When does reward occur? When dopamine is released or when it is binded?

My understanding of feed forward systems is that the uptake of transmitter would induce the effect. Though, the simultaneous release of more dopamine is part of its effect. The synaptic gap has no mechanism of inducing a response to a transmitter besides the reuptake on the other side. I am no sort of professional so take what I say with a grain.


Can a depressed person experience the sense of happiness?

Depression is characterized by emotion dysregulation (e.g., Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014).  This means that depressed patients have difficulties decreasing (downregulating) their negative affect and increasing (upregulating) their positive affect.  This may be a consequence of cognitive distortions and deficits (Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014) as well as maladaptive emotion goals (e.g., the goal to increase/maintain negative affect; Millgram, Joormann, Huppert, & Tamir, 2015).

Many kinds of therapies seek to improve (directly or indirectly) the ways depressed patients regulate their emotions, including cognitive-behavioral therapy (Beck, 2011) and cognitive bias modification (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011), which includes memory therapeutics (e.g., aiding recall of positive autobiographical memories or reducing the impact of negative memories; Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014) and attention training (e.g., Papageorgiou & Wells, 2000).

These therapies are effective/efficacious at reducing the cognitive deficits associated with depression and thus facilitate more adaptive emotion regulation (i.e., less rumination, more positive reappraisal, more self-distancing). This leads to improved mood (decreased negative affect, increased positive affect;  e.g., Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010).

So, yes, depressed patients can experience happiness via establishment of more adaptive emotion regulation skills. Moreover, positive affect is associated with activation of many different brain regions (Lindquist et al., 2015), which makes it unlikely that depressed patients have a total inability to experience happiness.

Interestingly, positive memory recall may not be effective for depressed patients as a short-term mood repair strategy.  In fact, it may make them feel even worse (Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007). Depressed patients may not find positive memories to be intrinsically rewarding, perhaps due to processing disfluency and/or dysfunctional reward circuitry (Chen, Takahashi, & Yang, 2015).


Development of social cognition as an alternative to the obstetrical dilemma

Doing some research on this interesting question, I can point you towards a few articles and books which can give you a start.  From my research, there are 2 possible reasons for early childbirth compared to infants of other great apes.

The maternal heat stress hypothesis (Wells et al., 2012) (mentioned in your question as metabolic considerations) put forward as a challenge to the Obstetrical Dilema is a plausible reason.  It is well established that the brain uses more energy than any other human organ, accounting for up to 20% of the body's total energy use.

Through secondary altricity, babies only have a third of the brain size relative to mature adults (Walker and Ruff, 1993), and in the article within Scientific American you linked to, it states that

  by one estimation a human fetus would have to undergo a gestation period of 18 to 21 months instead of the usual nine to be born at a neurological and cognitive development stage comparable to that of a chimpanzee newborn.

Apart from the idea of a woman giving birth to a baby the size of a 9 to 12 month old baby being hard to imagine, a larger brain mass in the newborn corresponds to more energy needed to sustain it.  It stands to reason that when pregnant, a human having 2 fully developed brains to provide energy for, will have problems.

The hypothesis, variously dubbed the ‘Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis’ or the ‘Social Brain Hypothesis’, depending on what theorists take to be its most important features (Adolphs, 1999), is also plausible.

In support of this idea, there is a correlation between mean group size among various primate species and their neocortex volume (specifically, the ratio of neocortex volume to the rest of the brain).

Clearly, the emotional and social development of humans is extraordinarily complex, involving a multi-factorial interplay between genes, parental
behaviour, and the influence of culture.

When looking at developmental issues, there are 5 models of development which theorists – and people in general – often disagree. (Miller, 2010) (Sigelman & Rider, 2012).  When we are looking at social development in the context of social environments we are looking at the nurture argument of nature vs nurture.  When looking at human development through other angles, along with goodness vs badness of human nature, there are other debates such as

Activity vs Passivity (Humans shape their environments vs environmental forces shape humans),
Continuity vs Discontinuity (Changes are gradual vs dramatically through life), or
Universality vs Context Specificity (Development is similar between people and cultures vs considerable differences between people and cultures)

Carol Sigelman and Elizabeth Rider in their book Life-Span Human Development (Sigelman & Rider, 2012) states that

  Development is characterized by lifelong plasticity. Plasticity refers to the capacity to change in response to both positive and negative experiences. Developmental scholars have long known that child development can be damaged by a deprived environment and optimized by an enriched one. It is now understood that this plasticity continues into later life—that the aging process is not fixed but rather can be altered considerably depending on the individual’s experiences. For example, elderly adults can maintain or regain some of their intellectual abilities and even enhance them with the help of physical exercise like John Tatum’s swimming, a mentally and socially active lifestyle, or training designed to improve specific cognitive skills (Hertzog et al., 2009; Willis et al., 2006).

References

Adolphs, R. (1999). Social cognition and the human brain In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3(12) pp 469–479. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01399-6

Hertzog, C., Kramer, A. F., Wilson, R. S., & Lindenberger, U. (2009). Enrichment effects on adult cognitive development: Can the functional capacity of older adults be preserved and enhanced? In: Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 9(1), pp 1–65. doi:10.1111/j.1539-6053.2009.01034.x.

Sigelman, C. K. & Rider, E. A. (2012). Life-Span Human Development. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Walker, A. and Ruff, C. A. (1993). *The Reconstruction of the Pelvis** In:
The Nariokotome Homo Erectus Skeleton. Edited by A. Walker and R. Leakey, pp 221-233. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Wells, J. C. K.; Desilva, J. M.; Stock, J. T. (2012). The obstetric dilemma: An ancient game of Russian roulette, or a variable dilemma sensitive to ecology? In: American Journal of Physical Anthropology. 149(s55) pp 40–71. doi:10.1002/ajpa.22160. PMID: 23138755

Willis, S. L., Tennstedt, S. L., Marsiske, M., Ball, K., Elias, J., Koepke, K. M., Morris, J. N., Rebok, G. W., Unverzagt, F. W., & Stoddard, A. M. for the ACTIVE Study Group (2006). Long-term effects of cognitive training on everyday functional outcomes in older adults. In: Journal of the American Medical Association, 296(23), pp 2805–2814. doi:10.1001/jama.296.23.2805


Does training affect the tactile oblique effect?

Indeed, research on this particular question is somewhat lacking, but what is available suggests that training does improve performance in tactile tests of the oblique effect.

In an article published 1999, Gentaz & Rossetti lament:

  Unfortunately, the effect of practice on the haptic oblique effect has
  not been yet studied.

An indication that this might soon be remedied was noted in  Junker-Tschopp, Gentaz & Viviani (2010):

  We used bars instead of fuzzy stimuli (such as Gabor’s patches)
  because this study is part of a larger project in which we also tested
  learning effects in the haptic modality (blindfolded participants
  explored manually a rod with varying orientations).

It does not look like the results of this "larger project" were ever published.  However, they are reviewed in the book Psychology of Touch and Blindness by Morton A. Heller and Edouard Gentaz (one of the authors of the above mentioned papers) published in 2013 (pp 56-57):

  ... Junker-Tschopp, Gentaz, and Viviani (2010) investigated the extent
  to which visual and haptic perception are penetrable by cognitive
  factors by assessing the effect of learning on the perception of
  orientations.  The "oblique effect" questions the nature of the
  linkages between perception and cognition. ... In the haptic modality,
  the results showed that practice resulted in a general dramatic
  improvement of orientation discriminabilty.   Furthermore, the
  anisotropic bias in orientation perception is actually suppressed by a
  global learning paradigm ...

These results are in line with the idea that the persistence of the oblique effect across modalities indicates that it is situated in higher cognitive processes (it is a top-down effect).  This theory is backed by evidence demonstrating the similarity of the effect across visual and tactile modalities, so the effect of training would be expected to be similar in both.

Unfortunately, not everything is the same about the oblique effect across modalities, and authors note differences such as the role of gravity cues, memory constraints, reference frame, and while training does improve discrimination, it never eliminates the oblique effect, suggesting some bottom-up influence, and hence the potential for differences in results.

In a recent review, Mier (2014) examines the influence of training and feedback on the haptic perception of parallelity, and comes to a more guarded conclusion suggesting a more significant role for bottom-up processes:

  ... Kappers and coworkers (2008) found that the deviations were only
  marginally affected by training and feedback. Without informing their
  participants about their biased performance, they studied the effects
  of visual training (seeing the correct orientations), haptic training
  (feeling the correct orientations) and combined visuo-haptic training
  (seeing and feeling the correct orientations). In addition they
  studied the effect of error feedback on the performance of the
  participants, again under visual, haptic and visual-haptic conditions.
  They showed that the robustness of the deviations persisted even after
  participants received haptic and/or visual feedback and training.
  Haptic or visual training did not significantly decrease the magnitude
  of the deviations, only combining both training modes resulted in a
  small but significant improvement. ... Although providing participants
  with haptic and visual feedback about their errors reduced the
  deviations, performance was still far from being veridical ... As the
  authors state, it might be that extension of the feedback phase would
  eventually lead to more veridical parallel matching.

Compared to the visual realm, where training has failed to eliminate the oblique effect, the effectiveness of training on the tactile oblique effect is unclear.  The first study suggests that training is more effective on the tactile oblique effect, and is capable of entirely eliminating it, while the second study suggests that the tactile effect is less amenable to training than in the visual modality.  Note however, that the second study refers specifically to haptic perception of parallelity, which is a specific sub-case of the oblique effect where exceptionally large oblique effects have been found, and therefore may not be applicable in general.  More research is needed.


