belonging to privileged groups. In tiering, it is crucial to harden the AdminSDHolder container ACLs (CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System) to ensure only authorized Tier 0 accounts have permissions on protected objects. Monitoring AdminSDHolder modifications is also essential as an attacker could add ACL backdoors that would be automatically propagated.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-009	GPO	questions_answers	How to configure GPO logon restrictions to enforce tiering?	GPO logon restrictions are the central technical mechanism of tiering. On Tier 2 machines (workstations), configure 'Deny logon locally' and 'Deny logon through Remote Desktop Services' for Tier 0 and Tier 1 groups. On Tier 1 machines (servers), apply the same restrictions for Tier 0 groups (except from PAWs). Use User Rights Assignment in the GPO for each tier. This technically prevents a privileged account from logging on to a lower tier, thus preventing credential theft if the lower tier is compromised.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-010	Network segmentation	questions_answers	How to segment the network to support the AD tiering model?	Network segmentation for tiering requires at minimum three VLANs: one for Tier 0 (DCs and critical assets), one for Tier 1 (member servers), and one for Tier 2 (workstations). Firewall rules should only allow necessary flows: authentication (Kerberos 88, LDAP 389/636, DNS 53) from all tiers to Tier 0, but block administration flows (RDP, WinRM, SMB) except from PAWs. Microsegmentation between DCs and IPsec for replication add an additional protection layer.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-011	Lateral movement	questions_answers	How to prevent lateral movement in the tiering model?	Lateral movement prevention in tiering relies on several complementary measures: LAPS deployment to eliminate identical local admin passwords, Credential Guard to protect in-memory credentials, GPO logon restrictions to prevent privileged accounts from logging on to wrong tiers, SMB signing to prevent NTLM relay, LLMNR and NetBIOS disabling to counter Responder, and network segmentation to limit connectivity between machines within a tier. Lateral movement detection via SIEM completes these preventive measures.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-012	Privilege escalation	questions_answers	What are the privilege escalation prevention techniques in tiering?	Privilege escalation prevention in tiering combines: privileged group cleanup (fewer than 5 members in Domain Admins), residual SIDHistory removal, SeDebugPrivilege restriction, LSASS protection with RunAsPPL, AD replication permission control (against DCSync), ACL rights restriction on critical AD objects, AdminSDHolder hardening, unconstrained Kerberos delegation elimination, and authentication policies and silos implementation. Each control eliminates a specific privilege escalation vector.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-013	Attack detection	questions_answers	How to detect a DCSync attack in the AD environment?	The DCSync attack exploits 'Replicating Directory Changes' and 'Replicating Directory Changes All' rights to simulate a domain controller and extract hashes of all accounts. Detection relies on monitoring Event ID 4662 with replication GUIDs (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 and 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2) from machines that are NOT domain controllers. Any replication from a non-DC must trigger an immediate critical alert. Prevention consists of restricting these rights to only legitimately necessary accounts.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-014	Attack detection	questions_answers	How to detect and prevent a Golden Ticket attack?	The Golden Ticket attack uses the KRBTGT account hash to forge arbitrary TGTs with any privileges. Prevention requires regular KRBTGT password rotation (twice consecutively, at least 12 hours apart). Detection relies on identifying anomalies in Kerberos tickets: lifetime exceeding policy (Event ID 4769), RC4 encryption instead of AES, non-existent SIDs in the PAC, or username/SID mismatches. Deploying Credential Guard on DCs also limits KRBTGT hash extraction.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-015	Kerberoasting	questions_answers	How to protect against Kerberoasting in the tiering model?	Kerberoasting targets service accounts with SPNs to extract TGS tickets and attempt offline password cracking. Protection in tiering includes: migration to gMSAs (240-character passwords), enforcing 25+ character passwords for service accounts that cannot use gMSA, using AES encryption instead of RC4, deploying honey tokens with SPNs for detection, and monitoring massive TGS requests with RC4 encryption (Event ID 4769 with EncryptionType 0x17). Real-time detection is essential as the attack is silent.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}
QA-EN-016	Core concepts	questions_answers	What is the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 in the tiering model?	Tier 1 includes member servers and enterprise applications (SQL Server, Exchange, SCCM, WSUS, file servers) that host critical data and services but do not directly control identity. Tier 2 includes workstations, laptops, and mobile devices. The main difference is the risk level: Tier 2 is the most exposed (direct contact with users and Internet), while Tier 1 is more controlled but contains more sensitive data. Administration accounts are strictly separated between the two tiers.	https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/	{"type": "qa", "language": "en"}

End of preview. Expand in Data Studio

Active Directory Tiering Model Dataset (EN)

Comprehensive English dataset on Active Directory tiering model implementation, covering tier architecture, security control points, implementation roadmap, and detailed Q&A.

Dataset Contents

Category	Entries	Description
Tier Architecture	5	Detailed definitions for Tier 0, 1, 2, Control Plane, Data Plane
Control Points	69	Security controls organized in 6 categories
Implementation Roadmap	10	Phases 0 to 9 with deliverables and success criteria
Questions & Answers	80	Q&A covering all tiering aspects
Total	164

Control Point Categories

Identity & Access Management (15 points): Protected Users, AdminSDHolder, gMSA, LAPS, Kerberos delegation, FGPP
Network Segmentation (12 points): VLAN isolation, SMB signing, LDAP signing, IPsec, NTLMv1
Privileged Access Workstations - PAW (10 points): Credential Guard, AppLocker/WDAC, MFA, Secure Boot
Group Policy Hardening (12 points): Per-tier GPO, logon restrictions, PowerShell auditing, RunAsPPL
Monitoring & Detection (10 points): DCSync, Golden Ticket, Kerberoasting, honey tokens
Operational Procedures (10 points): Break-glass, backups, access reviews, incident response

Data Structure

{
  "id": "IAM-001",
  "category": "Identity & Access Management",
  "subcategory": "Protected Users group membership",
  "question": "How to implement the control...",
  "answer": "Detailed description with steps...",
  "source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livres-blancs/tiering-model/",
  "metadata": "{\"priority\": \"P1\", \"effort\": \"low\", \"impact\": \"high\"}"
}

Usage

from datasets import load_dataset

dataset = load_dataset("AYI-NEDJIMI/ad-tiering-model-en")

# Filter by category
tier0_controls = [r for r in dataset["train"] if "Tier 0" in r["answer"]]

# Search by priority
import json
p1_controls = [r for r in dataset["train"]
               if json.loads(r["metadata"]).get("priority") == "P1"]

Additional Resources

AD Tiering Model Guide - Complete implementation guide
AD Security Guide 2025 - Security recommendations
Top 10 Active Directory Attacks - Most common attacks
Top 10 AD Audit Tools 2025 - Recommended audit tools
Active Directory Resource Hub - AD resource center
AD Security Whitepaper - Complete whitepaper
Golden Ticket Attack - Golden Ticket attack analysis
DCSync Attack - DCSync attack analysis
Kerberoasting - Kerberoasting attack analysis

About the Author

AYI-NEDJIMI Consultants - Cybersecurity consulting firm specialized in Active Directory infrastructure security.

Our experts help organizations implement the tiering model, conduct AD security audits, respond to incidents, and train technical teams.

Free Resources - 8 Whitepapers

We provide 8 free whitepapers covering Active Directory security, the tiering model, attack techniques, and defense best practices. Visit our complete resource collection.