Is there a difference between physiological stimulations and psychological stimulations?

Psychology and physiology are at different levels of explanation or levels of analysis. The answer depends entirely on how you view the relationship between such levels and in particular (mental) causality within and between levels. As this is still heavily debated, this metaphysical consideration is a precursor for giving a more specific answer to your question. Some options:

The physicalist and reductionist answer is probably the simplest: they are the same thing, only physical stimulation is the only real one! According to this view, Psychology is an (epiphenomenal) abstraction which is entirely realized by lower levels. Therefore, there can only be psychological stimulation in the presence of physical stimulation, but the latter may occur without the former being intrinsic to that. As an example, you present a snake to the subject to elicit psychological fear, but the physical stimulation (photons tranduced by the retina and the pressure transduced by the cutaneous receptors in the skin) is a necessity for this to happen. If you count neuronal activity as physical self-stimulation, then fearful memories could be cast in the same language.

Others try to keep the relationship between levels less well defined. For example, if you align more with emergentism, poetic naturalism, or the like, you acknowledge the underlying physical reality, but you want to keep the causal language such as "the snake made him fearful" within a given level of analysis rather than crossing levels. So the answer to your question is that there IS no difference, but you better act as if there is because you'll miss something or get confused if you don't.

A dualist, of course, would hold that physical stimulation and psychological stimulation can (at list in principle) occur in its own right. Usually, they have great difficulties answering the very question you pose, and even though most people in their day-to-day lives tend to think dualistically (as intuitive psychologists), very few defend dualism in academia nowadays.

There are other positions as well, and each of the above has many branches. But the above should give some search terms to get acquainted with the heavy players in the field.


How synapses are hold in place if they're not phisically attached?

There is a physical connection.

Synapses are held together by adhesion molecules, like cadherins and neuroligins/neurexins.

Missler, M., Südhof, T. C., & Biederer, T. (2012). Synaptic cell adhesion. Cold Spring Harbor perspectives in biology, 4(4), a005694.


Is it true that stimulants make neurons fire more often, and depressants make them fire less often?

Short answer
Generally spoken, yes.

Background
Excitatory neurotransmitters lower the firing threshold, inhibitory neurotransmitters raise the firing threshold (Fig. 1).

For example, glutamate is the principle excitatory neurotransmitter in the central nervous system (contrary to what you pose in your question!). Glutamate (Glu) has multiple receptors associated with it. Each and every one of them has an excitatory effect on the postsynaptic neuron. For example, NMDA receptors are ligand-operated cation channels and binding of Glu causes the channel to open. Influx of Na+ depolarizes the neuron and increases the likelihood it will reach firing threshold. Likewise, AMPA receptors lower firing threshold by opening of Na+ channels, as does acetylcholine abundant in the peripheral nervous system. Note that the metabotropic Glu receptors have other, indirect effects on the cell.

Inhibitory neurotransmitters like GABA, being the principal counterpart of Glu in the central nervous system operates by opening Cl- channels associated with the GABAA receptor. Influx of negative charge hyperpolarizes the neuron and hence increases firing threshold and hence causes the postsynaptic neuron to fire less often. Dopamine receptors are of the metabotropic class and have more indirect effects.

Fig. 1. Excitatory and inhibitory neurotransmitter responses. source: Study Blue


How does body temperature affect perception of time?

It seems that there is a research literature on the topic of the relationship between body temperature and time perception.

Weardon and Penon-Voak (1995) present a literature review of the topic which would be worth reading if this interests you. The following quotes their abstract:

  Experiments investigating timing behaviour in humans under conditions
  where body temperature was raised or (much more rarely) lowered,
  dating from 1927 to 1993, were reviewed. These tested the hypothesis
  that humans possess a temperature-sensitive chemical or bio!g,gical
  internal clock. Most studies used conditions in which subjects
  produced or estimated durations less than 100 sec long, probably using
  chronometric counting, but other experimental paradigms were sometimes
  employed. Data from each study were expressed in a uniform fashion, as
  plots of changes in the rate of subjective time (estimated from
  changes in timing behaviour) against changes in body temperature. In
  almost all cases, rate of subjective time increased when body
  temperature increased above normal, and decreased when body
  temperature was lowered below normal, although observations of the
  latter type were rare. The data also suggested a parametric effect of
  body temperature, with higher temperatures generally producing faster
  subjective time. Some possible mechanisms for the effects obtained
  were discussed, with the most promising explanation probably being
  that the temperature manipulation produces changes in arousal.

Aschoff  (1998) also summarises some of this literature and highlights the important distinction between time frames of time perception:

  From the point of view of a chronobiologist, human time perception can
  be divided into 2 distinct classes that differ in their interaction
  with the circadian system: short time intervals in the range of
  seconds (up to about 2 min) ... [and]... long time intervals, such as 1 h...
  The production of short intervals shows a negative correlation with
  body temperature and a positive correlation with the intensity of
  illumination, while the 1-h intervals are independent of both these
  variables. For the short time intervals, the negative correlation
  with body temperature has often been documented (Aschoff and Daan,
  1997; Francois, 1927; Hancock, 1993; Hoagland, 1933; Pfaff, 1968;
  Wearden and Penton-Voak, 1995), and 2 publications give strong
  evidence for a positive correlation with light intensity (Aschoff and
  Daan, 1997; Pöppel and Giedke, 1970). With regard to the 1-h
  intervals, an independence of light intensity is well supported
  (Aschoff and Daan, 1997).

Hancock (1993) summarised the literature and discussed the proposed mechanism:

  The general notion of a temperature influence on time perception may
  be traced to Pieron (1923,1945)[1] who suggested that "if the speed of
  organic processes are modified, by variation and temperature for
  instance, mental time will increase or decrease proportionally." It
  was Pieron's student Francois (1927 a, b), however, who conducted the
  original empirical evaluations of the proposition. Yet, it is Hoagland
  who is associated most frequently with this general effect, mainly
  because of his postulate of a chemical clock to control estimates of
  duration. Using both his own data and those previously collected by
  Francois, Hoagland (1933) proposed that estimates of duration were
  directly dependent on internal body temperature. He described this
  relationship through the Van't Hoff-Arrhenius equation, which
  describes the speed of a chemical reaction in relationship to its
  temperature in degrees Kelvin. In observing that the collective data
  provided a unitary slope value within this equation, Hoagland (1933)
  concluded that our judgments of time depend upon "an underlying
  chemical master reaction, implying an irreversible chemical mechanism
  controlling the consciousness of duration."

References

Aschoff J (1985) On the perception of time during prolonged
temporal isolation. Human Neurobiol 4:41-52.
Aschoff J and Daan S (1997) Human time perception in
temporal isolation: Effects of illumination intensity.
Chronobiol Internat 14:585-596.
Aschoff, J. (1998). Human perception of short and long time intervals: its correlation with body temperature and the duration of wake time. Journal of biological rhythms, 13, 437-442.
Francois, M. (1927a). Contribution a l'etude du sens du temps. La temperature inteme comme facteur de variation de l'appreciation subjective des durees. Annee Psychologie, 28,186-204.
Francois, M. (1927b). Influence de la temperature inteme sur notre appreciation du temps. C. R. Soc Biology, 108, 201-203.
Hancock, P.A. (1993). Body temperature influence on time perception. The Journal of general psychology, 120, 197-216. PDF
Hoagland, H. (1933). The physiological control of judgments of duration: Evidence of a chemical clock. Journal of General Psychology, 9, 267-287.
Pieron, H. (1923). Les problemes psychophysiologiques de la perception du temps. Annee Psychologie, 24, 1-25.
Pieron, H. (1945). The sensations: Their functions, processes and mechanisms. London: Muller.
Pfaff D (1968) Effects of temperature and time of day on time
judgments. J Experimental Psychol 76:419-422.
Pöppel E and Giedke H (1970) Diurnal variation of time
perception. Psychol Forschg 34:182-198.
Wearden JH and Penton-Voak IS (1995) Feeling the heat:
Body temperature and the rate of subjective time, revis-
ited. Quart J Exper Psychol 488:129-141


BCI has rougly two different approaches to extract features. I will address them both.

When EEG is recorded, you can see an pattern of activity in a particular channel over time. This is the time-domain. The time domain is predominantly used to analyze Event Related Potentials. One application within BCI is the P300 speller. A matrix of letters is shown and letters are highlighted one at a time. Whenever the letter you thought of (i.e. attended to, i.e expected) a component called the P300 will show a larger deflection.

The P300 (or P3) is a positive deflection around 300-400 milliseconds after presentation of a stimulus. The amplitude of the P300 is highers when you perceive something you expected, and smaller when something unexpected (or unattend) is seen. The P300 speller is a neat and simple way to spell out one letter at a time thus (see also Brain-computer interface with EEG: how to name imaginary movement of a non-self object?)

The Fast Fourier Transform (FTT), which you asked for, is used to transform the time-domain to the frequency domain. Every signal in the time-domain can be subdivided in simple sinusoids with different frequencies, amplitudes and phases. The amplitudes are also referred to as the power of the frequencies. The frequencies are grouped (see also Does stimulus-independent ERP make sense/ exist?) and the power is correlated to many many different cognitive states (sleepiness, attentiveness, etc. See also Are brain waves electromagnetic waves?)

BCI in the frequency domain makes use of the power of a frequency band. By focussing more or less attention, thereby de- or increasing the power in the alpha band, you can for instance move a cursor over a screen (also discussed here: Brain-computer interface with EEG: how to name imaginary movement of a non-self object?).

There is a third domain, namely the time-frequency domain (see How to compare brain waves?) and there are many more other ways to look at the data, such as coherence and synchronization, and I bet (but do not know) that it is used for BCI applications.

For some more reading on BCI see Is EEG brain-computer interface reliable?


How do memories come up for no apparent reason? Is this evidence that we remember everything?

