The confusion originates from Sigmund Freud who initialized the field with his idea of the unconscious mind. Freud was of course Austrian, and used the terms das Unbewusste and das Vorbewusste. These are  most accurately translated to unconscious and preconscious. The latter is the technical term for what you called 'subconscious'.

The word 'subconscious' is usually frowned upon in academic settings (because it is often unclear if it is talking about the unconscious or the preconscious). However, it is very popular in the everyday lexicon and thus creeps into scientific writing as well.

You can introduce further distinctions (such as subliminal) and if you want a nice and thorough modern treatment of all three terms in the context of visual processing, then I recommend:

Dehaenea, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccachea, L., Sackura, J., and Sergent, C. (2006) "Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(5): 204-211. (pdf)


Freudian repressed unconscious as the biological reason behind self-destructive behavior?

It has been a while, but I've always understood the theory to say that the superego, the internalization of values and rules, can cause us to repress ideas that aren't inline with our values. Basically, as we continue to do things that we 'know' are 'wrong' there is a resultant feeling of anxiety, which we often seek to avoid.

There are better ways to explain this type of phenomenon though; I would suggest some basic cognitive behaviourism. For instance, if we suggest that a person's thoughts of guilt, let's say around exercise, create a punishing effect, then we can in turn come to associate exercise with the negative feeling of guilt. If we expand out and include the further associations of obesity/guilt and their close association with exercise, we can start to build a theoretical model of why neurotic behaviors develop around exercise.

-edit-

I'll do a quick edit to respond to the a comment about sources. I was doing some research after I posted this, I managed to find an article discussing how attitudes relate to the avoidance of exercise:

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1038/oby.2010.234/full

I'm having a harder time finding anything specifically talking about exercise and the types of avoidance/escape you see in high anxiety behaviour. Here's an article talking about how avoidance and escape can serve as reinforcing mechanism for phobias:

http://www.gracepointwellness.org/1-anxiety-disorders/article/38494-operant-conditioning-and-avoidance-learning


How does one make a decision between different cognitive tests for the same construct?

There are systematic ways to compare similar tests and determine which test best fits your needs.

Construct Definition
Identify the constructs (in this case, traits or abilities) you are interested in and clearly define the meaning of each construct. Cognitive performance can encompass many domains, including memory, processing speed, psychomotor functioning, and various aspects of intelligence (including social intelligence). Once you’ve identified which components you consider to be key to “peak cognitive processing,” use literature in your field to develop accepted or theory-driven operationalized definitions for each construct so you have a standard to which you can compare different tests.

Test Identification
Identify potential tests; generally their title or brief description will allow you to identify tests that are assessing constructs of interest. When comparing tests, however, there are several things to consider in order to 1) ensure the test is actually measuring your construct of interest, 2) compare similar types of tests, and 3) select the test which best suits your needs.

Validity
Assess various aspects of test validity for each tests. Construct validity assesses whether the test measures the construct of interest; a quick (though not thorough) way to assess construct validity is to compare the definition or theory the test’s developers use to the definition you have created. If you’ve defined “depression” in cognitive terms (difficulty thinking, distraction, ruminative thoughts) and the test you’re assessing has defined it in emotional or somatic terms (sad, hopeless, problems sleeping, loss of appetite), then that test would not match your definition of depression and may not capture the construct you are interested in. I advise using these definitions as a starting place, so that you feel confident the test is appropriate for your purposes. However, you should also consider other types of validity as well. Content validity assesses whether it captures part of a construct (like factual knowledge) or the whole construct (like factual knowledge and the application of that knowledge). Criterion/predictive validity is whether the test has shown to predict certain outcomes measured at a later time; an example is seeing if a reading test predicts year end grades in reading. Criterion validity is most often used in achievement or employment testing and may not be relevant to your work.

Other Psychometric Properties
Assess additional psychometric properties of each measure. Is there evidence of convergent (is it positively correlated with similar variables) and divergent (is there a negative or null correlation with dissimilar variables) validity? Has test-retest or inter-rater reliability been established? Do the scales have good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha)? Is the sensitivity (number of true positives identified) and specificity (number of true negatives) known?

Norms and Development
Think about what groups the test has been used with and developed in. Was it developed only based on samples of college students? Has it been validated in diverse groups? Some of the more well-known batteries may be “normed” tests, which allow you to compare scores to a well-defined reference sample. However, if that sample is drastically different from the population you work with, it may not be helpful to make that comparison.

Test Burden and Assessing Secondary Traits
You will also need to decide if there are certain factors that might complicate the use of a test, such as excessive length or a high reading level or difficulty. Finally, when you’ve settled on a valid, reliable, assessment of appropriate length that matches your construct of interest, look over the measure and be aware of any construct contamination issues. An example is a working memory test (perhaps making someone do solve oral story problems in his head) that is also timed. In this case, if the person is penalized for not working quickly enough, you might be capturing deficits in processing speed rather than working memory. Similarly, if you’re using the test to assess math skills, you might be capturing working memory problems rather than an accurate assessment of math ability; the person may be able to correctly complete the math problems on paper pencil if they are not required to remember the problem while solving it. You may be able to counter the effects of contamination by measuring the same skill (math) multiple ways (both orally and on paper, both timed and untimed).

Summary for identifying and comparing assessments:

Ensure the test is assessing the construct of interest using the
operationalized definition you have in mind.
Assess reliability and validity (including norms, sensitivity, and
specificity)
Ensure length, language, etc. are practical for your purposes
Be aware of possible construct contamination

References

Groth-Marnat, G. (2009). Handbook of psychological assessment. (5th Edition). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Furr, R. M., & Bacharach, V. R. (2008). Psychometrics: An introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.


How does recognizing an answer differ from creating an answer to a question?

If I understand you correctly, then the terms you are looking for are "recognition" and "recall".

See: http://www.ehow.com/info_7754397_recall-vs-recognition.html

In depth:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recall_(memory)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recognition_memory


Is homosexuality a psychological illness or a natural disposition of a person's sexual orientation?

Freud (1905) believed that every human was innately bisexual, and that monosexuality (i.e. hetero- or homosexuality) is a result of internal and external influences during psychological maturation.

Currently, the question of a biological, e.g. genetic or uterine, cause of non-heterosexual sexual orientation is still a subject of research and has not yet led to any conclusive results. Until that question has been answered with some level of certainy, we simply do not know whether homosexuality is a natural variety of sexuality or a deviation from an inborn disposition through influences after birth. (Wikipedia summarizes the research well: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biology_and_sexual_orientation)

What you must differentiate is homosexual behavior, which can appear in heterosexual individuals such as experimenting adolescents or prisoners, and homosexuality, which is a preference for same-sex partners, which might not show up in behavior at all. Historically, many homosexuals led heterosexual lives, marrying, mating with and procreating with opposite-sex partners, despite a contrary sexual preference.

Freud, S. (1905). Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie. Leipzig: Deuticke.


Is there anything in Freudian psychoanalytic theory that is scientifically sound?

Freudian psychology (and it's derivatives) are indeed pseudoscience, by and large.  That said, Freud was arguably the first to systematically theorize and study human behavior and cognition, and in so doing laid the foundation for the scientific study of psychology.  It's generally useful for the purpose of such discussions to distinguish between Freudian psychoanalysis and Freudian psychodynamics.  The latter is generally sound though embryonic to the point of near-uselessness to contemporary students (except of course, from a historical perspective).  As such, there are concepts in Freud's work that have been scientifically validated.

The basic premise that we're unaware of the majority of our mental processes, for example, is perfectly valid.  More generally, the idea that behavior is the sum of concrete biological forces (what Freud called psychic energy) has been substantiated by quantitative evidence time and time again.  Once again, the problem is that it's very superficial and hand-wavy by modern standards, not to mention its propensity to be severely abused.

Modern attachment theory, that is, the idea that emotional bonds are an essential part of infant development, also very clearly originates with Freud.

Most interestingly, IMHO, is the concept of defense mechanisms.  Indeed the study of psychology and cognitive science has been impeded for years because of an over-reliance on subjective self-report.  Thanks to Freud, we recognize that people can be unaware of their own misrepresentations of fact.

It's actually quite difficult to find a nook of cognitive science that hasn't been positively influenced by Freudian psychology in some meaningful way.  Freud got many things right, but wasn't very concerned with establishing the validity of his claims.  In practical terms, this means that studying Freud from a historical perspective will be quite informative, but one will have a hard time applying his theories directly to modern research or therapy.  And of course, there are a significant number of Freudian claims that have been positively disproven in all but the most metaphorical sense (the general "death wish" comes readily to mind).

Another way to look at this is as a modeling problem.  Freudian psychology proposes a number of models of how the human psyche works, most notably the Id/Ego/Superego hierarchy.  At the time, this was a very useful model, but it has since been supplanted by better models that better predict behavior.  This having been said, Freud's groundwork is readily visible:  everybody agrees that automatic non-conscious processing occurs and that it influences conscious perception.  Similarly, it's well known that top-down influences of expectation, cultural bias or attention can affect conscious processing.  In this sense, the Id/Ego/Superego model is alive and well... it's just been refined a great deal.


Is Altmann's memory-for-goals model valid for higher-level multitasking?

Short answer:
Altmann's model is hierarchical and allows for "higher-level" goals and "lower-level" goals, but a goal is ultimately a goal―higher level goals are just sets of lower level goals, at least as far as I understand it. Given its ability to predict performance on solid laboratory tasks like the Tower of Hanoi, there is no reason to think that goal-activation/memory-for-goals theory wouldn't apply to "higher-level" multitasking.

