How should results from linear mixed models (LMMs) be reported?

The APA style manual does not provide specific guidelines for linear mixed models. Additionally, a review of studies using linear mixed models reported that the psychological papers surveyed differed 'substantially' in how they reported on these models (Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily, 2013). It depends greatly on your study, in other words. Normatively speaking, I find this checklist (Ferron et al., 2008) extremely helpful in such cases.
Besides the more general checklist, Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily (2013) also provide some guidelines for reporting on LMMs. The whole paper is well worth a read, but excerpts of their "Reporting results" section are provided below.

One needs to provide sufficient information for the reader to be able to recreate the analyses. One way of satisfying this requirement is to report the variance–covariance matrix, which includes all the information about the random effects, including their estimates. ... A simpler option is to mention that one attempted to use a maximal LMEM and, as an added check, also state which factors had random slopes associated with them.
If it is seen as necessary or desirable in a confirmatory analysis to determine the random effects structure using a data-driven approach, certain minimal guidelines should be followed. First, it is critical to report the criteria that have been used, including the a-level for exclusion/inclusion of
random slopes and the order in which random slopes were tested. Furthermore, authors should explicitly report the changed assumptions about the generative process underlying the data that result from excluding the random slope (rather than just stating that the slopes did not ‘‘improve model fit’’), and should do so in non-technical language that non-experts can understand. Readers with only background in ANOVA will not understand that removing the random slope corresponds to pooling error across strata in a mixed-model ANOVA analysis. It is therefore preferable to clearly state the underlying assumption of a constant effect, e.g., ‘‘by excluding the random slope for the priming manipulation, we assume that the priming effect is invariant across subjects (or items) in the population.’’

Searching the Barr article, I also found a highly relevant CrossVal.SE question which asks for examples rather than guidelines. Since no guidelines appear to exist, I would suggest that.
References

Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure for confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 68(3), 255–278. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001
Ferron, J. M., Hogarty, K. Y., Dedrick, R. F., Hess, M. R., Niles, J. D., & Kromrey, J. D. (2008). Reporting results from multilevel analyses. Multilevel modeling of educational data, 391-426. (Statistical checklist only.)


The effect of proper food intake on emotions and brain function

Part of the issue is maintaining blood-glucose concentration, which one doesn't always sense is crashing until it's already low and still crashing. As @BennySkogberg's answer implies, disruptions in the energy supply threaten cognitive function. This implies a loss of functional capacity and efficiency (which, when lacking, increase the probability of frustrating outcomes), as well as implying some disinhibition of impulses. Impulsivity relates to negative emotionality (including anger and stress), and interferes with attention. Reductions in the ability to focus attention on practical problems and address them planfully (problem-focused coping, which also relates to impulsivity, but negatively) would likely result; trouble envisioning solutions to problems might then decrease confidence and increase stress.

Another part of the issue is the homeostatic equilibrium between the sympathetic ("fight-or-flight") and parasympathetic ("rest-and-digest") nervous systems. Even before getting the post-digestion blood-glucose boost, one might achieve relaxation by simply having something to digest. Food in the stomach triggers parasympathetic activation, which facilitates relaxation and dulls the senses somewhat. An increasingly urgent lack of food in the stomach might (don't actually know) trigger the sympathetic system, as hunger implies some need to wake up and act assertively to correct it and prevent starvation. Sympathetic activation promotes aggression (and thus anger) and emotional arousal (and thus stress, which is negatively valent emotional arousal).

For a particularly extreme example of the effects of starvation, you might find the results of the Minnesota Starvation Experiment interesting. Food definitely has profound effects on psychological function; what you've felt may be a lesser shade of what these research participants reported after more prolonged deprivation. Also, FWIW, I've noticed the same effects you describe in myself and others I know well when starving (if only in the "first world problems" sense of being really hungry, having waited a couple hours too long to fix a meal). One doesn't need to prolong it to start seeing effects, especially when there's some violation of implicit expectations or customary levels of need satisfaction. Our bodies adapt to how well or how poorly we're fed on a regular basis, so those of us who are used to eating regularly may have exacerbated reactions to the rare violations of our habits, as our bodies haven't had the chance to adapt to deprivation gradually when the onset is sudden and unusual.

Edit: BTW, you might also find this question interesting (I've answered it similarly):
How is fasting related to insomnia?


How does neural spiking begin in the fetus?

Many parts of the fetus brain begin showing neural activity before the senses that feed them are sufficiently developed to provide actual sensory information. In other words, it is unlikely that spiking activity in the brain is initiated by the senses. Some of the cells that become sensory organs, however, often fire in very specific patterns similar to the patterns they will use when they start actually sensing.
An example from Penn & Shatz (1999): in the human fetus, the connections from the eye to the visual cortex form before the retina is developed enough to respond to light. However, at this time the retinal ganglion cells spontaneously generate highly correlated bursts of action potentials. These bursts are similar to the sort of data they will generate once they actual start sensing, and these preliminary bursts allow the human fetus to start developing its visual cortex before it even has functional retina. This is not unique to humans, and similar activity was first observed in rats (Galli & Maffei, 1988).
The take away message, is that the cell in the brain start firing spontaneously before they has any sensory input. Some of this early firing is 'random' in the sense you asked before. However, neurons that develop into future sensory organs, tend to have their spontaneous firing resemble what their typical sensory production will look like in the future (once they start sensing). This allows the downstream circuitry to start adapting to the firing pattens before any real sensory infromation becomes available.
References

Galli, L., & Maffei, L. (1988) "Spontaneous impulse activity of rat retinal ganglion cells in prenatal life". Science 242(4875): 90-91.

Penn, A.A., & Shatz, C.J. (1999) "Brain Waves and Brain Wiring: The Role of Endogenous and Sensory-Driven Neural Activity in Development". Pediatric Research 45: 447–458.


Do people like those who are similar to them and why?

Since you mentioned that you want an evolutionary explanation, there is one available. In biology the effect of providing benefit towards potential non-kin based on an arbitrary marker is known as the green-beard or armpit effect. In a social human setting, if the marker is arbitrary social construct it is usually known as ethnocentrism. This sort of behavior is studied in game theory in the context of cooperate-defect games (typical example: Prisoner's dilemma) and usually called conditional altruism.
It has been shown that conditional altruism evolves in a simple spatial agent-based model and promotes cooperative behavior (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006a 2006b). The effect does not create cooperation, but if there is another mechanism for creation of cooperation (say spatial factors in the H&A model) then ethnocentrism helps maintain it and extend the range of parameters under which cooperation can occur (Kaznatcheev & Shultz, 2011).
In humans, this ability to cooperate only with others of similar culture is believed to require a significant amount of cognitive ability. In fact, some even suppose that it could have been one of the factors that drove towards the increasing complexity of our brains. Unfortunately, Kaznatcheev (2010a) shows that the ethnocentrism of the sort present in the H&A models is not robust to increase in the cost of cognition. Thus, in humans (or simpler organisms) the mechanism allowing discrimination has to have been in place already (and not co-evolved) or be very inexpensive.
The above examples dealt with the prisoner's dilemma (PD) which is a typical model of a competitive environment. In the PD cooperation is irrational, so there conditional altruism allowed the agents to cooperate irrationally (thus moving over to the better social payoff), while still treating those of a different culture rationally and defection from them. This doesn't seem as bad, but Kaznatcheev (2010b) shows that the mechanism of ethnocentrism is robust across different games (not just PD) including ones where cooperation is rational. In those games conditional altruism produces an irrational defection from the out-group. Thus, from an evolutionary stand-point this is a two-edged sword: it can cause unexpected cooperative behavior, but also irrational hostility.
References

Hammond, R., & Axelrod, R. (2006a). Evolution of contingent altruism when cooperation is expensive. Theoretical Population Biology, 69, 333-338.

Hammond, R., & Axelrod, R. (2006b). The evolution of ethnocentrism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50, 926-936. (pdf)

Kaznatcheev, A. (2010a). The cognitive cost of ethnocentrism. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd annual conference of the cognitive science society. (pdf)

Kaznatcheev, A. (2010b). Robustness of ethnocentrism to changes in inter-personal interactions. Complex Adaptive Systems - AAAI Fall Symposium. (pdf)

Kaznatcheev, A., & Shultz, T.R. (2011). Ethnocentrism Maintains Cooperation, but Keeping One's Children Close Fuels It. In L. Carlson, C, Hoelscher, & T.F. Shipley (Eds), Proceedings of the 33rd annual conference of the cognitive science society. (pdf)


What makes some things more fun than others universally?

This is a primary subject of study in game studies and ludology, which are domains of theory and research unto themselves. Moreover, the question as it pertains to games might be interesting to ask over on Arqade, though I can't guarantee it would be "on topic" enough for their community. You might find the following questions from Arqade interesting, as they hint at some general principles:

Techniques to deal with game 'addiction'
How do I limit my gaming?

Problems I've seen mentioned in answers to these (to which I relate personally as a gamer) include:

The ability to continue playing for a longer time than one can engage in other activities
Costs of quitting freely and abruptly, such as loss of progress or satisfaction from proximal goals
Proximity of goals in general, and immediacy of gratification
Social involvement and its time sensitivity: teamwork requires coordination with friends' schedules
Availability of games on a PC: even when I go to work, I inadvertently bring games with me!

