If I think of a checkerboard, is there a similar structure to see in my visual cortex?

Probably. What you mentioned in your question is called retinotopy. There is a mapping between locations on your retina and areas on your cortex. As you go further up the visual processing streams, the mapping gets more complex and the patterns would be less obvious.

Here's an image of from a 1988 paper in the Journal of Neuroscience (Tootell, et al.). It shows a visual pattern on the left, and the corresponding neurons that were activated by that pattern in a monkey's primary visual cortex. The pattern was created using a technique called Deoxyglucose Labeling, where active neurons absorb a radioactive substance which can later be detected during dissection.

Also, Here's something similar in a mouse brain using a different technique.

Your question is about imagining a visual image, though. That is more complicated and research is currently underway to answer that question. Evidence points towards similar cortical patterns between imagined and perceived stimuli. Here is a study, not as detailed as the mouse or monkey ones, that found some evidence for retinotopy during imagining visual stimuli. Here is another where researchers could decode an imagined visual stimulus through fMRI. And here is yet another using fMRI to detect the direction of imagined motion.

There is a huge difference between the precise results from the animal perception studies and the human imagining studies. One big difference is that it is very difficult or impossible to do invasive studies with humans where you can get such high precision. Another difficulty with this research is knowing exactly when and what someone is imagining. It's easy to correlate brain activity with an external stimulus, because you know exactly what is occurring. All you have for the imagining case is self-report, which can be flawed.

Anyway, the research is progressing and there will be a good answer to this question soon enough.


Why Do People Feel "Safe & Secure" with Their Emotional Distress?

You are right, and consolation often backfires. this is for 2 reasons.

We as human beings, want to be witnessed, heared. Few year ago a video based on research work of Megan Devine went viral over internet.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2zLCCRT-nE
https://refugeingrief.com/

Lot of positivity we say, is actually "toxic positivity". It make our pain invalidated, disbelieved, or may have a discriminatory "bad vibes unwelcome" approach. Toxic positivity may oppress people from telling their problem and finding a solution.

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-man-cave/201908/toxic-positivity-dont-always-look-the-bright-side


Summary of meta-analytic correlations between self- and other-report measures

Some side notes to your question:

The amount of self-other-agreement depends on the acquaintance of the perceiver with the target (the more acquaintance, the more agreement) and on the "visibility" of the trait (extraversion can be relatively accurately judged by strangers; Neuroticism can only be judged by well-known others; Vazire, 2010)
Using the Social Relations Model (SRM; Kenny, 1994) more detailed informations about the processes in self- and other ratings can be revealed. For example, one can meaure the amount of assumed similarity (i.e., how much do perceivers generally think that the others are alike to oneself), or the consensus of multiple other-ratings.
Beyond the pure self-other-correlation it might be interesting to see which rating is more valid in terms of predicting external criteria.

References:

Kenny, D. A. (1994). Interpersonal perceptions: A social relations analysis. New York: Guilford Press.

Vazire, S. (2010). Who knows what about a person? The self–other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(2), 281–300. doi:10.1037/a0017908


Q: When does a human baby develop a consciousness? … Consciousness - the ability to sense the world around you in an independent way. You can think for yourself, and make choices that defy your natural instincts. It is what some say separates us from wild animals...

A: Consciousness is the term that has various meanings. In the above meaning, it requires the function of certain groups of neural circuits that include the ARAS (ascending reticular activating system), several cortical areas, and the thalamo-cortical loop [1,2]. So, for a fetus to begin to have consciousness, it must have these neural circuits developed to the point that they start functioning, which occurs around gestational week (GW) 24 -26. [3,4]

  “Two of the most important pathways in the brain are the ones that transmit sensorimotor information, the thalamocortical (TC) and corticothalamic (CT) pathways. The TC relays sensory and motor information from the receptors in the retina, cochlea, muscle or skin to the sensorimotor regions of the neocortex via the major subcortical sensorimotor relay, the thalamus. The CT pathway completes the feedback loop by transmitting information from cortex back to the thalamus. These essential pathways begin to form in the later part of the second trimester in humans, and are complete by GW 26. [3]”

Studies about sleep-wake cycles in fetuses also find that a fetus has definite sleep-wake cycles with distinguishable REM and non-REM periods between GW 28 – 31 [5,6]. This means that a fetus does already have periods of wakefulness, which are necessary for conscious awareness to occur, instead of being in an unconscious state all the time, during this time. So, consciousness begins to exist in a fetus no later than this time period.

However, consciousness in a fetus is in a very rudimentary form; this can be evident from the fact that even an infant, which has a more mature brain than a fetus, exhibits consciousness only at a low level compared with an adult and that the default mode neural circuit, which is now found to have an important role in consciousness at rest [2], is still incomplete[4]. What’s more, the sense of self or self-recognition begins to appear in some infants only around 15 months of age and in a majority of infants by 24 months of age [7]. So, it’s very very unlikely that an infant has the sense of self and that it can think for/about itself.

In conclusion, it seems that an infant begins to have a rudimentary form of consciousness at around GW 24-26. This may help provide informed decision about legal abortion.

  “Assuming that consciousness is mainly localized in the cortex, consciousness cannot emerge before 24 gestational weeks when the thalamocortical connections from the sense organs are established. Thus the limit of legal abortion at 22-24 weeks in many countries makes sense...[4]”

However, these are only indirect evidence. Direct, definite evidence of when exactly a fetus begins to have consciousness is not available yet.

References.

Koch C, Massimini M, Boly M, Tononi G. Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems. Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 2016;17: 307-321. The full pdf file can be downloaded from here.
Song X, Tang X. An extended theory of global workspace of consciousness. Progress in Natural Science. 2008 Jul;18(7):789–793.
Stiles J, Jernigan TL.The Basics of Brain DevelopmentNeuropsychol Rev. 2010 Dec; 20(4): 327–348.
Lagercrantz H.The emergence of consciousness: Science and ethics. Semin Fetal Neonatal Med. 2014 Oct;19(5):300-5. doi: 10.1016/j.siny.2014.08.003.
Okai T, Kozuma S, Shinozuka N, Kuwabar Y, Mizuno M. A study on the development of sleep-wakefulness cycle in the human fetus. Early Human Development. 1992 Jun-Jul; 29(1-3): 391-396. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-3782(92)90198-P
Mirmiran M, Maas YGH, Ariagno RL. Development of fetal and neonatal sleep and circadian rhythms. Sleep Medicine Reviews. 2003; 7(4):321-334.
Anderson JR. The development of self-recognition: A review. Dev Psychobiol. 1984 Jan;17(1):35-49.


Why did humans develop the "sense of humour"?

Interestingly, the same question you asked has been asked since quite some time:

The Act of Creation, 1964 - Arthur Koestler

  What is the survival value of the involuntary, simultaneous contraction of fifteen facial muscles associated with certain noises
  which are often irrepressible? Laughter is a reflex, but unique in
  that it serves no apparent biological purpose; one might call it a
  luxury reflex. Its only utilitarian function, as far as one can see,
  is to provide temporary relief from utilitarian pressures. On the
  evolutionary level where laughter arises, an element of frivolity
  seems to creep into a humorless universe governed by the laws of
  thermodynamics and the survival of the fittest.

Firstly, like all other narratives built by evolutionary psychologists, it is difficult to back up speculations with empirical evidence. Since we are going back far back into the evolutionary history of homo sapiens, we will be dealing with what I would call "well-informed speculation".

Quoted from The Mating Mind (2001) by Geoffrey Miller.

  To traditional evolutionary psychologists, human abilities like music,
  humor, and creativity do not look like adaptations because they look
  too variable, too heritable, too wasteful, and not very modular. But
  these are precisely the features we should expect of fitness
  indicators. If a human mental trait shows large individual
  differences, high heritability, high condition-dependence, high costs,
  and high correlations with other mental and physical abilities, then
  it may have evolved through sexual selection as a fitness indicator.
  (pg. 132-133)

Sexual Selection

Notice that he also mentioned your speculation about decreased stress levels:

  Some theories of humor have proposed that laughter evolved to promote
  group bonding, discharge nervous tension, or keep us healthy. The
  more laughter the better. Such theories predict that we should laugh
  at any joke, however stupid, however many times we have heard it
  before, yet we do not. A good sense of humor means a discriminating
  sense of humor, not a hyena-like shriek at every repetitive pratfall.
  Such discrimination is easy to understand if our sense of humor
  evolved in the service of sexual choice, to assess the joke-telling
  ability of others.

Furthermore, I recommend that you read this review of Robert Mankoff of “Inside Jokes”: The Hidden Side of Humor. (2011) and of course the book itself. It sheds a strong light onto your question.

Sources:

Matthew M. Hurley, Daniel C. Dennett, and Reginald B. Adams Jr., Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind. MIT Press, 2011, 376 pp., ISBN-13: 978-0262015820

Koestler, Arthur. 1964. The Act of Creation, Penguin Books, New York

Miller, G. (2000), The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature, London: Heineman, ISBN 0-434-00741-2 (also Doubleday; ISBN 0-385-49516-1)


Are the center surround receptive fields learnt or inherited?

This is a very interesting question!

I cannot give a definite answer, however. What I can provide is supportive, but indirect evidence for my personal view that peripheral sensory organs are genetically hardwired, and that the brain is the plastic center of the nervous system during development.

A 1985 review paper by Boothe et al. mentions that at that time, little information was available about the development of the receptive field properties of single neurons in primates, and that no studies were then available regarding the development of receptive fields of primate retinal ganglion cells. I could not find later works dealing with the development of center-surround structure.