Altmann's theory does not appear to be implemented in ACT-R. The relationship between the two instead appears to be that Altmann borrowed ACT-R's forgetting function for his model.

Longer answer:
Goal-activation theory relates to real-world work in the sense that real-world work often requires juggling multiple goals. Such higher-level multitasking often requires the worker to temporarily stop working towards a goal in order to pursue another. Goal-activation theory helps explain this by accounting for this inhibition of the ongoing task and shifting to the new task. In order to do so, the worker must encode, store and retrieve different goals from memory depending on contextual salience and retrieval history.

The paper Jeff quotes in his comment, by Trafton, Altmann, Brock & Mintz (2002), proposed two mechanisms for how different goals reach the top of the goal pile and actually become activated: prospective goal encoding and retrospective rehearsal. Both rely on the effect of retrieval practice, and possibly (but not explicitly stated) retrieval-induced forgetting.

Participants were either interrupted during a task with no warning or an 8-second warning prior to interruption. They found that participants in the warning condition were able to improve their responses to interruption. This suggests that the goal-activation model's ability to explain inhibitory performance on Tower of Hanoi can be generalized to real world tasks.

(As an aside: Methodologically speaking, the Tower of Hanoi in particular is a generally well validated task for measuring executive inhibition across task domains. It has an impressive clinical/practical empirical pedigree that is readily available by, for instance, forward searching Miyake et al. (2000). I don't see why performance on a Tower of Hanoi task would be considered "low-level" or meaningfully different from "real-world knowledge work," at least in terms of aspects that might relate to goal-activation.)

References

Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex “frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive psychology, 41(1), 49-100. Chicago.
Trafton, J. G., Altmann, E. M., Brock, D. P., & Mintz, F. E. (2003). Preparing to resume an interrupted task: Effects of prospective goal encoding and retrospective rehearsal. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 58(5), 583-603.


How objective are scientific measures of paraphilia?

wiki's Psychopathology page should give you some insight into this issue.
First, you must realize that a psychological illness is generally different than a biological illness. The difficulty when dealing with most (not all) conditions included in the APA's DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders) is that there is no truly objective way of determining whether something should be considered a disorder. This is why they use the 4 D's to determine whether the thing someone is experiencing is a disorder.
It is not truly a paraphilia unless the behavior includes a combination of the following: highly statistically deviant, causes distress, causes the person to not be capable of doing things they normally would be able to, or causes danger to others.

Deviance: this term describes the idea that specific thoughts, behaviours and emotions are considered deviant when they are unacceptable or not common in society. Clinicians must, however, remember that minority groups are not always deemed deviant just because they may not have anything in common with other groups. Therefore, we define an individual's actions as deviant or abnormal when his or her behaviour is deemed unacceptable by the culture he or she belongs to.

(There are moves to start avoiding using this as a reason because of the complexity and it's apparent arbitrariness, but that's a different issue)

Distress: this term accounts for negative feelings by the individual with the disorder. He or she may feel deeply troubled and affected by their illness.
Dysfunction: this term involves maladaptive behaviour that impairs the individual's ability to perform normal daily functions, such as getting ready for work in the morning, or driving a car. Such maladaptive behaviours prevent the individual from living a normal, healthy lifestyle. However, dysfunctional behaviour is not always caused by a disorder; it may be voluntary, such as engaging in a hunger strike.
Danger: this term involves dangerous or violent behaviour directed at the individual, or others in the environment. An example of dangerous behaviour that may suggest a psychological disorder is engaging in suicidal activity.

So no, a paraphilia cannot be scientifically determined by behavior alone (just like the idea of love cannot be proven scientifically by behavior alone).
In short, paraphilia (just like most psychological illnesses) is definitely somewhat subjective. From a clinical standpoint, they're just a way of categorizing and defining disorders that people deal with, like happiness or sadness, not a scientific definition like whether or not someone has cancer.


The most well known sensory after effect illusion in the auditory system is probably the Zwicker tone (Zwicker, 1964).

  If a white noise with a half‐octave‐band suppression placed anywhere from 300 to 7000 Hz is presented at an over‐all sound‐pressure level of about 60 dB for 1 min and then switched off, a decaying, poststimulatory sound similar to a pure tone is heard for about 10 sec. The pitch of the post‐stimulatory tone corresponds to a frequency within the suppressed band.

Norena and Eggermont (2003) argue that compared to non Zwicker tone stimuli, Zwicker tone stimuli give rise to an increased firing rate and an increase in the between neuron correlation of spike trains (I think) in the primary auditory cortex.


Technical term for the temporary loss of understanding a word

Sounds like what you're describing is "semantic satiation". Wikipedia explains:

  The explanation for the phenomenon was that verbal repetition repeatedly aroused a specific neural pattern in the cortex which corresponds to the meaning of the word. Rapid repetition causes both the peripheral sensorimotor activity and the central neural activation to fire repeatedly, which is known to cause reactive inhibition, hence a reduction in the intensity of the activity with each repetition.

English.SE also has some good answers related to usage of this term, rather than the neurological/psychological mechanics of the phenomenon itself.


Why do some students find it difficult to focus on study when at home?

The answer to this question could be found in the mind-wandering literature (see this for a review). Figure 1 in the paper really nicely depicts the possible situations possible when looking at task engagement and self-generated thought. I'll summarize them here:

You are engaged in the task, i.e. attention is focused outwards, and the stimuli you perceive are task-related. You are focused.
You are generating thoughts about the task you are working on, i.e. attention is focused internally, but regarding the task. This is not a harmful state, since contemplating about something relevant may be very useful.
You are engaged in the task, but a non-relevant stimulus is perceived (e.g. phone ringing, seeing your dirty dishes on the kitchen counter). You get distracted.
You are generating thoughts about something completely irrelevant (e.g. your upcoming holiday. This is the most harmful state, and will only stop until you realize your mind is wandering. (I will not go into the meta-cognitive processes of this. For that, see the referenced paper).

There are thus two reasons why you fail to focus on the task at hand. (1) there are external stimuli that distract you, or (2) you distract yourself.
Task Interruptions and Multi-tasking
When the problem is that too many distracting stimuli are present, we should look at the multitasking literature. Salvucci and Bogunovic (2010) for instance, showed that workload determines how easily a distracting task/stimuli may grab your attention. The lower workload is, the more "opportunities" there are to switch to the other task. With more opportunities I mean that you use little cognitive resources on the primary task, which allows a secondary task to be attended at. This is also shown by Katidioti and Taatgen (2014) by showing that people tend to switch tasks when the time to load a webpage is rather long (3000 ms in the paper). During this period of time, a person has to wait before he can continue his task, therefore decreasing workload at the time. On the other hand, when workload is high and you are focused on the task, less opportunities exist for switching tasks. This may also be explained by "attentional narrowing", i.e. having a higher focus on one task/stimulus and, therefore, being unable to actually perceive distracting stimuli.
However, when you do get interrupted during a high-workload period, the costs of task-switching is a lot higher. It takes considerable more time to "reset" your goals and, sometimes (when you had to remember a particular fact e.g.), you must again search for that information (Salvucci & Bogunovic, 2010). This may greatly affect productivity, even more so if you consider people are interrupted every six minutes (Reference in Katidioti et al., 2010).
Self-generated Thought (SGT)
Being distracted by SGTs is also greatly affected by workload, as described in the review (as are all other statements). Again, if workload is low, there are more opportunities to "reset" your goals, i.e. to focus attention internally. On the other hand, if workload is high, you are less likely to create SGT. This effect is especially easy to see during vigilance tasks (such as studying or monitoring).
Getting distracted by yourself, i.e. focusing on SGT, is not always a bad thing though, so do not immediately try to diagnose ADHD or something. It has been shown that people that create more SGT are more creative than people who are in general more focused. Moreover, as stated earlier, SGT may be about task-relevant issues.
Concluding
There are thus two reasons why one may get distracted when studying alone. There are external stimuli that grab your attentions or you just have difficulties with vigilance tasks and you distract yourself. Let me give you some tips that may help focusing your attention.

Clean up your house before you start studying. If there is nothing to do around you, you won't have a reason to get distracted by another task. You could also try to study in a library. You definitely won't start vacuuming over there.
Study with a fellow student. The "social pressure" (this is how I experience it) prevents me from doing other things, because I know it will also distract the other. Another benefit is that you can ask each other thing you do not understand. The downside of studying together is that the other may in fact be the distractor.
Staying vigilant is difficult for a longer period of time. Switch between studying and walking for instance may help focusing your attention for the briefer periods of time.
Make the material more interactive. Reading a book requires vigilance and is a really passive way of studying. Make flash cards, write a summary, create a game; anything that may help you study in a more interactive way is good.

I really hope this will help.


Why can a user seamlessly switch from one language input to another on the same keyboard?

Focusing on the word "seamlessly", in the more general case (not just typing)--once you look at cognitive/linguistic activity with a fine enough resolution it becomes clear that language-switching is not usually seamless.  There is typically a cost (lowered performance, either in speed or accuracy) to switching languages in any modality, which is typically greater from second language to first language than from first language to second language (Language Switching & Competition, Second Language Research April 2012 vol. 28 no. 2 131-149, among many others).


how to find out the references of various languages of EMI-2 (exercise motivation inventory-2)

For question 1 - How can I find out all the references in blanket.
This will be very difficult if you cannot read and understand the language yourself. If you can, then Google Scholar can possibly be of help.
The problem comes when you don't understand the language.
The only one you can easily reference is the Spanish one as the APA reference was provided by the bangor.ac.uk website you referred to.  That is of course

Capdevila, LL. (1999). Actividad Física y Estilo de vida saludable. Terrassa: Cardellach, S.A.