What are the definitions of 'multi-channel coding' and 'opponent channel coding'?

Short answer

Multi-channel coding in color vision refers to the different photoreceptors in the retina.
Opponent-channel coding refers to the opposing color pairs: the red-green and yellow-blue axes.

Background

I think you are referring to terminologies often used in color vision.

Multi-channel coding generally refers to different types of photoreceptors in the retina, namely rods and cones. In terms of color vision, it is the cones doing the work. In trichromatic species, such as humans, there are three types of cones in normally sighted people, namely red, green and blue cones. So humans have a 3-channel color system, the same as your computer screen you are looking at now, namely R, G, and B channels.
Opponent-channel coding refers to the opponent theory of color vision as proposed originally by Hering. It basically states that our RGB color system defines color space by 3 opponent processes, namely a black-white, a red-green and a blue-yellow opponent system (Fig. 1). Basically it is theorized that red opposes green, yellow opposes blue and white opposes black (and vice versa). This means that colors are mixed between these channels (e.g. a reddish blue equals purple), but that colors within channels are mutually exclusive (e.g. there exists no such thing as a yellowish blue).

Fig. 1. Hering model of color vivion. source: University of Calgary

Reference
- Gouras, Color Vision. In: Kolb et al (eds), Webvision. The Organization of the Retina and Visual System. Utah University


Is gaming more addictive than watching movies or tv shows?

To answer your question directly, there are so much different factors involved in addiction to games and movies, that I don't believe any study could cover the whole thing. We can, though, try to identify the factors that are different and study them individually.

The fundamental difference between movies/series and games, the one thing that separates more these types of entertainment than anything else, is the following:

  "Mechanics in games imply the need for the player as an active part of the whole system, instead of a mere spectator"
  https://lakitusdevcartridge.wordpress.com/2012/07/05/the-elements-of-game-design/

Engagement

Some factors involve personalizing your character, items and environment. Since people value more to the things they themselves made, they attach to the part of the game that has been designed for them (their characters, their items, etc). It makes them a whole lot more engaged in the process. Providing some personalization to the customer has been used a lot in marketing in order, for example, to sell cake mixes.

  "When we talk to people who bake with mixes, they consider themselves every bit the scratch baker as someone who doesn’t use a mix,"
  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/business/media/11adco.html?_r=0

  "This decorating obsession sold the idea that, this way, you’re making this cake yours."
  http://www.bonappetit.com/entertaining-style/pop-culture/article/cake-mix-history

This type of incentive cannot be applied to movies or series, since the spectator cannot have an effect on the outcome of the scenario. He's a passive observator, probably less attached to the outcome as well.

Comparison

For MMO's or games where you can share your scores online, Envy and pride are also big motivators. These are feelings you rarely have while watching a movie, since your experience is the same as everyone else watching the movie. You can have a leader-board that shows you who's best, you can have multiple stats on which people can compare, you can even have purchasable cosmetic items to put on your character and show other people!

  In-game or in-app purchases for cosmetic items and customization options rake in a lot of money, and developers go to great lengths to make sure that players see all the cool stuff that their teammates and opponents have acquired.
  http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2015/10/podcast-8-envy-and-microtransactions/

Other factors

Although I only mentioned a few, there are a lot of other factors that influence addiction and that are distinct from the ones seen in movies or TV series. I don't think there is one answer, but you can develop form there and add to this discussion.

Again, the main difference between the two types of media mentioned in this question is the role of the consumer. In games, it is an active part of the experience, an actor bound to the media by causality. In Movies, it is a passive spectator and does not hold any power to influence the outcome. This is a good starting point in order to study addiction to both forms of entertainment.


How do we explain that some humans require far more evidence for some claims than others?

There are at least two important factors or phenomena at play here. The first is whether the subject of the belief has real-world consequences to the believer. The second is whether the belief relates to groups to which the believer associates or belongs.

When a person's belief on a particular matter makes no functional difference to that person, he or she is free to believe whichever or whatever way without gain or loss. In this sense, it is easy for a person to criticise others for doing something a certain way when the person doing the criticism is not in the business of trying to accomplish the same goal. A person might complain, for example, that company X would be more successful if they focused on product Y instead of product Z. Having this belief is inconsequential to the believer since he or she has nothing to gain or lose from being right or wrong. A similar occurrence is when a person believes something to be dangerous without real evidence, as for example the consumption of GMO foods. Whether GMOs actually hurt you is irrelevant to a person who eats strictly non-GMO organic foods. Granted the person has no shortage of money, the accuracy of this belief makes no functional difference, so there is little if any incentive to be honest about the actual safety record. For a person having barely enough money to buy food, on the other hand, the actual safety record of low-cost foods is much more pertinent and important since the decision makes a substantial difference in financial burden. It is easy for a person having ample money to make the claim that expensive items are substantially safer and more effective. For a person with limited funds, the truth of the matter is far more important.

In the case of wet paint, if there is a risk to the person of getting the paint on his or her clothes, then the person is likely to see real consequences in the reality of the matter. Hence, there is little room for carelessly choosing a belief -- the truth has real consequences to this person.

A person's affiliations and group identity may be given high priority, especially when a person stands to gain from that association. Any attack or perceived attack on the group or its collective beliefs may be taken as an attack on the individual. The group may be seen and felt as an extended self. A person having no such association or feeling toward a group or its beliefs is not likely to be much offended or protective of those beliefs. Hence, he or she is free to consider their truth or falsehood. Someone whose life and well-being depend on that group or set of beliefs, on the other hand, is not going to take skepticism lightly since it poses a very real threat. In this sense, the situation is similar to that mentioned above about consequences. If a person depends on a group or belief-system for material or emotional well-being, then any attacks on that group's reputation or status may harm the person indirectly.

Naturally there is a third factor where certain religions impose or threaten penalties for those who do not defend the religion and its beliefs. In this case, a true believer may protect the group and its beliefs purely out of fear for said consequences.

To answer your main question more directly, those for whom knowing the truth is more consequential will require greater evidence than those for whom knowing the truth is irrelevant or even harmful (whether materially or emotionally). A person dependent on a group for material or emotional support is more likely to believe in that group and its teachings, regardless of the truth.

On a side note, even science can be seen as a group identity these days, from which we can expect that some individuals would derive emotional or material well-being. Having an emotional stake in science would make a person require more evidence to the contrary before considering a religious perspective. Unfortunately, this type of group identity can blind individuals on both sides of the science/religion debate, among other debates (politics, GMOs, et cetera). Ego and emotion, when left unchecked, can be very harmful.


What is the basis behind the idea of Dom-Tert loops in Jung Function Theory?

Has dom-ter loops theory been expressed formally in any kind of Jungian function theory study?
Based on a reasonably diverse search of Google Scholar, Web of Science and Scopus, I am concluding that dominant-tertiary loop theory seems to be an original proposal by the author of the forum post cited by the question author. It appears to be a theory which has not been peer reviewed, and which has not been validated within the theoretical Jungian or empirical psychology literature. Hence, it appears that the answer to your question A is no, dominant-tertiary loop theory has not been expressed formally in any kind of Jungian function theory study.
Can dom-ter loops explain personality disorders?
Because the theory is an original proposal which has not undergone peer review or scientific testing, we cannot say whether or to what extent it might help to explain the development or maintenance of personality disorders based on the available evidence (because there is none).
I would say it is not trivially wrong, in the sense that it doesn't appear to be internally inconsistent or inconsistent with Jungian theory in any egregious way, but at the same time, the lack of empirical evidence implies that we have no credible reason to believe that it explains anything at all. It is conceivable, but not probable, that dom-ter loops can explain personality disorders.
Does the idea exist in other personality theories?
Short answer: No.
Long answer: The more popular modern personality theories differ in fundamental ways from Jungian theory's ontology of the mind, and one of these differences in particular makes the existence of such a theoretical explanation of personality disorders unlikely to work out.
The reason is that psychodynamic theories assume personalities are a driving force underpinning behavior in a fundamentally dynamic (intrinsically time-dependent) way, while theories like the Big Five tend to be more static (time-independent) and descriptive than explanatory. That's why it's meaningful to talk about discrete types in Jungian theory, because it is conceivable that stable classes of patterns of behavior can emerge from interaction over time between these driving forces based on their relative contribution to determining behavior.
Static theories such as the Big Five or Cattell's 16PF do not have the same notion of intrinsic dynamics and interaction over time, so they can't lead to the same notion of discrete types. Instead of discrete types, the development of personality disorders is today mostly based on a statistical diathesis-stress model, which, for example, might hold that people who are high on neuroticism in the Big Five are statistically more likely to develop anxiety disorders given the right stressor. The statistical basis allows for more fine-grained analysis of interactions, but also makes them more difficult to understand and identify with.
Closing remarks
Satisfying negative answers are always difficult to write in the cognitive sciences, so I hope I have covered all the bases. Please let me know if I need to elaborate or explain on anything.