Within the limbic system the hippocampus and  amygdala processes  memory. The hippocampus processes declarative memory, the memory  recalled in the form of thought.  The amygdala processes emotional memory.

hippocampus

  Hippocampal integrity plays a crucial role in intact memory functioning. Research has demonstrated that normal hippocampal development continues into early adulthood . Investigators specifically examining the development of the hippocampus have suggested that the hippocampal formation undergoes a steep increase in volume until approximately the second year of life, then the volume slowly increases throughout adolescence. 1

amygdala

  ...here is extensive evidence that the amygdala is involved in affectively influenced memory. The central hypothesis guiding the research reviewed in this paper is that emotional arousal activates the amygdala and that such activation results in the modulation of memory storage occurring in other brain regions.
  2

involuntary memory

  Involuntary autobiographical memories are conscious and unintended recollections of personal ex- periences.  ...
  involuntary retrieval, more fre- quently than word-cued memories, accesses memories of specific episodes and involves more mood impact and bodily reaction to the remembered events...
  Using a double-cuing methodology, Chu and Downes (2002) found that memories cued by smells were more vivid and detailed than memories cued by verbal labels
  and photographs of the sources of the odors. Herz and Schooler (2002) found that odor cues yielded more emo- tional memories than did verbal and visual cues
  3

Many cues can trigger involuntary memory. Memories triggered by smell, general evoke a larger emotional response with that memory as opposed to visual or verbal cues.

1. Abnormal Hippocampal Development in Children with Medulloblastoma Treated with Risk-Adapted Irradiation
Bonnie J. Nagela,g, Shawna L. Palmera, Wilburn E. Reddickb,f, John O. Glassb, Kathleen J. Heltonb, Shengjie Wuc, Xiaoping Xiongc, Larry E. Kunb, Amar Gajjard,e and Raymond K. Mulherna
2. Involvement of the amygdala in memory storage: Interaction with other brain systems
James L. McGaugh, Larry Cahill, and Benno Roozendaal
3. Memory & Cognition 2004, 32 (5), 789-803
The episodic nature of involuntary autobiographical memories
DORTHE BERNTSEN and NICOLINE MARIE HALL
University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark


At what point in our life do we know what is real?

Ability to distinguish reality from fantasy happens somewhere between 4 and 6. This is marked by the use of facts and evidence based research in deduction. This ability is gained through changes in the brain like increased cerebral volume, lateral ventricle volume, grey matter, white matter. Interesting the Mid-Sagittal Corpus Callosum also grows significantly during this time. The Corpus Callosum integrates signals from both sides of the brain but the Mid-Sagittal Corpus Callosum size has a negative correlation to IQ.

Anyone above age 6 who is unable to distinguish reality from fantasy based on evidence is maldeveloped. Some behaviors associated with fantasy, irrational behavior or spirituality are common throughout life. Spirituality would in this case involve any set of beliefs about God or the spirit or psychic realm which are not provable with evidence based observations by science. Irrational value and moral based systems are also normal. These beliefs are typically built on the foundation of spirituality. Some fantasy like beliefs about Santa and other non-spirit but magical creatures are also normal. Irrational behaviors like needing to double check to make sure the clothes iron is unplugged and doors are locked are also common. Problems arise and need to be treated when these types of behaviors begin to interfere with the life of the person experiencing the behavior or those surrounding.

In young adults psychosis result in mental illnesses marked by an inability to distinguish reality from hallucinations and delusions. Psychosis may be drug induced by hallucinogens like cocaine or occur because of a stress vulnerability to a mental illness. Schizo typical illnesses can range from the minute of hearing voices which are not really there  with odd behavior to the extreme of becoming totally immersed in a delusional states of dream like trances and losing touch with reality. Psychosis caused by mental illness is correctable with anti-psychotics. Major sedatives which help alleviate the insomnia immediately and over the course of months correct the dopamine overdose thought to be caused by psychosis. Some people must remain on maintenance levels of anti-psychotics all their lives.


Does identifying a student's sensory learning style and exploiting it result in significantly better performance?

I think your intuition might be correct. According to Hal Pashler, there is no real evidence for learning styles. The authors do not state that one particular learning style is applicable to everyone. Instead, they conclude that a particular subject may have a preferred learning style. For example, essay writing would have a preferred "verbal" learning style.

Source

Learning Styles: Concepts and Evidence by Pashler et al.Psychlogical Science in the Public Interest. Volume 9.3 (2008).


What is the best way to reduce measurement biases when studying topics that can evoke insecurity?

This isn't the exact answer to your question, but one way in which you can assess a person's likelihood of answering a measure honestly is the Social Desirability Scale (SDS). The SDS measures a participant's tendency to self-report responses that are viewed positively by society. Multiple versions of the SDS exist- here's an example of one.


Is it possible for any arbitrary able bodied human to develop exceptional cognitive talent & genius across multiple disciplines?

Can any arbitrary [able bodied] human become a genius across multiple
  disciplines or at least one discipline assuming that they have some
  Secondary Eduction in these disciplines?

No, not all able bodied humans will be able to be become a genius across one or more disciplines. Assuming genius in this context means someone achieving international acclaim for their accomplishments in a specific discipline, only a very small number of able bodied humans will be able to achieve this. This kind of rare accomplishment requires an uncommon interaction of intellect, work rate and opportunity amongst other factors, which is why most people do not achieve it. I am happy to expand on this answer if you want further clarification.

Edit 1:
Ok, let me reiterate what I said, but maybe make it clearer. Before I do that, I would just like to also add that one of the challenges with answering this question is the subjectivity involved. For instance, what are exceptional problem solving skills? For now, I will assume that you mean good enough for meeting the admission standards for one of these top level business schools. Assuming this is what you mean, I would still argue that not all able bodied humans will be able to develop exceptional problem solving skills across one or more disciplines.

Getting accepted to one of the business schools (i.e., demonstrating exceptional problem solving skills) is something that only the top x% of applicants will achieve. In developing these exceptional skills applicants will have benefited from the positive contribution of several different factors (what I referred to before as "the uncommon interaction") such as their intelligence,  physical and mental health, network, discipline, confidence. For instance, probably few or none of the applicants will be of average intelligence (e.g., having an IQ of 100), have got severely, or regualarly sick, had severe depression, had to work extensively to support their family, had bad role models, had below average discipline or self-belief etc. While some may have been disadvantaged in some ways (i.e., maybe they did have to work to support their family), these applicant will likely have been able to counteract this through advntages in other factors (i.e., being exceptionally smart). In summary, as this example hopefully serves to show, those who are able to get exceptional scores are those who have had exceptional combinations of the different factors. By definition exceptional means not normal,  therefore it would not be expected that such achievement would be within the reach of any able bodied human.

Having said all of this, what I will add is that most/many average individual ( interms of IQ/available time/movtivation etc) probably could probably become exceptional in one or more areas if given enough time - it is just that it would take a very long time for them to learn enough to be exceptional. Additionally, it would be most/many, but not certainly not all as some people (i.e., the unmotivated, the sick, the homeless etc) would have disadvantages that would prevent them from succeeding.


The following citations don't speak to starting slow, but they confirm that speed and accuracy increase with practise.

It is interesting that with practice, [...] limb trajectories get faster and more asymmetric (Elliott, Chua, Pollock, & Lyons, 1995; Khan & Franks, 2000).

Elliott, D., Hansen, S., Grierson, L.E.M., Lyons, J., Bennett, S.J., Hayes, S.J. 2010. Goal-directed aiming: two components but multiple processes. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 1023-1044. PDF page 5.

Decrease in endpoint variability occurs in conjunction with an increase in the peak velocity of the limb (e.g., Elliott et al., 1995).

(Elliott et al., 2010, PDF page 10)
Edit: Found some more relevant sources.

The group exposed to the slowest speed training program was the only group [...] which had significantly lower time-on-target scores from the control group who trained at the criterion speed.

Barbara E. Jensen (1975) Pretask Speed Training and Movement Complexity as Factors in Rotary Pursuit Skill Acquisition, Research Quarterly. American Alliance for Health, Physical Education and Recreation, 46:1, 1-11, DOI: 10.1080/10671315.1975.10615298

The effect of learning a novel skill at specific speeds on performance over a range of speeds was examined on the pursuit rotor. Three groups of subjects were given three days of training: Group 1 at 30 rpm, Group 2 at 60 rpm, and Group 3 at 30–45.60 rpm. Group 4, a control, practiced on a pegboard task during this period. On Days 4 and 5, all four groups were tested for transfer at 30, 45, and 60 rpm. For the most part, Group 3 appeared to perform equal to or better across the range of speeds than any of the other groups.

Siegel, D., & Davis, C. (1980). Transfer Effects of Learning at Specific Speeds on Performance over a Range of Speeds. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 50(1), 83–89. https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.1980.50.1.83

Speed and accuracy are two sides of the same skill coin. although there is a strong and widespread belief in industry that the instructor should focus on developing accuracy because speed will follow, that is not true. The research is clear: if you want speed and accuracy, you must train for both and preferably right from the start of training.

James, R. (1995). Chapter 8. In The techniques of instruction (p. 55). Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Gower.


Can observing neutral objects prime the brain to integrate them into new ideas in the waking state?

There is some support for a short-term day residue effect in the literature, but no support for a more extended dream-lag effect.

Nielsen and Powell (1992) published a test of the day residue effect (incorporation of material from the immediately preceding day) and the dream-lag effect (incorporation of material from 6–8 days prior). Based on dream journals and self-reports of daily events, they found evidence to support the day residue effect, but not the dream-lag effect.

A short 2005 Nature article by the same first author provides a review of the literature for memory's general relationship to dreaming, and includes a very nice summary of the different theories that are in play right now (Nielsen and Stenstrom, 2005).

References

Nielsen, T. A., & Powell, R. A. (1992). The day-residue and dream-lag effects: A literature review and limited replication of two temporal effects in dream formation. Dreaming, 2(2), 67.
Nielsen, T. A., & Stenstrom, P. (2005). What are the memory sources of dreaming?. Nature, 437(7063), 1286-1289.