What I did find was an interesting and relatively recent review by Maurer & Lewis (2001). They describe that the retinas of monkeys that were visually deprived by lid suture or dark-rearing had permanent deficits in visual acuity. However, the retina appeared normal, with no changes in the gross electrophysiological response (electroretinogram), the topography of photoreceptors, or the morphology of retinal ganglion cells.* These data strongly hint towards a genetically-based development of the retina, because visual deficits due to visual deprivation are mainly of a cortical nature, and hence plasticity is cortical and not retinal. However, the data only indirectly address your question and until electrophysiological studies are undertaken that specifically characterize center-surround fields in the visually-deprived retina, I cannot answer this question definitively. Unfortunately, much of the recent work has focused on cortical V1 and beyond after visual deprivation. Retinal re-structuring has been investigated mainly after photoreceptor degenerations.

References
- Boothe et al., Ann Rev Neurosci (1985); 8: 495-545
- Maurer & Lewis, Clin Neurosci Res (2001); 1: 239-47

*When visually deprived for more than 2 years retinal re-structuring was seen. This can, however, easily be explained by degenerative processes (at least, as far as I know, this was not mentioned in the paper).


Are social phobia cases on rise, being the Internet and mobile phones with cameras the main cause for their rise?

Studies have been done to see how technology can alleviate social phobia, by communication through the net. (Yen et al 2012)

Heavy use increases (general) anxiety: (Anxiety was measured using the Beck Anxiety Inventory.) "Logistic regression analyses indicated that heavy Internet use is associated with high anxiety; high cell-phone use is associated to being female, and having high anxiety and insomnia." (Jenaro et al, 2006) *2 A replication of this study with a comparable population might answer your question.

Other studies have shown that "social phobia was associated with the risk for smartphone addiction in young people." (Darcin et al, 2016)

A study published 2009 sets the prevalence rates of social phobia at "in community samples of children and adolescents also vary considerably, ranging from 0.9 to 13.1% [26]. The highest rates have been noted in studies of older adolescents and young adults ", and sets the numbers for the whole population, quoting other articles,  "3.9–13.7% in Western societies" (Gren-Landell et al).

The prevalence numbers seem to vary wildly depending on how the research has been done, as Furmark (2002) points out in his review of epidemiological studies from the 1980s onwards. - Doing this with current research would give more of an insight into your question.

So I'm sorry to say I couldn't, so far, find a study that specifically addresses your issue. :-(


What is the origin of the belief that the heart plays a role in influencing the emotions?

In the 4th century B.C., Aristotle identified the heart as the most important organ of the body, and claimed that it was the seat of intelligence and sensation. Aristotle described it as a three-chambered organ that was the center of 'vitality' in the body.  Other organs surrounding it (e.g. brain and lungs) simply existed to cool the heart (source: Stanford University). Since then it has been associated with emotions, although in the middle ages during the Enlightenment it already became clear that he heart was a pump, and not the seat of emotions.

A fact, however, is that intense emotions, such as love, fear and anger have pronounced effects on heart rate, mainly because of the release of adrenaline and other (stress) responses regulated by the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis (HPA) axis (source: Penn State University). The brain sends signals to the adrenal gland, which then secretes  hormones and then they go to the heart which causes the heart to beat faster.


Does suppressing a desire make it more powerful?

First of all, your question title asks about suppression and your question in the main text asks

  what empirical evidence exists to support the notion that repressed desires will make them stronger?

What you need to be careful about here is that repression is different to suppression.

Repression is unconscious/subconscious, whereas suppression is completely conscious

  repression is the term for unintentional, unconscious forgetting,
  and suppression [is] intentional, conscious removal of a thought from subsequent conscious attention. Suppression is almost never studied, whereas a wide literature has formed around the concept of repression.....

  ....Although repression and suppression processes are by no means mutually exclusive or contradictory, the interest value of repression has tended to exclude suppression from scientific study. It is in this sense that Freud was responsible for what we do not know about suppression. (Wegner, 1992)

Short Answer

Wegner, in the above referenced journal article points out a lot of evidence to back the though that any attempt to suppress thoughts or desires will be in vain as they will rebound.  Whether or not they become stronger is open to interpretation, as it is concluded that

  When the Rolling Stones sang “You can’t always get what you want,” they provided a bit of relief by adding “but if you try some time, you just might find, you get what you need.” Regrettably, their refrain rings a false note in the world of thought suppression. The research to date suggests that you can’t always think what you want, and that even if you need ever so dearly to stop thinking of something, you still may not get what you need.

Long Answer

As I said in my answer to a previous question,

  With Sigmund Freud, lot of people get hung up on the sexual elements of his theories when really, Freud’s theories centres on his motivation and drive theory and they centre on all sorts of pleasure. We are motivated towards whatever brings pleasure and are motivated away from pain, difficulty, destruction, confusion, etc.

When looking for empirical evidence, Freud's work itself is derived from empirical evidence.

  His theories are clinically derived - i.e. based on what his patients told him during therapy. (McLeod, 2007)

Repression is described by Freud by saying

  the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious. This view of repression would be made more complete by assuming that, before the mental organization reaches this stage, the task of fending off instinctual impulses is dealt with by the other vicissitudes which instincts may undergo - e.g. reversal into the opposite or turning round upon the subject’s own self. (Freud, 1915/1957)

There are 2 parts to repression,

Primal Repression

  a first phase of repression, which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct being denied entrance into the conscious. With this fixation is established; the representative in question persists unaltered from then onwards and the instinct remains attached to it. (Freud, 1915/1957)

Repression Proper

  second stage of repression, repression proper, affects mental derivatives of the repressed representative, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it. On account of this association, these ideas experience the same fate as what was primally repressed. Repression proper, therefore, is actually an after-pressure [Nachdrängen]. (Freud, 1915/1957)

You Can't Always Think What You Want: Problems in the Suppression of Unwanted Thoughts (Wegner, 1992) is an article covering articles etc. from Freud onwards.

What you need to be careful about here is that repression is different to suppression.

Repression is unconscious/subconscious, whereas suppression is completely conscious

  repression is the term for unintentional, unconscious forgetting,
  and suppression [is] intentional, conscious removal of a thought from subsequent conscious attention. Suppression is almost never studied, whereas a wide literature has formed around the concept of repression.....

  ....Although repression and suppression processes are by no means mutually exclusive or contradictory, the interest value of repression has tended to exclude suppression from scientific study. It is in this sense that Freud was responsible for what we do not know about suppression. (Wegner, 1992)

Now think about suppression in a quote provided by Wegner in the above article.

  Try to pose for yourself this task: not to think of a polar bear, and you will see that the cursed thing will come to mind every minute. (Fyodor Dostoevsky, Winter Notes on Summer Impressions)

Conscious efforts to suppress unwanted thoughts are reported by normal individuals (Rachman & de Silva, 1978), as well as by those suffering from problems such as

depression (Turner, Beidel, & Nathan, 1985),
anxiety and worry (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983),
obsessions and compulsions (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Reed, 1985),
addiction (Marlatt & Parks, 1982),
obesity (Polivy, 1990), and
posttraumatic stress (Ellis, 1983; Horowitz, 1975; Pennebaker, 1988; Tait & Silver, 1989)

and is employed for the purposes of action inhibition (behavioural self-control), communication inhibition (e.g. keeping secrets), and emotional inhibition (e.g. to remain calm in stressful situations) (Wegner, 1992).

The suppression cycle

The exercise of continuous thought suppression is reminiscent of the task of
Sisyphus, the figure of Greek myth who was condemned forever to push a stone up a mountain only to have it roll back down. As a rule, people asked to suppress a thought (e.g., of a white bear) while they deliver verbal reports of their thinking show a cyclic sequence of activities with precisely this up-and-down character (Wegner et al., 1987). Suppression begins with a plan to self-distract (e.g., “Okay, I’ll think of something else”), continues with the choice of a distracter (e.g., “I’ll think about the telephone”) and a period of concentration on distracter-relevant thoughts (e.g., “This phone is a portable, etc.”), and is completed with an intrusive return of the suppressed thought (e.g., “There’s the white bear again”). The cycle then repeats with a return to the plan to self-distract (i.e., “Okay, I’ll think of something else”).

Interestingly, according to Wegner (1992), Knutson (1990) found, that people asked to shut their eyes and report their thinking during suppression indicate more frequent occurrences of the unwanted thought than those allowed to keep their eyes open.

Automatic Target Search

This is the operation of an automatic search for the unwanted thought during suppression.  For example,

  an undergraduate student I asked to think aloud while she tried not to think of the Statue of Liberty began talking about the books on the wall of the room and in a matter of moments mentioned that one was just the greenish tint of the Statue (Wegner, 1992).

All of the above information points to the fact that any attempt to suppress thoughts or desires will be in vain as they will rebound.

  Suppression is a street battle raging in the forefront of the mind, not a few random muggings hidden deep in its alleyways (Wegner, 1992).

References

Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T., & DePree, J. A. (1983). Preliminary exploration of worry: Some characteristics and processes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 21: pp. 9—16.PMID: 6830571

Ellis, E. M. (1983). A review of empirical rape research: Victim reactions and response to treatment. Clinical Psychology Review. 3: pp. 473—490.DOI: 10.1016/0272-7358(83)90025-9

Freud, S. (1957). Repression. In: J. Stachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 14, pp. 146—158) London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1915)

Horowitz, M. (1975). Intrusive and repetitive thoughts after experimental stress. Archives of General Psychiatry, 32: pp. 1457—1463.DOI: 10.1001/archpsyc.1975.01760290125015

Knutson, B. (1990). Thought suppression and access to distraction. Unpublished research data, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.Available by emailing: knutson'at'stanford.edu

Marlatt, G. P., & Parks, G. A. (1982). Self-management of addictive behaviors. In: P. Karoly & F. H. Kanfer (Eds.), Self-management and behavior change (pp. 443—488). New York: Pergamon.