Angst seems to fit your first example about as well as I could imagine any one word fitting. Angst is somewhat complex and ambiguous because it's used in many contexts with different connotations. It's roughly a combination of smoldering frustration and creeping anxiety as I understand it. It's more of a latent restlessness than an overt, clear emotion – somewhat more trait-like than most emotions, which are generally more transient states. Its use in existentialism particularly suits the global feeling of incompleteness you describe. IMO, it's a more cognitive or conative term than most emotion words too, in that it is sometimes thought to arise from unresolved cognitive dissonance regarding one's identity and meaning in life. Emotions are more often automatic reactions to present circumstances, generally speaking.

As I understand this contrast, the usual emotions may occur on a somewhat different level of conscious experience. The ordinary emotional level fluctuates and cycles like the stimuli and routines that provoke them, somewhat like echoes of the stimuli. One may focus on them, or choose to let them pass, depending on the extent to which they hold one's attention, I suppose. The more cognitive side of experience is somewhat more stable. In some ways, people are built to resist changing their minds in response to every new stimulus. To be fair, most don't want to have a strong emotional reaction to every stimulus either, but the resistance is stronger with respect to beliefs and attitudes, or schemata in general. (I've described this resistance somewhat further in my answer to, 'Can attention be improved to reduce the frequency of mistakes?')

Schemata are more heavily involved in emotions about the self and life in general. Arguably, these emotions about subjects are attitudes, and thus subsumed partially within schemata as a broader class...but I haven't got a citation for that; it's just my understanding of how these concepts intertwine. (See also my answer to, 'Is there a precise definition of "attitude"?') IMO, it explains why feelings like angst, which often reflect discontented attitudes toward oneself or life at large, don't fluctuate as much and resist attempts to cheer up. The problems these attitudes indicate generally can't be resolved by just having a little fun or forgetting about them, as people often do to cope with simpler, more circumstantial, negative emotions. These problems tend to require attitude change to resolve, which surely is a deeper process. I see no problem with referring to this as "deeper" BTW; depth psychology and existential psychology both use this term extensively to differentiate higher-level (i.e., more complex or developmentally advanced) motivational content from the simpler stuff people are more used to discussing casually, atheoretically, or from folk psychological perspectives.

As for your second example, companionate love from Sternberg's triangular theory, or storge from John Lee's / Hendrick & Hendrick's theory of love styles would seem to fit equally and more or less synonymously. Again, it's more of an attitude about an enduring identity (hers, rather than yours, or that of life itself) than an emotional reaction to present, transient circumstances, so relative stability and independence from daily fluctuations in emotional states is to be expected. I would say empathy and respect are components of the emergent property of companionate love, especially the intermediate component of intimacy (one half of companionate love, according to Sternberg). Here's the diagram:

 by Lnesa, I think...

Feel free to comment or edit if I've missed your point by addressing your examples too specifically or narrowly. If you have other feelings that need classifying, I'd be happy to see more questions like this.


Thinking, Fast and Slow vs. Mindfulness vs. Flow

Short answer: Dual-process, mindfulness and flow theory are related by way of attention theory. Two previous posts that may be of interest are "What is the relation between concepts, constructs and measures?" and "How can we realize when a sociological question is impossible to answer?".
Commensurability
This is an apt example of what Thomas Kuhn would have called a question of commensurability.  In normal terms, commensurability means the extent to which we can or cannot talk about two or more theories within a common framework, while incommensurability is a fancy way of saying we're comparing apples to farming equipment or dress shirts. In order for two theories in the cognitive sciences to be commensurable, they generally need to satisfy two criteria:

A common conceptual denominator.
At least one common construct.

If they satisfy these, then can look for comparable ways of operationalizing and measuring these comparable constructs that can be related to the common concept. In other words, two theories are comparable if they are conceptually related AND conceive of this concept in some at least partially related way.
Dual-process, mindfulness and flow theory: commensurable?
In this case, there is a clear common conceptual denominator, and that is attention, although they differ in how they express that denominator. For Kahneman and Tversky, there is a generalized resource allocation mechanism which produces qualitatively different modes of thinking; for mindfulness, there exists a discrete mental state partly characterized by a particular attentional pattern; for flow theory, there exists another discrete mental state partly characterized by another attentional pattern.
We can therefore talk about these theories in principle, although how effective our ability to do so turns out to be will depend on the merits of the underlying theory of attention. For example, it is meaningful to ask whether meditational practice involves fast or slow thinking, or whether flow states may be considered a form of meditation, and so forth, but only insofar as we can state those questions in terms of a third (attentional) theory. If one of the theories had assumed that attention was infinite, for example, it would be incommensurable with the other two.
Concluding remarks
A direct three-way comparison of these theories does not exist in the literature. It is possible that someone has directly related one theory to the other for each combination of theories, but it would take three fairly extensive literature searches (dual-process/mindfulness, dual-process/flow, mindfulness/flow). Even if these comparisons actually exist, summarizing them all would almost certainly be beyond the scope of a single SE answer, so I will leave it at this generalized answer.
I think your question about whether these theories are related by neuroimaging evidence is a good intuition, but establishing that similar brain areas are involved in the same behavior does not provide evidence that these are the same, because brain function is dynamic and areas therefore 'have' many functions. It's not just about what areas are active, but also when they are active, in what order they are active, the exact quality of the activity and where the areas are getting input from and sending output to.


Can hypomania be induced by just thinking quickly and variably?

I had a read through the Pronin and Wegner study.
The study had a sample size of 144. They manipulated thought speed by getting participants to read aloud one statement after another at either half normal reading speed (slow thinking) or double normal reading speed (fast thinking). They also manipulated the content of the text being read (depressing statements versus elated statements). They seemed to find that both the content and the speed of thought manipulation seemed to yield similar increases in positive emotion, energy, feelings of power, feelings of creativity, and grandiosity.

The first issue is whether their study is replicable. I don't know the literature regarding replications, but all the effects seem plausible, and the sample size is reasonable for this kind of study.

Another issue is how the manipulation of reading speed affected the reported emotions. Perhaps the slow reading led to frustration or being annoyed.

With regards to the nature of the effect, there are questions of how long this mood induction lasts. My guess is that the effect of the mood induction would be short lived.

There is also a difference wherein mania the speed of thought is presumably internally driven whereas on this task the "speed of thought" is externally driven. The study did not measure whether this "speed of thought" continued after the external stimuli was removed. For example, does speed of thought work with an inertial principle or not such that it can be started with external stimuli and will keep going on its own. My guess would be even if such a concept of inertia existed, people would quickly return to their own typical level. Thus, I don't think such a manipulation would induce clinical levels of mania, especially not in a sample of participants who do not suffer from bipolar disorder.


Name of cognitive bias that causes experts to overestimate their ability in other areas?

The Dunning-Kruger effect is specific to expertise in a particular domain. The domains tested in the original studies by Kruger & Dunning (1999) are: humor, logical reasoning, and English grammar.

It is fully possible to underestimate your skills in one domain in which you are an expert, and overestimate your skill in another in which you are a novice. As per an interview with Dunning, published at Vox.com:

  But there are a couple things that people get wrong that are major.

  The first is they think it’s about them [i.e., others]. That is, there are those people out there who are stupid and don’t realize they are stupid.

  Now, those people may exist, and the work isn’t about that. It’s about the fact that this is a phenomenon that visits all of us sooner or later. Some of us are a little more flamboyant about it. Some of us aren’t. But not knowing the scope of your own ignorance is part of the human condition. The problem with it is we see it in other people, and we don’t see it in ourselves.

  The first rule of the Dunning-Kruger club is you don’t know you’re a member of the Dunning-Kruger club. People miss that.

Your description also seems related to a logical fallacy, namely appeal to unqualified authority, or appeal to false authority, typically categorized simply under appeal to authority:

  However, appealing to authority as a reason to believe something is fallacious whenever the authority appealed to is not really an authority in this particular subject, when the authority cannot be trusted to tell the truth, when authorities disagree on this subject (except for the occasional lone wolf), when the reasoner misquotes the authority, and so forth.

Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of personality and social psychology, 77(6), 1121.


Do psychology deals with what others could call spiritualy?

Maybe what you are looking for is the field cognitive science of religion:

Cognitive science of religion is the study of religious thought and behavior from the perspective of the cognitive and evolutionary sciences. The field employs methods and theories from a very broad range of disciplines, including: cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, cognitive anthropology, artificial intelligence, neurotheology, developmental psychology, and archaeology. Scholars in this field seek to explain how human minds acquire, generate, and transmit religious thoughts, practices, and schemas by means of ordinary cognitive capacities.

Follow up resources:

International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion (IACSR)
Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion


What are the effects of implanting electrodes into the brains of monkeys?

The interface between the brain and the hand is not like a USB computer port, and we don't unplug the biological arm and plug in a mechanical one instead. We implant electrodes to just a tiny fraction of the neurons in M1 (about a hundred, out of millions), and use their signals to control the mechanical arm.

So the answer is yes. The monkeys don't lose any dexterity in their biological arm because of the Brain-machine interface (BMI). Actually, during the BMI experiments, they usually move their biological arms all over the place. There is no reason why, after enough training, they couldn't control the mechanical arm almost completely independently of the biological arm and at the same time, like you control your digits (almost) independently.


Is it possible to enhance one's learning ability?

Interventions which try to make a person 'smarter' in pretty much any sense of the word don't really work. In particular, methods very rarely show any spillover effects whatsoever.

However, what can work is the application of good learning techniques.

Most people trying to learn stuff tend to highlight, reread, summarise, or try fancy mnemonics. These usually don't work very well and are more likely to make you think that you know what you're doing than actually facilitate understanding.