Is there a way to use a STDP learning rule on rate-based neurons?

The appropriate way to do this is to find the cross-correlation of the time series of rates of the two neurons.  Then take the dot product of the cross correlation with the STDP kernel (i.e., the integral of the correspondence at each point in the STDP window between how much STDP "likes" cross correlation at that lag and how much cross correlation there actually was at that lag).  This gives a value that, when properly scaled, tells you the amount of weight change that synapse should receive.

In the first panel, the rates of two neurons in a simulation are shown in blue and red respectively.  A zoomed in view is shown (top middle) to emphasize that the blue neuron increases in firing rate slightly before red neuron.  The cross-correlation is plotted on bottom left.  A zoomed in view (bottom middle) emphasizes that the peak of the cross-correlation is slightly negative, corresponding to the fact that the blue neuron leads the red neuron.  We look at the cross-correlation just at lags where STDP is relevant (in this case +/- 100 ms, top right) and there is more correlation at slight negative lags, corresponding to the tendency of the blue neuron to lead.  We then multiply each lag in the cross-correlogram (top right) with the STDP kernel (bottom right) and sum over all relevant lags (between +/-100 ms) to get the value of the synaptic weight change. We can do this because we assume that the likelihood of having a spike lag of a certain amount is proportional to the cross-correlation of the rates at that lag (as probability of spiking is proportional to spike rate).  In this particular case, the weight change will be positive because there is cross-correlation during the positive part of the STDP kernel (lags <0) is greater than the cross-correlation during the negative part of the STDP kernel (lags >0).


I think the key concept to tackle this question is to consider the concept of abstraction.

Abstract models are generalized models of some kind "reality" that we are interested in, with the aim to describe some behavior of the system in question reasonably well. Often the abstraction should also be relevant to many instances of the entity that we would like to describe: If you want a abstract model to describe a human, you would probably want it to be useful to describe many humans, and not just a specific human. This might provide less detailed predictive power for individuals, but might be more useful to apply to populations.

When talking about the world or the reality in any kind of descriptive way, we are really always using abstract models to think, rationalize and communicate about it.

Now for your question, of course you can make an abstract model of a human being, but you would have to ask yourself on what level of detail you want. Ignoring the practical difficulties in constructing this, we have to consider that the path to a model that matches "reality" as good as possible is endless. For example, for you to successfully model a brain, you would in the end not only have to describe every atom of the brain, but the quarks and maybe end up all the way in string theory. And in the same time capturing all the emergent behavior down this chain and not only being a reductionist.

Theoretically, I'd say that the answer to your question is definitely yes, it would be theoretically possible to make a abstract model for a human mind that has "good enough" predictive power.

Everything we know about the real world is deterministic (except for some uncertainties if we get down to quantum mechanics, that probably would not have any significant influence on a very high-level system like a brain anyway). There is no scientific support that imaginal non-deterministic things like "free will" either exists or have any practical influence, so there is nothing except the pure complexity of the matter, our knowledge and our scientific processes that sets the limits for how detailed we can describe something.


Mulitiple partners: macho man vs. easy woman?

There are two very broad domains of theory that commonly address the double standard regarding promiscuity. Haven't got the time to lay it all out at the moment (would be happy to edit later to elaborate if you like; just comment on what aspects you'd like expanded!), but as you suspected, both biological and social factors pertain in ways that are essential to consider. In some senses the theories that focus on each oppose each other, as is a common consequence of any myopic discussion of an issue this complex and multidetermined. One answer focuses on one aspect, another answer focuses on another aspect, conflicting explanations and predictions arise, and hopefully the debate incorporates this...but unfortunately often, the original theorists who focus on one (their) side of the issue become invested and entrenched in their perspective, and dismissive of others (another example with which I'm personally familiar arose as the person-situation debate). Keep this in mind if you choose to read further into the literature on these theories. The best answer is often the one that is informed by both, or more accurately, all sides.

evolutionary psychology is the side that argues for explanations in terms of biological factors. Evolutionary theories pertaining to polygny and monogamy are not hard to find; even from a male perspective, there are competing motives to address here. Meanwhile, social-psychology has a lot to say about the influence of culture on social norms regarding promiscuity, particularly in women's studies. Again, a quick Google search on "women's studies sexual double standard" will give you more than you have time to read about that perspective. Bear in mind, these two are not the only ways to address the issue; they're just the most popular and most inclined to address this issue as a focal topic.

Enjoy, stay open-minded, and "trust no one [completely]!" :)


Where to post online psychology studies for participant recruitment?

Sites:

The social psychology network has a page for posting online social psychology studies. There are a range of requirements. In particular, it needs to be closely related to social or personality psychology.
SampleSize Subreddit is a community dedicated to completing surveys. They like it when results will be provided at study completion. It has close to 10,000 subscribers at time of posting. I have also seen posts to other subreddits such as the psych subreddit. However, such forums do not always react positively to such postings. If there is particular alignment between the topic and the reddit forum, then there is more likely to be a positive response.
Psychology Research on the Net is a site maintained by Dr John H. Krantz at Hanover College. It lists a lot of different studies.
Online Psychology Research UK contains several hundred studies and is maintained by Dr Kathryn Gardner from University of Central Lancashire.
PsychStudies is maintained by Andrew Thomas from Swansea University.
Psych Forums has a section for posting studies to a section of their forum. However, they do require some form of payment for posting.

General observations

Most of these forums require that you have ethics clearance.

Other strategies

As @lmjohns3 mentions Mechanical Turk is a more general strategy
http://beta.cognilab.com/ looks like it might try to make the process of using Mechanical Turk simpler
Many general purpose forums on the internet have an "off-topic" section, which can be effective if the topic of the study is aligned with the topic of the forum. In particular, I have heard about people getting very large samples when posting research surveys to appropriately themed SubReddits.


Does super-intelligence necessary lead to consciousness, self awareness, freewill or emotion

As the other response noted, a lot of the answers will depend on how you define the terms. Here, I will use Legg & Hutter's (2007) definition of intelligence, where an agent is intelligent if it can achieve a large variety of goals in a large variety of environments. For instance, a chess-playing robot is great at achieving the goal of winning at chess when it is in the environment of a chess game where nobody cheats or does anything else odd, but it fails miserably at just about everything else. So it has low intelligence. In contrast, a human can achieve many different goals in many different environments, from hunting food in a rainforest, to repairing solar panels while wearing a space suit on Earth's orbit. So a human has a considerably higher intelligence. See the paper for a formalization of this intuitive definition.

Note that a system can be exceedingly complex, or good at one thing, without necessarily being intelligent in this sense. Complexity does not imply intelligence by itself. But let's suppose that a system were intelligent in this sense? Well, let's tackle each of your terms in turn.

Self-awareness. One widely-used definition for self-awareness is being "aware of themselves as a differentiated and unique entity in the world". For instance, Rochat (2003) discusses the development of self-awareness in babies and very young children:

  All parents also notice an important change at around 2 years of age when children
  manifest ‘‘self-consciousness,’’ the so-called secondary emotions such as embarrassment or pride
  in very specific situations such as mirror exposure or competitive games (Kagan, 1984; Lewis,
  1992). Prior to the second year, an infant placed in front of a mirror will typically smile, coo, and
  explore in apparent delight of the perfect contingency between acted and seen movements
  bouncing back at them from the polished surface of the mirror (Amsterdam, 1972). By 2 years, the
  specular image is associated with radically different behaviors. Toddlers become typically frozen
  and sometime behave as if they wanted to hide themselves by tucking their head in their shoulders
  or hiding their face behind their hands. They show embarrassment. This is a robust phenomenon
  and one is naturally tempted to ask what it means psychologically for children in their development. [...]

  It appears indeed that by 2–3
  years young children do start to have others in mind when they behave. The expression of embarrassment
  that children often begin to display in front of mirrors at around this age is the
  expression of such ‘‘self-consciousness.’’ They behave not unlike criminals hiding their face to the
  cameras. Their behavior indicates a drive to vanish from the public eyes, as if they came to grip via
  the experience of their own specular image of how they present themselves to the world. Not only
  do they discover in the mirror that it is themselves, they also realize that it is themselves as
  perceived by others. The malaise might come from the realization of a fundamental discrepancy
  between how the child represents herself from within, and how he or she is actually perceived by
  others as reflected in the mirror.

So self-awareness implies an understanding of the fact that there is such a thing as a "me", which is separate from the world as a whole, and which others will perceive differently than it will perceive itself. There can also be varying levels of self-awareness, ranging from the level 1 self-awareness that newborn infants have ("immediately after birth, infants are capable of demonstrating
already a sense of their own body as a differentiated entity: an entity among other entities in the
environment") to level 5 self-awareness involving a theory of mind and an understanding of the fact that others may have false beliefs about something while you yourself have a true belief of it.

Would a superintelligence necessarily need to be self-aware, in any of these senses? I'd say that it would. While there are lots of goals that could plausibly be solved without any kind of self-awareness (proving mathematical theorems, for instance), many seem impossible to solve without it. Pretty much any social activity requires you to have a model about others as distinct from yourself, as well as an ability to model their beliefs and attitudes towards yourself. So in order to really be capable of solving many goals, you need to be self-aware. On the other hand, if it was a narrow intelligence that had been built to only solve theorems of math, it probably wouldn't need self-awaraness.

Emotion. There are many theories of emotion. For instance, the Information Principle says that emotional feelings provide conscious information from unconscious appraisals of situations (Clore et al. 2001). Your brain is constantly appraising the situation you happen to be in. It notes things like a passerby having slightly threatening body language, or conversation with another person being easy and free of misunderstandings. There are countless of such evaluations going on all the time, and you aren't consciously aware of them, because you don't need to. Your subconscious mind can handle them just fine on its own. The end result of all those evaluations is packaged into a brief summary, which is the only thing that your conscious mind sees directly. That "executive summary" is what you experience as a particular emotional state. The passerby makes you feel slightly nervous and you avoid her, or your conversational partner feels pleasant to talk with and you begin to like him, even though you don't know why.