McLeod, S. (2007). Psychodynamic Approach. Simply Psychology [Online]Available at: https://www.simplypsychology.org/psychodynamic.html

Pennebaker, J. W. (1988). Confession, inhibition, and disease. In: L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 22). San Diego: Academic Press.

Polivy, J. (1990). Inhibition of internally-cued behavior. In: E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 131—147). New York: Guilford.

Rachman, S., & de Silva, P. (1978). Abnormal and normal obessions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 16: pp. 233—248DOI: 10.1016/0005-7967(78)90022-0

Rachman, S., & Hodgson, R. J. (1980). Obsessions and compulsions. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Reed, G. F. (1985). Obsessional experience and compulsive behavior. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

Tait, R., & Silver, R. C. (1989). Coming to terms with major negative life events. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 351—382). New York: Guilford.

Turner, S . M., Beidel, D. C., & Nathan, R. S . (1985). Biological factors in obsessive-compulsive disorders. Psychological Bulletin, 97: pp. 430—450.DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.97.3.430

Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S., 111, & White, L. (1987). Paradoxical effects of thought suppression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53: pp. 5—13.DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.53.1.5

Wegner, D. M. (1992). You Can't Always Think What You Want: Problems in the Suppression of Unwanted Thoughts. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25: pp. 193—225DOI: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60284-1


Can we stop the brain from processing a particular task?

One answer is through turning off these messages or "tasks" via mindful awareness and focused attention on another task requiring much less cognitive load - like breathing.

Look up Dr. Jeffery Schwartz's book "You Are Not Your Brain" for scientific data on this.

Basically, latest scientific research shows that we can use our mind to stop the brain (or really work around the task, observing it, until it slowly diminishes activity in the bran).

It's the old saying; "mind over matter" - where the brain is also matter.


How close is it to reality in future of consciousness to be transferable as shown in the movie Chappie?

I have seen - and enjoyed! - the movie last week-end and asked myself the same question.

Let's face it, we are so far from being able to transfer knowledge from one human being to a machine with the help of a "mind-reader". The main point is that we don't have a useful brain signal to read from (the ones we know have structural limits).

No good brain signal, no associated technology and no reading device. On the contrary, we probably have the technology at the end of the human-to-machine process (a way to transfer and store a mind).


All personality models are related in that they are carving up the same variance into different factors, and some of the factors will overlap. Extraversion is probably the most similar trait between the two models, but it's still quite different.

As a personality psychologist, I would say yes, this is potentially an overestimation of their convergence. A brief description of why the Big Five is preferred over MBTI is that the measures of the former are dimensional rather than categorical, have more test re-test stability, and have more stable relationships with other levels of analysis (e.g., genes predicting traits; traits predicting behaviors). Reliability and validity are the cornerstones of quality measurement.


What is the difference (in a recording) between speech and a sound? What makes the difference to the brain?

Speech is sound and the brain will recognise the sound as speech. As for the possibility of creating the sound of speech without recordings using sound waveforms I would say that is off topic here and would be a question for sound creators.

The subject of recognising speech from sounds is a big subject but to give a starting point here are a few pointers for further reading and research, depending on what area you want to look at more.

Neurological basis of Speech Perception

Heald & Nusbaum (2014) gives a brief outline of the neural processes involved.

  One view of speech perception is that acoustic signals are transformed into representations for pattern matching to determine linguistic structure. This process can be taken as a statistical pattern-matching problem, assuming realtively stable linguistic categories are characterized by neural representations related to auditory properties of speech that can be compared to speech input. This kind of pattern matching can be termed a passive process which implies rigidity of processing with few demands on cognitive processing. An alternative view is that speech recognition, even in early stages, is an active process in which speech analysis is attentionally guided. Note that this does not mean consciously guided but that information-contingent changes in early auditory encoding can occur as a function of context and experience. Active processing assumes that attention, plasticity, and listening goals are important in considering how listeners cope with adverse circumstances that impair hearing by masking noise in the environment or hearing loss. Although theories of speech perception have begun to incorporate some active processing, they seldom treat early speech encoding as plastic and attentionally guided. Recent research has suggested that speech perception is the product of both feedforward and feedback interactions between a number of brain regions that include descending projections perhaps as far downstream as the cochlea.

They also define active and passive processes

  The distinction between active and passive processes comes from control theory and reflects the degree to which a sequence of operations, in this case neural population responses, is contingent on processing outcomes (see Nusbaum and Schwab, 1986).

Figure 1A-C [Source: Heald & Nusbaum (2014)]

  A passive process is an open loop sequence of transformations that are fixed, such that there is an invariant mapping from input to output (MacKay, 1951, 1956). Figure 1A illustrates a passive process in which a pattern of inputs (e.g., basilar membrane responses) is transmitted directly over the eighth nerve to the next population of neurons (e.g., in the auditory brainstem) and upward to cortex. This is the fundamental assumption of a number of theories of auditory processing in which a fixed cascade of neural population responses are transmitted from one part of the brain to the other (e.g., Barlow, 1961).

  By contrast, active processes are variable in nature, as network processing is adjusted by an error-correcting mechanism or feedback loop. As such, outcomes may differ in different contexts. These feedback loops provide information to correct or modify processing in real time, rather than retrospectively. Nusbaum and Schwab (1986) describe two different ways an active, feedback-based system may be achieved. In one form, as illustrated in Figure 1B, expectations (derived from context) provide a hypothesis about a stimulus pattern that is being processed. In this case, sensory patterns (e.g., basilar membrane responses) are transmitted in much the same way as in a passive process (e.g., to the auditory brainstem). However, descending projections may modify the nature of neural population responses in various ways as a consequence of neural responses in cortical systems. For example, top-down effects of knowledge or expectations have been shown to alter low level processing in the auditory brainstem (e.g., Galbraith and Arroyo, 1993) or in the cochlea (e.g., Giard et al., 1994). Active systems may occur in another form, as illustrated in Figure 1C. In this case, there may be a strong bottom-up processing path as in a passive system, but feedback signals from higher cortical levels can change processing in real time at lower levels (e.g., brainstem). An example of this would be the kind of observation made by Spinelli and Pribram (1966) in showing that electrical stimulation of the inferotemporal cortex changed the receptive field structure for lateral geniculate neurons or Moran and Desimone’s (1985) demonstration that spatial attentional cueing changes effective receptive fields in striate and extrastriate cortex.

Linguistic Speech Perception

The following information was sourced from an article by John Kingston (Professor in the Department of Linguistics, University of Massachusetts) in 2013.

Links below are for Free PDF files - DOIs are provided in the references section in case of future breaks in links

  According to the motor theory of speech perception (Liberman, et al., 1967; Liberman & Mattingly, 1985; Liberman & Mattingly, 1989), listeners recognize speech sounds by emulating their articulation in their heads. The sound is recognized when the acoustic properties of the emulation match those of the speech sound heard...Now, this is embodied cognition in that the cognitive act of perceiving a speech sound consists of emulating the speaker’s articulatory behavior mentally, i.e. behaving in the mind as the speaker would in the world.

  ...

  According to the direct realist theory of speech perception (Fowler, 2006), no such emulation nor embodied cognition is necessary to perceive speech sounds because the speaker’s articulatory behavior in pronouncing them so structures the acoustic properties of the speech signal that the listener can identify the unique articulation that produced those properties. In other words, the acoustic properties are specific information about the articulations that produced them...This is extended cognition because no mental act is required to extract information from the speech signal’s acoustic properties. The information is instead present and patent within those properties and no analysis is required to turn those properties into information. All the cognitive work, other than simply being around to hear the sounds, is done outside the listener’s head.

Kingston says that there are empirical and theoretical challenges to both the motor theory’s and direct realism’s accounts of speech perception, stating that speech perception is neither emboedied or extended; however he did not elaborate on this.

Source

Kingston, J., (2013). Why speech perception is neither embodied nor extended cognition [Online] Available at http://blogs.umass.edu/jkingstn/2013/12/

References

Barlow, H. B. (1961). Possible principles underlying the transformations of sensory messages In: Sensory Communication, ed W. Rosenblith (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): pp 217–234. ISBN-13: 978-0262518420 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262518420.003.0013

Fowler, C. A. (2006). Compensation for coarticulation reflects gesture perception, not spectral contrast, In: Perception & Psychophysics. 68(2): pp 161-177. DOI: 10.3758/BF03193666 PMID: 16773890

Galbraith, G. C., and Arroyo, C. (1993). Selective attention and brainstem frequency-following responses, In: Biological Psychology 37(1): pp 3–22. DOI: 10.1016/0301-0511(93)90024-3

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To the best of my knowledge, there is one and only one psychologist who received the Nobel prize: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Kahneman

The prize was awarded for economy.

So, it's possible for cognitive scientists to win the actual Nobel prize if his or her work is relevant to any of the Nobel prize categories.

Maybe there are other laureates whose work could be seen as cognitive science.


What is the metabolic load of the visual system?

I don't have an answer in terms of percentages, but I thought I could offer at least some insight I may have. Really cool question though, never really thought of this.