What people generally don't do but what does work are distributed practice, spaced learning, practice testing.


You're not really blocking them out. It's more that you're processing the language of the person you're focusing on.

You could do exactly what you describe at reasonably high volume levels.

Though the level is not equal for all people. Young children and people with attention difficulties
Why it's Difficult to Listen to two People


Name or theory for a particular phenomenon pertaining to ideological possession

There is a fallacy in thinking called "confirmation bias" in which one only looks at or perceives "facts" in light of, or to support, their pre-conceived notions.
Here is the definition of confirmation bias:

  The tendency to interpret new evidence as confirmation of one's existing beliefs or theories.

See confirmation bias definition.
Of interest see also article in Psychology Today


The effects of pain on cognitive function and incidence of depression

This may be more of a non-answer than an answer, but here it goes.

When you're talking about the effect of something like pain, it's valuable to first understand some of the complexity. While it's easy to put things in boxes in practice, (physical pain, emotional pain, etc.) it's very difficult to put those things in boxes when you're talking about a neuropsychological response like pain. While there are breakthroughs being made in understanding specific parts and functions of the chemical soup that is the human brain, it's still largely a mystery as to how those parts interact, not to mention how our psychological state affects/is affected by our brains.

Can pain affect mood and general ability to function? I think it's safe to say it can. When we feel pain all kind of stress hormones with significant amounts of adrenaline, (such as Corticosteroid) are release that ideally will only be there for a short amount of time and then fade away. When you have chronic pain, your body doesn't get a chance to recover from the heightened state of arousal. This is known to affect many parts of general function negatively and probably is somewhat similar to the affect of long term chronic pain.

As far whether there is an intrinsic biochemical link between an actual depressive disorder and the brain's ability to function, I think there just isn't enough understanding about what happens in the brain to answer that properly. Depression itself is still a hot topic of debate as to how it develops, and since plenty of evidence supports it being both a psychological and neurological disorder, it would also depend on the individual's psyche as to whether they would develop depression. Pain, even chronic pain, has been dealt with successfully by people without much change in their life. Chronic pain has also destroyed people's lives. Any response is probably possible. At this point there are simply too many variables (many of of which are not yet understood) in order to make any statement as to what is normal.

The brain has really only began to be explored and understood, and while theories abound, with many questions like this the only honest answer at this point is that we don't know. At least not yet.


What is the independent variable in the Wason 1968 experiment on the Wason Selection Task?

The paper uses rather dense language so I can understand why you might be confused.

The wikipedia page offers a good example of the Wason selection task:

  You are shown a set of four cards placed on a table, each of which has
  a number on one side and a colored patch on the other side. The
  visible faces of the cards show 3, 8, red and brown. Which card(s)
  must you turn over in order to test the truth of the proposition that
  if a card shows an even number on one face, then its opposite face is
  red?

Wason designed the task to examine the human tendencies to make four kinds of inferences. Two valid inferences: modus ponens (if P implies Q and P is true, then Q is true), and modus tollens (if P implies Q and Q is false, then P is false). And also two invalid inferences: denial of the antecedent (if P implies Q and P is false, then Q is false), and affirmation of the consequent (if P implies Q and Q is true, then P is true).

Both experiments in the Wason paper manipulate between an experimental and control condition the instructions and preparation given to participants before they perform the selection. This manipulation defines the independent variables of the experiments that you're asking about.

In the first experiment, subjects in the experimental group are prompted after trying the selection task to "project falsity", or, in other ways, to say what values associated with P, not-P, Q, not-Q in the context of the selection test would make a conditional sentence false. Subjects in the control group were instead merely prompted to think again about their initial selections (ie revise them) "because people often do this task too quickly and get it wrong". Since Wason investigated how these changes in instructions affected behavior, they are the experiment's independent variable.

You can see from this quote here that something similar is going on in the second experiment:

  In the experimental group the conditional sentence was presented and
  the four programme cards were handed to the subjects who were asked to
  pick out “the one card which makes the rule false” (i.e. falsifies the
  conditional sentence). They were then asked to pick out any which
  “prove the rule true.” It was explained to them that their decisions
  meant that the converse of the sentence could not be assumed-“that the
  rule only held one way.” The subjects in the control group were given
  a similar amount of time to understand the conditional sentence without any
  explanation of its meaning.

The special manipulation in the instructions here is that experimental subjects 1) were told that only one card would make the conditional statement false, and 2) received some explanation that the converse of said conditional statement couldn't be assumed. So, they got extra information and Wason examined how it impacted their answers. That's the independent variable for the second experiment.


Can stress or training influence the perception of time?

Part of the difficulty in studying time perception is that memory is known to be biased by numerous factors including arousal and salience.  So while people commonly report time slowing down during specific events, it is difficult to differentiate the effects of retroactive memory bias in encoding and recall from actual increased resolution in the perception of time and accelerated physical abilities or mental processes.  For example, adrenaline is known to affect both physical response and memory consolidation.

One hint regarding the plasticity of the brain's actual perception of time comes from the temporal binding effect (nice review here).  A variety of experiments show that the brain automatically recalibrates simultaneity amongst different neural processes through learning: That is, the brain processes different stimuli at different rates, but it learns to calibrate those processes so as to create the illusion that they occur at the same time:

  At least over a short time frame, our temporal perception of events is
  far from veridical, and multiple timelines are capable of dynamic
  recalibration.

In other words, there is no single perception of time, time is perceived at different rates by different parts of the brain, and then retroactively synchronized.

A more direct attempt to differentiate memory from perception was done by Stetson et al (2007).  In this experiment, subjects were dropped 150 feet with no ropes or parachute - into a safety net.  During the free-fall, they were asked to read numbers flashed on a wrist-watch.  The numbers were flashed at different rates to test whether perception resolution was actually enhanced during the fall.  Despite estimating their fall to take much longer than control subjects not performing this task (corroborating the effect of salience on memory), there was no evidence of increased time resolution:

  Our findings suggest that time-slowing is a function of recollection,
  not perception: a richer encoding of memory may cause a salient event
  to appear, retrospectively, as though it lasted longer.

However, this conclusion has been criticized by other authors as the failure to produce an effect on time perception may be due to the experiment not being frightening enough, for only testing visual perception, and that free-fall may actually distract from the reading task.  Evidence from life-threatening events such as accidents and the performance of skilled individuals in extreme sports for example, suggests that increased time resolution, physical performance, and cognitive abilities during extremely stressful events may be possible:

  This evidence supports the suggestion by Arstila (2012) that humans
  possess a specialized hormonal or neurophysiological mechanism for
  high-speed cognition; and that this is activated inadvertently by real
  fear of imminent violent death in accidents, emergencies, and certain
  extreme sports; and may on some occasions be activated intentionally
  by individuals who have trained themselves to do so.

Edit (re updated question):

The latter paper - Buckley (2014) - summarizes research on the performance of experienced / trained / skilled individuals.  Accelerated performance (physical and mental) is found in accidents in extreme sports, such as climbers in accidental falls; and in the performance of many physical activities:

  Less skilled participants perceive only confusion, and are likely to
  freeze, panic, or act in ways which increase danger (Buckley, 2012).
  It is also experience and training which allow skilled exponents of
  many physical arts to achieve feats which appear impossibly fast and
  precise. There are many examples in ball and boardsports, gymnastics,
  acrobatics, dance, martial arts, archery, shooting, swordsmanship, and
  in aircraft, car and motorbike racing and stunt driving.


What is the correlation between grit and Big 5 conscientiousness?

There is some discussion on Wikipedia

  A meta-analysis [by Crede et al] found that the grit was functionally a measure of conscientiousness

A study by Mayer and Skimmyhorn (2017) using two large military cadet samples (i.e., samples of approximately 1000 in each) obtained measures of Grit (12 item measure, Duckworth, et al 2007) and IPIP 20 item conscientiousness. They obtained correlations between conscientiousness and grit of .75 and .74 in the two samples. The reliability of conscientiousness was close around .90 for conscientiousness and .80 for grit. Thus, the correlations suggest that almost all of the meaningful individual differences are shared across the two scales.

References

Mayer, J. D., & Skimmyhorn, W. (2017). Personality attributes that predict cadet performance at West Point. Journal of Research in Personality, 66, 14-26.

Crede, Marcus; Tynan, Michael; Harms, Peter. "Much Ado About Grit: A Meta-Analytic Synthesis of the Grit Literature.". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. doi:10.1037/pspp0000102. PMID 27845531


Your title suggests that you might be interested in individual preferences/differences in who chooses which printer, but the rest of the question made me think of research into "queue joining". There are some classic social psychology papers on this subject. For example, this paper confirmed that people are more likely to join the (wrong) queue if there are more people waiting, presumably because they conform and assume that other people know something that they don't. There is also interesting related research in an applied setting about the balance between preferring a restaurant because it is busy (therefore must be good) and preferring one because it is less busy (therefore you might get served quicker). I'm sure there is recent research along these lines too.

So maybe people stand in line because at least they can be sure that that printer is working!


Wikipedia on time perception

The Wikipedia article on "time perception". In particular, the section on long-term time perception cites a couple of articles.
    * The articles makes the common point that a unit of time as a proportion of one's life decreases with age. A few empirical studies are also cited.