So this theory says that emotions are both a source of information about unconscious appraisals, and a way to bias your behavior on the basis of circumstances. For instance, in happy moods (when things are presumably going well), we tend to rely more on our pre-existing routines and heuristics, while in sad or frustrated moods (when things aren't going so well), our minds switch to a more analytical mode of thought where we're more likely to take apart our existing beliefs and routines to find whether there's something wrong with them (Schwarz, 2010).

Would a superintelligence have something that we would consider to be akin to "emotions"? I would think that it might or might not, depending on its architecture. Thinking for a moment about humans, maybe a human with a vastly larger working memory capacity wouldn't need to have the subconscious appraisals packaged into summaries in the form of emotions, but could just constantly review their un-summarized conclusions while also thinking about other things. Maybe such a human could also learn to consciously control the style of their information processing, and adapt either heuristic or analytical thought as seemed reasonable. Arguably, such a human wouldn't need emotions. So it seems plausible that a superintelligence wouldn't necessarily have them either.

Free will. Okay, now we are getting into tricky territory. There are lots of definitions about free will, so I'll merely say that the computational theory of mind seems to be the majority view in cognitive science. If you accept the computational theory of mind, then you also consider the human mind to be a kind of a computer executing certain algorithms. Then on most accounts, if you would consider a human to have free will, you would probably also consider a machine intelligence to have free will, and vice versa.

Consciousness. This is another vague term, and people mean different things by it. Copeland (1993) notes at least three possible meanings:

Baseline sense: an entity is conscious if it is capable of perceiving the world via sense organs of some sort, and if it is capable of performing inner activities such as reasoning, deliberating, judging, hypothesing, planning, and so on.
Consciousness as internal monitoring: an entity is conscious if it is capable of observing and reporting on itself. For instance, I am not simply thinking looking up Copeland's definitions and typing a summary of them: I also know that I am doing so, and can think about this fact.
Phenomenological consciousness: an entity is conscious if there's something that being that entity "feels like". Pain and pleasure are not just algorithmical responses that modify an entity's behavior: they feel painful or pleasant. This is the hardest category to really express in words, but hopefully everyone understands what's meant.

A superintelligence would most definitely need to be conscious in the baseline sense: if it couldn't collect information from the world and make plans on that basis, it wouldn't be much of an intelligence. It would probably also need be conscious in the sense of being capable of internal monitoring, for otherwise it might not really be self-aware, and we already concluded that self-awareness is necessary for (broad) intelligence.

What about phenomenological consciousness? Chalmers (1995) has a pretty convincing (to me) thought experiment, where he says that a human who was changed into a robot, replacing one neuron at a time with an artificial one, would remain phenomenally conscious. But that argument presumes that the human retains their mental architecture unchanged. If we built a mind that had an entirely different mental architecture as humans did, would it exhibit phenomenal consciousness? There are lots of arguments, but the essential gist is that nobody knows.

Indepedent goal-directed behavior. But there's one more thing that your question seems to be implying, which wasn't fully covered by any of the terms above. You seem to also be asking whether an intelligent system might start doing things which conflict with the desires of its creators.

The answer seems to be yes. Omohundro (2008) argues that even a chess-playing robot, if it were intelligent enough and if it were not designed carefully enough, "will resist being turned off, will try to break into other machines and make copies of itself, and will try to acquire resources without regard for anyone else’s safety". Suppose that the robot has "winning at chess" as its goal. Now, it will exhibit these behaviors because, if it is turned off it might not be able to play any more chess, if it can make copies of itself those copies can continue to play chess even if some were turned off, and extra resources will help it in making sure that it can always win at chess. Omohundro also mentions a number of other drives which will arise as natural subgoals of almost any other goal.

Armstrong et al. (forthcoming) have an extensive discussion about "Oracle AI", an artificial intelligence which would be built to be safe, as it was built to only answer questions and not do anything else. But even this is harder to do than it might seem. Even trying to program the Oracle AI to want to stay within a specific physical box requires a number of definitions about what constitutes its physical location and what constitutes the Oracle AI itself (is it still staying within the box if it makes remote copies of itself?), and it might plausibly discover theories of physics in which those definitions became meaningless. Note that all of this presumes that we actually understand the OAI well enough to be able to specify its goals with such detail. If we don't, then that plan fails right away. Probably the best existing review article about this topic is Muehlhauser & Helm (forthcoming).

References

Armstrong, S. & Sandberg, A. & Bostrom, N. (forthcoming) Thinking inside the box: using and
controlling an Oracle AI. http://www.aleph.se/papers/oracleAI.pdf

Chalmers, D.J. (1995) Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. In Metzinger, T. (Ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html

Clore, G.L. & Gasper, K., & Garvin, E. (2001). Affect as information. In Forgas, J.P. (Ed.), Handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 121–144). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Copeland, J. (1993) Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction. Blackwell.

Legg, S. & Hutter, M. (2007) Universal Intelligence: A Definition of Machine Intelligence. Minds & Machines, 17:4 391-444. http://arxiv.org/abs/0712.3329

Muehlhauser, L. & Helm, L. (forthcoming). The Singularity and Machine Ethics. http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Muehlhauser-Helm-The-Singularity-and-Machine-Ethics-draft.pdf

Omohundro, S. (2008) "The basic AI drives," in Wang, P. Goertzel, P. and Franklin,
S. (eds.), Proceedings of the First AGI Conference. Frontiers in Articial Intelli-
gence and Applications, Volume 171 (IOS Press) 483-494. https://selfawaresystems.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/ai_drives_final.pdf

Rochat, P. (2003) Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 717-731. http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/rochat/lab/5%20levels%20of%20self-awareness.pdf

Schwarz, N. (2010) Feelings as information. In Van Lange, P. & Kruglanski, A. & Higgins, E.T. (Eds.), Handbook of theories of social psychology, Sange. http://people.ict.usc.edu/~gratch/CSCI534/schwarz_feelings-as-information_7jan10.pdf


What makes people easily subscribe to pseudoscientific theories?

There are two great TED talks that together help shed some light on your question:

David Deutsch (2005) "A new way to explain explanation", and
Richard Dawkins (2009) "Why the universe seems so strange"

At a fundamental level, science is about explanation (and sometimes using that explanation to make predictions). Thus, to most people, science is useless unless they understand the story it tells. The problem with modern science is that to have a good grasp of its explanatory power, you need a lot of (often difficult) background. As you gain this background, you develop what Feynman would call the most fundamental skill in science: always questioning, being able to say "I don't know", and to hold contrasting ideas together. If you don't invest in acquiring this background, most of science seems like witchcraft passed down by ivory-tower academics in funny gowns and hats.

What pseudoscience (or even cargo-cult science) provide is explanations that require less background, purport to be more certain, have something for everyone (Forer effect), and reassure you that "there is an answer". If you look at much of pseudoscience (or ancient myths) more closely, you will notice that they tend to personify their subject matter much more than science (my favorite example is the homunculus fallacy). They use this personification to provide agency, intent, and meaning to their explanations.

The great advantage of these human stories is that our minds are optimized for them. If you subscribe to Dunbar's Social Brain Hypothesis, then one of the main things evolution produced is a mind built to understand social structure, and other people. When an agent does not adhere to its role and violates our theory-of-mind and behaves erratically, without discernible intent and meaning, this is dangerous to us and our society; it causes us great discomfort. When you hijack the social mind to try to explain further and further afield parts of nature, you try to build the same sort of characters.

When you have to say "I don't know" or "I don't understand" this character, it creates discomfort. Pseudoscience thrives on this by giving an arbitrary, simple, shallow and easy to change explanation. Since most lay-people never pursue this explanation far enough to notice its contradictions, and since it shapes their observations (in the Popper-sense and through confirmation bias) they never get a strong enough cognitive-dissonance to overcome to positive feeling of having an understandable 'explanation'.

Unfortunately, all I can do in this answer is provide a intuitively appealing, intent and agency based explanation. Reread my answer and make note of unnecessary personifications I made -- just like much of pseudoscience, science is a story and there is the biggest rub.


What explains involuntary imitation of behavior such as shrugging?

The kind of involuntary, imitative behavior you are describing is usually called behavioral mimicry - "the automatic imitation of gestures, postures, mannerisms, and other motor movements" (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013).

Chartrand and Lakin's (2013) review is a good starting point into the research that has been done on this phenomenon. They provide references to research that has looked at a wide variety of motor movements [references deleted for readability]:

  including body posture, face touching, foot shaking, food consumption, pen playing, coloring, handshake, angle and speed, cospeech gestures, and a variety of health-related behaviors (e.g., smoking, taking the stairs rather
  than an escalator). Other research has looked at micro movements, such as finger tapping (...) People mimic facial expressions, and emotional reactions of interaction partners (...) In addition, people mimic verbal characteristics of interaction partners, including accents, linguistic style, speech rate, and syntax.

Shrugging is not part of this list, but there is also research that has used shrugging as one example of a behavior that can be imitated (Kurzius & Borkenau, 2015).

Chartrand and Lakin (2013) note that even though people can imitate others intentionally, behavioral mimicry is indeed often automatic:

  the mimicry of gross and fine motor movements (e.g.,gestures, mannerisms, finger movements), facial expressions, and vocalizations is often nonconscious, unintentional, and effortless. In fact, people often feel it is uncontrollable and are embarrassed when it is pointed out to them
  (Chartrand et al. 2005, White & Argo 2011).

There are several explanations for behavioral mimicry, and some posit that mimicry is (or has been) adaptive (as summarized by in Chartrand & Dalton, 2009).