Searching Agnieszka Zajac emi-2 to find the Polish version in Google Scholar as an example gives one paper by Zajac and that is in English (Zajac & Schier, 2011), yet it isn't a paper on a Polish version of EMI-2.
Searching for just the name gives lots of papers in Polish, which without being able to understand the language, you cannot ascertain which one provides a Polish version of the EMI-2.
You then have the alternative as asked in question 2

how to make quotation to indicate there are various languages available in EMI-2.

For question 2
This depends on the referencing style you prefer or are required to use.  Using the APA referencing style preferred here on this site you could provide the following
Markland, D. (2007). The Exercise Motivations Inventory: The EMI-2. Retrieved from: http://pages.bangor.ac.uk/~pes004/exercise_motivation/emi/emi-2.htm Non-English retrieved from: http://pages.bangor.ac.uk/~pes004/exercise_motivation/emi/foreign.htm
That way, the author's disclaimer is available whereby he points out that

I cannot guarantee the accuracy of the translations (because I don't speak the languages well enough, if at all!). Nor can I vouch for the psychometric properties of the translated versions. Authors' names are supplied and they may be able to provide information on the validity and reliability of their versions.

References
Zajac, A. U., & Schier, K. (2011). Body image dysphoria and motivation to exercise: A study of Canadian and Polish women participating in yoga or aerobics. Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, 4, 67-72. Free PDF: http://www.archivespp.pl/uploads/images/2011_13_4/Zajac67_APP_4_2011.pdf


Apparently, this can happen when your ROI is near the edge of the brain as reported here. The thread is pretty old though so this might have been fixed by today and there is another reason in your case.


How does one add a commutator to the UCLA miniscope cable?

I'm one of the developers of the Miniscope. We have been very happy with #FL-2-C from dragonfly. This commutator is very low torque and we have never had an issue with sending power or data through it. The key is to minimize the length of non-coax cabling coming out of the top and bottom of the commutator. We trim the lead wires short and solder coax connectors to both ends of the commutator.

For a slightly cheaper option you can check out the commutators sold by MOOG. I should mention that we haven't tested these with the Miniscope system yet.


Long term cocaine use and personality change - Scientific references?

I couldn't find a longitudinal study on this, which would be direct evidence, but it seems plausible due to circumstantial evidence:

Just taking a dose to lowers the perception of facial sadness (expressed by others)

Twenty-four healthy recreational cocaine users participated in this placebo-controlled within-subject study. [...] Findings show that cocaine impaired recognition of negative emotions; this was mediated by the intensity of the presented emotions. When high intensity expressions of Anger and Disgust were shown, performance under influence of cocaine 'normalized' to placebo-like levels while it made identification of Sadness more difficult. The normalization of performance was most notable for participants with the largest cortisol responses in the cocaine condition compared to placebo. It was demonstrated that cocaine impairs recognition of negative emotions, depending on the intensity of emotion expression and cortisol response.

In a cross-sectional study users/addicts did perform worse than controls on game-theoretical selfishness

The performance of healthy controls (n = 68), recreational cocaine users (n = 68) and dependent cocaine users (n = 30) in [...] social interaction paradigms (Distribution Game, Dictator Game) was assessed. [...] Decisions in the social interaction tasks of both cocaine user groups were more self-serving compared with controls as cocaine users preferred higher monetary payoffs for themselves.

In cocaine users

younger age-of-onset of cocaine use was associated with more pronounced empathy impairment [...]

Mean explicit and implicit emotional empathy ratings of the multifaceted empathy test (MET)
in cocaine users with an age of onset (AoO) of cocaine use ≤18 (n=27) and >18 (n=73), and controls
(n=68). Cocaine users with an AoO≤18 showed less explicit and implicit emotional empathy than
controls and less implicit empathy than cocaine user with an AoO >18. Error bars refer to SEM.
*indicates significant difference between groups (p<.05)

With risk of being pedantic, this last study is also not direct evidence, because there could be some other factor (genetic or environmental) that causes someone to both take up cocaine use early in life and also cause them to exhibit lower empathy later in life (which is the only time when empathy was measured in this study design).


What can reduce the cognitive abilities in a common workplace?

One of the most significant factors impairing cognitive abilities in a typical office environment is the noise. It is well-known that quiet environment is essential for good concentration. For instance, WHO recommends school classrooms should have noise level as low as 35 dB during classes. Yet a typical office environment can be as loud as 70 dB, which is about 30-50 times louder.

There are loads of articles describing the effects of different levels of noise on various cognitive abilities, which inevitably show that noise above 60-65 dB has a significant impact on mental activity, and noise above 75 dB has a lasting effect which can be measured 4 hours after the exposure. For reference, most public transport is louder than that, and a subway can be as loud as 95 dB.

It is well known that private offices (which reduce the noise quite a bit) can boost productivity significantly. Unfortunately, they are too pricey, or at least are seen as such, to become widespread.


Is there a psychological model or theory that describes strangers in the vicinity unknowingly causing discomfort?

I think the answer to that question can be teased out if one knows the reason why the presence of or noticing strangers in the vicinity leads to feelings of discomfort.

What do you mean by "in the vicinity"?

Social psychologists have studied what is called proxemics. If we simplify it, one can say that they study the concept of "personal space". Mostly focused on two people interacting with each other, but there is also research on what is called cognitive spatial mapping.

I can think of multiple "diagnoses" that can be tossed around and played with. Schizoid personality disorder. Schizotypal personality disorder. A mild form or some pervasive developmental disorder (Asperger syndrome, for example). If the discomfort is not rooted in a fear of embarrassment or feelings of social ineptitude, it is harder to proximate the root of the discomfort, harder to put a label on it.

On a tangential note, going back to the topic of proxemics, people tend to have social conventions on what the appropriate distances away from others are; given the environment, closeness of the relationship, distance between or amongst people and yourself, etc. It is interesting to note that the same phenomenon (uh, exaggerated word) occurs in social interaction in a virtual world sort of setting. A well-known example is the study of proxemics in Social Life. When someone does not follow convention or simply violates another's personal space, even in Social Life, it generates discomfort. But I digress. Sorry, tangential ramble.


Country records about criminal recidivism rates

Seena Fazel and Achim Wolf published an article titled A Systematic Review of Criminal Recidivism Rates Worldwide: Current Difficulties and Recommendations for Best Practice (Fazel & Wolf, 2015) and the article concluded that

  Recidivism data are currently not valid for international comparisons. Justice Departments should consider using the reporting guidelines developed in this paper to report their data.

The references section of this article also lists articles, reports and statistics available including an article on "the prediction of criminal and violent recidivism among mentally disordered offenders".

UK Statistics

The Ministry of Justice (part of the UK Government), produces regular statistical reports on reoffending rates within the UK.  The Government Collection of Proven Reoffending Statistics contains quarterly reports for periods covering January 2009 through to March 2016 — the last report covering January 2016 to March 2016 is dated 25th January 2018.  Without comparing reports from that date with older reports against this article, I cannot say whether the recommendations were followed by the UK Government.

US Statistics

  The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) collects criminal history data from the FBI and state record repositories to study recidivism patterns of various offenders, including persons on probation or discharged from prison.

  The latest study of state prisoners estimated the recidivism patterns of about 400,000 persons released from state prisons in 30 states in 2005. The findings from the 2005 study cannot be directly compared to those from BJS's previous prisoner recidivism studies due to changes in the demographic characteristics and criminal histories of the U.S. prison population, an increase in the number of states in the study, and improvements made to the quality and completeness of the nation’s criminal history records since the mid-1990s. BJS has also used criminal history records to examine the recidivism of persons placed on federal community supervision in 2005.

  In addition to recidivism statistics based on criminal history records, BJS collects administrative data through the Annual Surveys of Probation and Parole to examine the rate at which offenders are at risk of being incarcerated for a new offense or for violating the conditions of their supervision.(Source)

References

Fazel, S., & Wolf, A. (2015). A Systematic Review of Criminal Recidivism Rates Worldwide: Current Difficulties and Recommendations for Best Practice. PLoS ONE, 10(6):e0130390.DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0130390 PMCID: PMC4472929


One explanation for the development of 'acquired tastes' is a form of reinforcement learning called flavor-flavor learning. The name sounds a bit odd on its own, but should best be seen in relation to the concept of flavor-nutrient learning.
What flavor-flavor learning is
When a previously unexperienced flavor is encountered with familiar flavors, the eater may learn to associate these tastes. This is called flavor-flavor learning. There is some experimental evidence to suggest that flavor-flavor learning is automatic when eaters are hungry (Brunstrom and Fletcher, 2008). The study is not as well powered as might have been preferred, however, so the chance of false positives should be kept in mind.
How flavor-flavor learning explains taste acquisition
Supposing the Brunstrom and Fletcher result is not a false positive, we then have a plausible idea of how acquired tastes might develop from a flavor-flavor theoretic viewpoint: people are exposed to novel flavors in combination with liked flavors at meal times, either through parents or friends or just eating out. Since we tend to eat when we are hungry, in the long run this induces flavor-flavor learning and hence taste acquisition.
If you want to know more, a forward Scholar search on the Brunstrom and Fletcher paper lists some subsequent studies that deal with acquired tastes in additional detail.
References

Brunstrom, J. M., & Fletcher, H. Z. (2008). Flavour–flavour learning occurs automatically and only in hungry participants. Physiology & behavior, 93(1), 13-19.