Finally, the existence of consequent problems in general is an important part of what motivates the use of the negatively connoting word, "addiction". Practically anything can be done to excess of course, but drawing and playing sports may have higher thresholds of activity before they become counterproductive overall. At high levels of activity and skill, drawing and sports become marketable trade skills, and athletic activity generally promotes health. Gaming has less obvious benefits too (see for review Johnson, Jones, Scholes, & Carras, 2013), but popular culture and research literature are both still catching up with this, as well as to the revelation that many of the supposed problems with gaming aren't so bad after all (e.g., aggression; Ferguson, Garza, Jerabeck, Ramos, & Galindo, 2013). Therefore, I wouldn't read too much into popular (mis-)usage of "addiction" in this case. That's also not to say that true gaming addiction doesn't exist; I don't honestly know, but I've heard of cases that seemingly ought to justify application of addiction models to game obsessions, so it may just be a matter of time before the DSM takes note. (If it hasn't already; again, I don't know, and wish I had more time to look into it!)

Anyway, considering what makes games fun might lead to some insights as to why they produce fanatics. Whether video games really produce more than these other hobbies is an empirical question that I haven't seen answered yet, but my intuition suggests you're probably right to think they do, because video games appeal to people on very many levels. Again, you might have a hard time finding articles on game studies that don't address ways to appeal to people and reinforce participation. By virtue of being designed expressly to entertain us and reinforce participation, video games represent a culmination of creative efforts and marketing experiences that probably should supersede less modern forms of entertainment and hobbies with other focal purposes, at least to the extent that game designers are good at what they do. They've been getting better with the advent of affordable, portable, high-powered computers designed to optimize the user interface; the advent of education in programming and game design; and the economic prosperity of game designing and publishing companies. Drawing, sports, and board games are more often (but not always) tied to simpler mechanisms and traditional designs, so it may make sense if these pastimes haven't been keeping up with those that capitalize directly on modern trends in technological and educational progress.

Since there's enough literature out there on game studies to keep anyone busy, I'll only list a subset of specific ways that video games appeal to players that relate to psychological theories of motivation:

Enjoyment is what intrinsic motivation is made of. Producing enjoyment is a primary purpose.

Extrinsic motivation also arises from the structure of requirements games impose upon players seeking their more intrinsically desirable rewards (e.g., you have to beat a boss before you get to watch a FMV, or "grind" to a higher level before you can use a spectacular new ability or exciting game mechanism)

Scalable difficulty improves users' ability to optimize challenge, which leads to the flow experience in gaming when challenge is tuned just so to an individual's "Goldilocks zone": not too high or low.
Social interaction is facilitated by multiplayer games in a variety of ways.

Cooperation satisfies the need for affiliation or relatedness, and promotes self-transcendence. Game objectives that require teamwork also play upon introjected motivation when a person plays to avoid the guilt of letting down a teammate. Social support has widely documented ramifications for well-being.
Competition satisfies the need for power or competence when it goes well for a player or promotes skill acquisition and refinement.
Both kinds may satisfy the need for achievement, especially when one can show off to others! The promise of approval or respect from others is another form of extrinsic motivation.

Variety in general is the "spice of life" (Barrett, 2009; Kahn & Isen, 1993), and is readily available across the broad range of games.
Investment in goals with long time frames may promote well-being and intrinsic motivation.

My own research (Stauner, 2013) demonstrates a weak, predictive relationship between the average time frame of students' goals (longer-term goals being rated higher) and change in well-being over an academic quarter $(\beta=.09, t_{(267)}=2.61,p=.009)$, though this isn't necessarily a causal relationship.
Manderlink and Harackiewicz (1984) also claim that setting long-term goals can "enhance subsequent intrinsic motivation relative to conditions involving proximal goals or no goals."
Video games have surely been extending the time frames of their players' goals. In my own adolescence, I recall finding an RPG that required 60 hours to complete exceptional. Newer games—especially MMORPGs—have increasingly adopted an expand-and-patch strategy to keep new content flowing for years of (potentially endless!) goal pursuit. Blizzard Entertainment's World of Warcraft is a prime example of a game universe that's taken on a life of its own since its release in late 2004; I've "met" some players who have been around since then myself.
Long-term involvement in any goal or activity increases its relevance to a person's sense of identity, and may thereby affect the sense that the goal or activity is meaningful and important (identified motivation).
Behavioral economic principles like sunk costs and escalation of commitment also explain why people have a harder time stopping a longer-term habit.
Neurological bases of habituation are also an ongoing area of research that longer-term involvement and routinization would naturally make increasingly relevant regardless of initial motives.

References

Barrett, L. F. (2009). Variety is the spice of life: A psychological construction approach to understanding variability in emotion. Cognition and Emotion, 23(7), 1284–1306. Available online, URL: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2835153/. Retrieved February 5, 2014.

Ferguson, C. J., Garza, A., Jerabeck, J., Ramos, R., & Galindo, M. (2013). Not worth the fuss after all? Cross-sectional and prospective data on violent video game influences on aggression, visuospatial cognition and mathematics ability in a sample of youth. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 42(1), 109–122. Available online, URL: http://www.christopherjferguson.com/Not%20Worth%20the%20Fuss.pdf. Retrieved February 5, 2014.

Johnson, D., Jones, C., Scholes, L., & Colder Carras, M. (2013). Video games and wellbeing: A comprehensive review. Sydney: Young and Well Cooperative Research Centre. Available online, URL: http://www.youngandwellcrc.org.au/document/ea0e9511fce02b8be23990_07ef7fc4c7/Videogames_and_Wellbeing.pdf. Retrieved February 4, 2014.

Kahn, B. E., & Isen, A. M. (1993). The influence of positive affect on variety seeking among safe, enjoyable products. Journal of Consumer Research, 20(2), 257–270.

Manderlink, G., & Harackiewicz, J. M. (1984). Proximal versus distal goal setting and intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47(4), 918–928.

Stauner, N. (2013). Personal goal attainment, psychological well-being change, and meaning in life. (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Riverside). Available online, URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3t34c68w.


Why are dreams about failing exams so common?

Yes this kind of dreams are commonly called nightmares. The reason we experience nightmares is to prepare us for threats in the real life.

"A dream-production mechanism that tends to select threatening waking events and simulate them over and over again in various combinations would have been valuable
for the development and maintenance of threat-avoidance skills."

http://www.unil.ch/files/live//sites/ln/files/shared/Revonsuo_1.pdf


What is the maximum time difference to still associate an acoustic and visual event?

Short answer
In the case of simple stimuli, visual and auditory stimuli can be offset between 25 and 50 ms and still be perceived as coming from one and the same same event.

Background
The question can be re-phrased as what is the window of integration of intersensory asynchrony in case of visual and auditory stimuli?

A well-known example where these two stimulus modalities are perceived as separate, while they are in fact coming from the same event, is a thunder heard after lightning. This is caused by the fact that sound travels at a speed much slower than light, and hence a thunder can lag lightning by seconds.

source: NASA

In many instances, however, a multimodal perception is actually perceived as being synchronous, while they are in fact offset in time due to differences in physical characteristics of the stimuli. Take the storm as an example - when it is far away, the thunder is perceptually dissociated from the lightning, because the sound lags the light by seconds. But when the thunderstorm is close enough, the auditory crack and visual lightning are perceived as synchronous, while in fact they are still offset because of the sound travelling so much slower than light.

So the question becomes, as you rightfully ask, what are the margins in which stimuli across modalities can be asynchronous while perceived as one event? In other words, what is the window of integration?

Vroomen and Keetels (2010) conclude in their review on this topic that a stimulus asynchrony in the case of auditory beeps and visual flashes can be between 25 and 50 ms and still be perceived as coming from the same event.

The window of integration between more complex stimuli can be much greater. For example, the window for speech and visual information can be as large as 203 ms. Such large windows of integration point toward higher processes playing a role in the brain. Only temporal lags below 20 msec are expected to go unnoticed because of hard-wired limitations on the resolution power of the individual senses.

Hence, Vroomen and Keetels (2010) argue there must be higher processes at work in the brain that actively synchronize percepts that are offset in time, but seem to belong to one and the same event. One such mechanism is referred to as temporal ventriloquism, which means that a perceptual modality is actively shifted in time to match it with another modality. This effect is most pronounced in visual stimuli, in that a visual percept is actively adjusted in time to match a sound or tactile stimulus. Likely visual percepts are shifted preferably by the brain, because the visual system is the slowest of all the senses.

Reference
Vroomen & Keetels, Att Percept Psychophys 2010; 72(4): 871-84


How to distinguish mental illness and neurodevelopmental disorders?

As @BryanKrause said; mental illness and neurodevelopmental conditions are not distinctively separable.
Example: Neurodevelopmental hypothesis of schizophrenia,
Obsessions and compulsions in Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism
Etc.


What is the difference between problem solving and intelligence?

First, intelligence (as a notion in psychology) is a theoretical construct... with numerous definitions. Wikipedia's article on intelligence lists a lot of them. Just going with the fist one there (which comes from an op-ed signed by many intelligence researchers), intelligence is defined as

  A very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings—"catching on," "making sense" of things, or "figuring out" what to do.

So, at a theoretical level, problem solving is seen a specific (but pretty important) aspect of intelligence. In practice, the way intelligence is usually tested in IQ tests, involves solving some types of problems (assuming a generous defintion of "problem"). Which essentially entails operationalizing intelligence. It's fair to say IQ tests test some specific types of problem solving. Of course the hope is that these correlate well enough with "problem solving anything".

There have also been some definitions proposed in psychology literature for what "problem solving" should mean. I'm not sure any of them has gained enough acceptance to be worth mentioning here.

IQ tests are however not the only investigated paradigm covering problem solving. There's a lesser known one that talks about CPS ("complex problem solving"), proposed in one definition to be:

  “(…) the successful interaction with task environments that are dynamic
  (i.e., change as a function of the user's interventions and/or as
  a function of time) and in which some, if not all, of the environment's
  regularities can only be revealed by successful exploration and integration
  of the information gained in that process.”