1. Shared mental representations of perception and behavior

According to this explanation, perceiving a motor movement increases the likelihood of engaging in the same movement, because perception and action have a shared mental representation. According to this argument mimicry is an automatic and passive response, because the regions of the brain that are activated when we perceive action and the ones that are activated when we engage in an action are partly the same (see also mirror neurons, common coding theory).

2. Basic survival benefits of mimicry throughout our evolutionary past

According to this explanation, we have inherited the tendency to imitate others from our prehuman ancestors, because it may have carried important physical benefits for survival. For example, if you notice others of your group running, it may be functional to start running along instead of first scanning the environment for the dangerous predator.

3. Mimicry as social glue

According to this explanation, mimicry fulfills important communicative functions, by communicating togetherness, understanding, and therefore fosters empathy, social bonds and other positive social outcomes. In line with this view is research showing that mimicry increases liking and rapport and that people who have the goal to affiliate with others have a stronger tendency to mimic (e.g., Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).

References

Chartrand, T. L., & Dalton, A. N. (2009). Mimicry: Its ubiquity, importance, and functionality. In E. Morsella, J. A. Bargh, & P. M. Gollwitzer (Eds.), Oxford handbook of human action, Social cognition and social neuroscience. (pp. 458–483). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.

Chartrand, T. L., & Lakin, J. L. (2013). The antecedents and consequences of human behavioral mimicry. Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 285–308. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143754

Kurzius, E., & Borkenau, P. (2015). Antecedents and Consequences of Mimicry: A Naturalistic Interaction Approach. European Journal of Personality, 29, 107–124. doi:10.1002/per.1990

Lakin, J. L., & Chartrand, T. L. (2003). Using nonconscious behavioral mimicry to create affiliation and rapport. Psychological Science, 14, 334–339. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.14481


Is the concept of neuroplasticity applicable to visual cortex and how does it affect visual perception?

Yes, the visual cortex is plastic, even in adults:

  We measured adaptation in the responses of populations of cat V1
  neurons to stimulus ensembles with markedly different statistics of
  stimulus orientation. We found that adaptation served two homeostatic
  goals. First, it maintained equality in the time-averaged responses
  across the population. Second, it maintained independence in
  selectivity across the population.

http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v16/n6/full/nn.3382.html

  Plasticity is invoked for encoding information during perceptual learning, by internally representing the regularities of the visual environment, which is useful for facilitating intermediate-level vision--contour integration and surface segmentation. The same mechanisms have adaptive value for functional recovery after CNS damage, such as that associated with stroke or neurodegenerative disease. A common feature to plasticity in primary visual cortex (V1) is an association field that links contour elements across the visual field. The circuitry underlying the association field includes a plexus of long-range horizontal connections formed by cortical pyramidal cells. These connections undergo rapid and exuberant sprouting and pruning in response to removal of sensory input, which can account for the topographic reorganization following retinal lesions.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22841310


What personality traits moderate the effects of trauma on empathy?

There is a large and diverse literature on this topic which paints a complex picture of the relationship between trauma and empathy.

Some studies have found significant trauma symptoms to be related to less empathy. A study of Israeli children who had experienced the trauma of Arab missile attacks found that 66% of children with very negative attitudes towards Arabs had severe posttraumatic symptoms, while none of the children who expressed balanced attitudes towards Arabs had severe posttraumatic symptoms (Laor, Wolmer, & Cohen, 2004). Children with balanced attitudes also exhibited more prosocial behavior, offering to donate 35% more candy to ill peers than children with more negative attitudes. Overall, the authors found that those with very negative attitudes were less able to regulate their behavior, had poorer defense mechanisms, and had more externalizing and PTSD symptoms, while children with balanced attitudes were older and had fewer symptoms and more positive defenses. Thus, while children with better coping styles had both fewer trauma symptoms and were more empathetic/generous, is not possible to determine the direction of these relationships in this study. Also, the coping styles and attitudes of these child could be highly influenced by the environment (i.e., their parents’ behavior and attitudes).

A study of college students found that over 26% reported significant PTSD symptoms and 29-58% various forms of psychological distress following the 9/11 attacks, despite having no personal connection to the event (Woodward, Murrell, & Bettler, 2005). The study also found that a person’s level of empathy was positively correlated with the amount of traumatic stress symptoms they reported; perhaps not surprising, as you might need a certain level of empathy to experience someone else’s trauma so acutely. Additionally, while traumatic stress symptoms were positively correlated with the amount of psychological distress the person was experiencing, empathy was negatively correlated with psychological stress, both directly and via the person’s interpersonal style. That is, those individuals with more empathy and with positive interpersonal styles (a combination of coping skills, attachment, and social support), had better psychological functioning in the face of trauma.

Other studies have found that trauma may impact empathy in different ways, depending on the type of trauma. One study suggests that trauma which is directed at the self (abuse or severe illness) may not stimulate empathy for the self, resulting in negative psychological  outcomes, but that trauma directed at another (losing a loved one, witnessing injury/abuse of a loved one) may stimulate empathy to help the other person (Keinan, Shrira, & Shmotkin, 2012). Thus, even if the person experiences an event as traumatic, the motivation to help the victim (or others who care about the victim) may result in surges of empathy.

Another study found that only certain types of empathy were impacted by trauma (Nietisbach, Maercker, Rossler, & Haker, 2010). When these authors compared individuals with PTSD to those without PTSD, they found that both groups had similar levels of the complex empathic skills such as social cognition (i.e., being able to recognize faux pas or take the perspective of others), but individuals with PTSD symptoms were less likely to demonstrate more basic empathic skills such as “empathic contagion,” yawning or laughing when seeing someone else yawn or laugh. The authors also noted that individuals with PTSD for whom more time had passed since their trauma had a greater ability to take the perspective of others compared to individuals with PTSD who were closer to their time of trauma; this may indicate a change in empathic ability over time. Finally, they found that both individuals with PTSD and those without PTSD reported similar self-reported levels of empathy for others, but that those with PTSD reported greater distress when faced with the difficulties of others. The authors hypothesized that individuals with PTSD may be consciously avoiding empathic contagion due to this heightened experience of distress when watching others struggle, meaning part of the empathic deficit may actually be a defense mechanism.

A study of veterans with PTSD found that those who lacked empathy were more likely to be verbally, but not physically or impulsively, aggressive (Teten, Miller, Bailey, Dunn, & Kent, 2008). However, those veterans who also experienced alexithymia, meaning they are unable to name or describe their emotions with words, were more likely to be impulsively aggressive; a lack of empathy was not significantly associated with impulsive aggression. So, when considering aggressive behavior and trauma, it may be important to recognize that not all negative behavior is necessarily due to trauma’s impact on empathy.

Other studies have focused on the role of trauma in increasing empathy or helping behavior. One study found that individuals with greater numbers of lifetime traumatic events had greater self-reported empathy and volunteering behavior than those with fewer traumatic events (Frazier et al., 2013). However, this study was unable to conclude whether trauma had led to increases in empathy and whether such an increase was the reason for the increased prosocial behavior. Staub and Vollhardt (2008) have suggested that there are a specific set of experiences that may promote “altruism born of suffering” (i.e., increased empathy in reaction to trauma). Specifically, they propose if individuals who experience a traumatic event then experience psychological healing, social support, positive self-action, and altruistic role models, they may experience a range of post-traumatic growth including increased empathy and prosocial behavior. Staub and Vollhardt (2008) do note as others authors have that empathizing with other people’s distress can cause distress and possibly decrease empathy unless sufficient coping mechanisms are in place. A 2009 paper reviews recent evidence for this concept, and emphasizes the need for a better understanding of the experiences which lead to altruism following trauma, rather than suffering or revenge (Vollhardt, 2009).

In sum, trauma can impact empathy and prosocial behavior in a variety of ways, depending on individual characteristics and context. The links below should provide you a starting point to find additional resources on this topic. While most of the literature focuses on the impact of trauma on adults with “normal” empathic responses prior to the trauma, Music (2012) provides a theoretical argument that the development and acquisition of empathy may not occur properly when children are subjected to significant abuse or neglect. His paper may be a good reference if you’re interested not only in how trauma impacts existing capacity for empathy, but in how it impacts the development of empathy.

Frazier, P., Greer, C., Gabrielsen, S., Tennen, H., Park, C., & Tomich, P. (2013). The relation between trauma exposure and prosocial behavior. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 5(3), 286-294. DOI: 10.1037/a0027255.

Keinan, G, Shrira, A., & Shmotkin, D. (2012). The association between cumulative adversity and mental health: considering dose and primary focus of adversity. Quality of Life Research, 21, 1149-1158.

Laor, N., Wolmer, L., & Cohen, D. J. (2004). Attitudes toward Arabs of Israeli children exposed to missile attacks: The role of personality functions. The Israel Journal of Psychiatry and Related Sciences, 41(1), 23-32.

Music, G. (2012). Selfless genes, altruism, and trauma: Research and clinical implications. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 28(2), 154-171. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752-0118.2012.01276.x

Nietlisbach, G., Maercker, A., Rossler, W., & Haker, H. (2010). Are empathic abilities impaired in posttraumatic stress disorder? Psychological Reports, 106(3), 832-844. DOI: 10.2466/PR0.106.3.832-844

Staub, E., & Vollhardt, J. (2008). Altruism born of suffering: The roots of caring and helping after victimization and other trauma. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 78(3), 267-280. DOI: 10.1037/a0014223

Teten, A. L., Miller, L. A., Bailey, S. D., Dunn, N. J., & Kent, T. A. (2008). Empathic deficits and alexithymia in trauma-related impulsive aggression. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 26, 823-832. DOI: 10.1002/bsl.843

Vollhardt, J. (2009). Altruism born of suffering and prosocial behavior following adverse life events: A review and conceptualization. Social Justice Research, 22, 53-97. DOI: 10.1007/s11211-009-0088-1

Woodward, L. E., Murrell, S. A., & Bettler, R. F. (2005). Empathy and interpersonal style: A mediational model of secondary traumatic stress symptomology following 9/11. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment, & Trauma, 11(4), 1-28. DOI: 10.1300/J146v11n04_01


How long does it take to refocus after context switching?