Are the raw scores of the NEO-PI-R normally distributed?

Generally,  psychological scales that are the sum of forced-choice items exhibit skew as the mean approaches the floor or ceiling of the scale.

The test manual for the NEO-PI shows the exact relationship between raw scores for domains and facets and corresponding percentiles. So if you want to be more precise and not assume normality, you can use that data.

Here's one table showing skewness values in an officer sample from Detrick & Chibnall (2013). As is typical with this kind of data, there's a little bit of skew, but it's not huge. So the normal approximation wont be too bad.

Detrick, P., & Chibnall, J. T. (2013). Revised NEO Personality Inventory normative data for police officer selection. Psychological Services, 10(4), 372.


Is there a foveal explanation for the duck-rabbit illusion?

Short answer
Ambiguous figures do not necessarily depend on focus, they do depend on attention though.

Background
The figure you provide is huge. From a standard face-to-monitor distance of a meter or so, one indeed needs to scan the image. Under these conditions I agree with you, in that the perceived animal changes when you change focus. The ears become a bill when you focus on that part and you see a duck. Reversely, when you focus on the head, you see a bunny.

However, below I've pasted a smaller version of it (Fig. 1). If it is still too big take some more distance from your monitor and look at the center. You'll notice it will freely flip-flop between critters, also without shifting your gaze. I found another version depicted in Fig. 2. that, in my case, even more smoothly transitions from duck to rabbit and vice versa. Hence, foveal focus is not key.

Ambiguous images are not truly illusions; Many illusions rely on unconscious inferences in perception, while ambiguous figures illustrate the role of expectations, world-knowledge, and the direction of attention. For example, children tested on Easter Sunday are more likely to see the figure as a rabbit; if tested on a Sunday in October, they tend to see it as a duck or similar bird (source: Kihlstrom, University of California, Berkeley, see references there). Hence, by shifting your attention from one part to another, you may indeed evoke a flip flop and although this i medited by visual input and hence needs the retina, it nonetheless is a process induced by shifting your attention and hence a top-down process. Your suggestion of a foveal dependence would imply a bottom-up effect. It is not.

Fig. 1. Rabbit/duck ambiguity. Taken from OP above, source unknown

Fig. 2. Animated version of the ambiguous rabbit/duck figure. source: Tom van der Bilt, Nautilus issue 19, 2014


When should a percentage be written as a percentage and when should it be written x out of n?

Two comments. First: the "frequentist" format appears to be easier to understand than the normed percentages, at least if information needs to be chained as in Bayesian reasoning. On the other hand, probably normed percentages are easier to understand if two fractions are to be compared.
Second, I'd say that you should only use percentages if your sample is large enough. For example, "4 out of 5 respondents" amounts to 80% but the latter figure would probably suggests higher confidence than is warranted, given that it is really only a single respondent away from 3 out of 5 (60%)…


Why aren't Connectionism and Dynamicism considered part of the Computational Theory of the Mind?

The Computational Theory of Mind is not that the mind does some form of computation in the wide sense of computation. Rather, look at the examples for the CToM given in the Wikipedia article; people like Fodor, Pinker, Marr. Their view is very much the opposite to the Connectionist position of West Coast scientists like Rumelhart, Elman and McClelland. Both assume the brain does some form of computation, but they differ greatly about what kind of computation it is doing. Fundamentally, by the CToM, cognition is symbol manipulation and the mind Von Neumann-like (with a central-processor accessing memory), and to Connectionism, it isn't.

Historically, much of the foundations of CToM as it is currently used was first and best articulated by David Marr (although the basic thought is of course much older). Marr assumed cognition can be described on 3 distinct levels;

a computational level, which describes what job the system is supposed to do; for example, the visual system is supposed to discover cues for depth, object boundaries, and so on
The algorithmic level is a description of which calculations are used to perform this computation; for example, in the case of vision, by computing a Laplacian transformation.
The implementational level is how neurons are actually wired together to perform these algorithms - the wet, and to many researchers, not so interesting part.

This framework is basically what much of modern CToM operates within.

Fodor or Pinker assume minds operate like a specific form of computer: somewhat akin to a Von Neuman machine. Specifically, minds do symbol manipulation. Symbols are distinct, abstract cognitive entities which are assigned some meaning. Typically, they represent something. So to a CToM person, the mind works by taking a symbol, such as a low-level representation of a small part of the outside world, and performing an operation on it. In vision, it might take low-level visual items and add them together to construct a 3D representation of the outside world. In language, it might take lexical units and operate on them using linguistic rules, yielding a linguistic/semantic representation.

Importantly, in all of these, the thing which is operated on (the symbol) and the thing which does the operation (some mental module) are distinct. Symbols are manipulated via mental modules showing rule-like, algorithmic behaviour. In at least some theories, each manipulation within a module follows in sequence after another.

So CToM typically entails a symbolic and representational theory of mind; it also often comes as a modular, nativist, and universalist theory.

Connectionism, in contrast, does not assume any of these, and it was in fact originally proposed as a direct answer and alternative to the CToM. In connectionism, the 3 levels approach is often not seen as foundational, or even useful; to study how neurons work is to study how cognition works. In Connectionism, there is no central processing unit and no distinct symbol. There is no difference between "data" (symbols, representation) and the processor. Processing and symbols are implicitly distributed amongst neurons; processing doesn't happen in modules and in sequence, but in parallel. The central unit is not the module, but the network. Neuronal systems don't implement specific rule-like operations like a "normal" computer program, but deal with the world by finding patterns in the input and linking it to dynamically created response patterns. In some frameworks, representationality is disputed.

The two Stanford Encyclopedia articles on CToM and Connectionism are a good introduction to the topic and the long and intense argument between the two schools about what the mind does.

The same spiel also goes for the Dynamical Systems take on cognition, because when compared to CToM, the two - Dynamicism and Connectionism - are united in what distinguishes them from the CToM. When comparing Dynamicism to the CToM at length, van Gelder immediately and explicitly aligns connectionism and dynamicism when comparing them to

  ... the computational hypothesis (CH) that cognitive agents are basically digital computers. Perhaps the most famous rendition is Newell and Simon’s doctrine [:] “a physical symbol system ..."  ...
  In recent years, however, the ... alternative has been gaining momentum. One of the most notable developments has been the rise of connectionism, which models cognition as the behavior of dynamical systems ...

Dynamicism, like connectionism, is non-symbolic, not sold on the Von Neumann model, and emphasizes adaptive processes (such as learning) over static, modular faculties. Moreover, Dynamicism emphasizes interactions with the outside world as well as embodied, non-symbolic phenomena.

As a post-script, I want to note that Marr is perhaps a bit straw manned when he is (by people on the CToM side, usually!) painted as the Arch Symbolist. Marr developed his foundational work together with Poggio, who has worked with neural networks and stochastic models a lot, and is sometimes presented as a Dynamicist(!).

Also: to add to the confusion, CToM research usually features much less interest in explicit computational models than connectionist work. Connectionist research almost always features computer implementations of models, and dynamicism can be heavy on the formulas. CToM research often prefers qualitative descriptions.


What is the current state of knowledge on the roles and mechanisms of top-down information flow in the brain?

No the brain doesn't in practice work in a single flow. It takes a combination of top-down and bottom-up at various frequencies to perform any task. Outside a laboratory the amount of time you spend going top-down or bottom-up will depend on what kind of life you lead.

  Hippocampal movement-related low-frequency oscillations are one of the most well-characterized and replicated findings across species. Previous literature has demonstrated that movement-related oscillations are distinct phenomenon from memory-related low-frequency oscillations. We suggest that movement-related oscillations arise, in part, due to entrainment from sensorimotor information inherited from upstream cortical areas and thus may represent largely bottom-up input. We also discuss memory-related low-frequency oscillations and their emergence when rodents retrieve information about which part of a maze to explore. These memory-related oscillations often appear coordinated between hippocampus and cortex and may reflect top-down, or rule based processing. The presence of both bottom-up and top-down low-frequency oscillations may be yet another example of spectral fingerprinting, in which different cognitive operations manifest in the same brain networks via different frequencies of synchronization. While many aspects of this idea remains to be tested, particularly in the context of navigation, we believe that these ideas represent one step in bringing some synchrony to an often desynchronized field on the study of neural oscillations.

-Multifaceted roles for low-frequency oscillations in bottom-up and top-down processing during navigation and memory


What do we call the "middle" variables in a complex research model?

I've always found it difficult to pack up real-world data into the neat boxes of methodology textbooks, but if you really need a label for these, I'd go with mediator variable.

From a famous article on these variables:

  Specifically, we differentiate between two often-confused functions of
  third  variables: (a) the moderator function of third variables, which
  partitions a focal independent variable into subgroups that establish
  its domains of maximal effectiveness in regard to a given dependent
  variable, and (b) the mediator function of a third  variable, which
  represents the generative mechanism through which the focal
  independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable of
  interest.

Reference:

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of personality and social psychology, 51(6), 1173.


What is the threshold where actions are perceived as "instant"?

Preface

This is a very interesting question, that is also somewhat related to my area of research. I know of several related results (which I might add later in an edit), and I thought that with a few minutes of scholar search I'll find a paper dealing with this question exactly. I was surprised to find no such papers. So I decided to conduct an experiment...

Answer (preliminary. hopefully, will be edited)

As with many cases in psychology, the threshold is completely non-existant: there is no delay up to which the reaction is perceived as instantaneous, and after which it is perceived as delayed. You can measure the probability of the subject perceiving a delay, as a function of the delay time. You can choose any probability you want, arbitrarily, and call it the 'threshold'. If we decide on 50% (the chance of responding there was a delay is identical to the chance of responding it was instantaneous) then for me it is about 110ms.