However it's not terribly clear how that is different from the theoretical notion of intelligence. What is different is how [C]PS is operationalized, i.e. the tests used to measure it... and that actually affects the level of correlation:

  This theoretical ambiguity is reflected in empirical findings on the
  relation between CPS and intelligence. Multiple early studies indicated
  that, while performance in CPS tasks varied tremendously among individuals,
  psychological assessments of general intelligence were unable
  to explain this variability (Brehmer, 1992; Rigas & Brehmer, 1999).
  Kluwe,Misiak, and Haider (1991) summarized 11 of these early studies
  on the relation between CPS and intelligence and concluded that most
  of them failed to show a close relation between intelligence scores
  and CPS performance measures. This led several researchers to suggest
  CPS to be a cognitive construct mostly independent from intelligence
  (Putz-Osterloh, 1985). Rigas and Brehmer (1999) summarized this
  view in the different-demands hypothesis. To explain the weak correlations
  that researchers observed between measures of general intelligence
  and CPS performance, this hypothesis suggests that CPS tasks
  demand the performance of more complex mental processes than intelligence
  tests [and they mean IQ tests] do, such as the active interaction with the problem to acquire knowledge on the problem environment, which, in turn, results
  in low empirical correlations between the constructs.
  [...]

  In reaction to these problems, Funke (2001) introduced Linear Structural
  Equation systems (LSE) and Finite State Automata (FSA) as formal
  frameworks that allowfor the description of underlying task structures.
  Both of these frameworks enabled the creation of single complex systems [SCS],
  which are independent of any semantic embedment (Greiff,
  Fischer, Stadler, &Wüstenberg, 2014) as they only specify an underlying
  system that can be clad in multiple semantic contexts.
  In particular, the LSE formalism has been widely adopted by CPS research
  and has led to the development of a considerable number of single
  complex systems (e.g., Multiflux, Kröner, 2001; FSYS,Wagener, 2001).
  In a further advancement, after Leutner, Klieme, Meyer, and Wirth
  (2004) had used a combination of two single complex systems for measuring
  CPS, Greiff, Wüstenberg, and Funke (2012) used the LSE framework
  for the development of the multiple complex systems (MCS;
  Greiff et al., 2014) approach, which was featured in the Program for International
  Student Assessment (PISA) 2012, the arguably most important
  large-scale assessment worldwide. [...]

  The comprehensive answer to the question on the relation between
  CPS and intelligence however, appears to depend on the
  operationalization of CPS.Whereas themoderator analyses did not indicate
  significant differences between measures of general intelligence
  and measures of reasoning in respect to their relation to measures of
  CPS, there are substantial differences inmean effect sizes found for studies
  using different operationalizations of CPS. The smallest average effect
  size for the relation of CPS and intelligence was found for classical
  measures of CPS, M(g) = .339, followed by single systems based on
  LSE, M(g) = .471. CPS scores gained from MCS tests are related most
  strongly to intelligence, M(g) = .585 [...]

  However, unlike classical measures of CPS or SCS, current MCS tests
  do not feature some highly complex elements of problem solving such
  as the recognition and handling of time-delayed effects. Thus, the cognitive
  demands posed by MCS tests are likely to be relatively closer to
  those posed by intelligence measures. Following the different-demands
  hypothesis (Rigas & Brehmer, 1999), this might be causing the high correlations
  of intelligence and CPS scores obtained from MCS tests. In
  order to test this hypothesis, it would be necessary to develop MCS
  tests that feature highly complex elements while simultaneously maintaining
  high levels of reliability.

The bottom line is that there are problem solving abilities not entirely captured in basic IQ tests. Whether that tells us anything about "intelligence" vs "problem solving" is a matter of how one construes these notions theoretically.

Also asking if "Is [it just that] intelligence [is] learnt?" is a pretty different question, and I will not devote too much space to that here to that.

Of course intelligence (as usually measured, IQ) develops over time in adolescence, and according to some empirical stuedies the more schooling a child has, the better the outcome for IQ tests as well.

But this raises the question: what allows one to learn (better)? The answer, according to some is that there's no distinguishable factor between intelligence and learning ability. So basically, the question is circular in this view: you learn (better) because you are (more) intelligent, which make you (even more) intelligent. And that seems a pretty widely held view:

  However, if we think of IQ as prediction devices, there is no better predictor of future learning than past learning. Furthermore, past learning does not just predict future learning—it often enables it.

But that hinges on the definition of intelligence as being this whole encompassing thing, which includes learning ability. Just going back to the opening definition of intelligence, but emphasizing a different portion of it should be enough to illustrate this:

  A very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings—"catching on," "making sense" of things, or "figuring out" what to do

It would make a good separate question whether learning ability and problem solving (rather than intelligence) can be substantially differentiated in cognitive tests... and whether assuming such a testing separation is possible, are the results highly correlated anyway?


What is the biological reason behind disorganized thinking and disorganized behavior in thought disorders?

There is some evidence that thought disorder (also called loose association) arises, at least partially, from increased spreading activation; schizophrenics, for example, often show a greater increase in activation to indirectly related words compared to unrelated words, than do non-thought disordered controls.  This is primarily a cognitive mechanism, not a biological one, of course, and I have found very little biologically-based explanation of spreading activation itself; it comes from the computational cognitive science end of things, and is often discussed as part of a neural network model of cognition.

To address Alex Stone's comment above, I believe what he is talking about is either Broca's area (the language-dominant hemisphere's inferior frontal gyrus), generally understood to be important for producing language as well as comprehending complex sentences, or Wernicke's area (the language-dominant hemisphere's posterior superior temporal gyrus), which is generally thought to be important for processing the dominant meaning of words as well as understanding nonliteral language such as jokes, sarcasm, etc.  There is some evidence for a correlation between volume reduction in both Broca's and Wernicke's areas, and thought disorder symptoms.  Again, however, no mechanism has been suggested; and as with much imaging research, it is at this stage impossible to tell whether the neural abnormalities are the cause of the symptom or themselves a symptom of another cause.

Schizophr Res. 2013 May;146(1-3):308-13. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2013.02.032.
Schizophr Bull (2008) 34 (3): 473-482. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbm108
Neural Basis of Semantic Memory, ed. Kraut & Hart (2007).  Cambridge University Press.


If reality is just hallucination, how come different people see same objects

According to Anil Seth, in this talk, consciousness is an active construction process. In that view, for the subject to have an experience about world, physical signals from mind independent objects are processed by brain and a highly probabilistic mental content of the physical is experienced. Even though I mentioned objects, it could be material things and features.
But our sensory abilities are not inherently cable of perceiving everything. The range of vision is 360-400 to 760-830nm. Similarly, for audition its 20Hz to 20,000Hz. There are other phenomena like aftereffects and adaptations, which too work along with perception. The information thus processed by sensory faculty is further compared with prior data that is stored in the brain and brain tries to come up with a decent construction of mind-independent objects. This experience can be called a controlled hallucination as there are other possibilities for such construction.
The general organization and working pattern of typically developing humans brains are very similar, especially in the early processing of sensory signals. Similarly, the physical signals that it processes of mind-independent objects are also very similar. Given these two, it is highly likely that two people have similar experience, even though we cannot confirm it and can only say that we share a human like experience.
Reference:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructive_perception

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2888317/

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4763133/


Is there a canonical reference for behavioral, attentional, and memory tests?

I'm not aware of a comprehensive resource that details all of this information for all of these tests. A simple solution would be to find a specific reference for each of the tests you're interested in.

A good place to start looking for these references might be The Cognitive Atlas, which has a Tasks section. For example, the page about Digit/Symbol coding test gives some information about the task, what it measures, and relevant bibliography.

For the Attentional Network Test the canonical reference is probably the paper that introduced it:

Fan, J., McCandliss, B. D., Sommer, T., Raz, M., & Posner, M. I. (2002). Testing the efficiency and independence of attentional networks.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14, 340–347. PDF

Visual analog scale, as far as I know, is not a specific test, but rather a methodology of presenting a visual scale to which the participants compare something (usually something 'subjective' like pain).


Are there any reliable type descriptions for Big Five personality traits?

A few thoughts:

MBTI has four dimensions, whereas the Big Five has five dimensions. Thus, when you set a high-low split on MBTI you get $2^4=16$ types. If you were to apply the same idea to the Big 5, you could get $2^5=32$.
However, the Big 5 framework tends to take the underlying continuum of personality traits more seriously. At the very least this should yield a more precise description of standing on a dimension.
The dimensions of the Big 5 are generally understood independently. Thus, it might be sufficient and more parsimonious to have a verbal description to describe a person's standing on each of the five traits. I think this is how most Big 5 test manuals work. They will provide descriptions of what it means to be high or low on each trait and this can be used to provide an overall description to the test taker.


Is pacemaker action potential considered a calcium dependent or sodium/calcium dependent?

The initiation of SA node action potential is through slow Na+ channels (slow, inward depolarising current, note there are no fast Na channels. These pacemaker setting Na channels only act when it is VERY hyperpolarised, won't initiate otherwise). As the membrane potential rises, you get the additional opening of T-type calcium channels and then the opening of L-type calcium channels. These all add to the depolarisation until you reach the threshold potential where an AP can then fire. I think some K+ channels also close during this early depolarisation.