So two ways to go about this answer. For one, when you close your eyes you immediately can register so called alpha waves from an EEG (electroencephalography). This was actually how EEG was first discovered, it's the easiest brain oscillation we can capture through scalp potentials and see with our bare eyes. You find these alpha oscillations at occipital and parietal locations, and are slow waves (8-12Hz). If you compare an alert person in an awake state, and someone who is tired or even deep sleep, you see a difference in oscillatory activity, so more alert higher frequencies (gamma bursts >50Hz) versus asleep slow wave (theta, delta). I may be wrong and this, and someone do correct me if I am, but I would propose that high frequencies would indicate more neuronal activity, whereas low frequencies less so. There is of course a preference in neuronal populations to have a frequency they best oscillate at, so then maybe that hypothesis is out the door. In any case, as soon as you shut your eyes, you get these slower oscillations.

But even when your eyes are open and processing visual information, already 100ms later does that information get to other brain areas. So things like ERPs (event related potentials) have shown emotional differences in those waveforms already after 100, 200ms. This indicates that already the brain is processing that stimulus, not JUST the visual cortex.

At the same time though, that is only lower-tier visual cortex. Almost the entire back portion of our heads and part of the temporal lobes are all higher order processing. We are very unique among vertebrates for having so much of our brain devoted to visual processing. Most other mammals rely mostly on olfaction.

So taken together, I would say that just due to the amount of neuronal mass that is committed to processing visual information, yes a significant amount of the energy budget goes to vision. If you look at fMRI images, you can see the entire occipital cortex light up, only when viewing pictures, as well as other areas talking to the visual cortex.

Very cool question, I'm curious if someone has a more accurate prediction of just how much energy it takes for our camera to work!


How to compare effectiveness of psychological treatment for psychological illness, versus medical treatment for medical illness?

You asked:

  Is there a way to compare treatments for medical vs psychological issues?

I would say no because we aren't looking to compare medical treatments to psychological treatments. It isn't possible to do so and there isn't any real world application for such a process, i.e., it doesn't tell us anything useful.

The question I think you're getting at is:

  Can we show that a treatment for a psychological disorder is effective at treating the psychological disorder, in the same way that we can see that a medication is effective in treating a physical disease/disorder?

The answer to that question is absolutely!

When we implement a treatment for a psychological disorder we are often hoping to reduce the symptoms of that disorder, rather than finding a cure. When we are looking at the effectiveness of psychological treatments we are looking for a statistically significant difference in measured behaviours from before treatment to after treatment. Researchers in the paper linked below used 4 treatment conditions to (1) determine if treatments for depression were effective and (2) to compare the effectiveness of the treatments against each other (Elkin et al., 1989).

The statistics can get very complicated when it comes to showing effectiveness of treatments.

I believe that it is extremely important to note that many psychological disorders are life long and many people can experience a wide range of symptoms that vary in intensity for their entire lives. So, to bring it back to your original question, psychological disorders don't have an easy 'cure' the way that some physical diseases/disorders do. Seeing a counsellor/therapist/psychologist for CBT Treatment does not have to mean having a life long relationship with a counsellor/therapist/psychologist. The treatment includes learning skills/tools to cope with your situation and if CBT is successful the person can end therapy whenever they have learned enough skills/tools to live a full and healthy life.

Elkin, I., Shea, M. T., Watkins, J. T., Imber, S. D., Sotsky, S. M., Collins, J. F., ... & Fiester, S. J. (1989). National Institute of Mental Health treatment of depression collaborative research program: General effectiveness of treatments. Archives of general psychiatry, 46(11), 971-982.


Are there any tests for one's belief or philosophy?

The confidence in one's own ability to achieve intended results is assessed by tests on self-efficacy

Self-efficacy or personal efficacy is a dimension developed by Bandura (1997) in his social cognitive theory.

He also developed some tests which assess the sefl-efficacy in many situations:

Academic self-efficacy
Self-efficacy to regulate eating habits
Driving self-efficacy
Problem solving self- efficacy
Teacher self-efficacy

And a great deal more scales. In fact  "the efficacy belief system is not a global trait but a differentiated set of self-beliefs linked to distinct realms of functioning" (Bandura, 1997) . Multidomain measures reveal the patterning and degree of generality of people’s sense of personal efficacy.

(I wish to have helped you)

REFERENCES

Bandura (1997), Self-efficacy. The excercise of control, New York: Freeman
The article: Guide for constructing self-efficacy scales : link: http://web.stanford.edu/dept/psychology/bandura/pajares/014-BanduraGuide2006.pdf


Why do people get addicted to things like TV, Facebook, games?

At least two phenomenons can be found here :

The drive to wath the TV series is higher than the drive to study.
The TV series are structured in such a way to attract and hook viewers.

I will try to answer the second :

TV series i.e. soap operas, Lost TV series etc mostly use two components to create addiction to viewers : curiosity and emotionally charged stories.

  Curiosity-drive theory relates to the undesirable experiences of
  "uncertainty". The reduction of these unpleasant feelings, in turn, is
  rewarding. This theory suggests that people desire coherence and understanding in their thought processes. When this coherence is
  disrupted by something that is unfamiliar, uncertain, or ambiguous, it
  is curiosity-drive theory that attempts to gather information and
  knowledge of the unfamiliar to restore coherent thought processes once
  again.

...

  British psychologist Edward B. Titchener (1867–1927) might have argued
  that we become glued to complex, emotionally-charged stories because
  of our ability to recognize the feelings of others. A newly identified
  phenomenon at the time, Titchener coined the term empathy in 1909. In
  addition to identifying others' discomfort or elation, "cognitive
  empathy" examines how humans can also adopt others' psychological
  perspectives, including those of fictional characters.


Motion perception

This article on motion perception might be a good start.

  pure motion perception is referred to as "first-order" motion
  perception and is mediated by relatively simple "motion sensors" in
  the visual system, that have evolved to detect a change in luminance
  at one point on the retina and correlate it with a change in luminance
  at a neighbouring point on the retina after a short delay

Vehicle velocity

There are a few articles on estimating vehicle velocity.
Scialfa et al (1991) provides a more behavioural account focussing on age differences.

References

Scialfa, C. T., Guzy, L. T., Leibowitz, H. W., Garvey, P. M., & Tyrrell, R. A. (1991). Age differences in estimating vehicle velocity. Psychology and aging, 6(1), 60. PDF


Why clothes' color is different than it appeared in stores?

It's difficult to say why this happened in your particular situation, but one contributing factor may be that color perception is relative. How a particular color is perceived depends on the surrounding colors. The best way to demonstrate this is through an optical illusion:

It looks like there are two different color hearts, but all of the hearts are exactly the same color. The illusion is created because the "green" hearts are striped with orange lines, and the "blue" hearts are striped with purple lines. Since color processing is relative, the different stripes cause us to perceive the underlying color very differently.This illusion comes from Akiyoshi Kitaoka's website, where there are several more examples.


Why does a British accent sound smarter to Americans?

Short answer: This is still debated, but it might be due at least partly to social stereotypes.
Attitudes:
There are many British accents, but the one most likely to be used in comparisons to say, American, Australian, or New Zealand accents is called RP, or the Queen's English.  Other accents used include MLE and Estuary, which are more common in modern times.  American accents also vary, and the one most commonly used in regional comparisons is called Standard American English, or GenAm, or Network English.  Much like RP, the Standard accent is most common in broadcast media.
Subject perceptions of accents are tested using the matched-guise and similar verbal-guise paradigms, in which speakers read the same content in different accents, while listeners, unaware of the manipulation, are asked to rate the speakers on various traits.  A common finding in matched-guise research is that people in general prefer standard accents over foreign accents, presumably due to in-group bias.  However, can exceptions be made for native speakers of non-standard accents, such as the way Americans rate British accents?
An early study by Stewart, Ryan, & Giles (1985) suggested that Americans indeed perceive British speakers as higher status than own-accent speakers.  However, in a later study by Bayard et al (2001), Americans rated the American accent higher than British on many traits, including intelligence and class.  Had attitudes changed in the intervening years?  Or is the difference due to changes in method used?  Results of other studies (eg, Scott, Green, & Rosewarne, 1997; Anderson et al, 2007; Gill, 2009; Wang et al, 2009) also question Americans' preference for the British accent.  Even if a preference for the British accent exists among Americans, it may only reflect the RP accent (eg, Trudgill, 1983).
Reasons:
Several hypotheses have been proposed for why listeners might have preferences for some accents over others:

The inherent value hypothesis is favored by many lay people - when asked about their preferences, they often claim that certain accents just "sound better".

The imposed norm hypothesis suggests that certain accents are "standard" in a given culture, and consequently preferred over non-standard accents.

The social connotation hypothesis is a variation that suggests that traits are associated with accents through social stereotypes, influenced by media.

An interesting way to test these hypotheses is to compare listener preferences when they don't recognize the accents that they are asked to rate.  To this end, Giles et al (1974) asked Brits to rate Greek accents, and Giles, Bourhis, & Davis (1979) asked Welsh to rate French accents.  Native speakers of the rated accents report clear preferences for one accent over another; however in both studies, listeners with no knowledge of the rated languages were unable to discern the accents and gave speakers similar ratings.  This result challenges the inherent value hypothesis.
Furthermore, native speaker ratings do not correlate well with how similar accents are to the "standard" accents, challenging the imposed norm hypothesis.  A study reported by Trudgill (1983) also demonstrated that native English speakers that can discern British accents give accents different ratings depending on which region or country the listener is from, contrary to both the inherent value and imposed norm hypotheses.  Finally, ratings can differ significantly depending on what trait is measured (eg, intelligence, class, solidarity, success).  Consequently, the social connotation hypothesis tends to be the dominant theory in current scholarship.
Controversy:
However, while some later studies (eg, Leemanna, Kollyb, & Nolan, 2015) corroborate the social connotation hypothesis, others lend support to the inherent value hypothesis (eg, Ladegaard, 1998; Hiraga, 2005; Gooskens, Hilton, & Schüppert, 2016; Wadas, 2020).  It is also possible that accent cannot always reliably be separated from other differences in speech, or that subjects unable to discern accents have nonetheless developed implicit associations through media exposure.  Additionally, accent preferences don't always align well with media stereotypes as reported by subjects.  More research is needed.
If the social connotation hypothesis is correct, then preference for the British accent may be the result of American Anglophilia - basically, the British have done a good job of branding themselves overseas.  Indeed, subjects from many countries (eg, Spain, Norway, Japan) prefer the British accent, but others (eg, Iran, Korea, Denmark, New Zealand, and Australia) seem to prefer the American accent - attributed to Pax Americana, or the USA doing a good job of branding themselves in those countries.