The results presented here are based on 100 trials, performed by myself. Hardly counts as good study, but if a few more people run the test, I promise to process the results and post them here (and who knows, maybe even publish it somewhere :))

To participate in the experiment yourself

Sign up to ofri.webfactional.com. (It is a site I developed for web-based experiments conducted in my lab. It's still in beta, which is why its under a domain with my name, and not under huji.ac.il.  I promise we do not use your email for anything except for identifying you. No spam ever).
In the Group Name field in the registration, enter instant.
Login, and follow the on-screen instructions. Its really simple.
After running more than 60 trials another button will appear with the text 'show results'. Clicking it will draw a graph similar to the one presented here, based on your personal results.


What are other methods to induce ego depletion besides using emotional videos and thought suppression?

In the supplemental materials (Appendix A) of the meta-analysis by Hagger et al. (2010), you can find a comprehensive taxonomy of different methods that have been used to induce ego depletion. As the table summarizes a great variety of different paradigms, I will only list a few examples of methods and papers here. The references can be found in this document.

Hagger et al. sort the methods into 3 "task spheres" depending on whether they focus more on affective or cognitive processes:

Affective

controlling emotions - for example reading book passage aloud in emotionally expressive fashion (Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Maner, 2007, Study 1), regulating negative affect when describing a situation (Bruyneel et al., 2009, Studies 3 & 4)
controlling impulses - for example crossing-out-letters task (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998, Study 4), modified Stroop task performance (e.g., Bray, Ginis, Hicks, & Woodgate, 2008), Appetizing/unappetizing food taste perception task (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998, Study 1)

Cognitive

controlling attention - for example focusing attention on subject and not displayed words while watching a video (e.g., DeWall et al., 2008, Study 2), arithmetic task with/without auditory interference (e.g., Alberts, Martijn, Greb, Merckelbach, & de Vries, 2007, Study 2)
cognitive performance - for example paced forward (low fatigue)/backward (high fatigue) counting task (e.g., Wright et al., 2007), easy/difficult labyrinths task (e.g., Alberts et al., 2007)
controlling thoughts - for example suppressing thoughts of death (e.g., Gailliot, Baumeister et al., 2007, Study 8), suppressing thoughts of previously-viewed emotive video (Ostafin et al., 2008)
choice and volition - for example making product choices (Bruyneel, Dewitte, Vohs, & Warlop, 2006), forced-choice essay task (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998, Study 2)

Affective and cognitive

social processing - for example, high-maintenance social interaction tasks (e.g., Finkel et al., 2006), other-race/same-race social interaction task (e.g., Richeson & Shelton, 2003)

References

Hagger, M. S., Wood, C., Stiff, C., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. D. (2010). Ego depletion and the strength model of self-control: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 495–525. doi:10.1037/a0019486


There are a few references to the scientific literature on trolling in the wikipedia article

  Some psychologists have suggested that flaming would be caused by
  deindividuation or decreased self-evaluation: the anonymity of online
  postings would lead to disinhibition amongst individuals (Kiesler et al, 1984). Others
  have suggested that although flaming and trolling is often unpleasant,
  it may be a form of normative behavior that expresses the social
  identity of a certain user group (Lea et al, 1992; Postmes et al, 1998).

References

Kiesler, S. , J. Siegel and T.W. McGuire (1984). "Social psychological aspects of computer-mediated communication". American Psychologist 39 (10): 1123–1134. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.39.10.1123. LINK
Lea, M., T. O'Shea, P. Fung and R. Spears (1992). "'Flaming' in Computer-Mediated Communication: observation, explanations, implications". Contexts of Computer-Mediated Communication: 89–112.
Postmes, T., Spears, R., & Lea, M. (1998). "Breaching or building social boundaries? SIDE-effects of computer-mediated communication". Communication Research (25): 689–715. FREE PDF


Is it possible to create an inhibition against some activities?

There is an answer to the first part of your question here:  What causes behavioural inhibition?

I am answering this part of your question:
I'm interested in whether or not an inhibition can be psychologically created by choice against some bad habits (for example it could be the saviour of the people who are trying to quit smoking if, however bad they want to smoke, their hands just won't take a cigarette).

To induce inhibitory behaviour requires the use of negative reinforcement. To avoid punishment, or discomfort, an individual will learn to avoid a particular behaviour.

In the case of addiction (as mentioned in your example with cigarettes), the issue is:   Creating a negative reinforcement that causes greater   discomfort (referred to as negative affect in the article below) when using the drug, as opposed to the discomfort that results from abstinence.
The same can be drawn for behaviour payoffs. If a certain behaviour alleviates for example, anxiety, then the discomfort of the negative enforcement will need to be greater than the anxiety the individual is avoiding.
As one can imagine, it is not always easy to create a humane punishment that creates a discomfort greater than the what the individual seeks to avoid.

  This article offers a reformulation of the negative reinforcement
  model of drug addiction and proposes that the escape and avoidance of
  negative affect is the prepotent motive for addictive drug use. The
  authors posit that negative affect is the motivational core of the
  withdrawal syndrome and argue that, through repeated cycles of drug
  use and withdrawal, addicted organisms learn to detect interoceptive
  cues of negative affect preconsciously. Thus, the motivational basis
  of much drug use is opaque and tends not to reflect cognitive control.
  When either stressors or abstinence causes negative affect to grow and
  enter consciousness, increasing negative affect biases information
  processing in ways that promote renewed drug administration. After
  explicating their model, the authors address previous critiques of
  negative reinforcement models in light of their reformulation and
  review predictions generated by their model. (PsycINFO Database Record
  (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved) 1

 1 Addiction Motivation Reformulated: An Affective Processing Model of Negative Reinforcement.
Baker, Timothy B.; Piper, Megan E.; McCarthy, Danielle E.; Majeskie, Matthew R.; Fiore, Michael C.
Psychological Review, Vol 111(1), Jan 2004, 33-51. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.111.1.33


What are new and exciting research areas or applications in systems neuroscience?

As Chuck says in his comment, read, read, read - as you do, consider the following factors for your potential PhD:

What topics are PhD projects in available at the universities that you are considering. Be sure to check not only the project availability, but also the research interests of academics.
A PhD is quite a commitment, which topic would light that 'fire' in you to the extent that it could become a lifelong vocation.

As you read, read, read - ask questions of the academics in that field, download their papers and have a look at what directions that particular research is taking.


Are Pareto charts identified in the cognitive sciences (and for willpower in particular)?

Regarding reducing one's anxiety, a "meta-analytic review" by Cheng et al. (2014) published in a fairly high-impact venue suggests that coping flexibility is the stuff that matters... when it comes to coping outcomes, of course. (As the joke goes, madness is doing the same thing and expecting different results.) What exactly coping flexibility is isn't so easy to pin down, but apparently some conceptions of that notion are better than others:

  Researchers have conceptualized coping flexibility in diverse ways: as a broad coping repertoire, a well-balanced coping profile, cross-situational variability in strategy deployment, a good strategy–situation fit, or the perceived ability to cope with environmental changes. [...] Studies adopting the perceived ability or strategy–situation fit conceptualization yielded moderate effect sizes, whereas those adopting the broad repertoire, balanced profile, or cross-situational variability conceptualization yielded small effect sizes.

The notion of strategy–situation fit seems largely derived from the CAPS theory. For a more recent (quantitative) work of that kind see e.g. Kato (2012).

The meta-analysis by Cheng et al. also identified a small role played by individualism (and age):

  In addition, the positive link between coping flexibility and psychological adjustment was stronger in samples from countries lower (vs. higher) in individualism and samples with higher (vs. lower) average ages. Individualism and age explained 10% and 13% of the variance, respectively.

(Cheng et al. also conducted a quantitative analysis of publication bias for the set of studies they considered and concluded that "publication bias is not a concern".)

Having said that coping is basically reducing your own stress, which is not the same thing as achieving some externally set goal (e.g. meeting society's expectation in some regard). I'm not sure what research has to say with respect to "willpower" strategies for the latter. Clearly if one considers unreasonable goals in some societies (e.g. eliminating homosexuality) probably no such "willpower" strategy is going to work. It would be more interesting how less incongruent goals fare; from Koestner et al. (2014)

  research has begun to show that support for
  autonomy facilitates goal progress, whereas more directive
  forms of support appear to be less consistently helpful, or even
  unhelpful.

There's a substantial body of work on the effects of goal setting. I'm not incredibly familiar with it, but one highly cited line of work by Locke and Latham (see 2006 update or the Wikipedia page on it) finds that setting high bars is better than "best effort" approaches as far as achievements go.

There's also a substantial body of work on conflicting goals, e.g. see Fishbach and Dhar (2005), but such research doesn't seem to involve ranking strategies. Note that reducing your own anxiety and achieving some externally imposed goal may well be conflicting goals.


James Randi is a famous skeptic who challenges paranormal and pseudoscientific claims. Pseudoscience consists of statements, beliefs, or practices may give the appearance of being scientific, but, are untestable. James Randi's claim is that the Silva method is untestable and, therefore, unscientific.  In other words, the Silva method has no observable (or statistically significant) effect on memory, learning or telepathy.


Why are humans the only species to maintain relationships with other animals simply for pleasure?

According to Hal Herzog, humans are the only animals that keep pets. Other animals have also kept pets however it was not under natural settings. These other "pet" relationships were observed in zoos, controlled experiments. etc.