During the action potential rising phase (after threshold), it is primarily L-type Ca channels that are bringing Ca into the cell (the other channels close off a bit). As you reach the peak of the action potential, the L-type channels close and the K+ dawgs open, causing the repolarisation phase. Also note that the speed in which Ca2+ can move in through L-type channels is somewhat compromised compared to other channels, so it's slower and causes that slower up/rising phase (which is what you want in a pacemaker cell - check out the link for the shape of the SA node AP).

http://cvphysiology.com/Arrhythmias/A004.htm


Generally spoken, synesthesia is unidirectional. For example, grapheme–color synesthesia (i.e., letter–color and digit–color synesthesia) is the most prevalent type of synesthesia. The presentation of a
grapheme leads to an additional synesthetic color percept. Although
grapheme–color synesthetes are strongly influenced by the synesthetic color perception triggered by a specific grapheme, they usually do not report that a color triggers the perception of a specific grapheme.

However, while explicit synesthesia is unidirectional, there is evidence that it can be implicitly bidirectional. To show this phenomenon, clever experiments need to be devised. For example, the left-hand responses of digit-color synesthetes were faster for colors representing a small number,
whereas their right-hand responses were faster to colors representing large numbers. Hence, apparently there was an implicit association of the color with numbers.

Reference
Weiss et al., J Cognitive Neurosci (2008); 21(10): 2019–26


How to induce procrastination in an online experiment?

Present subjects with a long-form writing task about anything - most likely, you'd be best-off supplying a topic that's difficult to write about (self-analysis, distant dates, self-assumed tardiness, etc) and not fun to think about. Don't set a time limit or a word limit, and stress that it's important they answer fully, completely, and honestly. If you want best results, you should aim to have a secondary control question that's meant to be easy to reply to, or relaxing, or ultimately nice to think about. Maybe pick "The best time of your life" vs. "The absolute worst time of your life".

Then provide them with a procrastinatory task. If you have access to the room they'd be doing this in, provide something hard to notice on first go, but actively distracting - for example, a Spanish soap opera on mute. Up to you on behavioral protocol here - you could watch it while you wait (and risk influencing the subject to watch it too), not appear to notice it, etc. Your goal at this stage is to be able to measure the time spent not working on the task - you might want to make notes of when they look away, create a program that records exactly how much time is spent not inputting data, etc.

You can also choose to make the testing separate and instead only give a single type of test (easy/hard) to a single person, and that person's procrastination responses are recorded. Etc.

The important thing to remember is that you don't need to invoke the purest sense of boredom or negative emotion to make a subject procrastinate; you only need to gently invoke procrastinatory emotions, and then provide a suitable distraction.


Is it possible to imitate two way communication between a brain and a limb?

Short answer
Mimicking action potentials is possible, but not the most practical approach.

Background
In general, stimulation of neural tissues occurs through placing electrodes in the vicinity of the target tissue and applying short current pulses, e.g. think cardiac pace makers, cochlear implants, retinal implants (Rao & Chiao, 2015), as well as muscle stimulators.

Long-term electrical stimulation of tissues in humans are accomplished by means of biphasic pulses, such that one phase reverses the current injected by the other. Such alternative current stimuli are called charge-balanced pulses, and are used because direct current (DC) stimulation may damage neural tissues (Bahmer & Baumann, 2013). In animals and short-term applications other asymmetric and unbalanced pulse shapes may be applied.

Secondly, external electrical stimuli induce electric fields such that neurons are depolarized and start firing their own action potentials. Mimicking action potentials doesn't make much sense therefore. It is a more straightforward approach to activate the system externally and let things develop physiologically thereafter to maintain normal neuronal processing.

But of course, in the end you could stick a needle electrode inside neurons and attempt to mimic the voltage changes over time like that in an action potential train, for example through the application of voltage clamp techniques. Nonetheless, I would rather stick to state-of-the-art applications and apply external biphasic pulse trains and leave the details to the neuronal tissue.

References
- Bahmer & Baumann, Hear Res (2013); 306:123-30
- Rao & Chiao, IEEE Microwave Magazine (2015); 16(2): 54-64


Is there a complete cortico-cortical connectivity map based on a useful partitioning of the cortex?

Yes-- you may be very interested in the Human Connectome Project (also here), whose goal is to map human brain connectivity.

One of the primary tools used to map functional and anatomical connections is diffusion tensor imaging (DTI). Unlike the more often used T2-weighted images, DTI allows researchers to image white matter tracts directly.

The data from the HCP is available for free to researchers, but you need to apply for access. See their website for details.


Is there consciouness when a person is sleeping and not dreaming?

According to Giulio Tononi,"consciousness is what goes away when you fall into a dreamless sleep,” he explained that  "once a person goes into dreamless sleep, there is no experience, no perception of surroundings or the environment; there are no memories of the past or the future or even the present. It is thus at this point that everything disappears, which corresponds to consciousness “going away.”" [1]
You can look up his integrated information theory of consciousness [2]

Tononi G, Edelman GM: Consciousness and complexity. Science. 1998, 282 (5395): 1846-1851. 10.1126/science.282.5395.1846.
Tononi, G. (2011). The integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account. Archives italiennes de biologie, 150(2/3), 56-90.


What research is there on how people go from examining/gathering evidence to executing on a decision?

It's possible that there is no sharp threshold between information gathering and acting. A recent paper by Piantadosi exploring that possibility, and citing a ton of (admittedly more conventional/mainstream) work on decision boundaries is:

Alonso-Diaz S, Cantlon JF, Piantadosi ST (2018) A threshold-free model of numerosity comparisons. PLoS ONE 13(4): e0195188. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0195188


What is the frequency range of electrotactile stimulation?

Short answer
Stimulus frequency does not matter too much for electrical neural stimulation.

Background
The frequency of electrical stimulation does not need to be in the same ball park as the physiological stimulus impinging normally on a tactile skin receptor. This, because the normal route of stimulation is bypassed and the axons can be activated directly (Kajimoto et al., 1999). In contrast, physiological tactile stimulation typically involves the deformation of a specialized dendritic region of a mechanoreceptors (Fig. 1). The effectiveness of mechanoreception depends highly on the physical properties of the dendritic sensory region in terms of responsiveness to various stimuli, including frequency selectivity, as you nicely illustrate in your answer. For electrical stimuli, all the dendritic mechaoreceptive selectivities are simply bypassed and pretty much any electric stimulus will do.

To give an example: a single jolt of direct-current electricity from a 9 Volt battery evokes a clear tactile sensation on the tongue. The BrainPort device, which is a sensory substitution device that aims to provide visual function to blind patienbts, relies on electrical stimulation of the tongue to provide the user with tactile images of the field of view as recorded by a head-mounted camera. The BrainPort uses a pulse rate of 200 Hz, which clearly electrically stimulates the tongue (Danilov et al., 2007). Hence, whether you provide a single jolt, or a continuous pulse train of 200 Hz doesn't really matter for perception, at least as far as I know.

References
- Danilov et al, J Vestib Res (2007); 17(2-3): 119-30
- Kajimoto et al., ICAT 1999

Fig. 1. Skin receptors. source: Lumen.


What is the opposite of the Bandwagon Effect?

The term "bandwagon effect" was originally used to explain voting behavior. In 1950, Leibenstein introduced it as a concept in economics to describe changes in consumer demand:

  By bandwagon effect we refer to the extent to which the demand for a commodity is increased due to the fact that others are also consuming the
  same commodity. It represents the desire of people to purchase a commodity in order to get into "the swim of things"; in order to conform with the people they wish to be associated with; in order to be fashionable or stylish; or, in order to appear to be "one of the boys."

He also defined a term that describes the opposite pattern of behavior, the "snob effect":

  By the snob effect we refer to the extent to which the demand for a consumers' good is decreased owing to the fact that others are also consuming the same commodity (or that others are increasing their consumption of that commodity). This represents the desire of people to be exclusive; to be different; to dissociate themselves from the "common herd."

These definitions have coined the usage of the terms "bandwagon effect" and "snob effect" in micro-economics.

In psychology, the terms have been less relevant. Social, personality and consumer psychology have used other labels investigating people's diverging responses to social influence, such as their tendency for "conformity", or their motives for seeking "uniqueness" (e.g., Berger & Heath, 2007; Snyder & Fromkin, 1977) and "optimal distinctiveness".

References

Berger, J., & Heath, C. (2007). Where consumers diverge from others: Identity signaling and product domains. Journal of Consumer Research, 34, 121–134.

Leibenstein, Harvey (1950). "Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand". Quarterly Journal of Economics 64 (2): 183–207. doi:10.2307/1882692.

Snyder, C. R., & Fromkin, H. L. (1977). Abnormality as a positive characteristic: The development and validation of a scale measuring need for uniqueness. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 86, 518–527. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.86.5.518


Why do prices ending in 99, e.g., 0.99, 199 or 1999.9 convince consumers to buy?

An interesting article relating to your first question is the "Analyzing the Psychology of Pricing", where they suggest that consumers don't really notice any change in units of 10, e.g. \$54 vs \$59.99 etc.

In answer to the 2nd of your queries about what part of the brain is affected, here is some research that I found.

According to the article "Marketing actions can modulate neural
representations of experienced pleasantness" (Plassman et al. 2007), very little is known about the neural responses to marketing.  However, they tested the hypothesis that

  marketing
  actions, such as changes in the price of a product, can affect neural
  representations of experienced pleasantness.

In another of that author's papers "Branding the brain: A critical review and outlook" (which includes diagrams of the parts of the brain affected), he bases the process on the parts of the brain that control

  (1) representation and attention, (2) predicted value, (3) experienced
  value, and (4) remembered value and learning.

This is also something that many in marketing are actively pursuing, according to "Neuroeconomics: Studying Brain Responses Gives Marketers Increased Ability to Predict How People Make Decisions".


Why might a stutterer not stutter when talking to themselves, whispering, or singing?