As part of my PhD within the field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), one of the things I am trying to support the user in is multitasking. This might be relevant for you since interruptions and multitasking are highly interlinked. I'll refer you to some of the key papers I encountered during my background research, including some on the effects of interruptions.

You are asking "how long it usually takes a person to refocus". In order to answer that question fully you'd need to define 'refocus' better, but there are some papers on some effects of interruptions.

Multitasking and activities

One of the main referenced papers on multitasking within HCI is “Constant, Constant, Multi-tasking Craziness”: Managing Multiple Working Spheres by Victor M. González and Gloria Mark, 2004. They introduced the concept of 'working spheres' representing higher-level contexts, which "people spend about 12 minutes in [...] before they switch to
another". I assume you are interested in the effects on these higher-level context switches, rather than low level tasks as part of these contexts. This is an important first difference to keep in mind when reading up on multitasking/interruptions. Following up on citations of this paper will lead you to a lot of papers which might interest you.

Differences in interruptions

Not all interruptions are alike and not all interruptions are even disruptive. Monk et al. (2008) note "the time to resume task goals after an interruption varied depending on the duration and cognitive demand of interruptions".

Some characteristics that have been observed to affect primary task performance:

Interruption

Duration
Cognitive demand
Similarity to primary task
Complexity
Relatedness to primary task

State when interrupted

Control over interruption onset
Availability of primary task retrieval cues
Cognitive load (Bailey, B. P., & Iqbal, S. T., 2008)

For references to the relevant papers and a lengthy discussion see Monk et al., 2008.

Effects of interruptions

Studies concluded that people performed post-interruption tasks more slowly compared to pre-interruption performance. They also found that people made more errors in post-interruption performance. (Kreifeldt, J. G., & McCarthy, M. E., 1981) (Gillie, T., & Broadbent, D., 1989)

However, as Monk et al. also describe in their review there have been contradictory findings. For example, in a more recent paper by Gloria Mark et al., 2008 "people completed interrupted tasks in less time with no difference in quality". They suggest people compensate for interruptions by working faster, at a price: experiencing more stress, higher frustration, time pressure and effort.

More relevant to your question, although described in a lot more detail by Monk et al. (2008) the graphs near the end of the paper show a resumption time of about 1250-1700 ms depending on the interruption duration (5-60s). These, however, seem to reflect much smaller (low-level) context switches.

Discussion

My intuition (and some contradicting findings) tells me it's hard to generalize these results. I hope by providing this overview you have a broader picture of the scope of interruptions. I suggest you start by looking into Monk C. A. et al.'s paper (2008). It provides a nice overview and reports on the resumption time results mentioned earlier, relating them to memory models which might interest you. If you follow up on citations and find something interesting, please keep us up to date! :)

Again, it is still important to be concrete about what 'resumption times' are. I don't feel like there is one official definition, and rather think it's whatever researchers decide to measure in their methodology. I've done some experiments myself measuring resumption time as the time needed to re-establish the working context needed to execute the task being switched to, using the Windows 7 window manager (Jeuris & Bardram, 2016). Although this sometimes only took people around 2 s, others were totally overwhelmed with the many resources open due to multitasking and it took them over a minute.

González, V. M., & Mark, G. (2004, April). Constant, constant, multi-tasking craziness: managing multiple working spheres. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems (pp. 113-120). ACM.
Monk, C. A., Trafton, J. G., & Boehm-Davis, D. A. (2008). The effect of interruption duration and demand on resuming suspended goals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 14(4), 299.
Gillie, T., & Broadbent, D. (1989). What makes interruptions disruptive? A study of length, similarity, and complexity. Psychological Research, 50(4), 243-250.
Kreifeldt, J. G., & McCarthy, M. E. (1981). Interruption as a test of the user-computer interface.
Bailey, B. P., & Iqbal, S. T. (2008). Understanding changes in mental workload during execution of goal-directed tasks and its application for interruption management. ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction (TOCHI), 14(4), 21.
Mark, G., Gudith, D., & Klocke, U. (2008, April). The cost of interrupted work: more speed and stress. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 107-110). ACM.
Jeuris, S., & Bardram, J. E. (2016). Dedicated workspaces: Faster resumption times and reduced cognitive load in sequential multitasking. Computers in Human Behavior, 62, 404-414.


How to differentiate attentiveness, arousal and memory via gamma oscillations

You'd need to "shut down arousal" to give a causal dissociation of arousal and memory reactivation, right?

E.g.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3174240/

Then you'd need to define what do you mean by "memory activation", physiologically, and record there simultaneously with the above. This will introduce additional difficulty in a mouse due to its small size, -- depending on where do you want to record when looking for "memory activation".

However, you may try using a simpler to implement EEG screw to get the oscillations https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5802558/

But the above link is for a rat, and you'd have to confirm in the literature that you can get the gamma through an EEG screw in a mouse. Also consider that in conjunction with your search for the area where you want to record the gamma.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5333145/

which itself is tied to the experimental design (task) that captures "memory activation".

During training, and for validation you may employ a proxy for arousal in a form of pupil dilation.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3612940/
There you again need to confirm  if someone has successfully used this measure in a mouse (the link is for humans, and it's possible in rats too).


How are the questions in IQ tests formulated?

Alfred Binet developed the first intelligence measurement with some psychological validity. He asked general psychological questions from groups discovered by Spearman of varying difficulty based in the (not yet discovered) concept of fluid intelligence to children. Some did well some did not. This led to an age standardized test called the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test. Which essentially was problems of varying difficulty tested on many different children of diverse backgrounds to create a baseline. Results were grouped by age in order to give a predicted evaluation of common performance ability.

IQ tests do not work as a measurement of success and no one thinks that they do. They do work as a measurement of specifically identified and labeled cognitive ability. They are more useful psychologically in identifying cognitive problems to give treatments or accommodations than providing congratulatory measures to those who perform well.


What is the fear of having regrets called?

Although not a clinical diagnosis, in research on social media the term "Fear of Missing Out" (FoMo) is often used (Przybylski et al., 2013):

Defined as a pervasive apprehension that others might be having rewarding experiences from which one is absent, FoMO is characterized by the desire to stay continually connected with what others are doing.

This sounds related, but perhaps more specific in that it focuses specifically on regret of not having experienced a rewarding experience online.
Przybylski, A. K., Murayama, K., DeHaan, C. R., & Gladwell, V. (2013). Motivational, emotional, and behavioral correlates of fear of missing out. Computers in human behavior, 29(4), 1841-1848.


What is a good measure of self-regulation?

You can also use a stop signal task that measure response inhibition. It has been associated with dependencies like smoking http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3077266/ and http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0018898 for a go/nogo task, though the stop signal task is preferred. There is also some studies linking inhibtion to self regulation and self control, although I dont remember the sources at the moment. Sorry for poor formatting, new here at s.e.


Under what circumstances does the brain devote resources to only the "when" of sensory events?

To what degree can the brain move resources from the "what" to the "when" to achieve a precise level of timing for conversion between sensory and motor output?
I think that you may be making a false assumption here. I don't think that the 'what' and the 'when' are in competition for resources. According to Arnal and Giraud (and many others), having a valid prediction of when an event is going to occur and having a valid prediction on which event is going to occur, both lead to reduced primary sensory activity (and to a shortened reaction time). As such, you could say that the resources that go into making both types of predictions (the 'when' and the 'what'), reduce total resources used. In the opposite situation, where there is an invalid prediction, there is not only more total neural activity in primary sensory areas, but stimulus representations are also less sharp (Kok et al., 2012).
Furthermore, the differences seen in frequency space that are related to 'what' and 'when' predictions, as well as the fact that 'when' predictions seem to have a necessary stimulus-driven component while 'what' predictions do not, also point to a possible dissociation in resources used. In other words, it might not be the same neurons firing anyway. As an example, Wacongne et al (2012) suggested a model on how the feedforward and the feedback portion of predictive coding (of 'what' predictions) might work using different neurons within a single cortical column.
Finally, less resources does not necessarily translate to better sensory-motor conversion: selectively attending to a stimulus increases the amount of sensory brain activity, but decreases reaction times. It seems that it might boil down to how sharp the stimulus representation is (which is connected to valid/invalid 'what' predictions), followed by how strongly these neurons are firing (which is connected to selective attention). Squandering resources would mean having the wrong neurons firing, rather than firing more vs. less in a given sensory area. Once again, this would mean that forming any type of prediction leads to better use of total resources.
I'm still not sure if this answers your question, as the examples you give (e.g. drum beat) contain certainty on both the 'what' (sound of drum) and the 'when' (time of sound onset). If you want to dissociate the two, you could have a situation where you know what is going to come (sound of drum) but with a jittered stimulus onset asynchrony. Or, you could have a precise timing with novel sounds (a sound of a different pitch is displayed every half a second). In those cases your predictions would be mainly on the 'what' vs 'when', but in both cases hearing any of these sounds would carry an element of surprise, and would therefore lead to more primary sensory activity and a longer RT, i.e. more resources would be used.
References:

Wacongne C, Changeux JP, Dehaene S (2012) A Neuronal Model of Predictive Coding Accounting for the Mismatch Negativity. The Journal of Neuroscience 32:3665-3678.
Kok P, Jehee JFM, de Lange FP (2012) Less is more: Expectation sharpens representations in the primary visual cortex. Neuron 75:265-270.


Is there any correlation between n-back level and short-term memory?

Yes. n-back performance correlates with short-term memory capacity as measured by standard tests. However, there is no standard implementation of the n-back task, which is why the literature is fairly inconsistent. Because it is not administered in a standardized fashion, it is not a good test that is comparable between studies. However, it is often used in working memory training.