Term for "That feeling that in a game you don't get items that you really need"

Sounds like an example of the availability heuristic.

  Availability heuristic: The process whereby judgments of frequency or probability are based on how readily pertinent instances come to mind.

You're more likely to notice when you don't get your way, which makes that event stand out to you. That combined with how people tend to not notice how frequently things do go our way because there isn't a negative emotion associated with that experience (I would assume) could make it seem like the game is rigged. Then again, I don't know anything about video game design so it could be part of how it is programmed.


First, a major caveat: a less-than-30-second video clip of Monk in a particularly stressful context is insufficient basis for trait judgments, according to trait theory, which defines traits "as habitual patterns of behavior, thought, and emotion. According to this perspective, traits are relatively stable over time" (Kassin, 2003). Since this clip doesn't afford the opportunity to observe Monk over time, it's dangerous to assume his eccentric behaviors are a result of his personality, not of his circumstances. Most people could find themselves behaving thusly in the right circumstances. BTW, I acknowledge that outside of this clip's context, Monk's (fictional) behavior is often stably similar to this. This point is mostly meant to dissuade application of my points to other cases where context outside a 30-second observation is unavailable. That's not to say personality is entirely unobservable in such a short time though, just that it's difficult. You may want to read about the Realistic Accuracy Model of personality judgment (Funder, 1995, 1997) for a sense of when you can pick up on personality generally.

Second, you might try directing this to the Movies & TV Stack Exchange as well (or instead, if you wish), since Monk is a popular fictional character, and people over there probably love questions like this (can't say for sure, as I haven't spent much time there myself). That's not to say I mind answering here though. I also see you have three upvotes from our community already (make that three plus mine, and one unexplained downvote—shame on them :P ). I appreciate your genuine interest in our perspectives here!

Third, assuming strictly for the sake of argument that his behaviors do reflect his basic tendencies and characteristic adaptations (for context on these terms, see McCrae & Costa, 1999), and not other endogenous causes like physiological conditions (e.g., Parkinson's disease, low blood glucose, drugs)...I can first note that this is a relatively good situation for making trait judgments, in that it's unstructured, hence there's freedom for self-expression (Snyder & Ickes, 1985; Funder & Colvin, 1991), and in that it's an emotionally arousing situation, hence it provokes personality expression.

The strongest eccentricity I note is the fidgeting. (BTW, I focus on strong eccentricities in general because normal behaviors are somewhat less diagnostic of traits, and more ambiguous for their inseparability from behaviors prescribed by social norms.)  To me, fidgeting is a signal of high emotional arousal, and probably also slightly negative emotional valence (see the diagram of the circumplex model of emotion I included in this answer). Again, this could just be an emotional state, but assuming it's trait-level negative emotionality, this may imply neuroticism.
Self-doubt is also characteristic of definitionally neurotic individuals—e.g., Woody Allen, or at least his public persona...though Wikipedia notes self-described phobias, which relate to neuroticism too. I wouldn't call this a phobia in "unsure Mr. Monk's" case though :) nor would I be sure that it's a result of his probable neuroticism. As a detective, it's his job to reason carefully and objectively. I probably should've mentioned before that we need to consider (and control in any statistical model) the stable influence of social roles when making judgments about role-relevant traits like self-doubt too. In this case, I'd read more into his personality from his initial certainty, which he then tempers with reason.
In contrast to self-doubt, the initial self-assurance that he later judges to be inappropriate reminds me of "black-and-white" thinking (a.k.a., splitting). To some extent, we all do this initially, as it takes time to elaborate our initial reactions into probabilistic, pluralistic, or otherwise non-absolute judgments. When we act on these thoughts without inhibition, though—even if we later renounce those actions on further reflection—that's another hint of high emotional arousal, and maybe neuroticism. Disinhibition can also indicate low conscientiousness or extraversion (which relates to positive affect, including enthusiasm and confidence to the extent that these are emotions).

However, knowing what I do about Monk outside this context, I wouldn't say he's extraverted or unconscientious. If anything, I'd say his quick switch from enthusiastic confidence (the eagerness in his "eureka moment") to self-doubt expresses a strong need for affect (see Maio & Esses, 2001). Basically, this is a trait-level motive to seek emotional experience, and relates to emotional intensity in general—both positive and negative. You can probably also infer this need from his initial decision to become a detective—it's very emotion-provoking work. Also, his self-checking behavior and thorough reconsideration of the situation—even delayed as it is here—is a marker of high conscientiousness. Both detective work and self-checking may also reflect strong needs for cognition and achievement.
Considering that he does the most talking and is somewhat loud at times, we might have more reason to infer extraversion, because this relates to talkativeness and dominance somewhat. However, again, considering his social role, and the context of the TV series overall (most of which I haven't watched, TBH), I don't really think he's particularly extraverted. This is one of those personality cues we'd probably read too much into if we only had this brief video clip to judge, and nothing more. However, a strong need for power might be safe to infer here—again, especially in light of his career choice in law enforcement. He might even tend toward high authoritarianism, in as much as this trait entails tendencies toward favoring harsh punishment of rule-breakers and strict enforcement of societal law and order. Authoritarianism is very similar to social dominance orientation and related to conservatism, but I don't think we have much indication here of those traits.
Another source of information is his appearance. A colleague of mine, Laura Naumann(, Vazire, Rentfrow, & Gosling, 2009), would call the following static cues (as opposed to dynamic cues): he looks fairly healthy and neat (clean-shaven, clean clothes, buttoned shirt), and not what I would call fashionable. Here's what those cues indicated in Naumann and colleagues:

Healthy: extraverted, stable, likable, confident, and less lonely
Neat: extraverted, less open to experience, and less lonely
Unfashionable - introverted, lonely

Mixed signals here overall, especially in the context of the behaviors we've covered so far. The only not-so-mixed signals seems to be "likable" and "not open to experience".
Your question itself provides some useful context: obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD). I add the "P" for "personality" here because I happen to know his obsessions and compulsions aren't specific, but generalized, and I've checked this against the show's premise according to Wikipedia. I'm no clinician, so I can't say for sure that he wouldn't get diagnosed differently by a professional (if he were a real person, not just portrayed by one). Then again, professionals often make mistakes, and as far as I know, this is one of the primary ways of distinguishing OCPD from OCD.

OCPD may be useful for trait inferences, because in theory (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson, & Costa, 1994), it is an expression of pathologically extreme traits: i.e., extremely high neuroticism and conscientiousness. This is why I don't think he's unconscientious, and again, another reason why we might be wrong to read low conscientiousness into his initial disinhibition. (Also, a good example of why stability is so important in judging traits!) OCPD may also relate to low agreeableness and openness to experience, and to high extraversion, but again, this is according to Widiger and colleagues' (1994) theory, as cited in The Personality Puzzle (Funder, 1997).

I express doubt because I tried to find an independent source for these relationships just now, and found Morey, Gunderson, Quigley, and Lyons (2000), which contradicts Widiger and colleagues (1994). Morey and colleagues' data shows a pattern of high neuroticism, low extraversion (i.e., introversion), and low agreeableness and conscientiousness in OCPD patients relative to community norms. Low conscientiousness is the main contradiction of Widiger and colleagues. The low extraversion contradicts my previous understanding too, but I expected low agreeableness and high neuroticism.

BTW, the distinction between OCD and OCPD is important for judging trait relationships, as Samuels and colleagues (2000) found some different relationships between OCD and the Big Five. Unfortunately, I don't think they report their data about relationships between OCPD and the Big Five...

In summary, that adds up to the following list of probable trait scores:

High neuroticism and negative emotionality
High conscientiousness?

Monk's character seems based on the theoretical prototype of a conscientious person with OCPD (as in Widiger et al., 1994), but real people with OCPD tend not to be conscientious (Morey et al., 2000).

Moderate-to-high extraversion?

This doesn't sit well with me for Monk. It might be indicated in this clip, but it seems unlikely for a real OCPD case, and doesn't suit my impression of Monk in general.

Moderate-to-low openness to experience?

Indicated by his neat appearance, and maybe Widiger and colleagues' (1994) theory of OCPD
Real people with OCPD seem to be relatively average on openness (Morey et al., 2000).

Somewhat high needs for achievement, power, cognition, and affect.

I know this theory a bit less well, but I'm comfortable saying he wouldn't score low on these.

Maybe moderate-to-high authoritarianism?

A loose inference based on his profession and other apparent traits.
If I had to guess his political orientation from his traits, I'd say he's conservative. However, the show is set in San Francisco, which is relatively liberal, so this is also iffy.