I'm not an expert in this field, but this seemed interesting enough I did some reading up on the topic. The two review papers I found quickly were Prasse & Kikano (2008) and Lawrence & Barclay (1998), both from the Journal of the American Academy of Family Physicians. I have no idea whether this is a reputable journal or not.

There appear to be three types of stuttering; developmental (acquired during youth, often leaves after age 4), neurogenic (acquired due to neurological trauma), and psychogenic (secondary symptom of latent psychiatric disorder) [1]. Interestingly, the articles disagree on whether psychogenic still exists (see Etiology discussion in [2]). While both articles suggested that the etiology of stuttering is largely unknown (see here, Etiology section), theories suggest that there's a neurologic dysfunction at play and/or physical causes relating to airflow. Specifically, the neurologic dysfunction suggests increased brain activity during speech in stutterers relative to non-stutterers. There's a lot of discussion about genetics and stuttering as well; read the articles for more.

Your situation as described seems to be in the "developmental" case, with a neurologic underpinning. Assuming no car crash or other blunt force trauma in your past, your stuttering comes and goes depending on the situation (i.e., if you're in public or private). As such, the symptoms you describe are likely related to stress, discussed in both articles above. It seems to be understood that stuttering as a disorder can be overcome with time and practice, and it seems that you have managed to do that to a small amount. However, stress is a large factor in stuttering, and can in fact exacerbate the problem tremendously. For what it's worth, I can also state anecdotally that stress is a large factor in stuttering, and for some people the severity of the stutter will increase as a factor of how stressful the situation may be.

I'm not sure that this addresses the singing aspect of your question. Hopefully someone else can address that.


There is little evidence that stress affects structural MRI (reduction in the volume of the hippocampus). The review article (Effects of stress throughout the lifespan on the brain, behaviour and cognition Lupien et al., 2009) synthesizes the current knowledge in the field. Another article might be of interest (MRI measurement of hippocampal volume in post-traumatic stress disorder: A meta-analysis).

If you are interested in functional MRI and day-to-day stress, even less is known. The study  (Perfusion functional MRI reveals cerebral blood flow pattern under psychological stress) shows that ventral RPFC (right prefrontal cortex) activation is specifically associated with psychological stress, and this activity persists even beyond the stress-task period.


I've seen somewhere that declarative headings in PowerPoint presentations are more effective. From a straight-on cognitive load standpoint, having to decipher a question and pick out the relevant topic words from among all of the different possibilities would certainly increase the extraneous cognitive load required to understand the material. So, my hypothesis is that heading format is better.


What happens psychologically to a Robinson Crusoe?

I have skimmed this paper about solitary confinement and the consequences seem disastrous

"The paradigmatic psychiatric disturbance was an agitated
confusional state which, in more severe cases, had the characteristics
of a florid delirium, characterized by severe confusional, paranoid,
and hallucinatory features, and also by intense agitation and random,
impulsive, often self-directed violence. Such disturbances were often observed in individuals who had no prior history of any mental
illness. In addition, solitary confinement often resulted in severe
exacerbation of a previously existing mental condition. Even among
inmates who did not develop overt psychiatric illness as a result of
solitary confinement, such confinement almost inevitably imposed
significant psychological pain during the period of isolated
confinement and often significantly impaired the inmate’s capacity to
adapt successfully to the broader prison environment. "

A statement from the US supreme court regarding the matter (in the same paper)

"[E]xperience [with the penitentiary system of solitary
confinement] demonstrated that there were serious objections
to it. A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a
short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it
was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became
violently insane; others, still, committed suicide; while those
who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and
in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of
any subsequent service to the community."

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1362&context=law_journal_law_policy&sei-redir=1&referer=https%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.ch%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3Dsolitary%2Bconfinement%26btnG%3D%26as_sdt%3D1%252C5%26as_sdtp%3D#search=%22solitary%20confinement%22


Does self-compassion have negative consequences?

This is only my own experience, but for many years I had no self-esteem and did things that were harmful to myself.  It wasn't until I started thinking objectively about myself as a child that I could be compassionate towards her that I began to feel better. She still lives within me, but the memories no longer rule me. I went on from there to myself at different ages, forgiving myself as I went along.  Finally I started asking myself, "If you could, what would you want to do." After the answer to that I was able to realize some of the dreams that I'd thought were impossible for me.  I'm not saying that I'm the perfect picture of mental health now, but am I certainly finding it easier to live with myself, and I am generally happier.  I still need to take antidepressants to keep me on a level, but everything is better
than I ever imagined it could be, even with medication.  I never could afford the specialist, so I had to do my own. However, I don't think they could have done it better.  I'm still working on it and I'm 71, but happy.


Is it good to take playful breaks at work?

Building on @caseyr547's answer, and especially the second link in the first reply to your comment, yes!

From Cook's (2009) abstract (emphasis added):

  Over the past decade, there have been numerous claims in the popular media relating to having fun at work, touting a plethora of benefits for both individuals and organisations that have to date not been empirically investigated. Thus far, any research related to fun in the workplace has often been indiscriminate with its use of terms, interspersing fun with humour and play, thus adding confusion to an already inadequately defined construct. The aim of this research is two fold: to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the construct to differentiate and define fun in a work context, and to measure the perceived impact of having fun in the workplace. In order to locate fun as a unique construct, literature related to fun, humour and play/playfulness was reviewed and positioned in a nomological net utilising a three phase framework consisting of presage, process and product (3P). Four studies in this research program investigated the domain of fun activities in the workplace, the underlying structure of the construct, the process of having fun and the perceived impact of fun specifically in relation to job satisfaction, stress reduction, effectiveness and workplace relationships. Results identified a domain of 15 distinct fun activities. Using multidimensional scaling, an underlying structure of four neighbourhood clusters (humour and play, informal socialising, formal socialising and organisational activities) and two dimensions (contextual connections with others and activity structure and intensity) were identified. The investigation of the process of fun was conducted by examining case vignettes using the 3P framework. Results suggest the experience of fun at work is activity based, with an emotionally qualitative dimension that is highly socially interactive and engaging. The organisational context for fun appears to be embodied in supportive management and colleagues, positive team dynamics and a non stressed environment. The participant experiencing the fun is usually in the role of contributor rather than observer, is highly engaged, experiencing amusement, laughter, flow, social connection and as an outcome, an increase in positive mood. While humour and play contribute to the process of fun, fun appears to be a uniquely distinct construct. Finally, the present results suggest the perceived impact of having fun at work, while positive, was not reported globally to the extent suggested in the popular press. The most significant outcome of having fun was the reporting of improved positive mood after the fun event, with the related cascading organisational effects discussed. Complimentary to this, having fun at work was perceived to positively influence workplace relationships to a moderate-high degree, contribute to managing stress to a moderate degree, improved job satisfaction to moderate degree and was reported to have a little more than neutral, direct impact on workplace effectiveness. These outcomes must however be examined in the context of results, suggesting not only are different types of fun activities enjoyed more, but different types of activities are highly salient in relation to the particular organisational variable measured. Results of this series of studies have provided a revised nomological net that can be used in further research to define the construct of fun in a workplace context. Supplementary to this, outcomes suggest having fun at work has positive impacts for both individuals and workplaces and therefore further
  investigation, at multiple organisational levels is required, ranging from individual
  disposition in relation to fun, to the effects of fun on workplace culture.

In summary, @what is right to be concerned about the definition of "playful break". The particular kind of fun activity in question seems to moderate the effects quite a bit. Popular media seems to have over-hyped the effects somewhat. Still, overall, fun is indeed fun – i.e., the behavior affects affect and cognition. It may also improve coworker relations, reduce stress, and make people happier with and better at their jobs...but these results may be too subjective to trust on their own, and deserve replication and reexamination.

Reference

Cook, K. (2009). Fun at Work: Construct Definition and Perceived Impact in the Workplace. (Doctoral dissertation.) Griffith University. Retrieved from https://www120.secure.griffith.edu.au/rch/file/16034620-6834-02f5-2d07-79df62b21e6c/1/02Whole.pdf.


Is there any scientific evidence that lack of physical affection has adverse effects in human adults?

Short answer: No, science-based sources (including Healthline and Floyd, if you read them carefully) don't claim that physical contact is necessary for survival.  Most of the literature on touch deprivation is focused on the benefits of physical affection.
Survival:
While social isolation is often confounded by physical constraints (as in solitary confinement) or mental health factors (as in hikikomori), there are also cases of voluntary isolation with positive outcomes, such as recluses, hermits, and anchorites.  Some notable cases of these involve little or no physical contact with others for many years, without apparent adverse effects.  There is a selection bias here - this lifestyle is more likely to be adopted by people who prefer less contact - that precludes conclusions about the general public, but it seems safe to say that physical affection is not strictly speaking necessary in adulthood for survival.
The situation in childhood, which is covered better in the other question, is more difficult to test.  One example is the case of "bubble boys" such as David Vetter, who spent virtually his entire 12-year life from birth without any direct physical contact with others, though he received much non-physical affection, and appeared to "thrive" as best as can be expected under the circumstances.
Adversity:
Reviews of affection deprivation (eg, Floyd, 2014; Floyd, 2020) mainly focus on the association between perceived lack of physical affection and negative outcomes.  As these are mostly correlations, they are not very convincing with respect to causality.  Evidence that touch deprivation may have a causal effect on mental and physical health, as reviewed by Ardiel & Rankin (2010) and Field (2010), is largely based on the remedial effects of handling or massage of children with developmental and behavioral issues.  However, such studies may also simply indicate that physical affection is an effective treatment, but not necessarily the cause, of underlying issues.
Historically, many children have been raised with high levels of emotional affection but little or no physical affection from their parents - notably in Victorian-era England - and this parenting style does not universally lead to adverse effects in adulthood.  For example, some traditional Asian parenting styles are described as "warm" but not physically affectionate, while leading to positive outcomes in adulthood.  Lack of controls in such studies preclude firm conclusions, as children may receive physical affection from others (eg, their nursemaids, siblings, or friends) in lieu of their parents.  Affectionate parenting styles are recommended for their potential benefits, but evidence for lack of physical affection (independent of emotional affection levels) being responsible for negative outcomes is weak overall.