One the main reasons Herzog notes that humans are the only animals to keep pets is the idea of culture. Humans have evolved to form a culture with social rules and norms. They can gather social information from others by relying on certain cultural rules. So it is acceptable for humans to form pet relationships with other animals. Some cultures do not have a word for pet. However ultimately these cultures end up forming relationships with animals that are "pet-like." The reason for this is because of memes. That is, the idea of having a pet spreads across different cultures.


Does high IQ give cause to doubt an ADHD diagnosis?

Sounds to me like someone is making a logical fallacy here, though the origin of this fallacy isn't clear to me.

We cannot go from 'poor academic performance', to 'not amounting to anything', to 'having a low IQ'. These are not relationships of cause and effect.

The motivation to do something ('amount to something', if you will) is driven primarily by the reward-center. The neurotransmitter 'dopamine' is considered to be a large player in this game. Dopamine tends to project to the areas associated with reward (and these areas are clustered into the abstraction known as the pleasure center). Incidentally, ADHD has shown to be a dysfunction of executive reasoning as a result of low dopamine levels.

IQ is not determined by executive functioning. IQ is almost independent of executive functioning. If they were interchangeable, then Albert Einstein would have a very low IQ compared to, say, Donald Trump. I say that it is 'almost' independent because it is not clear that there is no relationship between the two at all. Studies have shown that ADHD sufferers show an average increase of 4.5 IQ points after long-term use of dopamine-reuptake inhibitors. [1]

You might also be interested in this page to answer the second part(?) of your question. It is well-written and extremely insightful.

Sources:

[1] Millichap JG (2010). "Chapter 3: Medications for ADHD". In Millichap JG. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Handbook: A Physician's Guide to ADHD (2nd ed.). New York: Springer. pp. 121–123.


Which ready-made programs can I use for running a preference-rating experiment?

I have been using TRUE and it seems quite fine. There is free access to
TRUE online version.


Recommend a book for studying the brain structure

I have a couple of reference recommendations for you, please take these with a truck load of salt as I am just an enthusiast in this field - given this, the criteria I tend to go by are - ease-to-understand and interest-factor (ie. gets me thinking) - as I do not know where you are, I am not sure of their costs for you:

Brain, Mind and the Structure of Reality (Nunez, 2010).

This book brings together neuroscience and links it to other related fields related to cognition and how we perceive the world.

Atlas of Brain Function (Orrison, 2008).

This book has a glossary as well as the details and results of imaging.

Biology of Mind (Bownds, 1999).

Even though this reference is a bit dated, it is a good starting point about brain structures and the evolution of the human brain.

Hope these are a bit helpful.


Are younger people less capable of driving?

Research shows that teenagers are not any less capable at driving, per se, but that the adolescent brain undergoes a period of neural changes that often lends itself to risk-seeking behavior. From Somerville et. al (2010):

  In adolescence, there is a heightened propensity to engage in risky behaviors that can lead to negative outcomes, including substance abuse, unprotected sex, inflicting harm on others, injuries, and death. According to the 2007 Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS, Eaton, et al., 2008) the four leading causes of death that account for 72% of adolescent mortality – motor vehicle accidents, unintentional injuries, homicide, and suicide - are preventable. Such statistics suggest that these fatalities may be attributed, in part, to poor choices or risky actions (e.g., accidents, injuries) and/or heightened emotionality (e.g., suicide) underscoring the importance of understanding the biological basis of emotional and incentive-seeking behavior of adolescents, the focus of the present review.

The paper goes on to discuss how the intensity of young adults' emotional states relative to those of adults, as well as a heightened sensitivity toward reward (as well as an immature 'self-regulatory competence') are all underlying factors.

I think that this is what your article is referring to when it mentions that teenagers have 'less-developed brains'. On the other hand, one could argue the opposite. With puberty and adolescent development comes an influx of hormonal changes. With these changes come developments and mental states that are novel, new, and (at first) difficult to control. From this perspective, it is less a question of the brain being 'less-developed' -- on the contrary, there is 'too much' new development in puberty and adolescence, which can be overwhelming. As we learn to cope with these new developments with time and experience, they become easier to manage and control.


Moral Foundations Theory and trigger word combinations

I am a research psychologist working with moral foundations theory and messaging and I haven't seen these particular questions addressed. But you maybe interested to see work that uses different framed messages with these 'trigger words' in different populations (e.g., by political orientation) and measures outcomes, e.g.,

  The Moral Roots of Environmental Attitudes - Feinberg & Willer
  journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0956797612449177


Able to type promptly, but doubt validity when spelling it out?

I'm not sure I know a name for the phenomenon, but the general idea is that for patterns of info you retrieve consistently in certain ways (e.g., typing into a standard phone key pad), you have formed consist mappings between your cognitions and your motor responses. The original work on this was done by Richard Shiffrin and Walt Schneider (1976, 1977?). Their works is real low-level, but what you have done is automatized a certain retrieval-execution circuit that "fires off" less-optimally when someone asks for that info in a different circumstance (e.g., on the phone with someone you have never talked to before like a tech rep), and you have to generate it without other tactile and visual cues (like a keyboard).

Hope that helps. If you google scholar "skill automization" there will be a rabbit-hole of information 40 years deep. I think there is a chapter by Reason in 1990? that has come cool, easy to digest implications of automization for errors in behavior and thought (e.g. "Freudian slips").


Frequency at which electrodermal response should be measured

A starting point is the full text chapter "The Electrodermal Response", describes electrodermal response as being based on:

  Interest in the conductance between skin electrodes, usually placed at the palmar surface, arose because of the involvement of the sweat glands in this measurement. Since sweat gland activity, in turn, is controlled by sympathetic nerve activity, this measurement has been considered as an ideal way to monitor the autonomic nervous system

Given that it takes time for processes in the human body to occur, the time delay or latency for the electrodermal response is due to, (from the article):

  If one assumes initial resting conditions, then
  a sweat response consists of sweat rising in the ducts
  , and correspondingly R2 slowly diminishes. The response latency is associated with the time required for this to take place.

Further information that may be of use:

"Electrodermal response propagation time as a potential psychophysiological marker." (Silva et al. 2012). (Unfortunately the article is behind a pay-wall)

An important point from their abstract:

  So far, there is still no clear consensus regarding the relation between the specific responses of the autonomic nervous system activity, and the features typically extracted from the electrodermal activity signals.

However,

  In this paper we present an experimental setup and corresponding data analysis for electrodermal response propagation time measurement.


What causes dreamers to accept dreams as reality?

If you are searching specific part of the brain, I think that frontal regions of cortex will be an answer(In particular, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex which was associated with self-focused metacognitive evaluation). But, as it common in real life, becoming aware of dreaming state required coordinated work of different parts of brain.
You can read this very good article and wiki of course.

  Lucid dreaming is characterized by a regaining of higher cognitive capabilities, eventually leading to the awareness of the dreaming state. Recent quantitative EEG data have shown that this wake-like intellectual clarity is paralleled by neural activations in frontal and frontolateral regions. Likewise, PET data show cognitive control in dreams to be associated with activation of frontal cortex components. via


Why is the last part(transmit) of the Feynman learning technique optional?

From your source:

If you really want to be sure of your understanding, run it past someone (ideally someone who knows little of the subject). The ultimate test of your knowledge is your capacity to convey it to another. You can read out directly what you’ve written. You can present the material like a lecture. You can ask your friends for a few minutes of their time while you’re buying them dinner. You can volunteer as a guest speaker in your child’s classroom or your parents’ retirement residence. All that really matters is that you attempt to transmit the material to at least one person who isn’t that familiar with it.

This step being "optional" in this particular write up (it isn't noted as such everywhere) is just a practical matter; the author does not want you to be discouraged and feel the technique cannot be applied when you don't have someone else to teach to or don't feel comfortable doing this. It's suggesting that it's ideal to spread what you've learned as a final check on your knowledge, with some ideas here of how to accomplish that, but failing to do so doesn't make the other steps useless, it just makes it slightly incomplete.


Why does munching sound unpleasant to most people?

I have speculated that it arises from two cognitive biases — but pardon that I will present my conjecture without citations.  (This isn't my focal area)

our bias for music shows we dis-prefer arhythmic noises.
the arhythmic noise is unpredictable.

I think there may also be dissonance between a sympathetic response (to hunger at food odors and others' savoring of flavors), against a conscious choice not to be eating at that time. (only in the case where the person(s) experience misophonia are not also eating)


"Do it yourself" Cognitive-Behavioral-Therapy-style intervention methods

Actually, reconceptualization is only one tool of CBT.

The basis is still what you might call "conditioning" or "skills training" (depending on the disorder). The depressed person does not "think away" (or "feel away") his depression, but learns and practices new behaviors until they become habitual. And it is this behavior change that leads to different experiences, new insights, and to a different "feeling" and "thinking".

For example, a person with Social Anxiety will simply learn social skills and practice them until they become second nature. This person experiences that they are not repulsive (as they had thought), when their new skills (e.g. smiling when approaching a stranger) lead to positive outcomes (e.g. the stranger smiling back). Discussing the mental concepts ("Believing that you are repulsive has the function to help you avoid situations that cause you fear.") and changing them ("I behave in a way that repulses people, and I can change that behavior.") helps motivate the patient to commit to the therapy and supports the practical exercises.

Reconceptualization accompanies behavioral methods and complements them. That is why it is not called Cognitive Therapy, but Cognitive Behavioral Therapy.

Basically, what CBT does is "faking it": you act as if you weren't afraid of spiders, until you have lost your fear; you act as if you weren't depressed, until you no longer are. The C-part helps you understand what you are doing and process your experiences.