Ukraintseva (2001)

Ukraintseva (2001) wrote an article devoted to the topic and makes several interesting points about time perception over aging. E.g.,

Ukraintseva argues the rate of aging decreases with age and that this may have relevance to experience of time.
Ukraintseva also suggests that living may be slower in some sense with age citing examples of slower "metabolic rate, rate of cell proliferation, physical, mental alertness, and the rate of living in general".

Graf and Grondin

Graf and Grondin have an article that reviews the literature on the psychology of time perception and discusses age related differences. However, the article seems to focus more on aspects of performance rather than the subjective experience of time slowing.

They cite a few studies that suggest that in relation to judging time intervals, older adults may be less accurate.

Personal musings

My own random musings (treat them as you wish) suggest that topics such as flow, goals, rhythm of life, and boredom might also be relevant.

A feature of being immersed in a state of flow is a sense of time distortion.
As we get older, perhaps we start to set more long term goals, and this might shape the experience of time and change.
Increased levels of routinisation and automaticity might also decrease awareness of time passing.
Perhaps knowing how to avoid boredom would be relevant to time passing.

References

Graf and Grondin "Time perception and time-based prospective memory" in TIMING THE FUTURE - The Case for a Time-Based Prospective Memory (FREE PDF)
Ukraintseva (2001) Aging and the subjective sense of time. (FREE PDF)

The above are just a few quick points (it's not my area):


Is there any actual evidence for the common model of the "real you" and a separate section that contains all your weaknesses?

For sure presentations aimed at lay audiences tend to oversimplify and exaggerate research findings, but for the underlying construct, there is a great deal of evidence, and it is considered widely accepted in the field.
The technical term for it is dual-process theory, and is often referred to as System 1 and System 2 based on the popular book Thinking, Fast and Slow, by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, which is a very accessible source for anyone interested in the evidence-base behind this theory (or class of theories, as many have been proposed).  It is also a popular topic on this forum, so be sure to search for these keywords to learn more (examples: Is Decision-Making Emotionally Based, with Rationalization as the only Conscious Component?, Does fixing cognitive biases do more harm than use?, Research on aversion to cognitive effort?).
One quibble with the way some non-technical presentations refer to this construct is that they seem to imply that System 1 and 2 refer to distinct physical "parts" of a person.  For example, the left brain / right brain division can be a reasonable metaphor for lay persons, but it should not imply that a stroke in one half of your brain will turn you into Spock (an emotionless perfectly logical decision-maker).  It's important to emphasize the process part of dual-process theory, and to this end, authors in the field often use the terms Type 1 and Type 2 thinking instead.  For example, Type 1 (intuitive) thinking is likely to be composed of many sub-processes working in parallel, and Type 2 (rational) thinking surely depends on these processes for its own contributions.
Consequently, asserting a good/bad dichotomy to these processes is misleading, as they serve interdependent purposes.  There are many scenarios where Type 2 thinking is impractical due to time constraints and bounded rationality.  Evans and Stanovich, two of the leading researchers in the field, agree (excerpt from Evans, 2012):

In recent writing, I have attributed responsibility for a range of
cognitive biases roughly equally between type 1 and type 2 processing
... Stanovich ... similarly identifies a number of reasons for error
other than a failure to intervene with type 2 reasoning; for example,
people may reason in a quick and sloppy (but type 2) manner or lack
the necessary “mindware” for successful reasoning.


What is the brain doing when someone tries to solve a physics or math problem that they can’t make any progress on?

To survive, the brain has evolved to solve problems it faces at the best it can, from the problems of escaping a stalking tiger, finding food, competing for the fit mate in the ancient time to solving physics/math problems, trying to make ends meet, and planning for a secure future in the present time.

But the ability for a particular brain to solve any problem depends on both the hard-wiring of the involved neural circuits of the cognitive areas and the information, both declarative (the memory that you’re conscious of) and non-declarative (the skills, the experiences you’ve learned), that the brain has. The hard-wiring is mostly genetically-determined, which is different among individuals, but is and can be modified by practicing, aging, and diseases. The information the brain has is determined by what the brain has accrued from previous encounters, which are obviously vastly different among individuals. So, the ability to solve problems among different brain are different.

That’s why some people are genius, some are average, and some are handicapped. But no matter of what type they are, in the normal conditions, their brains always try to do it best to solve problems because it is inherent in the nature of the brain to do so. Of course, in some situations such as when the brain is bored from repeated stimuli, fatigued from prolonged working, in a sleepy stage, or in a pathological stage (i.e., having a cerebral concussion, an encephalopathy, or an encephalitis), it might not try to solve the problems as usual. But those are abnormal conditions.

So, when a student who can’t come up with any ideas to write longer essays is trying to come up with sentences to write about, the brain is still working and does not refuse to fire neurons to come up with ideas. And the ability to solve problems is not about firing electricity in the brain at a high enough amplitude but is about firing signals in the correct ways in the capable and knowledgeable neural circuits, which depend on the hard-wiring and the information as mentioned above.

Accordingly, to be better at solving problems, one has to practice solving problems (this will modify the hard-wiring of the involved neural circuits) and learn more and more (this will help increase the information that may be useful in solving problems).

You may find more information about the brain function on the net. The fairly good  and not-very to understand one is Neuroscience
(Purves D, Augustine GJ, David Fitzpatrick D, Hall WC, Lamantia AS, McNamara JO, Williams SM, editors. Neuroscience. 3rd ed. Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates Inc; 2004. ISBN-13: 9780878937257 ISBN-10: 0878937250.) in Unit IV  The Changing Brain and Unit V Complex Brain Functions.


Is there a part of the human brain responsible for triggering imagination, fantasy and coming up with unusual stories?

There is no known specific process or part of the human brain which, when activated, causes the person to daydream, engage in fantasy or come up with ideas that are far from common reality. Instead, imagination is a broad-based activity which involves and overlaps with many brain regions and cognitive processes.

The cognitive neuroscientific basis of imagination is believed to comprise a core network of brain regions, which seems to utilize parts of a vast and broad-based set of other regions for different purposes. There are too many of these to list, but the main activity seems to revolve around the frontal lobes, parietal lobes and the hippocampus. Interestingly, and consistent with the idea of memory as a generative process, the brain regions involved in imaginary events appear to be highly related to the regions involved in episodic memory retrieval for real events.

Hassabis, Kumaran and Maguire (2007) report relevant fMRI evidence on imaginary scene construction:

  Our results show that when subjects construct new fictitious scenes an extended brain network involving the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial cortices, posterior parietal cortices, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex is active. Critically, we show using a conjunction analysis that this network is not specific to the construction of new fictitious experiences, but is also engaged when subjects remember both previously imagined experiences as well as their own real personal experiences. The implication is, therefore, that this distributed network supports cognitive operations engaged in common during the three main conditions in our experiment, most likely the (re)construction, maintenance and visualization of complex scenes.

These are associations, however. The results should not be taken to support the idea that there exists any process/brain region or set of brain regions which, if stimulated, will cause a person to daydream or engage in fantasy, only that these regions are active when people do so. This is always true for neuroimaging studies, but this is doubly true when the results involve a dozen or more areas.

References

Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., & Maguire, E. A. (2007). Using imagination to understand the neural basis of episodic memory. The Journal of neuroscience, 27(52), 14365-14374.


Why (and how) do people seek acknowledgement?

Freud would say its all your Mother's fault you want acknowledgement! She should have never told you thats a good job. Indeed current pseudo-scientific psychologist say our childhood programming given to us by our guardians and peers are the reason why we seek affirmation through certain means. Their thought is if your parent created an appetite in you for praise and external affirmation then you will seek such from other people.

The thought that children are addicted to parental approval may be valid however I doubt such addictions come through praise alone. I suspect that gifting and rewarding much in the way Prince Horace was spoiled in the Whipping boy or the complete inverse like Lex Luthor's relationship with his father in the Smallville DC universe or Jace Lightwood's relationship with Valentine Morgenstern in the Mortal Instruments Universe. In these cases the parent was cruel to the child demanding an unnatural level of performance. In modern and real life that would be the bad sports scholarship parent vs the good parent involved in the life thier children which includes sports.

Science on the other hand offers a more clear view our desires for affirmation come from a maldeveloped self-esteem. As individuals we should not require the praises of others to remain mentally stable and happy. However when people base their self esteem on the praises and acclamations of others. They create a system which they are not running but an external group must continue and this is counter productive.

  College students who based their self-worth on academic performance did not receive higher grades despite being highly motivated and studying more hours each week than students who did not rate academic performance as important to their self-esteem, Crocker found. Students who based their self-worth on academic outcomes also were more likely to report conflicts with professors and greater stress.

  "They feel motivated to do well in academics, but having their self-worth on the line doesn't help their performance," Crocker says. She speculates that students who base their self-worth on academic performance might become anxious and distracted and threatened by feelings of failure, and, as such, their anxiety might then interfere with their memory.
  Students who based their self-esteem on internal sources--such as being a virtuous person or adhering to moral standards--were found to receive higher grades and less likely to use alcohol and drugs or to develop eating disorders.

  "We really think that if people could adopt goals not focused on their own self-esteem but on something larger than their self--such as what they can create or contribute to others--than they would be less susceptible" to some of the negative effects of pursuing self-esteem, Crocker says. "It's about having a goal that is bigger than the self."
  Crocker's research appeared in a recent issue of the Journal of Social Issues (Vol. 58, No. 3).