What factors improve mood and increase cognitive functioning when people wake up?

Particulalry short wavelengths (such a UV light) have been shown to suppress melatonin[1], a hormone that regulates sleep.  The authors also show that:

  All subjects had an elevated cortisol level in the 90 minutes prior to
  onset of light exposure compared with the corresponding clock time on
  the previous day

So there's a kind daily memory in the diurnal system.  In the case of cortisol, 555 nm (green light) affected hormone levels just as much as UV.

However, if you take people out of the sun cycles, they still maintain very close to the same cycle for some time.  Michel Siffre is known for his six-month cave stay (he even kept his rectal temperature).  Wiki says after a month, his cycles started to vary from 18-52 hr  "days", but I've never seen that data so I can't comment.  Lack of sunlight can cause mental instability, so you'd really need more controlled experiments than Siffre provided (I'm sure they're around if one digs, Siffre's work is decades old now).

Biological clocks are dominantly regulated by genetic and proteomic processes, but will take cues from the sun.  However, many people can suffer a mental disorders (Seasonal Affective Disorder) from not having enough sun.  In Alaska, you can buy a light to treat it during the dark winters.  So the sun doesn't need to be there for the rhythm to be there, but the light can mess with the rhythm if it is there..

Other than light intensity and frequency content, sights and sounds probably don't matter much (unless of course, they're loud and wake you up, ruining your sleep schedule).  What's probably most important is to have a consistent schedule and not let it get interrupted.  Jet lag, interrupted sleep, drugs, alcohol, inconsistent sleeping schedules can all make waking uncomfortable.

It does vary between people.  They can have a different genetic regime, but they can also have a different developmental behavior regime and/or a different environmental reigme.

[1] Steven W. Lockley, PhD1,2; Erin E. Evans, BS, RPSGT1; Frank A.J.L. Scheer, PhD1,2; George C. Brainard, PhD3; Charles A. Czeisler, PhD, MD1,2; Daniel Aeschbach,
PhD. Short-Wavelength Sensitivity for the Direct Effects of Light on Alertness, Vigilance, and the Waking Electroencephalogram in Humans. SLEEP, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2006


I'm not aware of a more systematic study, but I'm aware of some (old) case reports, best summarized in this 1978 1-para letter-to-the editor (of AJP):

  SIR: I would like to comment on the interesting paper ‘‘A
  Note on the Addictive Personality: Addiction to Placebos”
  by Ira Mintz, M.D. (March 1977 issue). Dependence on placebo
  might not be rare. As far as I know, I published the first
  case report nine years ago (1). Similar descriptions by Czech
  authors followed (2, 3). Dr. Mintz’ patients and my patient
  were schizophrenic, but the other patients never have been
  psychotic.

  REFERENCES

  Vinar O: Dependence on a placebo: a case report. Br J Psychiatry
  115:1189-1190, 1969
  Boleloucky Z: A contribution to the problem of placebo dependence:
  case report. Activ Nerv Super(Prague) 13:190-191, 1971
  Honzak R, Horackova E, Culik A: Our experience with the
  effect of placebo in some functional and psychosomatic disorders.
  Activ Nerv Super(Prague) 14:184-185. 1972


Unfortunately, answers to these questions are not yet available.  As Morgan et al (2016) put it:

  ... whether and to what extent science achievement gaps display
  stable, cumulative, or compensatory growth trajectories are unknown.
  This has been due to the lack of large-scale, multivariate, and
  longitudinal studies, particularly those following diverse samples
  across the elementary and middle school grades.

Available data (eg. the ECLS) typically follows children only as far as middle school, so effects on post-secondary level students are hard to come by.

That said, as the Elisabeth McClure reports listed in the question assert, the available data suggests that early STEM education has significant impact on academic achievement and cognitive skills later in life.  The earlier the intervention, the greater the impact down the road, particularly for pre-kindergarten (eg, Duncan et al, 2007; Sackes et al, 2010; Tippett & Milford, 2017), and early kindergarten (eg, Sarama et al, 2012) exposure.  That is, even where achievement gaps may be compensated for with later remedial programs, the sooner children are exposed to STEM education, the more favourable the future effects.

Correspondingly, interest in STEM education and careers is already set well before high school - from Sadler et al (2012):

  The key factor predicting STEM career interest at the end of high
  school was interest at the start of high school. ... During the high
  school years, the percentage of males interested in a STEM career
  remained stable (from 39.5 to 39.7), whereas for females it declined
  from 15.7 to 12.7.


Why infant experiences shame as shyness when some unknown face looks at him/her?

When looking at the whole idea you pointed out, it sounded preposterous.  How would a 6 month old infant have any concept of shame? As @BryanKrause pointed out in the comments, there are a lot of self-help books out there which are not based in the sciences of Psychology, but there are some good ones out there, such as Laura Davis' The Courage to Heal Workbook and John Bradshaw pioneered the concept of the "Inner Child" and brought the term "dysfunctional family" into the mainstream (Bradshaw, 1990) so I thought I would look into this.
John Bradshaw is a New York Times Bestselling Author and founding father of the self-help movement (John Bradshaw Media Group, n.d.).  Looking for his qualifications in Psychology, Wikipedia points out that:

He earned a B.A. degree in Sacred Theology and an M.A. degree in philosophy from the University of Toronto in Canada. Six years after his 1963 graduation, Bradshaw returned to academia at Rice University in Houston, Texas, doing three years of graduate work in psychology and religion.

Looking at the sample pages linked, the idea pointed out is in the first section of the book, which is titled The Healthy Faces of Shame (HDL Shame) with HDL liking the shame to the HDL (high-density lipoprotein) variety of cholesterol—the "Good" cholesterol.
As the quote pointed out is referring to a 6 month old infant, this is in the Interpersonal Bridge: Established Codependence stage of Bradshaw's Developmental Stages of Healthy (HDL) Shame (Page 9 of the book you linked).
Bradshaw's Development Stages of Healthy (HDL) Shame

Stage
Description

Interpersonal BridgeEstablished Codependence
6 MonthsOnce securely attached—shame as SHYNESS appears as a response to being exposed to strange faces

When you look at the various models of development stages or life stages, they can be a matter of opinion and there are 5 spectrum models of development which theorists – and people in general – often disagree.
Crozier (2010) points out that:
page 43

Research on shyness in the early years tends to draw upon observations of children's behaviour (e.g., Kagan, 2001), whereas studies in later childhood also draw upon self-report questionnaire and interview methods (e.g., Crozier & Burnham, 1990; Crozier, 1995).

page 47

[T]he relations among shyness, shame, and embarrassment are little understood, and there is disagreement as to whether they are versions of the same underlying affect or emotion (Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1963), or whether they constitute distinct emotional states (Keltner & Buswell, 1997).

Reading this book, and maybe reading the cited texts within, highlights the reason there is so much disagreement and gives a more balanced view on the research behind shame and shyness.
Looking at 2 different theories of development of shyness pointed out in Crozier (2010), one of which is

Buss A.H. (1986) A Theory of Shyness. In: Jones W.H., Cheek J.M., Briggs S.R. (eds) Shyness. Emotions, Personality, and Psychotherapy. Boston, MA: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0525-3_4

for the idea that a 6 month old hides in shame when they are shy, I don't have children myself, but when observing my step-grandchildren when they were infants, to me it is still preposterous. As Buss (1986) points out, the shyness at this age is fearful shyness as they are fearful of someone who essentially is a stranger.

Fearful shyness starts during the first year of life, usually during the latter half of the year. Sometimes called stranger anxiety, the reaction occurs mainly when unfamiliar people, usually adults, confront the infant. The typical response is wariness, retreat, and the seeking of comfort in the security of mother's arms; more intense reactions include a cry-face or the crying and shrinking back that characterize fear.

The sense of shame isn't developed until they are (depending on advancement etc.) around 18 months old to 3 years old.
With the concept of "lockdown babies" (The Children's Commissioner, 2020), even though some parents may be introducing other members of family to their infants via Zoom, Skype etc. I would imagine that, along with other social issues, there will be more issues with fearful shyness with opening up outdoor spaces to everyone as the Covid crisis lessens.  Not just with strangers approaching, but also through exposure to so many people at once.
References
Bradshaw, J. (1990). Home Coming: Reclaiming and Championing Your Inner Child New York, NY: Bantam Books ISBN: 978-0-5530-5793-5
Bradshaw, J. (2005). Healing the Shame That Binds You (Expanded and Updated Edition): Recovery Classics Edition. Deerfield Beach, FL: Health Communications, Inc. ISBN 978-0-7573-0323-4
Buss A.H. (1986) A Theory of Shyness. In: Jones W.H., Cheek J.M., Briggs S.R. (eds) Shyness. Emotions, Personality, and Psychotherapy. Boston, MA: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0525-3_4
Crozier, W. R. (2010). Shyness and the development of embarrassment and the self-conscious emotions. In K. H. Rubin & R. J. Coplan (Eds.), The development of shyness and social withdrawal (p. 42–63). New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 978-1-6062-3523-2
John Bradshaw Media Group. (n.d.). John Bradshaw https://www.johnbradshaw.com/
The Children's Commissioner (2020). Lockdown babies: Children born during the coronavirus crisis https://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/report/lockdown-babies/


Can autistic savants beat computers in known computationally hard problems?