What you also need to keep in mind is that behavior change might entail removing the patient from a pathogenic environment. For example, an alcoholic might profit from not going to bars to meet his dinking buddies. A depressive might profit from divorcing an abusive spouse or finding a job more in tune with his values and interests.

Reading through the old edits of your question, I realize that I have probably misunderstood your intent. Please comment, if you are looking for something else.


How does displaying existing votes to a poll influence subsequent voting behaviour?

Yes, this does happen. It is called an information cascade. From Wikipedia:

  An information (or informational) cascade occurs when people observe the actions of others and then make the same choice that the others have made, independently of their own private information signals.

There is lots of evidence that people will abandon their own opinions and conform to the opinion of the masses (see the Asch conformity experiments). Depending on the domain, there could be many explanations for this. A non-exhaustive list includes:

the decision-maker may be uncertain and believe that the masses, on average, will make the correct decision
the decision-maker may want to avoid being on the 'losing' end of things (social pressure)
the decision-maker may want to avoid responsibility
the decision-maker may not want to expend cognitive resources making a difficult decision

Do smart respondents resist this influence?

My brief research did not turn up any articles on the effect of intelligence on susceptibility to this effect. However it should be noted that there is no reason a "smart" voter should resist a cascade, and in fact it may be smarter to conform to the cascade. Consider the situation where your favored candidate is losing in the polls. Your second-favorite and least-favorite candidates are in a dead heat for first place. A rational voter might actually vote for his second-favorite candidate to prevent his least-favorite candidate from winning.

Does this happen in real-life major governmental elections?

While information cascades certainly exist, I'm not aware of any proof that an information cascade has affected a real-world, major governmental election. Which isn't to say this hasn't happened, only that the evidence is contentious. (It's generally hard to prove this kind of stuff outside a laboratory.)

Battaglini (2004) states:

  Despite the fact that much attention in the theoretical literature has been focused on simultaneous voting mechanisms, many important decisions are actually taken in sequential
  mechanisms. This is certainly the case of presidential primaries, and of roll-call voting
  in legislatures; but it is often the case that even mechanisms that are supposed to be
  simultaneous, are not in practice, because late voters generally have access to exit polls
  and other information describing the choice of early voters.1
  A famous example is the 1980
  Presidential election in which the news that Ronald Reagan was winning by a landslide
  changed expectation “suddenly and dramatically.”2
  The “popular” intuition, therefore,
  is that because of bandwagon eﬀects, timing matters. This view is also supported with
  strong historical and experimental evidence (see Hung and Plott, 2000, and Morton and
  Williams, 2000a and 2000b).

This literature is not my area of expertise, but this article seems relevant and provides several pertinent citations:

  Battaglini, M. (2005). Sequential voting with abstention. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2), 445-463. PDF


Effects of treatment versus psychotherapy on mental health of transgender people

Johns Hopkins did stop doing gender reassignment surgery and one of their psychiatrists apparently says that

  The suicide rate among transgendered people who had the surgery is 20 times higher

He also apparently says that

  transgenderism is a “mental disorder” that merits treatment, that sex change is “biologically impossible,” and that people who promote sexual reassignment surgery are collaborating with and promoting a mental disorder.

According to this website, the Johns Hopkins psychiatrist involved has a history of speaking out against transgendered people.

On the flip side, the DSM-5 (5th Edition of the Diagnostics and Statistics Manual) in 2013 added Gender Dysphoria as the new term for Gender Identity Disorder in order to try and prevent stigma; and current case reports offer no evidence that psychotherapy offers total and long-standing change of gender dysphoria.


Understanding neuronal firing in the context of Spike Timing Dependent Plasticity

Not sure I understand your question correctly.  What is it you can't find anywhere?  I would comment and ask for clarification, but that requires 50 rep which I don't have in this community.  Just tell me if my reply doesn't answer your question and I'll update.

There are two basic ways to describe neurons' firing.  One is rate-based and the other is spiking.
In rate-based neural networks, we look at the intensity, as it were, of a neuron's response to a certain input.
Within the framework of rate-based neural networks, we usually assign numbers to firing rates without attaching any units.
That is, in the model of a neural network, we may say that the response of a neuron has a firing rate of 0.8, but we don't specify 0.8 of what this is (spikes per second, per 10 seconds, per minute...), and it usually doesn't matter either, because all that is important is that it is more or less than the response of another neuron or to a different stimulus.
Note that this presumes that the rate is constant after the stimulus is presented.

In spiking neural networks, we model neurons' responses in much greater detail, designing differential equations which describe the time course of polarization and depolarization, such that a given depolarization can lead to explosive behavior which we call a 'spike'.

Now, many instances of neural information processing can be described very adequately using rate-based abstractions.
This is convenient, because rate-based ANN tend to be much more stable and computationally more efficient.
Also, biological neural firing can be measured much more easily in terms of intensity than in terms of spiking---especially for whole populations.
Therefore, we know more about many of the phenomena we try to model in terms of firing rates than in terms of timing, so rate-based neural networks actually capture our knowledge better.

Only in those cases where we have information about the precise timing of responses, and where we believe it to be important for the phenomena we try to model, does it make sense to accept the much more specific and difficult ontological commitments of spiking neural networks.
Otherwise, we understand what is happening in terms of intensity, not timing, and therefore the actual number of spikes per second do not matter.

The point is, 'firing' refers to related but very different concepts in the two abstractions of biological neurons, and they can't really be compared.
Either you talk about individual spikes in a spiking model, or you talk about rates of spiking over some non-descript unit of time in a rate-based ANN, but trying too hard to compare the two concepts will lead to confusing and nonsensical situations.


Does creativity decrease when invested in multiple areas?

There are two sources of creativity, the within-domain analogies and the between-domain analogies. Within-domain analogies are less original but more easy to apply and use. Between-domain analogies are far more original but usually need a lot of work to apply them in the target domain. (see this book for more info)

Within-domain analogies may be quite effective in making the resulting design solutions more useful, since the sources may be
industry standards that are effective and tested. But the resulting
solutions are less original.
Between-domain analogy. Random between-domain cues have a positive
affect on originality.

In the community of innovation T-shaped persons are highly valued. These individuals are very specialized in one area (the vertical line of T) and also have a broad but shallow knowledge of many other disciplines (the horizontal line of T).

The vertical bar on the T represents the depth of related skills and
expertise in a single field, whereas the horizontal bar is the ability
to collaborate across disciplines with experts in other areas and to
apply knowledge in areas of expertise other than one's own.

You will not "run-out" of creativity, it is simply a matter of resource allocation. You should spend most of your time at your specialized field, but at the same time you must allocate a significant proportion of your time in other fields like physics, philosophy, history, music, engineering, biology or even to more diverse domains like fishing, sports etc. This way you will create a T-shape knowledge which according to the above references, will make you more creative and more usefull.


Term for behaviour of transfering personal problems to other people and trying to solve them there?

There are a couple of defence mechanisms that may fit the bill.  Keep in mind that these defence mechanisms typically involve an unconscious denial of the problem - ie, they apply to people who don't admit to the problem in themselves.
Projection:

... a theory in psychology in which humans defend themselves against
unpleasant impulses by denying their existence in themselves, while
attributing them to others. For example, a person who is rude may
constantly accuse other people of being rude.

Someone with a time management problem may constantly focus on and accuse others of being late, while someone with a drinking problem may imply that others around them have this problem rather than themselves.
Reaction formation:

... a defensive process (defense mechanism) in which emotions and
impulses which are anxiety-producing or perceived to be unacceptable
are mastered by exaggeration (hypertrophy) of the directly opposing
tendency.

Someone with a time management problem may actively promote the importance of punctuality and time tracking, while someone with a drinking problem may act as a spokesperson for the virtues of abstinence.
Note that the construct of defence mechanisms in general is outdated and has largely been superseded by cognitive dissonance theory.


Why does Jung suggest that we need to defend our psyche from original religious experience?

For a really quick and clear understanding of why sometimes it is better to stay in the container of dogma read Edward Edinger's Moby Dick.
Jung's position is that religious energy must only sometimes be defended against. The entire process of Jungian Analysis does, in fact, consist of a process of contacting one's own religious experience in a first-hand, non-dogmatic (responsible, discriminated) way. This process is what Jung developed and described in the Red Book and consists of analyzing one's dreams (which are essentially products of religious experience) active imagination, and discovering the religious energies in one's own, individual psyche.  However, Jung said in many places that Analysis was not for everybody, and if you can stay in the "container" of dogma contentedly, do so. He advocated Analysis only when your religious container was broken and neurotic symptoms where beginning to appear. I.e., those for whom the old dogmas would no longer work.
To understand the power of the psyche's religious function, consider St. Paul's experience on the road to Damascus. He was knocked off his horse and went temporarily blind from having a religious experience (i.e., moving from persecuting Christians, to suddenly being converted to a Christian.) Similarly, think of Islamic religious fundamentalism; here is an example of religious energy coming up in raw form. It's not that that energy is "bad;" it is that it has not been reflected upon by the ego, the conscious mind, in a modern way, and the energy coming from the religious function is not "channeled," or "well-contained."
Consider also the numerous cults gone awry: Jamestown, Nazism, etc. The appendix in Edinger's book The New God Image is worth studying here. If that's the best you can do with your religious energy, better to stay in dogma. . . .
Jung frequently establishes his point of view by reviewing what others have thought and done in history. He does this to show that there is a psychological necessity and historical precedent for what he is saying. The repression or suppression of the individual religious experience has been the historical position of much organized religion, particularly Christianity, for millennia.  The Catholic position has been that all believing Catholics need to "adopt the official dogma" (only Jesus and a few saints get to have a first-hand, non-dogmatic experience.) So Jung is just saying that throughout history, the need to contain religious energy in something has been found to be a necessity. (Esther Harding's Psychic Energy: It's Source and Transformation is particularly clear on this.)
See also Edward Edinger's many other books on this topic, for instance

The Psyche in
Antiquity.,

Transformation of the God
Image,

Transformation of
Libido
and

The Christian
Archetype.