Here is a paper that is critical of the n-back task. To be fair, although there is scientific consensus that there is insufficient evidence that "brain training" is effective, this is a publication from one of the more skeptical (which is a good thing) research groups. In this regard my example is somewhat biased, but I am open to discussing other perspectives. The group has also published some quite excellent criticism of how training experiments are not always well-designed, but I digress...

In cognitive training, it is important to distinguish between tasks that are optimized for testing and tasks that are optimized for training. A test task should optimally not vary in performance. The retest reliability should be high, while a training task should optimally improve performance over time and induce neuroplasticity in a consistent manner.

It is still open what makes a training task efficient. Some suggestions have been made, but criticized to an equal degree. One such concept is adaptive tasks. This describes when a task adapts the difficulty to the user depending on the user's previous performance. In summary, different n-back tasks vary in design and thus may vary in efficiency.

The problems of far and near transfer remain. Sometimes a battery of different tasks are administered simultaneously, but in such cases it becomes more difficult to attribute improvement on performance to specific tasks.


What is the name of the survey question style that forces a choice between non-opposite pairs of items, and why is it used?

Short answer
Forced-choice task

Background
You have answered your own question:

  ...tests that force one to choose...

Such tests are generally referred to as forced-choice tests in psychophysics. There are many applications of these tests. In general, AFC tasks are less biased than for example yes/no tasks (Yushurun et al, 2008). A sample paper on an AFC test for personality testing is Christiansen et al. (2005).

References
- Christiansen et al. Human Performance (2005); 18(3): 267-307
-  yushurun et al. Vis Res (2008); 48(17): 1837-51


Why is solo dancing not as popular as contra and partner dancing?

Should be something associated with Courtship Display. Not entirely sure if this explains entire thing fully. There might be some other factors.


Is there any connection between visual processing ability and social skills?

Reading facial expressions is very important to understand others' intentions (Heise, 1985).

Recent research indicates that (1) the human face is a highly sophisticated signaling system for communicating affect, and (2) affect plays a key role in the experience of social organization and in the day-by-day production of culture. This essay suggests that emotional displays—on the face especially—are a primary means of socialization, allowing a neophyte to attain knowledge of the sociocultural system rapidly and efficiently.

Having a visual impairment may yield difficulties in socializing (at least in child in the Autism Spectrum Disorder) (Hellendoorn, et al, 2013):

This study suggests that visual perception may be a mechanism in the development of interpersonal relationships in ASD, which is in accordance with an embodied approach to social cognition.

...and in schizophrenia cases, as per @what comment (Sergi et al, 2006):

Social cognition appears to be a key determinant of functional status in schizophrenia. Using a very basic measure of visual perception, the present study found that social perception mediates the influence of early visual processing on functional status in schizophrenia.

Other indirect consequences may happen due to behavior related to some visual disorder. Vision problems and social skills (note: not a peer-reviewed article):

Vision problems also affect social interaction. Your child might appear awkward, clumsy, or other children may complain that he is invading their personal space, because he has trouble with spatial and body awareness and depth perception. The other children might treat him differently because he has developed coping habits, such as constantly rubbing his eyes, squinting, or tilting his head, or because he often complains of headaches or nausea. He may become distracted while talking or ignore the rhythm of a conversation and other social cues. Children or other parents might unfairly judge this behavior as unmannerly or inconsiderate.
Dealing with difficulty in school, awkwardness in social settings, poor performance in physical activities, and strained relationships with parents is a lot for a child to handle. While children with other learning disabilities may excel in sports or sociability, vision problems interfere more often beyond the classroom. Falling behind academically and being treated differently by peers and adults can lead to low self-esteem and withdrawal.


What is the effect of irrelevant reading after study on memory consolidation?

First off, a citation on the neurochemical effects of exercise beneficial to memory consolidation. Certain activities (post-study) that modulate neurotransmitter systems have generally been shown to affect how well the brain stores memories, such as caffeine consumption. Regarding the topic of your question, i.e. the effect of mental exercise on memory consolidation, it seems that post-study mental exertion has a negative effect on consolidation. This work cites a number of studies which generally show something along the lines of: "wakeful rest provided a more favorable condition for memory consolidation than the non-verbal cognitive task." Generally speaking, memory consolidation seems to work best under the influence of specific neurotransmitter release (induced by physical activity, for instance) or rest. After all, one main theory of why we sleep is that it is for the purpose of storing memories.


Why both hypokinetic and hyperkinetic changes are seen in Parkinsons?

I am not highly proficient in neuroscience, but I managed to find the following  from Sonne et al. (2020) which may help while you wait for a more proficient answer. (Emphasis mine)

While most forms of Parkinson disease are due to the insidious degeneration of the substantia nigra over a lifetime or during old age, the cause of that degeneration is unknown. These forms of Parkinson disease are termed idiopathic due to their unknown cause. A great deal of research is being done to identify these causes, which can include peripheral inflammation,[15] metabolic insufficiency,[16] and various environmental toxins,[17][18][19] which have been shown to affect the substantia nigra. Several other neurological conditions exhibit parkinsonian-like signs and symptoms by affecting the dopaminergic neurons of the substantia nigra. These include drug-induced parkinsonism in which a patient is taking a pharmaceutical compound, such as antipsychotics and antihypertensive, that affects dopamine metabolism.

Brydon L, Harrison NA, Walker C, Steptoe A, Critchley HD. Peripheral inflammation is associated with altered substantia nigra activity and psychomotor slowing in humans. Biol Psychiatry. 2008 Jun 01;63(11):1022-9. [PMC free article] [PubMed]
Yang L, Wang H, Liu L, Xie A. The Role of Insulin/IGF-1/PI3K/Akt/GSK3β Signaling in Parkinson's Disease Dementia. Front Neurosci. 2018;12:73. [PMC free article] [PubMed]
Langston JW, Irwin I, Langston EB, Forno LS. 1-Methyl-4-phenylpyridinium ion (MPP+): identification of a metabolite of MPTP, a toxin selective to the substantia nigra. Neurosci Lett. 1984 Jul 13;48(1):87-92. [PubMed]
Gash DM, Rutland K, Hudson NL, Sullivan PG, Bing G, Cass WA, Pandya JD, Liu M, Choi DY, Hunter RL, Gerhardt GA, Smith CD, Slevin JT, Prince TS. Trichloroethylene: Parkinsonism and complex 1 mitochondrial neurotoxicity. Ann Neurol. 2008 Feb;63(2):184-92. [PubMed]
Tanner CM, Kamel F, Ross GW, Hoppin JA, Goldman SM, Korell M, Marras C, Bhudhikanok GS, Kasten M, Chade AR, Comyns K, Richards MB, Meng C, Priestley B, Fernandez HH, Cambi F, Umbach DM, Blair A, Sandler DP, Langston JW. Rotenone, paraquat, and Parkinson's disease. Environ Health Perspect. 2011 Jun;119(6):866-72. PMC free article PubMed

Reference
Sonne J, Reddy V, Beato MR. (2020) Neuroanatomy, Substantia Nigra. In: StatPearls. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK536995/


How can I understand the phenomenon of mood better?

Are you interested in mood, emotion, or affect? Or all three?

Mood is considered a "diffuse" affective state, whereas emotions are "object specific."  If you're interested in this distinction, look up Mathias Siemer's work.  Gerald Clore also does work on mood.

If you're interested in emotions, then this is a bit harder to tell you who to look up.  There's a vast body of literature on many different things relating to emotions.  If you're interested in pure theory, look up Paul Ekman, Klaus Scherer, and Lisa Feldman Barrett.  If you're interested in emotion regulation, look up James Gross.  If you're interested in positive emotions, look up Barbara Frederickson.  The list goes on!  If you want a not particularly comprehensive overview, you can look at the Handbook of Emotions.

If you're interested in affect (arousal and valence), look up James Russell.

Hope this helps.


How can you gamify the recruitment of new employees?

I would try to work on stimulating rejected candidates to become referrals.

Every candidate who has been rejected is already quite well into what the job is all about. S/he should be very good at explaining the job requirements. (The pitfall of the majority of job ads, IMHO is that they bitterly fail at explaining what the job is about.)

At the same time rejected candidates must be likely to know colleagues good for that job. And it is in their self-interest to promote those colleagues, because they would have less competition for all the other vacancies.


Is k-winner a biological plausible model of inhibition?

As mentioned by honi, it is possible to have bio plausible k-means. However, neither Leabra nor Hierarchical Temporal Memory (HTM) use it.

As Section 3.5.1 of How to Build a Brain by Chris Eliasmith notes:

  There are basic computational methods underlying Leabra that are of
  dubious plausibility. The most evident is that Leabra directly applies
  a k-Winner-Takes-All (kWTA) algorithm, which is acknowledged as
  biologically implausible: “although the kWTA function is somewhat
  biologically implausible in its implementation (e.g., requiring global
  information about activation states and using sorting mechanisms), it
  provides a computationally effective approximation to biologically
  plausible inhibitory dynamics”
  (http://grey.colorado.edu/emergent/index.php/Leabra; see also O’Reilly
  & Munakata [2000], pp. 94-105 for further discussion). In other words,
  the actual dynamics of the system are replaced by an approximation
  that is computationally cheaper on digital computers.

The same problem occurs with the HTM as discussed in this forum post by Travis DeWolf:

  In the second step of their spatial pooling, they
  find the k most active columns, to apply learning to only these
  columns. Dynamically, setting up WTA with lateral inhibitory
  connections is notoriously very tricky, and isn't something that can
  be done in a single time step. On top of that, controlling the
  learning so that it's only applied after the network has settled on a
  set of winners is a whole other issue. It might be the case it works
  running the whole time as the WTA circuit settles, but the dynamics
  are complex and can't just be assumed to work.

To summarize, k-winner inhibition is possible, but it's not used in a biologically plausible manner in either Leabra and HTM.


In C. elegans, which neuron has the largest span, and why is it this large?