People easily solve cognition, but number crunching isn't what the brain's optimized for. Current generation hardware easily beat any savant at numbers due to their optimization and clock speed.
Look at this and this on hashing. The brain simply can't beat these things (trivial?), let alone with harder problems?


Can electromagnetic fields be used to stimulate areas of the brain?

Maybe this is not what you expected, but since you mentioned electro-magnetic stimulation, I'd like to mention optogentics, where light (electro-magnetic waves) are used to

  control cells in living tissue, typically neurons, that have been genetically modified to express light-sensitive ion channels.


Free online survey and diary software for conducting experience sampling studies

The best review of experience sampling tools I've found is here.

Specifically, to answer you question, check out "MyExperience". To quote the website:

  MyExperience is a BSD-licensed open source mobile data collection tool
  developed for Windows Mobile devices (including PDAs and mobile
  phones) using .NET CF 2 and Microsoft SQL Compact Edition.

  MyExperience is available for free on SourceForge in beta release.
  Please see our wiki for documentation and our blog for updates.
  MyExperience combines sensing and self-report to collect both
  quantitative and qualitative data on human behaviors, attitudes and
  activities in the field. Using a mobile phone's wireless connectivity
  to the internet, researchers have the ability to access MyExperience
  data as it's collected allowing for ongoing analysis of study data and
  early detection of subject compliance or technology issues.

  MyExperience is based on a three tier architecture of sensors,
  triggers and actions; triggers use sensor event data to conditionally
  launch actions. One novel aspect of MyExperience is that its behavior
  and user interface are specified via XML and a lightweight scripting
  language similar to the HTML/JavaScript paradigm on the web.


Term for a disposition to ramble on special interests in conversation?

I think the term you're looking for describing the nature of the interests is "obsessive". Quoting from a presentation aimed the general public:

Why so obsessive? Exactly why special interests, obsessions and autism tend to go together is still not very well understood. However, if you look at the key characteristics of autism, it does make a certain sense.
To begin with, autism is associated with ‘rigid’ thinking. This sounds quite judgemental, but another way to say it would be to say that people with autism tend to be more all-or-nothing than most people: something is either absolutely not interesting or absolutely fascinating.
This can be an oversimplification, but people with autism do tend to think in fewer shades of grey. When applied to favourite subjects, this can turn an interest into a passion, or an obsession.

And from a more DSM-ish perspective (that is not presupposing a common cause) that is stated as

Research suggests that anxiety disorders and OCD are highly prevalent in individuals with ASD. However, the significant overlap of ASD features with anxiety and OCD symptomology makes differential diagnosis of these disorders particularly challenging.

In the autism literature, the term "obsession" is used

to indicate strong, repetitive interests, even if this is not accompanied by anxiety.

The latter paper also has a survey of the content of obsessions in children with autism spectrum conditions, in case you're interested. (Generally speaking, such obsession tend to be more object- rather than people-oriented in subjects with autism.)
Keep in mind that the distinction between a "passion" and an "obsession" can be a bit value-laden, and not just when talking about autism, but also in the wider context of perfectionism etc.
An alternative term with practically the same meaning as "obsessive" [interests] is "circumscribed interests". I don't read enough autism literature to tell you if this or "obsessive" is the more prevalent term used. It's probably wise to search for both. It doesn't seem like the terminology has settled. The DSM is not terribly helpful in this respect because it discusses/titles the notion together with behaviors, more precisely using the term(s) Restricted and Repetitive Behaviours and Interests (RRBIs).
Finally the "rambling" part of your question relates more to social deficits present in autism, so what you're asking for is a combination of terms/notions rather than just one. In fact these two dimensions (social deficits and RRBIs) are considered definitory for autism... so the umbrella term you're looking for (for someone rambling about their very narrow interests) is basically... "autistic".
It would be nice if there were a term for some subset of A (social deficits) + some subset of B (RRBis) features, but I doubt you'll find a term so specific given the state of the literature I've looked at. So if "autistic" comes off as too broad, the precise answer is that there isn't a specific term for what you're asking... unless you want to coin/combine existing terms.
It's rather hard to even find a technical term just for the autistic rambling (regardless of subject). I did find an informal term for this used by autistic persons themselves, which has been reproduced in a psychiatry monograph, namely "data dump":

Paradoxically, when patients do eventually begin to talk, they can soon switch into a speech-like monologue that is difficult to interrupt or halt, and may seem rambling. (Often they are also quite self-conscious about how much they are digressing and 'wasting [your] time'.)
Being autistic means being slow to notice non-verbal cues from another person [i.e. from you the doctor] that signal to them [the patient], 'it's my turn to say or ask something now'. It is as as if they have been silently building up their in their minds a long and very detailed account of their lives, which is suddenly released. Some on the autism spectrum refer to this using the computer analogy of 'data dump' (there is no humorous intent here). Attempts to interrupt this flow can produce irritated reactions. This is not anger (although expression of anger can occur suddenly). A common complaint of people on the autism spectrum is that interruptions are hugely problematic--in more extreme cases the only way to resume is to start over at the beginning. Equally, they are sometimes aware of this. 'I know I talk on too much, but I just don't know when to stop, the way other people seem to know with its time to give way'. [sic]

So... if we were to coin a combined term for precisely what you are asking for... "obsessive interest data dump" (more informally) or "circumscribed-interest speech-like monologue" (somewhat more formally) would be the term combo I'd use. And that's for the action itself; for the [pre]disposition to it; prepend that word.
Finally the notion of perseveration defined as

the continuation or recurrence of an experience or activity without the appropriate stimulus

does seem to apply to the [socially uncalled for] "data dump" as well, but perseveration is a slightly broader term, so "perseverative speech/discourse on fixated interest" seems more precise... although there are at least some DSM-5 guidelines on autism using the terms "perseveration on a specific topic" (under criterion B3) and "preservative speech" (criterion B1), and it seems they suggest the former (rather than the latter) for what you ask about. (criterion B3). Note however that "failure of normal back
and forth conversation through reduced sharing of interests" including "One‐sided conversations/monologues/tangential speech" is under criterion A1... and (all three) A's and two B's are required for a diagnosis under DSM-5; and they also suggest to "avoid using the exact same behavioral exemplar to satisfy two criteria." (In general, meeting the DSM-5 criteria for autism is more difficult than for DSM-IV-TR; furthermore, the tightened criteria also results in greater OCD comorbitidy.)


Scientific term for people who value following the rules

The concept you are looking for is social conformity, which is opposed to personal autonomy.

Scales measuring this concept, such as the Feldman conformity scale (Feldman, 2003) and the conformity subscale of the "Portraits Value Questionnaire" (Schwartz et al., 2001), contain items similar to your examples, e.g.

Obeying the rules and fitting in are signs of a strong and healthy society.

Sources:

Feldman, S. (2007). Enforcing social conformity: A theory of authoritarianism. Political Psychology, 24, 41-74.
Schwartz, S. H., Melech, G., Lehmann, A., Burgess, S., Harris, M., Owens, V. (2001). Extending the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human values with a different method of measurement. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 519–542.


Making Up The Mind by Chris Frith is fantastic for a casual introduction to general Psychology concepts. ( http://www.amazon.com/Making-Mind-Brain-Creates-Mental/dp/1405160225/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1386952875&sr=8-1&keywords=Making+Up+The+Mind )

I would also recommend Bonk! by Mary Roach if you're looking for an easy read to ease you into the topic of Human Sexuality within Psychology. ( http://www.amazon.com/Bonk-The-Curious-Coupling-Science/dp/0393334791/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1386952898&sr=8-1&keywords=bonk! )

Both of these books are informative and educational, and present what would otherwise be extremely dry research as entertaining prose.

Also, I would highly recommend going to http://www.ted.com and watching any of the talks by Vs. Ramachandran - Ramachandran is extremely talented in explaining Psychological concepts in a down-to-earth manner.


How do you denoise and extract features from EEG data with Python?

you can convert your data frame to numpy array using

data=df.to_numpy()

If your data is single trial meanining two dimensional dataset, you can use

channel_names=df.columns.tolist()
channel_types=len(channel_names)*['eeg']
sfreq = 1000  # in Hertz
montage = 'standard_1005'
info = mne.create_info(channel_names, sfreq, channel_types, montage)
raw = mne.io.RawArray(data, info)

If you have multitrials dataset

channel_names=df.columns.tolist()
channel_types=len(channel_names)*['eeg']
sfreq = 1000  # in Hertz
montage = 'standard_1005'
info = mne.create_info(channel_names, sfreq, channel_types, montage)
data=data.reshape(len(channel_names),-1,sfreq*time)
data=np.swapaxes(data,0,1)
epochs = mne.EpochsArray(sub, info)

Once you convert your dataset to mne structure, you can use mne filters and mne features


Experiment where groups of dogs were treated differently to find difference in affection

VSauce mentions this experiment in "Why Do We Kiss?" at 9m 24s in.

Topál, J., Miklósi, Á., Csányi, V., & Dóka, A. (1998). Attachment behavior in dogs (Canis familiaris): a new application of Ainsworth's (1969) Strange Situation Test. Journal of comparative psychology, 112(3), 219.


How higher/lower taxes can affect reward system and overall satisfaction of someone

This is pretty close to being a classic example of a framing effect (wikipedia), originally described in the literature by Tversky & Kahneman (1986).