-APA Self-esteem that's based on external sources has mental health consequences, study says

The follow is a valid summary of the science behind the previous series of work:

  Authentic self-esteem is not dependent upon others or things external to us. Such self-esteem is a manifestation of our relationship with our self. The essence of self-esteem is that it flows from within. If we lay ourselves bare in our vulnerability and strip away our careers, our families, our friends, our possessions and achievements, what are we left with? And how does that feel? Beyond the obvious losses, do we like and respect who we are, irrespective of the markers of other-esteem?

  We modify and mold so much of our behavior and even more, our very personality to achieve other-esteem. We literally create personality masks in this endeavor, presenting to others the person we think they would approve of. In such circumstances we are abandoning our true self to derive approval or recognition from others. Not only is this a self-deprecating experience, it also sabotages our relationships, for they are far from authentic. When we act in this manner we are literally taking our well being and serving it up to other people. It then becomes the other person's to decide if we are worthy. This is not a healthy place to be and it is a soul-defeating exercise. We should never judge ourselves based upon who we think others see us.

  Who is the Judge?

  The simple truth is that others don't judge us. They may have opinions of us. Yet, to elevate their opinion to the status of a judgment is simply ridiculous. No one can judge you unless you grant him or her the power of being your judge. Why would we put a judge's robes on an ordinary person and confer such power upon them? The only person who you might grant such power to works in a courtroom; all others are people with opinions. With a healthier measure of self-esteem we might more easily tolerate other's opinions without escalating them into counterfeit judgments.

  Esteem most be generated from within and can then radiate outward. When we focus outwardly for approval, we are seeking it in the wrong place. And in so doing, we subordinate our authentic being in a vain attempt at happiness. Such fulfillment must be dependent and superficial and undermines our personal evolution. This process of external gratification is other-esteem. Self-esteem is not contingent upon others.

  When we set up this drama around approval, we create issues in regard to notions of rejection. The issue of rejection can be misleading. With a healthy self-esteem one doesn't consider rejection. It is actually the rejecting of one's self that inclines people to seek approval from others. In such cases, we're not content with ourselves and so we solicit that acceptance from others. If that approval isn't granted, we have a habit of claiming that we were rejected. In truth, we have rejected ourselves when we set others up as judge. The degree to which we are reactive to other's opinions of us in likely inversely correlated to our level of self-esteem.

  A reconsidering of our understanding of self-esteem might be helpful in reframing our cultural expectations of happiness. Almost all parents would claim that they are thoroughly invested in their children's self-esteem. Educators and other professionals place great value on the development of children's self-worth. Yet, I would argue that most don't begin to comprehend self-esteem. If an A student becomes depressed by a B, it is abundantly clear that their grades are a product of other-esteem. As such, the diminishment of other-esteem leaves them feeling devalued. Their sense of well being is dependent upon factors outside of themselves. Similarly, athletic achievement or popularity are things that we understandably encourage in our children. When put into proper perspective we might see that these experiences might enhance their lives. But it is critical that they not be the cornerstones of how they see themselves. For in that case, the average student or the mediocre athlete is relegated to the imprisonment of low self-esteem.

  Self-esteem is the legitimate foundation for a healthy relationship with our selves and others. Genuine self-esteem removes the construct of neediness so prevalent in most relationships. And liberates us to thrive, as issues of rejection and judgment recede. If we seek our esteem from outside, we leave ourselves in a tentative and dependent place. When the sense of worth emanates from within, life unfolds in a empowered way.

-Self-Esteem or Other-Esteem?


Does introducing an element of play, hunt, or competition make feeding more rewarding?

Yes. See contra-freeloading or (for humans) ikea effect.

  Contrafreeloading: (verb) The behavior in which animals offered the choice between eating food provided to them for free or working to get that food would eat the most food from the source that required effort. This term was created in 1963 by animal psychologist Glen Jensen. Jensen ran a study on 200 male albino rats where the end result was the rats ate more from the food source where the rats had to press on a bar to get the pellet rather than the dish of pellets where they didn’t have to do anything at all. Jensen then studied the behaviors of gerbils, mice, birds, fish, monkeys and chimpanzees. In fact many have studied contrafreeloading since then with similar results, except for the domestic cat – which likes to be served. This 1963 study’s results were surprising because it would be more logical, from an evolutionary point of view, to not expand energy to get food when food is freely available. Why do pet bird people care about this? Birds seem to want to work for food, which is a wild instinctual behavior. Avian behaviorists recommend that pet bird owners encourage contrafreeloading behavior with foraging setups and bird toys within the pet birds’ cages and that pet bird owners engage their parrots by training commands like Step up or tricks such as the eagle, and then use a treat reward system. This keeps pet birds busy, active and healthy.

From http://www.birdchannel.com/bird-words/contrafreeloading.aspx


Where do our memories get stored and how are they retrieved again?

This is a good question.

The question of "where" is not answered yet by mainstream science. One problem is the huge amount of data we get only through our eyes each day, approximately about one terrabyte if this data is compressed by modern algorithms. A lifetime of 100 years would be almost impossible to store "inside our brain".

There are some alternative theories which could explain how the brain stores data. Maybe our brain works like a antenna, similar to a computer which has a access to a vast data pool from the internet. You could ask the question where is the movie inside the television or where is the internet inside the computer? Certainly a computer has a harddrive, a local data storage unit and a cpu, but it is very limited in processing everyday data for a lifetime. It would be very restricted if it would not access to outer data pools.

Carl Gustav Jung has wrote about the theory of a collective subconsciousness and he was in contact with Wolfgang Pauli, a quantum physics pioneer. I would not wonder if we one day discover that our memory is nonlocal.


What is the mechanism behind unihemispheric sleep in animals?

In general, I don't think the answers to these questions are known.  This paper is a good review of unihemispheric slow-wave sleep (USWS); the section on neurophysiological mechanisms is largely speculation based on how slow-wave sleep is generally thought to function--despite its lack of answers, that section is good reading anyhow, since it covers current evidence (in 2000, anyway!) and lines of inquiry.  I dug through its citing articles as well, hoping for a more informative update; the best I found was this paper, which shows small differences (which may or may not be statistically significant) between the openness of the ipsi & contralateral eyes to the sleeping hemisphere based on right/left--which does suggest at least some hemispheric dominance at play. Eared seals also sleep on their side during USWS, and leave the sleeping side of the body out of the water, while the awake side of the body paddles to keep their nostrils from submerging; I found nothing suggesting hemispheric dominance issues there, though.

As far as hemisphere-switching mechanisms go, that first paper mentions work finding that unihemispheric slow-wave sleep develops only following sagittal transsection of the lower brainstem in cats--even when the interhemispheric commissures were not involved; that implies some kind of uncoupling of lower brainstem sleep regions, but that's about as far as anybody's got (or as far as I could find!).

An interesting question!  If you find more work, come back and tell me about it.

References
1 Rattenborg, Amlaner, & Lima (2000). Behavioral, neurophysiological and evolutionary perspectives on unihemispheric sleep. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews Volume 24, Issue 8, December 2000, Pages 817–842.
2 Lyamin, O., & al. (2002). Unihemispheric slow wave sleep and the state of the eyes in a white whale. Behavioural Brain Research Volume 129, Issue 1-2, 1 February 2002, Pages 125-129.


What theory discusses modes of "Being" vs. that of "Happening"?

I believe you are referring to Erich Fromm's work on the "having" (not "happening") and "being" modes. See here


Why is the occipital lobe behind instead of in front?

From the retina, visual signals next travel through the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus. This nucleus is quite centrally located, about as much in the middle of the brain as possible, and much much more ancient (evolutionarily, and developmentally) than the folded outer part of the brain that is highly recognizable in humans.
This entire folded brain region including frontal/parietal/temporal/occipital lobes is called the neocortex, and it is quite recent in evolution, only appearing in mammals.
In other vertebrates, the next step in visual processing is the optic tectum, also found in the center of the brain. In mammals we typically call this the superior colliculus, and it still functions in eye movements and visual target localization.
The position of visual cortex in humans is determined simply by the part of neocortex that gets direct inputs from the visual part of thalamus, so it is likely that it inherits somewhat from the organization of the thalamus, where you can notice that the LGN is located towards the back part of the thalamus, but note that LGN isn't simply the structure furthest back (MGN, the auditory thalamus, is further back, for example). Otherwise, there is no need or reason for the visual cortex to be in any particular part of the brain, only that it needs some space for itself apart from other regions. Input isn't coming directly from the retina in the eyes, so there is no improvement to path length to have the visual cortex anywhere else.
Vision isn't even forward-focusing in many mammals, this is a trait that you really only see in carnivores and primates that use binocular vision to make an improved 3D map of the world in front. Prey animals like rodents and many herbivores have vision that is more concerned with what is above or on any side rather than what is in front.
See also, to some extent, https://biology.stackexchange.com/questions/35532/why-do-some-bad-traits-evolve-and-good-ones-dont


Articles about model of eye movements and trajectories

I am not sure what you may have looked up previously, but here are a couple of referenced articles that may be of help to you:
"Identifying Fixations and Saccades in
Eye-Tracking Protocols" (Salvucci and Goldberg, 2000), from their abstract:

  In this paper we propose a taxonomy of fixation identification
  algorithms that classifies algorithms in terms of how they
  utilize spatial and temporal information in eye-tracking
  protocols.