References

Funder, D. C. (1995). On the accuracy of personality judgment: A realistic approach. Psychological Review, 102(4), 652–670. Retrieved from http://uwed.yolasite.com/resources/Funder_On%20the%20Accuracy%20of%20Personality%20Judgment%20A%20Realistic%20Approac_PR1995.pdf.
Funder, D. C. (1997). The personality puzzle. W. W. Norton & Co.
Funder, D. C., & Colvin, C. R. (1991). Explorations in behavioral consistency: properties of persons, situations, and behaviors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(5), 773–794.
Kassin, S. (2003). Psychology. USA: Prentice–Hall, Inc.
Maio, G. R., & Esses, V. M. (2001). The need for affect: Individual differences in the motivation to approach or avoid emotions. Journal of Personality, 69(4), 583–614. Retrieved from http://psych.cf.ac.uk/esrcfertilitynetwork/pubs/Greg%20Maio_%20The%20need%20for%20affect%20Individual%20differences%20in%20the%20motivation%20to%20approach%20or%20avoid%20emotions.pdf.
McCrae, R. R., & Costa Jr., P. T. (1999). A five-factor theory of personality. Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2, 139–153.
Morey, L. C., Gunderson, J. G., Quigley, B. D., Shea, M. T., Skodol, A. E., McGlashan, T. H., ... & Zanarini, M. C. (2002). The representation of borderline, avoidant, obsessive-compulsive, and schizotypal personality disorders by the five-factor model. Journal of Personality Disorders, 16(3), 215–234.
Samuels, J., Nestadt, G., Bienvenu, O. J., Costa, P. T., Riddle, M. A., Liang, K. Y., ... & Cullen, B. (2000). Personality disorders and normal personality dimensions in obsessive—compulsive disorder. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 177(5), 457–462. Retrieved from http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/177/5/457.long.
Snyder, M., & Ickes, W. (1985). Personality and social behavior. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 883–948). New York: Random House.
Widiger, T. A., Trull, T. J., Clarkin, J. F., Sanderson, C., & Costa, P. T. (1994). A description of the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV personality disorders with the five-factor model of personality. In P. T. Costa & T. A. Widiger (Eds.), Personality disorders and the five-factor model of personality (pp. 41–58). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.


Predicting the individual effects of psychotropic drugs

Predicting individual side effects is generally not feasible in current clinical practice, although in the purview of "personalized medicine", mostly as a research goal/topic. For psychotropic medications, this is largely envisaged to work through pharmacogenomics:

In pharmacogenomics, genomic information is used to study individual responses to drugs. When a gene variant is associated with a particular drug response in a patient, there is the potential for making clinical decisions based on genetics by adjusting the dosage or choosing a different drug, for example. Scientists assess gene variants affecting an individual's drug response the same way they assess gene variants associated with diseases: by identifying genetic loci associated with known drug responses, and then testing individuals whose response is unknown. [...]
Scientists believe many idiosyncratic effects result from individual variation that is encoded in the genome. Thus, genetic variation in genes for drug-metabolizing enzymes, drug receptors, and drug transporters have been associated with individual variability in the efficacy and toxicity of drugs. Genetics also underlies hypersensitivity reactions in patients who are allergic to certain drugs, such as penicillin, wherein the body mounts a rapid, aggressive immune response that can cause not only a rash, but can also hinder breathing and cause edema to the point of cardiovascular collapse.
Predicting serious ADRs [adverse drug reactions] is a priority for pharmacogenomic research. For example, the enzyme CYP2D6, one of a class of drug-metabolizing enzymes found in the liver, breaks down and terminates the action of certain antidepressant, antiarrhythmic, and antipsychotic drugs. Molecular cloning and characterization studies of the gene that codes for this enzyme have described more than 70 variant alleles (Meyer, 2000). These alleles contain one or more point mutations, only some of which affect enzyme activity; however, some of these alleles involve gene deletions and duplications that can lead to increased enzyme activity. Individuals who are homozygous or heterozygous for the wild-type or normal activity enzymes (75%–85% of the population) are called extensive metabolizers; intermediate (10%–15%) or poor (5%–10%) metabolizers are carriers of two alleles that decrease enzyme activity (Ingelman-Sundberg, 1999); and ultrarapid metabolizers (1%–10%) are carriers of duplicated genes. The most common alleles can be detected by DNA chip microarrays, allowing most patients to be assigned to a particular phenotype group. [...]
With the completion of the Human Genome Project, anticipation was high that genetic information would radically improve medicine, that side effects would be more predictable, and that patients could be screened for likely drug responses. But thus far, progress has been much slower than what the initial excitement suggested.
A great deal of this delay relates to the fact that an individual's response to drugs is multifactorial, resulting from multiple gene and environmental interactions (Haga & Burke, 2004). Scientists also recognize that even as the knowledge base continues to expand, the clinical translation of that knowledge still requires empirical evidence, generated for a particular disease and drug combination, before treatment can be customized to a patient's genotype. Thus, much work remains to be done before personalized medicine can reach its fullest potential.

Last year the FDA has issued a warning against improper/premature use of pharmacogenomics to select antidepressants. An excerpt...

For example, the FDA is aware of genetic tests that claim results can be used to help physicians identify which antidepressant medication would have increased effectiveness or side effects compared to other antidepressant medications. However, the relationship between DNA variations and the effectiveness of antidepressant medication has never been established. The FDA is aware that health care providers may have made inappropriate changes to a patient's medication based on the results from genetic tests that claim to provide information on the personalized dosage or treatment regimens for some antidepressants. [...]
There are a limited number of cases for which at least some evidence does exist to support a correlation between a genetic variant and drug levels within the body, and this is described in the labeling of FDA cleared or approved genetic tests and FDA approved medications.

As noted in a review of last year there are now several guidelines trying to put together the available knowledge:

There are multiple guidelines in various stages of development during the past 5 years including those by the Clinical Pharmacogenetics Implementation Consortium (CPIC), a registered service mark of the US Department of Health and Human Services and other authoritative scientific consortia [(e.g., Dutch Pharmacogenetic Working Group (DPWG)] for cytochrome P450 and drug therapy including for psychiatry.

CPIC has a database page roughly ordered by the drug in question, e.g. "CYP2D6, CYP2C19 and Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors". The DPWG guidelines currently seem to be one large (book-sized) pdf document, not restricted to psychotropic drugs. Various papers, e.g. Lunenburg et al. describe how their methodology (and thus sometimes conclusions) differs from CPIC etc. The latter consortium also publishes journal papers on their individual drug guidelines, e.g. they have one on "Genotypes and Dosing of Tricyclic Antidepressants".


I am not a professional, but it is my understanding that it is common for major depression to not show up in adults until the age of 30 to 60 years old; see for example, Table 2 of Lifetime Prevalence and Age-of-Onset Distributions of DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, Mood Disorders - Major Depressive Disorder.  Overall, the most likely age group for any disorder to present itself is the years 30-44.

The beginning of the paper states: "Little is known about lifetime prevalence or age of onset of DSM-IV disorders".  The study included 9282 participants.


What are the effects of rejection from both parents on a child?

The psychological theory most commonly used to describe these sorts of situations is Parental Acceptance-Rejection Syndrome. Most of this research was pioneered by Ronald P. Rohner at the University of Connecticut.
The best book on the subject is probably New perspectives on family. The warmth dimension: Foundations of parental acceptance-rejection theory by R. Rohner (1986).
Here are some highlights from his research
Rohner & Rohner, 1980

For example evidence shows that the effects of parental rejection and
emotional abuse are not limited simply to individual personality and
behavior disorders, but they reach into such abstract domains as the
religious beliefs of a people, their art, music, and other expressive
behaviors. There now seems to be little doubt that the results of
parental rejection as well as the mechanisms which produce or distort
parental warmth work uniformly throughout our species, regardless of
differences in race, nationality, time or other limiting conditions.

The main difficulty that a child who has experienced total parental rejection will have is an inability to give or receive love. Specifically, because the child has not learned strategies for how to emotionally and socially process unconditional positive regard, they will be at a significant disadvantage should it appear in their life, much like how a child who never learned French will have difficulty learning it as an adult. Children in this scenario tend to hide their emotions. They will, in many cases, cease to try to get affection from people who are important to them. Emotional attachments will inevitably be constrained by emotional constriction, or defensiveness.

Beyond a certain point, the dependency response may be extinguished or
transformed. The seriously rejected child has not learned how to give
love, because he has never known a loving parent after whom he can
model his own behavior, and for reasons described below, even though
he craves affection he has difficulty accepting it. In order to
protect himself from more emotional hurt, the rejected child tends to
wrap his emotions in cotton, to encyst his emotions. Ultimately he may
stop trying to get affection from the people who are important to him.
That is, dependency responses disappear. Thus the rejected child
becomes emotionally insulated, unable to freely and openly form warm,
lasting, intimate relations with others. His attachments tend to be
troubled by emotional constriction or defensiveness, and in extreme
cases the rejected child may become apathetic or emotionally bland or
flat. In addition, as a result of the grave psychological damage
brought about by rejection, the rejected child is inclined to have
less tolerance for stress and he is therefore likely to be less
emotionally stable than those who were accepted as children.

Children who are allowed to express anger without recrimination generally prefer that mode to becoming withdrawn. Totally-rejected children who find violence as an outlet will usually exploit it.

The rejected child is especially likely to become hostile, aggressive,
or passive-aggressive if rejection takes the form of parental
hostility. Under these conditions he is provided with an aggressive
model to emulate, and thus his own aggressive responses may intensify.