In essence, our subjective valuation of a choice or outcome isn't invariant, as economic theory says it should be, but instead is influenced by contextual effects, such as riskiness, and if the outcome is seen as a loss or a gain.

I don't know much specifically about framing effects and framing effects and taxation, and haven't time to do any research, but a Google Scholar search for the terms throws up this and this, among other articles, which seem to cover what you're talking about (although they may be behind a paywall, I don't know).

Looking back at your question, your hypothesis seems about right: while both people end up with the same amount of money, person B will perceive a greater loss due to taxation, and so, when both are thinking about their earning from this perspective, should be less satisfied.

However, if decades of research have shown us one thing, it's that high-level cognitive effects like this are extremely context dependent. What happens when both individuals aren't thinking about their income in terms of taxation, but with reference to the minimum, or average, wage in that region? Or what if the comparison happens in a context where public services, like education, are salient? Would person B be happier, because they feel they have contributed more to their community? Where I'm going with this basically that psychology can be very very hard, and that context always matters.


Why are websites constantly updated even when the change seemingly reduces functionality?

1)  Split testing designs in marketing (this is partially related to Jeromy's first point):  You don't know which type of layout or content will accomplish the ultimate goal you want your potential customers or users to attain for you.  Thus, you test several different varieties, measure the difference in them, factor in statistical validity, and get a better site/page for your goals.  These litte improvements can mean the difference betwee, campaign (lets say for example a paid one) making you a negative return on your investment(s) or could cause it to make you a million dollars this year.  When there are so many people online, the margins are thin and any little advantage you have will, essentially, be your profit most of the time.

2)  They hired someone who is "specialist at UI design" and are paying them on salary.  The UI is already complete, so they have all this free time on their hands to do nothing.  So instead of looking completely useless to their boss/company they start making arbitrary and unnecessary updates to the website/webpage many of which may seem pointless and skewed within actual testing that is going on.  They do this so they can keep their UI design jobs, that is, unless they're legitimately trying to test things and know how to go about doing this in the correct way (most have no clue what they're doing besides making something that is aesthetically pleasing and which could be obtained by simply looking at the UI's of other popular softare).

3)  Different theories of search engine optimization for your website:  A large theory out there is that Google likes sites with freshly updated content and that it is usually a positive variable towards increasing your rankings.  Part of the thing about SEO is is looking natural as possible, if you were to update too much content too frequently there's a possibility that their algorithm may sense a red flag.  Noone really knows how this works though. Thus some people may even prewrite content updates and then just release them as time goes on.


Button box for a reaction time study on OS X

First off, what button-box you use is going to be influenced by what software you're using to run the experiment, so ideally you should specify that.

The PST serial response box is probably the industry standard, and is what we have in my lab, although a lot of that is probably down to it coming from the makers of EPrime.  EPrime doesn't work on OSX though, and the PST box isn't cheap, so you might want to consider...
Neil Stewart has done some work on building your own accurate button boxes.  I haven't tried this myself, but if you are, or know someone who is, up to the technical challenge, this could be helpful.

Caveat: The paper describes how to do it on Linux.  It almost definitely wouldn't work on Windows, but OSX and Linux are pretty similar deep down.
Caveat #2: Do Macbooks have serial ports?

When I started writing this, I thought I knew of other, cheaper makers or SR boxes. Apparently I imagined that.

Edit:

Whatever you end up doing, make sure you also take a look at How can I create computer based psychology experiments using OS X?.


Is there evidence to suggest that music can trigger release of a particular kind of neurotransmitter?

Music is known as a form of an abstract stimulus, which can arouse feelings of euphoria, similar to tangible rewards that involve the striatal (corpus striatum) dopamine system.

In a study, published in nature neuroscience, researchers used the   neurochemical specificity of 11C Raclopride positron emission tomography scanning, combined with psychophysiological measures of autonomic nervous system activity, to find endogenous dopamine release in the striatum at peak emotional arousal during music listening. To examine the time course of dopamine release, they used functional magnetic resonance imaging with the same stimuli and listeners, and found a functional dissociation: the caudate was more involved during the anticipation and the nucleus accumbens was more involved during the experience of peak emotional responses to music. These results indicate that intense pleasure in response to music can lead to dopamine release in the striatal system. Notably, the anticipation of an abstract reward can result in dopamine release in an anatomical pathway distinct from that associated with the peak pleasure itself.

Music characterized by genres and musical elements evoke distinct patterns of messenger production.Music of Johann Strauss caused rises in atrial filling fraction and atrial natriuretic peptide and falls in cortisol and tissue-type plasminogen activator (t-PA). Prolactin, cortisol, noradrenaline, and t-PA concentrations decreased after listening to the music of H.W. Henze. Ravi Shankar’s music resulted in lowered concentrations of cortisol, noradrenaline, and t-PA.Listening to techno music was found to alter levels of b-endorphin, adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), norepinephrine , growth hormone, prolactin, and cortisol in healthy people.Critically ill patients who listened to Mozart’s slow piano sonatas had increased growth hormone and decreased interleukin (IL)6 levels.

From the neurochemistry of music by Mona Lisa Chanda and Daniel J. Levitin, Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, QC H3A 1B1, Canada

Disclaimer: I will keep editing my answer, this is just a start!

References:

Krumhansl,  C.L.  An  exploratory  study  of  musical  emotions  and  psychophysiology. Can. J. Exp. Psychol. 51, 336–353 (1997).
Egerton, A. et al. The dopaminergic basis of human behaviors: a review of molecular imaging studies. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 33, 1109–1132 (2009).
Dube, L. & Lebel, J. The content and structure of laypeople’s concept of pleasure. Cogn. Emot. 17, 263–295 (2003).
Sloboda,  J.  &  Juslin,  P.N.  Psychological  perspectives  on  music  and  emotion.  in Music  and  Emotion:  Theory  and  Research  (ed.  Sloboda,  J.)  71–104  (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001).
Möckel M, Röcker L, Stoörk T. Immediate physiological responses of healthy volunteers to different types of music: cardiovascular,hormonal and mental changes. Eur J Appl Physiol. 1994;68(6):451-459.
Gerra G, Zaimovic A, Franchini D, et al. Neuroendocrine Responses of healthy volunteers to ‘techno-music’: relationships with personality traits and emotional state. Int J Psychophysiol.1998;28(1):99-111.


Publicly accessible database for the Autistic brain under MRI and/or fMRI

I'm not personally familiar with this project (outside my area of research), but a quick search brought me to the Autism Brain Imaging Data Exchange (ABIDE):

http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/abide/

Based on citation counts for the primary articles, it seems popular. If you want to compare to other types of brains you will probably need to use multiple data sets and combine them.

Di Martino, A., Yan, C. G., Li, Q., Denio, E., Castellanos, F. X., Alaerts, K., ... & Deen, B. (2014). The autism brain imaging data exchange: towards a large-scale evaluation of the intrinsic brain architecture in autism. Molecular psychiatry, 19(6), 659. doi: 10.1038/mp.2013.78.

Di Martino, A., O’connor, D., Chen, B., Alaerts, K., Anderson, J. S., Assaf, M., ... & Blanken, L. M. (2017). Enhancing studies of the connectome in autism using the autism brain imaging data exchange II. Scientific data, 4, 170010. doi: 10.1038/sdata.2017.10.


What's the difference between inductive and deductive research in cog sci?

As far as my knowledge goes, I don't think these two types of reasoning in cogsci are any different to other forms of inductive or deductive reasoning: one is a bottom-up approach and the other a top-down process.

Deductive reasoning starts at the general and moves towards the specific, going from theory to hypothesis, observation to a confirmation. This is good science: a priori we form specific predictions and test them in very restrictive lab settings. An example could be examining modular and embodied approaches to cognition, forming a specific hypothesis about a specific circumstance, and then testing it.

Inductive reasoning on the other hand works visa-versa, going from an observation to a pattern, a tentative hypothesis to a theory. This is not always a good way to work, especially for quantitative methods, as it relies upon post hoc interpretations of observed effects. Work of this form could be interested in understanding stress in the workplace, may interview people about it and then finally form a conclusion based upon these conversations.

The latter is more useful to qualitative research, the former is practically necessary for quantitative work.


Does the use of cannabis affect the ability to recall dreams?

Current research tells us that yes, cannabis will affect the ability to recall dreams. As for the negative - positive outcomes, it seems to be subjective.

One of the few researchers in this field, Hans Hamburger says:

  “By smoking weed, you suppress the REM sleep, and with that you also
  suppress a lot of important functions of that REM sleep. One of those
  functions is reliving the things you have experienced and coming to
  terms with them, as it were. Processing all kinds of psychological
  influences is something you do in REM sleep.

  You also anticipate the things that will happen the next day or the
  days after that. While you’re sleeping, you already consider those and
  make decisions in advance.” – Hamburger

You can find more of his publications here: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Hans%20Hamburger


Why do we become bored of stimuli after multiple exposures to it?

This will probably only answer part of your query.

I think that this is an example of 'habituation', which is a decrease in response to stimuli.  There has been some research in this field, a particularly good reference is "Habituation: the
 difference between
 familiar and unfamiliar
 stimuli", where the authors contend that the underlying cause goes beyond 'sensory adaptation' and 'muscle fatigue', and that the reasons and neurological responses are quite unique for each situation.

An important point from the reference above is:

  There is in fact a wealth of examples from a wide range of human and animal behaviour where isolated responses wane as the stimulus which provokes them recurs, without the intervention of muscular fatigue or sensory adaption (Hinde, 1970). However, the scope of habituation is so comprehensive, embracing almost every type of behaviour, that as Hinde says the `underlying processes' must vary enormously.

I hope this helps.