In terms of Human-computer interaction:

"Commentary on Section 4. Eye tracking in human-computer interaction and
usability research: Ready to deliver the promises." (Jacob and Karn), this article makes reference to several more specific references.


Yes.

One particular mechanism for reducing synaptic strength is called long-term depression (note: this terminology is not related to the mental health term depression). Much like the opposite process that strengthens synapses, certain firing patterns tend to weaken synapses.

Additionally, synaptic scaling is a homeostatic mechanism by which more excited cells become less excitable over time, including by reducing their response to inputs globally (this is also a particular category of long-term depression). If you keep re-strengthening certain synapses, and then scaling all of them down, the result over multiple iterations is that those synapses that don't get re-strengthened get weaker.

The synaptic homeostasis hypothesis of sleep suggests that this process occurs during sleep and is a key reason why sleep is important (there are many other theories about sleep, however).


Is it possible to effect both positive and negative reinforcement through the same action?

Yes.

In fact, the modern view of positive and negative reinforcement is that they are essentially synonyms. They are different ways of looking at the same thing, like describing a glass of water based on how full or how empty it is:

  In this paper, we reconsider the issue from the perspective of 30
  years. However, we could not find new evidence in contemporary
  research and theory that allows reliable classification of an event as
  a positive rather than a negative reinforcer.

Wikipedia as well:

  Distinguishing between positive and negative can be difficult and may
  not always be necessary; focusing on what is being removed or added
  and how it is being removed or added will determine the nature of the
  reinforcement.


How does modulation of the activity of an afferent neuron lead to increase in MEP's?

The passage you reference is talking about connections within the motor cortex in the brain. Afferent/efferent can be confusing terminology in the brain.

In the periphery, the terms have clear meanings as you say: efferents go to muscles, afferents carry sensory information back to the CNS. No real controversy there. However, the meaning of "efferent" is just outwards/away from; afferent is the opposite, meaning towards. In the context of the periphery, we consistently use these terms in relation to the CNS: efferents go outwards relative to the CNS, afferents go towards. If the terms are used in the spinal cord, the convention is to relate to the brain: afferents are signals heading towards the brain, efferents are heading towards the spinal cord (and then likely to the muscles next).

Within cortex, you're already in the brain, so it makes little sense to talk about afferents or efferents relative to the brain: we are already in the brain so neither makes sense unless you are talking about cells that specifically project outside the brain. Instead, we use the terms with respect to whatever structure we are in. Confusingly, that means nearly every axon in the brain is simultaneously both an afferent and an efferent, it's all a matter of perspective. If you are studying thalamus, you could refer to efferents projecting to cortex; your friend studying neocortex could refer to afferents projecting from thalamus. They could be the very same axons.

In the Rahman et al 2013 paper that your link is referring to, they are talking from the perspective of cells in motor cortex, and when they refer to afferents they mean axons projecting to a cell in motor cortex. Really, they almost could have dropped the word "afferent" and just said "axon" throughout the whole paper; probably the only reason they used the term is because they are not talking about descending axons leaving motor cortex headed towards the brainstem/spinal cord, they are talking about axons terminating on cells in cortex.

Rahman, A., Reato, D., Arlotti, M., Gasca, F., Datta, A., Parra, L. C., & Bikson, M. (2013). Cellular effects of acute direct current stimulation: somatic and synaptic terminal effects. The Journal of physiology, 591(10), 2563-2578.


You don't say what language you want the tests to be in, so I'm assuming English.

In the book Evidence-Based Assessment in ASD (Autism Spectrum Disorder), author Kenneth J. Aitken "describes and analyses a wide range of available Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) assessment measures". The chapter on "Attention" lists the following tests:

Conners' Continuous Auditory Test of Attention (CATA)
Conners' Continuous Performance Test II - Third Revision (CCPT 3)
d2 Test of Attention (d2)
Sustained Attention to Response Test (SART)
Test of Everyday Attention (TEA)
Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch)
Test for Variables of Attention - 8th Edition 2015 (TOVA-8.2)

The book also explains what kind of attention each test assesses, why the test is useful in relation to Autism, and research findings.

You may want to check your local university or public library to look into a copy of that book.

There are many widely used, valid, and reliable tests of attention that an experienced clinician or researcher can use to assess attention in a patient with Autism. Just open any recent handbook or textbook on either attention or Autism and see what measures they use and describe.


What correlation research has been done on MBTI vs Big5?

The MBTI can be considered to be subsumed by the Big5/Five-Factor Model. McCrae and Costa examined this back in the late 1980’s. First of all, they showed that the types do not interact in a statistically meaningful way indicating that there isn’t a reason to interpret four type categories (e.g., ESTJ vs INFP). The categories (e.g., extraversion vs introversion) describe some meaningful amount of variance themselves but combining them into the types and interpreting the whole is not statistically warranted (McCrae & Costa Jr., 1989). Statistically, false dichotomization/median splits (here called types) reduces the predictive power of a measure in general.

To further examine the universality of the Five-Factor Model, they examined how the MBTI dimensional raw scores related to the FFM/Big5 scores. They showed that FFM-Extroversion was highly correlated to MBTI-Introversion (r = -.74), FFM-Neuroticism was weakly correlated to MBTI-Introversion (r = .16), FFM-Openness was correlated to MBTI-Intuition (r = .72), and to MBTI-Perception (r = .30), FFM-Agreeableness was correlated to MBTI-Feeling (r = .44), FFM-Contentiousness correlated to MBTI-Perception (r = .49). These correlations were for men only, but are reported to give as an example of how the FFM can account for MBTI measures. The MBTI does not capture trait Neuroticism which could be considered a fault because Neuroticism is strongly predictive of many negative outcomes (Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 2014). The other factors of the MBTI are accounted for in the FFM, but captures additional variance above and beyond the MBTI. Validity and universality of the Five-factor model is another question but, briefly, it is empirically derived from factor analysis of the entire English dictionary (lexical approach) a factor structure which has been replicated in over 40 languages (McCrae & Costa, 2008).

                                **References**

Barlow, D. H., Sauer-Zavala, S., Carl, J. R., Bullis, J. R., & Ellard, K. K. (2014). The Nature, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Neuroticism: Back to the Future . Clinical Psychological Science , 2 (3 ), 344–365.

McCrae, R. R., & Costa Jr., P. T. (1989). Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator From the Perspective of the Five-Factor Model of Personality. Journal of Personality, 57(1), 17–40.(https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Paul_Costa3/publication/20447534_Reinterpreting_the_Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator_From_the_Perspective_of_the_Five-Factor_Model_of_Personality/links/00b49515b9ad847e86000000.pdf)

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (2008). Empirical and Theoretical Status of the Five-Factor Model of Personality Traits. The SAGE Handbook of Personality Theory and Assessment: Volume 1 — Personality Theories and Models. SAGE Publications Ltd (pp. 273–295).


Can an individual having strong identity associations with groups be used to infer anything about them?

Social Categorization Theory

From a social psychology perspective Social Categorization Theory (Haslam, Jetten, Postmes & Haslam, 2009) might be of interest to you. SCT states that self-categorization varies with different social contexts and leads to a depersonalisation in the sense that an individual is less likely to perceive himself as independent but rather as belonging to a group. This self-categorization then leads to group behaviour. SCT has been applied to many different areas. With regard to your question I think the relations of SCT and Perceived Threat (Steele, 1997) are relevant.

SCT and Perceived Threat

Perceived Threat occurs in situations where performance matters and refers to a process in which a member of a stereotyped group is threatened by the perception that other persons perceive him based on that (negative) stereotype. The Perceived Threat leads to stress, which in turn negatively affects performance. The theory has been used to account for the difference in cognitive ability tests between african americans and white people (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn & Steele, 2001). The authors found that, under a high threat condition, african americans had greater blood pressure and lower test scores than white participants. There was no difference in blood pressure or test scores under a low threat condition.

The theory has also been used to demonstrate negative effects of stereotype against women (Von Hippel, Issa, Ma & Stokes, 2010) and older men (Von Hippel, Kalokerinos & Henry, 2012).

References

Blascovich, Jim, Steven J. Spencer, Diane Quinn, und Claude Steele (2001). African Americans and high blood pressure: The role of stereotype threat. Psychological Science, 12, 225–229.

Haslam, S. Alexander, Jolanda Jetten, Tom Postmes, und Catherine Haslam (2009). Social identity, health and well-being: An emerging agenda for applied psychology. Applied Psychology 58, 1–23.

Steele, Claude M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. American Psychologist, 52, 613–629.

Von Hippel, Courtney, Mona Issa, Roslyn Ma, und Abby Stokes (2011). Stereotype threat: Antecedents and consequences for working women. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 151–161.

Von Hippel, Courtney, Elise K. Kalokerinos, und Julie D. Henry (2012). Stereotype Threat Among Older Employees: Relationship With Job Attitudes and Turnover Intentions.


How to assess participant awareness of experimental deception without inducing awareness?

Procedures like this are often called "funnel debriefing" procedures, and they basically consist of an extended version of what you already had in mind.

You begin with some very general questions about the nature of the experiment (e.g., "Do you have any initial thoughts or reactions about this experiment?"), then move on to some questions that are slightly more specific, but still not fully revealing (e.g., "Why do you think we showed you X?", "Did you notice anything unusual or inconsistent about task Y in the experiment?"), and finally terminate with direct inquiries of awareness (e.g., "Did you notice that we swapped one of the images during task Y?").