Children who experience total rejection generally see the supernatural, if they believe in it, as a hostile, terrifying force. This includes perceptions of religion.
In general, rejection is experienced, and processed, similarly across all races, nationalities, times, or limiting conditions.
In terms of how to overcome such trauma:
Abusive parents tend to live in isolation themselves, cut off from an effective network of friends, family, or other community support. It is sadly quite common for abusive parents to simply be overwhelmed, either with too many children, too little emotional, social, or financial support, or a terrible combination of many of these factors.
Social workers and clinical psychologists are best equipped to handle patients who suffered from such abuses. Providing social services, both physical, tangible benefits (food, shelter, education, healthcare) and intangibles (companionship, romantic love, open and honest communication) do a great deal to help someone who has been abused. The best strategy is unconditional positive regard. That is, to accept and love without judging or feeling a need to dissect, rehash, or understand. This is a sort of ego-less interaction that can be very draining on the provider.
In order for the patterns of behavior that develop from systematic abuse to be ameliorated, the subject must be treated kindly consistently for a long period of time so that the defensive habits can be unlearned.


What is the difference between hypnosis and meditation?

I believe this question is impossible to "answer" because the inherent premises in the question are based on the assumption that there are two discrete dichotomous phenomena, "hypnotism," and "meditation," which can somehow be meaningfully "defined," and, then, "compared."

Both "hypnosis" and "meditation" are figuratively vast conceptual collages of imprecise multiple-meanings, observations of what appear to be "special" states of human awareness, and consciousness, admixtures from what in "western science" is termed "psychology" with an equally vast mix of practices, lumped-together as "spiritual," from the world's religions, etc.

From the viewpoint of epiphenomenal philosophy ... wikipedia entry ..., and from some modern, western, theorists of human consciousness as grounded in our biological, neurological, reality, both hypnosis and meditation can be regarded as secondary phenomena: in the sense that they are culturally defined and shaped modes of thought, behavior, and experience, in a "continuum of consciousness," which, over time, are conserved, institutionalized, even valorised into being perceived as "sacred."

In Vipassana meditation, in the Theravadan Buddhist tradition (Sanskrit "sthaviravada," "teachings of the elders") one way the "anti-goal" of meditation could be defined is: it is a practice meant as a vehicle for the de-hypnosis of the "illusory personal, small, self," leading to a direct experience of the "real, undifferentiated, trans-personal Self."

But, in that tradition, in its "purest" form, meditation is not a "goal in itself," and meditation is not a "means to an end" of achieving "altered states of consciousness."

But, there are countless other types, schools, philosophies, of "meditation," with very different conceptual underpinnings, some "secular," some "formally religious," and a wide range of behavioral practices associated with them.

On the "grossest" level, you might say we observe, when we see what appears to be hypnosis of one person by another, a loss of conscious, and subconscious, control of self from the person hypnotized to the hypnotist. But, then: there's stage hypnosis, self-hypnosis, so-called therapeutic hypnosis for behavior modification (such as giving up smoking, etc.).

While we typically associate meditation with acts of what we define, in western psychological terms, as individual "self-control," and "discipline," there are traditions in which group practices (rituals) leading to mass ecstasy are considered meditation (Sufi Zhikr ?).

From one perspective, "cultural identity," itself, can be considered a cohesive set of internalized hypnotic states of mind: continually reinforced from within, and without, the self, and modified in biological development throughout the life-cycle ... I am not referring, here, to the movie-series, "The Matrix" :) !

Suggested readings:

Hypnotism and psychotherapy: Milton Erickson ... Amazon page ....
Psychology and consciousness: books by Robert Ornstein ... Ornstein's website ...; books by Andrew Weill ... Weill's Amazon page ..., books by Steven Pinker, particularly, "The Language Instinct" ... Pinker's website ....
Meditation and Buddhism:

a. Donald Lopez ... "The Story of Buddhism: A Concise Guide to Its History & Teachings" ...: excellent overview of how original Buddhism became "modified:" incorporated a mixture of Vedic/Hindu classic ideas (influence of Advaita Vedanta, and Yogacara schools, for example); incorporated Sivaite Tantra as developed in what is now Bengal; and, later, became "deistic," with an elaborate hierarchic pantheon, in India, Tibet, China, Japan (into what can be loosely lumped together under the rubric "Mahayana Buddhism"). Depending on your biases, you might say, rather than "modified:" "evolved," or "corrupted.."

b. Theravadan Buddhist tradition (Sri Lanka, Southeast Asia), and Vipassana meditation (aka "mindfulness", or "insight" meditation): Walpole Rahula ... "What the Buddha Taught: Revised and Expanded Edition" ...; Thich Nhat Hanh ... Amazon page ...; books by Joseph Goldstein ... recommended: "Insight Meditation: The Practice of Freedom" ...; books by Bernard Kornfeld ... Amazon page ....


What is a neurobiological explanation of borderline personality disorder?

The Neurobiology and Genetics of Borderline Personality Disorder indicates that a good deal of research has been done but a specific mechanism causing it has not been pinned down. It appears to be largely genetic which would strongly suggest a neurobiological/nature basis as opposed to a "nurture" related cause.
(emphasis mine)

  In summary, the neurobiological research that has been the most useful in
  shedding light on the physiology underlying borderline personality disorder has examined
  this multifaceted disorder by examining simpler dimensions of behavior separately,
  including impulsive aggression and affective instability. Evidence suggests that impulsive
  aggression involves a deficit in serotonergic activity. However, the specific mechanism
  underlying this remains unknown. It is clear that this component of behavior is
  substantially genetically encoded, and so new research has focused on elucidating the
  specific receptors underlying impulsive aggression through the examination of genes
  coding for specific receptors.


Which personality traits cause "non-cruelty"?

I've been commenting a lot and not answering for quite some time now! My hesitation was largely due to the terms "unfailingly", the mixture of "altruism" and "non-cruelty", and having forgotten my intention to answer. My answer certainly won't be foolproof (haven't yet heard of a trait model that is), and I may not cover both altruism and non-cruelty, but here are some pointers anyway...

To start this answer off "Big", I'll begin with agreeableness (and its Wikipedia page, which has a lot to offer on the topic), one of the Big Five personality traits [emphasis added throughout]:

  Agreeableness is a personality trait manifesting itself in individual behavioral characteristics that are perceived as kind, sympathetic, cooperative, warm and considerate [(Thompson, 2008)].

All of these aspects (traits unto themselves, really) will relate somewhat to non-cruelty or altruism; even cooperation entails not harming one's teammates and sometimes putting them first.

  People scoring low on agreeableness are generally less concerned with others' well-being and report having less empathy. Therefore, these individuals are less likely to go out of their way to help others. Low agreeableness is often characterized by skepticism about other people's motives, resulting in suspicion and unfriendliness. People very low on agreeableness have a tendency to be manipulative in their social relationships. They are also more likely to compete than to cooperate.

Less concern for others' well-being and emotions in general means greater freedom to disregard or willfully harm them, as are often useful to do for personal gain via manipulation or competition. Here we also have a direct connection to altruism, and a few indirect connections, including disinterest and mistrust of others' concerns. Yet the most direct connection to altruism appears in the facets of agreeableness (lower-order factors in a second-order model of agreeableness as a multidimensional construct; see Figure 1 for a similar model):

  Agreeableness is considered to be a superordinate trait, meaning that it is a grouping of personality sub-traits that cluster together statistically. The lower-level traits, or facets, grouped under agreeableness are: trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tender-mindedness [(Matsumoto & Juang, 2012)].

I've emphasized trust and straightforwardness above because the Big Five model of personality isn't the only one that relates trust to altruism—see also:

Figure 1. Second-order model of trust linking altruism to honesty (Perepelkin & Di Zhang, 2011).

Again, logically, a lack of trust would likely reduce motivation to help others altruistically. As for straightforwardness, Wikipedia notes, "Low scorers...are generally deceitful or manipulative." Again, these behaviors are likely to relate to some form of cruelty more often than not (i.e., "white lies" are the exception, I assume).

Also, from the same section, "Straightforwardness is similar to the honesty aspect of honesty-humility in the HEXACO model" (Ashton & Lee, 2005). So, speaking of HEXACO...

  The factors of Agreeableness, Honesty-Humility and Emotionality are distinctly different from their counterparts on the Five Factor Model (FFM). Honesty-Humility, Emotionality and Agreeableness are proposed to be measures of Altruistic versus Antagonistic behaviour. Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness both measure two different aspects of Reciprocal altruism, high levels of which indicate a propensity for helping behaviour and cooperation as opposed to the exploitation of others. The Honesty-Humility factor represents a person's tendency for pro-social altruistic behaviours [(Thalmayer, Saucier, & Eigenhuis, 2011)], while Agreeableness indicates an individual's tendency to forgive and to show tolerance. Emotionality is a measure of kin altruism, that is, the tendency to show empathy and attachment to one’s kin.

This implies a little complexity in altruism itself, but brings agreeableness, honesty-humility, and emotionality directly into the equation within the HEXACO model. It may also claim that emotionality is "distinctly different" from neuroticism, but I'm not sure I'd go so far. Consider that neuroticism relates negatively to happiness in the context of the Wikipedia page on altruism itself:

  While research supports the idea that altruistic acts bring about happiness, it has also been found to work in the opposite direction—that happier people are also kinder. The relationship between altruistic behavior and happiness is bidirectional. Studies have found that generosity increases linearly from sad to happy affective states [(Underwood, Froming, & Moore, 1977)]...While generous acts make people feel good about themselves, it is also important for people to appreciate the kindness they receive from others. Studies suggest that gratitude goes hand-in-hand with kindness and is also very important for our well-being. A study on the relationship happiness to various character strengths showed that "a conscious focus on gratitude led to reductions in negative affect and increases in optimistic appraisals, positive affect, offering emotional support, sleep quality, and well-being" [(Shimai, Otake, Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2006).]

This adds happiness and gratitude to the equation as well, which can be measured at the trait level.

BTW, since empathy has come up a fair amount, you may be interested in the "empathy-altruism hypothesis". This also implicates empathy as a trait of sorts that relates to altruism, but I'm not sure this adds anything to what I've said above. Also, while I'm disclaiming, I may not have addressed cruelty sufficiently yet, much less neural correlates. Both are likely to make the necessary answer much bigger, so I'm at least going to take a break on this one for now. I'd encourage someone else to step up and cover those bases in the meantime.

References

- Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2005). Honesty-Humility, the Big Five, and the Five-Factor Model. Journal of Personality, 73(5), 1321–1354.
- Matsumoto, D., & Juang, L. (2012). Culture and psychology (5th ed.), pp. 271. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth-Cengage Learning.
- Perepelkin, J., & Di Zhang, D. (2011). Brand personality and customer trust in community pharmacies. International Journal of Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Marketing, 5(3), 175–193.
-Post, S. G. (2005). Altruism, happiness, and health: It's good to be good. International Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 12(2), 66–77.
-Schwartz, C., Meisenhelder, J., Ma, Y., & Reed, G. (2003). Altruistic social interest behaviors are associated with better mental health. Psychosomatic Medicine, 65(5), 778–785.
-Shimai, S., Otake, K., Park, N., Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. P. (2006). Convergence of character strengths in American and Japanese young adults. Journal of Happiness Studies, 7(3), 311–322.
-Thalmayer, A. G., Saucier, G., & Eigenhuis, A. (2011). Comparative validity of brief to medium-length Big Five and Big Six Personality Questionnaires. Psychological Assessment, 23(4), 995–1009. Retrieved from http://pages.uoregon.edu/gsaucier/comp_val.pdf.
-Thompson, E. R. (2008). Development and validation of an international English big-five mini-markers. Personality and Individual Differences, 45(6), 542–548.
-Underwood, B., Froming, W. J., & Moore, B. S. (1977). Mood, attention, and altruism: A search for mediating variables. Developmental Psychology, 13(5), 541–542.


What is the difference between work engagement and flow?

While there are some differences, the two concepts are closely related.
Both flow and work engagement are "positive emotional states" (Schaufeli, Bakker and Van Rhenen, 2009, p. 898).

According to Schaufeli et al. (2009, p. 895) "recent research suggests that vigor and dedication constitute the core of engagement, whereas absorption seems to be related to the concept of flow" as defined by Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989).

"However, typically, flow is a more complex concept that includes many aspects and refers to rather particular, short-term ‘peak’ experiences instead of a more pervasive and persistent state of mind, as is the case with engagement" (Schaufeli et al., 2002, p. 75). Moreover, work engagement refers specifically to "identification with one's work" (Schaufeli et al., 2009, p. 895).

References

Csikszentmihalyi, M., & LeFevre, J. (1989). Optimal experience in work and leisure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(5), 815–822. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.56.5.815

Schaufeli, W. B., Bakker, A. B., & Van Rhenen, W. (2009). How changes in job demands and resources predict burnout, work engagement, and sickness absenteeism. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 30(7), 893–917. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.595

Schaufeli, W., Salanova, M., González-romá, V., & Bakker, A. (2002). The Measurement of Engagement and Burnout: A Two Sample Confirmatory Factor Analytic Approach. Journal of Happiness Studies, 3(1), 71–92. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015630930326


How to create an effective and efficient team - with the same or different cognitive style?

Let me say first off that I don't know anything about cognitive style. However, I have recently read an interesting article by van Knippenberg and van Ginkel (2010) about diversity in work teams which might be relevant here.

Demographic Diversity.
To explain the sometimes contradicting effects of diversity on work teams, the authors propose a model that differenciates between two types of diversity, demographic and functional diversity. According to the authors, these two forms of diversity have opposing effects. According to Self-Categorization Theory, demographic diversity (age, gender, country of origin, etc.) is likely to initiate categorization processes (see this post for more information) through which people perceive themselves as belonging to different groups. These perceptions of ingroup and outgroup might lead to conflict and thereby negatively impact team performance.

Functional Diversity.
Functional diversity on the other hand refers to different areas of knowledge and expertise, that members of a team might have and is seen as an informational ressource. A team with experts from different fields has a potential benefit (at least with regard to some tasks). This might also cling to cognitive style. This kind of diversity, then, can potentially increase a team's performance. However, it is not sufficient for a team to be functinally diverse. Rather, the members have to put this diversity to use by elaborating together on the task at hand. This Elaboration process is not automatic and involves the exchange, discussion and integration of information.

The Categorization-Elaboration Model of Work Group Diversity

It is important to note that according to van Knippenberg & van Ginkel (2010), it is not the question, which one of these two approaches is the correct one. Instead, both kinds of diversity might be present at the same time and interact, leading to the often mixed results from studies on diversity. There are a couple of moderators in the model, as well. Task complexity is thought to be a factor with regard to funtional diversity: the more complex the task, the more schould the team benefit diversity. The two other moderators are motivation and ability, which are, as I would argue, not specific to the discussion of diversity.

Team Design and Management

What can one learn from this with regard to the design of work teams? The first thing that comes to mind is that teams should be functionally diverse. In addition, the importance of the elaboration process needs to be acknowledged, because otherwise informational ressources will not be put to good use. As to demographic diversity, the suggestion cannnot be to have teams not be diverse (to prevent categorization as ingroup and outgroup). Rather, the authors suggest to foster the importance of group members beliefs in the value of diversity. van Knippenberg & van Ginkel also prevent evidence that leaders can be trained in order to do so.

Reference:

Van Knippenberg, D., & van Ginkel, W. P. (2010). The categorization-elaboration model of work group diversity: Wielding the double-edged sword. In R. J. Crisp (Hrsg.), The psychology of social and cultural diversity (S. 257–280). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.


Difference between voting patterns in men and women

I imagine there would be a huge literature on this topic. I found one interesting article by Inglehart and Norris (2000). I recommend reading the article. The article reports empirical findings relating to gender differences in voting patterns across countries and over time. It also discusses some of the proposed reasons for these differences.

The authors note that gender is generally not as important as class, region, or religion in voting patterns and in the formation of political parties.

To quote a few particular passages:

  Studies carried out in many countries in previous decades found that women were more
  conservative than men and less likely to participate in politics....  The article draws on evidence from the World Values Surveys in the early 1980s, and the early and mid-1990s carried out in over sixty countries around the world. This study establishes that gender differences in electoral behavior have been realigning, with women moving toward the left of men throughout advanced industrial societies (though not in postcommunist societies or developing countries) ...

To explain this movement of women tending to vote for left wing candidates, they offer what they call the Developmental Theory of Gender Realignment:

  [They] argue that a developmental theory can be used to explain this
  phenomenon, in which the transformation of sex roles in postindustrial
  societies has influenced the process of value change. As women’s and
  men’s lifestyles and cultural attitudes have been altered by the
  process of societal modernization [the authors] expect this to have a major
  impact on their political preferences.

In short, the article is well worth reading particularly for the way they have summarised various empirical sources of information regarding gender differences.

References

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2000). The developmental theory of the gender gap: Women’s and men’s voting behavior in global perspective. International Political Science Review, 21(4), 441-463. PDF


Bereavement and loss can be different from person to person due to society, culture and religious beliefs; and different situations of loss can result in different reactions and death can result in different reactions depending on the relationship with the person affected and how the death occurred.

Take for example, a hospital surgeon fighting to save the life of someone on their operating table.  They know that their life can be saved but complications arise which result in their death.  Also for another example, a train driver strikes and kills a person on the line.  There can be feelings of guilt and anger with themselves as well as grief, and in the case of the train driver, there can be anger felt towards the dead person, especially if the situation was a suicide.  Whilst working on the railway I have heard comments such as “Suicide is selfish”, “They don’t think about the poor driver”, and “Now the driver is having to live on sick pay whilst he is dealing with the death in his head”.

Grief can also affect a large population of people with the death of some people, for example the death of Princess Diana in 1997 and Robin Williams in 2014 (Connor, 2014)

Bereavement, loss and grief can also be evident as a result of the loss of a job, sudden loss of physical or mental abilities, loss of material things, or loss of relationships through separation, divorce or death.  Catherine Jackson commented in the editorial at the front of March 2016 edition of BACPs journal ‘Therapy Today’ that,

  Dementia is often seen as stealing the person and leaving only a body
  behind.

With death, someone who has religious and/or spiritual beliefs may believe in an after-life of varying kinds, which can add a different dimension to the therapeutic work needed as these beliefs can create different outlooks on death in all sorts of ways.

There are 3 representations of bereavement, loss and grief I know of, which were reported by the people related to those representations which were:

Colin Murray Parkes,
William Worden, and
Elizabeth Kübler-Ross.

William Worden was different because he only covered the tasks involved with dealing with grief following death, however, this can be used whilst dealing with other forms of grief, and the following table I put together shows how the representations combine and overlap each other.

References

Connor, J., 2014. In Practice - Thinking about dying. Therapy Today, October, 25(8), p. 6


Problem solving capability as a "function" of room temperature

As @what mentions Pilcher et al (2002) provide a meta-analysis of the effect of hot and cold temperature on performance. They found that cold temperatures of 10 degrees celsius resulted in an average reduction in performance of 14.88% and that hot temperatures of 32 degrees celsius resulted in a decrement of 13.91% relative to more neutral temperature conditions.

The study does discuss how type of task and duration of task moderate the effect of temperature on performance. However, as is often the case with meta-analysis, I found the results to be somewhat confusing and not readily explainable by a coherent theoretical model.

References

Pilcher, J. J., Nadler, E., & Busch, C. (2002). Effects of hot and cold temperature exposure on performance: a meta-analytic review. Ergonomics, 45(10), 682-698.