I am a member of OpenWorm.org, an open-source project that aims to simulate a C. elegans cell-by-cell. I didn't know the answer to this myself off the top of my head, but I have access to a number of folks who have been working hard on C. elegans anatomy for the last couple of years so I went ahead and asked them this question on our discuss mailing list. Thanks to Chris Grove and Tim Busbice for providing the answer that I am reporting below:

Chris Grove:

  Finding the neuron with the largest span partly depends on your
  definition of "length" in this context. In terms of largest amount of
  total axon/dendrite length, this would most probably be the PVDL/PVDR
  sensory neurons. They produce a large number of branches of dendrites
  that act to perceive mechano and thermo-sensation. See the WormAtlas
  page here.

Tim Busbice:

  If by "length" one means, absolute longest extension from head to
  tail, that's a tougher call, as there are several that extend from the
  head to the tail. An example of these are the AVDL/AVDR command
  interneurons, that function as touch modulators for backward
  locomotion induced by head-touch, and also drive backward movement of
  the animal along with driver cell AVA neuron, AVE and A-type motor
  neurons.

You can find a lot of info on C. elegans anatomy on WormAtlas and on an OpenWorm data spreadsheet in which we are consolidating detailed anatomy data from different sources.

Also I would advise checking out the OpenWorm Browser - a web-based 3D viewer that you can use to explore the C. elegans anatomy cell-by-cell (the 3D model was developed by Chris Grove, see VirtualWorm for details). For instance you can easily search for those "longest" neurons mentioned above! Screenshot of one of them selected (AVDL) below:

Hope this helped!


Is there anything comparable to the IPIP for IO psychology, work psychology and the like?

I'm not aware of any such initiatives. But it would be great to see.

In general, I think I/O psychology has been a bit less proactive in engaging with the open science approach than some disciplines of psychology. More generally, many researchers are silent on the issue of licences for their scales. Thus, it can be ambiguous about what you are allowed to do with a scale, say, that you find in a published journal article. Furthermore, many scales in organisational psychology are explicitly free to use for research purposes are not free for commercial purposes.


Can you catch up on sleep over the weekend?

Well, to be able to answer your question affirmatively, we'd have to know all the effects of sleep deprivation, including the long term ones, and those are still are not fully accounted for.
However I did find some more recent research that addresses the question of weekend sleep recover on some parameters. Pejovic et al. found (quoting from the abstract):

Serial 24-h IL-6 plasma levels increased significantly during sleep restriction and returned to baseline after recovery sleep. Serial 24-h cortisol levels during restriction did not change compared with baseline, but after recovery they were significantly lower. Subjective and objective sleepiness increased significantly after restriction and returned to baseline after recovery. In contrast, performance deteriorated significantly after restriction and did not improve after recovery. Extended recovery sleep over the weekend reverses the impact of one work week of mild sleep restriction on daytime sleepiness, fatigue, and IL-6 levels, reduces cortisol levels, but does not correct performance deficits. The long-term effects of a repeated sleep restriction/sleep recovery weekly cycle in humans remain unknown.

The good news is that on most measures there was recovery after the weekend, and this is consistent with other studies e.g. with that by Faraut on hormonal measures. I still find their performance finding rather shocking, so it's perhaps worth taking note at exactly what performance they looked at; it was basically just the PVT:

It's indeed a good question how many more nights of leisurely sleep would cause PVT to recover. I strongly doubt the impairment is permanent. Alas the study by Pejovic et al. didn't have any follow-up after the weekend.
A similar study was conducted prior by Banks et al., and they made a prediction on PVT recovery, but it still hasn't been confirmed

Neurobehavioral deficits induced by 5 nights of sleep restricted to 4 h improved monotonically as acute recovery sleep dose increased, but some deficits remained after 10 h TIB [time in bed -- my note] for recovery. Complete recovery from such sleep restriction may require a longer sleep period during 1 night, and/or multiple nights of recovery sleep. [...]
PVT fastest reaction times were projected to require a sleep dose of more than 13 h TIB (11 h TST [total sleep time -- my note]) to intersect the control condition. However, the confidence intervals for intersection with control group levels were large for all outcomes presented

I found one more recent animal study on the matter, by Deurveilher et al., which used a rat version of PVT, with rather different results

A 28-h period of the 3/1 chronic sleep restriction (CSR) protocol [sleep reduced to ~60% of normal as result of this protocol -- my note] disrupted performance on a sustained attention task in rats, as sleep deprivation does in humans. Performance improved after longer [one week -- my note] periods of CSR, suggesting allostatic adaptation, contrary to some reports of progressive deterioration in psychomotor vigilance task performance during CSR in humans. However, as observed in humans, there were individual differences among rats in the vulnerability of their attention performance to CSR.

Below are the graphs from the paper on the week-long CSR, which shows the remarkable allostatic adaptation on PVT, but not on weight loss.

So I'm guessing the jury is still out how quickly humans recover or if they may even adapt to sleep deprivation on PVT. I'm guessing that given the other effects of sleep deprivation, controlled longer-term studies in humans are probably going to be difficult to come by...
I've also consulted the 6th edition (2017) of Principles and Practice of Sleep Medicine; its chapter on sleep deprivation (and recovery) has among its authors two of the co-authors (the lead and the PI--Dinges) of the Banks study I already mentioned. So its conclusion are somewhat similar.

Few studies have examined recovery sleep after periods of
sleep restriction. [...] Although participants felt that their functioning
was restored, with subjective reports of sleepiness and
performance recovering to baseline, subjective measures do
not appear to accurately parallel objective measures of neurobehavioral
recovery. These findings suggest that more than
2 or 3 nights of extended sleep may be needed to return neurobehavioral
functions to baseline levels. [...] Overall, work to date suggests that complete recovery from
a period of sleep restriction may necessitate a sleep opportunity
of more than 10 hours or more than 3 days if sleep is
restricted to 8 hours a night. In addition, different aspects of
performance and neurobehavioral function appear to recover
at different rates, with different trajectories.

That combination finding is additional based one other study they highlight, by Rupp et al., which did look at longer recovery periods; the summary from the book

Rupp et al extended the recovery period
to five 8-hour sleep opportunities, following a week of sleep
restricted to 3 hours of time in bed each night. Despite the
extra recovery nights, performance still failed to return to
baseline levels. In a second group that extended their sleep
prophylactically to 10 hours of time in bed before the period
of sleep restriction, performance declined at a slower rate and
recovered to baseline more quickly, suggesting that sleep
restriction and recovery vary as a function of prior sleep.
Therefore, sleep extension or supplemental nap sleeps can be
used as a prophylactic measure or countermeasure to lessen
the performance effects of sleep deprivation during periods of
extended wakefulness or sleep deprivation.

Looking at the actual article, the 5 recovery days were 8 h TIB (probably because the author works at an army hospital), which for me personally would still count as mild sleep deprivation (less than 8 hrs actual sleep = TST), and which is somewhat odd contrast with opening statement in the paper that 8 hours of actual sleep are considered non-deprived. But that seems to be the only study using a longer recovery period to date. Below is a graph from that paper:

The two tests are part of PVT. And description of the two groups:

“Extension” group (nightly TIB = 10 h) or a “Habitual” sleep group (usual nightly TIB).
To determine Habitual Sleep schedules for volunteers assigned to the Habitual Group, actigraphic estimated total sleep time on weeknights (Sunday through Thursday nights; nights excluded if followed by a holiday or weekend) was determined, and 15 min were added to the average (to avoid inadvertently sleep restricting volunteers) and rounded up to the nearest 5 min for the final TIB amount. Bedtime was determined by subtracting TIB from the 07:00 rise time (i.e., a subject averaging 7 hours 15 min of sleep would have a bedtime of 23:45).

Frankly I find that being able to bank on sleep prior to deprivation, not just recover it thereafter, even more interesting. Also despite the obvious (and statistically significant) difference in PVT between groups,

No group differences in subjective sleepiness were evident during any phase of the study.

And also another finding

For both PVT variables, younger individuals showed a steeper slope of performance deterioration during sleep restriction and steeper slopes of improvement during the transition from sleep restriction to recovery and during recovery compared to older individuals.

Honestly I'm a bit concerned about overfitting because this was a small study (two dozen participants). However they say in their discussion of related research that this observed interaction/influence (of age) is consistent with other studies. Perhaps it goes along with the received wisdom that older people [need to] sleep less.
Another paper derived from the same study of Rupp et al. looked at math throughput and task acquisition (tested using ANAM, which presents a significant learning effect) and found that their observations mostly mirror those for PVT, except that presleep wasn't as significant as recovery sleep for this math/learning test.

Finally, it's generally accepted (see e.g. Pilcher and Huffcutt) that sleep deprivation influences mood even more than either cognitive or motor performance, however it seems that the recovery is quicker (perhaps owing to the hormonal one?), at least in older people, cf. Reynolds et al.:

While the increase [in Total Mood Disturbance -- my note] tended to be greater in women, in both groups self-ratings of mood returned to baseline after 1 night of recovery sleep.

References:

Pejovic et al. (2013) Effects of recovery sleep after one work week of mild sleep restriction on interleukin-6 and cortisol secretion and daytime sleepiness and performance

Banks at al. (2010) Neurobehavioral Dynamics Following Chronic Sleep Restriction: Dose-Response Effects of One Night for Recovery (This is the study referred to in a CNN blog.)

Deurveilher et al. (2014) Psychomotor Vigilance Task Performance During and Following Chronic Sleep Restriction in Rats

Rupp et al. (2009) Banking Sleep: Realization of Benefits During Subsequent Sleep Restriction and Recovery and Sleep history affects task acquisition during subsequent sleep restriction and recovery

Pilcher and Huffcutt (1996) Effects of sleep deprivation on performance: a meta-analysis

Reynolds et al., (1986) Sleep deprivation in healthy elderly men and women: effects on mood and on sleep during recovery.