These questions may or may not be accompanied by recall or recognition tasks where awareness is gauged through participants' performance on the memory task.

Unfortunately there is typically little or no standardization (at least that I have seen) of how extensive these procedures should be, or for how to score and otherwise handle the results.


Should always selecting the same response on the IOWA Gambling Test result in a good value?

In the standard version of the task there are "good" decks (overall positive payoff) and "bad" decks (overall negative payoff), so the optimal strategy is to figure out which ones are the good decks and stick with those. In principle, which deck is which should be randomized, but I don't know if your version implements that. There are also many variations that manipulate amount of gain/loss (e.g., rare big gains vs. consistent small gains) or change the payoffs in the middle, so the optimal strategy can vary.


Can someone move into cognitive science from a linguistic or philosophical background?

It is common for psychology departments to have a cognitive specialization available at the graduate level.  At the undergrad level, I would expect to be forced to choose between psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, or something else. That is, cognitive science does not include philosophy or computer science by most academic systems for demarcating scientific domains. In scientific reality, all these domains bleed into one another of course, but you can probably expect to have to choose among them for any degree program. One can often pursue interdisciplinary study to some extent too (e.g., double-major, minor, or have two graduate advisors).

It is not unheard of to approach any degree from any other degree / background as far as I'm aware. Of course it's less likely for a creative writing major to apply for an organic chemistry doctoral program as compared to a biology major, but that's not to say either option is impossible. I don't think it would be exceptionally difficult to transition into a cognitive science from a philosophy background, and I imagine it would be easier still to transition from linguistics to psychology or neuroscience, but it's probably the easiest to stick with a single degree program the whole way. Easiest is not necessarily best, of course.

Consider how competitive you can be for each program, and compare with how badly you want to pursue each and what the world needs most from you. Consider what career options are for each, and which suits you best. Travel into the future and ask your future self what choices you regret...No other method is foolproof, unfortunately. Fortunately, career change is always an option, if not always easy.


How can surprise be labelled conscious when mismatch negativity shows that surprise takes place earlier than conscious states?

As often in this area, the problem seems to be entirely created by confusions about definitions and terminology and the difficulties resulting from the use of common-sense concepts like “surprise” in scientific theories. One answer would be “Why not?” Basically you seem to object to the definition of surprise used by some theorists but definitions are neither true or false, they are merely common or unusual, and useful or not. Emotions in particular have received so many definitions that there isn't much of a basis to claim any particular one as the “correct” one anymore. Those theorists are just talking about something else than mismatch negativity, it's as simple as that.

Obviously there is a such a thing as being consciously surprised and we have a word for it: “surprise”. There is no way around that without redefining the word to something unrecognizable to most speakers of the English language. It's only with a way to clearly distinguish (1) physiological processes (2) cognitive processes and (3) subjective experiences that we can begin to explore the relationship between them, describe the physiological underpinnings of surprise and account for the experience as such. This experience is a basic fact that you can always “define away” from the scope of your interest but would still need to be explained. Said differently, the “labeling” process is an interesting object of study in itself, whether or not you are prepared to include it in the definition of surprise or want to define emotion through, say, autonomic activation.

If you just assume “surprise” to mean “mismatch negativity”, what you have is neither an empirical finding nor an interesting theory of the conscious experience of surprise. You have just deprived yourself of the ability to clearly speak about the core phenomenon of surprise. In my view, interesting questions to ask would therefore be “What reason is there to conflate surprise with mismatch negativity (or, for that matter, any other brain process)?” or “To what extent does our experience of surprise coincide/follow from mismatch negativity?”


Any studies on lack of imagination and creativity?

Personality and individual differences research has a range of constructs that relate to what you are talking about:

conservatism or fear of uncertainty seems relevant
Low levels of openness to experience

You seem to describing a "type" of individual. However, a multidimensional continuous approach is probably a better model of individual differences. For example, you describe a person with low intelligence (i.e., concrete thinking, low abstract reasoning). However, from memory intelligence and traits like openness only correlate weakly if at all.
Thus, the characteristics you describe don't necessarily go together.
What you seem to be describing is a stereotype, which probably has a poor match to reality where people tend to vary on a range of factors. Sure you can probably point to some point who fit the type, but there will be plenty more than only reflect some of those characteristics.

With regards to a person's main desires being protection of self and family both physically and financially, this sounds like a description of a lot of people. There are plenty of motivational theories and evolutionary models of human psychology which would reinforce such motives as very important to people.


Is it established that personal success or happiness is primarily determined by personality and is largely independent of social identities?

This seems to me the old nature versus nurture debate and there is no real answer to this. However, I highly doubt that it is personality (as an inherent trait of you - nature) that's the most important factor for personal success. The question is what shapes your personality.

Family matters a lot, so building your personality over the right type of Childhood experiences seems to have strong effects on personal performance.

Yet, even such mundane things like names can have a huge impact on personal success regarding job oppurtunities.


How does Kohlberg's moral reasoning work, can I measure it myself?

That can't be answered with one particular stage because:

  Another criticism of Kohlberg’s theory is that people frequently demonstrate significant inconsistency in their moral judgements.[26] This often occurs in moral dilemmas involving drinking and driving and business situations where participants have been shown to reason at a subpar stage, typically using more self-interest driven reasoning (i.e. stage two) than authority and social order obedience driven reasoning (i.e. stage four).[26][27] Kohlberg’s theory is generally considered to be incompatible with inconsistencies in moral reasoning. [...]  Krebs and Denton have also attempted to modify Kohlberg’s theory to account for a multitude of conflicting findings, but eventually concluded that the theory is not equipped to take into consideration how most individuals make moral decisions in their everyday lives.

Having said that Wikipedia also mentions that some tests have been developed based on Kohlberg’s theory anyway, e.g. DIT (presumably averaging reasoning over a number questions), so you could try to take some of those tests.

As far as I can tell from their description(s), the DIT tests only involve abstractly reasoning about some scenarios that don't involve sellf-interest of the test-taker, so they don't quite seem to address the criticism, and they probably won't capture your exceptions in that area either, e.g "My happiness is often more valuable than other's". Krebs and Denton found that self-serving bias affects most people when it comes to moral judgements:

  Self-serving biases. In contrast to the third-person moral judgments
  evoked by Kohlberg’s test, most real-life moral judgments are made in the first person and second person. As examples,
  people say such things as “I was wrong; I should never have done
  that” and “You should do your share.” Krebs and Laird (1998)
  found that first-person moral judgments made by participants
  about transgressions they had committed were significantly more
  lenient than the third-person judgments they made about transgressions
  committed by others, especially when others’ transgressions
  were committed against them


Are Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development supported by empirical evidence?

Kohlberg constucted his stages of moral development using a sample consisting of 72 boys from Chicago. The sample consisted of three age groups: 10, 13 and 16 years. This was also the start for a 30-year long lasting longitudinal study to test his theory (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1983). The results generally support the theory. Younger children are classified as belonging to the lower stages, older children as belonging to the higher stages of moral development. Differences between stages become smaller as one goes up the hierarchy. Also, age differences between stages become smaller with higher stages.

But there also appears to be some criticism. First, there were only few subjects in some of the age groups of the study. Second, apparently Kohlberg has quite often revised his theory and reformulated the descriptions for the stages, and it is not always clear which version was used for testing. Some critics have therefore argued that Kohlberg has "immunized" his theory against falsification. This point also has to do with criticism regarding the assesment of the moral stage, which was done using the Standard Issue Moral Judgement Test, an interview developed by Kohlberg.

Everything I have said so far is taken from Heidbrink (1991), who has tested the theory using a different test, the Morals Judgment Test by Lind. His study supports Kohlbergs's stages. Among over 1000 subjects between ages 14-29, only two showed a pattern that is not consistent with the theory.

In a re-analysis of a study from 1913 – 45 years before Kohlberg's first relevant publication and thus free of the suspicion of having jumped on the "Kohlberg bandwagon" –, Heidbrink (1989) finds that the results conform to those of Colby & Kohlberg's longitudinal study (1987). He concludes that the fact that American adolescents of the 1950s and 60s show the same moral development as pupils from Berlin before the First World War supports Kohlberg's hypothesis of the universal validity of his stages of moral development.

If you want to go further, the Wikipedia article on Kohlberg's stages has a long list of references that you can look at. Probably some of those review the relevant research. Also try to input Kohlberg's own articles or books into Google Scholar and click the "Cited by" link to see which other articles deal with this theory, there will be empirical studies among those.

After collecting all the information to answer your question, I have to say that I am also a bit surprised about the example chosen to describe stage one. The example caters to very young children, while youngest boys in Kohlberg's study were 10 years old. Maybe we shouldn't focus too much on this example. Right off the bat I don't have a better example, but I could imagine there is one.

References:

I used German publications. If someone has English references, please help me out here.

Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J., & Lieberman, M. (1983). A longitudinal study of moral judgment. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 48 (Serial No. 200), 1-124. University of Chicago Press.
Heidbrink, H. (1989). Moralpsychologie: Die Reanalyse einer Untersuchung von 1913. Geschichte der Psychologie, 6, 4-9. Available online at http://journals.zpid.de/index.php/GdP/article/view/424/459
Heidbrink, H., & Lück, H. E. (1991). Stufen der Moral: Zur Gültigkeit der kognitiven Entwicklungstheorie Lawrence Kohlbergs. Quintessenz-Verl.