Lawrence Jaffe's Celebrating
Soul
might also be useful.


Lucid dreaming is a practice in buddhism. La Berge (1980) describes in some detail how he learned to dream lucidly, and several authors managed to induce lucid dreams in their test subjects through electrostimulation, food supplements and other means. There are some popular books that claim to teach the skill, some of them written by La Berge.


Neurophysiological indications of focus and motivation

Focus and motives are very different cognitive processes. Essentially focus would be attention, while motivation is a complex neurocognitive process, such as hunger or thirst, which drives attentional orientation.

I'm going to have to break this down a bit further because motivation is largely considered two processes 'wanting' and 'liking'. 'Wanting' is the drive to obtain a motivational object, such as food. While 'Liking' is the assessment of the motivational object. So if a digestive tract is empty of food it will typically send chemical signals telling the brain its empty, amongst a whole host of other factors but lets not get into that. As a result we will 'want' food, and this alters the hedonic value of food, which ultimately influences its salience (how much it grabs your attention). And its representation in the brain, all of this is done to draw your attention towards the motivational target, or make us seek it out. Once the target i.e. food, is obtained it is consumed, this is the point at which it is assessed for how much we 'like' it. All of this is done by a neural system, often referred to as the reward circuit. The reward circuit is made up of a number of brain areas (nuclei), so many it would take an dissertation to write about them all however the main constituents are: Nucleus Accumbens, Ventral Tegmented area and the parabracial nucleus. Changes in these structures appear to influence activity in the cingulate cortex (likely to do affective assessment and memory) and orbitofrontal cortex (attention, inhibition, hedonic value, etc). As you can see this is just gross anatomy, these structures are involved in a variety of cognitive processes.

Going by your question I imagine you are interested in the drive to behaviour or determination. The nucleus Accumbent shell is considered responsible for this, although I think thats like saying wembley is responsible for one of two teams winning a football match. The resolution in functional signals has a long way to go. Anyhow endocannabinoids are thought to be responsible for modulating the increase in eating or rather 'wanting' to eat, they do this by increasing the hedonic-value of the motivational target. Hence cannabis give people the 'munchies' and can make them feel sexually aroused.

So to answer your question can we measure this? Yes and no. fMRI can detect motivation-related activity in NA shell, but there is alot going on in that area so there is bond to be noise that must be controlled for in any design. But essentially you can show someone images of food before and after eating and measure their neural responses. However I must stress that the NA is not the only area involved in this motivational process.

As for EEG, research is a bit inconsistent and I would feel uneasy recommending anything from this area. This is mostly because motivational processing is largely conducted in subcortical structures, which EEG isn't really the best method of investigation for. However it can be used for detecting arousal, but cognitive arousal can occur as a result of merely interesting or treating stimuli.

Another method are implicit cognitive measures and eye tracking, this is a growing field. Measures include, visual-search tasks, dot-probe, stroop, go/n-go, attentional blink tasks etc. What this area tends to show is that people are more attentive to motivationally-relevant stimuli i.e. more attentive to food when they are hungry. Although some research shows that people attend to such stimuli regardless of motivational state, the methods here are constantly being updated as they are still relatively new methods.

Finally and importantly do any measures discriminate between levels of motivation? No, not any of the neural or cognitive measures I know of anyway, most are lucky to detect differences between fasted and fed states. There is work going on in this area, but so far differences in levels of motivational state are only collected on explicit measures such as VAS scales asking someone what there level of motivation is.

Sorry for lack of references SE only allows you two references on the first post in a new area of SE.


Where to find patient responses on Rorschach's Inkblot test?

Unfortunately, Exner scoring seems to be the standard for Rorschach test studies. The scores are likely a way of protecting patients that may give very personal answers that can identify them. For example, if a research subject reports the Rorschach image as reminding them of their hometown in Brooklyn and their mother who is a famous person, a research study that report raw data and raw responses will not pass ethics due to confidentiality issues.

You are right, most studies use the Exner reporting system -

Japanese study looking at young people with schizophrenia

Adolescent females study

You will likely need to contact studies and join teams that do Rorschach studies to learn the specifics for yourself. Unfortunately, you would not be able to cite or use it as the basis for your research.


Have any studies been done on the inheritability of different mental abilities such as short-term-memory, long term memory and so on.

One of the most replicated findings of behavioral genetics is that all psychological traits show significant and substantial genetic influence, however not 100% genetic influence (Plomin et al, 2016). So yes, short term memory has a heritability of larger than zero, but smaller than one.

  Many studies, if at all, seem to rely on an over-all IQ. This seems extremely wide-ranging when mental abilities can be made of so many different parts. Someone with a good memory may not have good reasoning skills etc.

It is certainly true that it is possible to have good memory and low reasoning ability (The most extreme being some savants, e.g. Kim Peek). However, abilities are positively correlated. Therefore, high ability X makes it statistically more likely that the individual is higher in ability Y as well, for practically any cognitive abilities X and Y (Certainly for memory and reasoning). This was discovered more than a century ago (Spearman, 1904). Although the increased likelihood may only be modest.

  For example if a man has a short term memory able to memorise 10 numbers at a time and a woman has a short-term-memory able to memorise 5 numbers at a time. How many numbers could their children memorise?

There are multiple reasons why you couldn't predict in any exact manner the short term memory abilities of the child.

First, while heritability is larger than zero, it is also smaller than one. In other words, not only genetic differences are responsible for differences in short term memory.

Second, the genetics are not even determined in a unique way from the parents. Said in another way, you cannot predict the exact genetic makeup of a child from its parents' DNA. It depends on how the recombination of the mother's and father's genes. The most obvious demonstration of this is that biological siblings do not have identical DNA. Therefore, even if short term memory was 100% heritable (It isn't), you still wouldn't be able to exactly predict the short term memory of the child just from knowing the parents.

The most you could say is statistical. Parents with better short term memory will, on average, have children with better short term memory.

  I seem to remember a documentary about the extraordinary memories of `native' Australians compared to their European descended compatriots. So this seems one piece of evidence that memory ability can be inherited.

Now you're getting into a socially sensitive topic of population differences in cognitive abilities. I don't know what documentary you've watched. Personally, I haven't seen the evidence that native Australians have extraordinary memory abilities. Of course, I would be open to see such evidence. However, one thing to note is that even if native Australians showed high ability in memory, that fact in itself does not prove that the difference is due to genetic differences. Memory is only partially heritable. It could simply be that due to whatever environmental or social cause that they showed enhanced memory. Of course, I'm not saying that it is impossible either.


Comparison of Aversion Therapy to other interventions for nail-biting

One of the techniques used for nail-biting is the (training) habit-reversal: Developed by Nathan H. Azrin and R. Gregory Nunn (1987) focused on the treatment of nervous habits (although in general, other authors in the clinical field developed it under different variation). It is not usually as well known as it should be, since during that time many techniques conditions were experienced: reciprocal inhibition and counterconditioning (Joseph Wolpe), exposure, alternative response, incompatible response.

Key:

Given a habit that we could qualify as negative linked to nerves or anxiety, select a response that ideally is incompatible with the negative habit (in any case compete strongly). The incompatible response fulfills the objectives, goals, motivation or causes that satisfied the negative habit, precisely about nervous habits is not convenient an increase of the anxiety, the person has developed the negative habit for reasonable reasons, whatever they are, and that habit is somehow adaptive and positive, surely to reduce anxiety). As in the case of self-instruction, it is not the point of whether the psychologist or therapist, or the client, select one or the other response, but must be meaningful and optimal for both of them.

Therefore it would be advisable to master previously:

Background, causes and triggers of behavior (motive or motivation of activity).
Knowledge about anxiety (different anxiety profiles) and exposure.
Reciprocal inhibition and counterconditioning.
Therapy based on the alternative response.
Therapy based on incompatible response.

A very flexible and wide-ranging approach so that it can be integrated as a training and in conjunction with other techniques.


Coaching is not as well researched and not as well conceptualized as for example psychotherapy. There are no clear and distinct schools and approaches, especially since many certifying institutes require by contract that the coaches they train must not disclose the copyrighted methods to third parties.

Generally, literature on coaching and the reports of coaches show that coaching uses a "toolbox" of methods taken from any and all schools of psychotherapy (from behavioral therapy to humanistic therapy to Gestalt therapy to psychoanalysis to systemic therapy and so on) and sociology as well as other, even New Age methods (see for example Rupert, 1992) of personality development, most prominently NLP. Usually the tools are used in an eclectic, "experimental" (try-what-works) manner. Rarely is there a theoretic "framing" of methodology (one example is Schmidt-Lellek & Schreyögg, 2008, who use a phenomenological frame).

Sources:

(I'm currently enrolled in a psychological seminar on methods in and evaluation of coaching)
Rupert, G. (1992). Employing the New Age: training seminars. In J. R. Lewis & J. G. Melton (Eds.), Perspectives on the New Age. Albany, NY: SUNY Press., 127-35.
Schmidt-Lellek, C. J., & Schreyögg, A. (Eds.) (2008). Praxeologie des Coaching. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften